dc.contributor.author | Bingeman, Emily Venita | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-12-15T15:25:59Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-12-15T15:25:59Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-12-15T15:25:59Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/80096 | |
dc.description.abstract | The aim of this dissertation is to build a concept of epistemic responsibility that takes seriously insights from feminist epistemology, addiction studies, and disability theory. I use John Greco’s knowledge-as-achievement account as a starting point, and demonstrate how an ability-centred account such as Greco’s can be undergirded with these insights to create a concept of epistemic responsibility that better captures the complex social and political nature of our epistemic practices.
I begin in Chapter 1 by outlining the contours of the project and making an argument for the importance of projects that create porousness between feminist epistemology and mainstream epistemology. In Chapter 2 I outline five key insights in feminist epistemology that I use both in assessing Greco’s theory and in guiding the reconstruction. I argue that accommodating these insights will require, at a minimum, a thoroughly social/non-individualistic concept of epistemic responsibility.
The strategy that I take to build such a concept is threefold. First, in Chapter 3, I provide a theoretical background of currently existing social/non-individualistic concepts of responsibility that serve to lay a groundwork for my notion of epistemic responsibility. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the work on responsibility, but rather to draw out tools and frameworks that are helpful in thinking through epistemic responsibility. Second, in Chapter 4, I develop an extended analysis of a concrete phenomenon that I take to be a thoroughly social/non-individualistic context of responsibility ascription: responsibility for addiction, or rather for the harms associated with drug use. And finally, in Chapter 5, taking all of the insights and tools that I have gathered in Chapters 2-4, I embark on the project of theory reconstruction. I begin by outlining the strengths and weaknesses in Greco’s theory with respect to the insights I have highlighted. I then bring in disability theory in order to shore up the notion of ability operative in Greco’s account which I argue allows us to better account for the social and political complexities of epistemic practice. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.subject | Epistemology | en_US |
dc.subject | Disability | en_US |
dc.subject | Feminist Epistemology | en_US |
dc.subject | Social Epistemology | en_US |
dc.subject | Addiction | en_US |
dc.subject | Responsibility | en_US |
dc.subject | Epistemic Responsibility | en_US |
dc.subject | Feminist Theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Drug Use | en_US |
dc.subject | Knowledge | en_US |
dc.subject | Ignorance | en_US |
dc.subject | Hermeneutics | en_US |
dc.subject | Ecosystems | en_US |
dc.title | EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY: ON THE RELEVANCE OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY TO MAINSTREAM EPISTEMOLOGY | en_US |
dc.date.defence | 2020-10-30 | |
dc.contributor.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
dc.contributor.degree | Doctor of Philosophy | en_US |
dc.contributor.external-examiner | Heidi Grasswick | en_US |
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinator | Greg Scherkoske | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-reader | Tyler Hildebrand | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-reader | Duncan MacIntosh | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisor | Kirstin Borgerson | en_US |
dc.contributor.ethics-approval | Not Applicable | en_US |
dc.contributor.manuscripts | Not Applicable | en_US |
dc.contributor.copyright-release | Not Applicable | en_US |