dc.contributor.author | Phillips, Donovan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-06T12:16:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-12-06T12:16:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-12-06T12:16:53Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/75011 | |
dc.description.abstract | Propositional attitude ascriptions raise important questions about what constraints a semantic theory for natural languages must accommodate, but ascriptions of “what is said” are thought by some to be semantically uninformative. Where past attempts to defend a semantically robust notion of “what is said” fail to meet several objections raised to them, I provide a way to specify semantic content through ascriptions of “what is said” by focusing on de se ascriptions, or as they are sometimes called: propositional avowals. For those that make such ascriptions, semantic content is fixed by the ascriptive immunity to error that avowals exhibit. The standard objections against a semantically informative notion of “what is said” are avoided by adopting a first-personal stance. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.subject | Metasemantics | en_US |
dc.subject | Semantics | en_US |
dc.subject | Meaning | en_US |
dc.subject | First Person Authority | en_US |
dc.title | Se What You Mean | en_US |
dc.date.defence | 2018-12-07 | |
dc.contributor.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
dc.contributor.degree | Master of Arts | en_US |
dc.contributor.external-examiner | n/a | en_US |
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinator | Greg Scherkoske | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-reader | Duncan MacIntosh | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-reader | Tyler Hildebrand | en_US |
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisor | Michael Hymers | en_US |
dc.contributor.ethics-approval | Not Applicable | en_US |
dc.contributor.manuscripts | Not Applicable | en_US |
dc.contributor.copyright-release | No | en_US |