Gender-Based Violence and the Insecurities of Security:
A Feminist Institutional Analysis of UN Peacekeeping Operations

by

Tegan Belrose

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<u>Dedication</u>

This work is dedicated to all victims of gender-based violence, and to the many people committed to making the world a safer place through peacekeeping operations.

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Abstract

The last thirty years have seen a boom in the number of peacekeeping operations across the globe. This increase can be attributed to a shift in global culture towards humanitarian interventionism. Despite the UN's increased commitment to pursuing peacekeeping as a tool to protect human rights, there is still an overwhelming amount of gender-based violence during operations. This issue prompts the research question of this thesis: Why has the presence of peacekeepers not been a more effective deterrent against sexual and gender-based violence?

This research approaches the above-mentioned question using feminist security theory and feminist institutionalism in an effort to shift peacekeeping into a more multi-dimensional frame. These analytical frameworks are utilized to examine the institution of peacekeeping, its evolution, and the limitations placed on it by the current conditions of the international system in order to prove that current peacekeeping policies are not doing enough to adequately address GBV.

List of Abbreviations Used

UN-DPKO: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EU: European Union

FST: Feminist Security Theory

GBV: Gender-based Violence

ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IO(s): International Organization(s)

IR: International Relations

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

POC: Protection of Civilians

R2P: Responsibility to Protect

TCC(s): Troop Contributing Country/Countries

UN: United Nations

UN-INSTRAW: United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the
Advancement of Women

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction to Research

Gender-based violence has long been used as a weapon of warfare due to the physical and psychological damage it inflicts on some of the most vulnerable members of society. Gender-based violence (GBV) is defined as "violence that targets individuals or groups on the basis of their gender."[1] Included in this are "acts that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm or suffering, the threat of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty."[2] While men are certainly victims of sexual violence in some cases, it is women who are most often the targets of these crimes during times of conflict simply because they are female. Gender-based violence is one of the greatest barriers to gender equality in both war and peace times, but conflict seems to have an exacerbating effect on gendered-violence.

In a 2018 report, UN Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted 19 states that are experiencing high levels of conflict-related sexual violence and GBV.[3] Guterres notes that conflict-related sexual violence does occur in many other areas around the world, but his report only focuses on the cases where verifiable information was present.[4] The report also provides a "list of parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed

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[1] Kaori Izumi, "Gender-Based Violence and Property Grabbing in Africa: Denial of Women's Security and Liberty," in *Gender-Based Violence*, ed. Geraldine Terry and Joanna Hoare (Oxford: Oxfam, 2007), 14.
[2] Ibid, 14.
[3] António Guterres, "Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence," March 23, 2018, https://undocs.org/S/2018/250, 1.
[4] Ibid, 1-2.

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conflict."[5] Named in the list are 47 parties, including both state and non-state actors, seven of which are designated terrorist groups.[6]

The past few decades have seen an increase in peacekeeping operations being deployed to conflict zones across the globe. On the surface the job of a peacekeeper is a simple one: help to maintain the peace while negotiations are ongoing, deliver aid to areas in need, and protect civilians from any violence that might break out, including sexual violence and GBV. Four of the states identified by Guterres (the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Darfur)[7] are currently hosts to UN peacekeeping operations but continue to see high rates of violence against women.[8]

This bring us to the question at the heart of this research: Why has the presence of peacekeepers not been a more effective deterrent against sexual and gender-based violence during peacekeeping operations?

This project attempts to demonstrate that the conditions the UN operates under have created a policy formulation process that does not adequately address the issue of GBV in peacekeeping operations. Werner Jann and Kai Wegrich point to policy formulation as being one of the key stages in their model of the policy cycle. Policy formulation includes "the definition of objective – what should be achieved with the policy – and the consideration of different action alternatives."[9] The end of this stage

[5] Ibid, 33.
[6] Ibid, 2.
[7] Ibid, 2.
[8] "Where We Operate," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed August 1, 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate.
[9] Werner Jann and Kai Wegrich, "Theories of the Policy Cycle," in *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods*, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald Miller, and Mara Sidney (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2007), 48.

results in "problems, proposals, and demands"[10] being converted into programs and plans for action. Policy formulation seems to be a highly structured and straight forward process, but there are arguments that it is actually "a chaotic procedure, dominated by political, practical, and socio-cultural forces."[11] This thesis seeks to support the latter interpretation by illustrating how gender norms play key roles in controlling the policy formulation process of the UN. Relying on the insights of feminist security theory and feminist institutionalism, this thesis will examine the institution of peacekeeping and the limitations placed on it by the current conditions of the international system in order to prove that current peacekeeping policies are not doing enough to adequately address GBV.

When the policy formation process is stuck in a cycle of outdate gender-bias, it creates situations in which peacekeepers are not adequately trained to handle cases of GBV and are trapped under narrow mandates that do not allow them to take the necessary actions to protect civilians. Giving special consideration to the unique needs of women when forming peacekeeping policies and increasing efforts to mainstream a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations will ultimately keep them safer on the ground and help operations run more successfully overall. This thesis also examines the evolution of international intervention, especially for humanitarian reasons, to show that, while the UN attempts to place the protection of human rights above all else, the organization tends to miss the mark when it comes to preventing GBV.

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[10] Ibid, 48.
[11] Rebecca Sutton, "The Policy Process: An Overview," Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, August 1999), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/104749/wp118.pdf, 10.

The fact of the matter is that women are still facing GBV in peacekeeping situations despite reduction efforts. Most of these efforts are focused on creating new policies, but the root of the problem may actually lie in the institutions and the policy formulation processes themselves. If the institutions are relying on male-centred perspectives, they will never be able to offer women adequate protection in the field. For too long civilian women have been overlooked in conflicts because they are not viewed as being central to them. But as stated above, these women are often targeted for sexual violence because of the effects it can have on the society as a whole. They are victims of atrocities and their suffering should not be ignored simply because they are not combatants.

This thesis aims to provide a meaningful contribution to the current body of literature on GBV and peacekeeping. Much of the work on GBV in peacekeeping focuses on acts committed by peacekeepers, not on peacekeepers failing to protect civilians from GBV by combatants. This thesis also approaches the problem differently by using a lens of feminist institutionalism to study the role (or lack thereof) that gender has played in international intervention and the evolution of peacekeeping. Although there is body of literature on both of these subjects, much of it is purely descriptive rather than explanatory or prescriptive.

Analytical Framework and Methodology

This thesis uses feminist security theory (FST) and feminist institutionalism to frame the problem of GBV in peacekeeping operations. FST looks at issues of conflict, peace, and security through a wider lens than most conventional theories do. To FS theorists, security is multi-dimensional and adaptable. According to Eric Blanchard, they

contest the idea of "a perfectly controlled, coherent security policy that could handle every international contingency."[12] Blanchard's work focuses on the erasure of women's issues and challenging conceptions of gender in security discussions. Authors like Christine Sylvester, Ann Tickner, and Judy Pettman also contest traditional constructions of gender and security in their works.[13] Laura Sjoberg maintains that gender is a necessary category for analyzing conflict and security situations.[14] Laura Shepherd agrees with the idea that using gender as a variable can provide valuable insight into the bigger picture of a conflict.[15]

     An FST framework fits well with discussions of gender and security in this day and age because the nature of conflict has drastically changed since the days of traditional IR theories. This thesis uses FST when examining peacekeeping policies related to gender-awareness to determine where the UN is placing its focus when formulating new policies and reforms. By establishing the focal points of the policies, we are able to see which issues are receiving attention and which ones are being ignored. FST also exposes the reality that violations of women's human rights are often secondary considerations for many states during the policy formulation process, which results in policies that do not adequately address GBV.

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[12] Eric M. Blanchard, "Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory," *Signs* 28, no. 4 (2003): 1289–1312, https://doi.org/10.1086/368328, 1290.

[13] Christine Sylvester, "Riding the Hyphens of Feminism, Peace, and Place in Four-(or More) Part Cacophony," *Women's Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 3/4 (1995): 136–46, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40003507, 137.
J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 28.
Jan Pettman, *Worlding Women a Feminist International Politics* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1996), http://ezproxy.acadiau.ca:2048/login?url=http://www.myilibrary.com?id=26840, 158.

[14] Laura Sjoberg, *Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 46.

[15] Laura J. Shepherd, "Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies," *Political Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 208–19, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2009.00180.x, 217.

This thesis also employs feminist institutionalism to approach the issue of GBV in peacekeeping. The feminist institutionalist approach "critiques and seeks to overcome the gender blindness of existing scholarship in the field…and to move the research agenda towards questions about the interplay between gender and the operation and effect of political institutions."[16] Feminist institutionalist scholars are not only concerned with the current gender dynamics of institutions, but also how institutions can be changed and improved upon.[17] Jennifer Thomson says that traditional institutional frameworks have been more preoccupied with the continuity of institutions and often present a static picture of them, rather than providing explanations for why changes are occurring or not occurring.[18] Feminist institutionalism, on the other hand, is highly interested in the "resistance, reproduction, and obstruction of positive change around gender issues in institutions."[19]

Georgina Waylen explains that the general approach and underlying assumptions of historical institutionalism make it much more open to integrating gender into its framework than other traditional institutional theories.[20] The use of historical institutionalism's tenets and methods, when combined with feminist approaches, can help answer some of the key questions, such as "how certain institutions and regimes are gendered, how they came into being, and how change can come about."[21] Waylen also

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[16] Fiona Mackay, Meryl Kenny, and Louise Chappell, "New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism?," *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 31, no. 5 (2010), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20869824, 574.

[17] Ibid, 582.

[18] Jennifer Thomson, "Resisting Gendered Change: Feminist Institutionalism and Critical Actors," *International Political Science Review* 39, no. 2 (March 1, 2018): 178–91, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116677844, 180.

[19] Ibid, 178.

[20] Georgina Waylen, "What Can Historical Institutionalism Offer Feminist Institutionalists?," *Politics & Gender* 5, no. 2 (June 2009): 245–53, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X09000191, 246.

[21] Ibid, 246.

tells us that institutional analysis can be improved upon by incorporating gender dynamics, as this reveals new power dynamics between the actors within the institution.[22] Despite Waylen's support for combining historical and feminist institutionalism, she advises that tools such as critical junctures and path dependency be used cautiously so scholars do not begin to obscure ongoing political happenings or fall prey to over-determinism.[23]

Since the main question of this thesis revolves around the issue of gender in peacekeeping policies, it is important to look at the concept of peacekeeping as an institution itself. Feminist institutionalism is used to study both formal, tangible organizations and informal, intangible concepts. According to Sven Stienmo, both formal and informal institutions are important in the field of politics because "they shape who participates in a given decision, and simultaneously, their strategic behavior."[24] In the UN, peacekeeping is a formal institution; it is controlled by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO). However, there is also the broader concept of peacekeeping, which, while intangible, is where norms developed and were adopted by states and the UN. These norms then went on to set the rules and operating procedures of the UNSC and the UN-DPKO and made UN peacekeeping operations into what they are today. Orfeo Fioretos makes a case of the usefulness of the approach to IR. Many of the processes and characteristics commonly found in IR are central to historical institutionalism, including "the legacies of founding

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[22] Louise Chappell and Georgina Waylen, "Gender and the Hidden Life of Institutions," *Public Administration* 91, no. 3 (2013): 599–615, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.02104.x.
[23] Waylen, "What Can Historical Institutionalism Offer," 248.
[24] Sven Stienmo, "Historical Institutionalism," in *Approaches to Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 124.

moments in shaping long-term power relations and whether new ideas become consequential, the ubiquity of unintended consequences, and especially the prevalence of incremental reform over stasis and fundamental transformations."[25]

An analysis utilizing a feminist institutional approach will help to dissect the broader institution of peacekeeping and the practices that have developed out of the existing norms. Historical institutionalism will be also be used to study the evolution of peacekeeping and how the purpose and methods of operations has changed over time. The Bosnian War will be examined as a "critical juncture"[26] in this evolution. This juncture represents a time when a major shift was taking place in the greater global culture; from cross border conflicts against the backdrop of the Cold War to humanitarian interventions in civil conflicts. The UN was trying to make a fundamental shift within itself to match the international system, but resistance to change from major member states and from the organization itself prevented this from happening when it was most needed. The Bosnian case played an important role in the evolution of peacekeeping. The impact on international law, as well as the failures to protect civilians, changed how peacekeeping operations are carried out and helped to shift the perspective to a more humanitarian approach. The case also illustrates how the most powerful states in the international system can control how operations are executed. Although the Bosnian peacekeeping operations ceased many years ago, the available body of information is

[25] Orfeo Fioretos, "Historical Institutionalism in International Relations," *International Organization* 65, no. 2 (2011): 367–99, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23016816, 369.
[26] Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath, *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills* (Oxford University Press, 2017), 155-156.

much larger and more complete than many other cases, which allows for us to draw important insights into current operations.[27]

The combined FST, feminist institutional and historical institutional approaches will show that norms in the wider global culture surrounding women and gendered-issues have prevented GBV from being the main focus in international interventions and peacekeeping operations. The feminist institutional lens plays a key role in this research by helping to identify instances of gender blindness that other approaches may overlook. Since this is also a core tenet of FST, the two approaches complement each other very well in this project. As discussed above, feminist institutionalism and historical institutionalism work well in concert together as the former can improve upon the latter by incorporating gender analysis into the processes of identifying path dependency and critical junctures.

This project will be combining a feminist institutional analysis and a review of past literature on the subject, including primary and secondary documents. The literature review will provide a basis of knowledge on the work that has already been done in this field and on this particular topic. There are a variety of scholarly journals and books that cover matters of peacekeeping, security, and women's issues, which can be used to gain further understanding of these areas. Secondary documents will include key UNSC resolutions, the Beijing Declaration, and reports from high-level panels conducted by UN bodies. Feminist theories, and FST in particular, have grown in popularity within the last few decades and there is now a substantial body of literature on the subject. This

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[27] Ibid, 156.

approach centers women's issues in the forefront of the analysis and can shed light on places where women have previously been erased or ignored.

Thesis Preview

Chapter 2 of this thesis will reflect on and evaluate past literature on the subject at hand. This chapter will present an overview of feminism in IR, as well as a slightly more in depth look at FST and feminist institutionalism. Ultimately, the literature review will provide a knowledge base of what work has already been done in the fields of peacekeeping and feminism.

Chapter 3 will being by covering noteworthy UN policies on women and security before moving on to examine the evolution of peacekeeping practices and how the goal of peacekeeping operations has shifted over the years. The peacekeeping operations carried out during the Bosnian War will be used as a reference point to explore and illustrate the major shift that has taken place in peacekeeping over time. This war saw an overwhelming amount of GBV due to the fact that it is an extremely powerful weapon during ethnic conflicts. The Bosnian War operations also show how peacekeepers have failed to protect women from continued GBV due to policy failures and narrow mandates. Chapter 4 will then assess the various limitations that peacekeeping operations face due to the conditions of the international system and the structure of the UN. This will be followed by a section of recommendations for the inclusion of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. Finally, chapter 5 will summarize the main conclusions of the thesis. There will also be a discussion of the limitations that were encountered in this research and the potential practical applications of the findings.

Chapter 2: International Relations, Feminist Security Theory, and Institutional Feminism

Introduction

Feminism has been an important part of political science discussions since the early 20th century. As feminist theories evolved and grew in popularity, they were gradually integrated with other existing schools of thought, including IR theories. Feminist approaches provide scholars with a perspective to problems that differs from more traditional theories, which are often agendered and rooted in patriarchal origins. This new perspective removes gender blindness from the problem-solving equation and allows for issues specifically pertaining to women to come to the surface.

The first section of this chapter provides an overview of how feminist theories are utilized in the field of IR. The second and third sections delve into the main tenets of FST and feminist institutionalism. These approaches, and the unique perspectives they offer us, are the foundation of the research in this thesis.

Constructing Women in International Relations

There exists an infinite number of ways to be masculine or feminine, but in order to define what exactly is masculine we must first define what is feminine, or in other words, what is not masculine.[28] Gender dichotomies structure how we think about and interact with the world around us. Whether the dichotomies are true or false does not matter.[29] Notions of what is masculine or feminine are heavily ingrained into our brains

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[28] Claire Duncanson, "Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peacekeeping Operations," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 11, no. 1 (2009): 63–80, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1080/14616740802567808, 64.
[29] Ibid, 67.

from the time we are young, and they influence many of our everyday activities and interactions with other people.

The military is a key place where masculinity and femininity are defined; behavior seen as feminine is discouraged while masculine actions are praised.[30] Peacekeeping operations can present soldiers with a confusing contradiction. Soldiers are trained to be physically and emotionally strong, but when engaged in peacekeeping activities they are faced with situations that require a gentler approach, especially when dealing with traumatized civilians.[31]

Claire Duncanson's work examines firsthand accounts of male peacekeepers and uncovers two main themes related to gender. The first theme is a feeling of frustration at being part of the operation due to the viewpoint that peacekeeping is less masculine than "real fighting."[32] The second theme involves attempts to position peacekeeping as a masculine activity because it often includes protecting defenseless women and children.[33] The latter theme reflects a more traditional discourse of peacekeeping in which peacekeepers, usually white men, were seen as heroes that were needed to save the vulnerable civilian population. In turn, the civilians are seen as being weak because they cannot protect themselves, which leads to them also being viewed as inferior or feminine.[34] Women in conflict situations are often still seen as simply being mothers or caregivers. Constructions of women and femininity that are created during conflicts are

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[30] Ibid, 65.
[31] Ibid, 65.
[32] Ibid, 68.
[33] Ibid, 68.
[34] Ibid, 68.

problematic because they continue to disregard what role women actually fulfill and perpetuate traditional stereotypes.[35]

Feminism has a long history as both a social movement and a critical theory of politics. But as previously mentioned, feminist work did not become prominent in IR until many decades after the establishment of the field. The advent of postmodern feminism in the 1990s drew feminist scholars into the spotlight and began a process of gender analysis in earnest. Some of the most influential feminist IR literature, including works on women in conflict, were produced in this era.

Judith Ann Tickner criticizes the worldview of classical realists like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz who gender the state, and thereby all of its activities in the international system, as male.[36] Realists also view the state as being a rational actor which forms links between men and rationality, and women and irrationality.[37] These false associations have led to the belief that only men are suited for positions of political leadership because women lack the proper mentality and temperament for them. Cynthia Enloe tackles the issue of women's erasure in high politics from a slightly different angle. While Tickner explains why women might be completely absent from some political spheres, Enloe seeks to explain how women who are working in those spheres get ignored by their male counterparts. When women get involved in policy making, they often ask questions about issues that are crucial to women's lives, but that seem trivial to

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[35] Ibid, 71.
[36] Tickner, 29.
[37] Ibid, 42.

men.[38] So it is possible for women to hold positions in policy making, but they cannot always exercise their power because their contributions are dismissed.

Recent decades have seen a fairly steady increase in the number of women in national legislatures, cabinet positions, and other high-level political offices that were traditionally reserved for men. This increase has been viewed as a huge step forward in movements for the empowerment of women, but it does not come without its critics. Marie E. Berry argues that we cannot define women's power simply by their access to rights or resources, but rather by their ability to control these things.[39] While women may have legal, political, and economic rights on paper, the barriers of patriarchal societies may still restrict them from fully controlling those rights.[40] Enloe believes that the inclusion of women in politics can sometimes be seen as an action of "abstract do-gooding"[41] rather than a genuine effort to gain a female perspective. Some countries have created quotas designed to ensure that at least a certain percentage of the national legislature is female. When women are asked to participate in politics, they are often pigeonholed into positions by men instead of being allowed to exercise their own agency in defining their roles and issues.[42]

The issue of women's agency is an important one in IR, especially in conflict situations. The world is full of false dichotomies surrounding gender norms. Men are associated with violence while women are associated with peace. Men are masculine

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[38] Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches & Bases : Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, 1st U.S. ed.. ed. (Berkeley: Berkeley : University of California Press, 1990), 4.
[39] Marie E. Berry, "When 'Bright Futures' Fade: Paradoxes of Women's Empowerment in Rwanda," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 41, no. 1 (September 2015): 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1086/681899, 5.
[40] Ibid, 5.
[41] Ibid, 15.
[42] Ibid, 15.

because they do not shy away from danger; in contrast to women who are vulnerable to danger, which makes them feminine.[43] These generalizations ignore the fact that many women are directly involved in conflict situations and have been for decades. Women are not simply mothers, housekeepers, and caregivers, and to portray them as such erases them from conflict narratives. Christine Sylvester says that depicting women as one-dimensional figures who only exist inside the family home robs them of their agency to determine their own roles and tell their own stories.[44] These dichotomies and generalizations are harmful to women and feminist movements as a whole. If women are not able to express their perspectives on conflict, how can policy makers possibly create strategies and programs that will adequately address their unique issues?

Feminist Security Theory

Feminist studies of conflict have grown in popularity as the nature of conflict in the international system continues to change. Traditionally, IR scholars have not dealt with women as a separate group. Though the feminist movements of recent decades have pushed women's issues and gendered issues into the foreground of some areas, the nuances of gendered analysis are still largely misunderstood in the field of IR.[45]

According to Laura Sjoberg, "feminist work sees gender as an intersubjective construct in global politics and therefore a necessary analytical category for the study of war."[46] Still, other IR scholars refuse to examine gender as its own variable in their

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[43] Cynthia H. Enloe, *The Morning After : Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: Berkeley : University of California Press, 1993), 15.
[44] Sylvester, "Riding the Hyphens of Feminism," 137.
[45] Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, "Introduction," in *Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices*, eds. Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), 10-29.
[46] Sjoberg, 46.

research. But Laura Shepherd says that doing so limits their access to the vital insights that gender analysis can provide.[47] Though it is largely understood amongst feminist scholars that there needs to be a change in the policy formulation process to better address women's issues, some of them still miss out on the idea that there needs to be a change in how research in IR is actually conducted. Using gender as a unique variable helps to extend the scope of feminism with the discipline[48] and provide scholars with a deeper understanding of gendered practices and behaviors.

Feminists define concepts like peace and security in broad, multi-dimensional terms that seek to eliminate all forms of social hierarchies that lead to political and economic inequalities between men and women.[49] The field has grown and expanded over the years in order to tackle the vast number of complex issues involving gender. Since the end of the Cold War, the role of women in conflict situations has been a steadily growing interest area for scholars. Out of this interest came the development of feminist security theory. The chief goal of FST is to further expand upon traditional IR definitions of security and conflict. It is important to note that many feminists view military security as contrary to individual human security,[50] especially for vulnerable groups such as women. According to Jacqui True, "emphasizing the need for "defense" legitimizes a militarized social order that valorizes the use of violence by either state or non-state actors."[51] When the culture of the international system leans towards the use of

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[47] Shepherd, 217.
[48] Ibid, 218.
[49] Jacqui True, "The Unfulfilled Mandate - Gender Mainstreaming and UN Peace Operations Politics & Diplomacy," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, no. 1 (2009): 41–50. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/geojaf10&i=41, 42.
[50] Ibid, 43.
[51] Ibid, 43.

force to resolve disputes, women will always find themselves getting caught in the crossfire and bearing the brunt of the social, political, and economic fallout of conflicts.

Eric Blanchard divides FST into four major theoretical movements. First, FS theorists expose the tendency of policy makers to erase women from international security matters.[52] Women are often left out of these discussions because conflict, like most areas of IR, is centered in the male perspective using male-stream language.[53] Since the field was developed by men, IR is based largely on male experiences, which makes it difficult to imagine women occupying the same spaces but in their own unique ways.

The second FST movement is to question the extent to which the state is able to provide adequate protection for women in both wartime and peacetime.[54] This viewpoint contests traditional conceptions of security and violence. Jan Pettman offers conventional definitions of war and political violence:

> War involves sustained, large-scale and politically directed violence, often between states, though frequently involving anti-state forces from within the borders. Political violence is broader; it includes state terror enacted by state agents or vigilante gangs with state complicity, for example, directed against all or parts of the state's own population.[55]

These definitions fail to make any mention of the additional issues in the private sphere that are exacerbated by conflict. It has been shown that women are disproportionately affected by problems like poverty, food scarcity, unattainability of proper medical care, and lack of access to education. FS theorists advocate for increased

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[52] Blanchard, 1290.
[53] Janet Siltanen and Michelle Stanworth, "The Politics of Private Woman and Public Man," *Theory and Society* 13, no. 1 (1984), 91-118. https://www.jstor.org/stable/657166.
[54] Blanchard, 1290.
[55] Pettman, 153.

"interconnectedness of poverty, environmental degradation, gross social inequality, exploitation, militarisation, and violence."[56]

The third movement rejects discourses where women are unreflectively connected to peace, and pushes for an acknowledgement of the "participation, support, and inspiration women have given to war making"[57] as well as peace-building. Buying into the assumption that all women are peaceful ignores the fact that many women play crucial roles during conflicts as combatants and logistical supporters. There is also an imbalance of narrators of conflict stories. Men are more readily listened to because they are usually the ones on the front lines of the conflict.[58] This once again erases the unique experiences of female combatants, but it also ignores the struggles that civilian women face when living in or around conflict zones.

Closely related to this is the fourth FST movement, which tries to challenge the belief that 'gendered security practices' are only meant for women by creating variegated concepts of masculinity to help explain security in new ways.[59] FS theorists attempt to frame masculinity in new ways in order to explain that there are many different ways to be "manly" without being considered a woman. Overall, FST analysis can benefit both men and women by changing traditional discourses and breaking apart false dichotomies of gender.

Using an FST approach when exploring peacekeeping shifts the analysis away from a traditional male perspective and towards a female perspective. It allows for us to

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[56] Ibid, 158.
[57] Blanchard, 1290.
[58] Christine Sylvester, "Contending with Women and War," *Politics & Gender* 11, no. 3 (2015), 586-595. doi:10.1017/S1743923X15000343, 587.
[59] Blanchard, 1290.

better understand the far-reaching effects of conflict on society away from the front lines, especially in civil conflicts where these lines are not always clearly demarcated. This helps to redefine security as being not only physical, but also social, political, and economical. By examining the policy formulation process through an FST lens, we are able to see whether the issue of GBV is being included in policy discussions or if it is being neglected. In this thesis, FST is used to illustrate how powerful states place other considerations before human rights violations and do not always deem the suffering of women to be sufficient grounds for intervention, as seen in the Bosnian context. It also helps to shed light upon the difficulties the UN faces in implementing gender mainstreaming policies and how this situation may be remedied, which will aid peacekeepers in preventing and handling cases of GBV.

Feminist Institutionalism

For Louise Chappell, one of the key aspects of new institutional approaches such as feminist institutionalism is the notion of "institutional dynamism."[60] The concept of institutional dynamism suggests that institutions are not fixed, permanent entities; they simply tend towards stability through path dependency.[61] Changes, when they do come about, are introduced through incremental or evolutionary processes.[62]

The greatest opportunities for innovation in institutions happen during times of extensive restructuring, according to Fiona Mackay.[63] Those looking to reform

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[60] Louise Chappell, "Comparing Political Institutions: Revealing the Gendered 'Logic of Appropriateness' | Politics & Gender | Cambridge Core," *Politics & Gender* 2, no. 2 (June 2006): 221–63, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X06221044, 230.
[61] Ibid, 230.
[62] Ibid, 230.
[63] Fiona Mackay, "Nested Newness, Institutional Innovation, and the Gendered Limits of Change," *Politics & Gender* 10, no. 4 (December 2014): 549–71, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/10.1017/S1743923X14000415, 249.

institutions must take advantage of the permissive stage of the reformation process in order to lock in the elements of rules and policies that will promote women and gender equality.[64] Mackay refers to this process as "nested newness", which she defines as "a metaphor used to capture the ways in which the new is embedded in time, sequence, and its institutional environment."[65] In other words, institutions are heavily defined by their pasts, no matter how far they may have departed from their origins. Because of this, periods of extensive restructuring present the best opportunities for innovation. Reformers must take advantage of these "permissive stages" if they want elements that promote women and gender equality to fully take root in an institution's foundations.[66]

The process of slow but sure institutional dynamism can be seen when looking at how the UN has approached gender issues. As covered earlier in this chapter, the UN has proposed and adopted many new strategies for tackling gender issues over the years. But the implementation of those plans has often been slow going and has even completely stalled in some cases. The 1990's saw a flood of new policies on women's rights and gender equality, which coincided with the Bosnian War and its accompanying peacekeeping operation. The failure of the UN member states to take a harder stance on GBV and adequately implement measures to protect women shows that the institution was creeping towards change, but ultimately continued to trend towards the path laid out for it at its founding. Here is where the concept of nested newness could have come into play. The breakdown of the Bosnian peacekeeping operation, coupled with other peacekeeping disasters of the decade, presented the UN with a perfect opportunity for a

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[64] Ibid, 249.
[65] Ibid, 249.
[66] Ibid, 549.

large-scale restructuring of the institution. However, the UN did not effectively seize this moment. The UN has never made any real attempts to broadly restructure itself in a manner that would change the underlying patriarchal culture that has been ingrained in the institution since its establishment. Despite the heavy hand of path dependence, it is possible for institutions to undergo broad cultural changes if reformers properly capitalize on the restructuring periods. Taking advantage of these rare moments of broad institutional reform may be the only way institutions can fight against path dependency and create large-scale changes in their underlying cultures.

Georgina Waylen and co-author Louise Chappell explain that one of the principles of feminist institutionalism is the acknowledgement of gender regimes, which provides greater insight into the power dimensions that institutions are built upon.[67] This insight highlights the asymmetry of power relations within institutions and the negative impacts it can have on women. According to Chappell and Waylen, "entrenched gender stereotypes and control of political resources have worked to privilege (certain) men and disadvantage most women."[68] When examining an institution, scholars need to ask themselves a series of important questions. What are the resources being dealt with here? Who is in charge of distributing them? How are they being distributed? The answers to these questions can reveal significant information about the power dynamics and gender regimes of the institution.

Aside from the implementation of new gender norms, activists and scholars are seeking more formal recognition for a variety of issues related to sexual violence and GBV: for sex crimes to be considered *jus cogens* so they cannot be amnestied and can be

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[67] Mackay, "Nested Newness, Institutional Innovation, and the Gendered Limits of Change."
[68] Ibid, 602.

tried anywhere; gender equality under the law even in societies that traditionally favor

men; the creation of laws that make forced and 'parental-sanctioned' prostitution crimes

against humanity; the implementation of services to aid trauma victims; for reparations to

be paid to female victims by individual actors, corporations, and states when applicable.[69]

UN agencies have played a crucial role in pushing women's issues to the forefront

of international politics by setting standards for gender equality and producing numerous

publications on the relationship between gender and development, economics, and the

environment.[70] According to Sophie Bessis, the UN fully understands that it is impossible

for any project to be gender neutral.[71] This certainly appears to be true considering the

vast amount of work the organization has done on gender issues, especially in recent

years. But then why are areas such as peacekeeping operations still facing the problem of

gender blindness? Bessis suggests that there are issues in the underlying culture of

institutions:

> In fact, the success of the gender approach—so common as
> to have become a regular part of all bureaucratic
> discourse—may mask a certain resistance at the heart of the
> system to the struggle for women's equal rights and for
> diversification of their roles. The difficulty lies in the
> political impact of gender equality. Institutional discourse
> is often generalizing, such that gender equality is frequently
> mentioned in all material released to the public but rarely
> referred to in internal working documents.[72]

Feminist institutionalism has drawn attention to the gap that exists between the words and

actions of some UN agencies when it comes to gender equality. However, as many

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[69] Henry F. Carey, "'Women and Peace and Security': The Politics of Implementing Gender Sensitivity Norms in Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 2 (June 2001): 49–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310108413895, 64.
[70] Sophie Bessis, "International Organizations and Gender: New Paradigms and Old Habits," *Signs* 29, no. 2 (2004): 633–47, https://doi.org/10.1086/379178, 636.
[71] Ibid, 637.
[72] Ibid, 645.

feminist scholars have explained, surface level changes on their own will not be enough to improve the situation. Broad cultural reforms in IOs are needed in order to make real progress towards gender equality.

Conclusion

Feminist scholars like Judith Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, and Christine Sylvester raised important questions about women in IR and conflict. Their works set the agenda for future scholars to focus on the intricacies of gendered-issues in politics. As we have seen, scholars are concerned with how we conceptualize, understand, and communicate about women's issues in political science. It is clear that the only way to maintain the forward march towards equality is to reevaluate the old assumptions and norms of years past. When discussing the protection of women in conflict situations, we must broaden our understanding of what security really means for them. Using FST and feminist institutionalism in resolving issues of GBV in peacekeeping allows us to see how concepts such as gender and security are constructed. The traditional constructions of gender tell us that women are far away from the fighting during conflicts and are therefore safe and not in need of extra protection. But women are often deeply involved in conflicts now, and even woman who are not combatants are in danger due to the complex nature of civil conflicts. It is only after constructions of women in security are altered to fit the new era of conflict that now exists that scholars and policy makers will be able to fully comprehend the experiences, wants, and needs of women, and integrate them into peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 3: Peacekeeping, GBV, and Institutional Dynamism

Introduction

Before discussing the intricacies of peacekeeping and building as an institution, it is important to understand what "peace" actually is. Peace is often viewed as a straight-forward concept; it is simply the absence of war. But this viewpoint only defines what is known as negative peace, while overlooking positive peace. Positive peace occurs when there is no armed conflict, and the state and its people are prospering.[73] Ibrahim Bangura reminds us that positive and negative peace can be equally important. The absence of positive peace in the wake of a civil conflict is an indication that the root causes of the conflict have not been dealt with.[74] Peacekeeping operations often offer short-term solutions to these problems, but they prove to be inadequate in the long-run and some states later backslide into violence. Accordingly, peacebuilding operations should be considered to be just as important as peacekeeping operations.

From 1948 until 1989, the UNSC authorized only 15 peacekeeping operations, one-third of which involved Israel and the surrounding states.[75] Most of the early peacekeeping operations involved the deployment of armed forces to oversee disputes over sovereign borders.[76] These peacekeeping operations were designed solely to maintain a ceasefire and allow both sides time to negotiate with one another.[77] During

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[73] Ibrahim Bangura, "We Can't Eat Peace: Youth, Sustainable Livelihoods and the Peacebuilding Process in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 11, no. 2 (May 3, 2016): 37–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2016.1181003, 37-38.

[74] Ibid, 38.

[75] Stiehm, "Women, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," 39.

[76] Roland Paris, "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 441–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661030093004, 449.

[77] Gabrielle Simm, *Sex in Peace Operations* (Cambridge: University Press, 2013), https://ezproxy.msvu.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=545027, 26.

this time however, peacekeepers were also occasionally deployed on operations to civil

conflicts in Cold War "hot spots" where the combatant forces were backed by either the

US or the USSR.[78] The limited number of peacekeeping operations over the course of

forty years can be largely attributed to the conflict between the two superpowers of the

day. The other members of the UNSC were hesitant to propose large-scale peacekeeping

actions out of fear that a veto would paralyze the entire peace process.[79]

 The end of the Cold War saw a sharp increase in peacekeeping operations around

the world. In just the first half of the 1990s alone, the UNSC deployed more

peacekeeping operations than it had in the previous four decades combined.[80] As the

balance of power in the international system changed hands, two new types of

peacekeeping operations began to emerge: mediating ongoing civil conflicts and

supervising the implementation of peace accords in post-conflict situations.[81] This shift in

peacekeeping practices reflects the shift in the culture of the international system at the

time. Peacekeeping operations were moving away from traditional interstate conflicts and

into the domestic affairs of states consumed by civil conflicts.[82] As civil conflicts were

becoming much more common, human rights violations were moved to the forefront of

international stage and peacekeeping discussions. But if this shift to protect human rights

was indeed taking place, why was more emphasis not placed on the protection of

women's rights? This latter portion of this chapter will look at the GBV that took place

during the Bosnian War, the decision to intervene in the conflict, and how the aftermath

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[78] Simm, 26.
[79] Ibid, 27.
[80] Ibid, 27.
[81] Paris, "Constraints of Global Culture," 449.
[82] Ibid, 450.

of the war impacted the international system's standpoint on women's rights as human rights.

The Institution of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not explicitly cited in the UN Charter, but considering that the Charter is a somewhat flexible document, some of its articles are up for interpretation. Article 42 states that if the measures laid out in Article 41, which makes provisions for unarmed responses to threats to international security, prove to be inadequate, the UNSC may "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."[83] The ICJ has clarified that Article 42 covers enforcement actions, not peacekeeping operations, but it has failed to identify which article gives the UNSC authority to organize and carry out peacekeeping.[84] There could be a case made that Article 36 grants the UNSC power over peacekeeping. Article 36 states that the UNSC may "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment"[85] in any situation that may threaten international peace. However, the language here is once vague and there are no specifics given as to what these procedures or methods might be.

Due to the lack of particulars in the Charter, peacekeeping has developed its characteristics and norms largely through informal agreements between the UN member states.[86] There are four defining features of peacekeeping according to Kelly Childers.

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[83] "UN Charter (Full Text)," United Nations, April 15, 2016, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.

[84] Kelly A. Childers, "United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan Wars and the Changing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold War World Comment," *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal* 8 (1994): 117–54, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/tclj8&i=123, 119.

[85] "UN Charter."

[86] Childers, 119.

First, the host state must give their consent for a peacekeeping operation to take place.[87]

While this is an important and necessary feature, it can also be detrimental to

peacekeeping operations. In conflicts where the established government is facing rebel

forces, the rebels may view the peacekeepers as an extension of the government rather

than an impartial actor. Peacekeeping operations can become increasingly complicated if

one side of the conflict refuses to work with or abide by the peacekeepers. The second

defining feature is that peacekeepers should only use force in their own self-defense.[88]

There have been questions raised over the extent of this point and whether or not

peacekeepers can or should intervene if they are directly witnessing atrocities. Third,

peacekeeping forces must remain completely impartial and objective.[89] They should not

align themselves to any particular combatant force or become involved in armed

hostilities between forces. The fourth and final feature is that peacekeepers reach their

objectives not through use of force, but rather through mediation, diplomacy, and

negotiation.[90]

      Peacekeeping actually falls under the larger umbrella of peacebuilding processes.

There have been strong links made between modern peacebuilding and western liberal

values; so much so that today's peacebuilding practices are known as 'liberal

peacebuilding.' According to Kristoffer Lidén's definition, liberal peacebuilding refers to

"the overarching objective of building sustainable 'liberal market democracies' that has

framed the operations as an apparently neutral reflection of their political environment in

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[87] Ibid, 119.
[88] Ibid, 119.
[89] Ibid, 119-120.
[90] Ibid, 120.

the post-Cold War era."[91] Lidén says that liberal peacebuilding has fallen off of its pedestal in recent years due to an increase in critiques over the process's methods.

The basis for many arguments made against peacekeeping interventions is that they violate principles of state sovereignty and self-governance.[92] Consent of the host state is usually required for a peacekeeping operation to be carried out, but in extreme cases of human rights violations the UNSC disregards this principle and authorizes an operation anyway.[93] Still, there are some aspects of peacekeeping operations that support this argument: "the transfer of political authority and agency to international agencies; the dependency upon international presence and support that are generated through the introduction of institutions 'from above', and the reliance of economic and political liberalization upon social and cultural change, including the disruption of traditional ways of life."[94] This grey area of state sovereignty and self-governance during peacekeeping operations can potentially create a disconnect[95] that threatens not only the success of individual operations, but overall success of liberal peacebuilding as an institution.

Lidén's outlook on liberal peacebuilding seems pessimistic from his definition, but while he admits that the current methods are flawed, he also argues that the process can be redeemed if policy makers can recognize the ethical and political limitations.[96] Despite his critiques of liberal peacebuilding, Lidén still believes that building peace

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[91] Kristoffer Lidén, "Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 5 (November 1, 2009): 616–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303255, 617.

[92] Ibid, 619.

[93] Gabrielle Simm, *Sex in Peace Operations* (Cambridge: University Press, 2013), https://ezproxy.msvu.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=545027, 27.

[94] Lidén, 619.

[95] Ibid, 619.

[96] Ibid, 631.

between global and local political levels is possible if practitioners can resist "the temptation of exploiting the power asymmetry between these levels for the imposition of a global political agenda,"[97] which has been trending towards the principles of liberal market democracies for many years now.

Roland Paris believes that in recent years the critiques have moved past the point of justified questioning and into the territory of unfounded skepticism.[98] He does admit that liberal peacebuilding operations have had their fair share of shortcomings though: inadequate attention to the health of domestic institutions to ensure successful democratization and market liberalization, lack of acknowledgement of contradictions between peacebuilding goals, absence of will from sponsors to finish tasks they have undertaken, poor strategic coordination amongst involved actors, insufficient commitment of resources, unsettled tensions between military and non-military actors, need for more local ownership of operations, challenges in defining a successful operation, and inadequate strategies for drawing operations to a close.[99] These criticisms have been widely discussed for many years, and for the good reason that they present very real challenges to peacebuilding operations. But recently critics have been questioning more foundational issues in liberal peacebuilding, and it is those claims that Paris is arguing against. In his work, Paris highlights some of the "mistakes" that he believes critics commonly make.

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[97] Ibid, 632.
[98] Roland Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (April 2010): 337–65, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000057, 338.
[99] Ibid, 347.

The first mistake is the conflating of post-conquest and post-settlement peacebuilding, which have different "conditions of birth."[100] Post-conquest operations follow an external invasion of the host state by another actor that carries out peacebuilding activities after they have prevailed in the conflict. Post-settlement operations involve local actors consenting to third-party intervention. Understanding the conditions from which an operation is born is key to understanding the nature of the operation as a whole.

Another mistake is equating liberal peacebuilding with imperialism. There is a similarity between the two as both peacebuilding and imperialism involve a strong external power intervening in a weaker state to refashion the domestic structures, but the resemblance should not be overexaggerated.[101] Imperialism was practiced largely to benefit the colonizing power, often at the expense of material and human resources from the colony while the principal motivation behind peacebuilding operations is to aid and stabilize the host state. Though international missions often reflect the desires of the most powerful states in the system,[102] the extraction of resources and the subjugation of the people are not the chief aims.

The final mistake is the oversimplifying of moral complexities. Some critics argue that liberal peacebuilding reflects the liberal urge to widen the frontier of the western world, represents a new form of international occupation, and has underlying tones of

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[100] Ibid, 348.
[101] Ibid, 348.
[102] Ibid, 349.

cultural racism.[103] Paris says that these arguments make sweeping judgements about the larger process of peacebuilding using only fragmentary analyses.[104]

While Paris acknowledges that liberal peacebuilding has its shortcomings, he does not believe that there have been any viable alternatives presented. Some practices that are not rooted in liberal principles may actually end up doing more harm than good.[105] There is the option of trusteeships, but this is too close to the territory of colonialism.[106] Another alternative is for international organizations to identify and place into positions of power strong local leaders. However, this can lead to long-term authoritarian regimes and renewed tensions between groups within the state.[107] A third option is to rely on traditional forms of peacebuilding and governance. Though these practices are rooted in local traditions, there legitimacy may still be called into question due to the initial intervention by external forces.[108] They may also reignite internal tensions. Though liberal peacebuilding may have its issues, Paris still maintains that there is no formidable contender to challenge it.

Timothy Donais and Erin McCandless, however, argue that the international peacekeeping paradigm is slowly but surely changing due to the rising inclusivity norm. Peacekeeping is a highly normative enterprise and the changing landscape of those norms has raised numerous questions about how operations should be conducted and who should be in control of them. Donais and McCandless discuss the role the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States plays in helping scholars and practitioners answer these

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[103] Ibid, 353.
[104] Ibid, 354.
[105] Ibid, 357.
[106] Ibid, 357.
[107] Ibid, 358.
[108] Ibid, 359.

questions. The New Deal is, in short, "an effort to recalibrate relations among donors, international organisations, and the peoples and governments of fragile and conflict-affected states."[109]

The New Deal is centered around five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) that re-frame the traditional normative commitments of peacekeeping in ways that put emphasis on inclusivity:

1) Legitimate or inclusive politics: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution;
2) Security: establish and strengthen people's security;
3) Justice: addressing injustices and increase people's access to justice;
4) Economic foundations: generate employment and improve livelihoods;
5) Revenues and services: manage revenue and build capacity for countable and fair service delivery.[110]

These five goals are also connected to two fundamental principles in the New Deal called FOCUS and TRUST. FOCUS is an acronym for five suggested instruments that could facilitate more inclusive, country-led processes: "*F*ragility assessments; *O*ne Vision-one plan; *C*ountry compact; *U*se of the PSGs to frame monitoring; *S*upport for inclusive and participatory political dialogue."[111] The acronym TRUST lays out a set of principles designed to boost resource management efficiency and build strong partnerships between the various actors involved in peacekeeping operations: "enhancing *T*ransparency; *R*isk sharing; *U*se (and strengthen country systems); *S*trengthen country capacities; and *T*imely (and predictable) aid."[112]

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[109] Timothy Donais and Erin McCandless, "International Peace Building and the Emerging Inclusivity Norm," *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (February 2017): 291–310, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1191344, 291.
[110] Ibid, 297.
[111] Ibid, 297.
[112] Ibid, 297.

Donais and McCandless believe that processes such as the New Deal will help combine top-down, state-centric peacekeeping approaches with bottom-up, society-centric methods[113] to create more inclusive operations. They also underscore the importance of vertical integration in order to facilitate "long-term consensus-building among all key constituencies involved in post-conflict transitions around both the means and ends of peace-building processes."[114] The New Deal has already begun to change the norms of security through its influence on the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals,[115] specifically Goal 16 which aims to "build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels"[116] in order to promote peaceful, inclusive societies.

No discussion of peacekeeping operations is complete without a mention of R2P. The rise of R2P came on the heels of the Cold War as the world turned to humanitarian interventionism, but the principle was not formally established until 2005. On September 16th, 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution 60/1, which encompassed all of the outcomes from the 2005 World Summit. Clause 138 of the resolution declares that each member state "has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity."[117] This protection extends to the prevention of the aforementioned offenses through "appropriate and necessary means,"[118] though it does not mention specific examples of what these means should entail. Clause

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[113] Ibid, 293.
[114] Ibid, 293.
[115] Ibid, 305.
[116] "Goal 16 .:. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform," Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, accessed July 16, 2019, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16.
[117] "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005," October 24, 2005, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf, 30.
[118] Ibid, 30.

139 compels the UN member states to intervene in other states if atrocities are being

committed:

> The international community, through the United Nations,
> also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
> humanitarian and other peaceful means…to help to protect
> populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
> and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are
> prepared to take collective action…through the Security
> Council…on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with
> relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should
> peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are
> manifestly failing to protect their populations from
> genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
> humanity.[119]

Intervening into sovereign states is highly complicated, even with the full support of the

UNSC, but the rise of civil conflicts following the end of the Cold War meant that an

increasing number of peacekeeping operations would take place within the borders of a

single state. The formal establishment of R2P was essentially a reiteration of the values

of the UN and a recommitment to uphold them on the part of the member states.

The arrival of R2P in the post-Cold War era also gave rise to what Alan J.

Kuperman calls the "moral hazard" of intervention. Kuperman has laid his theory out in a

four-stage cycle that models some of the potential consequences of R2P. The first stage

was the creation of R2P and the emergence of humanitarian intervention as a new

norm,[120] which will be discussed further in a later section of this thesis. In the second

stage, sub-state actors rebel against the government because they expect that retaliation

by the state will eventually result in international intervention.[121] Some rebel groups

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[119] Ibid, 30.
[120] Alan J. Kuperman, "The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (2008): 49–80, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29734224, 51.
[121] Ibid, 51.

mistakenly believe that the intervening forces will be on their side, but as we have discussed, peacekeepers must remain impartial. The third stage is triggered when the state retaliates against the rebel forces with genocidal violence before any intervention measures can be put in place to prevent it. The fourth stage occurs in cases where the intervention does result in rebel victories. This encourages the rebels, who then increase their level of violence. From this point, the cycle returns to the second stage and continues to repeat itself in this pattern until a lasting peace agreement can be secured.[122]

According to Kuperman, people are emboldened by the promise of intervention and possible protection under R2P, even if it is not guaranteed, which is a key reason for why some sub-state actors initially rebel.[123] For so long R2P has been viewed as a saving grace for those suffering human rights abuses, but for some it may pose more of a risk than it is worth.

Bosnia: The Turning Point

In the aftermath of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the newly independent Balkan states entered a decade overrun with conflict. The region has been a melting pot of different ethnicities and cultures for hundreds of years. Serbians, Bosnians, Croats, and Slovaks live side by side, but they have not always been the most harmonious of neighbors. The Bosnian War (1992-1995) officially broke out when ethnic tensions between Serbians and Bosnians boiled over. During the three-year war, civilians on both sides of the conflict experienced war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide on a massive scale.

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[122] Ibid, 51.
[123] Ibid, 50.

It is estimated that 20,000 Bosnian women were raped during the Bosnian War[124], but this is probably a conservative number since many victims of sexual violence never come forward and many other women were killed after their assaults. For some victims, the psychological damage of assault, or in some cases the threat of further violence, inhibits them from taking action against their abusers,[125] even when the proper channels are available. When reports of mass rape in Bosnia first surfaced, many people were outraged that other states or international organizations were not intervening to aid the victims.[126]

This lack of international intervention could be attributed to two different viewpoints. One, rape has been a weapon of war for thousands of years and therefore it does not make the Bosnian case a special one. Two, although rape is an abhorrent crime, it is something that can happen even outside of wartime and is therefore a domestic issue.[127] Still, some feminists were of the opinion that wartime rape should be taken more seriously and continued to push for intervention. But the differentiation between wartime and peacetime rape has never been explicitly stated. Is it based on the official time frame of the conflict? Or is wartime rape committed with a different intention than peacetime rape?

Furthermore, saying there is a difference between wartime and peacetime rape implies that one is somehow worse than the other and deserves a more vigorous response.

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[124] Carol Harrington, "Governing Peacekeeping: The Role of Authority and Expertise in the Case of Sexual Violence and Trauma," *Economy and Society* 35, no. 3 (August 2006): 346–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140600844910, 56.

[125] Izumi, 14.

[126] Pascale R Bos, "Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape: Berlin, 1945; Yugoslavia, 1992–1993," Signs 31, no. 4 (2006), 995-1025. doi:10.1086/505230, 1030.

[127] Lene Hansen, "Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 3, no. 1 (January 2000): 55–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616740010019848, 61.

While this implication is most likely unintentional, victims of peacetime rape may begin to believe that their assaults do not matter in comparison to what others have experienced. Categorizing, and thereby hierarchizing, rapes is harmful to victims and will not move feminist movements forward. In fact, it may even cause movements to backslide.

The sheer scale of rapes against Bosnian women shows that there were some systematic, and possibly genocidal, elements at play. While this figure is horrifying, it can also be misleading. Serbians have said the mass media attention focused on rapes committed by Serbians has been used to demonize them[128], and in a sense they are right. While there were fewer reported cases of Bosnian men raping Serbian women, it was happening more often than people were led to believe. Rapes committed by Bosnians are seen to have been more sporadic and spontaneous.[129] It is believed that these were acts committed by individuals acting on their own accord without a genocidal intent.

On the other hand, rapes committed by Serbians are considered genocidal due to the vast number of assaults, the systematic way they were carried out, and the fact that the victims were almost exclusively Bosnian women.[130] This is another example of hierarchizing rape. While the Serbians committed genocidal rape, the Bosnians also committed acts of sexual violence and should be considered just as guilty.[131] As with the wartime/peacetime rape debate, victims of non-genocidal rape should not be made to feel as if their suffering is somehow less important than victims of genocidal rape.

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[128] Bos, 1012.
[129] Hansen, 62.
[130] Ibid, 62.
[131] Tamara Banjeglav, "Gender, Nation, Rape: Intersections of Gender and Ethnic Violence during the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina" Central European University, 2009), 2.

Some feminist scholars claim that wartime rape in Bosnia should be considered a genocidal tool.[132] There is division amongst scholars over whether or not this is helpful for victims though.[133] Genocidal rape is defined as a process in which women are raped on a mass scale with the intent to impregnate them with a child of another nationality or ethnicity: "…a woman impregnated by a rape can be represented as a passive 'national' container of a child imagined to be the future bearer of the rapist's nationality."[134] In the long term, the mothers' nationalities/ethnicities will be wiped out. This works especially well in areas like Bosnia that are highly religious and anti-abortion, or in conflict zones where there is little access to medical professions who are skilled in performing abortions. Genocidal rape also has lasting negative psychological impacts on the victims who must carry and care for a child who is the product of their assault. Instances of genocidal rape can over time destroy the fabric of a society by attacking its ability to reproduce.[135]

The UNPROFOR operations were deployed to various states in the Balkans in 1992.[136] The parts of the operation specific to Bosnia lasted to 1995 when it was restructured and handed over to NATO and the EU. When the operation was authorized, the US did not list itself among the states that had expressed their readiness to deploy troops to the UNSC.[137] In fact, the US even voted in favor of limiting the UNPROFOR mandate at one point and then-President Bill Clinton said that the Bosnian War was an internal

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[132] Paul Kirby, "How is Rape a Weapon of War?: Feminist International Relations, Modes of Critical Explanation and the Study of Wartime Sexual Violence," The London School of Economics and Political Science 19, no. 4 (2012), 1-36. doi:10.1177/1354066111427614.

[133] Karen Engle, "Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina," The American Journal of International Law 99, no. 4 (2005), 778-816. doi:10.2307/3396669. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3396669.

[134] Hansen, 60.

[135] Ibid, 56.

[136] "United Nations Security Council Resolution 743," February 21, 1992, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/743(1992), 1.

[137] Ibid, 2.

matter that should have been settled by the parties involved.[138] The US was supposed to be the world's superpower now that the USSR was out of the picture and it should have been the leader in the fight against human rights abuses that the rest of the world would follow, but the US did not seem to be reflecting the turn towards humanitarian interventionism that the rest of the world was undergoing. The next section will examine the reasonings behind the US's policy stance, as well as a general look at the feminist perspective of Bosnian intervention.

Intervention

K. M. Fierke offers four different interpretations of the Bosnian War, each based on previous conflicts, that may have driven US intervention policies. The World War II interpretation portrayed the Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors and the Bosnian Muslims as the victims. NATO, the UN, and stronger western states were seen as potential liberators.[139] This interpretation was favored by peace and intervention advocates who sought to stop the injustices being done to the Muslims and to punish the Serbs.[140]

The Vietnam interpretation was employed by those who did not want to see the US involved in the conflict. This interpretation viewed the conflict as a complexed web of warring nationalities and identities,[141] which it was in some ways. The Vietnam interpretation also took note of the fact that many of the forces in Bosnia were skilled in guerilla warfare techniques similar to those of the Viet Cong, which had proved difficult

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[138] Leonie Murray, *Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism: Rise and Fall of a Policy* (Routledge, 2007), 50.

[139] K. M. Fierke, "Multiple Identities, Interfacing Games:: The Social Construction of Western Action in Bosnia," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 467–97, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066196002004003, 474.

[140] Ibid, 474.

[141] Ibid, 475.

for American soldiers to combat. Proponents of this interpretation wanted to keep the US

out of Bosnia in order to avoid another disaster like the Vietnam War.[142]

In contrast to the Vietnam interpretation, supporters of the Gulf War

interpretation thought the US did need to get involved in Bosnia. They saw the European

powers as being too weak to stop the conflict and believed the US should take the lead on

any intervention measures. However, they also said the US should use airstrikes rather

than putting boots on the ground to avoid the high casualty rate the Americans suffered in

the Gulf War.[143]

The final of Fierke's interpretations is perhaps the most straight forward. The

World War I interpretation cautioned that the Bosnian conflict could spiral out of control

and spread to other countries, and the UN should intervene to help maintain the balance

of power that existed in the international system at the time.[144]

Only the World War II interpretation makes any reference to intervening due to

human rights abuses. Even so though, there is no mention of the violence being

perpetuated against women, despite the fact that stories of mass sexual violence were

already spreading outside of Bosnia. Bosnian ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey addressed

the UN with the following statement in 1993 as he sought increased intervention:

> Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang raped…I do not
> lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the
> Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know,
> systemic rape has been one of the weapons of this
> aggression against Bosnian women in particular.[145]

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[142] Ibid, 474.
[143] Ibid, 475.
[144] Ibid, 476.
[145] Hansen, 62.

Lene Hansen presents three perspectives on the question of international intervention related to the issue of GBV in Bosnia: realist, national security, and feminist security. The realist perspective takes into account the national interests of the intervening state,[146] meaning the reward must be greater than the risk. Unfortunately for Bosnia, it is not considered by many to be a strategically significant state, nor does it provide any sort of valuable economic resources for the rest of the world. Simply protecting Bosnian women or defending the Bosnian government were not seen to be good enough reasons for intervening in the war.

There is some truth to the idea that war in the Balkans may have been inevitable. The ethnic groups in the region are traditional enemies to an extent, and the region has a long history with violence. But this "balkanizing", as Maria Todorova calls it, of these groups created a dangerous myth that enshrouded the region. Balkanism is, simply put, "a discourse about an imputed ambiguity."[147] It is similar to Edward Said's more well-known concept of Orientalism in the fact that it is the act of positioning an entire group of people as "others". The overall cultures of the Balkan states have been likened to tribalism, which makes them seem backwards and uncivilized compared to western states.[148] With Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, Albanians, Slovenes, and many ethnic groups sharing a relatively small region, the rest of the world viewed the Balkans as an obscure, perplexing mess.[149] Hansen argues that since the Bosnia War was primarily an ethnically-based conflict it would have been difficult for some states to truly understanding why

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[146] Ibid, 61.
[147] Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Cary, United States: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2009), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dal/detail.action?docID=431330, 17.
[148] Ibid, 184.
[149] Ibid, 17-18.

intervention was necessary.[150] In the early days of the conflict, many states simply wrote

the it off as an internal matter in the region and declined to intervene.

While the realist perspective largely ignores the human rights violations in

Bosnia, the national security perspective shifts the perspective to the interests of the state

in question. In this perspective, the decision to intervene should not be determined by the

interests of the intervening state, but by whether or not an intervention would be in the

best interest of the victims.[151] If states had subscribed to the national security perspective,

there would have been a much faster reaction to Bosnian War. While it can be argued that

the national security perspective is the best model for making intervention decisions, it is

important to note that interventions with the intent to relieve suffering are usually born

out of gender-blind policies and therefore do not adequately address gender-specific

issues on the ground.[152] This shows that there is a need to reconstruct intervention and

other conflict policies to remove this gender-blindness.

The feminist security perspective on intervention in Bosnia is rooted in radical

feminism. This perspective is based on the idea of the "Balkan patriarchy", which asserts

that all men have some identical traits that transcend national and ethnic lines.[153] It also

portrays the heart of the Bosnia War as a conflict between patriarchal, nationalist leaders

(Serbians) and vulnerable women (Bosnians).[154] While the feminist security perspective

brings much needed attention to the prevalence of violence against women, the way it

frames the conflict is somewhat flawed. This portrayal paints a picture of all Bosnian

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[150] Hansen, 61.
[151] Ibid, 62.
[152] Jayne Rodgers, "Bosnia, Gender and the Ethics of Intervention in Civil Wars," Civil Wars 1, no. 1 (1998), 103-116. doi:10.1080/13698249808402368.
[153] Hansen, 66.
[154] Ibid, 65.

women as being nurturing, helpless mothers and daughters, and ignores the fact that many women were directly involved in the conflict as both combatants and peace advocates.[155] Women lose their agency in this perspective,[156] which is detrimental to their position in society. There is also the issue of depicting only Serbians as aggressors and only Bosnians as victims. But as we have already discussed, both groups played both roles simultaneously.

Aside from the clashing perspective on the Bosnian conflict, the memories of other failures loomed large during the course of the war. As mentioned above, the US was already reluctant to send troops to Bosnia to avoid the possibility of high casualties. The ghost of Vietnam was soon replaced by the disaster of the Battle of Mogadishu though, when 18 Americans were killed in Somalia.[157] The Clinton administration initially blamed the UN for operating under a risky mandate in Somalia to cover up for the US's own lack of preparation.[158] They would do the same when things in Bosnia took a turn for the worse.

Clinton's stance during his presidential campaign led people to believe that he would create closer ties with the UN and establish the US as a major player in peacekeeping and humanitarian interventionism.[159] If this was truly the plan, the US should have jumped at the chance to get fully involved with the UNPROFOR operations and put a stop to the human rights violations in Bosnia. Instead, Clinton pulled back once he took office. There was the aforementioned vote to limit the UNPROFOR mandate, as

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[155] Ibid, 67.
[156] Bos, 999.
[157] Murray, 30.
[158] Ibid, 30.
[159] Ibid, 30.

well as Clinton's insistence that any US troops contributed to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia would work under NATO, not the UN.[160] The US would have much more control over its troops and resources this way, as the US was the de facto leader of NATO. The US became fully invested in Bosnia in 1995. Following a string of attacks on UN-designated safe areas, NATO launched a series of airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs, which were supported by group assaults by the Rapid Reaction Force.[161] Operation Deliberate Force was jointly carried out by NATO and UNPROFOR commanders,[162] who had been all but overrun by the Bosnian Serbs by this point. Unable to combat the combined forces of NATO and the UNPROFOR, the Bosnian Serbs eventually complied with the ceasefire conditions that had been offered to them. By the end of that same year, the Dayton Accords were signed in Paris and the Bosnian War had ended.[163]

The Impact of Bosnia

The UN conducted the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) from 1993 to 2017. The main goal of the tribunal was "to deter future crimes and render justice to thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia."[164] The tribunal, held in The Hague, was created to prosecute those who had committed crimes against humanity and war crimes during the various wars in the Balkan region. For clarity's sake, war crimes are atrocities specifically committed during an officially armed conflict. Crimes against humanity are atrocities committed outside the boundaries of an officially conflict. The ICTY dealt with

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[160] Ibid, 50.
[161] Tarcisio Gazzini, *The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law* (Manchester University Press, 2005), 69.
[162] Ibid, 69-70.
[163] Ibid, 70.
[164] "About the ICTY," accessed Dec 8, 2018, http://www.icty.org/en/about.

both types of offences as long as they fell within the years of 1991 to 2001.[165] Roughly

20% of all charges brought before the ICTY involved some type of sexual violence.[166]

The inclusion of sexual offences in the charges was not entirely revolutionary since these

acts were already considered to be crimes under international law, but the ICTY was one

of the first times that the prosecution argued that genocidal rape violated the Geneva

Conventions.[167] This change in perspective has been reflected in international law.

Article 6, subsection (d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

pertains directly to genocidal rape: "Imposing measures intended to prevent births within

the group."[168] In conjunction with rape, mass killings of men and boys are a key part of

preventing women from giving birth to new generations of their nationality or ethnicity,

which falls under this law. Article 7, paragraph 1, subsection (g) clearly states that many

types of sexual violence are crimes against humanity, including "Rape, sexual slavery,

enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of

sexual violence of comparable gravity."[169] Paragraph 2, subsection (f) of the same article

defines forced pregnancy as:

> the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made
> pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic
> composition of any population or carrying out other grave
> violations of international law.[170]

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[165] Ibid.

[166] Engle, 781.

[167] Ibid, 787.

[168] "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," , accessed Dec. 8, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/add16852-aee9-4757-abe7-9cdc7cf02886/283503/romestatuteng1.pdf.

[169] Ibid, 4.

[170] Ibid, 4.

While not every case of genocidal rape involves confining the victim, it was not uncommon for Bosnian women to be placed on concentration camps, as explained in an October 1992 report submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.[171] The acts of sexual violence listed above are also considered violations of customary international law on war crimes under article 8, paragraph 2, section (e), subsection (vi).[172]

Though less straightforward than with the previously mentioned laws, rape has also been considered a violation of the Geneva Conventions under article 8, section (c), subsection (ii) of the Rome Statute which protects against "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."[173] The Serbians wanted to make the Bosnians appear weak by humiliating them for not being able to protect their women,[174] on top of the personal humiliation each individual rape victim faces. The collective shaming of a group is a common tactic in genocides.

The work of the ICTY, as well as the work done during the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), helped to push international women's rights forward. Sexual and gender-based violence is now taken much more seriously at the international level. Ultimately, the ICTY brought charges against over 160 individuals, including "heads of state, prime ministers, army chiefs-of-staff, interior ministers and many other high- and mid-level political, military and police leaders from various parties to the Yugoslav conflicts."[175]

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[171] Official Records of the Human Rights Committee 1992/93, Vol. II (New York: United Nations, 1997).
[172] Ibid, 8.
[173] Ibid, 7.
[174] Hansen, 56.
[175] "About the ICTY."

Aside from the legal changes and a new focus on sexual violence, the ICTY also laid the foundation for exactly who should be charged in future cases:

> It has now shown that those suspected of bearing can be called to account, as well as that guilt should be individualised, protecting entire communities from being labelled as "collectively responsible.[176]

It is simply unreasonable to place the blame for these crimes on the shoulders of every Serbian or every Bosnian. Although there were guilty parties on both sides, not every person participated in the violence. In fact, many people condemned the actions of their countrymen and called for hostilities to cease long before peace talks even seemed like a possibility. Instead, the blame should be placed on the political and military leaders who orchestrated the acts. The ICTY also provided victims with a forum to tell their stories. Although testifying against their assailants can be a painful process for many victims of sexual violence, it can also be therapeutic and provide them with a sense of closure and justice. One of the ICTY's goals was to help the people of the Balkans heal from their experiences, and though the region continues to struggle today, it is in a much better position than it was just a few decades ago.

Limitations in Peacekeeping

World polity theorists claim that there is a single global culture with both formal and informal rules and norms which define who the principal actors in the system are, how the actors should behave, and how they should organize themselves internally and externally.[177] Roland Paris argues that peacekeeping agencies are "predisposed to

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[176] "About the ICTY."
[177] Paris, "Constraints of Global Culture," 442.

develop and implement strategies that conform with the social norms of global culture, and they are disinclined to pursue strategies that deviate from these norms."[178] This applies not only to norms of defense and security, but also to gender norms. Some governments lack the will or interest to change the existing gender norms in their countries.[179] Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations offer the perfect time for changes in norms to take place because the UN can offer resources, programs, and education on subjects like GBV and gender equality. However, since the host state must provide consent for a peacekeeping operation to take place, the mandate must be crafted to fit the standards of what the host deems acceptable. If the state will not allow for gender mainstreaming programs to be offered to civilians, then the matter is out of the UN's hands. Changing traditional gender norms and stereotypes is a key factor in reducing GBV both during and after conflicts.

Michael Lipson says that peacekeeping operations are often restricted by the pervasive organized hypocrisy of the international system. Lipson defines the concept of organized hypocrisy as, "inconsistent rhetoric and action – hypocrisy – resulting from conflicting material and normative pressures."[180] Actors will put forth symbolic actions when faced with these normative pressures, such as signing international accords or making public promises to change policies. At the same time, they will continue to violate those norms through tangible actions, such as allowing human rights abuses to continue or not following environmental safety standards.

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[178] Ibid, 443.
[179] True, 47.
[180] Michael Lipson, "Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 5–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107074283, 6.

According to Lipson, the current conditions of the UN have created a perfect breeding ground for organized hypocrisy to flourish. The UN has to reflect the various values and preferences of its member states, which leads to it upholding contradictory goals and principles.[181] Lipson says there is a contradiction between the UN's message of fighting against GBV and the fact that it sends mostly male personnel to peacekeeping operations.[182] Although the UN has made great strides in recent years by creating gender-focused units, staffing and resources for many of the units still falls short.[183]

The commitment gaps in peacekeeping operations can be attributed to organized hypocrisy.[184] UN member states often say they are committed to peacekeeping operations, but they do not always follow through when the operation is put into action. Many peacekeeping operations suffer from a lack of resources and personnel, which can lead to some aspects of the operation falling through the cracks and creating dangerous situations for civilians. However, while organized hypocrisy can hinder peacekeeping operations, Lipson admits that it may be essential for the continued survival of IOs.[185] Organized hypocrisy does facilitate cooperation between states by allowing them to collaborate without completely tethering them to any agreements they make. Despite this, changing the structure of IOs, including the UN, could help to eliminate some of the organized hypocrisy and close the gaps in peacekeeping operations.

The UN-DPKO's main objectives in confronting gender issues are as follows:

> 1) development of policy and operational tools;
> 2) facilitation of the participation of women in all aspects of the transition to peace;

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[181] Ibid, 12.
[182] Ibid, 16.
[183] Ibid, 17.
[184] Ibid, 14.
[185] Ibid, 6.

3) knowledge management and documentation of good practice;
4) development of partnerships with Member States and UN system partners; and
5) promotion of gender balance among peacekeeping personnel.[186]

The objectives may seem vague when presented in this form, but they are usually tailored to each operation to ensure they fit the context of the conflict. In terms of gender mainstreaming, the UN-DPKO reports that it has made progress by helping to build gender-aware training programs for troops, encouraging states to place more women in decision-making roles, and creating more positions for gender advisors in peacekeeping operations. The UN-DPKO has also worked to clarify reporting channels for victims and witness of GBV.[187]

According to the UN-DPKO, great progress has been made in gender mainstreaming. But there are three core issues that still stand in the way of the UN fully integrating a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations. First, there is a lack of understanding about the specifics of UNSC Resolution 1325 and the UN policies on gender equality in peacekeeping. Dharmapuri's research reveals that while most UN member states are aware of Resolution 1325, many of them do not understand the significant implications of it besides the call for an increased female presence in peacekeeping operations.[188] Two, there are gaps in the data available on gender issues in

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[186] Ramina Johal, "Room to Maneuver: Lessons From Gender Mainstreaming in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations" (New York: Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, January 2007), http://www.lm.gov.lv/upload/dzimumu_lidztiesiba/situacija_latvija/peace.pdf, 7.
[187] Ibid, 9.
[188] Sahana Dharmapuri, "Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping," *International Peace Institute*, July 2013, 1–23, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_epub_not_just_a_numbers_game.pdf, 12.

peacekeeping. Three, the continued existence of norms and biases that sustain gender inequality in matters of peace and security.[189]

While Resolution 1325 looked great on paper, its proposals has proven difficult to put into practice. There has been a lack of motivation on the part of many member states to implement gender mainstreaming policies from the UN-DPKO, which can be largely attributed to ineffective communication between UN staff and member states, according to Dharmapuri.[190] Peacekeeping operations have seen an increase in the number of female personnel since the adoption of Resolution 1325, but there are still many social barriers, such as gender stereotypes, that prevent women from rising up into leadership positions.[191] Many militaries, even in western states, still suffer from patriarchal attitudes that are stopping women from participating in peacekeeping activities at their fullest potential.

The UN-INSTRAW report found that many female peacekeepers are not even given a chance to do the jobs they have been trained for. Some women reported that they were not allowed to go out into the field on patrols and were instead relegated to kitchen duty, secretarial work, or cleaning tasks.[192] These women are still counted as military and police personnel when operation statistics are reported though,[193] which can make it appear that an operation has a significant number of female personnel when in reality many of them are not doing the jobs they are trained for. Some Troop Contributing

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[189] Ibid, 12.
[190] Ibid, 12.
[191] Ibid, 13.
[192] Francesco Bertolazzi, "Women with a Blue Helmet: The Integration of Women and Gender Issues in UN Peacekeeping Missions," UN-INSTRAW Working Paper Series (The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, July 2010), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D780F5E6E8F5476685257777700712B5B-instraw_women_with_a_blue_helmet_jul2010.pdf, 17.
[193] Ibid, 17.

Countries (TCCs) do not want to send women to peacekeeping operations in certain parts of the Middle East or Africa out of fear that they would be unwelcome and the operations' success would be hindered.[194] While it is true in some cases that civilians may be hesitant to work with female peacekeepers, the UN-DPKO and the TCCs should confer with the host state on this matter first to gain a better understanding of the local culture before making personnel decisions.[195]

Increasing the number of women in peacekeeping operations to help deal with GBV has been one of the most common recommendations made by scholars and practitioners for years. But as we can see, the inclusion and implementation of female personnel is a highly complicated issue that has been further impeded by ambiguous resolutions and ineffective communication.

Conclusion

The institution of peacekeeping seems to become more complicated with each new operation. The UN must balance itself between fulfilling the mandates it has set out, upholding the principles set out in its Charter, and meeting the demands of its many member states. Peacekeeping has gone through changes over its many decades and it seems to still be one of the best options the UN has for maintaining global peace and security. However, the institution is not without its flaws. The many issues of post-conflict peacebuilding operations, which are sometimes ill-planned, and the imperfect R2P principle, which has become somewhat of a hazard in itself, are just the beginning of

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[194] Ibid, 18.
[195] Ibid, 18.

peacekeeping's problems. This brief overview has not even covered the specific details of gendered-issues in peacekeeping operations.

There is a distinction between humanitarian and politically driven peacekeeping, which are both reflected in operations that are rooted in rescue or stability, respectively. Operations with the goal of rescuing are deployed "to seek the immediate and unconditional alleviation of human suffering."[196] The goal of a stability operation is "to seek to create and sustain viable social institutions that will prevent the need for subsequent rescue efforts"[197] and establish political order.

Many of the peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s were rescue operations. This was consistent with trend towards humanitarianism in the international system at the time, which the UNSC itself got swept up in as it quickly deployed dozens of operations to areas where human rights were being violated. The stability part of peacekeeping operations was developed slightly later, but it is now a common feature in most operations. Stability operations became more common later in the 1990s and into the 2000s. The increased focus on sustainable peace can be seen in the amount of peacekeeping operations the UNSC has recently undertaken. Since the late 1990s, the UNSC has slowed down the implementation of operations. Although there has been a new operation deployed almost every year,[198] there now seems to be more of a focus on ensuring mandates are suitable and strong before jumping into an operation. The missteps

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[196] Amir Pasic and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Politics of Rescue: Yugoslavia's Wars and the Humanitarian Impulse," *Ethics & International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (1997): 105–31, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1997.tb00020.x, 110.

[197] Ibid, 110.

[198] "Past Peace Operations," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed July 29, 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations.

in protecting the people of Bosnian most likely played a role in this, as well as mistakes made in other operations around the same time.

Bosnia represents a critical juncture for not only the institution of peacekeeping, but also for the path of international human rights laws. Bosnia was undeniably a rescue operation based around alleviating the suffering of the civilians. While it can be said that the UN intervened in Bosnia for humanitarian reasons, it cannot be said that the operation's mandate allowed peacekeepers the necessary latitude to use physical force in order to prevent atrocities from being committed. The fact that the Bosnian ambassador to the UN was still drawing attention to the regularity of GBV a year after the operation began and that GBV continued to be extremely prevalent for the remainder of the war indicates that little consideration was given to the topic. Given the pervasiveness of GBV in Bosnia, protecting women should have been paramount in the mandate. The US's approach to Bosnia shows that the Clinton administration was not as committed to protecting human rights as it made itself out to be and it was more concerned with not repeating mistakes from wars gone by. Rather than taking the lead in humanitarianism as the new political superpower, the US only seemed interesting in controlling the operations through NATO. At the same time, the UN was looking to deploy the UNPROFOR as soon as possible. To alleviate suffering certainly, but also to continue the upward momentum in popularity that interventionism had found. Preventing GBV should have been a major concern for the UNSC. Instead, it fell by the wayside.

Chapter 4: Gender in Peacekeeping Policies

Introduction

The increased bureaucracy of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era has led to the creation of specialized units that focus on a variety of areas such as gendered-issues, sexual violence, harassment, abuse, exploitation, and an array of other issues.[199] The expansion of gender expertise as a field of competency can be directly attributed to the intersection of the feminist knowledge that scholars had been developing for years and the newly discovered knowledge of trauma from GBV in the post-Cold War years.[200] Mainstreaming a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations quickly became the most popular way of dealing with any issues involving the treatment of women. While gender mainstreaming is undoubtedly a useful approach, there are still many problems with how it is being implemented in peacekeeping operations.

This chapter will explore some of the limitations placed on the policy formulation process, and the peacekeeping operations themselves, by the current conditions of the international system. It will also look at how gender mainstreaming is being applied in peacekeeping operations and make some recommendations on how it could be improved.

UN Policies on Gender and Security

In 1995, the 189 states in attendance at the Fourth World Conference on Women unanimously adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which has become a cornerstone of the UN's program for gender equality and the advancement of women. The Platform highlighted the fact that "peace is inextricably linked with equality between

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[199] Harrington, 346.
[200] Ibid, 367.

women and men and development"[201] and that women are often particularly affected by conflict because of their gender.[202] It also provided a series of recommendation to help prevent GBV during times of conflict. Women should be fully integrated into decision-making positions during conflict resolution processes in order to provide a gender perspective.[203] Governments, IOs, and national organizations should "take all measures required for the protection of women" from GBV.[204] One of the most crucial recommendations suggested the implementation of gender-awareness programs for peacekeeping operations:

> Take into account gender-sensitive concerns in developing training programmes for all relevant personnel on international humanitarian law and human rights awareness and recommend such training for those involved in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, with a view to preventing violence against women, in particular.[205]

Increasing and improving pre-deployment training programs for peacekeepers is a common recommendation from experts in the field of GBV. A later section of this thesis will discuss this further.

Twenty years after the Platform for Action was first created, UN Women analyzed the progress that had been made in implementing the recommendations and published a report of the findings. The report found that factors such as the rise of extremism, various humanitarian disasters, and an "unprecedented scale of forced

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[201] United Nations and Department of Public Information, eds., "Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: Beijing+5 Political Declaration and Outcome.," 2014, http://beijing20.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/pfa_e_final_web.pdf, 87.
[202] Ibid, 89.
[203] Ibid, 91.
[204] Ibid, 95.
[205] Ibid, 95.

displacement" have hindered progress in preventing GBV in conflict zones.[206] Many

states have increased their support for women's participation in peacekeeping and

decision-making positions,[207] but the progress of the overall movement is still slow

going. UN Women called for the promotion of women not only in decision-making roles,

but in full leadership roles during conflict resolution processes as a way to ensure

women's representation at the negotiation table. There was also a recommendation for

the creation of gender-responsive policies that "comprehensively address rising

inequalities, militarization, and the construction of violent masculinities"[208] to prevent

further human rights abuses. The fact that the report reiterates many of the same

recommendations that were made in the original Platform for Action shows that not as

much progress has been made in the fight against GBV in conflict as the UN was initially

hoping for.

On October 31st, 2000, the UNSC adopted a landmark resolution on the subjects

of women, peace, and security. Resolution 1325 was created mostly as an agenda-setting

document rather than one that proposed concrete actions, but it still stands as an

important piece of legislation for the future of women and peacekeeping. The key

message in the resolution is that women are disproportionately impacted by conflict[209]

and therefore there is an "urgent need" to mainstream a gender perspective into

peacekeeping operations.[210] Resolution 1325 advises that the number of women in

[206] "The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action Turns 20," Summary Report (New York: United Nations Women, 2015), http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2015/sg%20report_synthesis-en_web.pdf?la=en&vs=5547, 22.
[207] Ibid, 24.
[208] Ibid, 24.
[209] "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325," October 31, 2000, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement.
[210] Ibid, 2.

decision-making roles of conflict prevention and resolution processes should be increased[211] in order to promote long-term peace.[212] It also reminds UN member states that they have an responsibility to pursue and prosecute those who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, including sex crimes.[213]

UNSC Resolution 1820, another key piece of legislation on gender and security adopted in 2008, reaffirmed many of the points from Resolution 1325.[214] Resolution 1820 demands that all parties to conflicts take measures to protect women from violence, as well as educating their troops on the prohibition of all types of sexual violence against civilians and debunking the many myths surrounding sexual violence.[215] It also calls for the Secretary-General, the UNSC, and other UN bodies to work together to develop specialized training programs for all troops deployed under the UN flag.[216] The Secretary-General is also urged to invite women to discussions about conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding[217] in order to facilitate equal participation at all decision-making levels. Regional and sub-regional bodies are encouraged to create policies and advocacy channels for women who have been victims of sexual violence.[218]

In June of 2015, an independent panel under the guidance of the UN submitted "Uniting Our Strengths For Peace – Politics, Partnership, and People High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations" to the Secretary-General. The report reviewed the current state of UN peacekeeping and made

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[211] Ibid, 1.
[212] Ibid, 2.
[213] Ibid, 3.
[214] "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820," June 19, 2008, https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1820(2008), 1.
[215] Ibid, 2.
[216] Ibid, 3.
[217] Ibid, 4.
[218] Ibid, 4.

recommendations for new approaches to international interventions. The panel's

suggestions fall almost directly in line with what scholars in the field have been

advocating for in their work. The report says peacekeeping operations should be crafted

with a clearly defined purpose, which will make mandates more achievable and improve

the performances of uniformed personnel.[219] There is a need to close the gap between

what is being asked of peacekeeping operations and what the UN is actually able to

deliver on.[220] The UN report also suggests strengthening global and regional partnerships

by increasing engagement with host states and local communities,[221] a proposal that is

echoed by scholars.

UNSC Resolution 2272 was adopted on March 11th, 2016. This resolution focused

on the prevention of acts of sexual violence committed by peacekeepers themselves,

including both UN and non-UN personnel. Although that is not the topic of this thesis,

2272 still offers some important insight into how sexual violence is handled during

peacekeeping operations. Jeni Whalan highlights some of the problems with the UN's

current approach to the prevention of sexual violence. Civilians are often ill-informed on

how and where to report cases of sexual violence because the responsibility of

responding to the reports is split between local law enforcement agencies, the

peacekeeping operation's headquarters, and various offices within the peacekeeping

forces.[222] Whalan also points out that the language used in 2272 is unclear,[223] which can

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[219] "Uniting our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership, and People High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," (2015), xi.

[220] Ibid, vii.

[221] Ibid, xii.

[222] Jeni Whalan, "Dealing with Disgrace: Addressing the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping" (International Peace Institute, August 2017), https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IPI-Rpt-Dealing-with-Disgrace2.pdf.

[223] Ibid, 1.

make implementing reforms difficult. Scholars have critiqued the ambiguity of UN

resolutions for many years, but the structure of the UNSC may be holding the

organization back from creating resolutions and mandates with more clarity.

As of January 2019, there were 4,824 female military or police personnel serving

in UN peacekeeping operations out of a total 89,409 personnel.[224] At the same time, 15

peacekeeping operations were underway across the world and 10 of them had direct

mandates to protect women and girls.[225] This increase in women's involvement in

peacekeeping operations is a huge step forward in term of gender equality and the

inclusion of female peacekeepers has long been seen as the way to reduce GBV. There is

almost no data that can decisively prove this though, probably because this is a difficult

metric to measure. A later section of this thesis will discuss female personnel in

peacekeeping operations further though. The UN has certainly made strides on the matter

of preventing GBV and dealing with its fallout, but there remain many questions about

the true extent of this progress.

Reforms and Recommendations

The roots of the organized hypocrisy in the UN lie in the structure of the UNSC.

As previously mentioned, the UN has to reflect the values of all of its many member

states, but in the UNSC it is often beholden to the desires of the five permanent members:

China, France, Russia, the US, and the UK. The veto system as it stands gives virtually

unlimited control over the UNSC to these five members. The power politics of the UNSC

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[224] "Gender," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed May 29, 2019,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender.
[225] Ibid.

obstruct its ability to create clear, concrete security policies and to put them into action.[226]

There are multiple ways to change the current veto system that would even the playing field, so to speak. The vetoes could be eliminated entirely, which seems like the simplest solution but would most likely not be supported by many member states. Alternatively, every member of the UNSC could receive a veto rather than consolidating them to only five states. If the number of overall vetoes remains limited, they could rotate throughout the members states. Since the membership terms are staggered, the vetoes could be given to states in either the first or last year of their term. Permanent members could also have a rotation cycle to ensure that the same states are not constantly holding vetoes.

There is also the option of eliminating the five permanent seats all together and rotating these states through the UNSC just like all of the others. While this would break up some of the power struggles that stagnate the UNSC, it may also be detrimental for security purposes. Those five states control some of the largest military forces in the world. It can be valuable to have them at the table when negotiating troop and resource contributions for peacekeeping operations. They also give a voice to many of their smaller allies that do not often get the chance to sit on the UNSC. Replacing the veto system, or restructuring the UNSC completely, would be a drastic move that would fundamentally alter international politics, but perhaps it is the move that is needed to bring about changes in the handling of international peace and security.

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[226] True, 44.

Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham have discussed the idea of "cosmopolitan" peacekeeping, which they use to describe how the field of peacekeeping may evolve in relation to cosmopolitan ideas of global governance and conflict.[227] The theory of cosmopolitan peacekeeping seems to have quite a bit of merit as both the nature of conflict and the international system continue to change. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham advocate for the strengthening of ties between the UN and the regional peacekeeping forces that have been steadily growing across the globe.[228] This type of bottom-up peacekeeping by forming partnerships with regional organizations can be extremely helpful for the UN. Regional organizations can provide vital cultural information that can assistance peacekeepers in connecting to local populations, thus building trust between the two sides and hopefully leading to a successful operation. Local communities can also provide peacekeepers and policy makers with a greater understanding of what civilians actually need and what the roots of the conflict truly are.

Woodhouse and Ramsbotham do look to the future of peacekeeping warily though. The new generation of peacekeeping that we are now seeing may be trying to combine aspects that are incompatible: military robustness and a focus on cosmopolitan international ideals.[229] It is somewhat contradictory for the UN to push for increased military presences in peacekeeping operations while also upholding the cosmopolitan norms of the human security agenda. If the UN cannot find a way to fit these two

[227] Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, "Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization of Security," International Peacekeeping 12, no. 2 (2005), 139-156. doi:10.1080/01439680500066400, 141.
[228] Séverine Autesserre, "Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping Research," *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 4 (August 8, 2014): 492–500, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.950884, 493.
[229] Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 148.

concepts together moving forward, then it may be time to set peacekeeping aside as a method of maintain global peace and security.

Reina Neufeldt argues for a more holistic, philosophical approach to peacebuilding in an effort to contribute to the collective good of the state.[230] Neufeldt examines two different moral theories for peacebuilding and how they can be used collaboratively to strengthen processes and expand the perspective of what is considered 'good' and 'right'.[231] The first theory is consequentialism, in which an action is considered to be right if it brings about better outcomes than the alternative options.[232] The emphasis on consequences in peacebuilding is usually framed to achieve two ends. The first is to end any continuing violence or to stop it from recurring, known as negative peace. The second is to reach certain level of social, political, and economic reconstruction and stability known as positive peace.[233] The second moral theory is duty-based ethics, which "focuses on normative obligations to engage in particular acts."[234] Some obligations are codified legally, while others are unofficial norms, which can make decision-making using this approach difficult.

Peacebuilding practitioners can use the tensions between the two theories when making decisions to find solutions that meet multiple criteria.[235] This holistic approach to peacekeeping shifts the focus of the operation, and of the peacekeepers themselves, to a perspective in which people are the end rather than the means to an end. When this

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[230] Reina C. Neufeldt, "Doing Good Better: Expanding the Ethics of Peacebuilding," International Peacekeeping 21, no. 4 (2014), 1-16. doi:10.1080/13533312.2014.946710, 428.
[231] Ibid, 428.
[232] Ibid, 429.
[233] Ibid, 429.
[234] Ibid, 431.
[235] Ibid, 432.

approach is used, the emphasis is placed on the humanitarian element of the operation, where it should be first and foremost.

But while Neufeldt strongly advocates for a holistic approach to peacebuilding, she acknowledges that it can be difficult. The viewpoints of both consequentialism and duty-based ethics are based on the idea that decisions are being made from a distance by rational individuals.[236] There is always a human element to any kind of decision-making process. Policy-makers in their offices and peacebuilding personnel on the ground are both effected by emotional responses and the impact of personal relationships[237] when making decisions.

It is also important to note that norms and values change across cultural lines, especially when they concern gender. Understanding the underlying norms of the host state can alter the entire course of the decision-making process. One of the keys to creating a lasting peace for any state is the transforming of these gender norms: "…sustainable peace requires a more permanent transformation of social norms relating to violence, gender, and power."[238] Changing gender norms will require a dialogue between, and participation from, both men and women though, which may be difficult to make happen.

Paul Williams has examined the similarities and differences between R2P and POC and explored some of the opportunities and challenges that can arise when linking them in UN peacekeeping operations. Williams presents a three-pronged argument. First,

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[236] Ibid, 433.

[237] Ibid, 433.

[238] Elaine Zuckerman and Marcia Greenberg, "The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: An Analytical Framework for Policymakers," *Gender & Development* 12, no. 3 (November 1, 2004): 70–82, https://doi.org/10.1080/13552070412331332330, 79.

he says that R2P and POC cannot be completely separated because they share the same normative goals and their issue areas overlap.[239] Second, it is possible to combine R2P and POC in peacekeeping operations, but the UN must set clear mandates to ensure the operations do not become counterproductive.[240] Third, and related to the previous point, the UN must clarify the different ways peacekeepers should respond to R2P and POC situations.[241]

Combining R2P and POC in peacekeeping mandates will only serve to strengthen the UN's operations. The chief priority of peacekeeping operations should be to protect civilians from violence, which falls under both models. POC also helps to improve upon the concept of R2P. While R2P focuses mainly on protecting people from human rights abuses, an important part of the POC mission is to work on re-building communities after conflicts. Community building is sometimes forgotten in peacekeeping mandates, but it is essential in ensuring that conflicts are not re-ignited.

Authors Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon argue that peacekeeping operations would be more effective in protecting civilians if the forces were composed of adequate numbers of military and police personnel. Their research uses a series of data sets comparing civilian casualties to the number of peacekeepers on the ground to support the claim that more robust forces help to prevent violence against civilians. Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon make a series of recommendations for implementing more robust peacekeeping operations. The first is that peacekeepers could

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[239] Paul Williams, "The R2P, Protection of Civilians, and UN Peacekeeping Operations," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, eds. Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 525.
[240] Ibid, 526.
[241] Ibid, 526.

directly intervene in hostilities on the battlefield, which may help to decrease overall violence.[242] The second is that peacekeepers could be used to create buffer zone between not only armed forces and civilians, but also between opposing combatants.[243] These buffer zones would decrease opportunities for civilian violence.[244] Finally, peacekeepers could police behind the frontlines in order to further protect civilians.[245]

While the data from Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon's article is convincing, their proposed solutions for decreasing civilian violence do not seem to take the complexity of modern conflicts into account. Having peacekeepers directly involved in hostilities calls into question their supposed nature as neutral figures. They would either have to join one side in combat, thereby aligning the operation with those forces, or they would have to fight both sides equally, which would spread forces thin and could actually lead to more casualties. These solutions are also difficult to implement given the changing nature of conflicts across the globe.

It would be difficult to create buffer zones in instances of civil conflict for two main reasons. One, civil conflicts often involve more than two combatant groups. Two, these conflicts often do not have clearly defined frontlines because individual combatants may return to their civilian lives while they are not fighting. Increasing the number of military and police personnel in peacekeeping operations could very well cut down on civilian violence, but the activities of those forces needs further investigation to truly be effective.

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[242] Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (Oct, 2013), 875-891. doi:10.1111/ajps.12036, 876.
[243] Ibid, 876.
[244] Ibid, 888.
[245] Ibid, 880.

Many scholars and peacekeeping practitioners maintain that including more female personnel in operations will resolve many of the issues surrounding GBV. Much of the debate about female peacekeepers centers around their combat readiness rather than what their unique perspectives can bring to operations.[246] As Alexandra Ivanovic notes, women are able to access 100 percent of the host state's population.[247] In some societies, male peacekeepers would not be able to speak to women unless there is a male family member in attendance. This presents a challenge, especially when dealing with cases of sexual violence. Many women already feel uncomfortable reliving their trauma, and there is added pressure when doing so in front of men.

But others in the field argue that the matter is not so cut and dry. Simply adding more women to peacekeeping operations places unwarranted expectations on them.[248] The belief that women will be able to naturally handle cases of GBV better than men reinforces traditional stereotypes about gender. Connecting gender with operational effectiveness can be a difficult metric to measure.[249] Including female personnel in peacekeeping operations may prove to be useful in some situations, but those women must still receive training on the subjects of GBV and sexual violence.

Being a witness to or a victim of atrocities is a mentally and emotionally traumatizing experience. It is unrealistic to expect that all women will naturally have the temperament and attitude necessary to handle these delicate issues. It is also unfair to

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[246] Alexandra Ivanovic, "Why the United Nations Needs More Female Peacekeepers - United Nations University," accessed July 21, 2019, https://unu.edu/publications/articles/why-un-needs-more-female-peacekeepers.html.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Gender and Peacekeeping," Policy Options, August 11, 2017, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2017/gender-and-peacekeeping/.
[249] Ibid.

place all of the onus on women. Male peacekeepers should be receiving the same training

in order to facilitate a large-scale change in the institution of peacekeeping. While

peacekeepers do usually receive gender-awareness training, which will be discussed

shortly, the programs often focus more on challenging gender norms than on what

peacekeepers can do to help women in crisis. Moving forward, a skills-based approach to

peacekeeping is what will ultimately make operations more successful in protecting

women from violence.[250]

For pre-deployment peacekeeper training programs to truly be effective,

practitioners must change their perceptions of what is considered rational or irrational

behavior in conflict situations. Conflict causes fundamental changes to a society. Death,

disappearances, torture, sexual violence and GBV become a normal part of everyday life

for people living in conflict zones.[251] As these events become more common, people see

them as being less irrational than they were before the conflict started. Peacekeepers must

be properly prepared to work in a society where the norms of acceptable behavior may

have changed. Their training may also challenge their own beliefs and attitudes

surrounding gender.

Many gender units attached to peacekeeping operations, which are in charge of

gender-awareness programs, are understaffed though so it falls to the few members of the

unit to handle all of the training exercises.[252] Trainers are commonly faced with the issue

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[250] Ibid.

[251] A. B. Fetherston, "Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 1 (March 1, 2000): 190–218, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310008413825, 195.

[252] Minna Lyytikäinen, "Gender Training for Peacekeepers: Preliminary Overview of United Nations Peace Support Operations," UN-INSTRAW Working Paper Series (The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2007), https://trainingcentre.unwomen.org/instraw-library/2007-R-PEA-GLO-GPS-WPS.pdf, 15.

of "problematizing dominant constructions of masculinity, which the military and police often draw on."[253] Peacekeepers may have a difficult time with this because it can feel like an attack on their profession, but they must be made aware that many of the traditional "masculine" military behaviors can be threatening and off-putting to civilians, which will make it difficult to build relationships with the local populations.

Discussions of gender are highly politicized from the outset because they involve deeply ingrained notions that are linked to personal beliefs and values. To help with gender-awareness training, the UN-DPKO developed a guidebook that is issued to all peacekeepers and can be carried with them at all times. The guidebook takes a "rights-based approach", which emphasizes that all UN peacekeeping personnel are supported and directed by human rights conventions.[254] This approach is supposed to remove personal ethics from discussions of human rights, but it can be difficult for people to let go of their versions of morality, which again is why training programs are so vital. The course that goes along with the guidebooks tries to accomplish three main goals:

> provide knowledge and information on how the relationships between men and women and their gender roles and responsibilities are transformed by violent conflict; develop basic skills of gender analysis and a recognition of the differing needs, capacities, and expectations of men and women; and make peacekeepers aware of the implications of their actions.[255]

The bulk of the course focuses on gender norms and the fact that conflict can shift and alter them into something that may be contrary to what peacekeepers are familiar with.

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253 Ibid, 15.
254 Angela Mackay, "Training the Uniforms: Gender and Peacekeeping Operations," *Development in Practice* 13, no. 2/3 (2003): 217–22. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4029593, 219.
255 Ibid, 219.

Once this is understood, the peacekeepers are given sample cases and they must identify the gender issues and what their implications may be. After a final discussion of gender and human rights, they are presented with more complicated problems in which finding solutions can be difficult, or even impossible.[256] This training course is designed to teach peacekeepers how to handle gender issues in the field, but it focuses most of its time on explaining gender norms. While this is undoubtedly an important part of gender-awareness training, it might be better completed during pre-deployment preparation. Once peacekeepers arrive at their operation's headquarters, they could benefit more from practical training, such as what to do if they witness GBV or other human rights abuses in the field.

Mats Berdal's view of robust peacekeeping is much more focused on the policy formulation process than on the personnel, but it may help to provide peacekeepers with a better idea of what actions to take in the field. Berdal says that operation mandates need to have clear guidelines that convey precisely what the scope of the operation is and what measures personnel are allowed to partake in.[257] Besides improving success rates and performance, clarifying mandates will also make it easier to hold specific individuals, groups, or organizations accountable for mistakes. At the same time however, it is important that mandates are not made too restrictive. Conflicts can change course on a day-to-day basis, and peacekeepers must be allowed some measure of flexibility in the field in order to fulfill their duties and protect civilians.

Conclusion

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[256] Ibid, 219.
[257] Mats Berdal, "The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo," Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 5 (2018), 721-750. doi:10.1080/01402390.2016.1215307, 744.

The conditions of the international system today have shaped how peacekeeping operations are conducted. The organized hypocrisy of the UN, especially in the UNSC, allows member states to make commitments to peacekeeping operations on paper and then not follow through when the troops and resources are desperately needed. Members of the UNSC are meant to be focused on maintaining global peace, but the current structure and functioning of the organization essentially places all of the decision-making power into the hands of only five states, which may decide to invoke their veto and stall the entire peace process at any time. Linked to this is the fact that the language in UNSC resolutions and peacekeeping mandates is still too ambiguous. Member states have difficulty deciphering what some of the resolutions actually do and the UN-DPKO is still facing major roadblocks when it comes to integrating a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations.

The inclusion of more female peacekeepers is still a worthwhile pursuit for future peacekeeping operations. However, while creating policies designed to be more inclusive to women is commendable, it is important to ensure that these policies are properly structured. Policy makers cannot simply throw women at a problem and expect them to fix it. Female peacekeepers still need the proper support and specialized training to deal with cases of GBV.

While gender mainstreaming is certainly vital during peacekeeping operations, research seems to show that this has done little to bring about real changes in women's lives after the conflict ends.[258] Gender mainstreaming must also be included in post-conflict peacebuilding operations. Post-conflict peacebuilding is especially significant in

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[258] True, 45.

civil conflicts because the former enemy combatants must continue to co-habitat within the state.[259] These conflicts require an "extended development and reconciliation process"[260] to ensure that any improvements that have been made for women's social, political, or economic rights can be sustained.

Ultimately, the UN needs to build a policy consensus on GBV which will "recognize the inherent social and economic inequalities that exist between women and men, identify culturally-embedded notions of masculinity as the root causes of violence against women, and mitigate the effects of women's marginalization in conflict and post-conflict settings."[261] Only after recognizing the roots of the pervasive gender norms that are at the roots of gender inequality can the UN move forwards in the fight against GBV.

[259] Stiehm, 40.
[260] Ibid, 40.
[261] Ibid, 47.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Summary

The 1990s were an important time for peacekeeping. With the Cold War over and the threat of a long-term stalemate in the UNSC no longer a paralyzing factor, the UN seized its chance to deploy peacekeeping operations to all corners of the globe. This new phase of peacekeeping was supposed to be based around humanitarian interventionism rather than enforcing ceasefires between two sovereign states, but the UNSC may have bitten off more than it could chew with the influx of new operations though. Some of the mandates were precarious (Somalia), while others were too restrictive and lacked manpower and resources (Bosnia). Combined with this was the fact that the US, the world's sole superpower at the time, was not as invested in humanitarianism as its new president had promised it would be.

This thesis used the Bosnian War and the UNPROFOR operation to illustrate a turning point, or a major juncture, in the institution of peacekeeping. Bosnia was one of the most critical peacekeeping operations in the years that immediately followed the end of the Cold War and began the new phase of international intervention. Instead of starting off the new era of humanitarian interventionism with a success story though, the UN was left with what is now considered to be one of its greatest failures. The mandate lacked the necessary provisions for peacekeepers to engage with combatants and use force to protect civilians, which resulted in the continuation of mass gender-based and sexual violence throughout the duration of the war.

Peacekeeping operations are now more of a mixed bag of rescue operations, stability operations, and some hybrids of the two. International interventions on the basis

of human rights violations are still fairly common though. Earlier in this thesis it was mentioned that most of the current UN peacekeeping operations have a specific portion of their mandate dedicated to protecting women from violence. This is certainly a sign that the UN is increasing its attention to women's rights. But there is more work that needs to be done. There are never calls for peacekeeping operations on the grounds of solely protecting women from violence. Since GBV also happens outside of conflicts, it is rarely viewed as a crime that warrants special attention. It seems to always be included as an afterthought on a long list of other atrocities and crimes against humanity. The UN must continue working to change the traditional norms surrounding GBV.

Since the adoption of Resolution 1325, the UN has been trying to implement a gender perspective into all peacekeeping operations through the process of gender mainstreaming. The UN has made some progress in this area. Some operations have entire units dedicated to integrating a gender perspective into their work. Unfortunately, not every operation has a full unit due to a lack of manpower and resources. There has also been an increase in gender-awareness training programs for peacekeepers. However, the implementation of these programs has proven difficult in some cases. Despite the progress that has been made, there is still quite a way to go before the UN has fully integrated a gender perspective into its peacekeeping operations.

Ultimately, peacekeeping as an institution needs serious alterations if it is to continue being pursued as one of the chief methods of global conflict resolution. The traditional methods of peacekeeping are proving to no longer be sufficient for protecting civilians and resolving the new types of civil conflicts the last decades years have seen. One question still looms large over peacekeeping: if peacekeepers are only allowed to use

force to protect themselves, what are they allowed to do when they are faced with human rights abuses and violence against civilians? While that is an important and somewhat relevant question, it will have to wait for another thesis.

Lastly, this thesis is highly critical of the UN and its current peacekeeping methods, but this is not to say that UN peacekeeping is a complete failure. The UN is a massive, complicated institution caught up in the middle of the complex web that is the international system. Despite the conditions the it is placed under, the balancing acts it must perform, and the ever-growing number of critics it faces, the UN always continues the fight to uphold the values it was founded on.

Opportunities for the Application of Research

This thesis is mainly an agenda-setting work in its current form, mostly due to the limitations that were encountered during the research process. The research done here takes a critical look at the limitations placed on peacekeeping operations, and while it offers recommendations on how to improve peacekeeping policies, it cannot be considered a true problem-solving proposal as it stands. In the event that this research is further expanded upon, there may be opportunities for publication in an academic journal related to gender studies, peacekeeping, or security.

While some of the reforms and recommendations mentioned in this thesis are already being implemented by the UN, there is still a lot of ground left to cover in terms of strengthening gender-awareness programs and improving resource and troop management. This work has the potential to spark further discussions about the protection of women in peacekeeping operations, namely where the gaps in protection are and how they can be closed without compromising the UN's values. The ultimate goal of this

research is to identify the points of peacekeeping mandates that can be improved upon to offer more protection to women against GBV and improve gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations. Ideally, its findings will provide a knowledge base that can be used by future peacekeeping policy makers to create stronger, more inclusive mandates in hopes of creating a safer world.

Limitations of Research

This work would be better supported by further field research, but unfortunately time and resource constraints prevented that. This project is mostly theoretical in its present form and would benefit from the direct input of policy-makers, peacekeepers themselves, and civilians who have lived through (or are currently living through) peacekeeping operations. This research was also limited by a lack of access to materials. Not all information on peacekeeping mandates, policies, and operations is close at hand and readily available to the public. Again, the lack of time and resources access these documents played a factor in this.

This thesis does not cover the topic of peacekeepers themselves committing acts of GBV against civilians. There is without a doubt quite a bit of overlap between that topic and what has been discussed in here, but there is already an extensive body of work on the subject of peacekeepers committing sex crimes against the people they are supposed to protect. This is less of an accidental omission and more of a purposeful one. This research sought to look at women's issues in peacekeeping operations from a slightly different perspective than many scholars have taken. Nevertheless, some of the recommendations that have been made in this thesis could also help to guide future

efforts to prevent peacekeepers from harming women, both civilians and operation

personnel.

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