tries which have built military aircraft alone for five years cannot provide themselves with carriers overnight, and countries overrun by the enemy cannot organize airways for perhaps years. Yet this view was translated by the Americans as a wish to govern the airways of the world by cartels and monopolies and in general to challenge the sacred cow of free enterprise.[7] It is evident of course that the American attitude was a reflection of the strength and the ambitions of the great privately-owned American airlines. Clearly in these conditions any far-reaching agreement was impossible and no comprehensive agreement was in fact reached. If the Chicago conference is a portent of the tenor of future international conferences, the opponents of internationalism need have no fears for the future.

The magnitude of our role in the Chicago conference as well as in such bodies as UNRRA does however, suggest that in the future we may be rather more than a small power in world affairs.

It is perhaps worth concluding with more hope than the facts seem to warrant. Those who find in the first half of 1945 an atmosphere incapable of nourishing international co-operation, are prone to forget how often—at least since 1939—that common sense and an awareness of high purpose have prevailed in the last ditch. After all the difficulties that have to be overcome are formidable. The differences of attitude between, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union are so great that what has already been accomplished, represents a far greater willingness to compromise and to make concessions than is generally recognized. Much has already been accomplished before the fighting has ended, and that of the solid enduring kind which may encourage further efforts in the future. When we recall that courageous remnant of the International Labour Office (which sought refuge, significantly, in Montreal) which was all that remained of the world order of the twenties and compare it with the number of actually functioning forms of international co-operation which now exist, there is at least ground for hope. If it were not that the problems of western Europe have so far been met by the surprising vitality of free institutions in the liberated countries we could be more certain—and more gloomy—in predicting the course of future events.

7. American sensitiveness on the subject of free enterprisemay be a serious obstacle to good relations in the period after the war. The desirability of preservingfree enterprise is a popular and, on the whole, a harmless platitude, but it has a powerful effect in lifting American public opinion from the rational to the irrational plane. There are powerful private economic interests in the United States which hold or seek to hold, advantageous positions in other countries—positions from which they can be dislodged only by undertakings of comparable economic strength, which in most cases means government sponsored undertakings. The declaration made at the Mexico City Conference of American Republics aimed at "the encouragement of a maximum of vate enterprise and a minimum of state interfer ence with it," may be taken as evidence that they have been successful in enlisting the aid of American diplomacy in their objectives. This, of course, is what happened at Chicago. The well-organized opposition which the American Bankers' Association is mobilizing against the International Monetary Fund proposed at Bretton Woods is further evidence that opinion on the methods to deal with the peace are far more sharply divided in the United States than in any other of the United Nations. Even if this division were not so clearly one of principle, it would still be unfortunate because it makes for uncertainty, and uncertainty is bad for international confidence.

Canada's Place in The British Commonwealth

By GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

IF we succeed in establishing an effective international security organization, many may ask whether the Commonwealth relationship will continue to have value for Canada. Those who do so can have little awareness of what signficance membership in the Commonwealth has had for Canadian national life. But equally important for the future is the fact that without the Commonwealth, there would be little chance of achieving and maintaining the type of international setting which Canada needs. It may be true, paradoxically, that the

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British Commonwealth of Nations, long hailed as the only working international security organization in existence, will acquire its greatest importance for Canada when means to enforce general international security have been established. This can only be the case, however, if the existence of an effective international security organization leads Canada to replace the negative attitude of the past, which arose out of uncertainty as to how security could be attained, by a positive approach to international and Commonwealth relations which will be grounded in a realistic appreciation of Canada's needs and of the interplay of forces at work in the world to-day.

Canada's natural advantages of position and relationships have resulted in the past in a not surprising but rather dangerous illusion of freedom of action. Not having suffered direct attack in recent times, we have come to look on our war efforts as contributions rather than as matters of life and death. Never having known political isolation, we have sometimes treated customary relationships with casual unconcern. True, we have reacted in moments of crisis with intense and highly productive activity. But how much of this activity is due to pride and to instinctive loyalty; how much to a recognition that the Canadian way of life, that Canada's future security and prosperity are at stake?

Dual Lines of Policy

It has been part of our approach to the task of building a country on the foundation of two peoples, differing in tradition, language, culture and religion, that we have not plumbed too deeply into the motives for our actions, that we have tried to avoid theoretical issues and to let the logic of events dictate our course. But as we move into a new period in which, if our efforts at San Francisco and elsewhere are successful, there is going to be much more international planning for security, for exchange of goods, for development of backward areas (to mention only the most pressing matters), it is questionable whether Canada, any more than any other country, can afford to continue being so empirical about policy or about developing the public opinion which should underlie policy. The establishment of effective international organization demands in fact not less but more active awareness of what are the essential elements of national life which we wish to maintain. Increasingly, national and international policies are differentiated not in character but only in the plane of which they are operating. If we accept general international security as our goal, as the recent Parliamentary debate on representation at San Francisco showed we intend to do, we must face its implications nationally and in relation to the Commonwealth.

The modern British Empire is the only empire in history which has broken up (in part) without breaking down. Because independence has customarily been associated with separation, the transformation of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth has met with two widely divergent responses in Canada; the one hailing it with enthusiasm because the Commonwealth relationship was a new bond which combined unity with freedom; the other viewing it with suspicion as a new means of controlling the policy, particularly in times of crisis, of states like Canada which were too remote geographically and too mature politically to be susceptible to more obvious pressures. Much of Canada's policy in the interwar period was directed towards finding a *Modus Vivendi* between these two points of view. Freedom of action and absence of commitment were stressed at Chanak and over the Treaties of Lausanne and Locarno. At the same time channels of communication and exchange of information were maintained. The purpose of having dual lines of policy was to reserve the right to make ultimate decisions in the light of specific situations and yet have sufficient contact so that such collaboration as was desired could be carried out. In the events surrounding the outbreak of war in September, 1939, were exhibited both the advantage and

disadvantage of having pursued two types of policy: the advantage that there could be no doubt but that Canada chose of its own volition to enter the war; the disadvantage of insufficient preparation individually and collectively, of hesitant diplomacy until almost the end, of poor coordination of policy in the initial stages of the war.

Looking forward, it would appear that there is no justification for dual lines of policy in the future. In the first place, Canada has demonstrated effectively that it makes its own decisions regarding war. There are still some who question this on the ground that Canada had not been directly attacked when it entered this war but is it not rather anomalous to maintain that a country is more independent if it waits for its enemies to decide the moment when hostilities should begin than if it decides for itself? More important, however, is the fact that war and the making of war have been demonstrated to have such far reaching effects that in the future decisions regarding the use of force are not going to be left to chance. This will mean in fact that countries will have much less freedom of choice regarding their forcible intervention in disputes than they have had in the past. Responsibilities will have to be assumed ahead of time. After the San Francisco Conference establishes an international security organization, Canada will be expected to designate the contributions it is willing to make to the enforcement of peace. Cooperative action in time of crisis will be not merely hoped for, but demanded.

What does this mean in regard to the Commonwealth relationship? It means at the least that the ground will be cut from under the feet of those who have looked on the Commonwealth as a subtle means of ensuring Canadian support for Britain in times of crisis. Whether that was ever true in the past, and it is very doubtful, it cannot be true if security becomes organized internationally. It means that the way is opened to an unequivocal acceptance of the relationship in terms of its positive values unhampered by fears lest it should ultimately mean involvement in "British" wars.

Let us look then at the positive advantages which have accrued to Canada in the past from the Commonwealth connection. Through it Canada has avoided one of the chief disadvantages of being a smaller power, that is, the lack of information on and consultation concerning issues of world wide significance. Before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, for example, Canada with the other Dominions had the opportunity to discuss with Britain the general principles underlying the organization of international security. Prime Minister King has said that during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which drafted the proposals for an international security organization which are now being considered at the San Francisco Conference, Canada received day by day information of developments. No other smaller powers outside the Commonwealth had such an opportunity. In the second place, the Commonwealth has been a grouping specially interested in the problems and purposes of the Dominions. Their points of view have been particularly influential in such issues as the development of trade and of communications. Obviously the Commonwealth cannot and should not attempt to be even moderately self-sufficient economically as the experiment of the Ottawa Agreements proved, but there are many developments short of this which without penalizing other countries can contribute to the special needs of Canada, which has to export both agricultural products and manufactured goods in large quantities.

But there are also other ways in which the British connection embodied in the Commonwealth has been and will be important to Canada. Of all the Great Powers, Britain is the only one which is not primarily concerned with regional relationships. Britain will need to have closer relations with European countries

after the war than it has had before. It will be important that Canada and the other Dominions do not try to restrain it from these closer contacts with continental countries as they did in the interwar period. But even taking into account the fact that Britain will inevitably be more involved in European affairs than in the past, it will still be true that its interests are primarily world wide. It remains sensitive to developments and trends everywhere and with a lively sense of responsibility for finding a balance between national desires and international needs. The Commonwealth has always reflected these world wide interests and reinforced its members' efforts to participate in general international affairs.

Canada's dependence upon foreign trade, its position as a "crossroads of the air," its proximity to the United States, to Europe and Asia, and across the Arctic to the Soviet Union, mean that it is affected by developments all over the world. This has led Canada not only to oppose any conception of "bloc" politics for the British Commonwealth or for any other group of states but also to lack interest in regional groupings such as the Pan American Union or in the idea of a North Pacific regional security group lest they limit the wide range of Canadian interests. This reaction has done nothing to impede the closest relations with the United States, symbolized by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence established August, 1940, and demonstrated in so many fields throughout the war. It need not necessarily do so in the future (though there might be some American pressure to join a North Pacific regional group if such were formed). But while Canada has no special desire to join regional groupings, it is fairly evident that there is a strong movement particularly in the Americas in favour of regionalism which may result in giving special functions to limited groupings within whatever general international organization is established. In respect to such a movement the Commonwealth may have a dual importance for Canada: first, as a grouping into which it is easy and natural for Canada to fit, but second, and more important, by providing a corrective to excessive regionalism. So long as the Commonwealth continues, international organization cannot be built upon purely regional arrangements. To make the point more definitely it can even be said that it is probably only the existence of the Commonwealth which prevents international organization from being built upon purely regional arrangements.

This may well be a fact of very great significance for world peace for the presence of great regional blocs with little connection one with another would be an invitation to power politics on a gigantic and terrifying scale. But at least for Canada it means that the maintenance of the Commonwealth relationship is not merely convenient and helpful but necessary for the preservation of a national life which has never been circumscribed by continental boundaries. Moreover, it may well be essential to the maintenance of an international setting in which "middle" as well as great and small states have their place.

The special needs and position of "middle" powers have been expressed most clearly by Canadian statesmen and with good reason. Canada's resources and area befit a great power, its population is that of a small country. It is sensitive to all the developments which affect great powers, and though it lacks the influence to carry through its aims by itself, it can give powerful aid to others. If "middle" power status is recognized officially or unofficially in representation on the Security Council, it will be but due acknowledgment of Canada's contribution in the war and its potential effectiveness in the future. But it should not be forgotten at the same time that within the Commonwealth Canada has long had "middle" power status. It has had influence fitting its potentialities but only such responsibility as it chose voluntarily to assume. It has shared the knowledge of a great power without

the obligations which customarily go with such knowledge. It has had in the past the guarantee of protection, in as far as that protection could be extended, without any attempt to restrict its freedom of action in making arrangements with other great powers.

It is this right freely to associate with and make commitments to a number of powers which may mark the chief difference internationally between small and "middle" powers. Small powers with their limited range of interests tend to cling to larger states which are geographically near to them. "Middle" states like Canada, Australia, Brazil, Holland, Belgium, Norway, cannot separate themselves wholly from great states but they will attempt, with more chance of success, to preserve freedom for other relationships. The very existence of the Commonwealth in many parts of the world helps to perpetuate the idea of wide ranging interests and to modify attempts to establish more stereotyped institutional arrangements. Its flexibility in securing unity of political action in essentials without sacrificing its members' freedom of association with other countries stands as a constant example.

There has been no effective political partnership in history which has left so much freedom to its junior members as has the Commonwealth or so contributed to their development. But beyond this is the more vital issue of whether the maintenance of the Commonwealth is not essential for the preservation of the type of international society within which Canada wishes to live. If so, is it not time that we stop thinking of the Commonwealth in negative terms or even in relation to the immediate advantage it offers, and begin to consider what steps Canada could take to maintain and strengthen an association which can never be an end in itself but which can contribute powerfully "in favor of peace on sea and land, of good understanding among the nations, of expanding commerce and greater political freedom."[1]

1. Herbert Morrison in his speech at the Guildhall, London, Feb. 24, 1943, printed in *Prospects and Policies* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944.)

Canada and the I. L. O.

By Pat Conroy

THE relationship between Canada and the International Labour Organization has been different from that of most other countries, on account of the inability of the federal government to ratify conventions or act upon recommendations adopted by International Labour Conferences. This condition can be remedied only by amendment of the British North America Act. Otherwise, Canada has shown deep interest in the I.L.O. and its activities.

Constitution of the I.L.O.

It may be desirable at the outset to point out that the International Labour Organization consists of three agencies: (1) a Governing Body, consisting of sixteen government representatives, eight employers' representatives, and eight workers' representatives; (2) a General Conference, ordinarily held at least once a year, and attended by representatives of governments, employers and workers from the Member-States, and (3) the International Labour Office, or permanent Secretariat. The Constitution of the International Labour Organization was included in the Peace Treaties in 1919, and the International Labour Office forms part of the organization of the League of Nations. It occupied its own building at Geneva prior to the outbreak of the war, but since 1940 it has been located at McGill University, in Montreal.

The annual Conference is the highlight of the International Labour Organization's activities, and in April and May of last year the twenty-sixth session of the International Labour Conference was held at Philadelphia. Canada has always been well represented at the Conferences,

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