

POLICING THE UPTOWN: INNER-CITY COMMUNITY POLICING
CHALLENGES AND THE HALIFAX 'RACE RIOT' OF 1991

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....1

Research Approach.....4

The Uptown.....8

Pre-Change Perception of Policing and the Police.....10

The 1988 City-Wide Survey on Public Safety 12

Other Sources on Police-Black Community Relations 14

Changing the Police-Community Relationship.....23

Storefront and Foot Patrol.....28

The Village Constable Project.....34

The Uptown Response.....43

Uptown Influentials and Others.....58

Other Uptown Responses.....67

Objective Data Analyses.....69

Pre-Riot Assessment.....74

The July "Race Riot"	79
Eve of the Riot	80
The Riot Begins	82
Aftermath of the Riot	88
Four Key Issues.....	95
Was It a Riot?	96
Was It a Race Riot?	100
Was it an Anti-Police Riot?	103
Implications for the Uptown Police Initiatives?	106
General Conclusions.....	109
Appendix: The Uptown.....	116

POLICING IN THE UPTOWN

Introduction

Recent government publications (Normandeau and Leighton, 1990) and ministerial statements (Solicitor General Canada, 1990) have emphasized that community-based policing (hereafter CBP) is now a major dimension of the official morality as it were for progressive policing in Canada. Surprisingly though, in light of the fact that the concept has been extant for more than a decade, there has been little in the way of thorough-going implementation of CBP in Canada and there is scant evidence for anything other than a modest impact of CBP on policing to date (Clairmont, 1991). In fact, at the very time that government is officially proclaiming CBP, some academic researchers and some police practitioners are beginning to 'deconstruct' the CBP philosophy and hinting that it might well be passé (Klockars, 1991; Mastrofski, 1991).

Clearly, CBP has been a philosophy rather than a specific program (Bayley, 1991) and thus many diverse police actions have been implemented in its name just as much has been proclaimed but not implemented. As Mastrofski and others observe (Mastrofski, 1991), it is important for research to focus more - describing and assessing - on what has been in fact carried out. To what extent have the potential dangers of CBP (see for example Skolnick and Bayley, 1988), such as greater police sensitivity to the respectable citizenry rather than to the vulnerable, been effected? To what extent and precisely how has CBP implementation reduced the steady if not increasing pressure on police to be reactive and incident-driven¹ by effectively dealing

¹ In Halifax for instance calls for service, crime rate,

with repeat calls and problem situations? To what extent has CBP reduced the likelihood of collective violence? Bayley (1991) has persuasively argued that police departments must be willing to explore the potential long-run benefits of CBP and that indeed it "may forestall the very situation most police officials fear most, namely, collective violence in poor, ethnic communities". In his view the key to successful implementation of CBP may be the amount of initiative exercised at the local level, something that depends as much upon top management as upon the middle managers.

Assessing CBP's implementation and impact necessitates identifying what are the essential aspects of implementation, rather than merely marginal strategies or tactics, and what would be the key impact measures. Implementation aspects that seem fundamental would be new organizations/committees linking closely police planning priorities and community groups, the constable generalist role, concern and commitment by police with a wide range of community problems, decentralization, and participative decision-making in the police management itself. Impact measures that come to mind would include reduction in fear of crime, more positive attitudes to police, more sense of 'ownership' and partnership among community groups and police in an area's problems, evidence of higher status within the police organization of the uniformed officer (reflected perhaps in promotion opportunities), and, in the long run, more basic crime prevention. Clearly the jury is still out on CBP's implementation and impact.

How significant and expanding the village constable concept

especially violent crime rates, and use of intrusion alarms have continued to rise since 1986 while during the same period the number of police officers has remained roughly constant.

is in the police organization may be a good proxie measure of how advanced the CBP approach is there. While not in principle a structural requisite of CBP, this concept appears to be at the leading edge of CBP as a new paradigm in the policing service. The concept, village constable or community constable or neighbourhood officer, is used by departments such as Halton, Halifax, Edmonton, Victoria and Fredericton to describe the pattern whereby officers are assigned full-time to a particular defined area (e.g., mall, housing complex, socially recognized area). Operating out of a 'storefront-type office' they are expected to maintain a high police presence in the area and to work closely with interests in the area to deal not only with conventional offences but also a wide range of community problems relevant for peace and order. At the minimum they are expected to be constable generalists if not more wholly oriented to proactive, crime prevention and problem-solving in collaboration with community 'stakeholders'. It is usually expected that village constables will have significant flexibility in objectives and strategies and will form local committees to work with them in relating the police service to local problems and concerns.

In what follows the implementation of CBP in a relatively high-crime, multi-racial/ethnic area is described in depth as a case study. Many of the key issues noted above are examined, such as the exercise of middle management initiative and police exploration of unusual policing strategies including the village constable initiative. Moreover while this report was being drafted an outburst of collective violence, described in the media as 'race riot rocks Downtown' (The Mail Star, July 19, 1991) occurred in the area in question; in concluding this paper the impact of that outburst will be considered.

RESEARCH APPROACH

In November 1989, largely as a result of significant community pressure generated in response to blatant street-level drug activity and attendant fear of crime and concern for loved ones, policing in the Uptown area of Halifax was launched on a new trajectory. Earlier in the summer of 1986 Halifax P.D. had embraced community-based policing and began implementing internal organizational changes that advocates and critics in the department as well as informed outsiders in Canada's policing circles considered quite radical (for a full description see Clairmont, 1990). As part of the new CBP policing style Halifax P.D. had downsized and 'constabilized' its detective division,² eliminated standard specializations, fostered the concept of constable generalists, changed its management structure and rearranged its patrol division city-wide in relation to spatial zones labelled Alpha, Bravo and Charlie respectively³; these three geographical areas into which the city was divided for policing purposes each encompassed much socio-economic heterogeneity. Halifax P.D. also began to forge closer, more collaborative ties with the public at the zone level. New community-oriented programs were developed and conventional ones

² The detective division, C.I.D., was reduced from 43 to 27 persons and the proportion of constables there jumped from roughly 30% to about 80%.

³ A number of persons have commented that the terms Alpha, Bravo and Charlie connote a militaristic labelling that is antithetical to the idea of community policing; this writer has never encountered such an opinion among HPD officers themselves but it is true that the chief zone officer has been frequently referred to as 'commander'.

such as Neighbourhood Watch were elaborated; most importantly, in 1988 community advisory groups were constituted to facilitate police-community collaboration in each of the zones⁴.

Little of this considerable CBP-activity was evident to citizens in the Uptown area of the city. The slight increase there in Neighbourhood Watch organization and other police-community programs had not impacted much on Uptown problems and the police presence there was in fact somewhat reduced by the CBP change since foot patrol activity there had for all intents and purposes been eliminated. While CBP provided in theory the basis for a new policing style in the Uptown as elsewhere in the city, it took the spark of a contentious November 1989 public meeting in the area to ignite significant actual change. Within weeks after the public meeting the police department had established a storefront operation in the Uptown⁵ - really the offices for the

⁴ The community advisory groups were basically selected by the zone police management with input from a variety of sources including political persons. Replacements have usually been selected by zone police management in collaboration with the zone advisory groups. The city's legally empowered Board of Police Commissioners approved the police initiative to establish these advisory boards; the Board has generally adopted a hands-off policy towards them and has not established any formal guidelines for their operation.

⁵ Halifax P.D. offices are virtually smack in the middle of Charlie zone and at the divide between the Uptown area and the Downtown area with its large office complexes, government buildings and entertainment operations. Partly because the police station was so located the chief of police was reluctant to establish, as had been done in both other zones, a zone office for Charlie zone outside the

administration of policing in the larger Charlie zone in which the Uptown area was located- housing the zone commander (who directed the efforts of some 100 officers) and the zone crime prevention coordinator. Also an enhanced foot patrol program was quickly instituted in the Uptown. In the summer of 1990 Halifax P.D. also launched a special 'village constable' project there. The project involved two constables (called community or village constables) working for the most part normal daytime hours⁶ under an essentially proactive, problem-solving, community-policing mandate.

In the space of six months Halifax P.D.'s commitment to the Uptown area and the quality and quantity of its presence there had dramatically changed. Zone administrative offices, a visible and readily accessible storefront office on the main street, foot patrol, problem-oriented community constables and a wide range of new police programs (including in 1990 a voluntary ten-person auxiliary or support-team operating out of the zone office) were put into place. The policing change is on-going but it can be argued that its first phase came to an end with the 'riot' of July 1991 and a new phase has started in 1992. This paper is basically an assessment of the policing change over its initial

central police building. The storefront administrative office that was eventually established, under some pressure from Uptown citizens and zone police managers, is about five blocks from police headquarters.

⁶ There has been some modest flextime in the village constable role but both the village constables and the zone commander have opted for more regular daytime hours. Generally the village constables have been encouraged not to incur paid extra hours.

period with an eye on the implications for subsequent developments.

The evaluation has had four pillars. First, the change was examined from the police point-of-view. Here it was important to determine Halifax P.D.'s objectives and implementation strategies. Accordingly, Halifax P.D. documents have been examined especially for both foot patrol and village constable projects. Since the storefront operation and the village constable project were the particularly innovative thrusts of the new policing format in the Uptown they were looked at most closely. Zone officials were interviewed in depth and meetings and time allocations were detailed. The two village constables and their supervisors have been interviewed at length and there has been a regular monitoring of the village constables' actions and the departmental direction and reaction.

The second facet of the evaluation has focused on the Uptown community and its diverse response to the HPD initiative. A quota sample of fifty adult residents, roughly equal numbers of Blacks and Others, were interviewed using a formal questionnaire (the questionnaire items had been used in an earlier study of Halifax public opinion on crime and policing (Clairmont, 1988) and so allow comparisons to be drawn) and a score of Uptown influentials were interviewed using an interview guide. Additionally, modest contact was made with street people, including prostitutes and the homeless.

A third area of research involved analyzing trends in calls for service, crime rates, arrests and other objective data in collaboration with Halifax P.D. analysts. The fourth strategy or pillar was to follow developments over time not only with reference to police data but also as regards public response, evolution of police-community programs and Halifax P.D.'s policies and assessments. In this regard there will be a brief assessment of the 1991 riot and its aftermath and of recent

developments that are shaping the policing approach in the Uptown area.

THE UPTOWN

As noted above, beginning in the late fall of 1989 Halifax P.D. launched a number of new policing initiatives in the Uptown as part of an extensive CBP response to community concerns and to crime and social order problems in that area of Halifax. The Uptown area - bounded by Cogswell, Robie, North and Barrington streets - is a racially/ethnically mixed area centred around Gottingen street, a formerly busy commercial centre now best-known as the site of the relatively large Uniacke Square public housing project and the contiguous large 'low-rental' Springwell (formerly Brunswick Towers) apartment complex. Along the Gottingen street hub one finds the type of lounges, stores and service facilities that mark the area off as serving the less advantaged city core (e.g., the Halifax Food Bank, The Salvation Army Hostel, the Black United Front, the MicMac Friendship Centre, pawn shops, quick tax return etc). The Uptown area is also the site for several senior citizen residences. While the larger businesses may have fled the area (some 'anomalies' remain from that period such as the New York Dress Shop which caters to the wedding dreams of the well-off) and some deterioration of the large apartment complexes has set in, the Uptown is also in the processes of gentrification (i.e., 'invasion' of middle income and 'yuppie' homeowners) at its boundaries and of restoration through renovation of Uniacke Square, new cooperative housing developments and the like at its core. In the past two years a number of small independent businesses also have been established in the area.

Uptown Halifax in some respects has become an active arena of community development, much of the activity centred around the North Branch Library and the George Dixon Community Centre. An

annual Uptown festival of cultural events has been held the past few summers with a common motto being "unlike any other major street, we are a community". With its mix of residents and lifestyles the Uptown has variety and a buoyant sense of community. One White artist living in the area described it as: "a neighbourhood with lots of character, very mixed and dynamic, with interesting things and people to see on the street"; a noted Black poet observed "those people who live here know it's a good place to live" (Atlantic Insight, January 1988). The main challenge has been defined as restoring the economic base of the area. The Merchants Association, noting the advantages of cheaper rent, available space and sense of community in the Uptown, has set its task as "improving the perception of the outside community; the perception has been quite negative" (The Daily News, May 4, 1991).

While it is not clear whether Blacks form a majority of the Uptown population the area is commonly seen as a Black enclave. The lounges and entertainment centres along Gottingen Street cater for the most part to the Black population in the metropolitan region. Stores (e.g., beauty parlours, music shops) and institutional services (e.g., the George Dixon Centre) highlight Black subculture. The area is also home to the Cornwallis Street Baptist Church, mother church of the African United Baptist Association. A large number of artists, gay persons and aboriginal people also inhabit the area. In recent years a significant number of Vietnamese refugees have moved into the area; approximately five hundred now live in and around the Springwell apartment complex.

The Uptown area for a long time has had a reputation for street crime, including assault and prostitution. In recent years it has acquired notoriety as a major centre for street-level drug dealing. Crack 'houses' have been identified in several large apartment complexes which have acquired a reputation for criminal

activity. One resident complaining about police inaction in a 1988 survey observed "there are too many kids hanging out in the square [Uniacke Square] and doing dope." Not surprisingly break and enter occurrences in the Uptown also have been high. For example one HPD report in 1989 observed that there were about 40 residential break and enters in the months of March and April 1989 in and just around the Uptown and added "no other part of the zone [HPD divides the city into 3 zones and the Uptown is in Charlie zone] even comes close concerning the incidence of this crime"; local newspaper reports have highlighted similar rates in other months⁷. Overall the situation was succinctly described as follows in an HPD report: "the perception is held by the rest of Halifax and beyond that the Uptown is too dangerous to live in or even visit" (HPD, 1990 Memo, Village Constable File).

PRE-CHANGE PERCEPTION OF POLICING AND THE POLICE

There are no studies that have detailed the relationship of the Uptown residents or Blacks generally with Halifax P.D. In the 1960s and early 1970s there were street protests especially by Black youths there against putatively negative or unfair police actions and attitudes. One officer who worked the beat in the Uptown during these years observed that Black hostility to police was very sharp and recalled many instances of conflict, including

⁷ The North End News which highlights events in a broadly defined 'north end' that includes the more central Uptown area noted for example in October 1988 that "in August ... a record 23 break and enters were reported in the [Uptown]". The same story referred to the development of a citizens' group in that area "to help combat the growing drug problem".

the overturning of a police car by a group of youthful Black protesters. Another constable, now retired, who worked the Uptown for many years recalled the large-scale confrontations between Blacks and HPD police that occurred in that period, especially noting the several times that large numbers of Black young adults and teenagers marched to the police station in protest. Recalling the tensions of this period a well-known Black leader observed that, comparatively, recent 'racial disturbances' were quite modest (The Mail Star, August 17, 1991). For the most part however the relationships between Halifax P.D. and Blacks have not generated much public controversy over the last fifteen years though many might well argue that the quiescence hid much alienation on the part of Blacks (see W. Head and D. Clairmont, *Discrimination Against Blacks in Nova Scotia: The Criminal Justice System*, 1989) and much reluctance to become involved on the part of the police. Periodic 'almost riots', a few scuffles that have resulted in court cases, and a perception by officers that, in a disturbance in the Uptown, they might have to confront a cohesive and combative group of Blacks attest to the perceived strain between police and Blacks there. Certainly it is clear that Halifax P.D. had no ongoing programs in-place to improve relations with Blacks, no salient in-service race relations / multicultural training and very few Black officers, none beyond the constable level⁸.

⁸ At the time of this research, January 1991, there were five Black police officers, all constables. On the assumption that Blacks constitute roughly 4% of the city's population (slightly higher than indicated in the census figures), proportionality norms would dictate double that figure in the 270 officer force in Halifax.

The 1988 City-Wide Survey on Public Safety

In a 1988 late-summer, city-wide survey of public attitudes and expectations concerning crime and policing, Uptown respondents (constituting but a dozen of the 500 plus representative sample) were much more likely to perceive their neighbourhood as more crime-prone than the rest of Halifax and to report that crime as increasing; also they were more likely to express worry and fear about walking in their neighbourhood at night and about themselves becoming victimized by the full gamut of street crimes. Several persons reported their fear that neighbourhood social order was decaying; one observed "I'm scared for the children with drugs, drunks and all the wrong things being done. Things are getting terribly out of hand" (25 year-old White female). While the Uptown respondents identified many neighbourhood problems the major ones were drug/alcohol abuse and drug dealing. Highly visible street-level dealing in cocaine and crack was especially wreaking havoc with community life. Local newspaper stories in the fall of 1988 and 1989 also attested to the problem; in the former period one leading Black spokesman observed "brother is afraid of brother and the sense of community is lost" (North End News, October 24, 1988) while in the latter period some residents conveyed clearly their fear - "don't put my picture in the paper 'cause I ain't getting murdered by those people ... it's really touchy. You gotta be careful." (North End News, October 26, 1989).

Residents who were able to 'compartmentalize' their activities and see their loved ones avoid the pitfalls and dangers often considered themselves lucky as the following quote illustrates:

"I know there are drugs around and I'd like to see those done away with. Probably a lot of things going on that I don't know of because I just keep to myself and my friends in our prayer group. Thank the Lord I've been lucky with my family and they're not involved in any bad things" (senior Black citizen)

Uptown respondents were also more likely to be critical of the police service. Virtually all felt that there were too few police serving the area and not enough of a police presence there. Their views paralleled the observation of one Uptown person quoted in the local newspaper at that time, namely "The police are just not here in this neighbourhood. If you'd just walk around here in the night time, you would see that for yourself ... no police, no cars, no foot patrol" (North End News, November 21, 1988). The common complaint of lack of police attention to Uptown residents' concerns was expressed by one interviewee as follows: "the police are scared to come into this section of the city. When they do come in, it's in car loads." There was a sense that police were indifferent to the point of being discriminatory. Some residents claimed police took assaults in the area less seriously - "Police feel that if [residents] are going to kill each other, let them kill each other" (North End News, November 21, 1988). Certainly the Uptown persons in the 1988 survey were more likely than other Haligonians to report police-neighbourhood relations as only 'fair' or even 'poor'; none said 'excellent' and only two said 'good'. While most of the Uptown respondents (both Blacks and Whites) considered that Blacks were not always treated fairly by Halifax police officers and a few were sharply critical of police attitudes and behaviour, the general view was that they wanted to see a greater police presence, including foot patrol, in the area. Interestingly, perusal of the 1988 questionnaires of respondents in the areas immediately abutting the Uptown, namely the Commons, Central Halifax and the North End, revealed a common perception that street crime was increasing in these neighbourhoods too (tied in most persons' minds to the drug problem) but also that neighbourhood problems, including crime, were relatively few and that police service was adequate.

Other Sources on Police-Black Community Relations

The above views were consistent with the few studies that dealt with race relations and the police in the late 1980s. Petrunik and Manyoni in their paper 'Race Relations and Crime Prevention in Canadian Cities' (Montreal, Conference on Urban Safety, 1989) observed that in Toronto and Halifax community workers active in visible minority issues contend that

"Police are not committed to community-based policing outside the conventional middle class [areas]. In predominantly non-White or poor areas, the police are said to impose policing strategies rather than consult with residents on crime prevention."

In particular the authors reported that much Black resentment had developed because of the perception that all young Black males are under suspicion because of the criminal activities of a few persons. Among their several recommendations Petrunik and Manyoni emphasized greater positive interaction between police and visible minority youth especially in high density public housing areas, and more collaborative efforts between police and community groups on issues of policing service and community needs - in other words more intensive community-based policing!

Of much greater significance of course was the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution which released a major report on Blacks and the Criminal Justice System in Nova Scotia in the winter of 1989. The report presented results from a province-wide survey of Blacks and Whites as well as from special focussed interviews with Black leaders and professionals. Perception of police discrimination against Blacks, and the latter being treated less fairly than Whites, was widespread among both Blacks and Whites, especially among the young adults. This view was shared by the majority of the leaders and professionals as well. Black and White respondents also reported approximately equal contact with the police though their evaluations of that contact differed sharply; while Whites

overwhelming described their treatment by police as "extremely well or fairly well", the majority of Blacks, whether male or female, considered that they had been treated "somewhat unfairly or very unfairly". Urban Blacks were more likely than their rural counterparts to report their dealings with and perceptions of police as unsatisfactory but this locational difference masked underlying causal factors such as level of education, employment status and the like. Surprisingly perhaps, in light of the criticism directed at the police, Blacks and Whites were both more likely to consider the police to be more responsive to change than other sectors of the criminal justice system such as the courts or corrections.

The authors concluded that there appeared to be among the Black respondents a desire to construct a cooperative and supportive relationship at the local community level with the police (Head and Clairmont, 1989, p50) and their chief recommendation to the Commissioners concerned the establishment of more positive police-community relations. Overall, the report called for more hiring of Blacks in the police departments, more effective liaison by police with the Black community, significant departmental training in race relations and the establishment of departmental standards and mission statements that emphasized a strong commitment to avoid all aspects of racism and strive towards an 'equal opportunities approach' (see Oakley, 1989) in the policing service.

While the Marshall Inquiry unequivocally contended that racism in the justice system, especially but not only among the police, had been a factor in the wrongful prosecution of Donald Marshall Junior, it conducted little research or hearings which could place the above-noted Black perceptions of policing in context⁹. Apostle and Stenning (1989, 121) in their report on

⁹ There was some pressure exerted by the Black United Front on

public policing in Nova Scotia for the Marshall Inquiry observed that research has generally found that police "manifest levels of prejudice and discrimination which are reflective of the larger social environment from which they come and in which they work". These authors presented data from Canadian research relating to civil liberties which indicated police respondents held views generally similar to those held by citizens at large but more 'conservative' and potentially prejudicial than political, administrative or legal elites¹⁰. Police, like the public,

the Commissioners to deal with some controversial justice system incidents involving Blacks but the Commissioners claimed such consideration would be beyond their mandate. A study of sentencing carried out by this writer on behalf of the Inquiry was the only truly behavioral examination of Black perceptions. The analysis of sentencing data for assault offences in the years 1985-88 established that Black offenders did receive harsher sentences than non-Black offenders (the discrimination hypothesis) and that the sentences for Black offenders were harsher when the victim was 'White' than when Black (the devaluation of Blacks hypothesis). However when legally relevant variables such as severity of the offence, prior convictions of the offender etc were taken into account ('controlled for' statistically) the differences in sentences between Black and non-Black offenders became insignificant; similarly such legally relevant variables largely accounted for the finding pertaining to the 'race' of the victim.

¹⁰ In the nation-wide survey research cited by Apostle and Stenning the political elite sample consisted of legislators, the legal elite sample of lawyers and the administrative elite sample of ministry officials involved in legal issues. Police 'conservatism' was reflected in

generally held, it was claimed, an 'individualist perspective' (this researcher would prefer the label 'individualistic and universalistic' perspective). Such an orientation advocates a strict, formal equality (i.e., nothing special for anyone since all presumably have equal opportunity) which is not open much to appreciating the particular historical and social context of visible minorities' disadvantage. Interestingly, the authors cite data indicating that in both the police and citizen national samples roughly one-third of the respondents also agreed "when it comes to the things that count most, all races are certainly not equal". Clearly views such as these in conjunction with an 'individualistic' perspective could generate prejudice and negativism against certain groups. The individualistic perspective, too, when applied to groups such as socio-economically disadvantaged Blacks who may be seen as potential sources of social unrest and among whom there is a relatively high level of street crime - both central areas of police responsibility - could clearly generate the kind of negative and indifferent attitudes on the part of the police that Black and White respondents in the other Marshall Inquiry research reported to exist.

Recently a social psychologist (an ex-HPD officer with ten years policing experience) has completed a survey study of Halifax police officers' perceptions and attitudes vis-à-vis Blacks and others. Perrott (1992) explored the level of

findings such as their being less likely than the elite groupings and even the citizen sample to support laws guaranteeing equal job opportunities for Blacks and other minorities. The Atlantic Canada portion of the national survey had too few cases for detailed analyses but Apostle and Stenning reported that the same basic patterns appeared to exist in the regional data.

alienation of police from different groups (e.g., the rich, White middle class, Black middle class, poor Whites, poor Blacks, other police) and their perceptions of how alienated such groups are in turn from them¹¹. In general he found that police especially identified themselves with other police and the White middle class and most sharply distanced themselves from 'poor Blacks'. Apparently the officers perceived the genesis of this reciprocal alienation as resting more with the poor Blacks than with themselves. Interestingly, Perrott reports that the Halifax officers' responses to various police action scenarios indicated that the ethnicity ('race') of the suspects did not influence police responses to the randomly assigned scenarios. Taken together these three findings - officers' alienation from poor Blacks, their perception that the basis for the reciprocal alienation rests with the community, and the similar police response to hypothetical action situations regardless of suspects' ethnicity or race - are consistent with the Apostle-Stenning views on the 'individualistic perspective' held by police and with the complex Uptown and general Black view that decries police negativity and distance while still wanting more police presence.

The above portrait also fits well with this writer's knowledge and research experience of police-Black relations over time in Halifax. Evidence going back to the world war one era indicates that the police orientation to Africville, a modest-sized Black neighbourhood on the edge of the city, was one of 'benign neglect' at best as police services were rarely made

¹¹ Perrott used the concept 'alienation' as an umbrella label based on measures of respect, liking and commonality of moral values and beliefs. His research has been directed especially by hypotheses concerning the social psychological implications of police solidarity.

available (except of course for major incidents) to these citizens despite petitions from Africville leaders (Clairmont and Magill, 1974, 92-135). In recent decades there was as already noted a certain level of familiarity of some police officers with Blacks but contact was essentially limited to the professional police reactive role. In recent years this 'social distance' has been accompanied by a caution in dealing with Blacks as officers have become quite sensitive to possible charges of racism and to potential Black challenges to their interventions¹².

There has been little evidence of any direct discriminatory action by the police. The Marshall Inquiry noted the virtual non-existence of complaints brought to the Nova Scotia Police Commission or to the Human Rights Commission¹³ by Blacks against

¹² Researchers such as Charles (1986) emphasize that there is back-stage and front-stage police behaviour and that researchers usually are limited to the latter. It should be noted however that this writer has spent over five years interacting with Halifax police officers and is fairly confident about the observations reported.

¹³ There have been very few Black complaints against police recorded by the Nova Scotia Police Commission, the Ombudsman Office or the Human Rights Commission. As indicated in the Marshall Inquiry (see Head and Clairmont pp 189-191) these organizations have not been very proactive and only the Police Commission has an unambiguous mandate in the area of Black complaints about policing. Unfortunately because of the unavailability of data on complaints by race of complainant Police Board and HPD files are of limited value.

Halifax police (Head and Clairmont, 1989, 189-191). Black protest groups have complained about police, when dealing with disputes, taking the side or perspective of those practicing discrimination (e.g., management and staff of Downtown bars) but few have complained of direct discriminatory police action. In five years of close contact with Halifax police on patrol this writer encountered expressions of social distance and unfamiliarity towards Blacks but no slurs, no blatant racist language and no obvious practice of discrimination as to arrests and charges. Since most Black Halifax police officers have indicated that they have experienced some slurs and stereotyping in their interactions with other police officers it may be that the writer's experience has been too limited¹⁴.

There appears to be little doubt that, especially in recent years, street police in Halifax have perceived their relationship with some Blacks to be potentially explosive. Large gatherings of Black young people in confrontation with police appear to have been defined as more serious and threatening than counterpart

¹⁴ Four of the five Black officers have indicated in newspaper interviews or other quasi-public forums that they have encountered some racial slurs and stereotypical remarks from their fellow officers. At the same time in all cases the references were to distant, not recent encounters and there was not conveyed a sense that much such behaviour occurred. One situation that has been mentioned as generating some racist comment involved police response in certain incidents involving mixed racial young couples; here apparently some officers had been quick to apply negative labels (e.g., pimp and prostitute).

White gatherings¹⁵; in reality though, at least in the researcher's experience over the past five years, the boundary between 'confrontation' and 'battle' has seldom been passed. There is little doubt either that police in their professional roles have perceived Blacks as more likely to generate problems for them. Such views are empirically rooted in two factual patterns. First, there is the police responsibility to deal with whatever social unrest may be associated with Blacks' attempt to overcome the legacy of racism and current discrimination in society at large. Problems with employment, with discriminatory practices in bars and lounges and so forth consequently have ramified often into problems with policing as well. Secondly, local police are especially oriented to and competent in dealing with 'street crime' which is the kind of crime with which socio-economically disadvantaged Blacks are disproportionately charged¹⁶. Like police elsewhere in North America, Halifax police

¹⁵ In several confrontations between police and large gatherings of young people over the past few years, the writer observed a different 'sense of the situation' depending upon whether the crowd was 'White' or 'Black'. Clearly police were more likely to assess the Black crowd as more potentially explosive and dangerous for police safety than White crowds. This 'sense of the situation' appeared to be based not on the number of people involved but on assumptions that there was more underlying hostility to police among the Blacks and more likelihood that there would be a 'one for all' situation if skirmishes developed.

¹⁶ While it was not possible to isolate crime data for Uptown residents, information on crown files for Metropolitan Halifax in the period 1986 to 1988 indicated that Blacks' level of charges for theft, break and enter, assault and

fraud/forgery was usually several times the rate expected on the basis of population figures. The Black proportions as regards charges for drugs and prostitution were substantially higher (see Head and Clairmont, 1989; Clairmont, 1992). Corrections figures for Nova Scotia were consistent, indicating a level of probation and provincial incarceration twice to three times the rate expected on demographic grounds. The differences between Blacks and Others as regards 'street crimes' would undoubtedly diminish, perhaps to insignificance, if socio-economic status, educational attainment and more subtle social variables could be controlled for. This would be especially the case where there are few barriers to the street crime in question; for example theft, assault, break and enter and fraud can be readily committed by anyone. In the case of other street crimes such as drug dealing and controlling prostitution there are barriers that make it difficult for persons to become involved unless there are in one of the 'in-groups'; such situations can be likened to certain ethnic groups controlling specific occupations (e.g., the Irish and Italians used to control building trades in New York) and explain partially why people of certain ethnic or racial groups have been especially associated with certain criminal activities. In the case of drug dealing at the street level and control of prostitution there are both Black and White groupings involved but more Blacks proportionate to their general population numbers. Apart from these observations it can be noted that the level of charges against Blacks for certain crimes such as commercial crimes would likely be less than that of non-Blacks. Also there seems to be very little crime among middle-class Blacks, much the same pattern as among middle

officers' contact with Blacks has been for the most part very truncated, limited in type of situation (mostly negative) and type of Black person (mostly street criminals) encountered. Where police officers have had a more normal and wider range of association with the Black community they have reported in Halifax and elsewhere a profound and positive shift in their perspective; unfortunately such experiences have been too few and too happenstance¹.

Overall, then, the pre-change relationship between police and Blacks (especially in Halifax's Uptown area) was 'brittle', a surface-level familiarity resting on much 'social distance' and reciprocal alienation. While there was apparently little direct discrimination or obvious racism there was not an 'equal opportunities' situation in the sense that police were perceived as not responding well to Black citizens' particular needs and concerns. An 'individualistic perspective' and a reactive, incident-driven policing style were major obstacles to improving the situation. Clearly as both Petrunik and Manyoni and the Marshall Inquiry recommended, a more positive and collaborative relationship between police and the Black community was required. With HPD's adoption of community-based policing the chances for the latter improved considerably.

Changing The Police-Community Relationship

In 1989 there was a considerable increase in police presence and activity in the Uptown area. To a very large extent this development occurred because of citizen complaints about the increased street crime, especially the blatant drug dealing in

class persons generally. Race or ethnic correlates of crime are not then the end of analysis but rather merely its starting point.

cocaine, and particularly 'crack'. Several drug-related murders in the area had dramatized the problem (see for example, North End News, October 26, 1989). Citizens began to protest about police neglect and to form localized groups such as the Concerned Citizens Against Drugs in order to combat the street crime and social disorder (see North End News, October 24, 1988). In meetings with the police administrators responsible for the zone the Uptown residents complained that they were competing - unsuccessfully- for police attention with the Downtown area (the entertainment, business and institutional centre of Halifax). The zone commander observed "there has been some suspicion, and perhaps not unjustifiably so, that the area was not receiving the policing it should" (Daily News, October 14, 1989); he added that police were out to change that perception and, referring to the in-progress renovation project of Uniacke Square public housing, added that police also wanted to be part of the community revitalization currently underway. Uptown residents organized several marches to dramatize their opposition to the drug-related social disorder and the police administrators participated, noting "we can't just sit back. We have to take an active role" (Mail Star, November, 1989).

At the same time as Uptown residents were mobilizing against drugs, the Mayor was setting up a blue-ribbon committee to act as a task force on drug awareness. In November 1989 at a memorable meeting in the Uptown sponsored by the Concerned Citizens Against Drugs and attended by the Mayor, Chief of Police and other city officials a packed hall of predominantly Black citizens poured out their anger and frustration -"anger at the police for not protecting their community, anger at politicians for ignoring it, and anger at the media for stereotyping it" (Daily News, November, 1989). The meeting succeeded in wringing on-the-spot commitments from the Chief of Police for more police presence in the area, including a police community office. Soon after the

Chief announced an enhanced foot patrol program for the area and a policy of "zero tolerance in the war against drugs", the latter supported both by the uniformed task force and a "follow up force to carry out drug related investigations". The Halifax Housing Authority, responsible for public housing, also hired two uniformed officers for extra-duty patrol work on a short-term basis.

Halifax P.D. since the beginning of 1988 was fully launched into its new community-based policing mode. The new style of policing would presumably lead to more extensive collaborative linkages between the police and the diverse Halifax communities and a more proactive, problem-solving police response. Yet manpower shortages throughout much of 1988, along with increased crime (especially break and enter much of which was related to drug activity) and a priority response to the Downtown as a result of business and institutional pressure, had meant scant police attention to the Uptown. Beat patrol in the Uptown was non-existent (years earlier the area used to be policed by four foot patrol constables working the four beats, Jacob and Barrington Sts, Cornwallis and Gottingen Sts, Gerrish and Gottingen Sts and West and Agricola Sts); and the zone's police administrators were stuck in a 'cubby-hole' at police headquarters, physically located on the edge of the Uptown but in effect isolated from its concerns and more oriented to the Downtown business and entertainment area.

The combination of public pressure, HPD's return to full strength complement and the motivation of the Charlie zone administrators (who were eager to leave police headquarters and establish themselves more autonomously in the zone) resulted in significant change. In the spring of 1989 a special undercover zone task force was set up in the Uptown to combat break and enter crime. Several key 'players' committing housebreaks were arrested and charged; some 'fences' were identified. During the

roughly four week period of the operation and subsequent to it the burglary rate in the Uptown declined. In September 1989 a high profile 25-day foot patrol blitz was initiated there in order to "cool down the area that is reputed to be one of the hottest places to buy drugs" and to harass, especially via auto checks, the drug customers who frequent the area; the zone commander was quoted as saying, "you make a lot of people nervous and many of them never come back" (Daily News, October 14, 1989).

In November, in response to the large public meeting noted above, HPD finally established a storefront to house its Charlie zone administrators. It was located right in the centre of the Uptown in one of the Uniacke Square public housing units; subsequently the office was relocated across the street for several reasons including the wish not to compete with those needing public housing. Locating the zone office housing the zone commander and the crime prevention coordinator in the Uptown and allocating from the regular police budget the several thousand dollars to rent the space and equip the office represented a significant HPD commitment to the area. Enhanced foot patrol in the area became a matter of departmental policy and in the summer of 1990 the two-person village constable unit was additionally implemented. Having beat officers in the area was seen by many in the community, especially the local political leaders, as high profile policing (see North End News, October 24, 1988 and October 12, 1989) and in launching this initiative Halifax P.D. was responding to community demands.

The idea of having village or community constables in the Uptown was generated by the zone police administrators and "sold" to a sympathetic top management that was committed to responding to the Uptown problems. It was in the words of the zone commander "not a tough thing to sell". The zone administrators saw the need for a special program and resource commitment which could get at basic problems (e.g., police-community relations, group

conflicts) in a zone where otherwise the response and enforcement pressures were all-consuming. The zone commander in advancing the proposal to top management observed "this proposal is the police department's first step in attempting to break the cycle [of poverty, violence and negative role modelling]" (HPD Village constable File, 1990). In announcing the village constable project Chief Jackson emphasized the generalized problem-solving role that police might play, noting

"I look at the police as the front-end load to social agencies. If they can find out what the problems are and decipher or assist the people in finding the way to solve these problems, then that's what we want to accomplish" (Mail Star, May 26, 1990).

He added that if the village constable program was successful it may be broadened to cover other areas of the city.

By the time the village constable program was put into effect in the Uptown it appears that some reduction in street crime and blatant drug dealing had already been achieved. Several tactical task forces and the institution of regular foot patrol had brought results at the surface level. Drug dealing on the corners while still operative was less in sight. Break and enters in early 1990 were at a three-year low (though the reader should note that break and enter at least in the short to intermediate run is subject to cyclical effects). Newspaper reports at the same time indicated less fear of crime and a perception of more order-maintenance on the part of Uptown residents. Moreover most of the residents in the Uniacke Square project and many throughout the Uptown had been organized into the Neighbourhood Watch program. It was possible then to conceive that the decks were reasonably cleared for the community police office / storefront and village constable program to achieve some of the unconventional police objectives associated with the concept of problem solving (see for example Goldstein, 1990). Since the

village constable program was the symbol of that effort and given the fact that the village constable role explicitly entailed unconventional policing, for which there were few available guidelines, much would depend on the officers involved, their zone supervisors and of course the receptiveness of the Uptown residents. Also relevant would be the attitudes and behaviours of the other eighty plus zone officers, many of whom considered even the enhanced beat patrol in the Uptown area to be inefficient policing and basically 'political'.

Storefront and Foot Patrol

Foot patrol in the Uptown has consisted of two officers on each watch working the 'Gottingen beat'. The actual beat (technically there are two beats) extends to most of the area defined above as the Uptown and occasionally sergeants have had to remind the foot patrol constables that their responsibility went beyond the Gottingen hub. Occasionally during daytime hours only one officer worked the beat but on all squads the policy has been to have a two-person patrol in the evening. The foot patrol program was initially closely monitored by the watch commanders who ensured that this usually unpopular and often perceived by street police as unnecessary if not unwise policy, was faithfully implemented. For the most part, and especially apart from the vacation months of July and August, the program has indeed been carried out. While there have been some exceptions the foot patrol constables have not been frequently been pulled off for other duties such as bookings or for special assignments. About a year after the program's initiation foot patrol policy was revised such that the beat was worked only until 10 p.m. after which time the constables usually were assigned to the Downtown and/or to 'the wagon'; the change was premised on the argument that 'not enough was happening in the area to justify keeping them there'.

The four squads constituting the Charlie zone watch have implemented the foot patrol program in different ways. On one squad the beat has been assigned on a virtually permanent basis to specific constables while on the others the beat assignment has been rotated among the constables from 'rookies' to, in at least one case, those with middle levels of seniority. The constables with highest seniority have virtually all been exempted from beat work. Squads have varied too in the extent to which the beat assignment was allocated on a shift or cycle basis. The latter has been a popular option among constables since many found they could better prepare themselves mentally, clothes-wise etc for seven or so cycles per year of beat work rather than for four times that many twelve hour shifts.

As noted above, for the most part beat work has been unpopular and reportedly a fair amount of depression seems to have accompanied the beat assignment. Dislike of working the Uptown area may have been a factor but there were many others including the preference for mobile patrol, protection from the weather, being removed from the 'action' of the Downtown and so on. Certainly the beat officers rarely appeared unhappy about being drawn off beat work for whatever the alternative. Not surprisingly then sergeants often cite morale as the main reason for rotation of the assignment.

Research has established that while foot patrol does not impact much on the crime rate in an area (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) it can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime in an area and can improve police-community relationships (Trojanowicz, 1985). It appears from objective departmental data that foot patrol in the Uptown has had an impact on 'order maintenance' type problems (e.g., public intoxications, unwanted persons, street disturbances) and has contributed to the visibility and presence of police in the Uptown. Storeowners / managers have acknowledged the beat officers who regularly 'check in' their

premises. Some officers with other links in the area (e.g., sports programs) have particularly established good rapport with Uptown residents via their beat work. Clearly though few beat officers have developed the sense of 'ownership' often attributed to the beat officers of yesteryear. The foot patrol service suffers from inconsistent delivery partly because the constables have been seen as 'floaters' (to be used elsewhere if needed) by some NCOs, partly because of the lack of officer enthusiasm but more because of the rotation of assignments. Nor does the beat work allow much in the way of extensive proactive work or problem-solving. Its contribution is aptly described in a Charlie Zone document as "a service directed at the immediate and short-term needs of the community" (Village Constable File, 1990).

The establishment of a storefront or community police office on the main street in the heart of the Uptown may well have been significant in and of itself but the fact that the office houses the zone commander and zone crime prevention coordinator has added considerably to its significance. It has meant that middle management has been close to Uptown concerns, especially significant in this instance given the deep commitment of the officers involved to community-based policing. Interestingly when Halifax P.D. first introduced CBP there was a pervasive view even among some of its departmental advocates that it would work in the other more residential and less demanding (in terms of calls for service) zones but never in Charlie zone with its commercial, institutional and entertainment mix. A strong argument could now be advanced that in many respects - accessible storefront, close ties with local residents, extensive area proactive programs and of course the village constable project - Charlie zone is the most implicated in CBP.

The community police office has evolved over time into a genuine community office. Still-photographs across the eighteen months of its existence would, if they existed, reveal more and

more posters on the exterior windows and inside walls drawing attention to non-police educational and employment opportunities (e.g., the law program at Dalhousie for Blacks and Micmacs, affirmative action in the fire department) and to cultural events. A plaque on the wall given by the Ward 5 Association recognizes the Charlie zone office's contribution to the ward. The accessible office has been 'dropped into' by increasing numbers of Uptown residents and the phones have been constantly ringing. Unfortunately no record has been kept either of drop-ins or phone calls but this writer's observation over the period is consistent with the above description. An office worker hired on a short-term grant observed on her last day of employment in July 1991 that over the past six months the increase in local traffic and phone calls had been considerable. She felt that the office had indeed become a centrepiece of the area.

The community police office has increasingly been used for police-community meetings directed at area problems. Clearly the fact that the zone administrators are housed there has been a boon for innovation and problem-solving since middle management initiative has been directly harnessed. One of the most interesting illustrations of this has been police-community action concerning 'swarming or wilding' activity engaged in by some young Black teenagers from the Uptown¹⁷. This activity has received much media attention and extended beyond the Uptown. Zone police administrators arranged for meetings at the

¹⁸ Swarming or wilding as observed by police has involved more than Black youth but Black teenagers have clearly dominated the activity according to police information. In swarming or wilding a group of young people swarm around a person, hassling them and stealing something from them, be it a purse or an article of clothing. Swarming has occurred at public events such as at basketball games and festivities.

storefront with various Black community leaders and at these packed sessions (roughly twenty-five persons) where the exchange was freewheeling and vigorous, a collaborative strategy was worked out. Community leaders of course were opposed to 'wilding' (indeed it mostly affects Uptown residents with its disturbance/modest damage annoyance) but they did not want children arrested nor police-youth relations to sour. A plan of action was agreed upon whereby community cooperation identified the young persons and the identified youths' parents would be visited by a village constable working flextime in the evening. While it cannot be said at this time that the problem has been eliminated by this strategy it certainly represented a departure from conventional police practice and meaningful community input into operational policing practice.

Perhaps the main consideration is not that the storefront has become a major site for police-community meetings but that it has brought accessible and innovative policing to the Uptown. The openness to the community and the middle management involvement has enabled the police to relate at least minimally to real Uptown concerns expressed by real community leaders. Imaginative strategies have emerged for example from meetings between Black young adults and zone police administrators over the role the police might play in detecting discrimination and racism in Downtown bars; while these strategies (e.g., use of plain clothes officers to monitor how Blacks are treated) have not proven successful, the attempt and the whole problem-solving collaborative process seem to symbolize a new relationship. Zone police officials have come to judge themselves by how well they know the Uptown and its people and how positive the latter are with respect to the policing service. They draw satisfaction from the positive comments of Black youth and the increasing attention of major Black leadership. Clearly the relief shown recently when they found out that a broken storefront window was the work of

'outsiders' and not local youth speaks to that commitment. The only apparent shortfall of the community police office has been its strictly daytime hours of operation which has limited the police contact with the social life of Uptown residents.

While the storefront operation has effected some close ties between police and the Uptown community, police have been less successful in involving Uptown persons, especially Blacks, in their zone advisory committee or their auxiliary, support team of mostly young adults. Black community leaders have only infrequently attended zone advisory meetings and the drop-out level has been high among those who have joined; at the time of this writing - spring 1991- there has not been a Black attendee at a zone advisory meeting for well over a year. Similarly few Blacks or Uptown young adults have been attracted to the zone's voluntary support team¹⁸. Clearly the police-Uptown relationship while improved has remained brittle in the sense that a single negative incident could set back the relationship profoundly. Still the Halifax P.D. has invested heavily in effecting change in the Uptown. Indeed one might wonder why other areas of Charlie zone such as the Downtown and the more socio-economic advantaged Southend and far Northend have not complained about the considerable zone commitment to the Uptown. These areas had generated vocal spokesmen on presumed policing shortfalls in 1987

¹⁹ The difficulty of Halifax P.D.'s recruiting Black, Uptown youth for this volunteer activity has been discussed several times in the press (for example see North End News October 12, 1989 and October 26, 1989). As noted recruitment of Blacks for the zone advisory committee has not been very successful either. Indeed police recruitment of persons for any voluntary role has not been easy as is evidenced by the small number of cab-drivers who joined HPD's 'Taxi on Patrol' organization (see North End News, January 25, 1990).

and 1988 but the absence of some of these spokespersons, the use of off-duty officers in the Downtown and the persuasion of zone administrators (i.e., that the Uptown needs the policing resources) have so far produced a tolerant atmosphere.

THE VILLAGE CONSTABLE PROJECT

In inviting volunteer applicants for the two Village Constable or Community Constable positions the departmental posting identified the duties as follows:

- 1) to work and liaise with the social service agencies, citizen advocacy groups, business and youth in the pilot area
- 2) to aggressively present themselves to the community organizing Neighbourhood Watch and promoting crime prevention programs
- 3) to identify community problems and needs and work to develop solutions
- 4) to work with area youth promoting anti-drug and sports programs

It was further noted that among the personal characteristics required, the ability to work with minimal supervision, commitment to community-based policing philosophy and problem solving skills would be emphasized. While allowance was made for interviewing up to ten applicants few officers applied. The constable subculture did not identify the posting as desirable. Ultimately a senior constable (roughly fifteen years on the force) and a mature recruit (roughly thirty years of age and not yet a constable first-class), both of whom were 'White', agreed to take on the challenge.

The village constables since assuming their positions in the summer of 1990 have worked out of the zone office/storefront on Gottingen Street. While much has been left to their own initiative in terms of familiarizing themselves with the area and achieving the objectives noted above, they have been of course in

virtually daily contact with the zone administrators, namely the zone commander (Inspector rank) and the crime prevention coordinator (Constable rank). Additionally they have had some informal contact with regular patrol officers who for various reasons drop in at the zone office. Their major activities in 1990 included meeting with businesses, social services and advocacy groups in the Uptown, assisting in the furthering of Neighbourhood Watch activity, making themselves visible on the streets (they wear uniforms and are armed) and linking up with schools in the area. A special and time-consuming project was preparing for and participating in a fall conference, the Multicultural and First Nation Youth and Police Conference. They have had certain freedom to establish their own agenda but it has been understood that working with schools and youth and with Blacks and other visible minorities would be important however specifically it was done. They were advised by the zone commander to sharply limit conventional response and enforcement policing duties and have not handled follow-up investigations. Although at least initially it was expected that they would 'walk a lot' generating contact and exposure (the zone commander often remarked that at least initially the goal for the village constables was "to get out there and get known"), the zone commander indicated that they should not do substitute foot patrol work since that would deflect them from their special mandate. Additionally they were advised not to dissipate their efforts at community problem-solving and lose control of their agenda by simply joining the boards of extant community organizations.

Examination of the village constables' mid-term progress report and their monthly work reports for the first quarter of 1991 indicates that there has been a reasonable match between the goals and objectives laid out and the work accomplished. They have had a total proactive emphasis. Response activities have

been limited to a few incidents a week and there has been virtually no enforcement (e.g., tickets) nor investigative work (i.e., no follow-ups have been assigned to them). The village constables' efforts have come to focus around three themes, namely (a) school liaison and related activity (notably here an imaginative cross-walk safety program¹⁹ entailing competition among schools on traffic safety has been developed aimed at a significant real problem of children being struck by cars in this high traffic area), (b) social problems and crime in the Springwell apartment complex (especially working with the Vietnamese there to abort a potentially more serious crime problem), and (c) senior citizen liaison. Apparently their plans are to continue these thrusts during the rest of 1991 while also setting up an advisory committee from the Uptown to supplement the advisory committee for Charlie zone as a whole which was established in 1988. The proactive thrust might however be reduced somewhat since there appears to be a likelihood that for a variety of reasons the village or community constables will become more 'full service', that is take on more response, enforcement and investigative responsibilities.

The village constable program has been strongly supported by the zone administrators who advanced the concept initially. The zone commander emphasized its significance by discussing its elaboration as 'objective # 1' in his report on 1991 zone objectives. Both the village constables and the zone administrators regard the program as quite successful to date.

²⁰ The cross-walk program involved the establishment of a competition between schools to see which school's young children would secure most citations for safe cross-walk behaviour. The cross-walk safety problem had been much discussed previously by parents and school officials in the Uptown (see for example North End News, October 24, 1988).

Certainly the school liaison and the imaginative crosswalk safety program are seen by virtually everyone - police and community alike - as valuable. Preventing accidents and developing good police relations with Uptown children are priority concerns for both police and Uptown parents.

More generally, rapport between police and Uptown residents appears to have been advanced as the village constables increasingly identify with the area, develop a sense of "ownership" regarding its problems and by their commitment (i.e., the department's allocation of scarce resources) legitimate themselves and exhibit accountability to the community. The problem-solving activity concerning the Springwell complex and the Vietnamese seems to be an excellent illustration of the value of the village constable approach -working intensively to improve the living conditions (physical and other) in the housing complex and reduce criminogenic conditions as well as assisting an immigrant group in their adjustment (not the least of which may be a suspicion of police) to reduce potential crime. The village constables have been able to focus on problem spots which have generated repeat calls. In the case of the Springwell complex for example monthly sessions with security personnel, meetings with the owners to urge housing improvements and greater police presence have caused incident reports to decline in the first half of 1991 to 81 compared to 145 in the first six months of 1990. Certainly the village constables themselves have remarked that they have been able to do lots of things that could not have been done under the old policing style; in addition to the specifics already mentioned they noted how a problem of prostitution and drugs in a large apartment complex was resolved as a result of frequent meetings of police, security persons and housing management.

Possible Shortcomings Implementing the Village Constable Role

Not all the village constable activities may represent effective and efficient implementation of the concept and some omissions and trends may be significant. The senior citizen liaison appears less valuable as presently implemented. While the seniors may welcome the police presence and have their fear of crime lessened, it is not clear that the most vulnerable seniors are being targeted or that the effects, intended and otherwise, require the current police thrust. While seniors living alone or perhaps in mixed public housing would appear to be more vulnerable to crime and more in need of organization and crime prevention savvy than those in the senior residences, it is the latter who receive the police attention. Officers who have acted as liaison to senior citizen complexes elsewhere in the city have not been persuaded that the investment of their time there was worthwhile. Perhaps general volunteers or the HPD-trained auxiliary police volunteers established by HPD in 1990 could well provide the benefit now produced by the village constables in this area. Also the village constables both work essentially the same schedules and while there has been some flextime, essentially they have worked 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. This schedule may be fine for contacting institutions and businesses but it leaves something to be desired as regards linking up with community life in the Uptown.

Then too it may be observed that thus far the collaboration between the village constables and established advocacy groups (e.g., Black United Front, Uniacke Square Tenants Association, Welfare Rights, Citizens Against Drugs and other community service organizations) in the Uptown has been modest. This may have been quite predictable given the common difficulty of being accepted or welcomed initially by strong advocacy groups (as anthropologists have often found, 'outsiders' usually establish first contacts with more marginal community elements) and the

police 'decision' to avoid placing the village constables on the boards of extant organizations. The constables have had limited input from the dominant Black community though they did organize and attend conferences on police-race relations, participated in some community festivities and even wrote rap lyrics to publicize a new police-community relationship. The limited contact may of course be related to work schedules as noted earlier since the constables were rarely around in the evening when much community social life occurs. The village constables saw themselves as dealing with community problems; as one said "basically we go wherever the community's needs are. We see a problem and target it. We try to help or get the community to solve it" (North End News, September, 1991). The village constables basically set their own agenda without much formal input from any community grouping (aside from the schools) though clearly their objectives were quite reasonable and indeed were generally well-received by Uptown residents.

The limitations of the village constables' involvement in the Uptown also may not be a long-term problem. After all they cannot do everything and they have been building up credibility and greater acceptance. Certainly their goal of establishing an Uptown advisory committee to get more community and especially Black community input into their agenda-setting should at least yield a general level of Uptown community sanction for their activities. There would be no particular problem at all so long as other facets of HPD's community-based policing response are manifested in the Uptown; these latter include the storefront, an aggressive policy at hiring women and minorities, a multicultural in-service training program, use of the zone's auxiliary volunteer group and participation of the zone's community advisory committee. However as noted, Blacks have not been involved significantly in the volunteer group and zone advisory committee and thus far the recruitment policy has not been

implemented and the multicultural in-training program only modestly put into place. Under such circumstances more deliberate targeting might be necessary to ensure a high level of collaboration with Uptown residents.

It may be noted too that the village constables were not given any special training for their new work and there is a dearth of police material from any jurisdiction on the village constable role; accordingly they have to feel their way and develop strategies as they go. Moreover, given the heavy departmental commitment represented by the storefront and the village constable project, it should not be surprising that the village constables get neither overtime pay nor resources for specific projects; as one officer noted they generally 'have to bum it'. The apparent impending shift toward a more full-service village/community constable would certainly be popular with other patrol officers and especially the front-line supervisors in the zone who appear still to be quite skeptical of the village constable project. It might well also lessen whatever sense of estrangement the village constables have vis-à-vis other patrol officers. The danger of course is that it might also seriously erode the kind of problem-solving proactive thrust so promising in the current village constables' efforts, either by cutting sharply in the time available and/or undercutting their rapport with Uptown residents; aggressively pursuing 'the bad guys' might conflict with aggressively pursuing the criminogenic conditions.

Generally the village constables seem well satisfied with their task. They seem up to the ambiguities of the role. One observed that he is "a resource person for the village but I am a police officer so if they do something wrong I will enforce it"; another noted "we like to be a policeman but a friend type". They indicate much job satisfaction, particularly appreciating the considerable self-direction and flexibility of their work. Two significant problems have been the negative impact for wages and

the level of departmental moral support. Concerning the former the village constables by dint of their proactive emphasis forego significant court overtime pay and recently due to a departmental change of policy have also lost their shift differential pay, a total difference of roughly \$4000. The support of fellow zone officers, both constables and NCOs, for the village constable project has also been problematic given the removal of the officers from the patrol routine and the ambiguities of the proactive, problem-solving approach. There was virtually no consultation with regular patrol officers (NCOs or constables) prior to launching the village constable initiative and there is considerable ambivalence in the operating police subculture concerning proactive, prevention work. Some steps have been taken to mitigate the problem including having the village constables attend more departmental briefings and engage in more reactive and investigative activity (i.e., becoming more 'full service'). Still it is a challenging problem aggravated by the tensions that exist between police and some Uptown residents. One officer at the storefront summed up the challenge well; "they [regular patrol officers] are fighting the Blacks and we're down here shaking hands and writing rap songs".

In comparison with village constable programs elsewhere in Canada (Clairmont, 1992), this one launched by HPD is similar in that such activity in all jurisdictions has been somewhat segmented from the daily work of the rest of the department. In all jurisdictions village constables with their different policing mandate have reported problems of status and respect vis-à-vis field supervisors, middle managers and patrol constables. In most jurisdictions residents served by village constables usually perceived sharp differences between 'our police' and 'regular police'. Halifax's village constables have been somewhat unique in having a virtually exclusive 'proactive' mandate and in not having a formal advisory board to which they

would be partially accountable.

On the whole then the police officers involved in the storefront operation and the village constable project believe they have achieved significant success. Certainly the storefront itself offers easy access to Uptown residents and is increasingly a beehive of collaborative police-community activity. And clearly some imaginative, problem-solving (in the sense of getting at underlying factors) initiatives have been launched by the village constables. There is an expectation that objective departmental data on calls for service etc would support their claims of success. And maybe the bottom line is as one officer noted "the fact is that there has been no heat [community complaints about policing] on the mayor or the chief as there was in 1989". Both the storefront and the village constables basically operate only during the day which limits the match between their activity and community needs. Also there clearly has been less formal contact with dominant community stakeholders (especially Blacks) than might have been expected or desired.

Perhaps the most significant shortfall to date has been the relative failure of these CBP initiatives to make more headway vis-à-vis a skeptical police subculture. Foot patrol as noted appears for the most part to be regarded as inefficient and 'political' and most zone officers have still to be convinced that the heavy departmental commitment to the Uptown as represented by the zone office site and the village constable project are worthwhile. Several officers have observed that there still appears to be an anti-police attitude among many Blacks in the Uptown and that there have been a few 'near-riots' over the past year; they wonder too if only the converted drop into the community police office. Some officers have suggested that perhaps the problem has been a failure to communicate more fully to patrol supervisors and patrol constables the work that is being achieved by the intensive CBP effort. Since several patrol

officers on their own have talked to bar managers in the Downtown about discriminatory practices there, clearly openness to a more CBP-type approach exists. Of course a major problem in much of the latter activity is that it is difficult to develop measurable levels of success since it is virtually impossible to show how much crime, ill-will and so forth has been prevented (Fielding, 1989).

THE UPTOWN RESPONSE

The local newspapers publicized well the Halifax P.D.'s Uptown initiative, especially the community constables project (see for example North End News September 27, 1990 and October 11, 1990). Within two months of enhanced foot patrol and the community office being established Uptown residents were being asked for their reactions. In one typical instance in January 1990 the handful of interviewees praised the higher police profile in the area and suggested that it was already effecting more safety on the streets (North End News, January 25, 1990). In January 1991 this researcher undertook a modest survey (see questionnaire in appendix) of public opinion among Uptown adults using for the most part the same questionnaire items employed in the 1988 Halifax-wide study of public assessment of crime and of policing noted above. Fifty respondents were interviewed (47 usable questionnaires resulted) by two Black female university students employing a quota system (i.e., aiming at 25 Blacks and 25 non-Blacks, 25 women and 25 men). While the procedures were not as rigorously scientific as in the early survey they permit a reasonable assessment of Uptown views and allow for some comparisons to be drawn with the earlier Halifax study. In addition to the survey, special interviews were carried out with about twenty 'influentials' in the Uptown, usually leaders of various organizations there.

Table 1 indicates that what is special in socio-demographic

terms about the Uptown sample is that it is by design younger (having roughly half the percentage over 50 years of age as the Halifax sample as a whole or even the Charlie zone subset) and more Black (roughly 47% compared with 2%). There is much less difference among the three samples in terms of sex distribution and length of time lived in Halifax or in the current neighbourhood. It may be noted however (see Table 12) that only 23 % of the Black Uptown respondents had lived in the neighbourhood for less than five years. While these demographics would generate the expectation of less favorable orientation to police and policing among the Uptown sample (i.e., youth and disadvantaged minorities tend to be more critical of police) it is unclear what to expect concerning perception and fear of crime.

While the Uptown respondents were less likely than those in the Halifax-wide sample to perceive Halifax as a high-crime area and most reported their neighbourhood as 'average crime-wise' (see Table 2), they were more than doubly likely to perceive their own neighbourhood as having more crime than the average Halifax neighbourhood and they were more likely (68% to 48%, see Table 2) to report crime as having increased in their neighbourhood over the past year or two.

TABLE 1. SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS BY AREA (%)

<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u>	<u>UPTOWN</u>
	N=513	N=187	N=47
% FEMALE RESPONDENTS	61%	56%	62%
RESPONDENTS 50 YRS AND OLDER	42%	36%	20%
% BLACK	2%	2%	47%
LIVED 5 YRS OR LESS IN HALIFAX	15%	12%	21%
LIVED 5 YRS OR LESS IN NEIGHBOURHOOD	33%	43%	38%

* Unweighted frequencies

TABLE 2. SELECTED PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME IN HALIFAX* (UPTOWN % IN BRACKETS)

"Do you think Halifax is an area with a high amount of crime, an average amount or a low amount?"

High	Average	Low	"Don't Know"
36% (23%)	50% (70%)	13% (6%)	1% (0%)

"How do you think your neighbourhood compares with the rest of Halifax in amount of crime?"

More	Same	Less Crime	"Don't Know"
16% (34%)	33% (60%)	49% (6%)	2% (0%)

"In the past year or two do you think crime has increased, decreased or remained the same in your neighbourhood?"

Increased	Same	Decreased	"Don't Know"
48% (68%)	42% (19%)	2% (13%)	6% (0%)

* Unweighted Frequencies

Table 3 indicates that Uptown respondents were more likely than other Charlie zone or Halifax residents to perceive their area as crime-prone and dangerous. Only a minority of the Uptown respondents considered it was 'very safe walking alone in my neighbourhood' even in the daytime! And large majorities worried at least somewhat about victimization through street crime. On these matters of crime and fear and worry, the table clearly depicts an increase as one goes from Halifax as a whole to Charlie zone to the Uptown but the latter stands out as particularly threatening. Interestingly, this strong difference in perceptions was not as dramatically reflected in incidence of actual personal victimization.

TABLE 3. PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME/SAFETY BY AREA (%)

ASPECT	<u>CITY*</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u>	<u>UPTOWN</u>
CRIME IN HFX. HIGH	36	37	23
MORE CRIME IN NEIGHBOURHOOD	16	21	34
CRIME INCREASING IN NEIGHBOURHOOD	51	58	68
VERY SAFE WALKING (DAY)	74	72	42
VERY SAFE WALKING (NIGHT)	20	15	15
WORRY RE. MUGGING (NOT AT ALL)	60	53	34
WORRY RE. ASSAULT (NOT AT ALL)	59	52	38
WORRY RE. B & E (NOT AT ALL)	33	31	15
WORRY RE. VANDALISM (NOT AT ALL)	43	37	20

* Unweighted Frequencies

Table 4 indicates while reported personal victimization within the past two years increases as one goes from Halifax to Charlie Zone to the Uptown (31%, 36% and 41% respectively) the differences were rather modest. As might be expected Blacks expressed less fear and worry than other Uptown residents (see Table 12) but still their concerns exceeded the city and zone averages.

TABLE 4. VICTIMIZATION IN THE PAST YEAR, BY TYPE AND "DEGREE" (%)

"Were you, yourself, a victim of any crime at all in the past two years?" (% yes)

<u>CITY*</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u>	<u>UPTOWN</u>
31%	36%	41%

* Unweighted Frequencies

Respondents in both samples were asked whether any of nine social problems (see Table 5) were 'a big problem', 'somewhat of a problem' or 'no problem at all' in their neighbourhood. Table 5 indicates that there were no significant differences between the Halifax sample and its Charlie zone subset. Uptown respondents were however much more likely to indicate that each of the items was a big problem in the Uptown (see Table 5 and 6). Particularly emphasized as problems were break and enter, traffic, vandalism and drug/alcohol abuse; significantly the item which the most respondents considered a big problem was 'lack of contact between residents and police'. Asked what problems the police should be trying especially hard to prevent or eliminate, most Uptown respondents (67% of the sample) spontaneously said 'the drug problem'; the second most common response (33%) focused on other types of crime while a handful of respondents cited traffic or

social order type problems. There were no significant differences in the Uptown sample between White and Black respondents.

TABLE 5. PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBOURHOOD PROBLEMS BY AREA (% SAYING "BIG PROBLEM")

PROBLEM TYPE	<u>CITY*</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u>	<u>UPTOWN</u>
B & E	26%	28%	54%
TRAFFIC	21	18	54
VANDALISM	10	12	46
PROPERTY UPKEEP	06	06	26
GROUP CONFLICT	04	04	17
NOISE	06	08	18
LOITERING	08	10	31
LACK OF CONTACT WITH POLICE	08	13	58
DRUGS/ALCOHOL	12	15	52

* Unweighted Frequencies

TABLE 6. PERCEPTIONS OF SELECTED NEIGHBOURHOOD PROBLEMS IN HALIFAX BY SIGNIFICANCE* (UPTOWN % IN BRACKETS)

PROBLEM TYPE	A BIG PROBLEM	SOMEWHAT A PROBLEM	NO PROBLEM AT ALL
B & E	26% (54%)	51% (46%)	23% (0%)
TRAFFIC	21% (54%)	31% (37%)	48% (9%)
DRUG/ALCOHOL	12% (52%)	27% (41%)	61% (7%)

* Unweighted Frequencies

In Table 7 perceptions of police-community relations are reported. Uptown respondents were far less likely than Haligonians as a whole or Charlie residents as a whole (36% to 67% and 78% respectively) to report these relations as being excellent or good. They were also less likely -though less dramatically so (52% to 75% and 67% respectively)- to say that their neighbourhood was being adequately served by the police. A majority of the Uptown respondents (57%) considered that there were too few police working in their neighbourhood but in that regard their views were not dissimilar from other Charlie zone respondents. Black Uptown respondents were only slightly more likely than other Uptown residents to have more critical perceptions of these particular police-community relations.

TABLE 7. PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE - NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS BY AREA, (%) EXCLUDING "DON'T KNOWS"

<u>FACET</u>	<u>CITY*</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u>	<u>UPTOWN</u>
EXCELLENT OR GOOD RELATIONS	78%	67%	36%
AREA ADEQUATELY SERVED BY POLICE	75	67	52
TOO FEW POLICE IN AREA	50	61	57

- Unweighted Frequencies

Tables 8 and 9 describe responses assessing police performance. Reporting on the various police functions (see Table 8) respondents' rating of police performance as 'good' varied by function and by respondents' locale. In all samples respondents gave the best rating (i.e., percent saying 'good') for approachability and the worst rating for 'investigating and solving crimes'. In general Haligonians as a whole rated police performance on the various items as 'good' more than Charlie zone respondents did and the latter in turn gave more favorable ratings than the Uptown respondents. The largest percentage gap - roughly 20%- concerned the function "of being approachable and easy to talk to"; here the Uptown residents gave the least favorable evaluation. It should be noted too that the majority of respondents in all samples rated police performance as either 'good' or 'average' on all the functions. When asked whether police should spend more, same or less time on each of six policing activities (see Table 9) Uptown respondents generally wanted more police effort in all respects but they were almost unanimous in emphasizing that more time should be spent on controlling drug abuse and on investigating wife and child abuse. Again on all these items there were only modest differences between Blacks and Whites in the Uptown, perhaps the only one worth noting was the greater emphasis by Blacks on police spending more time talking with Uptown residents (i.e., 90% to 56%).

TABLE 8. EVALUATION OF MAJOR POLICE FUNCTIONS BY AREA (%)
(DON'T KNOW'S EXCLUDED)

<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>CITY*</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u>	<u>UPTOWN</u>
<u>ENFORCEMENT</u>			
GOOD	50%	42%	32%
AVERAGE	45	51	58
<u>RESPONSE</u>			
GOOD	56	50	28
AVERAGE	28	32	49
<u>INVESTIGATIONS</u>			
GOOD	32	27	20
AVERAGE	52	53	54
<u>APPROACHABLE</u>			
GOOD	69	61	44
AVERAGE	25	31	30
<u>GIVING INFORMATION</u>			
GOOD	50	37	30
AVERAGE	32	37	46
<u>PROVIDING HELP</u>			
GOOD	48	42	27
AVERAGE	39	40	46

TABLE 9. PERCENT OF UPTOWN RESPONDENTS SAYING POLICE SHOULD SPEND MORE TIME ON SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES (N=47)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>% SAYING MORE TIME REQUIRED</u>
ENFORCING TRAFFIC LAWS	44%
NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH TYPE CRIME PREVENTION	70
TALKING TO AREA RESIDENTS CONTROLLING DRUG ABUSE	72 89
INVESTIGATING WIFE AND CHILD ABUSE	89
CATCHING CRIMINALS	78

Table 10 which describes more general attitudes towards the police, indicates very little difference between the views of Haligonians and the Charlie zone subset; generally police are viewed very favorably though many respondents indicated they have no input into policing policy and that the rich and powerful have too much influence with the police. Uptown respondents were more critical across the board. The vast majority disagreed that police treated Blacks fairly but did agree that the police were too much influenced by the rich and powerful. Compared to other Haligonians, they were more skeptical about police conduct, whether it be willingness to help with community problems or guarding civil and legal rights; the large majority also felt they had no influence upon police policy or practice. Despite the critical stance however, there was evidence of dependency upon police; about two-thirds of the Uptown sample agreed with the statement "when I need help or fear something I think of contacting the police first of all". The chief differences between Black and White Uptown respondents were that the Blacks perceived police as less willing to 'help out' and more likely to harass and treat people unfairly (see Table 12).

TABLE 10. ASSESSMENTS OF POLICING BY AREA (% AGREEING) *

<u>FACET</u>	<u>CITY**</u>	<u>CHARLIE</u>	<u>UPTOWN</u>
BLACKS TREATED FAIRLY	56%	54%	17%
RICH INFLUENCE POLICE TOO MUCH	67	65	84
POLICE MISCONDUCT RARE	93	88	52
POLICE HELP OUT WILLINGLY	86	81	45
POLICE CAREFUL TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT	70	63	36
POLICE ARE PUSHY	39	42	53
NO CITIZEN INPUT INTO POLICING	51	49	70
FEAR/POLICE DEPENDENCY	80	81	64
NO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF POLICE UNFAIRNESS	85	74	62

* Unweighted frequencies

In Table 11 the focus is on how respondents evaluated various aspects of police performance in the Uptown area. The best evaluations (i.e., % saying 'good') concerned police treating Uptown people politely and fairly while the worst (i.e., % saying 'poor') concerned police preventing crime and dealing with the problems that really bother people in the area. Interestingly, 70% of the respondents in this relatively young and somewhat disproportionately Black sample rated at least 'fair' the job police are doing working with residents of the Uptown to solve local problems. On most items the Black response was less favorable than that of non-Black Uptown persons but the difference was modest.

TABLE 11. RATING POLICE WORK IN THE UPTOWN %, (N=47)

	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>FAIR</u>	<u>POOR</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
POLICE WORKING WITH RESIDENTS TO SOLVE UPTOWN PROBLEMS	26%	44%	21%	8%
POLICE FOCUSING ON THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE RESIDENTS	15	34	38	12
POLICE PREVENTING CRIME	15	51	28	6
POLICE HELPING CRIME VICTIMS	10	34	26	30
POLICE KEEPING ORDER ON THE STREETS	26	42	26	6
POLICE TREATING RESIDENTS POLITELY	34	38	15	12
POLICE TREATING RESIDENTS FAIRLY	28	32	17	23

TABLE 12
SELECTED COMPARISONS BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE
UPTOWN RESPONDENTS (%)

	BLACKS	WHITES
Lived in Uptown Less than 5 years	23%	52%
Say Crime is More in Uptown than Elsewhere in Halifax	23	44
Feel Unsafe Walking Alone in Uptown at Night	32	60
A Crime Victim in the Past 2 Years	27	54
Too Few Police in Uptown	46	68
Police Response to Calls is Poor	32	16
Police Poor in Helping People	38	17
Police Should Spend More Time Talking with Citizens	90	56
Police Do a Poor Job Working with Area Residents	35	13
Police Careful to Protect Innocent	18	40

Turning to knowledge and assessment of the police effort underway in the Uptown area it can be noted 65% of the Uptown respondents claimed to know by sight at least some of the officers regularly working the area; almost 50% claimed to know at least some of the zone officers by name and about a quarter of them reported knowing at least one such officer 'personally or socially'. Almost 70% of the sample reported having been in contact with a local police officer for one reason or another within the past year. Asked whether there had been any changes in Uptown policing in the last year, about 40% spontaneously identified the establishment of the Charlie zone storefront office on Gottingen Street while about a quarter referred to the increased foot patrol. Blacks were more likely to identify these

developments than White respondents, a fact perhaps indicative of their greater awareness of Uptown social life. When asked more specific questions over 70% reported increased foot patrol in the area and agreed that 'there have been more police in the area, talking with people'. Virtually all respondents -fully 96%- considered both that increased foot patrol was 'a good thing' and that increased police participation in the Uptown area community life was 'a good thing'.

In evaluating so positively an increased police presence in the Uptown, the respondents suggested in their comments that visibility can - and for some persons already did - decrease crime and lead to a greater sense of security among the area's residents. This view was summed up in the words of one 20 year old female who observed "[increased police presence] makes the people more secure or comfortable to confide in and see them. It also discourages criminals". A middle-aged Black male noted that "more police patrol helps build trust and security among community residents. Also it allows police officers to react to crime situations in the Uptown quicker than before". Others dwelt especially on the prospects for better police-community relations. A 21 year old Black male said that greater police participation is good because "it establishes a good personal eye-to-eye relationship". A 32 year Black woman contended that more police participation in the Uptown means "there are regular police who know the residents in the community, who work with the residents". This view was clearly evident in the following remarks of a 40 year old Black female;

"Increased police participation is good. The citizens feel that the police are approachable and so it should be. If you have a hostile community - police group then eventually you're asking for an explosive situation. I applaud this type of policing where there is interaction with the community, the citizens can feel comfortable when they have a complaint to make or just saying 'hello, how are you today' and likewise the police can feel comfortable approaching someone in the community".

Several Uptown respondents remained skeptical. Asked to evaluate the greater police presence a 27 year old Black female answered "this depends on the attitudes of the officers. I don't think that there are enough police in the force with enough social skills to answer the question 'yes'"; a 26 year old Black male answered in same vein as follows"

"The police in the Northend are in my opinion ineffective. There is a definite contradiction in their objectives. How can someone be your friend and on the same hand will arrest you. To be effective the police should just do their job and leave the community relations business to another branch in the department which must be community-based".

Overall, while both Blacks and Whites indicated greater police participation in the Uptown area was desirable, Blacks also stressed a concern that there must, too, be changes in police attitudes and behaviours.

In summary then the modest survey indicated that Uptown adults tended to see their area as average in crime but held that it had become more crime-prone and dangerous in recent years. Relative to other samples, Uptown persons saw crime and increasing crime there as at a high level and compared to other areas there was more reported fear and worry. Actual levels of reported victimization were not however much different than in other parts of the city (especially when one takes into consideration that this sample had so many young adults, the group typically reporting the most victimization). Uptown respondents reported many 'big problems' as characterizing the area but they most often identified the drug problem and related street crime as the priority for policing. Many considered that police-community relations must be improved and while they shared with other areas of the city the notion that more police are required in their neighbourhood, they, especially the Black respondents, were relatively uncommon in also emphasizing the need for changes in police attitudes. Generally, Uptown

respondents felt Blacks were not treated fairly by police and that in contrast to the rich and powerful they themselves had little influence with police or on policing policy. They were skeptical of the police yet nevertheless dependent upon them in times of crises and desirous of more policing activity. A surprisingly large percentage of the Uptown sample knew by sight and by name at least some of the officers working the area. Most were aware of the recent HPD initiatives in the Uptown and virtually all regarded these initiatives as a positive first step. On most items Blacks in the Uptown were more critical of the police and perceived police-community relations less favourably. Black respondents were especially desirous of a more collaborative police-community relationship and placed priority on more police openness to citizens.

UPTOWN INFLUENTIALS AND OTHERS

As noted above some twenty Uptown influentials were also interviewed with an interview guide (see appendix). These influentials included store owners/managers, community development workers (e.g., YMCA Job Generation, Parents Resource Centre), representatives of church and school organizations (e.g., principals, PTA leaders), service organizations (e.g., George Dixon Centre, North Branch Library, Community Y, Salvation Army Hostel) and advocacy groups (e.g., Black United Front, MicMac Friendship Centre) plus others (e.g., Halifax Housing Authority).

Asked what they liked about the Uptown the influentials usually emphasized one or more of three aspects, namely the area's centrality ('within walking distance of Downtown', 'easy access to all services'), the sense of community found there (e.g., one school principal noted "once you become familiar with the trials and tribulations within the community, you become a member of a close-knit family") and the friendly and culturally

diverse residents (e.g., one entrepreneur observed "the attitude of the people is good; they have no falseness as they have no reason to 'put on' because they are too busy trying to survive"). A number of these respondents liked the sense of vitality associated with all the community development activity that has characterized the Uptown in recent years.

The influentials were also asked what in their view the chief problems in the Uptown area were. The most common answer pointed to the combination of poverty/ unemployment and crime (largely perceived to be drug-related). The stigmatization of the Uptown was also frequently mentioned and several persons pointed out that whether or not the Uptown area is more criminogenic than other Halifax areas was moot and less significant than the terribly biased media presentation of the situation. Several residents expressed grief over the stigma and one influential who resides elsewhere noted:

"The chief problem is the way the Uptown area is perceived by others. There is no more problems [sic] in this area of Halifax than in any other part. There is the issue of low income housing and the issue of self worth that the community has because members of other communities look down on low income areas in Halifax".

There was a marked ambivalence in the response of influentials concerning crime and fear or worry about crime. Most held that there was significant crime and fear thereof. Several argued that recent drug-related murders have raised the fear level very much, particularly at night. Others pointed to the large number of the homeless transients in the area as causing fear. The leader of one well-recognized advocacy organization contended that "drugs and alcohol problems have disabled the area; people fear reprisals...there is more fear when people try to prevent such problems". But most influentials sharply criticized the media for sensationalizing the problems of the Uptown and appeared to believe that insiders or Uptown residents themselves could well cope with the situation, as is evidenced in

the following not untypical remarks:

"[Crime and fear]...depends on whether you are from the outside looking in or living here. All the South End [i.e., the wealthier section of Halifax] sees is what they can read or interpret from the media which is dramatized and ever sensationalized. Those who live in the area do not see so much crime or have so much fear".

Influentials were also asked about their contact with police in the area, what their expectations about policing were and whether these expectations were being met, and what they perceived to be the strengths and weaknesses of the policing provided. A third of the influentials, basically school officials, administrators in the large apartment complexes and representatives of social agencies, claimed to have had somewhat regular meetings with the officers operating out of the storefront to discuss policing policies. One school principal commented that "two public relations officers [the two village or community constables] come into the school a couple of time a week. They seem to want to get involved with the neighbourhood". None of the influentials associated with community advocacy organizations reported having these special meetings. On the other hand all but a few of the influentials indicated that they have good contact with the police working in the area and that their relationship was cordial and their concerns were taken seriously by the police. One local Black entrepreneur who felt her concerns did not receive top priority nevertheless commented:

"I have pretty good contact with people [police] on the beat. They make me aware when they are new, and if something is going on they will inform me. They are nice. They will pop in and say hi if they are walking by. The Department knows I am a bitch and will not let them get away with anything".

Another respondent reported "minimal contact with HPD" but then added "with the establishment of the Charlie zone office it is an easier task when I need to get a hold of them for any reason. I

feel much more comfortable".

The policing expectations of influentials ranged from "respond when asked" or "be visible", an expectation held by security persons, businesses and some service agency representatives, to "be part of the community and participate" or "be a role model for youth", a more demanding expectation held by some community advocates. Overall the tendency was to advance significantly demanding expectations as the following comment from a service agency person revealed:

"I expect the police to take our problems seriously when we bring it to their attention. I expect them to have a high profile in the community and to be aware of what is going on here. They should be available to improve public relations and community development".

Virtually all influentials indicated that the police were either meeting their expectations or at least were trying to. One school principal summed up this view well, noting "I feel the direction they are going in now, with two police officers [the village or community constables] becoming involved in the community, should create improvements". Shortfalls were explained as due to the external factors such as the vagaries of 'The Law' or unrealistic expectations by people or police manpower needs. Several influentials did however suggest that the police would have 'to dig deeper if Uptown people are to feel comfortable with them and see them as human beings'; this view was commonly expressed by the Black influentials who were still perceived the police as outsiders and shared the view reported by one leader in the local newspaper:

"Going to the games and meetings is good but it's only part of it -they [police] need to be more involved with adults in the community ... they need to understand what the community is about" (North End News, September, 27, 1991).

In general the influentials cited as the strength of the

policing provided, the adoption of the idea of community policing. Several actually used the phrase 'community policing', identifying it as a good idea and 'less intimidating' [than the usual style]. Others characterized the strength as 'the zone office', 'beat patrol', 'more visible' or, 'close to the community'. There was a widespread perception (among both Blacks and Whites but especially the latter) that the police department had made a new commitment to the Uptown, a perception reflected in comments such as "they're trying their best to stop the drugs" and "they have a positive attitude and want to get involved [in the Uptown]". Such a view was well-captured in the comments of one school principal:

"They seem to be developing a good interest in the community. They also seem to be more sensitive to the people of different ethnic groups. For example when they come into the schools one rarely hears negative comments made from or toward the students".

The major weakness according to many influentials was that the officers were virtually all White males. School officials, community advocates and social service leaders alike emphasized the need for more ethnic/racial members and/or more such sensitivity. Several others mentioned the need for more police in the area while a handful criticized the quality of the service provided in the evening when the village constables and the storefront office are usually inoperative. This viewpoint was reflected in the following comments of one government agency official:

"The police are fulfilling an excellent role as being the public relations vehicle within the community and they are creating a bridge between the real force [regular HPD officers] and themselves [zone office officers including the village constables]. But the community policing offices close at 5 p.m. and after this time a different group of officers takes over if any problems occur in the Uptown. The officers who take over tend to hold a negative attitude towards this area of Halifax and this causes them to treat the members within it with a completely different attitude than the community-based police".

All the influentials appeared well-informed about the recent HPD initiatives in the Uptown. They noted that the Charlie zone office had been set up on Gottingen Street and that beat patrol had been reinstated; the police were much more visible. Some, especially the school officials and the housing authorities, specifically mentioned the village or community constable project. With but a few exceptions these initiatives were regarded as 'very important', 'big changes' or 'significant'; the community police office was usually singled out for praise. Similarly widespread was the view that these changes were good and valuable, even necessary, for the Uptown area. About a quarter of the influentials emphasized the effect on the drug problem; as one noted, "They have pushed the open drug trade from the open street". Others mentioned aspects related to their own chief interests; school officials for instance referred to the high priority being given to school programs. When considering the impact most influentials however focussed upon general effects. One agency representative noted that "there now exists a lot of relationships with the public which can assist in solving problems"; in the same vein one entrepreneur and Uptown resident observed:

"There has been a big difference in HPD service in the Uptown area due to the opening of the community police office. The police who work in the area during the day feel more comfortable than the police who have worked in this community in the past. This in turn creates a better rapport between the police and the community. Having a good rapport between these two groups can lead to the solving of various problems in the Uptown".

A few influentials while noting the improvement wrought by these police initiatives thought it too premature to evaluate the impact. Certainly drug dealing on Uptown corners has not

completely vanished. One person reported that "people are still afraid to walk on Gottingen...[and] do not trust the police enough to make use of the Charlie office...[and] beat patrol has decreased since the summer". It would be fair to say as well that many Uptown influentials remain vigilant concerning the HPD commitment. It was common for them to report (correctly as it turned out) that beat patrol has been inconsistently delivered, that there was less in the winter than in the previous summer and that there was less at night than during the daytime.

Influentials were also asked, as the Uptown general sample had been, how they evaluated the police's work as regards helping Uptown residents in dealing with the area's problems, preventing crime, helping victims, keeping order on the streets and treating residents fairly and politely. Here there was an apparent, significant difference between Blacks and other influentials. The Blacks were quite critical, rating the police effort on each facet as either 'fair' or 'poor' but rarely 'good'; they were especially likely to rate as 'poor' whether the police treated the Uptown residents fairly and politely. Others, especially the non-Black Uptown influentials were much more likely to respond 'don't know', reflecting the fact that many were not themselves residents of the area. When they did render an evaluation the school officials, housing authorities, business persons and service agencies representatives were as likely to say 'good' as 'fair'; only once did a non-Black influential ever gave the rating 'poor' on any of the facets asked about. Clearly the difference between Blacks and other influentials in the assessments of the policing service in the Uptown reflected partly the fact that the former were more likely to be residents there and also more likely to be in community advocacy organizations.

As might be expected in the light of the above paragraphs when asked to give an overall assessment of the policing service

in the Uptown Black influentials stressed that while there have been improvements in that service and better police-community relations since the opening of the storefront office and other police initiatives, there was still room for a lot of improvement. One person's views summed up that position:

"The HPD police service in the Uptown has made an improvement in the last year; however a lot more work has to be done quickly, especially in the area of treatment towards the poor and people of colour. Community-police relations appear to be good but they could be better".

Other influentials, while acknowledging that the situation could be improved and identifying certain needs for the policing service, gave less qualified endorsements of the impact already effected by the new police initiatives.

Some influentials echoed the views of one principal who when asked what changes were needed replied "the police should be doing exactly what they are doing. They are doing an excellent job fulfilling the role of servers and helpers of the community". Influentials more generally held that the police initiatives had to be further elaborated in the Uptown. There was a widespread sense that the police have to become further involved in the community and its activities in order to understand it better and build greater trust there; it was contended that this would lead to better information from residents about crime. More beat patrol and evening hours for the storefront and community constables were frequently suggested tactics. Several influentials strongly suggested that if the storefront and village constables operated in the evening they would become more involved with Uptown life and understand the community better²⁰.

²¹ One Uptown family worker observed that if the storefront were open in the evening police would become more involved in family violence; as it is, much such behaviour is

Other influentials held that police in the area should hold workshops to interact with more residents, explain their [police] role, and advise on crime prevention. Concern was expressed for better relations between police and area youth especially by those who were parents and lived in the area; one said "the police should become involved with youth in a positive way, not as the 'long arm of the law that is going to get you'" while another influential noted "they should be working more with youths in this area as they promised". Finally a few influentials considered that a major need was for the police involved in the new initiatives 'to educate other police on what the Uptown is all about'.

In sum then, the influentials interviewed emphasized as attractions of the Uptown its accessibility, friendly, diverse people and sense of community. They acknowledged but were ambivalent about the crime and fear of same that characterized the Uptown, indicating there had been considerable media sensationalism. A segment of the influentials had participated in regular special 'policing policy' sessions with the zone police administrators or community constables but not, reportedly. the community advocates, mostly Blacks and residents of the Uptown. Yet virtually all influentials considered that the area police took them seriously and that their contact had been beneficial and cordial. The expectations for policing held by the influentials tended to be rather extensive; this was especially true among Blacks and those in community advocacy organizations. Generally the respondents considered that their expectations were being met though many felt police had to 'dig deeper' in their community policing effort. The influentials considered that the recent police initiatives in the Uptown -of which they seemed

unreported because victims and others do not like to go to the police station nor have police cars come to their door.

quite aware- were significant and positive. There was a clear consensus that the HPD should continue to elaborate its community policing thrust and a number of suggestions were advanced including information workshops, more involvement by police in community affairs, more evening hours, more beat patrol and more visible minority police members.

OTHER UPTOWN RESPONSES

Given the widespread presumption in the literature that initiatives such as the village or community constable may lead to special harassment of street people as police adopt a more aggressive order maintenance policy, an effort was made to talk with transient street people and prostitutes in the Gottingen Street area. No clear picture has emerged from the research which has been quite limited. The few prostitutes talked with did not reported any difference since the recent police initiatives in the Uptown though they acknowledged the greater police visibility. The transient, homeless men congregating around the Salvation Army hostel gave mixed and contradictory responses concerning police contact. While generally taking the view that the police have not had much impact on crime in the area, these typically alcoholic men were divided on whether police were 'giving them a hard time'; the fact that most indicated that younger constables were more likely to do so suggests that the beat patrol (which is carried out primarily by the younger constables) has been effecting more order maintenance.

Much proactive police effort as noted above has been directed at repeat calls and criminogenic conditions in relation to a large low-rental apartment complex in the Uptown. In addition to frequent meetings by the village constables with security and local management, meetings were held with the absentee owners located in Ontario. The success of these efforts is evidenced by the decline in the number of incident reports and

by some efforts on the owners' part to improve conditions through evictions and an advertising campaign. Special informal interviews were carried out in the complex to assess how significant the changes have been from the residents' perspective. Interestingly none of the ten interviewees (3 Blacks, 3 Vietnamese and 4 Whites) reported any significant race/ethnic conflict in the multi-racial/ethnic complex. They did however indicate that living conditions were terrible, virtually all citing cockroaches, rats, building decay, stench in elevators and noisy, uncaring neighbours. The advantages of the residence were basically cheap rent and closeness to the Downtown. None reported any improvements being effected in recent months and indeed the prevalent view was that things were getting worse. One fortyish woman noted that "I don't let my family visit...I can't let people come here -it's embarrassing". Clearly if the owners and managers are serious about change the challenge is formidable.

The above residents also reported much fear of crime and personal victimization. In a nutshell their homes (and especially the parkade) were not secure havens. One woman for example reported that she regularly carries a can of a mace substitute and recently as she opened the door to the parkade at 7:00 a.m. a man suddenly appeared and barred her way. She screamed but the man only smiled so she reached into her pocket and pointed the can at the man; "he sulked back and said 'please don't mace me'". All the interviewees reported that the police were around a lot and that their response times were good ("the cops get here fast"). While not enthusiastic about police and policing, the general view was that the police were 'okay', that it was unclear what more the police could realistically do! In the formal questionnaire that they also completed, these residents' responses were very similar to other Uptowners as described above. They exhibited much fear and worry of crime and a

perception that the situation was getting worse. Also here they were critical of the policing service they received but quite positive about the changes (especially the storefront and the village constable activity) that have been attempted. Perhaps the conclusion can be drawn that it will not be easy for any community policing strategy to deal with criminogenic conditions but at least the vulnerable will appreciate the effort.

OBJECTIVE DATA ANALYSES

Calls for service in the Uptown area were analysed in order to assess further the impact of the CBP initiative there. These data (see table 13) comprised incident calls which were cleared RTF (Report To Follow) for the recording units that constituted the Uptown as defined above. They were collected by the zone analyst for four six month periods, beginning with the six month period preceding the changes and ending in May 1991. Essentially the total number of calls remained quite steady over the two year period, being 1186, 1210, 1174 and 1028 over the four respective six month periods. The decline in the last period to 1028 was an artifact of a change in operational policy whereby public intoxication cases (section 87, Liquor Control Act) were recorded only in officer notebooks and no longer in RTF fashion. Still it can be noted that while during these two years calls for service increased substantially for the city as a whole (see figure 1) they remained consistent in the Uptown.

Table 13 does indicate that some significant changes may have occurred as a result of the greater police presence there. A considerable increase in reporting took place with respect to drugs; there were 72 in the period June 1990 to May 1991 compared to 32 for the previous year, and the last six months in particular witnessed a sharp increase. While this increase might be attributed partly to special activity undertaken by the enlarged drug squad, it seems to signal more citizen involvement

in reporting, itself an indication of more confidence in and reliance upon police by community residents. Another noticeable change has been in respect to reporting sex offences; while only 13 calls leading to reports occurred in the year June 1989 to May 1990 there were 65 in the following year period. Again some of this increase might be due to exogenous factors (e.g., the increasing tendency to report sex crimes) but a five-fold increase in just one year has probably something to do with greater Uptown confidence in the police and the pervasiveness of programs such as Neighbourhood Watch, Women Alone (most of these were done in the Downtown area).

There seems to be little doubt that the significant decrease in 'unwanted persons' calls (from 85 to 35 in one year) reflects the different police presence, especially as regards the large low-rental apartment complex noted above (where police response to harassment has been effective) and Hope Cottage Food Kitchen (where intoxicated and mentally disturbed persons had created much disorder).

As noted above the dramatic decline in 'liquor offences' calls is basically an artifact of changes in recording procedure (the 10 cases recorded for the past six months likely involved illegal possession). It is interesting to note however that prior to that change such calls had increased significantly from 189 in the six month period June to November 1989 to 326 for the succeeding six months when foot patrol was reinstated in the Uptown; clearly much more 'order maintenance' was being effected in the Uptown in the latter period. Changes in other types of calls are generally consistent with the thesis that the new policing style was effecting a more positive community-police relationship. For example, 'break and enter' calls more than doubled in one year (from 104 to 237), partly perhaps because of an increase in the crime but also partly because citizens were reporting more such incidents to the police. The storefront-based

officers themselves noted this increase in information (e.g., "we're getting more tips all the time"). 'Threat' calls also modestly increased and there were more calls regarding lost and found property. It may be noted too that table 13 reveals an increase in charges, especially dramatic in the case of theft from motor vehicles, a priority police concern in the past year.

It appears then that the changed Uptown policing effort has effectively targeted some 'repeat calls', reducing incident calls at trouble spots as noted above, and has also encouraged a higher reporting of a number of offenses. The calls for service and incident data undoubtedly understate both accomplishments since data are not available concerning what has been 'siphoned off' by the storefront and the village constables. Of course it is difficult to assess the impact overall given the co-presence of other possible causes and the inherent ambiguity of how to interpret either decreases or increases in calls and incidents. Drug-related crime and violent crime have continued to increase in the Uptown as in other parts of the city. Still it can be noted that the changes in calls for service and incident data have taken place while the thrust of the enhanced policing effort in the Uptown has been proactive rather than incident-driven.

TABLE 13

CALLS FOR SERVICE - ATOMS SELECTED RE AREA OF VILLAGE CONTABLE PROJECT
 TIME PERIOD OF JUNE 1989 TO MAY 1991

	JUN /89 NOV /89	DEC /89 MAY /90	JUN /89 NOV /90	DEC /90 MAY 29 /91	TOTAL
CALLS FOR SERVICE					
ABANDONED VEHICLES	4	4	5	3	16
ANIMAL COMPLAINT	1	1	3	1	6
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT	0	0	1	0	1
ASSAULT	77	66	98	73	314
ASSIST CITIZEN	21	10	12	9	52
ASSIST PQ: NON-EMERG	0	3	1	1	5
BREAK & ENTER	61	43	138	99	341
DISTURBANCE	34	38	33	24	129
DRIVING COMPLAINT	16	10	9	12	47
DRUGS	18	15	16	56	105
FIRE	8	4	8	8	28
LOST/FOUND PROPERTY	13	27	39	42	121
FRAUD	12	8	12	6	38
HOLDUP ALARM	0	0	1	2	3
IMPAIRED DRIVING	17	21	21	21	80
INDESCENT ACT	0	1	5	1	7
INJURED PERSON	8	6	10	6	30
INTRUSION ALARM	121	111	72	93	397
INSERCURE PREMISES	2	3	0	1	6
LIQUOR OFFENCES	189	326	118	10	643
MENTALLY ILL PERSON	3	3	2	4	12
MISSING PERSON	13	23	24	9	69
MVA PROPERTY DAMAGE	21	28	40	18	107
MVA PERSON I/F	6	6	8	7	27
MVA HIT & RUN	8	4	6	2	20
NOISE COMPLAINT	3	1	3	4	11
PARKING COMPLAINT	17	19	13	18	67
PHONE CALLS	17	13	8	12	50
PROPERTY DAMAGE	84	62	52	76	274
PROWLER	0	0	1	0	1
ROBBERY	12	8	19	17	56
SUDDEN DEATH	6	5	2	5	18
SEX OFFENCE	6	7	31	34	78
SHOPLIFTING	0	0	0	3	3
SUICIDE ATTEMPT	8	9	7	7	31
SUSP. PERSON	16	16	20	22	74
SUSP. VEHICLE	7	1	4	3	15
THEFT	213	106	130	107	556
THEFT OF VEHICLE	18	8	9	10	45
THREATS	22	13	23	29	87
TRANSPORT	1	0	0	1	2
UNWANTED PERSON	40	45	15	20	120
YOUTH COMPLAINT	2	0	2	2	6
BOMB THREAT	1	1	1	0	3
MISC.	12	13	12	12	49
MUN. BYLAW	0	4	0	1	5
UNKNOWN TROUBLE	1	0	3	0	4
EMER OFFICER NEEDS ASST	1	0	0	0	1
PUBLIC REL/CP	1	1	0	0	2
IMPAIRED DRIVER	1	0	0	0	1
OTHER CC	9	14	10	21	54
OTHER PROV. STATUTES	2	2	1	2	7
ARREST WARRANT	21	22	26	31	100
LOCKED UP/OTH AGENCY	0	0	17	0	17
WEAPON-WEAPONS RELATED	8	17	0	14	39

THEFT FROM M/V	4	62	83	69	218
TOTALS	1186	1210	1174	1028	4598

PRE-RIOT ASSESSMENT

Reflecting upon this research in the spring of 1991 prior to the 'riot' of July, several conclusions were developed. The Uptown policing initiative of Halifax P.D. involved three components, namely the storefront administrative quarters for the zone police leadership, the enhanced foot patrol program and the village or community constable project. These represented a significant proactive thrust / investment and were supplemental to increased conventional police activity in the area via task forces on street crimes and drug investigations. Clearly the Uptown area until that policing initiative had not particularly benefited from the HPD's community-based policing program and indeed the policing service there was in the eyes of many Uptown residents relatively poor. Moreover the historical relationship between Blacks in the Uptown and Halifax P.D. was one of 'social distance' and little active collaboration. The police initiative in the Uptown and the village constable project in particular can be seen as resulting from a variety of causes especially perhaps the unfolding of the Halifax P.D.'s community-based policing thrust, community pressure for more effective police involvement and the motivation of the police administrators responsible for the zone.

The establishment of the Charlie zone administrative offices in a storefront format in the heart of the Uptown has been a considerable success judging from the community's reaction as well as from the storefront officers' perspective. Along with other initiatives it has underlined the police commitment to the area. The fact that the storefront houses the zone commander has been important for decentralized police initiative in response to specific community needs. It has facilitated interesting if largely unsuccessful attempts at police-community collaboration in dealing with problems such as 'swarming' and 'discrimination

by bars and lounges'. The village constable project has to be seen in the context of the storefront administrative offices and the enhanced foot patrol in the area. The policing that it has implied has been directed to proactive problem-solving. In that regard there appears to have been some significant accomplishments especially in dealing with serious traffic threats for children and serious criminogenic threats (especially among immigrants) in a large low rental apartment complex.

At the same time it is clear that all these initiatives have a long way to go. Few Blacks have become involved in zone voluntary structures such as advisory committee and support team. There has been apparently little development of a sense of 'ownership' among the beat constables working the area. The village constables have concentrated on school children, senior citizen complexes and immigrant communities and have yet to link up with the young adults or adult influentials in the Black community. Officers involved in the Uptown proactive initiatives have still some work to do convincing their patrol and detective counterparts that this departmental investment is valuable and efficient. Important further challenges then include the development of better relations and deeper trust with the Black population in the area and with the various community advocacy organizations there. Another interesting set of issues revolve around the connection of the storefront and village constable activity to the more conventional, 'regular' police functions.

Although the storefront, village constable project and the other related Uptown police initiatives have had a very short history the survey of the Uptown public and interviews with Uptown influentials attested both to the need for such innovation and to its widespread positive reception in the Uptown. The survey revealed the need for imaginative and more collaborative policing, the desire for same by the residents and the comparatively high levels of estrangement from police that

continue to exist. The picture that emerged from interviewing Uptown influentials mirrored the survey findings; community fear and crime were considered significant, expectations for policing were quite extensive and initial evaluation was that the police initiative was both of significant scope and of much benefit for the Uptown community. There was a sophisticated sense among influentials -and some in the public survey- that because of the criminogenic conditions, the unemployment, the discrimination etc the police have to go well beyond a reactive, incident-driven style and collaborate with the community in protecting the community and steering youth away from the dangers. It was for such reasons that respondents wanted police (especially some Black officers) who would appreciate and identify with the community concerns and work positively with themselves.

There was a strong, clear consensus from the Uptown respondents that as regards the new initiative, HPD should not only 'stay the course' but elaborate it further. This positive assessment was echoed by the officers involved who hoped that top police management would not only continue to support the Uptown initiative but consider expansion of the storefront and village constable program elsewhere in the city and thus render it more integral in departmental planning. Analyses of departmental data on calls and incidents confirmed that the objectives of getting at 'repeat calls' and encouraging community confidence in police response have been at least partly accomplished.

More generally, there are perhaps three major theoretical implications that can be noted. First, it does appear that the storefront and village constable model may well represent the leading edge of CBP. In the Uptown and indeed in Canada generally (Clairmont, 1991) it is largely only because of such a policing format that one sees all elements of CBP actually - and fairly successfully - being simultaneously implemented. As noted earlier some of the chief indicators of CBP implementation include

decentralized decision-making, the constable generalist role, new organizations and linkages with the community to effect police planning, a problem-solving orientation and concern with a wide range of social problems. All of these facets, save the constable generalist role, can be seen to have been implemented to some extent in the Uptown. And some of the predicted impact of CBP can also be evidenced there. While adequate base-line data were not available, the public survey and special interviews suggest less fear and a more positive attitude towards police. On the other hand a collaborative sense of ownership of Uptown problems by police and community has only minimally been developed and not surprisingly (since crime prevention is a more long-term proposition) there appears to have been little impact on crime in the Uptown.

Secondly, it is clear that CBP is labour intensive and relatively costly. The Uptown area has been given enhanced foot patrol as well as a very disproportionate amount of the zone administrators' time and effort. Consistent effort at problem solving has necessitated two fulltime village constables who have had to carefully husband their time and resources. Given this large commitment, all financed out of the regular departmental budget, it appears vital that ample communication and participation characterize the linkages among management, the proactive initiators and the regular patrol officers. This requirement is especially necessary given the problem of measuring the success of proactive, preventive policing and the fact that such policing cannot be regarded as a 'quick fix'; it takes time, rapport, training etc to become effective. At present the Uptown is the only area in Halifax where the full gamut of HPD policing policies - which in total define community-based policing - have been put into effect. Spreading such proactive policing initiatives to other areas as suggested in 1990 by the Chief of Police would be costly but would reduce the departmental

marginality of the Uptown proactive initiative.

A third implication that merits attention concerns the limitations of community-based policing. Given the legacy of societal racism, significant current discrimination, high levels of unemployment among Blacks and others in the Uptown, there clearly would be a lot of pressure on the police role there. The long-established pattern of police-Black relations as detailed earlier of course would enhance that pressure. It will clearly take time for a wider police mandate to become entrenched not only among police but also in the society at large. And changes in the larger society such as more economic opportunity will undoubtedly be required if a strong collaborative police-community relationship will develop and become effective.

In the Introduction, several specific issues associated with CBP were noted. The concern that CBP would aggravate existing inequalities by the police becoming even more sensitive to the interests of the advantaged population was commonly raised by police researchers. Here one could argue that the Uptown, a less advantaged area, has in fact received a disproportionate share of the zone's police resources. On the other hand panhandlers, vagrants, and apartment dwellers purportedly engaged in criminal activity in the Uptown, might well have experienced more police attention and sanction as police became more concerned with Uptown peace and order. The issue of the extent to which increasing pressures for 'reactive policing' might be dealt with by problem-solving and police focus on situations of repeat calls was also noted. Here there is some indication that the Uptown initiative has reduced 'repeat calls' pressure though the crime rate and especially the violent crime rate apparently have continued to increase in the Uptown as they have in Halifax and Canada too. Finally, it was noted that for many advocates of CBP, the new policing philosophy might reduce "the likelihood of collective violence in poor, ethnic communities" (Bayley, 1991).

In early 1991 several officers involved in the Uptown initiative noted that while not everything has turned out as well as desired "at least there's been no heat on the Mayor or the Chief as there was in 1989". Within a few months a major incident occurred in the Uptown that certainly generated a lot of heat. It is to that incident that we now turn.

THE JULY "RACE RIOT"

Beginning in the 1970s Halifax's Downtown developed an extensive entertainment industry. Clubs and lounges concentrated in a few contiguous areas. By 1985 the majority of Charlie Zone's 59 clubs and lounges were packed into two four block areas. Tension between Blacks and Whites at the Downtown bar scene has had a long history in Halifax. Clear patterns of discrimination against Blacks, both clientele and musicians, by the clubs' management have been long-acknowledged even if poorly documented. Complaints have been registered with the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission²¹ and numerous ex-employees have verified the unstated

²² In 1990 the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission heard a handful of complaints from Blacks pertinent to bar discrimination. It found in favor of the complainants and a non-publicized agreement was negotiated between the parties. It may be noted that often the bar management position is that they are barring a person for dress violations, failure to have an I.D. and so forth but strong and pervasive evidence indicated an underlying policy of discouraging Black clientele. Government officials and the bar owners have indicated a willingness to talk about the problem and vowed a 'no-tolerance of discrimination' policy but young Black adults believe that legal sanctions have to be strengthened if this discriminatory behaviour is to be eliminated.

policy of discouraging Black clientele. In March 1991 a Black youth organization had carried out protests, including a large march, (see North End News, March 21,1991) and government authorities had subsequently issued stern warnings once again to bar owners to 'clean up their act'. Along with this tension there was a certain amount of conflict, as well as cooperation, among Black and White 'gangs' or 'toughs' dealing in drugs and prostitution in the area and establishing bragging rights to territory and people there. Purportedly, some combination of frustration and classic gang behaviour had led to a number of late night assaults on isolated Whites in the Downtown bar district by a small group(s) of Blacks in the several months preceding the July disturbance²². Interestingly this behaviour was paralleled by "swarming" or "wilding" on the part of younger persons.

The Eve of the Riot

On Wednesday evening July 17 a fight took place between a few Black and White males at a bar in the Downtown area of

²³ Beginning in the winter of 1990/1991 periodic such assaults occurred. Apparently there was a pick-up in such actions in the ten week period preceding the July 19th disturbance. HPD responded to the situation by establishing a task force in June to track down the assaulters. No arrests were ever made but victims did identify their assailants as a Black gang and certain automobiles were identified as usually in the vicinity of the attacks so there were suspects. It may be noted that none of the suspects were members of the young adult group which organized the March protests against discrimination in Downtown bars. There was no police information on whether White gangs were attacking Blacks during this period.

Halifax²³. The fight reportedly (and according to the major 'players') did not have an overtly racial cause nor did it initially entail the issue of bar discrimination against Blacks. It was a follow-up to an earlier fight among some of these combatants a few weeks earlier and that conflict in turn could be linked with other battles extending back some time. The main 'players' knew one another well, sometimes 'partied' in the same social context and had a common pattern of conflict with the justice system. Subsequent to the fight however the chief Black combatant who was 'smoked' (his term for being floored by a quickly delivered, solid punch) was also barred from re-entry, in this regard joining his close friend who had been barred for allegedly bad conduct earlier; the White combatants were not barred. Purportedly, the major Black player and his friends, about two carloads of largely North Preston area Blacks, refused to collaborate with police on the scene²⁴, arguing that police were biased and besides they would handle it [get revenge] themselves. They made some minor ruckus outside the bar, yelling, and so forth. Apparently the police on the scene were reluctant

²⁴ What follows is a summary of the July 1991 disturbance. A full assessment with detailed data and analyses is currently being prepared by this researcher and will be available shortly.

²⁵ After the Black man was assaulted he did accompany an officer into the bar to identify his assailant; however the latter and his friends had left through the back door. Apparently no further cooperation was rendered to the police.

to make arrests and lay charges largely because they did not want to single out Blacks and did not want to arrest just one party to a fight. The Black men in turn indicated they might return the next night to deal with the situation.

The Riot Begins

The next evening the air was electric with rumours of an imminent major confrontation at the bar in question. The bar management hired an additional extra-duty officer and the two HPD officers discussed with bar management a strategy of action should anything develop. A communication link had been established several months earlier under the aegis of Halifax's coordinator on race relations to deal with issues of discrimination on the bar 'scene' and to improve relations between Blacks and bars' management. This link was now utilized as the bar management contacted a major Black leader associated with the youth group which had protested against Downtown discrimination (referred to above) and discussed the situation and what preventative action might be taken. An informed HPD sergeant contacted the bar management early in the evening (Thursday) to discuss the events of the previous night and management response to it. One significant development from that meeting was the decision by club management to also bar the major White combatants of the previous evening, a decision that the sergeant then relayed several hours later to some Black leaders outside the Derby (i.e., the chief hangout of the Black combatants).

Later that night (i.e., about 1 a.m. Friday morning) a crowd of at least fifty Black males led by the group involved in the previous evening's disturbance erupted from the Derby at its usual closing time and set out at a running pace for the Downtown bar several blocks away. On their way down there were a few random assaults of Whites ('it was like being hit by a moving

train' said one victim). They were met at the bar by the extra-duty police who, following the planned strategy, stayed outside dealing with the crowd while the bar staff stayed inside behind the 'barricaded' closed doors. The Black leader contacted by the bar management was also at the scene. After much yelling, milling around and a few abortive attempts to get inside (actually the door was partially opened and a few fists flew), but without major incident there, the Black group moved off in the direction of the Uptown area which had been the staging point for the 'rumble'.

Police had established perimeter points in the Downtown bar area to contain any further movement Downtown but the mob basically circled the corner and headed back to the Uptown. As the participants proceeded on there was again some random assaulting of 'Whites' by Blacks in the rear and on the fringes; apparently there was also some fragmentation of the mob occurring. The entire Downtown phase of the rampage (sometimes called the Argyle Street phase after the street on which the targeted bar was located) lasted about twenty minutes from 1:20 to 1:40 a.m. There was neither significant property damage nor any looting but at least fifteen persons (a dozen men and three women) were assaulted, mostly pummelled by a flurry of fists and feet but in at least one instance hit in the head with a baseball bat. Seven persons were hospitalized with concussions, loss of consciousness or assorted bruises but none of the injuries proved to be serious and long-term²⁵.

Back in the Uptown the crowd's numbers reportedly swelled

²⁶ It should be noted however that there have been two reported cases of trauma. In one case an officer suffered trauma and in the other a victim reported some trauma effects.

to well over one hundred as youngsters and the curious gathered around the core group of young Black males between 16 and 30 years of age. On the main street, Gottingen Street, a stand-off developed between the crowd and the police that was to last for well over an hour till approximately 3 a.m. Demonstrators, a few in ski masks, taunted police, threw rocks, stones, bottles and other objects such as a baseball bat, and occasionally charged up to and 'practiced karate kicks against' police who were in riot gear²⁶. As soon as police supervisors assessed the scene they set up an inner/outer perimeter strategy for dealing with the situation and to keep the demonstrators from moving back Downtown. Earlier they also had the bridge from Dartmouth to Halifax closed down to prevent cars from coming into the Gottingen Street area, presumably to prevent their being stoned since reportedly such action had taken place against passing motorists, and perhaps also to lessen the likelihood of other Blacks from the communities on the other side of the bridge joining the melee.

Halifax police ranks were supplemented by seconding persons from plainclothes and other duty and welcoming off-duty officers who showed up. The total complement of HPD officers mobilized to face the 100 plus crowd was approximately forty but only about half that number was available at any given time on the

²⁷ HPD riot gear at the time included only the protective helmet and the large riot stick. Officers were not equipped with mace and HPD apparently did not have riot shields on hand. Most but not all of the officers from Charlie zone did have their riot gear with them upon assuming duty early in the evening while a senior sergeant from another zone carried a certain amount of such gear in his automobile. Several trips had to be made back to the police station to secure riot supplies.

confrontation scene. In addition Halifax P.D. received backup assistance from Dartmouth P.D., (two cars, one containing a dog master and his dog, were stationed at the bridge entrance to Gottingen Street), the RCMP and Ports Canada Police (here both organizations put some officers on call - standby - though they did not in fact become involved), and the military police (some of these officers provided assistance at 'bookings').

There were two phases to the Gottingen Street part of the disturbance. The first took place at the southern end of the street just up from the police station about 1.50 a.m. where a growing crowd estimated at about 150 persons²⁷ and 'led' by the major players in the earlier disturbance (and indeed in the Wednesday night incident as well) were confronting the police,

²⁸ Crowd estimation is difficult under the best of circumstances, never mind at night under the tumult of this incident. Taking a multitude of estimates into account, including those of both police and riot participants it appears that the Argyle Street phase of the incident involved 50 to 60 persons with a range of estimates from 40 to 150. The Gottingen Street part by the same criteria appears to have involved 150 persons in the first phase (a range of estimates from 60 to 300) and in its second phase about 75 persons (the range here was from 50 to 100). These estimates are also consistent with the testimony provided at the hearings of the Nova Police Commission in September 1992 by two White female witnesses. Both witnesses referred to the core of 50-60 young males being swelled by other people in the first part of the Gottingen St. phase. Of course as the curious and others congregated it would become very difficult to sort out bystanders from participants, a particular problem for police perhaps given the 'social distance' of their relationship with Blacks.

shouting and creating among the officers a few feet away a sense of increasing danger. At this time it appears that the new police perimeter lines had not been fully set up and there was little communication by the constables on the scene with their supervisors²⁸, some of whom were on their way from Downtown.

The Charlie zone constables on the scene were young and relatively 'green'; police testimony at the hearings of the Nova Scotia Police Commission was that the officers averaged eighteen months experience as HPD constables. They decided to squelch what they perceived to be a situation of escalating mob action where there was an identifiable leader, by crossing the street and seizing the major leader. The individual resisted and the constables were soon surrounded by a crowd determined not to allow this person to be taken away; in the ensuing melee three officers pushed their 10-100 (officer-in-danger) buttons and other officers quickly rallied to support them and see that they and the 'captured' disturbance leader were whisked from the crowd. Subsequently the crowd, partly because of some police initiative (advancing and pushing back the crowd) and partly

²⁹ Officers on the Gottingen Street scene could hear communications in the midst of the tumultuous noise by putting their radio microphone on their shoulder but they could hardly return messages and still keep their riot stick at the ready. There was clearly a problem of communication as, at least twice, officers from other zones were ordered by dispatchers (acting on supervisors' instructions) to return to their own zones while at the same time the Charlie zone police were under siege. Once all supervisors were in place on Gottingen Street there was no communication problem.

because two of its major players had responded positively to an NCO's request that they assist him in dispersing the crowd, moved north up Gottingen Street, throwing objects and breaking some storefront windows as they went. The flash-point, as far as police-crowd relations were concerned, now shifted to the bookings entrance of the police station a block down the street. Around 2:15 a.m. crowd of perhaps thirty protesters gathered there venting their displeasure for the police actions and/or inquiring about persons who had been carted off by police. The crowd was ordered off police premises and for a short time milled about across the street.

The second phase of the Gottingen Street disturbance took place further up the street, around Uniacke Square, at about 2:45 a.m. Here a smaller crowd, perhaps 60 persons, had concentrated or retrenched and were throwing objects at police and breaking a few windows. The police lines were in effect. There appears to have been in this phase some intervention by Blacks not personally involved in the demonstration; for example, a Black off-duty RCMP officer and a well-known Black minister presumably were urging dispersal and the latter subsequently approached the commanding HPD officer (a staff sergeant) with a request that the Preston area persons be allowed to leave the Uptown area in their cars and go home. Permission was granted and at 3:12 a.m. an HPD transmission went out not to bother cars proceeding north on Gottingen on their way home. Knots of the crowd drifted away and parents could be seen escorting their teenagers off the streets.

The disturbance finished in the early hours of Friday morning. While a few scattered, supposedly related events - especially a gang fight- were reported by the media to have taken place over the ensuing weekend, subsequent investigation found that they did not represent a continuation of the disturbance²⁹.

³⁰ There was an incident Saturday evening where a White young

The containment of the disturbance appears to have been the result of police response and Black leadership, although it is also important to appreciate that such disturbances in the Black community have been very rare despite the discrimination and prejudice Blacks have had to face over the years. Black leaders 'cooled down' the rhetoric, spoke against the violence and channelled Black response into meetings to air grievances and advance corrective policies. Out of these meetings among federal and provincial government officials and metro area Black leaders emerged a substantial number of recommendations for pervasive social change (see Advisory Group on Race Relations below).

Aftermath of the Riot

The police response was to use both the carrot and the stick. Police blanketed the Uptown and Downtown on Friday and Saturday evenings, often four to a car and with their riot gear at the ready. Top police management met with the watches on Friday to stress caution and restraint; in this respect several basic norms were communicated namely 'do not strike a person you are not going to arrest' [i.e., don't get physically involved with someone you are not going to arrest], worry about your own and innocents' personal safety but do not chase after people or go into crowds over property destruction except under very serious circumstances' etc... Undoubtedly these cautions and

man was assaulted at a bus stop by a small group of Blacks. Since this incident occurred outside the Downtown area where the pattern of such random race-based assaults had taken place over the previous months, it could well be that it represented a spillover from the emotional outburst of the riot. The assault was unusual and therefore likely to have been a by-product of the unusual disturbance.

norms were reinforced and amplified by the sergeants. The Uptown community police office was staffed and opened in the evening over the next few days. At the same time the chief of police personally directed a hectic schedule of meetings with Black leaders and youths as well as with elected officials and the media. He also invited two Black leaders to address officers at Friday fall-ins and quickly established an Incident Review Team consisting of three HPD officers and three Black leaders (suggested by Black community leaders) to assess riot issues including how the police handled the disturbance. A series of additional meetings were arranged including a visit to North Preston³⁰ by the chief and his deputy for operations, and a meeting between HPD's five Black officers and a group of local Black leaders. Characteristic of the police management's response was taking seriously both the dangers of such disturbances and the complaints of the Black community.

Perhaps the most controversial incident in the entire disturbance from the perspective of police-Black relations occurred during the initial Gottingen St phase when the young Charlie zone constables decided to cross the 15 or so metres separating them from the crowd and seize one of the major (if not

³¹ North Preston is one of the oldest Black settlements in Canada, tracing its origin to the Loyalist migration from the United States in the eighteenth century. There has been and continues to be considerable unemployment in the community which is located some distance (about 30 minutes from the Uptown by car) from Halifax on the eastern shore of the Nova Scotia. The community is well-respected but it does have an acknowledged problem with crime which local leaders are struggling with (Mail Star, August 27, 1992). According to police and Uptown informants a significant portion of the Black leadership in metro crime comes from North Preston.

the major) leader of the disturbance. From their vantage point such a move was consistent with their understanding of appropriate policing strategy given that there was an identifiable leader and that the disturbance in their view was 'getting out of control'. This latter view was reflected in the police transmission from the scene at 1:50 a.m. which noted that 'emotional activity [was] up'. While this proactive and aggressive strategy did snare the leader, it also led to a significant melee, to the 10-100 calls noted earlier and to an immediate escalation of the Gottingen St. disturbance. In general Black participants have contended that this action represented unwarranted police aggression. One person commented "it was not violent up to this point and then the brothers got mad and began picking up rocks and bottles and fighting back and busting windows"; another Black participant reported "people were running out of steam by this time and things seemed like they were going to calm down ...the police were hitting the brothers with their billie clubs, not caring what brother was doing what. The brothers got fed up and decided to strike back by throwing bottles and stuff".

It is very difficult to sort out what the facts were and in any event similar facts can be judged differently. A handful of officers did get involved in a serious battle while trying to seize the 'riot' leader and this in turn led to other officers, riot-clubs in hand, coming to their rescue. The assaults Downtown may well have been uppermost in the constables' minds. There is little doubt that just prior to this action there was a lot of shouting and milling around and that the crowd was growing. But while participants and the few witnesses to testify before the Police Commission appear to agree with the police on this score, they differ profoundly in their assessments. The demonstrators and three witnesses did not see the situation as threatening or explosive and contended that rocks and bottles were not thrown

nor was there physical contact with police until this police initiative when in their view 'the police came out swinging'. There is ambiguity in the police views on the extent to which objects were being thrown prior to this incident. There is little question that subsequent to this police initiative there was a barrage of missiles and several scuffles between police and Black individuals that resulted in further repercussions³¹.

This incident highlights the general pattern of different perspectives held by police and the Blacks involved in the

³² There appears to have been much divergence of views within the police department concerning the strategic initiative of the young constables. While sympathetic to the constables' growing concern and frustration and acknowledging the possible value of the tactic implied, the strategy advocated by most supervisors and management emphasized forming and maintaining 'the line' rather than trying for the 'surgical and disabling strike' entailed in the seize-the-leader move. It has been suggested that a number of difficulties, both legal and socio-psychological, pertain to the strategy of taking out the leader rather than a person specifically targeted for throwing an object or a punch. It was also noted that the more reactive approach of falling back or holding the line when the group is apart allows for negotiation and for the crowd to peter out. Of course it must be recalled here that the constables on the scene were dealing with a complex and potentially explosive situation (remember too that they had witnessed serious assaults by some of the demonstrators) without the presence of their supervisors and indeed with few officers on the scene to provide back-up.

disturbance. Many Black demonstrators and onlookers considered police in riot gear as hostile and provocative if not discriminatory; one demonstrator commented "don't know why they wore their riot gear. I never see them in their gear when they're Downtown Saturday nights breaking up fights between the White boys". Police officers on the other hand considered their riot gear as minimal, barely adequate in the circumstances, and in any event donning such gear was increasingly becoming routine police practice in disturbances. Some Blacks lamented too HPD's 'calling on the military' while some police officers noted they dealt only with the military police in a back-up role. It does seem that HPD had been developing and practicing a response to disturbances which entailed use of riot gear, setting up perimeter lines, closing off access (e.g. closing the bridge could be an illustration of this) and developing a back-up network with other police forces. Clearly all these tactics were employed in this disturbance and their implementation was interpreted through different filters by police officers and Blacks.

Their interpretations of the events of the previous evening differed sharply too. Several Blacks involved in the Wednesday melee indicated that police either took the side of the Whites or at least did not assist the Blacks there; in fact they argued that police were monitoring and trailing them. Several police officers on the Wednesday scene not only rejected these perceptions but contended that they should have been allowed to arrest the Blacks for disturbing the peace and if they had, a sufficient message would have been sent which would have made the Thursday disturbance less likely; they also contend that the only cars they were trailing were cars suspected in recent assault cases Downtown. In general then the interpretations were so different as to constitute 'two solitudes', a pattern consistent with the research findings noted elsewhere in this monograph.

Overall, when everything was said and done, the tangible

impact of the 'riot' was modest. Only one officer was significantly bruised even while several more suffered minor pains from being hit by rocks or bottles. None of the protesters was apparently injured by the police; with the one major exception noted, the latter used their riot sticks basically for defensive purposes to keep the demonstrators at bay. Despite taunts, thrown objects and some kicks, the shield-less police maintained discipline and, apart from the one incident, kept to the strategy of holding the lines. Scuffles were few and there was little actual serious police-protester scuffling. As already noted the more serious physical aspect of the 'riot' involved the assaults against persons as the mob made its way down to and back from the Downtown. These assaults, random, and, in the view of many police and demonstrators alike, carried out by a small minority of the demonstrators, did cause sufficient injury that a handful of persons were hospitalized.

Roughly a dozen establishments in the Uptown suffered damages, largely broken windows, and several police vehicles were the target of various missiles. The total costs associated with the rampage approximated forty thousand dollars. There was little looting throughout the incident and what there was, was confined to the Uptown area. An HPD transmission at 2:37 a.m. reported that "steel bars behind the windows at Mr. I Buy Anything, Scotia Drugs, Music Stop, etc prevented vandalism". These storeowners / managers along Gottingen St. confirmed that they did indeed have bars in the windows to prevent 'smash and grabs' which had occurred before; while acknowledging the police assessment, at the same time, and despite the lack of insurance or compensation for damage, they considered that the incident had been played up too much in the media. Clearly too the limited looting was consistent with the specific rationale for the incident and its targets as purveyed by disturbance leaders. Only four

participants in the disturbance were charged³². There have been two official complaints made by Black individuals at the disturbance charging inappropriate police action, namely racial slurs and excessive use of force. The police have contested both complaints.

The intangibles associated with the disturbance are more difficult to gauge. The brittle relationship between many Blacks and the police as discussed earlier appeared to have suffered a major setback. One well-known militant Black leader observed on the Friday morning following the disturbance that it had set back police-Black community relations twenty years! The few Black participants in the disturbance who were interviewed for this study essentially agreed that "because of the incident a greater distance has been placed between police and the Black community and I don't believe the gap will close too easily". One such person was especially bitter, commenting: "I know I hate the police more than ever. They're up here with their Charlie zone office pretending like they're concerned about our welfare and about improving the feeling between us and them. But it's always been us and them and it will always be us and them. If they were fooling anybody up to that point, they aren't anymore". Little data are available on the extent to which police action, actual or otherwise, alienated other participants, or other Blacks for that matter, but the publicity associated with the complaints to

³³ HPD officers arrested few Black persons and only charged four; of the four, in one instance charges were dropped, in another the person was acquitted and in a third the individual pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and was fined; the fourth case, where the charge is obstruction of police, is still pending.

the Nova Scotia Police Commission noted above as well as the subsequent criticisms raised by Black members of the Incident Review Committee could be expected to have a negative impact³³. On the other side, some officers have been badly shaken by the experience of being confronted by a large grouping of people taunting them and throwing things at them and seemingly bent on doing them real harm. A few officers will have to overcome an "I don't owe them anything" inclination. At the street level in the months since the 'riot' there appears to have been much tension and negativity in the police-Uptown relationship. At the same time while dealing with emotional scars and trust will be challenges, the disturbance has set in train a host of committees, proposals and actions that could effect dramatic positive change.

FOUR KEY ISSUES

Four key issues have emerged as a result of the above

³⁴ Two serious accusations were made by non-Black witnesses. In one instance a woman contended that police initiated the melee on Gottingen St. by charging a crowd that was winding down its demonstration. The incident she referred to appears to be the one where officers decided to seize the major disturbance leader. The officers in question contended that far from winding down, the disturbance was becoming more dangerous and potentially out of control and that therefore they had to do something to squelch the disturbance. In a second incident a taxi passenger reported that a cab-driver told her that she had heard over her car radio one or more racist slurs from police transmissions. Subsequent police investigation failed to identify the female cab driver.

alleged 'race riot': (a) what is a 'riot'?; (b) was it basically 'racial'?; (c) was it in any way an anti-police rampage?; (d) what does it imply with respect to the Uptown police initiative?

Was It a Riot?

Concerning the first issue, it is clear that the media both in Halifax and elsewhere have reported it as a 'race riot' in headlines and stories (e.g., The Mail Star, July 19, 1991). Media editors and reporters in turn generally contended³⁴ that the label was appropriate since it fitted well with dictionary definitions of the term 'riot' and also had been used by hospital workers, some Black leaders, and others in their communicating with the media throughout the incident. Some residents of the Uptown area, especially of course those around the Gottingen street hub where the 'rampage' (The Daily News, July 21, 1991) took place, initially at least viewed it as a riot (The Daily News, July 20, 1991). Many police officers observing the large number of demonstrators and the assaults of innocent bystanders in the Downtown area considered it a riot. And many police officers, especially but not only those who initially confronted the large group of young males in the Uptown, noting the number of people, the stones and bottles being hurled, the threatening talk and gestures, certainly felt threatened. The fact that Halifax P.D. issued riot gear, called for assistance from the

³⁵ Some media persons when interviewed indicated that subsequent to the riot, partly because of meetings with local Black leaders who objected to the riot label and partly because of a reassessment of the situation, they decided to drop the term 'riot' in their coverage. Nevertheless both papers and the other media have continued to use the expression 'race riot' in stories dealing with the incident.

other police forces in the area (Military, Ports Canada, RCMP and Dartmouth P.D.), and had temporarily closed the bridge linking Halifax with Dartmouth across the harbour would also suggest that the term 'riot' was deemed appropriate from an 'official' point of view.

Attention to the denotative and connotative aspects of language was often explicitly raised, and urged upon others, by the various parties (e.g., the comments of the race relations director of the Human Rights Commission, Daily News, July 20, 1991). Assault victims who were interviewed covered the gamut of views on whether a race riot had occurred and exhibited an awareness of conceptual nuances. Most believed that the scale of the incident did not justify the label 'riot' while some believed that, while the label was appropriate, its use would have negative connotations and thus should be discouraged. A few victims contended that the event had been downplayed too much and suggested that "someone [in the media] was paid off to keep their mouths shut".

There was a diversity of views even among the police as to the appropriateness of the label 'riot'. Police management seemed to be ambivalent about labelling the incident, exhibiting as some lawyers did, a sensitivity to the criminal code and the legal implications that could flow from a definition³⁵; as well they were aware of associated political issues such as community response and issues relating to the efficacy of police actions (e.g., control, justification etc). At the street level, police opinion was also diverse and, among those thinking the 'riot' label was more appropriate than the label 'disturbance', there

³⁶ Lawyers and others (Brodeur, 1991) have suggested that labelling a situation as a riot or insurrection could have an impact on what courts might deem to be appropriate or acceptable police behaviour.

was some difference over where it was most applicable, whether in the Argyle St. or Gottingen St. phase. While it is of course problematic to sort out all the motivations underlying a proffered viewpoint those officers holding to the riot label stressed that "things were out of control" and justified an aggressive police response. Officers holding more to a 'disturbance' label tended to emphasize that only a minority of persons initiated the assaults in the Downtown and that in the Uptown phase there was more of a stand-off and the 'perimeter lines' strategy was effective.

Virtually all Black persons interviewed, whether participants or not, shared the view that the July 19th incident was not a riot basically because as one person commented "it was not of the magnitude of a riot". For many Blacks the police had overreacted and mishandled the situation by being too aggressive. The riot label for many was a label that enabled the police to justify their aggressiveness and/or a concept used by the media because of the latter's bias and wish to sell papers through sensationalism. This unanimity of perspective was especially pronounced with reference to the Gottingen St. phase of the incident; here a common statement was "It was no riot. Most of the people there were just there to be nosey, to check out what was happening and what was going to happen". There was more ambivalence concerning the Downtown phase where the assaults took place. This ambivalence is reflected well in the remarks of one participant,

I wouldn't call the incident a disturbance nor would I call it a riot. It fell somewhere in between. It was definitely a racially motivated incident. Granted there was only a small number of people involved but it was rather violent. Also too many innocent people were affected for it to be simply a disturbance. Still it was not large enough for a riot. Maybe we should call it a racially motivated outburst.

A large number of persons and interests including North

Preston community leaders, tourist officials, and some Uptown business operators also disagreed with the riot label. Generally their argument appeared to be that the whole episode was brief, the damage of all kinds was limited and overall the scale of the event was too modest for such a powerful label. Clearly there was also considerable damage control being exercised by different interest groups. A number of persons and letters to the editors agreed in substance if not in style with the mayor who referred to it as a 'blip' (The Daily News, July 20, 1991).

The incident would appear to fit reasonably the definition of 'riot' given in the criminal code³⁶ since a large number of people were involved and some clearly illegal behaviour was being

³⁷ According to the criminal code a riot is defined as 'an unlawful assembly that has begun to disturb the peace tumultuously'. The code definition in turn of unlawful assembly entails a minimum number of three or more persons who conduct themselves when assembled in such a way 'as to cause people in the neighbourhood of the assembly to fear on reasonable grounds that they will disturb the peace tumultuously'. Associated with the code definition is a continuum of offences ranging from unlawful assembly (a summary offence) to being a rioter (an indictable offence with a maximum two years imprisonment) to a rioter not responding to an official dispersal order (an indictable offence with the sanction of possible life imprisonment). Clearly a participant in a riot could face a serious charge but the prosecution would have to prove the appropriate conditions existed. Few people are ever charged with rioting or even unlawful assembly and this was also the case in this Halifax incident; here as is usually the case the charges laid were more conventional ones such as disturbing the peace, obstruction and assault.

engaged in (e.g., the assaults which began on the mob's way to the Downtown area). It is clear that there was a disturbance Wednesday night in the Downtown bar area but the events of Thursday night both there and in the Uptown were qualitatively different and worthy of a different label. Still the incident lasted but a few hours, property damage, confined to the Uptown, was modest, looting was very limited and virtually all assaults occurred while the demonstrators were in transit and proved to be minor. The case for using the concept 'riot' would appear to apply better to the Downtown (i.e., Argyle St.) phase than to events in the Uptown. The Uptown phase was more complex, lending itself to diverse interpretations and involving a number of persons with quite different motivations. The confrontation between police and demonstrators on Gottingen Street, while threatening, was contained and there were no serious injuries and just a few arrests. By 10:00 a.m. Friday morning a special City cleanup response had replaced some of the broken windows and gathered up much of the glass and other debris. A naive passer-by might not have realized that a 'riot' had occurred. Clearly, insofar as a riot' did occur, it was a modest one.

Was It a Race Riot?

The incident was identified - and continued to be labelled over the next year - by the media as a 'race riot'. The label seems appropriate in many ways. The demonstrators were virtually all Black. All assault victims were White and even the property destruction was rather selective - there was virtually no property damage inflicted upon the many stores and offices/buildings identified as part of the Uptown cultural or community advocacy scene. Most interviewees in the Uptown subsequently noted that Black businesses and operations were not attacked. At the same time it is important to explore the motivations of the demonstrators, to underline the 'modest scale'

factor and to recall that only a small number of the participants committed any assault or inflicted any property damage.

First public assessments of the 'race riot' located it firmly in the context of Downtown bars' discrimination policy and general racial antipathy. This view was temporarily shattered when it was found that the bar which was the focus of the disturbance was in fact one of the most integrated bars in Downtown (its chief music was a combination of 'rap' and 'disco') and when the key Black combatants indicated on CBC Sunday Morning Radio that in their view the rampage had little to do with racism. The chief Black combatant commented "it wasn't racial, cause I never had no problems getting into any of those clubs Downtown"; the fight he said was an accident and "then the boys just started beating up everybody then" (The Daily News July 29, 1991). Another key Black player, a DJ at the Black-clientele Derby tavern in the Uptown which was the staging point for the event, commented that he announced over the loudspeaker that everyone should go Downtown; he added that while the purpose was "just to have a little fun", the young men had been drinking, were excited, and soon some were out of control"; "they started hitting anyone they could see and it wasn't supposed to be like that" (The Daily News July 29, 1991).

Other, ordinary participants in the disturbance generally echoed the above views. One observed: "[after Wednesday night's vent] the next evening everyone planned to go to Rosa's after the Derby closed; our intention was simply to go after the bouncer but everyone was frustrated and anxious and it got out of hand. The brothers were hitting White guys all the way Downtown. About 60 White men in total took heat". Another participant who was not involved in the Wednesday night episode, commented: "I was told that a bunch of White boys were waiting Downtown for the brothers so I decided to give support. I really didn't do too much, mostly I just watched and maybe busted a window or two". Still another

participant observed: "I was surprised [that it happened]. Now that I think about it though, alcohol was a big part of it. It turned the whole event into some kind of party. People let their actions and emotions get out of hand probably because of the alcohol". These statements and those of the major players cast the incident more in the context of a 'gang rumble' rather than a race riot.

These views raised eyebrows but were immediately countered by some Black leaders as well as some newspaper columnists who noted that perceiving the larger context of bar discrimination and racism was a prerequisite to a true understanding of what had happened (e.g., *The Mail Star*, July 30, 1991; *The Daily News*, August 4, 1991). It does appear crucial to separate out immediate causes from the more basic underlying ones. Precipitating factors in such disturbances probably are always personal and idiosyncratic (though some researchers such as Taylor (1992) might argue that for such events to escalate into a riot there has to be a history of police-minority negative relationships if not confrontations).

Yet, without understanding the underlying factors, one can hardly appreciate the ramifications or the character of the incident; in this case, without the broader causal context how could one understand why all victims were 'White', why property damage in the Uptown was so selective and why so many Blacks who certainly were not intoxicated and not seeking material gain (remember there was minimal looting) nevertheless became enthused participants of the 'riot'? This complexity is well reflected in the accounts of the participants. One participant, referring to the property damage, said "some of the windows were hit because they represented something. Most of the rest were just there to be hit"; another participant commented: "Personally I don't see it as being racially motivated. It didn't start that way. I think we did turn it into a racial thing when we began taking out our

anger towards the White society on innocent White boys but it wasn't a race riot".

Of course the different causal frameworks seen in isolation may be associated with different agendas for change. Without the broader context of racism, the agenda would emphasize stern response and punishment for the rioters committing offenses. If the broader context is advanced the thrust would be towards dealing with the racism and there would be an appreciation of the position that Black leaders and others can hardly be expected to positively channel all idiosyncratic happenings that could set off such conflagrations. In this instance the latter view prevailed not only among Black leaders but in the media (The Daily News, July 20, July 23, 1991; The Mail Star, July 20, 1991) and throughout authoritative circles in government and elsewhere (The Daily News, July 20, 1991; The Mail Star, July 25, 1991). The mayor of Halifax who initially resisted the use of the concept 'racism' was ultimately compelled by these pressures to recant (The Daily News, July 21, July 25, 1991; The Mail Star, July 24, 1991).

Was It an Anti-Police Riot?

There seems to be little reason to believe that the 'race riot' was basically an anti-police rampage. No police incident appeared to have precipitated the incident and there was only modest police-rioter contact during its primary Argyle Street phase. Police had in fact liaised with a few major players earlier in the evening informing them of new and putatively more equitable decisions by the bar management. At the same time it has been reported that for some participants the rampage was in part a pay-back to the police for trailing their cars the previous evening. Also relevant is the point raised earlier namely that disturbances such as this rarely occur outside a context of poor police-ethnic/race group relations. Moreover, in

the Gottingen Street phase clearly the confrontation was between the demonstrators and the police. Here in addition to taunts, rocks and bottles were thrown and there was some battling as police used riot sticks to maintain a perimeter and protect fellow officers, and demonstrators pummelled a few officers (one in particular took serious bruises) who left the 'lines' to help other officers. There was considerable tension and several officers at one point perceived themselves to be in such serious trouble that they pushed their 10-100 buttons. The specific incident aired publicly was presumed to have involved a Black man being thrown through a window by a police officer but it is clear now that both the young man and the officer (a Black officer trying to effect peace and avoid the arrest of the man in question) were both pushed into the window by the press of the crowd, breaking it but not themselves going through the window.

If police were not the focus of Black action in the Argyle Street phase it is also true that police action did not deter the demonstrators. The non-arrest 'policy' of Wednesday evening, the 'warning/advice' not to go Downtown given by police to some key players on the following evening, and the requests to desist and disperse were not able to prevent the outburst. At the same time the limited damage on Thursday evening and the positive response of two of the disturbance leaders to an NCO's request to get the crowd on Gottingen St. to move back and disperse, clearly indicated that the relationship was not totally negative.

In some ways it is surprising that the riot did not assume a more anti-police character. There was a history of tension and confrontation between Blacks and police in the Uptown. Several near-battles had occurred outside the Derby tavern and the now-defunct Motown 'dance-hall' over the past two years and a court case had only recently been resolved where several Black young men were charged with assaulting police officers at a high school dance. The North Preston group who were in the forefront of the

disturbance might well have been expected to exhibit ill-will towards the police as a result of the latter's action in closing down the presumably by-law violating Motown operation which was controlled by North Preston persons³⁷. Also it appears that at least a score of Black young men were facing court appearances over the next few months - most as a result of a recent undercover drug operation largely cantered at the Derby; since virtually all of these persons frequented the Derby it would be surprising if many were not part of the group that gathered there on Thursday evening. Still, as noted, tension and animosity were kept in check and the brinkmanship pattern that was not uncommon in past standoffs between police and Blacks in the Uptown basically prevailed again. Ties that had been cultivated by an HPD sergeant helped to keep the disturbance in check and perhaps also contributing was the intervention of others, including a off-duty Black RCMP officer.

³⁸ In the fall of 1990 a major confrontation occurred and a major battle was barely avoided when police raided the newly established Motown club in the Uptown apparently searching for drugs and illegal liquor. The North Preston owners of Motown claimed that they had set up their operation 'to fight racism on the Halifax club scene' by providing Blacks with an alternative to the Downtown bars who 'don't want Black people' (see North End News, October 11, 1990). When young Black adults formed an organization to protest discrimination in the Downtown clubs they urged people to avoid the latter and go to the two Black-operated clubs in the Uptown (see North End News, March 21, 1991). At this writing both operations, the Derby and Motown, were defunct.

Implications for the Uptown Policing Initiatives?

What does the race riot imply with respect to Halifax P.D.'s CBP initiative in the Uptown? It could be argued that despite a significant investment of departmental resources - foot patrol, community police office, disproportionate share of zone administrative human resources and village constable project - the outburst occurred and indeed its most severe effects were felt right in the Uptown itself. Departmental critics might well feel vindicated, questioning the pay-off of that commitment. From the point of view of zone police officials perhaps the unkindest cut of all was the remark, quoted in both daily papers, of the most prominent Black community leader in the riot and its aftermath, namely that the Charlie zone CBP commitment (as represented by the storefront) was "more show than substance" (The Daily News, July 23, 1991).

As noted earlier the foot patrol program in the Uptown could only be expected to have a modest impact on Uptown life. Its structure and operation mean that it cannot be expected to yield a strong sense of officer ownership and identification nor link up closely with Black community life. Foot patrol does establish a visible police presence, has significant order maintenance efficiency during daytime and early evening hours and may have a modest long-run implication as well. The community police office on the other hand does appear to be on a trajectory that is 'right on' with respect to the phenomenon of race riots. It has generated meetings with street leaders and parents of Uptown children and youth. Zone police officials have been taking initiatives with respect to gang activity among children and even with respect to discrimination in Downtown bars. As noted earlier, it would be an exaggeration to say that these initiatives have been successful to date but they nevertheless

appear to be the kind of general strategies that might be effective and within the limited range of what police can do in society. The issue here then may be more one of evaluating how to improve initiatives such as these. The village constable program has been achieving its mandate and has resulted in useful problem solving vis-à-vis specific, immediate community concerns (e.g. traffic, Brunswick Towers) and in potentially valuable long-run gains. As noted earlier however, it has not linked up well with the community forces that cause or might control/redirect the disturbances. Perhaps in light of the 'race riot' there might be some refocus of village constable activity, especially perhaps follow-up on the suggestion of an Uptown advisory committee for the village constables.

The CBP initiative in the Uptown may well have contributed to moderating the impact of the 'race riot' as far as person and property damage and even police-rioter battling are concerned. It is difficult to measure preventative effects. Certainly that CBP effort could be fine-tuned and focused more directly on the concerns implicit in the disturbance. Despite the efforts of zone officials the Charlie zone advisory board has no regular Black members and its support team of volunteers has no significant Black presence. These shortfalls might be considered challenges to be overcome. The effort to uncover discrimination at Downtown bars failed but more importantly there was apparently no feedback to the Black youth initially involved in discussions leading to that zone-generated strategy. Perhaps the issue has to be undertaken differently, more by governmental pressure and Human Rights officials but police might still play a useful role in coordination and feedback. Village constable activity could also of course be refocused and prioritized as well as linked better with the Black community through an advisory committee. True flextime for both the storefront and the village constables might also be experimented with - clearly a strong wish of most Uptown

residents as noted earlier; even the Black leader who disparaged the CBP effort requested that the storefront assume longer hours. At the same time all this CBP activity probably cannot be fully effective if carried out in isolation from regular patrol activity. These other officers should be communicated with fully and encouraged to see themselves as collaborators in the CBP effort.

In the aftermath of the 'race riot' there have been many calls from Black community leaders for more Black police officers (and indeed for more employment equity throughout the economy). Currently there are five Black officers while the Black population in Halifax city is roughly 4%. Proportionate Black presence on the 260-member police force would then entail doubling the current complement, a reasonable demand given the current situation and historical hiring patterns. Clearly though, following the rule that five officers are necessary to staff one additional round-the-clock police position, such hiring may not be profound in its implications. And it may be noted that it cannot be guaranteed that Black officers would elect to work in specified areas; in fact none of the current five Black officers have opted to work in the Uptown. Sensitivity and race relations training would also be required but experience here has shown most current programs to be of modest positive impact (Report of Race Relations and Policing Task Force, 1989). Halifax P.D., prior to the race riot, had made some progress along these lines, establishing the title, race relation coordinator in each zone, (basically adding to the zone coordinators' job description and duties) and having the coordinators participate fully in programs and conferences on race relations.

To get beyond the modest hiring and sensitivity training impacts it would appear necessary to radically change the way police relate to Blacks in Halifax. The keys here appear to be collaboration in problem solving and more positive police-Black

person interaction. In the words of one Black leader, "police have very little involvement with the positive things which go on in the Black community and they only know the bad things about Blacks" (Interview. August 1991). Another Black leader observed (The Globe and Mail, February 6, 1992) "the question we ask is why does everything have to come to a fight and why do we have to make a case, shout or complain before anyone listens". These concerns have shaped the CBP program in the Uptown so clearly that initiative should be continued and strengthened.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Since the July 19, 1991 incident HPD has launched a number of initiatives to improve relationships with Blacks and to enhance the quality of policing in the Uptown. One major post riot initiative was the establishment of 'an incident review team' having an equal number of Blacks and a free hand to proceed as they desired in examining police handling of the riot. This initiative was a first for HPD in the modern era. It was to some extent unsuccessful since separate and inconsistent reports were issued by the Black members and the police members. Many police officers had reservations about it as did many community members - surprisingly for much the same reason as they criticised the limited interviewing of persons involved in or witness to the events. Newspapers generally were critical. For example in its "second look" at the incident review one year later the Daily News (July 19, 1992) headlined its story "See no evil, hear no evil" and was critical of HPD efforts throughout the text (contending that review was done under pressure, did not interview many Blacks, etc). Earlier the North Ends News (March 20, 1992) had headlined a write-up on the incident review experience as "Cop-citizen effort a 'failure'" and quoted various Black leaders to the effect that "the police did not want to listen to the civilians". Despite the critical response the

incident review initiative represented a 'new look' strategy of collaboration. HPD has built upon that base by forming a special liaison committee bringing Black leaders and police officers together for regular sessions to discuss the policing service and provide a quick collaborative response in the event of disturbances and the like³⁸.

Other major HPD initiatives include an imaginative recruitment program for Black and aboriginal persons where approximately ten selected individuals would be paid for participating in a cadet training program. In this program there is no guarantee of the cadets being hired subsequently by HPD but the expectation is that some will be hired in Halifax and the others will quickly find employment. Interestingly, the police union has not only supported the initiative but also has publicly welcomed the possible recruits (Mail Star, May 7, 1992). In addition a Black officer has recently been appointed as village constable / community officer in the Uptown and part of his mandate is specifically to relate to the Black community there. Other initiatives include a summer student program where Black

³⁹ In the official HPD document on this initiative the committee is designated 'Police Black Community Liaison Committee' and its mandate is defined as advising the Chief of police on matters related to the Black community, specifically to provide advice on departmental and other police-related initiatives affecting the Black community, to identify problems, issues and remedies in the recruitment, training and career progression of Black officers, to advise on in-service training and education, and police services in general, as they relate to the Black community, and to promote communication between HPD and the Black community.

high school students have been hired to do liaison work in the Uptown and a sensitivity training program for HPD officers. HPD's chief has impressed Uptown Black leadership with his openness and his initiatives and appears to be an effective symbol of change (The North End News, November 1991).

Policing the Uptown in the absence of significant social change for the residents there remains a challenge for community-based policing. However policing is modified it still largely is reactive to what primary social forces generate. This truism is reflected clearly in the examination of the experience of the Nova Scotia Advisory Group On Race Relations established by the different levels of government and various Black organizations in the wake of the July 1991 disturbance³⁹. Only ten of the ninety-four recommendations advanced dealt with policing and/or the Downtown bar scene. Moreover, apart from those recommendations calling for 'cross-cultural' or race relations training and the recruitment of more Blacks in policing and in the hospitality industry (especially the bars), only one recommendation pertained to discrimination practices in the bars and only three recommendations pertained to policing policies and practices. While the provincial government accepted these four recommendations, modest changes apparently have been deemed

⁴⁰ The bulk of the ninety-four recommendations dealt with employment opportunities (especially affirmative action and job equity programs), educational reforms, cultural programs and economic development in the metropolitan Black communities. A recent updating by the federal and provincial governments has indicated some significant government expenditure and some employment creation has taken place but there is a significant shortfall with respect to government claims according to some Black leaders.

appropriate responses⁴⁰.

The conclusion could be drawn that detailed consideration of the July disturbance and related policing issues led informed persons quickly to the larger social forces such as the economy, educational system and the like. Uptown Black leaders, especially ministers working with youth, have suggested that in the absence of socio-economic change the youth continue to be sorely tempted by the criminal subculture. On the anniversary of the July riot a

⁴¹ The specific bar scene recommendation at issue concerned the Advisory Group's wanting to link racial harassment with loss of an establishment's license through actions of the provincial Liquor Licensing Board. The Nova Scotia government replied that charges of discrimination must continue to be dealt with by the Human Rights Commission. The three policing recommendations dealt respectively with standards and associated sanctions against racial slurs and stereotyping, the establishment of local police-Black community liaison committees, and the establishment of appropriately constituted incident review committees. The Nova Scotia government subsequently announced that a standards document (including a wide range of issues, among them race relations) is currently being vetted by municipal police organizations; that municipal police departments have been requested to form community advisory groups to provide input from minorities (including Blacks); and that it has advised municipal boards of police commissioners on the desirability of having visible minority representatives and will itself make legislative amendments to allow for greater representation of minority groups on the Nova Scotia Police Commission and the Police Review Board.

Black leader from the nearby North Preston area reiterated this point too, calling for revamping of the educational system and economic programs (but not mentioning policing) in his area where 'winter unemployment reaches 80%' (Mail Star, July 18, 1992).

Still, the policing itself can be - and on many levels has been - dramatically changed. More flexible storefront hours, more patrol, hiring Black officers etc would be immediately suggested by Uptown persons. If police cannot do what the citizens want they should perhaps have at least a public audit in the Uptown. And perhaps HPD could establish a panel along the lines of England's 'lay visitors to police stations program'; these have proved helpful in overcoming alienation there (Morgan, 1989). HPD management clearly is on the right track in its Uptown policing strategy but the CBP effort will have to be further developed and raised to higher levels in the wake of the July disturbance. At the present time the dialogue between area police and the Uptown community about the quality of policing there seems to be largely conducted in the mass media⁴¹ and HPD apparently takes the position that within its resources its policing policies concerning matters such as storefront hours and the number of officers on patrol are appropriate and thus only more resources can lead to more effective change. Maybe, but if so, the police stewardship should become more transparent to citizens.

Even as this report is being finalized the newspapers are

⁴² The Charlie zone commander has his administrative office in the Uptown storefront and meets informally with many Black citizens and leaders. Formal meetings in the Uptown, where police, governmental service agencies and community leaders would get together, did occur for a while several years ago but at present there is no formal, regular meeting where something along the lines of a public audit could be rendered.

again highlighting problems of policing in the Uptown. Some merchants have been complaining about lack of police protection. Several unexploded molotov cocktails have been tossed into the Charlie zone community storefront office, the work of disgruntled drug dealers according to HPD's chief (The Mail Star, July 13, 1992). Yet another murder in the Uptown in a drug-related context has taken place. A resident who heard the shots and the dying man's plea for help bemoaned that "the Charlie zone office doesn't provide adequate protection. Drug addicts roam the streets and hang out all night at a nearby playground" (Mail Star, August 12, 1992).

Twelve days later the front page of the largest newspaper had two large headlines, "Area crime stats too controversial to release" and "TURNING A BLIND EYE: Politics hampers policing on Gottingen St." (Mail Star, August 24, 1992). The former caption introduced a story featuring an interview with an HPD inspector where the suggestion was made that crime statistics for the Uptown, while available, are not being released because they would embarrass the area and its people. The second caption described an off-the-record interview with an unnamed HPD officer where the latter talked about a continuing "war between police and some Gottingen St. residents". The officer presumably argued that police are turning a blind eye to crime in the area for fear of being labelled 'racists', that in effect they are intimidated by 'policing by politics' wherein upper police management and city politicians presumably would not back up tough enforcement and fear Black complaints. Rather embattled police management challenged the assessments in the latter story in particular, emphasizing that the Uptown is receiving a lot of policing (the article noted that "Gottingen St. is the most patrolled part of the city" according to the zone commander) and the next day the deputy chief's response was highlighted, 'Law enforced equally in all areas' (Mail Star, August 25, 1992); at the same time the

deputy acknowledged that some officers may be frustrated as a result of negative contact with the community and that a lot of work remains to be done in the Uptown area (Mail Star, August 25, 1992).

A Black journalist commenting on the above controversy called for "hard work and education on both sides", with police appreciating the difference between bad actors and the innocent victims in the Black community, and the law-abiding Blacks trusting a police service that demonstrates its progressiveness (Sunday Daily News, August 30, 1992). That was the ostensible purpose of the Uptown policing initiative in the first place and that remains the elusive objective yet. The community-based policing philosophy still seems to be appropriate but it will take time and cranking up a notch to effect a satisfactory police-community partnership. The larger society, Black and White, must appreciate too that given the police role in society, that partnership will always be precarious and subject to considerable strain unless there is the kind of deeper primary change recommended by the Advisory Group on Race Relations and adopted in principle by all three levels of government.

APPENDIX

THE UPTOWN

The Uptown

The Uptown as many of its residents noted is well-located to take advantage of Halifax's urban life. The Halifax Commons with its tennis courts, baseball diamonds and large park area is on one of its edges, the Halifax waterfront is on another and the Downtown area straddles the third side; on the fourth side is the Northend of the city, an area with which the Uptown is sometimes grouped in the media's and the public's perception.

The Uptown is clearly heterogeneous in its land uses, people, type of housing and socioeconomic status. The area combines large apartment complexes, small businesses, government and social service centres, lots of small multiple family dwellings and of course single family dwellings. Its people are the most racially/ethnically mixed of any large Halifax area grouping, the majority apparently being White European ethnicity but a large minority being Afro-Canadian; other ethnocultural concentrations include the Vietnamese. Apart from the seniors' complexes, the 'Whites', are perhaps disproportionately young adults and appear to be concentrated more at the boundaries or corner areas while the Blacks appear to be concentrated more in the centre part of the Uptown but in all areas the heterogeneity of the population is quite evident. In its western and eastern corners (along its southern boundary) the Uptown, from the perspective of housing and the residents' occupations, is increasingly middle class while on the same criteria the rest of the area is less advantaged.

The Uptown, considering its small area, has a large amount of 'institutional' buildings, including several senior citizen complexes, six other low-income housing developments operated by the Halifax Housing Authority, recreational and service centres

as well as special homes for special clientele such as homeless youth and battered women. There are many heritage properties in the Uptown, most notably along Brunswick St where large, well-constructed homes recall an earlier era of Halifax society. A visitor would also notice much scaffolding and other signs of renovation and development throughout the area but especially in the south-western quadrant of the Uptown where significant gentrification has occurred in recent years. Schools, businesses and clubs are found more in the central part of the Uptown whose hub is Gottingen St.

The biggest single concentration of Uptown people can be found in the three high-rise units which make up the Springwell Complex (formerly Brunswick Towers); roughly 1300 persons live in roughly 400 units (another 100 units were vacant at this writing) in this relatively low-cost apartment complex where out-of-town owners have recently launched a campaign to improve housing conditions and the complex's public image. Approximately 1400 persons live in the properties (senior complexes and the other six referred to above) operated by the Halifax Housing Authority. The largest of these latter properties is the Uniacke Square public housing complex containing 181 units and 725 people; the other units are scattered throughout the central part of the Uptown. Another approximately 1100 persons are residents in one of the four housing cooperatives (there are income restrictions on membership) in the Uptown, the largest of which is the North Mews Housing Cooperative which has about 100 members and roughly 500 residents. The other large housing development is Northwood Manor, an essentially seniors' complex operated by a non-profit foundation, which has about 860 residents.

Aside from the 4700 Uptown residents identified above there are approximately 4500 other persons living in roughly sixty apartments or multiple family dwellings and six hundred single family dwellings in the Uptown. A very large percentage of the

single family dwellings are either row or 'town' type housing. The total Uptown population then is circa 9,000. Using a more restrictive set of boundaries (i.e., limiting the Uptown to the inner sides of North, Agricola and Barrington Streets) the Uptown population would be roughly 7800. Given the quick and dirty nature of our household estimates and the large number of apartments and special complexes and centres it is probably advisable to report the Uptown population, restrictively defined, as being in the range of 7000 to 8500.