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La "Société distincte": Political Socialization and the Renewal of Québec

N EARLY FORTY YEARS AFTER the Quiet Revolution in Québec, scholars continue to debate the reasons for and the nature of the enduring separatist movement. Some of this debate rests on theories of liberalism and communitarianism as they appear to illustrate current events in Québec and its relationship with the rest of Canada. But the process of political socialization¹ and the transmission of relevant values, political culture, and a language-based identity better explain the nature of the evolving Québec society. As the post-Quiet Revolution population expands in Québec relative to other generations,² the separatist movement and Québec identity regenerate the political culture for youth, and consequently solidify a language-based identity.

Canadian political culture does not entirely explain uneven group characteristics such as pro-federal attitudes versus separatist attitudes. If Canadian political culture simultaneously produces loyal

¹The term *socialization* refers to a process of increased possession by a community. While assimilation rests on the assumption that the individual fits him/herself to the expected comportment in a society, *socialization* emphasizes society's role in the individual's learning this comportment. Fred I. Greenstein has defined the term most completely: "all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicit political learning, but also nominally non-political learning of politically-relevant social attitudes and acquisition of politically relevant characteristics." See *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1965).

²Krisan Evenson, "When the Stakes are High: The Changing Nature of Political Education in Québec and Canada," *Québec Studies* (Fall 1997): 107-15.

citizens (e.g., assimilated into the pan-Canadian identity through Canadian civic education, or immigration) as well as a separatist sector, then either communities do not regard the political culture uniformly, or those communities engage their youth with different practices. Those who have studied the question³ suggest that the political subcultures of francophone and anglophone Canadians differ to such an extent as to prevent the formulation of unifying concepts. But these students also assume that peaceful domestic politics require a single political culture to which all groups subscribe. This fundamental assumption means that one attributes group differences to differences in political *subculture* rather than to socialization practices. The debate thus centres around the nature of the groups in question, or the nature of the individual in terms of these groups. As a result, they pay less attention to the production of these groups, or their reproduction, or the process of forming membership, followership and leadership among these groups.

This article considers sustained differences among Canadian subcultures⁴ (primarily francophones and anglophones) as an out-

³Jon Pammett and J-L Pepin, *Political Education in Canada* (Halifax: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 1988); M.W. Conley and K. Osborne, "Civics, Citizenship, State Power and Political Education: The Canadian Experience," *Changing Structures of Political Power, Socialization and Political Education*, ed. B. Claussen and Suna Kili, vol. 1 (New York: Peter Lang, 1988); Keith Spicer, Chairman, *Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1991); Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Report* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1974).

⁴Almond and Verba define *political culture* as a set of specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system; they regard political culture as comprised of psychological orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes. At the macro (such as nation-state) level, the political culture can be viewed as the particular distribution of patterns of these orientations toward political objects among the members of a society. At the micro (such as cultural community) level, the political subculture applies to the set of orientations distinguishing one group from another within the same overarching whole, so that ideals, practices, behaviour or attitudes may be discontinuous. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963) 12–13. As the literature on political culture developed, Daniel Elazar has offered a useful framework for considering political subcultures—instances where distinguishable groups live together. For Elazar, political cultures range from "traditionalist" (whose members work to sustain the status quo) to "moralistic" (whose members work to better a shared commonwealth). Researchers associate any shift in political culture with shared

come of sustained practices in political socialization. I accept differences in political subcultures as necessary but not sufficient for our understanding of political conflict in Canada. The study of political change in Québec as a shift in the political socialization process serves several goals. It offers an explanation of process missing from political culture work.⁵ In addition, political socialization illustrates an interaction among groups and individuals not always possible with models based upon such political theories as political liberalism⁶ or communitarianism.⁷ Finally, political socialization represents a renewed effort to understand the nature of citizenship at the core of politics in Canada and in Québec, especially since the Quiet Revolution.

Changes in the political culture of Québec came about because of sociopolitical, economic and industrial developments in the province; the Quiet Revolution hastened the process of industrialization by injecting French nationalism into a modernizing campaign. From the 1960s to the 1980s, Québec experienced a range of social changes that included the waning power of the Catholic Church, a flourishing of the arts, and public displays of cultural identification with a French identity increasingly referred to as Québécois, that is, belonging to the *société distincte*.⁸

historical events which cause 'great or lasting change.' See Chapter 4 ("The States and the Political Setting") of Daniel Elazar, *American Federalism: A View from the States* (New York: Cromwell, 1972).

⁵See J.R. Gibbins, *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age* (London: Sage, 1989) 68.

⁶See, for example, J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia UP, 1993). This work revisits his original theory presented in *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971).

⁷See, for example, M. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1982). For a discussion of groups' role in the Canadian context, see also Charles Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1993); and Will Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995).

⁸The nature of the unity debate in Canada naturally has led to a variety of definitions of what constitutes Québec's *société distincte*. For proponents of sovereignty, for example, the *société distincte* refers to a cultural difference that sets Québec apart from other provinces, largely due to its linguistic qualities. Québec is the only province in Canada where the majority speaks French. For others, the *société distincte* is not so clear. For opponents to Québec's sovereignty, for example, the idea of a *société distincte* implies a wish for special treatment, or superior-

The most salient feature of this cultural evolution not necessarily captured by the debate involving communitarianism and liberalism, the phrase *société distincte* increasingly delineates the Québec experience. Leaders use the phrase *société distincte* to invoke communitarian ideals of group identity, but Québec leadership has moved from the confrontational rhetorical style of the 1960s and 1970s to that of a pro-active inclusive stance, where Québec will use the momentum of the Quiet Revolution as a springboard for the full flourishing of its nationhood. The fact that liberalism has dominated in Québec does not necessarily represent a confrontation so much as an incorporation of two theoretical strains to build a political culture. Secondly, socialization employs the *société distincte* phrase to persuade Québécois with political arguments in favour of increased autonomy. Linguistic nationalists (whether separatist or not) form part of a successive renewal, through four generations now, of a followership whose socialization has occurred in eras of rising affluence but uninterrupted cultural ideals. Their political socialization has expanded from private to public spheres, such that their distinction is societal, where it was previously religious or cultural.

As Québec industrialized, economic and physical changes in the province accompanied these social changes. Ronald Inglehart⁹ has suggested that intergenerational socialization patterns in such changing conditions modify expectations and attitudes; in turn, values shift away from acquisitive to altruistic tendencies. Condi-

ity compared to other groups in Canada. Both of these perspectives, however, view Québec in terms of the liberalism-communitarianism debate. In either case, the notion of a *société distincte* underlines that there is a linguistic qualitative difference (increasingly defined in geographic terms) between Québec and the rest of Canada. In 1991, the Citizen's Forum on Canada's Future's *Report to the People and Government of Canada* noted that as long as "distinct society" did not indicate a superiority or superior entitlement, it was largely acceptable to most Canadians (123).

⁹"The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *Mass Politics in Industrial Societies*, ed. Di Palma (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1972). See also his "Public Support for Environmental Protection: The Impact of Objective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 Societies," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28.1 (March 1995): 57-72; see also Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, "Economic Security and Value Change," *American Political Science Review* 88.2 (June 1994): 336-54.

tions of rising affluence did not, however, attenuate a drive for independence in Québec. On the contrary, improving economic prospects and a culture come into its own allowed the Québécois to engage in traditional practices of socialization more openly and more formally. That is, socialization in Québec had been primarily private, cultural and/or religious. Stories about New France's past glory and sacrifices of her people in North America had been relegated to the private sector—family rooms and churches. But during the Quiet Revolution, these cultural identities, and their attendant narratives and symbols, remained the same, but moved to more public places as socialization practices became politicized. The now-public nature of political identity enabled nationalism to flourish. The Quiet Revolution thrives on a second wind because of the combination of the changes in economic performance, the change in political culture and in the sharing of (political) socialization practices. Perhaps foremost among these practices is the insistence upon and symbolic nature of the *société distincte*. The following discussion of the Quiet Revolution contextualizes this publicizing of political socialization.

The Quiet Revolution in Québec represents a radical break from previous patterns of social change in Canada. Within three generations, the francophone individual in Québec subscribed to views very different from those of parents and grandparents. Francophone Québécois changed their society in a modernization campaign with mobilization theretofore unrealized and unexpected among anglophones in Canada. While the Quiet Revolution helped to gain many recognitions and expanded opportunities for francophones both within and outside of Québec, it also accentuated deep divisions between English and French Canadians. Anglophones and others were forced to admit that the social status quo was no longer tenable, yet the speed and force of Québec nationalism surprised them. Today scholars regard the Quiet Revolution as the point of departure for French Canadians taking charge of their own destiny within Québec, but differing conceptions of how the Revolution came about have influenced interpretation and suppositions about the future of Canada as a federation.

Broadly speaking, at least nine features of the Quiet Revolution seem salient, though one could debate the order of their salience. A description of each of these nine features follows.

First, francophones began to enter government and then business circles. Government and business elites cooperated informally, using English as the language of record. But the language of public use changed as the numbers of francophones entering elite circles increased. As the presence of francophones in government mounted, they created and expanded social services as well. As a result of francophone elite penetration in the public sphere (historically reserved for anglophones), anglophones moved to the private sphere.

The second feature is the birth of a francophone public school system. While no real “public” school system existed before the Quiet Revolution, the administrators and inspectors were likely to be francophone since the Catholic Church administered the schools, while the traditionally dominant anglophone elite controlled Protestant schools. But, francophones at this point began to rise through the ranks and with the growing power of francophones in Québec generally, increasingly directed education in Québec. Much of the Quiet Revolution involved overturning traditional authority structures, and in school reformation, the Catholic Church was perhaps one of the most visible. But the fact that we can talk about francophone public schools signals also the role of language in this transition. For example, Joan Marshall¹⁰ notes that one anglophone response to the changing power base in Québec education was to open Protestant francophone schools in order to (1) maintain administrative control (by historically anglophone Protestants) and (2) continue to attract immigrants who had been assimilating to English. But, ironically, francophones managed to be elected to these school boards, and so anglophones’ power ebbed here too.

Third, and importantly, francophones began to use the government of the province of Québec as a social agent. Social programs designed to aid francophone as well as anglophone citizens replaced laissez-faire policies benefiting mostly anglophones.¹¹ The state, captured by francophones, enters as an equalizing force.

¹⁰ *A Solitary Pillar: Montreal's Anglican Church and the Quiet Revolution* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1995) 22.

¹¹ Laissez-faire policies, by definition, did not regulate the private sector, historically a place of dominance for anglophones.

Québécois assimilation could also explain these first three elements of the Quiet Revolution as well as political socialization, but perhaps not as convincingly. The growing presence of francophones in major institutions allowed them to effect change in the attitudes of future generations of Québécois. These institutions also serve as major agents of socialization which shape attitudes of youth regarding their community and their place in the political life in Québec. The process of socialization radically altered when the Québécois took hold of a primary agent (the schools) and made primary a previously secondary agent (the state).

The fourth feature is the decline of strong control by the Catholic Church as the organizer of personal and social life, affecting in particular education, religious observance, and social practices such as an already declining celebration of agriculture as a way of life. In political socialization terms, the Church as a primary agent receded as the schools and state rose in importance.

Fifth, closely related to the effect of a declining Church but different in its effects, the birth rate among francophones precipitously declined, requiring in-migration of French speakers for demographic stability. The declining birth rate, while similar to rates across Canada generally, intensified the perception of risk for the future of the French language in Québec, which the out-migration of anglophones from Québec did not assuage. Despite some analyses which might question whether the lower birth rate and out-migration reflect rather a growing Canadianization, an approach focusing on assimilation and cultural integration, the growing control of immigration policies¹² as a response to this problem has allowed Québec to determine its future demography. Proaction by the government of Québec allowed it, between 1990 and 1995, to 'capture' 16 per cent of immigrant children from Southeast Asia and Lebanon,¹³ a region historically associated with French foreign policy. Immigrants to Québec (and/or their children) must attend francophone schools. "Compared with other recent immigrants,

¹² Robert M. Gill, "Language Policy, Culture and Identity: The Case of Québec," *Language, Culture and Values in Canada at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1996) 106.

¹³ *Canadian Social Trends* (1994): 32-43.

the proportion of Indo-Chinese immigrants who know English is low, while the percentage who speak French is high.”¹⁴

Sixth, the average person in Québec increasingly heard French in everyday use, in streets, shops, and public places, in part due to language policies preferring French to English, leading to Bill 101 in the following decade. Custom and the political culture of Québec had accepted the use of French of course, but the increasing legislation ensured its continuation. The Quiet Revolution brought the French language and the nascent Québécois identity away from the minority sovereignists and out into the rest of Québec society. This transition institutionalized language and identity as a part of the public culture of Québec in the same way that the penetration of separatist parties into the power elite led the separatist movement to lose its ‘extremist’ appeal, but become more a part of the political discourse in Québec (indeed, in Canada).

Seventh, a proliferation of literature and the arts more formally celebrated Québec culture in public places (as opposed to more private or religious cultural observances). Again, the range of important socialization agents expanded. Before the Quiet Revolution, Québec culture had been celebrated in families, Catholic schools, and churches—those socialization agents said to be most salient and effective early in life. As the Quiet Revolution progressed, however, the institutions of social and public life (theatre and the arts, for example) grew more important as well. That is, socialization agents important later in life to produce enduring attachments and build community played an increasingly important role.

Eighth, Québec nationalists crafted the 200 years of ‘post-Conquest’¹⁵ frustration into an independence movement. The need for cultural and linguistic survival does not necessitate an independence movement, but some linguistic nationalists believed (or still do) that independence represents the logical extension of the Quiet Revolution. The sovereignist movement demonstrated to Québécois and (other) Canadians alike the seriousness of some

¹⁴ *Canadian Social Trends* (1994): 43.

¹⁵ In 1759, the English defeated the French at the Battle on the Plains of Abraham, marking the beginning of English control of all of Canada. The English refer to Canada as a Confederation beginning in 1867, whereas the French cite a need for survival after the Conquest.

nationalists' aims frustrated under the federal structure. Internal to Québec, the independence movement offered the possibility of a fruition of or return to the original autonomy of *les Canadiens*. Either way, the Québécois used the state apparatus to steer public opinion on issues important to francophones.

Finally, the largely recognized bilingualism and biculturalism as a facet of the Canadian culture polarized between the 1960s and the late 1970s. Instead of seeking to satisfy Québec's cultural concerns, thereby keeping the discussion open, provinces began to express ambivalence. Kenneth McRoberts¹⁶ documents this point when he notes the success of Trudeau's unity strategy among anglophone Canadians who were encouraged to leave behind the national narrative of the compact, their only basis for any discussion with francophone Canadians.¹⁷ This experience, together with the early 1980s' experiences of Constitutional Patriation, and later efforts at rapprochement through the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, have provided the Québécois with a set of socializing experiences: those experiences which profoundly mark a generation or cohort and influence future political attitudes or behaviour.

Scholars disagree on definitions of the Quiet Revolution's social reorganization; relatedly, considering English-French tensions throughout the history of Canada presents difficulties. Some contend that Canadian French-English relations, and thus the Quiet Revolution, have evolved primarily as a cultural transformation, a psychological reorientation in francophones which elicited change in political behaviour—both conventional and unconventional—an insistence on their identity as *Québécois*, and increasing nationalism.¹⁸ Even into the 1980s, scholars¹⁹ considered francophones' nationalism as 'ethnic' but not (yet?) 'civic' as anglophones' nationalism had purportedly become. As Québec developed, the thinking became that Canada in general represented above all a ques-

¹⁶ See Kenneth McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada* (Toronto: Oxford UP, 1997) 188.

¹⁷ That is, Trudeau pursued a strategy based on group and individual terms, relevant to the discussion that follows.

¹⁸ See Donald Creighton, *Canada's First Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970).

¹⁹ Raymond Breton, "From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Québec," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11.1 (January 1988).

tion of economic and class warfare,²⁰ which presumably continued to play itself out as Québec's political generations succeeded each other during the twentieth century.²¹ Economics and nationalism do appear to influence differently attitudes about the future of Québec.²² Younger generations account for economic viability in the calculus of their vote choices—for example in the November 1998 elections in Québec, when support for the ADQ rose to near 14 per cent of the vote. Support for the ADQ indicates that the question is no longer “federalism or separatism” but how Québec shall renew itself.

The traditional analysis of the Quiet Revolution revolves around concepts of the individual and his/her community, the parameters of each, and relevant political theories which shape political debate in Canada. The next section outlines this discussion.

Self and Group

Western political thought considers the self as apart from the group. In sociopolitical terms, the self has an individual identity distinct from the identity prescribed or proscribed in interactions with groups. In its current form, adherents of liberalism and communitarianism constitute the debate over whether one is a person first and then a group member, or the other way around. In liberalism, one is first an individual, a rational thinker who subscribes to group norms because it is advantageous and contributes to a greater good, without consideration of cultural or social needs. On the other hand, communitarians contend that one is a group member first and defined as such, and then has distinguishing qualities as an individual. Communitarians consider it impossible to hypothesize about rational individuals as divorced from social reality, as in Rawlsian liberal thought experiments.²³ When applied to

²⁰ See Fernand Ouellet, *Economic and Social History of Québec: 1760–1850* (Gage Publishing and Carleton U, 1980).

²¹ Françoise Ouellet, “Génération et changements dans le système des partis: le cas du Québec,” *Génération et politique*, ed. J. Crête and R. Favre (Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1988).

²² Christopher J. Fleury, “In Good Times and Bad: Comparing the Effect of Short Term Economic Perceptions on Support for Independence in Québec under Different Economic Conditions,” *Québec Studies* 24 (Fall 1997).

²³ See *Political Liberalism* and *A Theory of Justice*.

politics and societies, the liberalism-communitarianism debate translates to whether one can “rise above” cultural questions or lobbying for group rights, to support a “neutral” state. In the Canadian context, groups, individuals and rights have all been molded to discussions of the nature of Québec as a founding group or as a group among others, and whether individual or group terms should describe any rights of the Québécois.

A second related question about groups and individuals is whether economically-defined or culturally-defined experiences produce them. This question is also sometimes moulded to the debate on social movements, since mass mobilization could be described as emanating either from class interest, or from culturally-defined nationalism. In the case of Québec, the Quiet Revolution resulted from either a previously agrarian class mobilized to wrest control from local business elites,²⁴ or from the culmination of growing cultural nationalism.²⁵ If economic interests produced the Quiet Revolution, then one could describe it in political terms as an aggregate form of liberal tendencies whereby an agrarian class mobilized in its own interest to force its society to remain neutral in its distribution of power and responsibilities in local government. On the other hand, if a movement of cultural nationalism produced the Quiet Revolution, then arguably a communitarian group mobilized in favor of group-based recognition.

Finally, the idea of groups and individuals as separable or fused raises methodological questions. A group-based approach limits the characteristics of each group and presents a simplistic model of political relations. Both the liberal and communitarian views of the Quiet Revolution offer as many complications as explanations. An aggregate view of class relations necessarily leaves out the details of individual-level choices, interests, and cultural consciousness; rationality models omit motivational factors in individual choices to join such a movement. The communitarian view as well limits analysis, for it concentrates its efforts on cultural questions and symbolic attachments to the nation, leaving aside

²⁴Fernand Ouellet, *Economic and Social History*; John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1965); *The Vertical Mosaic Revisited* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1998).

²⁵Creighton, *Canada's First Century*.

economic factors such as the socio-economic position of members and attendant motivations.

The liberal, communitarian, economic and cultural approaches all seek to explain societies and social movements in terms of a static view of groups and individuals. They hesitate to take account of the possibility that both groups and individuals may change with context. Under the communitarian view, Québec politics offers a mode of intragroup cohesion, whereby a community of francophones (and increasingly, Québec residents) form and maintain a community. In liberal terms, the transformation of Québec prevents the continuation of a "neutral" society in which one respects dominant social values where they apply to a wide majority of the population. Digging even more deeply, in communitarian terms, precisely because the anglophone population is this wide majority, francophones sense a risk; in liberal terms, many in Québec opt for a society because they believe it offers the best arrangement for the greatest number within the province.

If we view communities in terms of individuals as in liberalism, then we are hard-pressed to explain how individual interest is aggregated in movements which do not necessarily benefit individuals. If we view communities as groups (as in communitarianism) with shared properties (race, social class, etc.), then we must explain anomalies detracting from a group-based view—such as why one member of a group refuses to join an independence movement, or subnational claims campaign.

Individualist and groupist views fail to explain why there is a continuing separatist movement in Québec; it would appear to be neither a solely francophone (group) phenomenon, nor is it fading with the province's economic progress since the Quiet Revolution (aggregation of individual interests). However, considering the Quiet Revolution in terms of sustained socialization practices allows us to exit these constraints. Socialization models include much more the fluidity of groups and individuals in changing conditions.

The individual-group phenomenon, and these debates about liberalism and communitarianism, find their connection in Canadian policy debates. Particularly in education policy, liberals and communitarians reveal their perspectives (and underlying assump-

tions about human nature) when they justify their policy preferences. Issues in education policy have centred on religion and language. Education policy, then, illustrates the nexus between a dominant liberalism and a growing communitarian challenge to a previously staid political culture. In addition, for the purposes of this discussion, educational policy evolution also reveals changes in the locus of political socialization.

Manzer²⁶ outlines education policy as an amalgamation of three types of liberalism and two types of communitarianism. Liberalism, premised on the priority of liberty, has political, economic and ethical strands that stress freedom, rationality and potentiality respectively. Communitarianism, prioritizing culture and language, has conservative and radical strands that view community as hierarchical or egalitarian respectively. According to Manzer, radical communitarians and ethical liberals are at times indistinguishable in their practice despite differences in their perspectives. Such a counterintuitive proposition makes more sense when we consider political socialization.

Ethical liberals focus on the potential of each individual whose self-development is even aided at times by a proactive state. Radical communitarians, also, place the individual within a community as an arrangement among equals where all participate and thus develop their potential. Both of these approaches to individual and group development are certainly present in the Québec tradition, particularly since the Quiet Revolution. When we consider political socialization and education in Québec, the convergence of radical communitarianism and ethical liberalism provides an instructive lens. It remains to be seen which socialization practices reveal these preferences and how they do so.

Self and Group as Practised

Socialization practices over the past forty years in Québec have moved from private and social milieus to the public sphere. In the course of the Quiet Revolution, socialization, once referred to as social, cultural or relating to traditions, became more obvious and more self-conscious. As a process over more than one generation

²⁶ Ronald Manzer, *Public Schools and Political Ideas: Canadian Education Policy in Historical Perspective* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994) 12–13.

in Québec, political socialization changed not in content, but in locus, by virtue of re-ordering the importance of socialization agents during and after the Quiet Revolution. A new emphasis on secondary agents (media, work, political parties, and the state) joined the primary agents of socialization (family, school, religion, socio-economic status) so that generations after the Quiet Revolution now receive a fuller political training and understanding about their place in Québec and in Canada. Socialization produces familiarity with their place in Québec because each element concentrates on the idea of Québec as a *société distincte*: that Québec uses French and flourishes as a consequence. Political socialization in Québec, much in keeping with radical communitarianism and ethical liberalism, involves strategically planning the optimal development of each individual and proactively engaging youth as group members whose participation ensures cultural regeneration.

Table 1: Practices of Political Socialization in Québec

Socialization Agent	Practices common to the <i>société distincte</i>	Each practice indicates expanded political socialization rather than changing political culture	Each practice is sustained
Family Schools Religion	History as lived experience	Quiet Revolution is within current generation's lifetime; immediacy and urgency. Only just now seeing obituaries of leaders of Quiet Revolution. History taught in present tense.	Curriculum (ethnic philosophy in junior high) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • constant revisit of citizenship and unity debates • Roman Catholicism still present as cultural if not formal religious affiliation
Schools Work Media	Language as the center of identity	Raison d'être for Québec in first place. Symbol of recognition, tool for assignation, way of being (optimal distinctiveness).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Office de la langue française • required in school—changing to language-based educational system (replaces confessional) • marketing to Europe as "Gateway to North American Market"
State Political Parties	Institutions as unlike the rest of Canada by definition	French model in contradistinction to rest of Canada/British model. Formal support of language (identity officialized) rather than reliance on informal political culture to maintain dominance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political parties in Québec have active youth groups for mobilization of next generation of politicians. • State of Québec makes overtures to US and Europe for business on its own behalf.
State Schools Political Parties	Civic culture as a unifying force	Proactive Québec state, rather than responsive. Encourages involvement by and for all; ties cultural to civic participation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At home v. rest of Canada; intraprovincial debate is a home matter. Use of <i>we</i>, <i>our</i> • language education system unifies the province along the variable shared by more (than religion, for example) • pride in defending rights and standing apart
State	Province as active on behalf of its majority members	vis à vis federal government, moves not just to block federal leaders, but to broaden possibilities for all who share Quebecers' traits—inside or outside Québec (language laws, education system is model for Northwest Territories).	moved from pan-francophone movement to tie identity and history. Easier to make gains. (more closely defined followership for greater results, given provincial structure of federal system) Over time, same practices, but more delimited membership.

But one could regard changes in group regeneration in Québec as trends in political culture or attitude change, and thus they still require clarification. The question then becomes, which practices constitute overt, self-conscious political socialization, how do they do so, and how do we distinguish them from political culture phenomena? Table 1 illustrates which agents and practices are involved with political socialization, what distinguishes each practice from an explanation involving the surrounding political culture and how public life sustains each practice. In this way, the account of change in Québec as political socialization encompasses both ethical liberalism's stress on the individual's potential, and radical communitarianism's emphasis on egalitarian community membership based on culture and language.

In Québec, the society is not only *distincte* but *practised* as *distincte*. Explanations of the evolving Québec movement which involve political culture fail to note the process of renewing the political culture. The continuation of the *société distincte* in Québec lies in the insistence on the propagation of encouraged behaviour. Language policies requiring the use of French might illustrate a changing political culture. But apparent changes in political culture are actually the public institutionalization of socialization practices. The curriculum changes, the growing common use of French through the arts and in the media, and a proactive state have all led actively trained newer generations of Québécois, whose experiences, challenges, and rewards all occur in French, to carry forward those behaviours to the next generation. Francophones in Québec have long insisted on the cultural maintenance of their way of life even at the cost of the industrial development experienced by anglophones. The consequences of the francophones' experiences include passing on the history of their people as a shared experience, in the present tense. That is, Québécois learn that they themselves illustrate the will to survive. Youth receive lessons in the first person plural; they carry forward this *société distincte* as a hard-earned survival.

Language as the main tool of political socialization centres this experience of the institutionalized *société distincte*. At the heart of a different identity in North America, the French language is already salient, but its institutionalization legitimates the language and vests francophones with the courage, hope and pride of their

difference. French defines at the surface and at the core a tradition of optimal distinctiveness²⁷ for the Québécois and offers a commonwealth even among strangers. French reminds us, too, that the origin of institutions in the province of Québec and in other francophone communities across Canada, lies not in England but in France, where the *code civil* and education practices have a different structure by definition. The *code civil* and education system are not simply part of a historical tradition: they set the stage for an active mobilization into an established community.

When they distinguish Québec from other places, French-language institutions also serve to unify the group from within. The civic culture of Québec thus functions as a unifying force to proclaim its evident difference from surrounding areas. The state now actively promotes the French language and all of its cultural instantiations (worldwide francophony), as well as provides a haven to other cultures whose members find themselves in a minority elsewhere, much as the francophones feel vis-à-vis the rest of Canada.

The five socialization practices presented here exemplify the convergence of the two perspectives defined by ethical liberalism and radical communitarianism. Post-Quiet Revolutionary Québec, as the community of the *société distincte*, takes the individual in hand, teaches him/her to be a productive participant in the culture of the community, and cares for his/her needs, even at times acting on his/her behalf.

These political socialization practices aid in the maintenance and flourishing of the North American francophone community for five primary reasons. First, the history-as-lived-experience tradition of political education in Québec has an uncommon immediacy. The community is foremost always (radical communitarianism) but cares for and treats the individual as a member of that community (ethical liberalism). History is lived, even more than taught, in the present tense, because the Quiet Revolution is within the current generation's lifetime. We are only now beginning to see obituaries

²⁷M. Brewer, "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17 (1991): 476. Identity is carefully navigated such that the self neither loses individuality by being too broadly defined, nor is exposed by being too narrowly defined.

of the political leaders of the Quiet Revolution.²⁸ Rather than promoting linguistic ethnic identity through the teaching of past cultural triumphs (common to nationalist movements), the Québécois simply indicate themselves.

Second, the French language in Québec provides a civic tool with which to expand the community. Language serves as political education: the individual through political education learns the elements of membership in the community of francophones (radical communitarianism) and yet there is room for individuals of all backgrounds within this community (ethical liberalism). Language as a civic education tool offers an inclusion of more people than is possible with a religious tradition (Catholicism) or cultural tradition (French heritage).

Third, developing historically French institutions in contradistinction to those in the rest of Canada makes obvious the formal support of the language—officializes identity as defined by language—rather than relying on the informal institutions of the political culture to maintain traditionally French practices. For the good of the community, the individual is forced to engage the community in French (radical communitarianism) but for his/her own good, in order that the individual avoid alienation from the whole that develops (ethical liberalism).

Fourth, the unifying force of the civic culture in the form that Québec has chosen to pursue—the proactive state—serves as a hallmark of the radical communitarian in that it supplies a forum for all to participate in an egalitarian fashion in the promotion of the community. Likewise the ethical liberal is satisfied because the potential development of each individual is a formal cornerstone of Québec's political education.²⁹

²⁸One example is Camille Laurin. See Lysiane Gagnon, "Camille Laurin, or Quiet Strength," *La Presse* (16 March 1999).

²⁹Education in Québec specifies the need for students to know their roles as citizens, as parents, and as workers. The Ministry of Education in Québec (MEQ) specifies the need for students to know all three of these roles because adaptation is a crucial skill for the variety of life experiences that are bound to occur. The MEQ is self-conscious about the purpose of the development of the individual as part of Québec society. It encourages students to acquire knowledge and skills to confront and transform the world. The MEQ's second goal, to socialize, includes the transmission of a cultural heritage as inspiration, social cement, and/or behav-

Fifth, the proactive Québec provincial government—known as *the national government* in Québec—does not simply move to respond to the needs of its citizens. Neither does it limit its action to countering perceived negative policy moves by the federal government. Rather, Québec represents the interests and needs of its citizens through social programs which pre-date their advent in other provinces, and directly result from the Quiet Revolution experiences.

Increasing linguistic and cultural concerns vis-à-vis the rest of Canada (not the least of which was a response to Trudeau's vision of unity as defined by a single pan-Canadian political culture³⁰) encouraged Québec to re-construct its *société distincte* utilizing both the historical roots of French exploration in North America and the growing use of French in everyday life. To be sure, Trudeau's strategy for national unity favored bilingualism over biculturalism, and so the case for centering the *société distincte* around Québec culture appears weakened (e.g., francophones' status hors-Québec is raised to the detriment of Québec-centered identity). But, expanding the use of French outside Québec, and making French the official language inside Québec, together brought language to the forefront of political identity. In addition, the Trudeau vision accentuated individualism, eliminated the idea of the compact (central to the francophone understanding of Canada), and heightened instead of attenuated allegiance to Québec.³¹ In terms of political socialization, the experiences with Trudeau's unity campaign and with the Meech Lake Accord reframed political education in Québec. Anglophones had sometimes resisted elements of Québec's politics, but anglophones across Canada became increasingly ambivalent about accommodating Québec. While Canadian politics polarized, Québec moved to accommodate a forward-looking identity committed to the French language in the absence of English Canada by reorienting the political socialization of its youth in kind.

our prescriptions. Such socialization occurs through courses, but also through democratic school milieus as well. Finally, the mission statement of the Ministry of Education refers to "our people" as a way to embrace each member as part of a whole. See <http://www.meq.gouv.qc.ca>.

³⁰McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada*.

³¹McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada* 176–87.

Québec's proactive state resonates with ethical liberals, and the room for debate and discussion within Québec as it develops model programs³² illustrates how the practices of radical communitarians can be shared across communities. With a nationally defined government, the individual, group and the government can be thought of as continuous, all sharing the same goals.

Sustaining these Socialization Practices

The maintenance of the francophone community in North America, largely through the efforts of the province of Québec, has relied upon the overt insistence on increasingly public socialization practices. But the renewal of these practices remains to be seen. Often lodged in the history curricula, citizenship education in Québec has solidified the idea that history is being lived rather than learned as a collection of past events. But in public life generally, the prominent unity debates encourage individuals constantly to revisit what it means to be a citizen, and how the group and the individual should interact in a political entity, whatever its future form.

With regard to the language question as continuing to define the Québécois identity, the consistent use of French despite a large surrounding majority of other-language speakers builds community. Language also underlines the group's importance to the survival of the individual as s/he understands her/himself—part of a culture under linguistic siege but bravely confronting cultural realities such as a growing multiculturalism internal to the province.

The active institution in Québec that concerns itself with the protection and promotion of the French language laws (*l'Office de la langue française*) provides formal assistance to francophones in their perceived struggle. The required use of French in schools is not new in Québec, but the government's implementation of a plan to redesign the entire education system to a language-based one (replacing the previous confessional system) underlines how wide-ranging the role of language has become to the promotion of

³²The practices in Québec's education system have been used as a model for other places not usually associated with francophone Canada, such as the Northwest Territories' use of concurrent endowment models whereby the education system maintained two sections, one Roman Catholic and the other Protestant. See Manzer, *Public Schools* 56.

this culture. In 1995, the Ministry of Education in Québec met to re-examine Québec's education system. In its *Report*, they noted that education should contribute to a future as open as possible to diversity and to market competition.³³ Reasons for the revisions to the education system include changing family makeup; an expansion of the socio-economic divide; a growing pluralism and ethnic diversity; growing complexity of the global (labour) market; an explosion in information and technology; and decentralization connected to the decline of the welfare state. That is, changes in the primary agents of political socialization require the regeneration of the primary agent of the schools, and the secondary agent of the state in Québec to step in. To answer these challenges, they will restructure the education system along language lines in order to move beyond the traditional confessional school system less relevant to today's demographics in Québec.

Maintaining practices through institutions in Québec requires teaching future leaders how to engage the political world. Organized youth groups of the federal and provincial parties in Québec socialize and mobilize their youngest members into the practice of Québec politics, a practice shared somewhat in other parts of Canada but not current or waning in other parts of the world. The 'state' (*l'État*) of Québec, as an entity distinguished from the rest of Canada, lobbies on its own behalf for business in the US and Europe, marketing itself as the "gateway to North America" for non-anglophones. In addition, Québec insists on separate provisions in international agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, in order to protect cultural (for anglophones) and linguistic (for francophones) concerns.

As for the civic culture of Québec as a unifying force for francophones within and outside Québec, the province insists on intraprovincial debate as a matter for its own citizens (such as language laws, cultural traditions, etc.) and not a point of discussion for those outside the province, which sometimes rankles. The constant use of 'we' and 'us' and 'our' in inter-provincial debate speaks to those at home as acting for the community as a whole. Making

³³The details of the *Report* are laid out online at <http://www.meq.gouv.gc.ca/etat-gen/menu>.

the education system into one based on language rather than religion expands this 'we' to include more people than the older religion-based system, and signals that Québec has moved the place of its language from the informal world of forty years ago to the centrepiece of its continuing public life.

Lastly, the movement in Québec that led to the Quiet Revolution has evolved from a pan-francophone movement to one in which identity and history are more closely tied to the land in Québec because it is easier for provinces to make gains in Canada's federal system. This evolution can be understood in terms of sustaining political socialization practices. In order to maintain the idea of a closely defined community, Québec began to act more in its own behalf and then to share results with other francophone groups. This transition more closely defined Québec's followership and cemented socialization practices because they were not diluted across wide-ranging circumstances: Such an evolution revealed a communitarian agenda which, when juxtaposed to a more liberal framework in the rest of the country, created a political crisis that has not yet ebbed.

Conclusions: La société distincte Carried Forward

Québec continues to socialize its youth as it meets the twenty-first century. Two main challenges greet this institutionalization of the *société distincte*, and socialization practices may mute their effect or offer resolutions to potential conflict. First, in using the French language as a socializing and mobilizing force, Québec cogently recognizes its changing cultural base, but this has made more salient such ideas as 'founding families.' The pro-sovereignty sector of the population, although rising over the long term, still waxes and wanes in the shorter term. But the rise of the ADQ points toward a successful socialization process among a younger generation who begin to consider Québec in terms other than those connected with the arguments pitting federalism against separatism.

Secondly, the First Nations' claims about land in the north of Québec and recognition of their own groups' concerns throughout Québec have countered the province's policy preferences in the areas of hydropower, education and local government. Events in recent negotiations with First Nations groups suggest some progress, albeit measured, in a cultural rapprochement.

To answer each of these challenges, Québec has added the state to the list of traditional agents of socialization: family, church, schools, peers, media and workplace experiences. Through its fostering of civic education practices, Québec has expanded the sphere of socialization once relegated to private, religious and cultural domains. That is, Québec has transformed the historical tradition of the persistence to survive into the institutionalization of the *société distincte*. The vehicle for this transformation is political socialization. Québec carefully negotiates notions of community and the individual under changing circumstances, but always with an eye toward maintaining the centre of francophone life in North America. Québec's investment in the political socialization of its youth³⁴ reveals its longer-range planning. Instead of regarding Québécois linguistic nationalism as a defense mechanism to counter the perceived threat from British, and then anglophone, cultures in Canada, the lens of political socialization permits us to examine processes of forward-looking measures to create a society of individuals who rose from a common past but are inspired by a common destiny.

³⁴In March 1999, the province of Québec placed youth at the top of its agenda, a cause which Mario Dumont, leader of the ADQ, had pressed during the Fall 1998 campaign. See <http://www.adq.qc.ca>.