

CURRENT MAGAZINES

THE POST-WAR WORLD

United States of Europe?—Prof. D. Saurat, in *World Review*.

"Equal Access" to Raw Materials—Mr. A. Istel, in *Foreign Affairs*.

Germany's Future—Prof. F. W. Foerster, in *University of Toronto Quarterly*.

For a Modern Bishop (or Archbishop)—Mr. L. Aaronson, in the *Nineteenth Century*.

THE end of the war in Europe may be still distant: quite possibly it is near at hand, but our wisest assumption—with corresponding preparation—is one that reckons on years of conflict still to come. Napoleon's practice on the eve of battle was shrewd—to plan in far more detail what he would do in the event of defeat than what he would do in the event of victory. We have few misgivings about whether in the long run we shall win: we know that we shall. But the run may be very long indeed, and our likeliest means of shortening it is to plan everything for the most effective effort no matter what the length may prove to be.

This, however, does not exclude, it rather demands, thought about terms of peace. For the prospect we hold out to Germany regarding the conditions for settlement may make a vast difference to the date at which she will bow to the inevitable. Hence the interest of numerous articles on that subject which have been appearing in the great British and American magazines.

I.

One sort of article is that which adjures us this time to avoid a "vindictive" settlement, and which warns us of the tragic result from the *Treaty of Versailles*.

That this much abused document was the stimulus which carried Hitler into power, has been a favorite thesis—particularly on the lips of those who have made no study of the historical stages of Hitler's rise, and who have never read the *Treaty of Versailles*. National Socialism during its first ten years of struggle was urged as a policy of retaliation on the leaders who had accepted, in the "Hall of Mirrors", such dishonor to the *Reich*. Its platforms then resounded with appeal to passion

in a Germany which had been so insulted as the abode of "a second-rate people". But after a decade of such rhetoric Hitler was still thought an unimportant demagogue, negligible as a force aiming to dislocate the Weimar Republic. His success was not serious until the great economic Depression, beginning in 1929, had transformed the scene, and until his ineffective railings at the foreign "Big Four" for their little known treaty of peace had given place to diatribes very effective indeed against a German government under which six million Germans were without work. We do not, surely, need to be told what new force comes at such a time into old speeches against a Ministry; whatever their formal argument, they are greeted with rapturous applause if their conclusion is one of disgust and anger towards the men in office. Invective which had been almost given up, because it had been received with comparative inattention, can be brought out with effect once more, and is suddenly found very much "to the point".

Treaty of Versailles thus became, after 1930, a name to conjure by. Germans who had only dim and confused notions about what it contained were taught to cite it always as the source of their woes, just as—about the same time, and under a similar influence—not a few persons in Britain and Canada and the United States began to quote it remorsefully, in equal ignorance of its contents, but eager for a quick and simple explanation of the "hard times". I do not mean here to justify the whole peace settlement of 1919. The *Treaty of Versailles*, both in its form and in its execution, had grave faults. Its "war-guilt" clause was among the most stupid expressions of mere malice that can be found in any victor's manifesto. The figure for "reparations" was set absurdly high: one wonders how even the popular rage of the hour can have so bewildered the wits in men of economic repute—for it was such "experts", not the "mere politicians" of current legend, who insisted that Germany should be ordered to pay such impossible sums. But it was not until such requirements of the Treaty had been practically cancelled that they began to serve as an effective plea for Hitlerism. With the present spectacle of Mussolini's Italy and Tojo's Japan exhibiting just the same disposition as Hitler's Germany, this argument fixing responsibility on the peace-makers at Versailles loses its last shred of force. Italy and Japan entered the First World War as national freebooters, with no purpose other than loot. It can scarcely be one and the same Treaty which deserves blame for throwing Germany into Hitler's

arms by pillaging her too much and for making Italy and Japan not only authoritarian but perfidious by sating them insufficiently with German spoil!

As one looks back, with the rich experience of the twenty years that intervened between the two World Wars, can one find fault with measures which were branded as vindictive but which in truth were rather precautionary? For example, with the disarming of Germany? With the prohibition of a German fleet and air force? With the erection of such new sovereign states as Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia and Poland to be Germany's vigilant neighbors? Or with the decision, so much denounced as a gratuitous insult, but now so tragically confirmed as sound, that Germany should have no colonies, because she had shown herself unworthy of the least degree of national trusteeship?

We are likely to meet at the end of this war, masquerading under the specious pretence of a plea against vindictive punishment, what is in truth an effort to block all effective guarantees that Germany shall be unable to perpetrate a third series of horrors like those she has perpetrated twice within a quarter-century. This is a peril to be watched, fought and overcome. It may be so that "the better element" among Germans detest Hitlerism, and will yet restore the character which once made their country respected abroad. But it is no matter of conjecture, it is a grim and obvious certainty, that this better element is now powerless against the other element in directing the national policies. Nor, surely, should there be any room, after a second tragic experience, for the counterfeit magnanimity which would risk again the fate of so many weaker neighbors on the assumption that defeat has effected rapid improvement in German national character.

II.

If, then, the *Treaty of Versailles* failed to maintain peace, not so much because some of its terms were over-exacting as because others were not enforced by the victorious Powers, what is the inference for "next time"?

The most important inference comes from recollection of the revival of separate national policies which those Powers so soon and so disastrously permitted themselves. When the United States Senate, by a narrow majority, refused to ratify the Treaty, it was made known to the world that the union of the democracies was at an end, and that what had been won

by common sacrifice on the battlefield had no guarantee of common vigilance to preserve it. Silently, but with delight, the Powers temporarily defeated took note of this encouragement for the day they would await. For what would yet be done by the Lindberghs and Nyes and Burton Wheelers to reassure Adolf Hitler, the Elihu Roots and Hiram Johnsons of twenty years before prepared the way. What graver responsibility was ever taken than that taken with such lightness of heart, even with such ring of exultation in the voice, by the group whom Woodrow Wilson called "wilful men"? They little realized indeed how such quick return to the thrill of a Republican-Democrat conflict would affect issues very different from those of American party. No inkling of what might come in the summer of 1939 from what they did in the fall of 1919 was present to their minds. But the thought of what happened then should haunt all of us as this war draws to a close. It should pervade the atmosphere of next Peace Conference, striking terror to the heart of the party zealot as often as promptings of party interest rise unbidden in his mind, and keeping the United Nations resolute, at whatever cost, for united policy in the Peace.

The bond lately signed by Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia is a token that this warning has not been forgotten. They have pledged their word to one another that, unlike the democracies of 1919, not one of them will make a separate bargain with the beaten enemy. Contemptuous laughter at once rang out from Nazi and Fascist microphones at this announcement. From the point of view of Paul Joseph Goebbels or Virginio Gayda, another "Pact" must indeed have seemed exquisitely laughable. To think that any Power should now trust, or pretend to trust, the pledge of any other Power for anything! With the cynical belief we know so well in individual rogues, that "Everybody cheats when he can", Fascist and Nazi leaders proceed on the assumption that each of the allied trio of nations will leave the other two in the lurch the moment it judges a separate peace to be to its own advantage. That a promise to the contrary should be thought a safeguard against this may well supply material for competitive jest between Rome and Berlin, where a peace treaty is always just fresh cover for secret war preparations, and where war itself is but an exercise in "the science and art of foul play".

Yet an element of misgiving must have mingled with the vociferous scorn of Axis commentators. This time they had to

interpret men very different from Neville Chamberlain, whose pathetic credulity at Munich the dictators no doubt often recall with a chuckle. They have to explain Winston Churchill, to whom the Munich swindle was from the first transparent; Josef Stalin, a realist if ever there was one in international affairs; and F. D. Roosevelt, whose recurring theme for so many years has been the peril to all mankind from Powers whose signature to a treaty is just another artifice of fraud. Was it possible that these three men will trust one another? So at least it seemed, and the dictators might well be uneasy.

What if that "ideological contrast" which they had so often mocked should turn out to have a basis of truth, and the pledge of certain nations to one another should prove reliable, though the pledge of certain other nations was worthless? Every banker, dealing with applicants for a loan, takes account, among other considerations, of just such ideological contrast among men, and pays no regard to the "debunking" psychologist who warns him that men are all fundamentally alike. Is it possible that Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, in like neglect of the debunking political scientist, distinguish in reliability between nation and nation? And will they perhaps be justified in practice, however they lend themselves to derision in theory—just like the banker?

Reflections such as these must visit the mind even of a Goebbels or a Gayda. The new Triple Alliance has a side of which they must think much, though they say nothing. It holds high promise for the future peace, no less than for the immediate war.

III

Three powers have pledged themselves to one another, that they will so reconstruct Europe, after the Nazi-Fascist horror has been overthrown, as to safeguard mankind against its return. Those three Powers are but the leaders of many more: it needs no seer to foretell how Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Free France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Greece, will rush to join the alliance. At least we shall have heard the last of the strange delusion known as "Isolationism". But for the moment only three, with a few others represented by a Government-in-Exile, can be outspoken.

The vast significance of this Treaty lies in the acceptance by Soviet Russia, for the first time, of partnership with Great Britain and the United States not merely for the present War but

also for the coming Peace. It had been noted that Russia was keeping strictly to her own defence, that she was careful to remain altogether aloof from British and American conflict with Japan, that Stalin's speech to the Red Army last May conveyed no hint of that "common democratic purpose" which President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill ceaselessly emphasize.

The prospect of having Soviet Russia at the coming Conference Table, with all the prestige which her achievement in the fight has won for her, is by no means to the mind of certain publicists in recent British magazines. They dread the sort of world-resettlement in which Soviet Russia would cooperate. Their compliments to the Soviet Union as a fighting ally are strangely combined with outbursts of rage against the "Communism" to which the Soviet Union is dedicated: what they plainly desire is that the Red Army, the Red Fleet, the Red Air Force should continue achieving marvels of courage and skill in battle, but that to the "Moscow ideals", which these fighters cherish, no serious influence should belong in determining the world-order after victory.

A time has come for very plain speaking on this matter, lest selfish anti-Russian influences in England may have a chance to repeat the damage they did in 1936 and in 1939. When the Spanish Civil War was raging, and—as Mr. Lloyd George truly said—the cause of democracy in Europe had its champion in the Spanish republicans, British reactionaries (still more effectively than French) favored the dictatorial enemy. They talked of "the Red Terror," extolled General Franco, insisted on passive acquiescence by the British government when ship after ship, manned by British seamen on their lawful business, was sunk by Mussolini's submarines off the Spanish coast. In that struggle democracy was overthrown, and the Axis Powers which achieved its overthrow secured as their reward such strategic advantages from Franco's Spain as intensified tremendously their anti-British strength in the western Mediterranean. We now know that to British, still more than to French, pro-Fascist interests this sinister result was due. Is not the tragi-comedy of the "Committee for Non-Intervention in Spain" still remembered? And the warning by Neville Chamberlain to the government of Leon Blum that, if airplanes and munitions were sold by French factories to the Spanish Republic, this would "break the Anglo-French entente"?

It would be undesirable to recall now the record of those years of disastrous folly, if there were not unmistakable stirrings,

here and there, of the same sort of influence. Pro-Fascism has to exert itself, for the present, in Britain under more cautious disguise: its relative timidity was shown, for example, by the fact that no more than 25 votes could be mustered in the House of Commons (against 475) to support a motion of No-Confidence in Mr. Churchill, though the *Atlantic Charter*, with its allegedly "Communist" flavor, had stirred British reactionaries to their old familiar rage. In a so sharply awakened nation they do not venture the bold hand they showed in 1936: they falter where they then so firmly trod. Still, they keep up the pressure, in hope of improving luck. They hunt for grounds of complaint about "the conduct of the war", even where the true motive in alarm at the Anglo-Soviet combination is obvious, and is occasionally disclosed by an incautious phrase. They revive the vocabulary of anti-League -of-Nations rhetoric about "fatuous idealism", about "international dreamers", about "millennial hope for a sudden regeneration of the world", and about the risk that the British Empire may be surrendered "piecemeal" under some pretence of "doctrinaires" that they know how to abolish war for ever. A favorite ruse in this reactionary campaign is to pour out vials of wrath on such bygone leaders as Woodrow Wilson and Ramsay Macdonald. These can now be arraigned in terms which it would be bad controversial tactics to apply to Mr. Churchill or to President Roosevelt, and the reader or the listener can be left to make his own application of the argument. Just now the attempts at mordant satire on the new Archbishop of Canterbury—sometimes in prose, sometimes in verse, but alike vulgar in each medium—proceed from a disposition too familiar for mistake.

The Archbishop indeed represents the spirit of post-war reconstruction on which hope may be intelligently built. From him, as all Canadians who listened to his eloquent voice on Dominion Day will remember, comes the moral appeal for which such a draft as the *Atlantic Charter* provides at least the outline of concrete application. He shares with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill the detestation of those too selfish to tolerate any proposals of economic or political change under which their personal advantages would be reduced, and too stupid to realize that change of this character, however disagreeable, is inevitable. That Soviet Russia will join in so rearranging the world order as to restore, with a new lease of life, just the old system of competitive capitalistic States plotting one another's economic disablement, is not conceivable. Neither is it conceivable that the new

world order which Soviet Russia will have done so much to win can be set up without her cooperation. What the far-seeing democratic leaders propose, and what the reactionaries abhor, is a serious and sympathetic study of what the Soviet Russian international transformation would mean, inviting Moscow leaders under the new Treaty to continue as peace allies of Britain and America. As basis of negotiation, as pledge of being in earnest (sufficient, apparently, to be so taken at Moscow in good faith) they have issued the *Atlantic Charter*.

IV.

An example of the need for fundamental change, perhaps specially impressive from the immediate situation, is the case of rubber or the case of oil. Like the raw materials of industry, like the fats, like wheat, these vital necessities of all are to be found in only certain areas of the globe: thus the accident of international quarrel may enable certain nations, by a close monopoly, to reduce other nations to desperate straits. For the same reason the fortunate private speculator in such fields has been able, under the negligent scheme that has hitherto prevailed, often to secure a vast personal fortune from the necessities of others. Soviet Russia is the country in which, on a great scale, the experiment of eliminating this "capitalist exploitation of the public" has been attempted. That in re-settlement of Europe she would press for a like reform in the international sphere, is certain. She will demand that national not less than individual monopolies be brought under "collective" control, so as to ensure that for what everyone needs it will be no longer possible for anyone to hold others, piratically, to ransom.

The urgency of such change is not disproved by evidence abundantly available of disappointment in the actual trial of Socialism. Anti-Soviet publicity departments in many countries have been tireless in supplying agents with proof that "in Russia the sufferings of the poor are worse than ever." Anyone who knew the great Russian cities in Tsarist days, and has observed them again in a recent year, must hear with amazement this colossal falsehood. But it has passed muster with very many, especially with those whose "wishful thinking" makes them credulous of any disparagement for a policy which they recognize as threatening their personal interests. There is now real danger that a public, disgusted by the campaign of deceit which they know to have been waged against the Soviet Union, and

predisposed to friendship with Moscow for recent gigantic service to the democratic cause, may summarily reject all they hear against Stalin's régime, and accept without question the most extravagant claims to its credit.

We do not need to recoil with such uncritical haste from the extreme of the Duke of Bedford to the extreme of Dean Hewlett Johnson. In carrying out her project of industrial and agricultural "collectivization", Soviet Russia made many mistakes and inflicted many cruel hardships, which cannot be too clearly pointed out and condemned for the benefit of the future. These will, however, for the first time be *effectively* denounced when the attack is conducted without wild exaggeration, and with due acknowledgment of the social benefits by which the injustices were accompanied. That there were such injustices, gigantic in Tsarist Russia, by no means absent or trivial in other capitalistic countries, and resulting from the capitalistic system (whether in its essence or in its abuse) is beyond reasonable dispute, though apparently not yet beyond rhetorical denial in some inner circles of the Carlton Club. What is urgent is a conference, among those whom the exigencies of war against a common Nazi-Fascist foe have brought together, that together they may sift out what is good and what is bad in their respective systems.

Does anyone fear that the Soviet Union, at such a conference, might overbear not only her British and American allies but also the whole array of European democracies—such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Czechoslovakia—which would be quick to enlist under British-American leadership? To ask such a question is to answer it. Again it is wishful thinking that propounds a monstrous incredibility. In the coming world-reconstruction it will be needful to take risks vastly larger than this one. As President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill convince Josef Stalin that there is nothing in either American or British form of government essentially hostile to what he means by social justice, so the new Archbishop of Canterbury may inaugurate a new enterprise at Moscow, showing how not from atheists (such as Hitler and Ribbentrop) but from those who understand and welcome the true implications of the Christian Faith is there real hope for the cause of fair play.

Those resolved upon refashioning the world order after this war are reviled, by the group whose interests the old order suited, alternately for being unpractical and for being unpatriotic. Any proposal other than one of complacent return to pre-war ways

is branded as "giving away the Empire" or as "running after an idealistic will-o-the-wisp". Affectation of superior patriotism is as idle on such lips as affectation of clearer practical insight. It was not its "visionary" character that ruined the League of Nations: the ruin of that institution was achieved by treachery within, and the warning for the future is that next project of collective security must be committed to those who can trust one another as faithful to the pledge to which they have set their seal. There is now no difficulty in judging which Powers these are. Out of a grim experience we are now at least clear about the differing character of Powers, about that "ideological contrast" which Neville Chamberlain was so loth to acknowledge but whose acknowledgment must be the basis of all planning for the future. We know the Powers which must remain, at least for a long time to come, outcast: Japan's performance in China, Italy's in Abyssinia, Germany's in places too numerous to count, have affixed that indelible brand. The federal union of the democracies must be formed with these international criminals in mind, to prevent them—or any others like them—from perpetrating the like again. Who dares to call it "unpractical" when one urges, after experience of two world wars, that the wretched method of national manoeuvring and counter-manoeuvering which led to them should not be risked again? There are but two methods of arranging for national as for personal safety—separate arming and collective guarantee: a sufficiently disastrous trial of the former should by this time have disposed us to try the latter, even if the first tentative experiment with it, twenty-three years ago, proved disappointing. One remembers that the police force has sometimes been badly organized and has been ineffective for its purpose. But we have not yet found those who, in recoil from this form of deficient collective security, would favor return to "private war".

If anything like the world-transformation indicated in the *Atlantic Charter* is to be carried out, it is obvious that a federal union of the Powers achieving it is essential. Opening up opportunities to the "have-not" nations, providing equal access to the raw materials of industry, and ensuring that such new privilege is not abused for the purpose of preparing (in the name of peaceful industry) for another world war, will call for such closely integrated international action as the world has not before known. Obviously it will mean an end of the system of antagonistic tariffs among the federated countries: you cannot pool resources, contributing proportionately to an international

army and navy and air force strong enough to keep the peace of the world, while you are at the same time planning one another's economic disablement by hostile duties on one another's goods. No doubt it is the vision of what must happen under federal union to their beloved tariffs that has prompted the more violent of the diatribes against it in the circle of certain large manufacturers. Of course such public advisers never mention their own interest: it sounds so much better to complain that "visionaries" want to "give the Empire away"

The usual pretence, but coming at a time when there should be far more than the usual alertness in detecting it! Not the men who planned the *Atlantic Charter*, or the Archbishop who so eloquently advocates it, should be held wanting in British or in American patriotism. Those by whom their country is indeed degraded are the men—of whom America and Britain alike have a few, but happily very few—who, in strange consonance with Dr. Goebbels, mock the very suggestion that she has any higher purpose in the war than that of holding for ever the territorial or economic predominance which fortune has bestowed upon her. Would-be monopolists in loyalty—as in much else! Their country is deserving of a service very different from that. That honor rooted in dishonor stands. One reflects with thankfulness that at this crisis American and British interests are in hands quite other than theirs.

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