UNIVERSITY DEVELOPMENT SINCE CONFEDERATION

Walter C. Murray

PERHAPS the most outstanding feature in the development of the universities in Canada since 1867 has been the application of the political idea of federation to university problems.

When the provinces entered into Confederation, their higher institutions of learning were hopelessly divided and distressed by denominational rivalries. Each of the major religious denominations had deemed it a matter of vital importance to establish colleges to preserve and vindicate the faith of their fathers and to furnish an adequate supply of ministers. For example, in Nova Scotia when the Anglicans had obtained exclusive privileges in King's College, the Presbyterians retorted with Pictou Academy, then favoured Dalhousie, and finally built a college for the United Presbyterians in Truro, an Academy for the Free Church in Halifax, and sent the students of the Established Church to Scotland. The Baptists, as a protest against the exclusiveness of the Presbyterians in Dalhousie in 1838, built a college and an academy at Horton. The Scottish Catholics built at Antigonish, the Irish in Halifax, and the French planned one for Digby, while the Methodists supported the academies, male and female, at Sackville. Fire and misfortune had obliterated Goreham College which the Congregationalists had built at Liverpool.

In Ontario conditions were no better. Again the exclusiveness of the Anglicans led by Bishop Strachan drove the Methodists to build at Coburg, the Presbyterians at Kingston, the Congregationalists at Toronto and the Baptists at Woodstock. The French Catholics had built in Bytown, and the Scottish in Kingston. In Toronto were also found Knox, St. Michael's, and Trinity. Each denominational university—Victoria, Queen's and Trinity—believed it essential to maintain a School of Medicine and a School of Law to rival those in the University of Toronto.

A system of denominational grants, intended to appease the critics of the King's colleges which were supported by the state and the Church of England, only whetted the appetites and called receiving stations into being. Ontario was distributing about $24,000 annually among ten universities and colleges when it abolished this system in 1868; at that time Quebec was distributing about

$22,000 among six institutions, New Brunswick about $13,000 among six, and Nova Scotia about $8,000 among eight. Nova Scotia abolished the system in 1882.

Waste and strife drove the politicians to find a way out. Joseph Howe and Charles Tupper advocated federation in Nova Scotia, but little came of it except a nominal union between Dalhousie College and Goreham College whose building had been burned. In 1863, the two groups of Presbyterians threw in their lot with Dalhousie and closed the college at Truro. Another generation attempted a federation after the manner of the University of London through the University of Halifax. From 1878 to 1882 it struggled and then collapsed. Union movements were renewed between King's and Dalhousie in 1903, and again in 1923, when they succeeded after fire had destroyed the building at Windsor. The larger union dreamed of by Lord Dalhousie, by Howe, and by Charles Tupper came within the horizon of probabilities when the Carnegie Corporation offered millions to a federated university. Sectional and sectarian interests were, however, too deeply intrenched in tradition to be overcome by the dreamers even with the aid of millions.

It is hardly fair to attribute the failure of the federation in the academic world to the experience of the Maritime people in the political. For, long before federation became a political issue, even in the twenties and the forties, the idea of academic union had been emphatically repudiated by the Anglicans and the Baptists. In Ontario, wiser councils prevailed. In 1887, Victoria moved from Coburg to Toronto, and with St. Michael's, Knox, Wycliffe and later Trinity and the medical, dental, agricultural and veterinary schools entered into federation with Toronto. Queen's hesitated, and only on the refusal of the Hon. G. W. Ross to grant a sum reputed to be in the vicinity of $100,000 as compensation for buildings did Queen's withdraw. Once an additional million dollars would have brought Newfoundland into the Dominion of Canada. Shortsighted parsimony in 1887 in Toronto and in the early nineties at Ottawa frustrated far-reaching plans and entailed much wasteful expenditure. In Manitoba in 1877 the competing denominational colleges agreed to accept an examining university like London. This examining university gradually expanded into a teaching university, which by 1925 had drawn within its fold the students of the denominational colleges and all the professional schools, including agriculture. As in the political sphere the idea of union had prevented division and rivalry when new provinces were being erected, so in the academic the same idea frustrated denomina-

tional and sectional rivalries and gave to each of the new provinces a single university, supported by the state and serving it in a great variety of ways. Possibly the dominance of Ontario men in the Northwest Territories was largely responsible for the avoidance of the repetition of a half century of conflict and stagnation in university affairs.

As a consequence of the federation of the colleges, or possibly as the motive for its accomplishment, was the re-assumption by the provinces of a measure of support and control of higher education. In the beginning the state had been benevolent in its attitude and generous in its assistance to the first colleges. The King's colleges in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario, Laval in Quebec and Dalhousie in Nova Scotia, all of which have celebrated the centennary of their foundation, received grants of money and in several cases grants of land from the provinces. Sectarian strife, however, embarrassed the state, and not until federation brought harmony between Churches and state could provincial Legislatures make substantial grants to any one university. The success of the Toronto venture after sixty years of strife confirmed the Legislatures in the newer provinces in their belief that from the beginning each province should assume full responsibility for the support and control of one university. Adoption of this policy has made possible a development of the newer universities that would have been declared impossible sixty years ago even by the enthusiasts.

There are difficulties and dangers in state support and control of the universities as in other forms of public service. The introduction of political patronage has been greatly feared; the restriction of the liberty to learn and to teach has been alleged; while the pollution of the academic atmosphere and the corruption of the academic mind by utilitarian and commercial studies and researches have been deplored by the *laudatores temporis acti*. But universities, privately endowed, if endowed sufficiently well, have vied with state universities in all their activities, and have been even more responsive to the wishes of the Greeks bearing gifts; while denominational colleges, safeguarded by their poverty against pollution and corruption, have been the most zealous of all in dictating what should or should not be taught or learned. In Canada there has been less anxiety over state interference with the traditional liberties of universities than elsewhere. There has, however, been not a little questioning of the educational value of merging small colleges into a large university. When federation was proposed for Toronto, many failed to realize how large and how complex the new university would become.

It is claimed for the small college that it permits closer contact between professor and students, and consequently enables the strong personality of the teacher to leave a greater impress upon the pupil. In the large university the student is too frequently little more than a name or a number to which are attached mechanically certain ratings. If the formation of character be the great aim, of education, there is less steadiness of purpose, less definition of aim and greater conflict between influences in the large university than in the small college. To the churchman the greatest of all objections is the weakening of religious influences, since there is much diversity of opinion. While admitting the force of these objections, one may point out that a strong personality will have a wider field and a greater influence in the large university. Further, there is the great probability that the large university will attract at least more strong personalities and able men. The influence of Jowett of Balliol or of Thomas Hill Green was not confined to the small colleges but pervaded the whole university.

There is another agency of greater value—the companionship of fellow students. In the large university there is greater opportunity for congenial spirits to find each other, and there is the constant challenge of strong minds interested in different fields. In the small college there cannot be the same quickening of wits, the same broadening of interests that characterize life in the larger universities. While everyone will admit that the small college in the sphere of personal relationships may seriously rival the large university, no one can seriously question the advantages of the large university in the facilities for scientific instruction and research, in the number and ability of the staff, and in the variety and character of the opportunities open to the student.

There is another aspect of the question that is most important. The large university is the state in minature. All the interests of the larger world without are reflected within the university. Within it the young men preparing for the most diverse callings come to understand and appreciate each other, and learn how to co-operate. From the narrower sphere they transfer this understanding, this co-operation, to the larger, with immense benefit to the state which educated them and which they will serve. That spirit of toleration, compromise and co-operation which has characterized the parliamentary government of England was fostered within the walls of Oxford and Cambridge. The great administrators of the empire acquired in the universities that understanding and confidence in their colleagues which has been so essential.

It is evident that the merging of many interests in one institution and the assumption by the democratic state of responsibility for higher learning must involve a change in the attitude of the universities. The Canadian universities since 1867 have, in this respect, kept pace with state universities elsewhere. They have appealed to all sections of the community, and have welcomed every branch of learning. Contrast the exclusive colleges known to our fathers in the early nineteenth century with the democratic universities of the twentieth century. The latter are open to women and to men without respect to creed, class or colour, and are sympathetic with every human endeavour towards illumination or amelioration. The avowed objects of the former were to teach the young men to fear God and honour the King. They safeguarded the interests of "the Church by law established" by requiring every matriculant to sign the XXXIX Articles. They were in the control of the officers of the Crown, and served the learned professions of law and medicine, the former because of its connection with the state, the latter out of respect to ancient tradition, due provision of course having been made for the training of the clergy of the Established Church and the culture in the liberal arts of the sons of the privileged few.

This change in attitude has been reflected in the curriculum. Classics, mathematics with natural philosophy, mental with moral philosophy, and divinity were the staples of instruction in the early nineteenth century. At the time of Confederation, French had been recognized and a modicum of science,—a little botany and some chemistry had found a place. Ambitious colleges like Toronto and McGill added mineralogy, geology and zoology; political economy crept in beside moral philosophy. With a rare exception rhetoric was taught with logic, and history with the classics. In law the colleges offered little instruction but considerable examination, while in medicine self-denying doctors gave instruction and the universities examinations and degrees. McGill, impelled by the daring of Canada's best known scientist, Principal Dawson, offered a two-year course, leading to a diploma in civil engineering. Beyond the time honoured courses in arts, divinity, law and medicine the colleges in 1867 did not dare to venture.

To-day the universities of Canada offer courses leading to over sixty different kinds of degrees, diplomas and certificates. Toronto alone conferred twenty-four different degrees in 1926. This reflects fairly well the variety of the instruction given. In the curriculum of Toronto are to be found nearly every variety of 'ology' from anthropology to zymology; such diverse subjects as art and

(1863). A Bailey, trained in the new chemistry at Harvard had joined Brewster's pupil, Brydone-Jack, in New Brunswick in 1861. In Wilson, the archaeologist who came from Edinburgh in 1853, Toronto found a leader in sympathy with the new ideas.

These influences within the universities had done little more than liberalize the character of the instruction given and quicken an interest in reform. Before 1867 the ferment had not caused the body academic to expand. That came when the growing business of the new Dominion provided the necessary wealth and new national needs.

The magnitude of that expansion has challenged the attention of every observer. The extent of the change may be indicated by two examples, Toronto, a university supported by the state, and McGill, supported by private endowments and gifts.

In 1866 Toronto had about twelve professors, giving instruction in classics, mathematics, natural philosophy, metaphysics and ethics, chemistry, natural science, geology, English with history and modern languages, to about 250 students. No instruction was given in law, medicine or any of the applied sciences, though 70 or 80 students were examined for degrees in law and medicine. The annual income of the university was in the vicinity of $55,000 and the total assets were about $700,000. The returns for 1926 for the *Canada Year Book* record a staff of 672 instructors of whom 62 are women, a registration of 5,480 (including 2,023 women), to which might be added approximately 1900 enrolled in the colleges of pharmacy, agriculture and veterinary science; an expenditure of $2,454,355 with total assets of $12,806,120. In 1926 this university issued 1107 degrees, diplomas and certificates to students who had completed courses.

The expansion of Toronto has a parallel in that of McGill. From a staff of 45 (including instructors in medicine) and an attendance of 293 (including 165 medical students) with an equipment valued at less than $350,000 and an annual expenditure of less than $50,000 in 1866, McGill has grown into an institution with total assets of practically $30,000,000, an annual expenditure in 1926 of $2,166,796, a staff of 434 (including 46 women) and a total registration of 2,565 (including 648 women).

These illustrations indicate the expansion within the universities. The addition to the number of universities is equally significant. The mortality is greater among colleges in Canada than among universities. Though they seldom die, they may be merged or quite changed in character. Witness the passing of the King's

colleges in Toronto and Fredericton, or the transformation of King's College, New York into Columbia University.

Since 1867 six or seven of the colleges receiving grants, given by the provinces to denominational institutions, have ceased to be; some have entered mergers; some have developed into universi-ies. Seven new universities have been created since Confederation. The most striking of these have appeared west of the Great Lakes. In the statement given below, one western university is compared with all the universities in Canada in 1866: What is true of Alberta is true of each of the other three western universities, and holds with greater force of any one of the four or five larger universities in eastern Canada.

From the returns for 1926 for the *Canada Year Book,* and from Monro's *Statistics of British North America* with the statements of H. Youle Hind and others in the *Dominion of Canada* published in 1869, the following comparative estimates, approximately correct, have been compiled:

	Univs. & Colls.	Students	Staff	Annual Expenditure	Assets
1866	16	2,500	190	$ 300,000	$ 4,000,000
1926	23	44,483	3,749	10,438,055	87,466,845
1926	Alberta	1,257	171	587,747	4,677,959

The students registered in 1866 included preparatory students as well. Many of the staff, probably more than one half, were part-time instructors.

The University of Alberta, incorporated twenty years ago, supported by a province over which the Indians hunted buffalo in 1866, had in 1926 assets of greater value, an annual expenditure larger in amount and more full-time instructors than had all the universities of Canada in 1866. And it had as many students of university grade.

The pre-eminence of the West in so short a time.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY

GEORGE HAMBLETON

CANADA'S election to a seat on the Council of the League brings sharply to the front the question of our foreign relations and how those relations are to be conducted. In recent years, since the war more particularly, it has been customary to emphasize the part we are playing in the affairs of the world. We have been told, as Sir Esmé Howard pointedly told a Canadian audience, that those who go down to the sea in ships cannot follow a policy of isolation. Our growing foreign trade has flared at us from the blackest of black headlines. Vessels of our Government Merchant Marine are bearing our ensign across the Seven Seas. Our trade treaties with foreign countries, our Ministry at Washington, our part in international conferences—all these have impressed upon us how our interests are widening, how the area of our responsibilities is extending.

Yet, dramatic as this chapter of our story may be, it is by no means the whole of the story. For while it tells of Canadian interests and Canadian influence stretching beyond the seas, it fails to record a change which is passing across the face of our external relations. It tells us, almost stridently at times, of Canada here, Canada there, Canada everywhere. But the decline and fall of the common-foreign-policy theory—the theory of one foreign policy for the empire which grew and prospered in the dark days of war and matured in the scarcely less dark days of the Peace—have passed unhonoured and unsung.

Let us turn back the pages of recent history. Let us follow the rise and fall of the theory over the few years of its eventful course. It is worth while. For surely no political theory in the governance of empire ever had a more alluring appeal. No theory ever struck the imagination with greater force. One had visions of the Dominions joining hand in hand with the mother country in the formulation of a foreign policy which would be, in truth and deed, not the policy of the British Foreign Office, but the policy of the whole empire. British embassies and legations throughout the world would present, not the view of 10 Downing Street alone, but views which came from the melting pot of empire. The British Government would lose some of its monopoly. The Dominions would assume some of the responsibility. That was the theory

and that (to avoid technical language) was the application we rather expected.

It is now sixteen years since representatives of the Dominions were invited by Sir Edward Grey (now Lord Grey), at the time Foreign Secretary, to hear a statement of foreign policy. Much was made of it at the time, for until then the Dominions had been neither consulted nor informed on questions of foreign policy. Here are the words of Sir Edward as he addressed the Committee of Imperial Defence:

> It is possible to have separate fleets in a united empire, but it is not possible to have separate fleets in a united empire without having a common foreign policy which shall determine the action of the different forces maintained in different parts of the empire. If the action of the forces in different parts of the empire is determined by divergent views of foreign policy, it is obvious that there cannot be union, and that the empire would not care to share an unlimited liability the risks of which it cannot gauge, because this liability would be imposed upon it by different parts of the empire having different foreign policies. Therefore, the first point I want to make is this, that the creation of separate fleets has made it essential that the foreign policy of the empire should be a common policy. If it is to be a common policy, it is obviously one on which the Dominions must be taken into consultation, which they must know, which they must understand, and which they must approve; and it is in the hope and belief that the foreign policy of this country does command the assent and the approval of the Dominions, that we wish to have a consultation. . .

Thus Sir Edward brought a common foreign policy within the range of practical politics. But, while he went so far, he was careful to define foreign policy as the "foreign policy of this country." In other words, its formulation was to lie entirely in Downing Street. The Dominions were to be consulted afterwards.

Rather more than a year passes by. Now we see Sir Robert Borden carrying the idea further. Quite logically, if there is to be a common foreign policy, Sir Robert would like to see the Dominions participate in its formulation. He has attended sittings of the Imperial Defence Committee in London. He returns to present his pre-war policy of an emergency contribution of three first class battleships. And, in these unmistakeable words, Sir Robert submits his views to the Dominion parliament:

> Responsibility for the empire's defence upon the high seas in which is to be found the only effective guarantee of its existence, and which hitherto has been assumed by the United Kingdom, has necessarily carried with it the responsibility for and control

> of foreign policy. . .When Great Britain no longer assumes sole responsibility for defences upon the high seas, she can no longer undertake to assume responsibility for and sole control of foreign policy which is closely, vitally and constantly associated with that defence in which the Dominions participate. . .The great Dominions, sharing in the defence of the empire upon the seas, must necessarily also be entitled to share in the responsibility for and in the control of foreign policy.

Echoes of the Borden Naval Bill had scarcely died away when the Great War broke in all its devastating horror. The part the Dominions played in the struggle, the necessity for common, united effort—all tightened the links of empire as no speeches, no learned disquisitions on constitutional relations, could possibly have done. There was little question now of political theories. The thing was to win the war and, in the conduct of it, to present a united front. In such an atmosphere, it was inevitable that the part played by the Dominions should be of increasing importance. It was but a logical consequence, therefore, that, two years after the outbreak of war, prime ministers of the Dominions should be invited to become members of the Imperial War Cabinet. The Imperial War Cabinet, to cite again Sir Robert Borden, who was Canadian representative, "was a consultative body in which all important questions respecting the conduct of the war and the war effort of the empire were discussed and determined, and in which Dominion ministers sat on terms of perfect equality with their British colleagues." And, in the same year (1917) the Imperial War Conference passed the resolution which has now become history, the resolution which recognized the right of the Dominions and of India to "an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations", and declared the necessity for providing effective arrangements for continuous consultation and necessary concerted action.

Nor was this the end of the chapter. Common dangers of war had entailed common action and a common policy. Perilous days of war were followed by scarcely less perilous days of the Peace; and Versailles saw representatives of the Dominions again in active association with representatives from Great Britain. Four years after the Imperial War Conference, the Conference of empire premiers placed their approval on the doctrine that "the whole weight of the empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs." And it was unanimously felt "that the policy of the British empire" could not be adequately representative of democratic opinion throughout its peoples "unless representatives of the Dominions and of India were frequently associated with those of the United Kingdom

in considering and determining the course to be pursued."

Still, it will be noted, "common action in foreign affairs"! Still, the "policy of the British empire"! Yet the pendulum had already begun to swing, even if ever so slightly. In 1917, the Imperial War Conference pressed the necessity for "continuous consultation." By 1921, "continuous consultation" had been whittled down to "frequently associated."

The premiers' Conference of 1921 was, in a sense, a prelude to the Washington Disarmament Conference and Washington,, like the Peace Conference at Versailles, saw the Canadian delegate sometimes differing from them, but generally in close association with his colleagues from Great Britain. But from Washington onwards, the common policy theory rode an ebbing tide. As the weeks rolled on, it entered less into the conduct of the empire's external relations. Downing Street would broadcast its information to the governments of the Dominions; but there is little indication that the Dominions, except in a few instances, did much beyond listen in. We remember the pressure which Mr. Mackenzie King exerted to have Canada represented at the Inter-Allied conference on the Dawes plan. But do we not also recall how, during the episode of the Dardanelles, the Dominions were suddenly electrified by a call which seemed almost to summon us again to the brink of war? Do we not recall how, following the subsequent peace conference of Lausanne, Mr. King declined to submit the peace treaty to the Dominion parliament for approval because Canada had taken no part in the peace negotiations themselves?

And so the tide ebbs further and further back until at Locarno the common foreign policy theory has become completely abandoned, and treaties are concluded out of which the Dominions are specifically ruled unless they voluntarily express a desire to adhere; and so far not one has adhered. Great Britain is in. The Dominions are out.

Since Locarno brought its new spirit (and its obligations) into war-scarred Europe, empire representatives have again met in conference. Again, they have heard the Foreign Secretary outline the course of foreign affairs. But the resolution passed by the Imperial Conference of 1926 no longer pressed for "continuous consultation." It did not even urge that representatives of the Dominions should be "frequently associated" with those of Great Britain in "considering and determining the course to be pursued." The Imperial Conference of 1926 "frankly recognized" that, in the sphere of foreign affairs, as in the sphere of defence, "the major share of responsibility rests now, and must for some time continue

to rest, with His Majesty's Government in Great Britain." The resolution goes on to tell how all the Dominions practically are engaged, to some extent, in foreign relations and, so the resolution adds: "we felt that the governing consideration underlying all discussions of this problem must be that neither Great Britain nor the Dominions could be committed to the acceptance of active obligations except with the definite assent of their own governments."

No word now of "common action in foreign affairs." The anxiety seems to be rather to escape possible commitments and obligations. Why the change in attitude? Why has Dominion participation in foreign policy become less active? The super-sensitive may see in it all the Red Hand of Downing Street stretching out again to take everything within its grasp. The plain truth of the matter is, so far as one may judge by externals, that the Dominions themselves, hesitant over further commitments in Europe or too occupied with their domestic problems, have made no forward move towards the continuous consultation which the Imperial War Conference judged to be necessary. Views on foreign affairs which Dominion prime ministers set forth in the seclusion of the Imperial Conference are not made public. But Mr. Mackenzie King has taken the ground that, in working out the problem of foreign affairs, a first essential is to distinguish between matters of primary interest to one part of the empire which should be settled by it and those which are of interest to all and should be settled by common consultation.

With that statement of principle, there will be pretty general agreement. But unfortunately it leaves the problem where it was. In the first place, a matter of primary interest to one Dominion might quite easily involve the whole empire. In the second, there can hardly be a common consultation on matters of common interest unless ways and means are devised to provide for consultation in the most rapid and most effective manner.

A difficulty about the common foreign policy theory seems to have been that Imperial conferences gave it their blessing without setting up any machinery to put it into general practice. It prospered under conditions which united the mother country and the Dominions in common effort. It withered as the Dominions turned from Europe to set their own house in order. As emergencies arose in the foreign field, Great Britain, having to act promptly, assumed the "major share of responsibility" and acted alone, as she acted alone at Locarno. Beyond the cable and the presence of a High Commissioner in London, there were no means for "continuous consultation."

Mr. Baldwin put the present problem rather succinctly when, at the opening of the last Imperial Conference, he used the words:

> The problem before us is how to reconcile the principle of self-government in external as well as domestic affairs with a necessity for a policy in foreign affairs of general Imperial concern which will commend itself to a number of different governments and parliaments.

How shall that problem be solved? It may be that, for the conduct of the day-to-day external affairs of the empire a common foreign policy is neither desirable nor practicable. It may be that the constantly changing scene in foreign affairs makes effective consultation virtually impossible. But if common foreign policy has passed beyond hope of redemption, what policy is to take its place?

By proceeding slowly and cautiously, we have met our difficult-ties in the past. In like manner, possibly, shall we solve the problem of our part in foreign affairs of "general Imperial concern." If given effect, the proposal to send a permanent representative of the British Government to Ottawa may be a step to that end.

But, for the time being, the problem remains.