The Role of the Prime Minister in Canadian Foreign Policy: Trudeau, Defence, Trade and Aid

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This thesis is dedicated
with my love, gratitude and affection
to my husband, Roy,
to my children, Kelli and Brett,
and to my mother, Lydia Ward

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents	v
Abstract	vi
Acknowledgements	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction: Trudeau as Prime Minister	1
Chapter 2: The Role of the Prime Minister in a Framework of Four Levels of Analysis	13
Role-governed Priorities	16
The Framework	29
The Application of the Framework	55
The Scope of the Study	67
Chapter 3: Literature Review	72
The "Levels-of-Analysis" Tradition	73
The Study of the Canadian Prime Minister	94
Chapter 4: Trudeau and Defence Policy	116
The Constraints of the International Security System	121
The Trudeau Government's Defence Policy	129
The Robertson Report	144
Role-governed Priorities	154
The 1983-84 Peace Initiative	173
Trudeau's Defence and Trade Policies	178
Chapter 5: Trudeau and Trade Policy	180
The Third Option	184
The International Political Economy	197
The Lack of a Domestic Industrial Strategy	200
The 1982 Reorganization	202
Chapter 6: Trudeau and Aid Policy	211
Trudeau's Priorities in Aid Policy	214
Prime Minister Pearson	222
Prime Minister Trudeau	228
The Treaty Process in Canada	233
Chapter 7: Analysis of the Findings	236
Opportunities and Resources	238
Systemic Constraints	239
The External Affairs Bureaucracy	243
The Prime Minister and Canadian National Interest	245
Chapter 8: Conclusion: The Role of the Prime Minister in Canadian Foreign Policy	249
Bibliography	255

ABSTRACT

This thesis develops a framework of four levels of analysis to show the determinants of prime ministerial behaviour in Canadian foreign policy. It focuses on the role of the prime minister where the notion of "role" is grounded both in the levels-of-analysis tradition in the study of foreign policy and in the rise of neo-institutionalism in the study of political behaviour. The thesis then applies this framework to the foreign policy actions of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who was Canada's prime minister from 1968 to 1984.

The central contention of the thesis is that the role of the prime minister is to protect the federal interest as the champion of federalism or the defender of the federal faith and that this role, in Trudeau's case, not only distracted him from foreign policy matters to deal with domestic affairs, primarily with the constitution and matters relating to the accommodation of Quebec in the Canadian confederation, but also influenced his foreign policy actions in the defence, trade and aid fields to ensure the protection of the federal interest vis-á-vis the provinces.

Thus, the role level of analysis, which has not been addressed adequately to date in the study of Trudeau's part in foreign policy, shows that the federal-provincial game is one played both at home and abroad. More importantly, it shows that "domestic" policy and "foreign" policy cannot be analytically separated if we are to understand the role of the prime minister in Canadian external affairs.

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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION: TRUDEAU AS PRIME MINISTER

The prime minister of Canada holds an important position beyond that of just being "first amongst equals" in the cabinet. The impressionistic view of the media and the public that the prime minister is the most powerful person in Canada, able to direct and effect change in politics and government at will,[1] has more than a little foundation. The prime minister is the leader of the party who can command a majority of seats in the House of Commons; given party discipline, she is the controlling member (particularly if she has a majority government) of the Canadian government. The prime minister is also the sole link between the formal and political executives. Because she alone deals with the governor-general, she has at her disposal the powers of dissolution and appointment. Her "indirect control over the formal executive also enhances (her) direct control over other elements of the political executive, such as the cabinet."[2] The office of prime minister is a coveted post, a position that few analysts would accept as simply "primus inter pares" in the cabinet.

The accession of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968 as prime minister, a post that he would hold for almost sixteen years, save

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[1]A prime example of this is a recent edited collection of essays by Mel Hurtig, entitled If I Were Prime Minister (Edmonton: Mel Hurtig Publishers, 1987), where individual Canadians offer their visions and solutions for Canada's problems "if they were prime minister" and, therefore, could implement them.

[2]Ronald G. Landes, The Canadian Polity, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1991), p. 109.

nine-months in opposition, marked a watershed in the conventional understanding of the position of the prime minister in Canadian politics because he apparently exerted control over both the cabinet and the bureaucracy.[3] Discussion of prime ministerial government emerged in debates about the changing character of Canadian parliamentary government as Trudeau's dominance of the governing process became clear.

How did this dominance carry over into foreign policy? In 1968, the new prime minister explicitly asserted control over foreign policy, questioning the traditional premises of Pearsonian internationalism and demanding a fundamental review of the priorities of Canadian external affairs. The foreign policy paper that emerged after the two-year review was clearly influenced by Trudeau's ideas and confirmed what students of Canadian foreign policy had historically believed: the prime minister dominated the cabinet with regard to foreign policy and whether she exercised that dominance depended on the particular inclinations of the individual in office.

James Eayrs' observation in 1961 is no less true today: the prime minister's position in foreign policy is unique.[4] She is the one who represents Canada abroad in summits and other meetings with world leaders and, at any point, can supersede the prerogative of the external affairs minister. Thus, the kind of

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[3]See Fred Schindeler, "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet: History and Development," in Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968).

[4]James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 3-31.

prime ministerial dominance of the cabinet that scholars of Canadian domestic politics observed with Trudeau's election in 1968 was already accepted by students of Canadian foreign policy.

In the past, prime ministerial dominance in foreign policy was not as evident (though that did not mean that it did not exist) primarily because the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs,[5] and the Department of External Affairs held similar views on foreign policy matters. The notion of Pearsonian[6] internationalism represents the congruence in thinking between elected, namely the prime minister and the secretary of state for external affairs, and unelected officials in External Affairs.

The Canadian prime minister, it would seem, is in a position to translate her beliefs into policy; and the content of Trudeau's foreign policy review bore this out, so far as it went. Yet, for all the furor of anticipation generated by the foreign policy review at the time,[7] there is general agreement by scholars

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[5]Until 1946, the Canadian prime minister also held the external affairs portfolio. Since then, only Prime Minister Diefenbaker had taken on the portfolio but only for a limited period of time: the few months after taking office and the few months after the death of Sidney Smith. Diefenbaker then appointed Howard Green to head External Affairs.

[6]The influence of Lester Pearson is generally accepted in the field; Pearson was a civil servant in External Affairs and served as Under-Secretary of State (1946-1948) when Louis St. Laurent was Secretary of State before entering politics and being appointed Secretary of State (1948-1957) when St. Laurent became prime minister. Pearson eventually became prime minister (1963-68) and, during his years as leader of the opposition (1957-1963), the Conservative government did not trust (what the Diefenbaker government saw were) the "liberal" tendencies of the external affairs bureaucracy that Pearson had left behind.

[7]In spite, too, of the valuable points made by Bruce Thordarson in his effort to relate the foreign policy review to Trudeau's personal political beliefs and preferences. Using the operational code approach, Thordarson argues that Trudeau's views prevailed in the government's 1968 decision to conduct the review, in its 1969 decision to reduce NATO forces in Europe and in the philosophy of foreign policy evident in its 1970 white paper. See Bruce

in the foreign policy field, with the exception of David Dewitt and John Kirton,[8] that Canadian foreign policy actually changed little during the Trudeau years. Harald von Riekhoff,[9] Michael Tucker,[10] Kim Richard Nossal,[11] and, recently, J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell[12] assert that Trudeau did not subsequently make the kind of impact on Canada's external affairs that we might have anticipated from the kind of influence that he supposedly had on the foreign policy review. Why not? Does the Canadian prime minister make a difference in foreign policy? When it comes to external affairs, does it matter who is in power in Canada?

We might be tempted to question the importance of prime ministerial influence on two different grounds depending on the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy. We might argue, on the one hand, that foreign policy is unlike domestic policy because foreign policy is subject to the constraints of the international system and, in that way, the question of prime

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Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[8]David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983).

[9]Harald von Riekhoff, "The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Foreign Policy," International Journal 33 (Spring 1978): 267-286. This was part of a special issue of International Journal, entitled "Trudeau and Foreign Policy."

[10]Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980).

[11]Kim Richard Nossal, "Political Leadership and Foreign Policy: Trudeau and Mulroney," in Prime Ministers and Premiers, edited by Pal and Taras, p. 112-123 and Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 166-168.

[12]J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

ministerial influence seems less relevant if the principal factors influencing the state's foreign policy decisions are found in the state's external environment. On the other hand, we might argue that foreign policy is indeed like domestic policy and, thus, it too is a product of the policy-making process in which the domestic environment, particularly the bureaucracy, plays a prominent part. In this case, the question of prime ministerial influence also seems less relevant if the principal factors influencing the state's foreign policy decisions are found within the state's domestic arena or its bureaucratic nexus and it is these that determine the prime minister's operational priorities. Indeed, these macro and micro views of foreign policy behaviour, emphasizing either international systemic constraints on state actions or domestic and bureaucratic pressures on the foreign policy process, define the range of view with which most academic analysts have approached foreign policy. Both approaches to some extent undermine the importance of studying the individual leader and the distinctive role that she plays. The macro view treats the leader as the same for purposes of decision as the state that she leads. The micro view treats the leader as largely inseparable, analytically speaking, from the state that she leads, i.e., the policy-making process itself is what is important because there is no conceptual distinction made among the various actors engaged in the process.

However, the analytical strength of both the macro and micro views of foreign policy behaviour in underestimating the significance of the individual leader in influencing the state's

foreign policy is based on the same general premise: the policy priorities of the leader are exogenous to the position or office that she holds in the state. In the case of the macro view, the foreign policy priorities of the leader are found outside of the state. The prime minister is a rational actor who defends the Canadian national interest in a world of sovereign states. For analytical purposes, we can identify the rational actor as the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Canadian cabinet, the Department of External Affairs, or even "Canada" because, regardless of the actor under examination, the goal or objective of Canadian foreign policy is the same: defending or preserving the Canadian national interest. This foreign policy priority stems from the anarchical nature of the international system of which the Canadian state is a part.

In the case of the micro view, the foreign policy priorities of the leader are found within the state. The prime minister is a rational actor who chooses between different interests in the Canadian state, be they expressed by individuals of the public, interest groups, elements of the mass media, members of parliament, or civil servants. The bureaucracy is by far the most important source of policy alternatives for the political leadership and, not surprisingly, other groups in the society may work through the civil service to voice their interests. The politico-

bureaucratic relationship is formalized;[13] that is why in examining the policy-making process foreign policy analysts often inquire to what extent bureaucrats are the ones making policy and, accordingly, attempt to identify specific departments or particular civil servants in the formulation of policy. These, analysts argue, are the real proximate sources of the leader's foreign policy priorities and that is why the policy-making process itself, rather than the individual leader, becomes the focus of study.

This thesis questions the premise of both the macro and micro views of foreign policy behaviour that the foreign policy priorities of the leader are exogenous to the position or office that she holds in the state. We argue that the office of Prime Minister imposes priorities on whoever occupies it; and that these have an important influence on Canadian foreign policy. The actions or behaviour of the prime minister in external affairs have been little understood because her policy priorities have been grounded either in the nature of the international system; or if in the context of the domestic arena, there particularly in bureaucratic "policy-making" and domestic pressures.

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[13]That is, the civil service is the body established by the political masters to help the latter govern the country. G. Kitson Clark contends that one of the central characteristics of the "modern" state is the rise of bureaucracies, "rendered unavoidable by the necessities of the world in which we all have come to live" (p. 35). According to Clark, the government's expansive nature and the growth of its "tremendous supervisory power" have been due to the demands placed on the state by the citizenry. What Clark finds alarming is that the tremendous growth of the bureaucracy has tended to blur the distinction between liberal democracies and non-democratic states because civil servants, unlike their political masters, are not subject to public accountability (e.g., elections). See Clark, "The Modern State and Modern Society: Historic Tendencies and Future Probabilities," in Introductory Readings in Government and Politics, 2nd ed., edited by Mark O. Dickerson, Thomas Flanagan and Neil Nevitte (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1988), p. 29-38.

In Trudeau's case, Bruce Thordarson attempts to ground the Prime Minister's foreign policy priorities in the man's personal or idiosyncratic nature.[14] But this makes Trudeau's priorities exogenous to the position of prime minister in still a third way. Thordarson's findings remain valuable for analysts interested in Trudeau's initial impact on foreign policy. However, his work—published in 1972 shortly after the foreign policy review—not only has spawned other works emphasizing the idiosyncratic level of Trudeau's influence on foreign policy,[15] but has also resulted in confusion between prime ministerial pre-eminence and prime ministerial priorities. Thordarson's work on Trudeau is more a case-study of prime ministerial pre-eminence—having his way against other Canadian actors—than of the full operating range of prime ministerial priorities, especially given Thordarson's lack of attention to the priorities that come with the office itself. The distinction is important because in the examination of Trudeau's influence on foreign policy during his sixteen-year tenure as prime minister, as we pointed out earlier, there is a general consensus in the literature that the former prime minister, although determined to change the nature of Canadian external affairs according to his personal preferences and beliefs, did not make much of an impact on foreign policy. Why not?

[14]Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy. (See footnote #5.) In a later work, Thordarson pursues this kind of analysis in explaining the impact of prime ministers generally on Canadian external affairs in the post-World War II era. See "Posture and policy: leadership in Canada's external affairs," International Journal Vol. 31 (Autumn 1976): 666-691.

[15]See Granatstein and Bothwell.

The most compelling explanation has come from analysts who question the capacity of the individual to affect foreign policy.[16] How much can the individual from a small- or medium-sized state (that is, not even a "great power") influence foreign policy given the constraints of the international arena? Clearly, the classic debate between voluntarism and determinism in the study of foreign policy merits even greater attention in the Canadian context. The debate turns on a deep question of human volition.[17] Analysts argue that Trudeau had little choice but to embrace a "more traditionalist course" because "there are larger forces that impel and constrain prime ministers, forces that remain impervious to the initial intentions and visions of those who assume power."[18] Thus, students of foreign policy question the relevance of prime ministerial dominance of the policy-making process in Canada because they have found that international systemic factors, in the final analysis, determine the state's foreign policy actions.[19] This is an important point which may explain in part why the Canadian state's position in the international system has been the preoccupation of Canadian

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[16]M. J. Tucker in his review of Granatstein and Bothwell's Pirouette questions whether scholars can assume that Canadian foreign policy was Trudeau's to direct. He asks:"(D)id it really matter who if anyone was attempting to steer the Canadian ship of state?" See M. J. Tucker, International Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1990-91): 201-202.

[17]A very useful treatment of this debate in the context of international relations theory is Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1993).

[18]Nossal, "Political Leadership and Foreign Policy: Trudeau and Mulroney," p. 122.

[19]Ibid. See also Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 166-168, and Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes.

foreign policy study[20] and why the prime minister is little studied in the field.

We assert both that prime ministerial dominance of the policy-making process is relevant, and that the influence of the individual leader is important. We sustain the assertion by examining the foreign policy priorities which are endogenous to the position or office of prime minister, or what we refer to as "role-governed priorities," as determinants of prime ministerial behaviour. This thesis first develops a framework which shows the role of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policy where the notion of "role" is grounded both in the levels-of-analysis tradition in the study of foreign policy and in the rise of neo-institutionalism in the study of political behaviour. The thesis then applies this framework to Trudeau's foreign policy actions, namely in examining the nature and extent of his influence on Canadian defence, trade and aid policies. Our central contention in the thesis is that the role of the prime minister is to protect the federal interest as the champion of federalism or the defender of the federal faith and that this role, in Trudeau's case, not only distracted him from foreign policy matters to deal with domestic affairs, primarily with the constitution and matters relating to the accommodation of Quebec in the Canadian confederation, but also influenced his foreign policy actions in the defence, trade and aid fields to ensure the protection of the

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[20]Michael K. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (Toronto: York University, 1984); Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., p. 46-57; and Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," International Journal of Canadian Studies 1-2 (Spring-Fall 1990): 78-96.

federal interest vis-á-vis the provinces. Thus, when we analyze Trudeau's foreign policy priorities as endogenous to his position as prime minister of Canada, we find that, contrary to the consensus in the literature, he did make a difference in foreign policy.

Our analysis of Trudeau's foreign policy behaviour does not rival existing views in explaining the prime minister's actions. Rather, the framework that we utilize depends on making use of the results of the accepted levels of analysis in the current literature--and, for purposes of clarity, we refer to them as resulting in the "macro system-governed," "micro state-governed," and "idiosyncratic" foreign policy priorities of the prime minister—but it adds a fourth level which, we argue, has not been addressed adequately to date: the level of role. The notion of "role-governed priorities" in determining the prime minister's foreign policy behaviour is an intermediate level between micro state-governed and idiosyncratic priorities. In essence, the framework combines the four levels of analysis together to offer a more complete picture of the determinants of Trudeau's foreign policy behaviour. It accepts from the current literature that Trudeau's actions were shaped partly by international systemic constraints, partly by domestic (and particularly bureaucratic) constraints, and partly by his own personal preferences and inclinations. However, the framework adds--and highlights--that Trudeau's actions were also shaped by his role as prime minister.

The second chapter outlines the role of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policy by placing it in a framework of four levels of analysis. Here, we take as our point of departure both role analysis and institutional thinking and use these in defining the role of the prime minister as the defender of the federal interest or the champion of federalism. Although the third chapter which contains the review of the foreign policy literature and the literature on the prime minister tends to take our study off track, it is vital in showing how far role analysis and institutional thinking have been anticipated in existing work.

The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters, in turn, discuss the application of the framework in assessing Trudeau's influence on Canadian defence, trade and aid policies while he was prime minister, particularly from the level of role-governed priorities. The seventh chapter compares our findings in the three case-studies and assesses the relative strength of the different levels of analysis in the framework. The concluding chapter contains our final remarks on the role of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policy and the significance of our work for both the study of foreign policy and the analysis of political behaviour.

CHAPTER TWO:
THE ROLE OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN A FRAMEWORK OF FOUR LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The notion of role-governed priorities in explaining prime ministerial actions in foreign policy is based on the following observations regarding the foreign policy literature and the literature on the prime minister. First of all, the levels-of-analysis tradition is central to the study of foreign policy. This is evident not only in the development of a "foreign policy analysis" distinct from the study of international relations,[1] but, moreover, in the acceptance of many and not simply two (i.e., state and system) levels of analysis. Role is itself a level of analysis and, as an explanatory variable of foreign policy behaviour, it assumes that the actions of the individual are governed by the office or position that she holds in the machinery of the state. Studies of Trudeau's foreign policy have not considered specifically how his role as prime minister may have governed his actions in external affairs. Secondly, political institutions are important determinants of political behaviour. This is evident in studies of the Canadian prime minister where scholars have attempted to understand the actions of the prime minister in relation to the evolution of the parliamentary system of government. However, the debate about cabinet or prime ministerial government is predicated on the

[1]We can see this explicitly in the publication in the 1960s of readings in the field edited by James Rosenau where scholarly work is divided between those who examine interactions of states (international politics) and those who look at actions of states (foreign policy). See Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

examination of only one of Canada's political institutions: parliamentary government. Studies of the prime minister have not addressed the centrality of federalism which, with the emergence in Canada of "executive federalism" in the Trudeau era, would for analytical purposes not only settle the debate on the side of the prime minister but also determine how to make sense of the prime minister's role based on Canada's federal institutional make-up. The literature review on which these observations have emerged can be found in the following chapter.

Here, in the remainder of this chapter, we describe (in a way that will make it superfluous to repeat some points in the literature review) the role level of analysis. The notion of role-governed priorities is grounded, first of all, on the continued relevance and appeal of the bureaucratic politics model[2] in the

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[2]Graham Allison in his often-cited work offers three alternative models in explaining foreign policy: rational actor, organizational process and governmental (bureaucratic) politics. We will use the accepted nomenclature of "bureaucratic politics," although, as Kim Richard Nossal has pointed out, this use has resulted in the unfounded criticism that the bureaucratic politics model focuses simply on bureaucrats and bureaucracies. That was never Allison's intent and it is certainly not ours here. We need to make two points at this juncture. First of all, we shy away from using the term, "governmental politics," (although it might appear to be a more inclusive term, i.e., it includes both bureaucrats and politicians, like the prime minister) because it tends to imply (what Allison did intend) the differing and often competitive nature of the process of making foreign policy decisions, thus directing our attention to what we have referred to as the micro view of foreign policy behaviour. We are primarily interested in the part played in foreign policy by one individual: the prime minister. Having said that, we recognize, secondly, that the pivotal importance of role is captured by the organizational process model because it does have a great deal to say about the origins of priorities or preferences of individuals in government. Indeed, this notion of the "player in position" is what Allison builds on in developing his bureaucratic politics model. In that way, we are drawing primarily from the contribution of the bureaucratic politics model to the study of foreign policy. See Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971) and Nossal, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Westminster Model," in International Conflict and Conflict Management, 2nd ed., edited by Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff and Janice Gross Stein (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 230-237.

study of foreign policy which has meant that scholars have recognized the importance of the position or office held by the individual policy-maker in explaining foreign policy; and, secondly, on the rise of neo-institutionalism, or the "new institutionalism," which has been centred on explaining political behaviour in terms of rules rather than choices and has justified scholarly thinking (once again) in emphasizing the importance of political institutions. In particular, we highlight the recent efforts of Martin Hollis and Steve Smith[3] in international relations theory and James March and Johan Olsen[4] in the study of political behaviour, both of whom have given more meaning to the notion of the individual as a role-player and not merely a "reason-giver."

We then develop the framework which includes the role of the prime minister in the making of Canadian foreign policy by adapting the contributions of Hollis and Smith and March and Olsen to the understanding of role-governed priorities as a determinant of political behaviour. Here, we outline the types of explanations offered within the framework of four levels of analysis.

Finally, we sketch in a preliminary way the application of the framework to understanding Trudeau's actions and priorities when he was prime minister. We see that Trudeau's emphasis on domestic over foreign affairs was determined as much by role-governed priorities as by idiosyncratic ones. This leads us not

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[3]Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1990).

[4]James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

only to question whether the central ideas and policies associated with Trudeau's two-year review of foreign policy, as argued by Thordarson, were simply grounded in the former prime minister's own political philosophy, but also to examine the extent to which Trudeau's role-governed priorities determined his actions in foreign policy.

ROLE-GOVERNED PRIORITIES

In examining the behaviour of the individual policy-maker, students of foreign policy differentiate between the idiosyncratic and the role levels of analysis. At the idiosyncratic level, the analyst explores the personality traits, the educational background, the personal and philosophical preferences, and even the physical health of the individual actor; at the role level, he or she studies the position or the office held by the policy-maker and the constraints and opportunities for action associated with that position. Nearly a quarter century ago, American political scientist Fred Greenstein argued that the impact of individual personality on politics had been overstated because little consideration had been given to the positions held by politicians.[5] Idiosyncracies point to uniqueness of individual actions; roles highlight more generalized patterns of behaviour. According to Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf in their study of American foreign policy,

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[5]Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush," American Political Science Review Vol. 61, No. 3 (September 1967): 629-641.

> roles refer to the impact of the nature of the office on the behaviour of its occupant. Roles are important because decision-makers indisputably are influenced by the socially prescribed behaviours and legally sanctioned norms attached to the positions they occupy. Because the positions policymakers hold substantially affect their behaviour, policy outcomes can be more influenced by the roles existing in the policy-making arena than by the particular individuals who happen to be in authority at any given moment.[6]

Works utilizing the concept of role highlight the context of making foreign policy and, like cognitive research, form the basis for challenging the assumptions of rationality in foreign policy. Decision-making analysts, such as Graham Allison, John Steinbruner, Robert Jervis and Irving Janis,[7] point to both the multiplicity of actors and the degree of complexity involved in making foreign policy decisions. In particular, Allison's bureaucratic politics model is predicated on "where you sit" goes a long way to determining "where you stand" on issues. Roles account for the multiplicity and complexity of foreign policy because the actions and decisions of the individual must be placed within the context of the actions and decisions of others. If one individual has a role to play, then there are in practice roles for others.

However, the individual's role, traditionally conceived as being largely synonymous with the position or office held by the individual, cannot account for all of the individual's behaviour; the

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[6]Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 22.

[7]See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

idiosyncratic level demonstrates that it does matter who is in office. Is there some way to combine the role and idiosyncratic levels of analysis to account for individual behaviour in any meaningful manner? We recognize that the individual is both a role-player (derived from his or her structural or organizational perceptions) and a reason-giver (derived from his or her personal or idiosyncratic perceptions). How are we to account for both? The ideas of Hollis and Smith[8] in combining roles and reasons taken together with the efforts by March and Olsen,[9] associated with the "new institutionalism," provide a more complete analysis of how roles can influence individual behaviour.

Hollis and Smith introduce a conception of role that "relates reasons to structure and allows for flexibility and judgement in the playing of the role: in so doing (they) bring the individual back in without reducing (their) explanations of foreign policy to the individual as the unit of analysis."[10] By bringing together the rational actor model and the bureaucratic politics model they come up with a definition of role that allows for particular individual (or idiosyncratic) judgements. Their argument is predicated on the characterizations that the rational actor model focuses on reasons whereas the bureaucratic politics model centers on roles and that both models inadequately

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[8]Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 143-170. The two scholars had published an earlier version of their ideas in Hollis and Smith, "Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," British Journal of Political Science 16 (1986): 269-286.

[9]March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions.

[10]Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 168.

account for the origin of individual preferences. Utilizing as their case-study the American government's decision under Jimmy Carter to undertake the Iranian hostage rescue mission, Hollis and Smith find that individual preferences are neither independent from the bureaucratic structure (as argued by the rational actor model) which means that actors do not totally determine their preferences, nor totally dependent on it (as contended by the bureaucratic politics model) which means that actors are not merely voices for pre-determined preferences. They argue that "(r)ole involves judgement and skill, but at the same time it involves a notion of structure within which roles operate."[11]

Fundamentally, Hollis and Smith assert that the performance of roles depends on the following of rules and rules simply cannot be made in such detail that individual judgements will not take place. Although these judgements need not be conceived as being uninfluenced by the role played by the individual, the point made by the two scholars is that the performance of roles is not automatic. Individual actors are not merely "puppets." We cannot simply substitute one actor for another in a particular role and expect the same outcome. They mean to allow for variations in personality and judgement when they combine the bureaucratic politics model with the rational actor model and develop their argument for what they call "role-governed preferences" and "reasoned judgements." Our notion

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[11] Ibid.

of the "role-governed priorities" determining the actions of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policy is grounded in Hollis and Smith's conception of the "role-governed preferences" determining individual behaviour.

According to Hollis and Smith, the bureaucratic politics model offers clues as to where some preferences originate, and thus some insight into explaining what personalities are attracted to roles that accept these preferences, whereas the rational actor model gives some measure of whose judgements will prevail over others, and thus some insight into explaining power. The judgements that prevail will be those that in the situation seem to other actors best reasoned.

"'Personality' (Hollis and Smith contend) can be incorporated...partly by showing how bureaucratic positions are suited to particular personalities, but more by reworking the relation of the models. Our role-player is not a self-contained processing device whose inputs are supplied by a bureaucracy. Roles call for judgement, which involves reasoned belief, self-monitoring of aims, and a general shrewdness."[12] They argue that rational judgement has not been properly understood by rational choice theorists. It is less a device of computation and more an instance of reasoned belief. Rationality is not simply the act of choosing one option over another. According to Hollis and Smith, individuals give reasons for their actions (e.g., "I chose to do A because A would lead to better consequences than B") and

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[12]Ibid, p. 161.

reasons are based on individual belief-systems (e.g., the statement, "A would lead to better consequences than B," is based on the individual's interpretations and beliefs of why A is better than B). In that way, they can account for the influence of personality on an individual's role. As the two scholars state: "In the language of international relations theory, personality is a crucial factor in the mind-sets or belief-systems of individual decision-makers."[13]

Moreover, the giving of reasons means that individual role-players are talking to other role-players, and in this context, debate and discussion are taking place. Debate and discussion necessarily involve attempts to affect the beliefs of others and here is where Hollis and Smith bring out their concept of power.

> On a role-playing account, (power) is not just stuff which some bureaucracies have more of. It is an ability which goes with different offices in varying degree, provided that the actor has the skill to use it. This skill is one of those involved in reasoned judgement and, because it is a skill, we can understand how the distribution of power among players of different ability can change during the game.[14]

Thus, while allowing for the importance of individual beliefs, Hollis and Smith contend that roles determine preferences; when individuals can get the belief-systems or mind-sets of others to conform to their own, their judgements prevail over other judgements. Any examination of role must discuss the beliefs and skills of the individual role-player in relation to other role-players. This gets at how idiosyncratic input would be allowed into a role level of analysis, but the central argument of

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[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid, p. 164.

the two scholars is that role, itself, is a primary determinant of individual preferences in foreign policy decisions.

This attention to the contextual part of decision-making has been reinforced by the emergence of the "new institutionalism." Decision-making analysis, focusing on rationality, has been predicated on identifying individual preferences or choices.[15] What recent institutional analysis demands, however, is the examination of the individual as part of a larger governmental body or institution and thus the recognition of the importance of the individual as a role-player.

Donald Searing contends that the neglect of research on roles in political science has been a product of shifts in intellectual interest as scholars turned to economic, rather than sociological, models to explain political behaviour.[16] Searing points out that prior to the Second World War, political scientists studied political institutions. They "emphasized that institutional structures greatly constrained the conduct of politicians (and)...stressed particularly the importance of **formal rules** (sic) such as constitutions, laws, contracts, and other institutional arrangements--stable formal rules that guided individual behaviour and thereby secured order in the political world."[17]

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[15]In the study of foreign policy, the decision-making approach, although pointing to internal determinants of state behaviour, had initially conformed to the traditional realist notion of an monolithic, rational state actor. The work of Allison, Steinbruner, Jervis and Janis challenged this assumption of rationality in the decision-making process. (See footnote #37.)

[16]Donald Searing, "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991): 1239-1260.

[17]Ibid, p. 1240.

After the war, particularly in the 1960s and the early 1970s, political scientists began examining the informal, as opposed to the formal, rules of political organizations and focused their attention on the "norms and roles that were said to guide behaviour more directly."[18] Individual behaviour, in any case, remained rule-governed, particularly since the formal rules evident in structured institutions seemed to influence the informal rules--norms and roles--which, in turn, guided individual behaviour.

In contrast, by the mid-1970s, the economic models of individual behaviour became "intellectually dominant" and political scientists directed their work towards "models that (were) purposive and stress(ed) the significance not of either formal or informal rules but, instead, of **individual preferences** (sic) and choices."[19] The influence of economics on the strength and development of rational choice theory in political science is widely recognized.[20] Recently, scholars have began questioning the conception of individual behaviour as primarily preference-driven (in terms of rational choice). Is homo economicus the human being that we must deal with in understanding political behaviour?

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[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]In the international relations field, Waltz makes a direct analogy between the market and the international system and, thus, between the structure determining the behaviour of firms and the structure determining the behaviour of states. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 89-91.

March and Olsen have argued that behaviour is driven as much, if not more, by institutional rules than individual preferences or choices. Testifying to the re-emergence of institutional analysis in political science, they have pointed to the organizational factors in political life as central to understanding individual behaviour.[21]

Is behaviour driven primarily by rationality or rules? March and Olsen attempt to address this question by distinguishing between the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness.[22] Rational choice theory is predicated on the logic of consequentiality where individual preferences or choices determine behaviour and individual logic is based on consistency between what the individual does and what he or she expects to happen (consequence). In contrast, institutional analysis is predicated on the logic of appropriateness where rules determine behaviour and individual logic is based on consistency between what the individual does and what role she thinks or actually plays. In Rediscovering Institutions, March and Olsen find that most political behaviour actually conforms to a logic of appropriateness but that this conformity is obscured by the fact that behaviour is justified by a logic of consequentiality. "Having determined what actions to take by a logic of appropriateness, in

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[21]James March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review Vol. 78 (1984): 734-749. Most of this article reappears in the first chapter of Rediscovering Institutions.

[22]March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 160-162.

our culture we justify the action (appropriately) by a logic of consequentiality."[23]

It is here that the arguments made by March and Olsen begin to coincide with those made by Hollis and Smith. Like Hollis and Smith, March and Olsen observe that individuals give reasons for their actions after the decision has been made, but that the giving of reasons may be more to justify or legitimize a choice after the fact rather than to make it in the first place. The need to legitimize a choice itself comes from the social context of the individual because, as the poet's line goes: "No man is an island." In other words, the process of rationality as traditionally understood takes place after the individual has already acted rather than before it. This leaves open the question what actually determines individual behaviour. Like Hollis and Smith, March and Olsen answer by emphasizing the roles played by individuals and the rules of appropriate behaviour that they follow.

Moreover, March and Olsen identify two theories of political leadership, which see the leader fundamentally as either a broker or an educator.[24] The first theory, which March and Olsen argue is fundamental to modern decision (rational choice) theory, treats individual preferences as exogenous to the political process. Society determines the character of the polity; political preferences reflect demands arising in society apart from the polity; and the role of the leader is to build coalitions among participants in the political process and provide information to

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[23]Ibid, p. 162.

[24]March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 163.

the society at large. In this case analysts would anticipate that the kind of leader who would win office in Canada would be rational and pragmatic because of the heterogeneous nature of Canadian society, divided by ethnic, linguistic and regional ties,[25] and we see this clearly in the "brokerage" theories of leadership.

In contrast, March and Olsen contend that the second theory of leadership, which demands a more autonomous role for institutions, treats individual preferences as endogenous to the political process. The polity affects society: "Leaders interact with other leaders and are co-opted into new beliefs and commitments"; and the role of the leader is to educate the society at large, "stimulating and accepting changing worldviews."[26] Individual preferences are transformed in this conception of leadership rather than remaining stable because preferences are shaped by political institutions. In this case, too, leaders in Canada irrespective of their personal inclinations and manners would become rational and pragmatic, and the central, determining institutional context, we would argue, would be the country's decentralized federal nature. But the result is arrived at from a different position, which is theoretically more fruitful. It is the same position taken by Hollis and Smith in contending that preferences are role-governed.

March and Olsen, however, take it one step further. What this notion of leadership offers our analysis is not simply role

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[25]This, as we see later in the chapter, is the kind of analysis utilized in Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (December 1982): 667-690.

[26]March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 163.

determining what actions are or are not allowed but role actually changing existing preconceptions of leaders. In this sense, an examination of the belief-system of the prime minister is not simply to see how she is able to change the beliefs of others to coincide with her own, but also to determine how holding the position of prime minister changes--transforms--her worldviews.[27]

Although rational and rule-driven behaviour are distinguishable, they are not mutually exclusive. Elinor Ostrom in her review essay on recent works in rational choice theory and institutional analysis, which includes an examination of March and Olsen's Rediscovering Institutions, calls for the integration of these two approaches.[28]

> Rather than conceptualizing rule-governed choice as more important than rational choice, a general approach would attempt to explain how both rules and anticipated consequences affect behaviour and outcomes. In a Western cultural context rules rarely inform individuals as to the exact actions to be taken. Rather, some actions are ruled in (permitted), and others are ruled out (forbidden). Choices made by rule-following individuals are from within the set of permitted actions...Choice from among those actions that are ruled in cannot be made on the basis of institutional rules. Choice from within the alternatives allowed by the rules of the game must be understood differently from the determination of what is or is not ruled in.[29]

In many ways the work of Hollis and Smith addresses the necessity for integration expressed by Ostrom; their conceptions

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[27]Such a notion regarding the transformation of the leader's worldviews would challenge the fundamental premises of the operational code approach as utilized by Thordarson.

[28]Elinor Ostrom, "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity," American Political Science Review Vol. 85, No. 1 (March 1991): 237-243.

[29]Ibid, p. 239.

of "role-governed preferences" and "reasoned judgements" appear to be congenial to her views.

The kind of complementarity desired by Ostrom is perhaps more easily achievable in the foreign policy field because foreign policy scholars have always been concerned with the contextual part of decision-making. First of all, states are part of an international system which means that foreign policy analysts do not explain the behaviour of an individual state without reference to its relationship with other states. Secondly, in looking at internal processes, the emergence of the bureaucratic politics model has forced scholars to look at the positions held by decision-makers. In other words, foreign policy explanation has always found value in both rational choice theory and institutional analysis. One reason why Hollis and Smith have successfully combined the rational actor model and the bureaucratic politics model in their work is simply because they can draw on both these intellectual traditions in foreign policy study. Moreover, the literature on the Canadian prime minister, which is the "role" of interest to us, is grounded in the importance of institutions which, as March and Olsen argue, are central to understanding political behaviour. This brings out further the continuity of our work on the role of the prime minister with the way Canadian scholars have studied the country's highest political office. Thus, a framework that conceptualizes the role of the prime minister in the making of Canadian foreign policy, while allowing for her individual beliefs or mind-set and her skills or ability in changing the beliefs of others, would focus on the rules

of appropriate behaviour that she follows in performing her role—that is, the institutional aspect of her actions—which, we argue, is in terms of Canada as a federal state.

THE FRAMEWORK

The acceptance of the levels-of-analysis tradition in the study of foreign policy means that we can combine the standard levels of analysis, namely, the international system, the state and the individual, as factors determining prime ministerial behaviour in foreign policy and add a fourth level: that of role. At the same time, the recognition of institutions in shaping an individual's role means that we can emphasize federalism as a central factor shaping the role of the prime minister.

To help us illustrate the framework, we modify Hollis and Smith's schema on the different levels of analysis both to emphasize the role of the prime minister (we are, after all, not interested in all the role-players in the state, as captured in Hollis and Smith's use of the term, "bureaucracy,"[30] but in one individual's role) and to show the different foreign policy priorities resulting from the four levels of analysis in determining prime ministerial actions. Hollis and Smith's schema on the

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[30]Hollis and Smith specifically use the term, "bureaucracy," in their discussion of role-players in the state, but they use the term in the original manner found in Allison's bureaucratic politics model which means that role players include both politicians and bureaucrats. (See note # 2 in this chapter.) Moreover, Hollis and Smith's use of bureaucracy is meant to capture a particular level of analysis (role) in explaining the behaviour of a particular unit of analysis (the individual human actor). We discuss this further at the end of the chapter when looking at the scope of this study and, then, in the following chapter when looking at the levels-of-analysis tradition in the study of foreign policy.

different levels of analysis and our modification of the schema may both be exhibited as follows:

International system
vs.
Nation-state
vs.
Bureaucracy
vs.
Individual

Fig. 2.1: Hollis and Smith schema (partial):
Different levels of analysis (p. 9)

International system	**Macro system-governed priorities**
vs.	**vs.**
Nation-state	**Micro state-governed priorities**
vs.	**vs.**
Role of the prime minister	**Role-governed priorities**
vs.	**vs.**
Individual	**Idiosyncratic priorities**

Fig. 2.2: Modified schema:
Determinants of prime ministerial behaviour in Canadian foreign policy

Based on the modified schema, we can outline the four kinds of foreign policy priorities that determine prime ministerial behaviour within the framework. There are, first of all, "macro system-governed priorities" of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policy which are derived from the level of the international system; in this case, prime ministerial policy priorities and Canadian state priorities are treated as the same. Secondly, there are "micro state-governed priorities" which are derived from the level of the Canadian state and, here, prime ministerial policy priorities are dictated by the interests of elements within the Canadian state as a whole, such as the external affairs bureaucracy. Thirdly, there are "role-governed

priorities" which are shaped by the country's federal institutional context and these priorities are endogenous to the office of the prime minister. In this case, the individual in office is compelled to act as the defender of the federal interest. Finally, there are "idiosyncratic priorities" which reflect the personal political beliefs and inclinations of the prime minister; these priorities are evident in the individual's attempts to make a particular imprint in foreign policy despite international systemic, state and role constraints.

We use March and Olsen's "logic of appropriateness" to illustrate the prime minister's role-governed priorities which centre on Canada's institution of federalism dictating rules of behaviour. The nature of the international system or the dynamics of the state are not discussed here. Essentially, March and Olsen's logic of appropriateness guides the attempt within the framework to explain individual (as opposed to state[31]) behaviour in foreign policy matters.

Finally, we combine the systemic, state, role and individual levels of analysis and outline the three possible types of explanation offered within the framework. These are the types of explanation that we use in our study of Trudeau's foreign policy behaviour.

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[31]To pick up from our discussion in the first chapter, state behaviour in this case can be seen as either the action of a unitary actor (macro) or the outcome of the policy-making process (micro).

THE LEVEL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: MACRO SYSTEM-GOVERNED PRIORITIES OF THE PRIME MINISTER

Is Canada a satellite, middle power or great power in the international system? The preoccupation of Canadian foreign policy scholars with Canada's position or status in the international system points to a rich literature to draw on for understanding the way the international system shapes Canadian foreign policy behaviour. For analytical purposes, we accept that the prime minister is an agent of the Canadian state with all the constraints and opportunities for action associated with Canada's place in the international system which means that the priorities that we discuss here are exogenous to the office or position of prime minister.

According to some foreign policy analysts, Canada's place has been negligible in the world; its foreign policy has been dictated by its economic dependence on the United States.[32] Indeed, the prominence of the satellite thesis in the field has forced students of Canadian foreign policy to come to terms with the concepts of "internationalism,"[33] "multilateralism,"[34] and "middle power,"[35] in order to prove that Canadian actions do

[32]See Stephen Clarkson, ed., for the University League for Social Reform, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968). See also Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., p. 52-54; Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite?; and Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature."

[33]See Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes.

[34]This is the central notion of a recent work by Tom Keating. See Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993).

[35]For a more theoretically-based approach on the concept from a comparative perspective, see Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993).

matter in the international arena and that Canadians are indeed exercising choice in their foreign policy decisions. Understandably, the level of constraints depends on the issue-area in question; Canada is able to do more in some areas and less in others.

Canada operates in both the international security system and the international political economy,[36] and the "functional principle"[37] introduced by Canadian delegates during the creation of the United Nations is predicated on Canada's relative global weakness in the first but its relative strength in the second. Canada, argued delegates to the 1945 conference on the United Nations charter in San Francisco,[38] recognized that it did not belong to the military decision-making club of great powers contemplated at Dumbarton Oaks but, at the same time, it did belong to a parallel economic decision-making body because

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[36]This characterization of the international system has been accepted by both scholars and policy-makers alike. See David Haglund and Michael Hawes, World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) and Canada, Department of External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985).

[37]The functional principle is based on the premise that the states most capable of properly performing a particular task or function in the international arena should be the ones to undertake it. It is in some sense a Canadian variant of functionalism. Functionalism is based on the idea that if the peoples and nations of the world work together to address common needs and advance mutual interests, political conflicts and war can be eliminated. Its most persuasive tract is David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).

[38]See G. P. Glazebrook, "The Middle Powers in the United Nations System," International Organization, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1947): 307-315; John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, Vol. I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); and F. H. Soward and Edgar McInnis, Canada and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing for the Carnegie Endowment, 1956).

Canada, after all, was an economic power in the world. Throughout the postwar era, Canada's economic strength in the global system has remained the basis for more independent foreign policy actions, a strength augmented further by its place as a "have" country in a world populated by many "have-not" states.

Accordingly, as outlined in a speech made by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1977,[39] there are three "worlds" which Canadian foreign policy-makers must address: first of all, the world of "allies and potential enemies" where security and defence matters are paramount; secondly, the world of trading partners where economic competitiveness amongst friends is dominant; and, finally, the world dividing North and South where the needs of poor and developing states are pressing. These worlds correspond, respectively, to the East-West, West-West, and North-South axes of Canadian external affairs and they shape its defence, trade and aid policies. In effect, Canada operates in three different global arenas, all placing different levels of constraints[40] upon the country and the prime minister and offering different types of opportunities for the prime minister to act in the international system. However, given that Canada's national power is measured by economic rather than military

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[39]Transcript of the Prime Minister's Address to the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1977, in The Proceedings of the Conference of Defence Associations 40th Annual Meeting, Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, Jan 13, 14, 15, 1977 (Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, Ottawa, 77/186).

[40]And, in the realist sense, these constraints are determined by the nature or degree of power capabilities possessed by the state.

strength, we would expect that the prime minister as the agent of the Canadian state would be able to make more of a difference to aid policy, less so to trade policy, and even less so to defence policy.

At the same time, although the opportunities for action are greater in the international political economy than in the international security system, Canada's defence, trade and aid policies are significantly intertwined. For either the state or the individual, defying the constraints of one issue-area may result in loss of opportunity for another or, in contrast, making use of the opportunity of one issue-area may result in loss of constraint in another.[41] The prime minister's ability to defy the constraints or make use of the opportunities of the international system has been measured by her impact on the country's external affairs. The identification of Canadian foreign policy actions in the post-World War II era as consistently exhibiting characteristics of internationalism, multilateralism or middle power behaviour, adding up to the lack of a foreign policy distinctly associated with a prime minister, is the basis for the assertion by analysts that international systemic factors rather than differing initiatives of

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[41] In other words, although we talk about three different worlds in which Canada operates, resulting (for analytical purposes) in the development of three different kinds of policies, i.e., defence, trade and aid, these "worlds" (and these policies) are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, we might argue that for most of the post-World War II era, the East-West conflict (the world of Canada's allies and potential enemies) dominated the foreign policy of Western states in general. For example, NATO solidarity often won out at the end of the day despite disagreements over trade or other economic matters between the allied members. That is why there is some debate now on whether NATO was founded on (or perhaps had led to) some notion of an Atlantic community or whether the transatlantic alliance was simply held together by a common threat. See the articles on the "changing global context" in International Journal Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1990-91).

prime ministers shape Canadian foreign policy. That is why from an analytical perspective the treatment of prime ministerial policy priorities as the same as those of the Canadian state remains extremely compelling.

THE LEVEL OF THE CANADIAN STATE: MICRO STATE-GOVERNED PRIORITIES OF THE PRIME MINISTER

The Canadian state, however, is not a monolithic, unitary entity. The growth of the Canadian foreign policy field (and the foreign policy field generally) has resulted from analysts studying the state's internal policy-making process. At the heart of the contributions of analysts, such as Allison, Jervis, Janis and Steinbruner, who have challenged the rational actor model, is not only the recognition of the complexity in making foreign policy decisions,[42] but also the understanding of this complexity from an internal rather than an external standpoint. As Ole Holsti so clearly articulates, "each of them direct(s) the analyst's attention

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[42]Allison's "bureaucratic politics" model, Steinbruner's "cybernetics" model, Jervis' "perception-misperception" model and Janis' "groupthink" model all argue that the state is neither unitary nor rational in its actions. Their work, representing in some sense the greater sophistication of foreign policy scholars, pose important challenges to the rational actor model. On the one hand, they borrow from the work of organizational specialists and experts on bureaucracies to challenge the notion that the state is rational. Allison talks about "bargaining games" characterized by conflict, compromise and even confusion amongst state officials, an analysis further pursued by Morton Halperin in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1974). On the other hand, they utilize the research of psychologists, probing into the minds of decision-makers, to question the notion that the state, or the individual(s) representing the state is rational. Steinbruner maintains that the individual decision-maker, rather than pursuing the optimum or maximum action dictated by the rational actor model, has a range of "critical variables" in which any option falling within the range is considered acceptable. This occurs, according to Steinbruner, because the decision process is conditioned by cognitive processes or certain governing principles of the human mind. Both Jervis and Janis (who is a psychologist) also undertake an examination of general cognitive processes leading them to argue for the existence of, respectively, misperception and "groupthink" amongst decision-makers.

to some aspects of the domestic political arena, with at least some potential dilution of the impact attributed to the external environment."[43] Although international systemic factors remain important in any study of foreign policy, the richness of the field has come from works that focus on some part of the foreign policy decision-making process.

Students of Canadian foreign policy have traditionally been interested in the internal factors determining Canadian actions and, in particular, the policy-making process of the state even when their analyses were more historical than theoretical. The "intellectual partnership" between practitioners and scholars of Canadian external affairs has played an important part in the way that we have studied foreign policy.[44] Although analysts nowadays apply to specific cases the notions of "bureaucratic politics" or "cybernetics,"[45] the case-study approach, which remains

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[43]Ole R. Holsti, "The Bifurcation of American and Non-American Perspectives in Foreign Policy" PS Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1984): 554.

[44]See John Kirton, "Realism and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," International Perspectives (January/February 1987): 3.

[45]The bureaucratic politics model has received numerous applications, particularly in doctorate work. For example, see Glyn R. Berry, "Bureaucratic Politics and Canadian Economic Policies Affecting the Developing Countries: The Case of the 'Strategy for International Development Cooperation, 1975-1980'," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1981) and Margaret Royal, "Canadian-American Relations: The Last Option: A Study of the Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Kingston: Queen's University, 1984). See also Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "Deep Seabed Mining: A Hotbed for Governmental Politics?" International Journal 41 (Winter 1985-86): 72-94; this article is based on her doctoral work. For an example of the use of the cybernetics model, see Douglas A. Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-73 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.

extremely popular, is rooted in the early development of the field.[46]

The micro view of foreign policy behaviour has always been central to the study of Canadian foreign policy and part of the reason why leads us back to our discussion earlier. The examination of international systemic determinants ultimately leaves Canadian analysts to ponder the extent to which Canada exercises independent action abroad. By looking at the policy-making process, students of Canadian foreign policy see the complexity of actions that simply cannot be characteristic of a satellite or insignificant state. The concept of a middle power is invaluable in the study of Canadian foreign policy. Not only is this the term utilized by Canadian statesman, both past and present, but it also gives meaning or reason to the existence of Canadian foreign policy scholarship. If Canada is simply an adjunct of the United States in the international arena, why study Canadian foreign policy? In this latter context, we need only to look at American actions. By showing the different domestic factors

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[46]In a recent collection of readings in the field focusing on different policy decisions, Don Munton and John Kirton state that their book has emerged as both a necessity demonstrated by the lack of Canadian material for foreign policy courses and a "testimony to the legacy of John Holmes who popularized the case study method as a principal approach to studying Canadian foreign policy" (p. v). The influence of Holmes in the field had been recognized earlier in a work edited by Kim Richard Nossal in 1982. There, it is clearly evident that Holmes, both a student and a practitioner of Canadian external affairs, directly and indirectly taught an entire generation of Canadian foreign policy scholars. See Munton and Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992) and Nossal, ed., An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays in Honour of John W. Holmes (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982). For a sampling of the contribution of Holmes which demonstrates his efforts to carve out a niche for Canadian foreign policy study, see Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); and The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).

involved in Canadian foreign policy decisions as, for example, the interplay of bureaucracies, individuals or groups, students of Canadian foreign policy substantiate not simply the importance of internal determinants but also the notion that Canada is indeed a middle power or, at the very least, that it is not merely a satellite of the United States. The problem, though, is that the analytical exercise is often more implicit than explicit.[47]

From our perspective, the focus on the policy-making process leads in the final analysis to the conclusion that the prime minister's policy priorities are found within the state. As analysts dig deeper into the process, they find the "origins" of the policy decision in either certain individuals in the bureaucracy or particular groups in the society. In our study of Trudeau's foreign policy, we have found that Klaus Goldschlag, a civil servant in External Affairs, wrote the third option strategy, the prime minister's 1975 Mansion House speech and the proposals of the 1983-84 peace initiative. Because these were, respectively, important elements of the prime minister's trade, aid and security (defence) policies, we should perhaps be writing a dissertation about Goldschlag rather than Trudeau.[48] Analysts who study the process ultimately find that the Canadian leader's

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[47]One notable exception is the study of the Vietnam War undertaken by Douglas Ross above. Ross utilizes the cybernetics model to dispute the complicity thesis regarding Canadian actions during the Vietnam War put forward, notably, by James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada—Indochina: Roots of Complicity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

[48]Clearly as a sign of both admiration and affection for Mr. Goldschlag, Geoffrey Pearson suggested that a thesis should be written about the contributions of Mr. Goldschlag to Canadian foreign policy. Interview with author, Ottawa, Ontario, June 29, 1993.

policy priorities have little to do with the person occupying the position.

THE LEVEL OF THE ROLE OF THE PRIME MINISTER: ROLE-GOVERNED PRIORITIES

The notion of micro state-governed priorities outlined above results from what we might properly call the "standard" micro view of foreign policy behaviour because the role level of analysis is also essentially a micro view. In the case of the role of the prime minister, we argue that what shapes the actions of Canada's leader in the making of foreign policy is the country's federal institution. Although the prime minister is subject to the constraints and opportunities of Canada's electoral and parliamentary democracy which includes the influence of, and the ability to influence, different aspects of Canadian government and society, such as cabinet, bureaucracy, parliament, party, public opinion, interest groups and media, these determinants of her behaviour are in some sense left aside at this level of analysis. Indeed, the whole notion of "prime ministerial government" rests on the prime minister's dominance of all these elements of government and society. That is why this micro view of foreign policy behaviour focusing on the role of the prime minister is different from arguments focusing on the foreign policy-making process.

Because the countervailing element to the "apex of power" in Ottawa is the "apex of power" in the provinces, we focus on federalism as the primary constraint on the role of the prime minister. Canada's decentralized federal nature combined with

the dominance of first ministers, captured in the term, "executive federalism," has resulted in the role of prime minister being defined as the champion of federalism or the defender of the federal faith. In the federal-provincial game, she is the protector of the federal interest.

In Canada, the federal-provincial game is not limited to domestic politics. The foreign policy area is not, as in other states, reserved exclusively for the federal government. The constitutional basis denying (or, at least, not confirming) foreign policy as solely a federal prerogative is the basis for provincial international activity. Although section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 does give the federal government the right to implement British imperial treaties, both the legacy of judicial interpretation and the rise of "low politics" in the international arena have eroded the federal government's sole claim to external affairs.[49] The constitutional ambiguity governing foreign policy acts as an important constraint on the prime minister; she cannot prevent provincial activism in external matters if the foreign policy issue or matter is under provincial jurisdiction. However, the prime minister must ensure that the international activity of provinces does not threaten the sovereignty of the Canadian state. Whereas the provinces are sub-national actors in the political system, the federal government is the only national actor; this is the fundamental basis of our argument that the role of the prime

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[49]This is what we bring out in the literature review. See, for example, Howard A. Leeson and Wilfried Vanderelst, External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973) and the special issue, entitled "Foreign Policy in Federal States," in International Journal Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1986).

minister in the making of Canadian foreign policy defined at the level of the state is to defend the federal interest.[50] Canada must speak with one voice abroad, and not eleven.

At the same time, this is also the reason why we cannot accept the distinction made between domestic policy and foreign policy in understanding the role of the prime minister in the making of foreign policy. There is a continuing realist legacy in the general study of foreign policy that, for analytical purposes, "politics stops at the water's edge." Although decision-making analysts in the field, such as Allison and Steinbruner, have questioned both the unitary and the rational assumptions of realism, and international relations scholars, such as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane,[51] have challenged its state-centric view, there is little consideration that the "politics" we are witnessing abroad may be a manifestation of the "politics" we witness at home.

A notable exception in the study of Canadian foreign policy is Denis Stairs' thoughtful discussion of the political culture of Canadian foreign policy.[52] Stairs' discussion is important in the

[50]In other words, only the federal government can speak on the "national interest" of Canada because provincial governments are sub-national parts concerned only with "sub-national interests." It is not problematic when sub-national interests are funnelled through federal institutions; the problem arises when the provinces go directly on the world stage and express their sub-national interests.

[51]Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972) and Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).

[52]Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (December 1982): 667-690.

evolution of Canadian foreign policy thinking because he points to internal as opposed to simply external reasons for what seemed to be Canada's compromising, rational, flexible and pragmatic stance in the international arena. Stairs wonders whether this is less a characteristic of an internationalist middle power and more a manifestation of the country's political culture. What other country has the tolerant atmosphere where a minority (French-Canadian Quebeckers) can flourish even to the point of allowing it to vote on whether or not to secede from the confederation? According to Stairs, because the federal government has had to act in a domestic environment characterized by strong provincial, regional and ethnic ties, policy-makers in Ottawa have become compromising, rational, flexible and pragmatic, a stance that has also found expression in the international arena. Although Stairs' account is based on the nature of Canadian society rather than Canadian institutions (and, thus, prime ministerial priorities still remain exogenous to the office of the prime minister), he nevertheless brings out the link between "politics" abroad and "politics" at home.

Our argument on understanding the role of the prime minister rests on the centrality of the Canadian federal institution. Canada's federal make-up has created a certain type of "politics" that has made the prime minister one of eleven voices and, yet, her voice remains unique. As one of eleven voices, the prime minister is a domestic political leader competing with ten other leaders. Unlike the United States which has accommodated its regional differences chiefly in the

national Congress. Canada has generated other institutions in the federal-provincial context to accommodate them, e.g., the first ministers' conference. In particular, we have come to expect that the prime minister directs her attention to federal-provincial affairs,[53] an expectation raised by the increasing decentralization of the federal state following the centralized structure of the wartime years.

At the same time, the prime minister's voice is unique amongst the eleven; she is the only national actor in the federal-provincial game. This "uniqueness" becomes prominent in two ways. First of all, in the domestic context, she is the one charged with preventing the disintegration of the Canadian federal state. She speaks for "Canada" in federal-provincial matters and the territorial integrity of Canada includes all the ten provinces claimed by the premiers. The only option ruled out in the performance of the role of the prime minister is the break-up of the country. This is vital in understanding why the Canadian prime minister places greater importance on domestic affairs than would consort with an explanation offered by conventional democratic or liberal-pluralist theory. Any analysis of prime ministerial behaviour must account for both domestic and foreign matters. If priorities are role-governed rather than choice-governed (or rationally-determined), the prime minister's decision to place domestic concerns before international ones

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[53]Until 1946, by law, the prime minister also held the external affairs portfolio. Prime Minister Mackenzie King separated the duties of external affairs from prime ministerial responsibilities because the prime minister, King argued, simply did not have the time to attend to the day-to-day problems of foreign policy.

may be less a matter of choice (i.e., because the prime minister wants to stay in office or get re-elected, he or she must respond to the wishes of the Canadian public who, themselves, are generally more interested in domestic than international affairs) and more a matter of role (i.e., because the Canadian parliamentary, federal state is executive-oriented and decentralized, if not, at times, unstable, the prime minister as the defender of the federal interest must direct her attention inward rather than outward).

Secondly, in the international arena, the prime minister is the one who attends summits and heads-of-government meetings because the federal government is responsible for "foreign" policy; Ottawa alone is recognized by the international community. However, the monopoly on the making of foreign policy by the federal government has been called into question by both the shift from high politics to low politics in the international arena and the lack of a constitutional basis to prevent provincial activity outside of Canada's borders. We may ask: How much of the federal-provincial game occurs abroad? The onus would be on the prime minister as the head of the national government to ensure that the sub-national parts led by the provincial premiers do not challenge the one voice of Canada in international affairs. There is an institutional imperative here that pits the federal and provincial parts against each other. This part of the federal-provincial game is what we examine in the case-studies and what we use to bring out prime ministerial influence in foreign policy.

THE IDIOSYNCRATIC FACTOR

However, the individual who holds Canada's highest office may defy the constraints and make use of the opportunities placed on her from the levels of the international system, state and role. She will invoke (or try to invoke) her individual beliefs and personal preferences in order to make a particular imprint on Canadian foreign policy. The particular individual in power does matter. The study of Canadian foreign policy grew up in the 1960s and the 1970s with the case-study method, rather than the quantitative exercise popularized in the comparative foreign policy approach (CPA) of the United States. Central to the development of the field has been the historical-descriptive tradition. The positivist and post-positivist (or post-structuralist) debates in international relations theory have few followers in the Canadian foreign policy field; the traditional influence of historians rather than advanced theorists continues to prevail in the literature. The study of individuals rather than concepts continue to be the driving force of research. How have individuals influenced foreign policy outcomes? We need look no further than the work of Granatstein and Bothwell who, in writing the concluding volume of the Canada in World Affairs series of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, focus on Trudeau from an idiosyncratic perspective.

Yet, we have seen that there are two compelling arguments in the study of Canadian foreign policy which challenge the significance of prime ministerial action, but ones that have been preoccupied with either the international systemic constraints

placed on individual actions or the centrality of the policy-making process. If, on the one hand, Trudeau's part in foreign policy can best be explained by the international systemic constraints placed on his actions, then perhaps the behaviour of the prime minister is little different from that of an agent of the Canadian state. If, on the other hand, Trudeau's part in foreign policy can best be explained by the domestic, and particularly bureaucratic, constraints on his actions, then perhaps it matters little who it is that occupies the office of prime minister. However, although it is a truism to state that the prime minister alone does not make policy, we would be hard-pressed to argue that the Canadian leader does not make any difference to the state's policy.

Our work is a study of Trudeau's part in foreign policy that accepts the importance of the idiosyncratic factor but questions it as the sole explanatory variable of individual behaviour. Our contention is that although the prime minister may attempt to defy the constraints of the levels of both the international system and the state and provide idiosyncratic input (which is often short-lived) in foreign policy, her role as the champion of federalism is an important determinant of her actions. This role-governed priority is not grounded in the nature of the international system; nor is the priority simply the result of domestic processes that constrain all politicians regardless of office. It is something endogenous to the office of prime minister.

LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS

How do role-governed policy priorities translate into behaviour? March and Olsen differentiate between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality in understanding political behaviour. Role-governed behaviour is best understood as the obligatory action which results from the logic of appropriateness whereas rational choice behaviour is best understood as the anticipatory action which results from the logic of consequentiality. The following from March and Olsen[54] serves as a guide to differentiate between the two types of action:

Logic of appropriateness:	**Logic of consequentiality:**
1. What kind of situation is this?	**1. What are my alternatives?**
2. Who am I?	**2. What are my values?**
3. How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?	**3. What are the consequences of my alternatives for my values?**
4. Do what is most appropriate.	**4. Choose the alternative that has the best consequences.**

As we noted earlier, March and Olsen assert that most political behaviour actually conforms to a logic of appropriateness but this fact is masked by the fact that behaviour is justified by a logic of consequentiality. Because individuals give reasons for their actions after the decision has been made, the giving of reasons has been more to justify or legitimize a choice rather than to make it. If the process of rationality takes place after the individual has already acted rather than before it, then individual

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[54]March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 23.

behaviour is best explained by the logic of appropriateness. By using March and Olsen's characterization of the logic of appropriateness, we can show how the role of the prime minister in the making of Canadian foreign policy can defined as the champion of federalism or the defender of the federal interest.

(1) **What kind of situation is this?** Canada is a decentralized federal state characterized by eleven different governments. Premiers, who speak for their individual provinces, are powerful actors in the Canadian state. In the domestic policy field, the constitutional division of powers places matters under either federal or provincial jurisdiction, although a few are shared areas of interest. In the foreign policy field, the federal government is dominant, but the constitutional ambiguity surrounding the treaty process gives the provinces a basis for action in the international arena. As the only national actor, the federal government speaks for "Canada" both at home and abroad.

(2) **Who am I?** I am the prime minister of Canada.

(3) **How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?** Because the federal government speaks for "Canada" both at home and abroad, and I am the prime minister, I must ensure that no province separates from the confederation and no province speaks for itself abroad. The Canadian state must remain sovereign.

(4) **Do what is most appropriate.** Defend the federal interest.

THREE TYPES OF EXPLANATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK: COMBINING THE SYSTEMIC, STATE, ROLE AND INDIVIDUAL LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

In order to discern which priorities--i.e., macro system-governed, micro state-governed, role-governed and idiosyncratic--determine the foreign policy actions of the prime minister, we need to state explicitly how the systemic, state, role and individual levels of analysis relate to each other. By combining the levels of analysis, we see three types of explanations offered within the framework. They all point to the importance of examining the prime minister's role-governed priorities.

(I.) The levels of analysis provide complementary explanations.

In some cases, there is no conflict between the levels of analysis. Macro system-governed priorities, micro state-governed priorities, role-governed priorities, and idiosyncratic priorities are all determinants of the prime minister's foreign policy behaviour. For example, Canada participated in the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during Trudeau's tenure. Why did the prime minister support Canadian participation in multilateral trade negotiations? We may respond: Because the Canadian economy benefitted from international trade liberalization (macro system-governed priority); the attentive groups in both the polity, such as the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, and the society, such as primary producers, advocated freer global trade (micro state-governed priority); the prime minister exercised the prerogative of the federal government to make trade policy (role-governed priority); and Trudeau believed in fostering Canada's trading relationships

through multilateral means (idiosyncratic priority). Due to the fact that the different reasons for Trudeau's support for multilateral trade negotiations do not conflict, the four levels of analysis come together to provide a more complete explanation for his behaviour. In these cases, we need to look at all the levels of analysis. Thus, we may ask: To what extent did role-governed priorities, along with macro system-governed, micro state-governed and idiosyncratic priorities, determine the prime minister's actions?

(II.) The levels of analysis provide conflicting explanations and one or more levels are determinative against the others.

(a.) Higher level is determinative against lower level(s).

Very often, in cases where conflicting explanations exist, the priorities shaped by the higher level of analysis determine the prime minister's actions over lower level(s). The explanatory strength of both the macro and micro views of foreign policy behaviour that we outlined in the first chapter is accounted for here. Both are based on levels of analysis that are higher than either role or individual.

For example, Trudeau expressed reservations about the manner in which NATO summits were conducted. He asserted that the leaders of the North Atlantic alliance simply undertook "the tedious business of reading speeches drafted by others with the principal objective of not rocking the boat...At NATO high-level meetings, any attempt to start a discussion or question the meaning of the communiqué--also drafted by others long before the meeting began--is met with stony embarrassment or strong

opposition."[55] Why then did the prime minister attend NATO summit meetings? In this case, although Trudeau's idiosyncratic priority would have led him to stay away from meetings of NATO leaders, his macro system-governed priority, predicated on the fact that only the prime minister attends international summits, compelled him to attend the meetings. Indeed, this macro system-governed priority also explains why Trudeau attended the Commonwealth heads of government meetings and the Group of Seven summits and why he met with other state leaders, such as the American president, on a regular basis despite state or role constraints; or idiosyncratic inclinations.

Generally speaking, summitry attests to the power of the prime minister vis-à-vis other actors in the Canadian state. It can also provide an international forum for her particular views or issues without the constraints of state or role. In the last two decades, the prime minister has participated in the annual meetings of the seven economic powers of the world, with the exception of the first meeting in Rambouillet, France in 1975. According to Sylvia Ostry, the Group of Seven summit arose as an institutional response not only to the fundamental changes that occurred in the global economy associated with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods-fixed rate exchange rate system, but also to the new problems that emerged in international relations requiring immediate resolution, such as the first 1973-74 oil

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[55]Quoted in Dan Smith, Pressure: How America Runs NATO (London: Bloomsbury, 1989), p. 16.

crisis.[56] Summitry is a reaffirmation of the power of heads of governments. "Only the leaders have the authority to integrate nationally policies concerning several ministries (often with competing bureaucratic mandates and territorial imperatives) or to reconcile the demands of foreign and domestic policy, having responsibility for both."[57]

In the same vein, the role level of analysis may be determinative against the idiosyncratic level. To what extent, we may ask, did the prime minister's role as the defender of the federal interest determine his actions despite his personal beliefs or particular inclinations?

(b.) Lower level is determinative against higher level(s).

In some cases where conflicting explanations exist, the priorities shaped by the lower level of analysis determine prime ministerial behaviour over higher levels. Any attempt by the prime minister to defy the constraints of system, state and role would be accounted for here. The reason that analysts study the particular individual occupying the office of prime minister is because, in some cases, the idiosyncratic level of analysis is determinative against the higher levels. This is the kind of explanation offered by Thordarson of Trudeau's foreign policy review as well as conventional explanations of Trudeau's 1980-81 North-South initiative and his 1983-84 peace initiative. In all these cases,

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[56]Sylvia Ostry, Summitry: The Medium and the Message, Bissell Paper Number Three (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1988).

[57]Ibid, p. 9.

analysts direct their attention to the examination of Trudeau's idiosyncratic priorities.

As well, in some cases, the role level of analysis may be determinative against the systemic and state levels. Here, role-governed priorities would be the primary determinant of prime ministerial actions. To what extent, we may ask, did the prime minister's role as the defender of the federal interest conflict with the imperatives from both the levels of the system and state?

(III.) The levels of analysis do not provide conflicting explanations and the higher levels of analysis are not determinative.

In some cases, there will be neither systemic nor state constraints on prime ministerial actions. Conventionally, the tendency for analysts, then, has been to point to idiosyncratic priorities as determining behaviour. However, the addition of the role level of analysis within the framework demands the examination of role constraints on the actions of the prime minister and the extent to which role-governed priorities determined her behaviour.

This third type of explanation (III) as well as explanations offered by type (I) show that the role level of analysis complements the other levels and provides a more complete picture of the determinants of prime ministerial actions. Explanations of type (II.a), particularly when role-governed priorities are determinative over idiosyncratic ones, and type (II.b), particularly when role-governed priorities are determinative over macro system-governed and micro state-governed priorities, show that the role level of analysis may

compete with the other levels and provide an alternative picture of prime ministerial actions.

THE APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK

Pierre Elliott Trudeau was the prime minister of Canada from April 1968 until June 1984, except during the nine-month reign of the Conservative government under Joe Clark from June 1979 to March 1980. He had three majority governments (1968-1972; 1976-1979; 1980-1984), a short minority government (1972-1974), and the nine-month wait in opposition (1979-1980). His sixteen-year tenure as prime minister has forced academics and journalists alike to come to terms with the nature of his leadership and the basis of his appeal to the Canadian people. "Trudeaumania" was the term coined in 1968 to describe the public adulation that he commanded and to account in part for his rapid accession both as leader of the Liberal Party and as prime minister of Canada. As observed by journalists then, Trudeau was the embodiment of Expo '67, of the Canadian polity coming of age. He won four elections—1968, 1972, 1974 and 1980—and his defeat in 1979, according to one biographer, led Canadians to question what they were doing to themselves rather than what they were doing to him;[58] "after the (1979) election, people began to feel guilty, and when their chance came (in 1980), projected their feelings of guilt onto their chosen instrument for destroying Trudeau: Clark."[59] Richard Gwyn called him the

[58]Richard Gwyn, The Northern Magus (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980; Paperjacks, 1981) p. 366, 394. The paperback version is the text used here.

[59]Ibid, p. 332.

"Northern Magus," asserting that some kind of magical bond existed between the prime minister and the Canadian people. Although Trudeau's long tenure in office appeared typically to end in public disfavor, his command of public attention, if not public approval, was clear in the Meech Lake[60] and Charlottetown[61] debates. Not surprisingly, recent biographers continue to focus on his persona and the nature of his relationship with the Canadian populace; Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall writing in 1990 open with: "He haunts us still."[62]

Few leaders have captured the imagination of the Canadian public as Trudeau has. David Taras and Robert Weyant argue that only John Diefenbaker can be classified in the same manner as Trudeau and both stand out historically as prime ministers because their type of leadership was unlike all the others. Using

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[60]Andrew Cohen in A Deal Undone (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1990), p. 159-182, asserts that it was Trudeau's intervention that set in motion the forces to oppose the Meech Lake accord and upset it.

[61]Trudeau's most memorable contribution to the October 26, 1992 referendum debate on the Charlottetown accord was his article in Maclean's (September 28, 1992) where on the cover of the newsmagazine was his picture and the headline: "Trudeau Speaks Out: Say 'No' to 'Blacknail'." (This article was based in large part on his essay on the "poverty of nationalist thinking in Quebec" which was added to the paperback version of Towards a Just Society published in 1992.) His notoriety continued in the pages of Maclean's (March 8, 1993) when the newsmagazine featured an interview with Brian Mulroney after the Conservative prime minister resigned on February 24, 1993. When asked by the interviewer whether Mulroney could be persuaded in the future to return to political life (i.e., what he would do) if the country was facing a crisis, Mulroney responded by saying what he "won't do." In a clear allusion to Trudeau's intervention in the constitutional debates, the Conservative prime minister stated: "There are no circumstances under which I would ever seek, publicly or privately, to undermine the honorable efforts of any of my successors on any matter relating to national unity. Ever (p. 39)."

[62]Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall Trudeau and Our Times: Volume I: The Magnificent Obsession (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990; M&S Paperback, 1991), p. 9. The 1991 paperback version is the text used here.

Stanley Hoffman's classification, Taras and Weyant contend that Trudeau and Diefenbaker were "heroic leaders" rather than "leaders of routine," the latter characterizing most of those, like Macdonald, Laurier, Borden, King, St. Laurent and Pearson, who have held Canada's highest office. Trudeau and Diefenbaker, as "outsiders," were not products of Canadian organizational life or the political mainstream.[63] Heroic leaders are mysterious, magnetic, if not mission-oriented individuals, who often rise to power in times of crisis; they come close to exercising the type of "charismatic authority" identified by Max Weber. As prime minister, Trudeau, like Diefenbaker, stood out in this manner. His public and political personality, his educational, intellectual, and philosophical background, and even his personal and private pursuits have become well-known. Trudeau's biographers have been plentiful and they have taken sympathetic,[64] critical[65] and even psychoanalytical[66] views of his political life. All of them have waited eagerly for the publication of his memoirs.

It is undisputed that Trudeau joined the Liberal Party and entered federal politics with a particular interest and view regarding the accommodation of Quebec in the Canadian

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[63]David Taras and Robert Weyant, "Dreamers of the Day: A Guide To Roles, Character and Performance on the Political Stage," in Prime Ministers and Premiers, p. 9-10.

[64]George Radwanski, Trudeau (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977). Radwanski is referred to by others who have written on Trudeau as his "official" biographer.

[65]Anthony Westell, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1972) and Michel Vastel, The Outsider: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, translation of Trudeau le Quebecois (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1990).

[66]Clarkson and McCall, The Magnificent Obsession.

confederation.[67] As students of Canadian foreign policy have pointed out, Trudeau's primary interest was not in external affairs. Trudeau spent most of his years in office negotiating with the provinces to repatriate the constitution from Great Britain with an agreed amending formula and a charter of rights. With the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982 not only did he make his mark on Canadian history by reaching agreement with nine of the ten provinces but he also succeeded, with the recognition of the linguistic equality of French and English and the protection of minority language educational rights, in implementing his lifelong vision of the accommodation of Quebec within Canadian federalism. The Quebec government's decision under René Lévesque not to sign the constitution attested to the triumph of Trudeau's view that the rights of individual French-Canadians and English-Canadians were to be protected, not those of French-Canada (i.e., Quebec) and English-Canada.[68]

The rejection of a dual Canada drew Trudeau to federal politics, and it drew him out of retirement to fight against the Meech Lake accord which, according to Trudeau, would have given Quebec the kind of special status that he had fought against

[67]This has been universally recognized by politicians, journalists and academics and it is clearly evident in Trudeau's writings both before and after his tenure as prime minister. See Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967) and Towards a Just Society, co-edited with Thomas Axworthy (Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books, 1990; Paperback, 1992).

[68]This, of course, is the classic debate on Quebec's place in the Canadian confederation. Ramsay Cook, translating Trudeau's words in Le Devoir, puts the question: "(I)s it in the interests of French-speaking Canadians to be a majority in a pluralist Quebec state, or a minority in a pluralist Canadian state?" See Cook, "'I never thought I could be as proud...': The Trudeau-Lévesque Debate" in Towards a Just Society, edited by Thomas Axworthy and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, (Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 343-344.

throughout his political career. Moreover, the instability, if not the impending break-up, of the Canadian confederation was a real factor during his tenure as prime minister. Successive Quebec provincial governments asserted their rights to speak for French-Canada and more and more Quebeckers demanded greater autonomy, if not outright independence, from the rest of the country.[69]

In 1968 the Union Nationale government under Jean-Jacques Bertrand, following the policies of his predecessor, Daniel Johnson, demanded recognition of Quebec's autonomous status in the emerging association of French-speaking states. In 1970 the radical Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped British diplomat James Cross and Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte and precipitated a national crisis. In 1971 the Liberal government under Robert Bourassa rejected the Victoria accord just days after constitutional agreement was reached, it seemed finally, between the federal and provincial governments. In 1976 the Parti Québecois under René Lévesque was elected on a platform of separatism which culminated in the 1980 provincial referendum on sovereignty-association. From the time of the

[69]Compare the statements made by the great student of Canadian federalism, Donald Smiley, in the introduction to his The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987). Here, Smiley states that his present work cannot be seen as the "fourth edition" of his earlier work on federalism, entitled Canada in Question. He asserts that he is more sanguine about the future of the Canadian confederation and that the "assumption of stability most clearly distinguishes this analysis from (his) writings on Canadian federalism in the past two decades" (p. xi). He adds: "In retrospect it appears that (he), and most other observers of Canadian affairs, very much over-estimated the strength of Quebec nationalism and provincialist influences elsewhere in the country and very much under-estimated the capacity of the system to respond effectively to such divisive pressures" (p. xi). But that was after the fact. The perception of the possible break-up of the Canadian confederation was very real during Trudeau's tenure as prime minister.

quiet revolution in 1960 which ushered in the provincial Liberal government under Jean Lesage, marking the end of the Duplessis era and everything it stood for—and stood against—in Quebec society, the necessity to accommodate French-Quebec's aspirations in the Canadian confederation was the most serious challenge to the future of Canadian federalism.

Although Trudeau had a particular view about the place of Quebec in the Canadian confederation, there has been little attention paid to the fact that his "magnificent obsession" was his answer to give and not his question to pose. The Quebec question in Canadian federalism would have been posed to anyone else holding Canada's highest office during Trudeau's tenure as prime minister; it was a question that preceded Trudeau's political career and, as evident by the Quebec (Meech Lake) and Canada (Charlottetown) constitutional rounds, it was a question that persisted after his political career. The threat of the disintegration of the Canadian federal state was real. As the champion of federalism, Trudeau had to direct his attention first and foremost to the question of Quebec's accommodation, which was, for Trudeau, to be in the form of constitutional change.[70]

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[70]Trudeau often points out that the federal government did not initiate the process of constitutional revision and that he, himself, was wary about the possibility of success. (See Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," in Towards A Just Society, p. 374.) It was Premier John Robarts of Ontario who called the "Confederation of Tomorrow Conference" on the constitution in November 1967, inviting the provinces and the federal government, the latter sending only observers (p. 362). Trudeau reminds us that "on May 22, 1963, the Legislative Assembly of Quebec voted unanimously to give itself a mandate to determine 'the objectives to be pursued by *French Canada* (sic) in the revision of the constitution of Canada, and the best means of obtaining these objectives'" (p. 366).

Thus, Trudeau's actions which were directed toward domestic, i.e., constitutional, matters, were determined as much by role-governed as by idiosyncratic policy priorities. This conforms with the type (III) explanation within the framework where neither systemic nor state constraints are placed on the prime minister's actions, and the role and idiosyncratic levels do not provide conflicting explanations. Granatstein and Bothwell assert that Trudeau made an impact on constitutional policy and not on foreign policy because he was interested in (or obsessed with) constitutional change and less interested in external affairs. Their assertion may be true, but inherent in the role of the prime minister as the champion of federalism or the defender of the federal faith is the ruling out of only one option: the disintegration of the Canadian federal state. Trudeau as prime minister had no "choice" but to direct his attention toward domestic matters. Like most analysts who have studied Trudeau's part in foreign policy, Granatstein and Bothwell conclude that the prime minister's interest in foreign policy was "sporadic"[71] because his personal preferences had lay with constitutional change. We contend that to say just this overlooks role-governed priorities and institutional analysis. According to March and Olsen:

> The resulting **sporadic** (emphasis added) and sequential attention to potential issues of coordination and consistency in politics makes political systems feasible—if not always coherent. It exploits limitations in attention and energy on the part of the participants. Regardless of the way in which institutions are structured, attention is a scarce good in politics; and control over the allocation of attention is important to a political actor. By inhibiting the discovery of and entry into some potential conflicts, a

[71] Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 378.

> structure of rules organized into relatively discrete responsibilities channels political energies into certain kinds of conflicts and away from others.[72]

The Canadian federal institution essentially directs the energies of the prime minister into federal-provincial affairs, and when the disintegration of the Canadian federal state is a real possibility, the prime minister as the champion of federalism has little option but to be preoccupied with the problem.

This analysis of Trudeau's behaviour, however, would lead us to conclude that role-governed preferences would have remained paramount until 1982 when the constitution was repatriated and the accommodation of Quebec, from Trudeau's viewpoint, was finally settled. That, in some sense, is our conclusion with two qualifications. First of all, we would have to point out that between 1971 and 1975 there were no formal constitutional negotiations going on between the federal and provincial governments. However, the oil crisis of 1973 precipitated a need, according to the federal government, to develop a national energy policy. "This new federal role produced a hostile reaction in the oil- and gas-producing provinces of Western Canada and gave rise to a whole new concern that the Constitution did not give sufficient protection to their control over natural resources."[73] As Trudeau states, he was "criticized for totally ignoring (constitutional debates) from 1971 to 1975,"[74] but

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[72]March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 27.

[73]Jean Chrétien, "Bringing the Constitution Home," in Towards a Just Society, p. 287.

[74]Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," in Towards a Just Society, p. 374.

federal-provincial problems were still pressing during these years even if the Quebec question was not at the forefront. The Liberals also had a minority government between 1972 and 1974. Yet, it is perhaps not surprising that we see, during this period, Trudeau playing an important part in Canadian negotiations to establish a trade link with Western Europe. Arguably, role constraints were weakened.

Secondly, we would argue that the turning point for Trudeau in the accommodation of Quebec in the Canadian confederation was the May 20, 1980 referendum in Quebec. The ruling Parti Québécois had asked for a mandate from the people of Quebec to negotiate sovereignty-association with the federal government. The party under the leadership of René Lévesque had espoused separatism—the independence of Quebec—as its primary objective and had released its white paper on sovereignty-association, entitled Quebec-Canada: A New Deal,[75] in 1979 to allay the fears of Quebeckers that an independent Quebec would have negative economic ramifications. The referendum was seen as a contest between federalism and separatism and the results were: 60% Non, 40% Oui. Trudeau, as he had promised after a "No" victory, returned to the process of constitutional revision with the provincial premiers, finally agreeing on the resolution which became the Constitution Act, 1982.

The defeat of Quebec separatism was, according to Clarkson and McCall, the culmination of Trudeau's "miraculous year": "He

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[75]Quebec, Gouvernement du Québec, Quebec-Canada: A New Deal (Quebec City: Éditeur officiel, 1979).

would resign as leader of the Liberal Party and then quickly return to lead it again. He would win his fourth election victory and with it a second chance to realize his political goals. And he would take on his political arch-enemy, René Lévesque,...and defeat him in a referendum whose outcome would be interpreted for a time to mean that it was Trudeau's view of Canada that would prove to be the nation's destiny."[76] The defeat of Quebec separatism also meant that, in the context of foreign policy, Trudeau was much less constrained by role factors. That is why in utilizing the type (III) explanation in analyzing Trudeau's behaviour (and Canadian foreign and domestic policies cannot be analytically separated in this instance), we assert that both the prime minister's 1980-81 North-South initiative and his 1983-84 peace initiative were the first actions, as now understood in the literature, that were determined primarily by his idiosyncratic priorities. Yet, even these actions were in some sense governed by what he had learned in his capacity as prime minister.

Questions immediately arise about these assertions. How do we explain the 1968-70 foreign policy review which, according to conventional wisdom, was grounded in Trudeau's political beliefs and personal preferences? Trudeau was clearly active in foreign policy when he first took office and his main critique of Canada's foreign policy was that it was determined by Canada's defence policy rather than the other way around. Thordarson asserts that the 1969 decision regarding Canada's commitment to the North

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[76]Clarkson and McCall, p. 19.

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was clearly inspired by Trudeau. Like the decision to initiate the foreign policy review and the political philosophy evident in the 1970 white paper on foreign policy, Thordarson states that the NATO decision was shaped by the prime minister's idiosyncratic priorities. We cannot at the same time offer a type (III) explanation which is predicated on the absence of conflict between the levels of analysis; and accept Thordarson's type (II.b) explanation which is predicated on the existence of conflict between the levels of analysis and the idiosyncratic level being determinative against all the others. We ask, then: Did Thordarson provide a complete picture? To what extent did role-governed priorities also determine Trudeau's actions with regard to the 1969 NATO decision and the 1970 white paper on foreign policy? Was the prime minister's behaviour influenced by the system or the state? And if the two higher levels did influence Trudeau's behaviour, were these priorities compatible[77] or conflicting[78] with role-governed and idiosyncratic priorities? We would have to revise Thordarson's analysis of the prime minister's part in the NATO decision and the foreign policy review.

The change in Canadian defence policy was, in any case, short-lived and, by the mid-1970s, Canada was back in the NATO fold. Was it because, in the long-run, the constraints of the international security system were too strong and, in the final

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[77]In this case, we would be utilizing a type (I) explanation within the framework.

[78]In this case, we would be also utilizing, like Thordarson, a type (II.b) explanation, but at the role, not the idiosyncratic, level.

analysis, macro system-governed priorities determined Trudeau's actions? Or was it because the re-emergence of NATO's importance in Canadian defence policy, according to many observers, was connected to the goals or objectives of the Trudeau government's trade policy, which points to the prime minister's micro state-governed priorities? To what extent do we find role-governed priorities also determining the apparent change in defence policy? And in what sense do we see the 1983-84 peace initiative, although determined by idiosyncratic priorities, shaped by Trudeau having been prime minister?

If changes in Canadian defence policy were connected to changes in trade policy, what happened to the government's third option strategy which was its guiding principle in establishing trade links with Western Europe? As we just mentioned, Trudeau played a visible part in the negotiation of Canada's contractual link with the European Community. The link was an attempt to give substance to trade diversification, as outlined in the third option. However, it was under the Trudeau government that the notion of sectoral free trade with the United States was first introduced. Did the 1982 reorganization of External Affairs, when it was merged with the trade component of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, play a part in the Trudeau government's movement towards greater bilateral trade in the continent? Given the indifference, if not hostility, of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce to the third option, why did Trudeau reorganize External Affairs in 1982? Analysts have pointed to systemic, state, and idiosyncratic

priorities determining his action. To what extent did role-governed priorities also affect his decision to make bureaucratic changes?

Trudeau, scholars agree, was personally committed to addressing the North-South problem in international affairs; this commitment became evident in his 1980-81 initiative to place third world issues at the forefront of the international agenda. However, do we find that Canada gave significantly more in aid to the less developed countries during Trudeau's tenure? Observers point to both the constraints of the international political economy and interests of groups in the Canadian state to account for why the prime minister did not make more of a difference in international development assistance. Yet, did the emergence of la francophonie in the early Trudeau years mark an important change in Canadian aid policy? Although the French-speaking organization was established during the Trudeau years, its roots are found in the Pearson government. What is interesting about the case of la francophonie is that the talks were not only undertaken at the first ministers' level, i.e., between the prime minister and the Quebec premier, but also dealt with both a constitutional question and one of international law. In this case, role-governed priorities seem particularly evident.

THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY

We are going to address the questions above, in turn, in the following chapters after the literature review. The study of Trudeau's part in Canadian defence, trade and aid policies is an

attempt to explain the behaviour of the individual, namely the prime minister, in Canadian foreign policy. Our application of the framework at this point already shows how Trudeau's role-governed priorities distracted him from foreign policy matters to deal with domestic affairs, primarily with the constitution and matters relating to Quebec's accommodation in the Canadian confederation. By adding the fourth level of analysis--the role of the prime minister in defending the federal interest--we can explain Trudeau's apparent lack of attention to, or action in, external affairs during most of his tenure.

At the same time, to what extent did role-governed priorities also determine Trudeau's foreign policy actions? In order to bring out the role level of analysis further in our study, we ask the following questions. Was the federal-provincial game played in the defence, trade, and aid arenas during Trudeau's tenure? What part did Trudeau play and was his part explicit in defending the federal interest? Were his role-governed priorities compatible with or contradictory to his macro system-governed, micro state-governed, and idiosyncratic priorities? What kind of evidence do we use to explain Trudeau's actions in foreign policy?

The last question is important because it points to the scope of the study in two ways. First of all, this is a study of the individual person in Canadian foreign policy. That means that we are attempting to explain individual behaviour as opposed to the behaviour of the Canadian state or the international system. Hollis and Smith, as we see in the next chapter, distinguish between levels of analysis and units of analysis. We are interested in the

systemic, state, individual, and (what we add in this study) role levels of analysis in order to explain the part played by Trudeau (i.e., the individual is our unit of analysis) in Canadian foreign policy. Secondly, this is a study of Trudeau's sixteen-year tenure as the Prime Minister of Canada. That means that we are interested in particular types of foreign policy decisions made during his time in office. Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr distinguish between three types of decisions and three phases in the decision process: there are crisis, general foreign policy, and administrative types of decisions and the decision process is characterized by the pre-decision, formulation, and implementation phases.[79]

According to Russett and Starr, crisis decisions are reactions to events in the international system in a relatively short period of time. They are best explained from a systemic level of analysis in order to highlight the interaction between states, and in these kinds of decisions, macro system-governed priorities would more likely determine prime ministerial actions. Administrative decisions, although important in the pre-decision as well as the implementation phases of the decision process, centre on the part played by bureaucrats and, here, the emphasis on the policy-making process means that micro state-governed priorities would more likely determine prime ministerial actions. General foreign policy decisions, which focus on the pre-decision and formulation phases of the decision process, point not only to

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[79]Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 4th ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1992), p. 254-257.

the importance of politicians (as opposed to civil servants) in foreign policy, but also to the centrality of policy papers and policy initiatives[80] in discerning individual influence.

In Canada, white papers are official declarations of the government's policy on a particular issue. The term, "white paper," has its roots in Great Britain where it is "applied to government documents, reports, and statements of policy of insufficient thickness to require the strong blue covers normally used."[81] The term was first used in Canada in 1939 by then Minister of Finance, Charles A. Dunning, when he tabled the government's budget in the House of Commons.[82] Unlike "green papers" which are released by the government to invite comment and discussion prior to making policy, white papers are released by the government to explain policy that has already been made.[83] Thus, they are important pieces of evidence to analyze in terms of both the factors and influences prior to their release, and the content contained within the papers themselves.[84]

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[80]Robert Boardman discusses the characteristics of an initiative in his study of the Canadian-European contractual link. Although our study deals with "accepted" initiatives, e.g., the 1980-81 North-South initiative, it might help us to ask (drawing from Boardman's discussion) what constitutes an initiative: Does it exhibit novelty? Does it focus attention on certain issues? Does it produce change? Does it spell out a goal or objective for the government? Does it have a reasonable possibility of success? See Boardman, "Initiatives and Outcomes: The European Community and Canada's 'Third Option'," Journal of European Integration 3 (September 1979): 7-8.

[81]Norman Wilding and Philip Landry, An Encyclopedia of Parliament, 4th ed. (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 787, as quoted in "White Papers 1939-1986," No. 126 (Library of Parliament, Information and Research Branch, January 1987), p. 3.

[82]"White Papers 1939-1986," p. 3.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Moreover, as a bureaucrat in External Affairs told me, white papers are clear assertions of governmental control of the civil service. It is often a painful process, he states, to leave aside routines and re-direct energies to the kind of

We will be examining both policy papers, such as the 1970 foreign policy white paper, the 1971 defence white paper and the 1972 options paper, and policy initiatives, such as the 1971 establishment of la francophonie, the 1974-76 contractual link with the European Community, the 1980-81 North-South initiative and the 1983-84 peace initiative, undertaken by the Trudeau government. Because we also include in the context of initiatives the attempts by the government to restructure the Canadian bureaucracy, we will also examine the 1982 reorganization of the Department of External Affairs.

The scope of the study seems both restricted, because of the focus on explaining the behaviour of one individual, and, at the same time, extensive, because of the attention paid to a number of policy papers and initiatives. The balance, we believe, is achieved by applying the framework to the evidence, and presenting the evidence in a manner which illustrates Trudeau's macro system-governed, micro state-governed, idiosyncratic, and (what has not been brought out fully to date) role-governed priorities as determinants of his foreign policy actions.

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review needed to write white papers. (Confidential discussion, External Affairs, Ottawa, June 14, 1993.)

CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Federal-provincial relations are the key to understanding the role of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policy. In this chapter, we examine two strands of literature that form the basis of this assertion, and at the same time show that the effect of federal-provincial relations has not been fully described in this literature. First of all, we look at the centrality of the levels-of-analysis tradition in the general study of foreign policy. We find that studies of Trudeau's part in foreign policy have focused on the systemic and idiosyncratic levels of analysis and the role level of analysis has not been utilized by scholars in explaining Trudeau's actions in external affairs. Secondly, we examine the importance of institutional thinking in the study of the Canadian prime minister. We find that scholars have focused on the evolution of parliamentary government in their analysis of the prime minister but they have not addressed the crucial nature of federalism in shaping the office of Canada's political leader. Yet, we see that both role analysis and institutional thinking can find grounding in the existing literature. These are the two fundamental premises on which we added the role level of analysis in the framework on determinants of prime ministerial behaviour, as outlined in the previous chapter.

THE "LEVELS-OF-ANALYSIS" TRADITION

The study of foreign policy, according to William Wallace, is a "boundary problem" in two respects: it is an area of politics bordering the nation-state and its international environment, and it is a field of study embodying two academic disciplines, namely, the study of domestic government and politics and the study of international politics and diplomacy.[1] Scholarly emphasis on either the internal or the external dimension of foreign policy behaviour corresponds to which level of analysis an individual pursues. As maintained initially by J. David Singer's often-cited essay on the "level-of-analysis" problem in international relations,[2] international relations and foreign policy can be seen generally from the level of the international system or the level of the state. Singer asserts that "the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system";[3] a difficulty arises about how or whether these different inquiries can be coordinated if analysts are examining different "facts" or phenomena.

Structural or theoretical realists,[4] such as Kenneth Waltz,[5] have dealt with the level-of-analysis problem by, in effect, arguing

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[1]William Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process (London: The Macmillan Press, 1971), p. 7.

[2]J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in The International System: Theoretical Essays, edited by Klauss Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 77-92.

[3]Ibid. p. 77. To illustrate this point, Singer uses examples such as the individual deciding to study the flowers or the garden, the trees or the forest, the houses or the neighborhood, and the legislators or the legislature.

[4]The realist legacy is long in the study of international relations and foreign policy. Prior to the behaviouralist movement, the study of foreign policy was not distinct from the general field of international relations. Scholars understood

that there is only one level of analysis in theorizing about the international system. By differentiating between systemic and reductionist approaches, Waltz contends that the systemic approach views a structure as something which has causal impact on its parts and, thus, the parts and their differing characteristics need not be examined. According to Waltz: "To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they arranged or positioned)."[6] This means that in explaining international politics, there is no need to look at states which are the units of the international system. Waltz's theory leaves little or no room for the examination of internal processes in explaining state behaviour and, from the viewpoint of foreign policy study, substantiates further the distinction between the fields of international relations and foreign policy.

Moving in a quite contrary direction, the work of other international relations scholars, such as Bruce Russett and Harvey

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state actions by looking at the international system. Central to understanding the traditional realist view of state behaviour has been the image of the "black box" or the "billiard ball." Fundamentally, traditional realists treat the state as a rational, unitary actor, whose actions are determined by both the anarchical and the hierarchical (i.e., the distribution of power amongst states is unequal) nature of the international system. Traditional realists, such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, laid the foundation for more theoretical realists, such as Kenneth Waltz. Justin Rosenberg identifies the works of these three scholars as primary examples of realism. He argues that Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz, respectively, represent the three phases of realist thought: descriptive, axiomatic and theoretical. See Justin Rosenberg, "What's the Matter with Realism?" Review of International Studies 16 (1990): 285-303. See also E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964) and Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

[5]Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

[6]Ibid, p. 80.

Starr,[7] points to multiple levels of analysis—not merely two—in explaining world politics. The state, in particular, has to be dissected or opened up because internal processes must be treated in explaining international political behaviour. Russett and Starr identify six determinants of world politics, from the specific to the general: individual, role, government, society, (state-to-state) relations, and world system, and assert that the appropriate level or levels of analysis utilized by scholars depends on the issue examined, the decision-maker identified and the evidence found.[8] Because scholars are expected to look at all levels—all possible determinants—and then judge which determinant or determinants is the most compelling in explaining a particular state action, Russett and Starr view levels of analysis as resulting in complementary rather than competing explanations of state behaviour.

Their work reflects the influence of James Rosenau adaptation framework[9] introduced as a "pre-theory" of foreign policy in 1966; here, Rosenau outlines the variables related to explaining foreign policy behaviour, namely, systemic, governmental, societal, role and idiosyncratic factors. Rosenau then examines in a later work, one that is especially significant for our purposes, the salience of idiosyncratic as opposed to role

[7]Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 4th ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1992).

[8]Ibid, p. 13-20.

[9]James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, edited by R. Barry Farrell (Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

factors in explaining individual behaviour and he finds that role factors were the more compelling determinants in his study.[10] Much of the foreign policy literature accepts different sources or factors and has referred to them as determinants, sources, settings, or environments; essentially, they accept different levels of analysis in explaining state actions. For example, Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf identify five "sources" of American foreign policy: the external environment, the societal environment of the nation, the governmental setting, the roles played by policy-makers, and the individual characteristics of foreign policy-making elites.[11] Similarly, Kim Richard Nossal outlines the international, domestic and governmental "settings" of Canadian foreign policy,[12] a tripartite analysis mirrored in D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky's external, domestic and federal governmental policy-making "environments" of Canadian defence policy.[13]

In a review of the theoretical tradition in foreign policy study, Steve Smith[14] states that Rosenau's framework reflected the attempts by American scholars in the aftermath of the

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[10]Rosenau, "Private Preferences and Political Responsibilities: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables in the Behaviour of U.S. Senators," in Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 17-50.

[11]Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

[12]Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy.

[13]D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989).

[14]Steve Smith, "Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview," Review of International Studies 12 (1986): 13-29.

behaviouralist revolution to find a general theory of foreign policy. These attempts, according to Smith, were grounded in the comparative foreign policy approach (CPA), which assumed that all foreign policy behaviour was comparable.[15] As evident in such massive research projects as Dimensionality of Nations (DON), Programmed International Computer Environment (PRINCE) and Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON), the comparative foreign policy approach was largely a quantitative exercise founded on the belief that a general theory of foreign policy would emerge from the accumulation of data. As adherents to the approach admit, their research did not live up to expectations in the field.[16]

Although scholars did not discover a general theory of foreign policy, they continued to dissect the "black box" of the state; these efforts, according to Smith, proved fruitful in producing middle-range theories,[17] explaining "bureaucratic politics,"[18] "cybernetics,"[19] "misperception,"[20] and

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[15]Ibid, p. 16-17.

[16]For example, see Charles Kegley and James Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

[17]Smith asserts that these theories are considered middle-range because they are less ambitious in approach, centring on fewer factors and varying from issue to issue as well as state to state; these middle-range theories demonstrate that work in the field can, at best, hope to explain one facet or facets of state behaviour (p. 19).

[18]Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

[19]John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

[20]Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

"groupthink."[21] Almost every student of foreign policy is familiar with the contributions of Graham Allison, John Steinbruner, Robert Jervis and Irving Janis to the field. Their works not only demonstrate important challenges to the rational actor model which is the legacy of realism in the study of foreign policy but also exemplify the centrality of decision-making analysis in explaining foreign policy behaviour.[22]

Since the seminal essay by Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin[23] which argued that the perspective of the decision-maker is central to the analysis of foreign policy, the growth of decision-making literature in the field has been tremendous.[24] Decision-making analysis as the dominant approach to the study of foreign policy focuses on three central concepts: the decision, the decision-maker, and the decision-

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[21]Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

[22]According to Ole Holsti, decision-making analysis is the major challenge to realism because it points to the importance of internal factors. If realists have studied domestic politics, Holsi states, it has been only "to explain deviations from 'rational' behaviour." See Holsti, "The Bifurcation of American and Non-American Perspectives in Foreign Policy" PS Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1984): 554.

[23]See Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: Free Press, 1962). We should take note, however, that according to James Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice A. East, eds., The Analysis of International Politics: Essays in Honour of Harold and Margaret Sprout (New York: The Free Press, 1972), the landmark work by Snyder and his associates, originally published as a monograph (Princeton, 1954), can be attributed partly to their association with Harold and Margaret Sprout at Princeton. "The Snyder monograph sharply focused and systematized insights and perspectives clearly evident in the earlier work of the Sprouts (p. 5)."

[24]An interesting account of the contribution (or lack thereof) of decision-making analysis to the development of international relations theory (as opposed to strictly foreign policy analysis) is Kim Richard Nossal, "Opening Up the Black Box: The Decision-Making Approach to International Politics," in World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence, edited by David Haglund and Michael Hawes (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), p. 531-552.

making process.[25] In particular, the notion of the decision-maker brings foreign policy analysis to the level of the individual human actor; scholars talk of the agents of the state as opposed to the states as units of the international system.[26] In addition, by focusing on the decision-making process, analysts can take into account both the international and domestic factors in explaining state (i.e., foreign policy) behaviour. According to B.P. White: "As demonstrated in the now famous box diagram, the salient features of the national and international system, and the relationship between them, are located and classified under the headings of the internal and external 'settings' of decision-making."[27] The box diagram referred to by White would be a "variation of a basic input-output model."[28] Approached in this manner, the decision-

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[25]Brian White, "Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches," in Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach," edited by Michael Clarke and Brian White (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989), p. 11.

[26]At the same time, the initial focus on decision-makers had not been unsettling as it first seemed for traditional realist assumptions. Although the level of analysis had indeed shifted to the individual and scholars had concentrated on internal determinants of foreign policy actions, the unitary rational actor had appeared to remain intact. Brian White points out that "Snyder's 'official decision-makers' appear to act in very much the same way as the purposeful, unitary government of traditional analysis" and that decision-making analysts still assume a rational decision-making process (p. 12). That is why the works of Allison, Steinbruner, Jervis, and Janis have been so important—they challenge the rationality of the decision-making process.

[27]B.P. White, "Decision-Making Analysis," in Approaches and Theory in International Relations, edited by Trevor Taylor (London: Longman Group Limited, 1978), p. 145.

[28]Nossal, "Opening Up the Black Box: The Decision-Making Approach to International Politics," p. 536. Here, Nossal recreates a typical foreign policy model (see diagram, p. 537). The "input" would be internal and external determinants; the "output" would be state action or behaviour; and the "throughput" would be the decision-making process. Clearly skeptical about the theoretical claims of the decision-making approach, Nossal states that the approach should be taken as a "heuristic device for the analysis of the key microphenomena of world politics—the decisions of states" (p. 547).

making (or policy-making) process of the state, while accounting for the complementary nature of Singer's levels of analysis, does not negate the position that the external setting—the international systemic level—remains the primary determining factor in explaining foreign policy. In that sense, if the actions or decisions of the individual foreign policy-maker are still driven by factors in the international system, how much can the individual influence the state's foreign policy? In the literature on Trudeau's foreign policy, analysis centres on this question.

Students of Canadian foreign policy have been interested in Trudeau's long-term impact on external affairs because he came into office apparently determined to change things. There is a general consensus in the academic literature that the 1968-70 defence and foreign policy review, which culminated in the publication of Foreign Policy for Canadians,[29] was largely a product of Trudeau. Bruce Thordarson's detailed study of the two-year review[30] remains a central work in any study of Trudeau's influence on external affairs. Indeed, J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell's 1990 contribution examining Trudeau's sixteen-year tenure begins with the review and largely mirrors Thordarson's presentation of documentary evidence to highlight Trudeau's initial part in foreign policy.[31]

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[29]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).

[30]Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[31]J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 3-35.

Thordarson analyzes what he identifies as the three major decisions of the foreign policy review—the 1968 decision to conduct the review, the 1969 decision to reduce NATO forces in Europe, and the philosophy of foreign policy evident in the government's 1970 white paper—and argues that all three decisions were primarily influenced by Trudeau's political philosophy.[32] Thordarson shows how Trudeau prevailed over both a recalcitrant foreign affairs bureaucracy and a divided cabinet; not only did the external affairs and national defence departments oppose any move, in particular, to change Canada's NATO policy, but their respective ministers, Mitchell Sharp, the secretary of state for external affairs, and Léo Cadieux, the minister of national defence, also opposed any change to the status quo. In Thordarson's examination of both the domestic and international environments, he finds that the determining factor in the foreign policy review was Trudeau himself.[33]

At the same time, examining Trudeau's long-term impact on external affairs when he was prime minister, foreign policy scholars inevitably highlight that his interests lay elsewhere despite his initial activism in the field. "(C)onsistency was never

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[32]Trudeau's political philosophy, according to Thordarson, was made up of his "philosophical beliefs"—his general philosophy and his attitude regarding specific foreign policy issues— and his "instrumental beliefs"—his view of government as a means of achieving his philosophical objectives (p. 54).

[33]Other studies have also pointed to the former prime minister's influence on foreign policy due to his personal beliefs and individual inclinations. This is particularly true in the analysis of Canada's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China which, according to John Harbron, was Trudeau's only firm election promise. See Harbron, "Canada Recognizes China: The Trudeau Round 1968-1973," Behind the Headlines (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1974).

present in Canadian policy during the Trudeau era--except on national unity," assert Granatstein and Bothwell.[34] Harald von Riekhoff states that any examination of Trudeau's impact on foreign policy must acknowledge that external affairs was a "residual function of his over-all political activity."[35] Michael Tucker argues that Trudeau did not provide the kind of consistent, day-to-day leadership in international matters, that would have unsettled "the conventional wisdom that 'foreign policy' was not an area of concern to the Prime Minister."[36] The widely accepted dichotomy of "Trudeau's foreign policy" and "Trudeau's domestic (i.e., constitutional) policy" has led foreign policy scholars either to "blame"[37] the former prime minister or to exonerate him for having been in power for sixteen years and not making any substantial changes to Canadian foreign policy.

The most recent and the most comprehensive work on Trudeau is the contribution of Granatstein and Bothwell. Pirouette is a monumental study of Canadian foreign policy during Trudeau's years in office from the major shake-up with the foreign and defence policy reviews in the 1968-70 period to the "last hurrah"—Trudeau's attempt to mediate between the Soviet

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[34]Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 381.

[35]Harald von Riekhoff, "The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Foreign Policy" International Journal 33 (Spring 1978): 267.

[36]Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), p. 14.

[37]This is the term used by Granatstein and Bothwell in their assessment of Trudeau's foreign policy (p. 381).

Union and the United States when disarmament talks broke down between the two superpowers—in the 1983-84 period.[38]

In between these years, Granatstein and Bothwell detail the part Trudeau played in managing Canada's relationship with the United States, specifically, in responding to the 1971 "Nixon shock"; in preventing Quebec from establishing an (independent) international presence abroad; in pursuing economic ties with Western Europe and Japan; in initiating links with the communist world, namely, the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; in dealing with Canada's military and the direction of its defence policy; in addressing Canada's relations with the Third World and its provision of

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[38]The recent work of Granatstein and Bothwell would be required reading for any student of Canadian foreign policy interested in the part that Trudeau played in external affairs while he was prime minister. It is meticulously detailed although many of its sources are simply noted as a "confidential interview." It is an historical work that perhaps whets the appetite more of a political scientist than an historian because as I was told by historians working in government in Ottawa (e.g., the National Archives, Department of National Defence, and External Affairs and International Trade Canada) Pirouette is simply much too "modern." At the same time, they admit that Pirouette is relatively accurate in what facts are provided. In a letter, dated 13 May 1993, to me, Dr. W. A. B. Douglas, Director General History, Department of National Defence, states that "Granatstein and Bothwell's Pirouette is a reliable guide—we cleared a good deal of material for them when they were writing this book." As well, in a discussion with a senior departmental historian in External Affairs and International Trade Canada on 14 June 1993, I was told that although Granatstein and Bothwell did not look at all the department's files (the two historians saw "hundreds" of files whereas there are "thousands") their reading of files that they did see was accurate. Interestingly enough, from my perspective, the departmental historian also told me that some members of the historical s- tion were "surprised" to find out after Pirouette was written that, in a response to another inquiry of access to departmental files, Granatstein and Bothwell had not asked for access to the department's files on Canadian-American defence relations. How could have they written that section, he asked? The Directorate of History in the Department of National Defence provided most of the information, pointing to, perhaps, the bureaucratic competition between the two departments. As a final point, however, if Granatstein and Bothwell's work whets the appetite of political scientists, it certainly does not fulfill it. From an analytical perspective, it is not very sophisticated and we find value in it as a descriptive work.

official development assistance; and in handling the British connection during talks of constitutional repatriation.

In spite of this variety of detail, Granatstein and Bothwell's study of the Trudeau years, in the final analysis, argues that Trudeau's changes in foreign policy were illusionary and that by the time he left office he had embraced conventional ways. They point to the former prime minister's peace initiative in his last years in office as clearly in the Pearsonian tradition of Canada as a "helpful fixer," a tradition that Trudeau had explicitly rejected in his initial years during the review process. This was the kind of "pirouette" performed by the former prime minister, according to Granatstein and Bothwell, in the conduct of Canadian external affairs.

Like Thordarson, Granatstein and Bothwell continue to utilize an idiosyncratic level of analysis to explain Canadian external affairs during all of Trudeau's years in office. "Canadian foreign policy (which was) Trudeau's to direct"[39] changed little during his 16-year tenure. Why? "We have to conclude that most of the blame lies at his door,"[40] assert Granatstein and Bothwell. By "blaming" Trudeau, they assume that had the former prime minister focused on foreign policy, he would have altered the nature of Canada's external affairs. Rather, Trudeau concentrated on constitutional policy and made his imprint there.

In Granatstein and Bothwell's view, the reasons for the dichotomy of Trudeau's focus and, therefore, impact, are clear: as

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[39]Ibid, p. 35.

[40]Ibid, p. 381.

evident in his early philosophical writings, intellectual and educational pursuits, political statements and speeches as well as stated reasons for entering public life, the former prime minister's interests lay with constitutional matters. Trudeau's knowledge of foreign policy was limited, and although he had travelled abroad and claimed himself a "citizen of the world" before entering politics, he had little experience in external affairs. In comparison, both St. Laurent and Pearson had held the external affairs portfolio before holding Canada's highest office. Granatstein and Bothwell's work exemplifies the historical-descriptive tradition in Canadian foreign policy study which has pointed to "great" makers of external affairs—Escott Reid, Norman Robertson, John Holmes, Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson—individual officials, both bureaucratic and political, who made impact on foreign policy. Trudeau, it seems, did not live up to this legacy.[41]

However, as posed by Michael Tucker in his review of Granatstein and Bothwell's Pirouette,[42] there is the question: can scholars assume that Canadian foreign policy was Trudeau's to direct? The capacity of individuals to affect circumstances and events is a timeless question and has been a subject of philosophical, historical and political enquiries. In the study of foreign policy, the influence of the individual foreign policy-

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[41]This is not meant to be a crass statement. As I went from person to person in the halls of the Lester B. Pearson Building in Ottawa (June 1993), I detected an "institutional dislike" of Trudeau despite nearly a decade of the former prime minister being out of office.

[42]M.J. Tucker, International Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1990-91): 201-202.

maker as the agent of the state must be weighed against among other things the constraints of the international system placed on the state. Given the country's geopolitical proximity to the United States, how can Canadian foreign policy analysts not be preoccupied with international systemic factors and with how much independence Canadians exercise in the international arena?

If there has been a source of tension evident in scholarly work in the field, it has been the extent to which the Canadian-American relationship influences the making of Canada's foreign policy.[43] Is Canada a satellite whose economic and military dependence on the United States has prevented it from acting in the international system in any manner substantially different from Washington? Is it a middle power whose relationship with the United States must be placed in the larger context of the global order created through international organizations and processes after the Second World War? Or is it a principal power whose national interest has been promoted by working in concert

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[43]This has been a major preoccupation of both Canadian and American scholars. See Andrew Axline, et. al., eds., Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); R. P. Bowles, et. al., eds., Canada and the U.S.: Continental Partners or Wary Neighbours? (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); A. B. Fox, et. al., eds., Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); John Holmes, Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); C. F. Doran, Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today (Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984); Charles Doran and John Sigler, eds., Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985); Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge, Updated ed. (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1987); and J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pittman, 1991). Elizabeth Smythe in "International Relations Theory and the Study of Canadian-American Relations" Canadian Journal of Political Science 13 (March 1980): 120-145 struggles to place the relationship in some kind of theoretical framework.

with other major or principal powers in the international system, including the United States, evident since the decline of the American hegemonic position in the last two or three decades?[44] Of course, we need not limit the debate to scholarly work or to the foreign policy field. The 5000-kilometer border that the country shares with the United States is a fact that permeates almost every aspect of Canadian political, economic, social and cultural life. Canada's geopolitical reality inescapably reflects the unchanging nature of this chief point in the country's external environment.

Moreover, it is an important reality in the study of personal behaviour in foreign policy. The Canadian position or status in the international system is an important determining factor in how much or how little influence the individual Canadian statesman will have on foreign policy. Arguably, the higher (or lower) the position of the state in the international system, the more (or less) effectively the state or its agent (the individual foreign policy-maker) can act in achieving its (her) objectives. Is Canada a satellite, a principal power or something in the middle and to what extent does the Canadian state's position in the international system constrain the actions of the prime minister?

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[44]This is the primary "debate" in the study of Canadian foreign policy, first given some theoretical substance by David Dewitt and John Kirton when they asserted their "principal power" thesis in 1983, and often used as an organizational device in reviewing the literature in the field. See David Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983); Michael K. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (Toronto: York University, 1984); Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 46-57; Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature" International Journal of Canadian Studies 1-2 (Spring-Fall 1990): 78-96.

The "economic nationalist" or "peripheral-dependence" perspective[45] which subscribes to Canada's satellite position is exemplified by Howard Peter Langille's recent work in Canadian defence policy.[46] Langille highlights how Trudeau's decisions in the defence arena were circumscribed by the dominant-dependent economic relationship between the United States and Canada, thus making an explicit link between Canada's economic and military dependence on the United States. Langille argues, for example, that the Canadian government's decision to allow the testing of American cruise missiles on Canadian soil directly contravened Trudeau's "strategy of suffocation" which the former prime minister had outlined in the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) in 1978 as a way to halt the nuclear arms race. Because technology was the "oxygen" which fed the arms race, Trudeau had called for a technological freeze in order to deter the development of new strategic weaponry.[47] According to Langille, one of Trudeau's proposals in the United Nations was the cessation of flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehices and, yet, within a few years the Trudeau government signed the Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program (CANUSTEP), an umbrella agreement which allowed the testing of the cruise missile's guidance system in Canada. The incompatibility between Trudeau's strategy and the government's

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[45]See Dewitt and Kirton, Hawes, Nossal and Molot (outlined above).

[46]Howard Peter Langille, Changing the Guard: Canada's Defence in a World in Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

[47]Ibid, p. 38-57.

decision, Langille contends, can be traced to Canada's economic dependence on the United States which, in this case, constrained Trudeau's ability to influence defence policy. The main determining factor in the government's decision, according to Langille, was the Canadian-American economic structure.

The principal power perspective is grounded in Dewitt and Kirton's view of complex neo-realism. Its ascent as the most compelling explanation of Canadian foreign policy, according to the authors, is concomitant with Trudeau's election in 1968. Not only do Dewitt and Kirton characterize the Trudeau years as the eras of "national interest" (1968-1980) and "bilateralism" (from 1980 to present) in terms of doctrines and decisions but they also claim to see the rise in prominence of the prime minister (and his "group") in the making of foreign policy during these years. This approach might be expected to minimize constraint placed on Trudeau by the international system. Yet, although Dewitt and Kirton argue that the Trudeau years were marked by Canada's ability to pursue its national interest in concert with other principal powers of the international system, they concede that Trudeau "offered no calculus or interpretation to guide specific Canadian actions in all regions abroad" and only with "the emergence of External Affairs as a *de facto* ministry of state was the national interest endowed with autonomous, transcending, and enduring force."[48] Even though, it seemed, that external forces had propelled Canada into a principal power position and

[48]Dewitt and Kirton, p. 232.

thus increased the power of individual actors in the state. Dewitt and Kirton find that Trudeau's part in external affairs was no more prominent than that asserted by other analysts.

The liberal-internationalist or middle power perspective dominates the study of Canadian foreign policy. We have already noted that it has had a strong historical-descriptive tradition (as evident in Granatstein and Bothwell's Pirouette). Attempts at theorizing or, perhaps more correctly, fleshing out the concept of Canada as a middle power have led scholars to assert that Canadian foreign policy has been characterized not only by a commitment to international organizations and processes which promote peace, stability, justice and humanity, but also by moderation, pragmatism, compromise and prudence.[49] In that sense, Canadian liberal-internationalism is as much a manifestation of the type or manner of diplomacy that Canada employs abroad (e.g., moderation) as it is a testimony to Canada's commitment to international organizations like the United Nations. Both Michael Tucker and Kim Richard Nossal argue that Trudeau's foreign policy remained in the internationalist tradition. Trudeau's apparent demand for change in external affairs, according to Tucker, did not eclipse internationalism.[50] Tucker asserts that Trudeau's emphasis on North-South issues and international economic matters differed only in the form and not in the type of internationalism practiced by St. Laurent and

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[49]See Kim Richard Nossal, ed., An Acceptance of Paradox: Essays in Honour of John Holmes (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982).

[50]Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 9-22.

Pearson who, in contrast, had emphasized East-West issues and matters of international peace and security.

Similarly, Nossal emphasizes the sense of continuity in Canadian foreign policy through the Trudeau era and his argument, in particular, is central to our purposes. His work, part of a collection of readings on Canadian prime ministers and premiers,[51] weighs Trudeau's individual (or idiosyncratic) traits as well as his prime ministerial power and influence against international systemic (and domestic) constraints in explaining Canadian foreign policy. Nossal discusses what he calls the "conventional view" grounded in the historical-descriptive tradition in understanding the role of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policy. This view points not only to the influence of individual prime ministers, such as Mackenzie King, in the conduct of external affairs, but also to the sources of the power of the prime minister, including dominance of the policy-making process, power of appointment, and participation in summitry. According to Nossal, neither the demonstrated skills of leadership (at the idiosyncratic level) nor the potential of prime ministerial power (at the role level) have shaped Canadian foreign policy. Looking at Trudeau's leadership traits, specifically, Nossal's analysis at the idiosyncratic level differs from that of Granatstein and Bothwell; he asserts that Trudeau demonstrated leadership and initiative in specific international matters as well as in constitutional affairs. The dichotomy

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[51]Nossal, "Political Leadership and Foreign Policy: Trudeau and Mulroney," in Prime Ministers and Premiers, edited by Leslie Pal and David Taras, p. 112-123.

between Trudeau's influence on foreign policy as opposed to constitutional policy becomes evident, not at the idiosyncratic level (i.e., Trudeau was not to "blame"), but at the systemic level. Although Trudeau demonstrated capability and leadership, he could not fundamentally change the nature of Canadian external affairs (because no policy-maker can).

Thus, it mattered little that Trudeau was empowered by holding Canada's highest office because the prime minister, like any individual Canadian actor, would be constrained by the unchanging conditions of the international system. From a theoretical viewpoint, Nossal's analysis is compelling because it is difficult to contend that the Canadian state's position in the international system does not have great explanatory worth. The problem, however, is that, ultimately, the systemic level of analysis explains the behaviour of the Canadian state and not the behaviour of the individual actor in the state.

The contribution of Hollis and Smith to the levels-of-analysis question illustrates the distinction between units of analysis (i.e., are we analyzing international systemic behaviour, state behaviour or individual behaviour?) and levels of analysis. Hollis and Smith assert that there are three different layers in Singer's level-of-analysis problem in international relations because, in explaining international systemic behaviour, the level of the unit (the state in Singer's discussion) invites further inquiry into the nature of state behaviour which, itself, invites further inquiry into the nature of human (or individual)

behaviour.[52] The three layers from the general to the specific attempt, in turn, to explain systemic, state and human behaviour. According to Hollis and Smith, the level-of-analysis problem is present in each layer because there is a debate on whether the analyst should proceed "top-down" and look at the structure or system, or proceed "bottom up" and look at the unit or individual part for explanation.

In the first instance, the analyst can explain international systemic behaviour at either the level of the international system (structural) or the level of the state (unit). Is international politics the result of structural factors (as Waltz contends) or the sum of the actions of individual states? In the second instance, the analyst can explain state behaviour at either the level of the state (structural) or the level of the state's bureaucracy (unit). Are the actions of the state (i.e., its foreign policy) the result of the state's rational pursuit of its self-interest in the global context (approaching what we have referred to as the macro perspective of foreign policy behaviour) or the product of conflictual and cooperative bargaining amongst its bureaucratic organizations (approaching what we have referred to as the micro perspective of foreign policy behaviour)? In the third instance, the analyst can explain individual human behaviour at either the level of the state's bureaucracy (structural) or the level of the individual actor (unit). Are the actions of the individual foreign policy-maker the result of the performance of roles in a bureaucratic or

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[52]Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 7-9.

organizational context or an outcome of the exercise of individual choices and preferences?

Nossal's conclusion that the primary determining factor in Trudeau's foreign policy is Canada's position or status as an internationalist, middle power is a structural explanation of foreign policy in terms of the behaviour of the Canadian state, and not the individual human actor. In other words, Nossal's explanation does not really give Trudeau a part in foreign policy because Nossal's analysis, utilizing Hollis and Smith's schema, is at the second level of debate on state behaviour. Although Granatstein and Bothwell's analysis is at the third level of debate on the behaviour of the individual human actor and their work does address Trudeau's part in foreign policy, they examine the former prime minister's personal preferences and interests and, therefore, offer only a unit (or idiosyncratic) explanation of his foreign policy behaviour. Thus, scholars have analyzed Trudeau's foreign policy from both the systemic and idiosyncratic levels[53] but they have not utilized the role level of analysis which would focus on Trudeau as the prime minister of Canada.

THE STUDY OF THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

Byrum Carter observed in 1955 that although the American president was the focus of many scholarly works, the British prime minister was not studied in the same vein, if really at all. Studies on parliamentary and cabinet government existed in

[53]The part played by Trudeau often does not figure in the works of scholars utilizing the state level of analysis, except in a very minor sense, because they focus on the countless actors (or factors) in the policy-making process.

which the prime minister's relationship was examined and historical biographies of different prime ministers abounded but there existed no comprehensive look at the office of the prime minister itself.[54] Nearly forty years later, little has changed since Carter's time. In his review of the literature on the British prime minister, G.W. Jones finds that "the life, career and times of particular prime ministers" draw a great deal of interest but the "analysis of their position and roles, and mode of operation" continue to receive scant attention.[55] Anthony King in the introduction to his edited work, The British Prime Minister, argues that the major obstacle to studying the prime minister has been the inaccessibility of the office.[56] Indeed some of the best works in the field, according to King, are by those who have been part of or privy to the workings of British cabinet government.[57]

Similarly, the study of the Canadian prime minister is confronted with "high barriers of official secrecy and reticence."[58] Taras and Weyant point out that this is a major impediment to any serious analysis of Canadian leaders.[59]

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[54]Byrum Carter, The Office of Prime Minister (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1956), p. 9.

[55]G.W. Jones, "The Study of Prime Ministers: A Framework for Analysis" West European Politics Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 1991):1.

[56]Anthony King, ed., The British Prime Minister, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1985). According to G.W. Jones, King's edited collection is the "major analytical text on the British prime minister" (p. 1).

[57]King's book includes chapters by Harold Wilson, Bernard Donoughue, Richard Crossman, Tony Benn, Kenneth Berrill and Richard Neustadt.

[58]King, p. 2.

[59]Taras and Weyant, "Dreamers of the Day: A Guide to Roles, Character and Performance on the Political Stage," in Prime Ministers and Premiers.

Biographies of Canadian prime ministers exist,[60] and textbooks on Canadian government mention the position of the prime minister in the context of the cabinet,[61] but the office of the prime minister itself receives little attention. Historically, scholars have directed their interest on the power relationship between political masters and civil servants rather than the prime minister and his ministers and, in fact, it was assumed that Canada was ruled by cabinet government.[62] Fred Schindeler argues that since World War II Canadian government has been characterized by the dominance of the civil service and that "(s)enior civil servants perhaps reached the apex of their power vis-à-vis the Cabinet under the premierships of Louis St. Laurent and Lester B. Pearson."[63] We see this in the study of Canadian foreign policy with the dominance of the Department of External Affairs during the "golden age" of Pearsonian internationalism.

Moreover, until the accession of Pierre Trudeau, Canadian prime ministers simply were not inspiring or controversial individuals that drew a great deal of scholarly interest or public attention. As we mentioned earlier, Taras and Weyant argue that in the post World War II era Mackenzie King, Louis St. Laurent,

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[60]Biographies on Canadian prime ministers are plentiful and date back to the life and times of Sir John A. Macdonald to today's less flattering pieces on Kim Campbell.

[61]See, for example, J.R. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971). Here Mallory states explicitly that the "unchallenged centre of power in the government of Canada is the Cabinet" (p. 69).

[62]See prior footnote.

[63]Schindeler, p. 27.

and Lester Pearson were all leaders of routine,[64] and even though John Diefenbaker possessed characteristics closer to that of a heroic leader, the split in his cabinet indicated that he was not entirely in control, thus detracting from his heroic image. The election of Pierre Trudeau was a watershed in the study of the Canadian prime minister; it set off a flood of arguments that prime ministerial goverment had emerged in Canada.

At the same time, we have to keep in mind that the prime minister and members of the cabinet as part of the Privy Council must swear to "keep close and secret all such matters as shall be treated, debated and resolved on Privy Council, without publishing or disclosing the same or any part thereof, by Word, Writing or any otherwise to any person out of the same Council, but to such only as be of the Council."[65] The lack of access to cabinet documents, meetings and deliberations prevent analysts not only from fully studying the prime minister but also from determining whether she is simply primus inter pares or the controlling member of the cabinet. This is an important consideration because it gets to the heart of whether the prime minister can be studied in the same manner as the American president.

Walter Bagehot maintained that the "efficient" secret of the English constitution (or the Westminster model of parliamentary government as adopted by Canada) is the complete fusion of

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[64]Taras and Weyant, p. 10.

[65]As quoted in R. MacGregor Dawson, "The Cabinet -- Position and Personnel," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science Vol. 12, No. 3 (August 1946): 275.

executive and legislative powers in the cabinet and that the cabinet, a group of equal colleagues taking responsibility for its actions and decisions, is the real source of power in Great Britain. The monarchy and the House of Lords, according to Bagehot, have simply become "dignified" institutions.[66] The fathers of Confederation formally adopted cabinet government in Canada by deciding to have "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom" (Constitution Act, 1867). Margaret Banks has argued that although the distinction between Privy Council, cabinet and ministry was clearly evident in Great Britain prior to Canadian confederation, the founders gave only the Privy Council legal standing and made no mention of cabinet or ministry in the constitution in order to be in keeping with British tradition and practice.[67]

Writing the introduction a century later to Bagehot's 1865 masterpiece, The English Constitution, Richard Crossman contends that the cabinet, no longer a group of equal colleagues, is in reality a body appointed by and subordinate to the prime minister. He asserts that cabinet government has given way to prime ministerial government, not only because of the creation of party machines (prompted by the extension of the franchise) within which party members in the House of Commons demonstrate remarkable cohesiveness and discipline, but also

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[66]Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, introduced by R.H.S. Crossman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).

[67]Margaret Banks, "Privy Council, Cabinet, and Ministry in Britain and Canada: A Story of Confusion," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science Vol. 31, No. 2 (May 1965): 193.

because of the establishment of a large and independent civil service.[68] The cabinet today is merely another "dignified" institution of the English constitution, concludes Crossman, because the prime minister is "now the apex of power not only of a highly centralized political machine, but also of an equally centralized and vastly more powerful administrative machine."[69]

The evolution of the Westminster model of parliamentary government from cabinet government to prime ministerial government can only substantiate the importance of studying the prime minister. Byrum Carter's observation that scholarly interest in the American president had no parallel in the British context would have elicited little response from his peers in 1955 because the parliamentary executive was understood as a collective and collegial body whereas the presidential executive was clearly identified with one individual. Studies on cabinet government never precluded the centrality of the prime minister but simply her ability to dictate and control the cabinet in the manner that the American president dictated and controlled the "secretaries" in his cabinet. With the rise of prime ministerial government, not only does the prime minister take on a presidential role vis-à-vis her cabinet but the fusion of powers inherent in the parliamentary system means that there is no check on her power. Unlike the American president who faces a strong Congress due to the separation of powers principle in a presidential system, the British legislature, as many have argued,

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[68]Bagehot, introduced by Crossman, p. 35.

[69]Ibid., p. 51.

is essentially controlled by the prime minister if her party holds the majority of seats in the House of Commons. That is why in writing about the power of the prime minister Humphry Berkeley warns Britons that they must create the "necessary safeguards" to curb the presidential powers of the country's leader.[70]

In the Canadian context, the notion of prime ministerial government was first given systematic scholarly attention after the election of Pierre Trudeau in 1968. The 1971 publication of Thomas Hockin's edited work, Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada,[71] was the first systematic attempt to look at the office of the prime minister in Canada. Notably, Hockin's collection includes articles by Fred Schindeler and Denis Smith who argue that prime ministerial government has indeed emerged in Canada. Schindeler contends that the kind of historical progression seen in Great Britain by Richard Crossman, Humphry Berkeley and others is also evident in Canada. Identifying four stages in the evolution of the British model of parliamentary government, namely dominance of parliament, of cabinet, of public service and finally, of prime minister, Schindeler finds that with Pierre Trudeau in office, the last stage--prime ministerial government--has triumphed in Canada.[72] Trudeau's control of the public service, according to

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[70]Humphry Berkeley, The Power of the Prime Minister (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), p. 87.

[71]Thomas Hockin, ed. Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), p. 87.

[72]Fred Schindeler, "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet: History and Development," in Apex of Power, p. 22-49.

Schindeler, has been achieved through the expansion of both the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) which has meant not only that "for the first time in Canadian history, the Prime Minister has a source of policy initiation that is independent of the permanent civil service" but also that he has "an even greater position vis-à-vis the Cabinet, so denying much of the essence of responsible government and turning our parliamentary system into a presidential form of government."[73] Scholars of public policy and public administration have studied in detail Trudeau's dominance of the policy making process, examining, in particular, how the former prime minister's "rational" philosophy permeated Canada's governmental machinery.[74]

Denis Smith echoes Schindeler's findings and takes the comparison between British and Canadian prime ministers one step further. Smith asserts that the Canadian head of government is even more powerful than her British counterpart because she becomes leader of the party through popular convention instead of caucus selection. The Canadian prime minister's "authority granted (her) from outside Parliament" gives her a basis of power

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[73]Ibid., p. 28.

[74]For example, see G. Bruce Doern, "The Policy-Making Philosophy of Prime Minister Trudeau and His Advisers," in Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, 2nd ed., edited by Thomas Hockin (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 189-196; Peter Aucoin, "The Machinery of Government: From Trudeau's Rational Management to Mulroney's Brokerage Politics," in Prime Ministers and Premiers: Political Leadership and Public Policy in Canada, edited by Leslie A. Pal and David Taras (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 50-68; Colin Campbell, Governments Under Stress (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 77-99.

and support unrivalled in the British system.[75] "The Canadian conventions have increasingly come to duplicate the effects of the American presidential conventions...(T)he political process is almost entirely personalized, issues fade away, and the winner is the only one to walk away alive."[76] In essence, party conventions produce national or popular leaders and not simply party chiefs and, in that way, Canadian prime ministers more closely resemble American presidents.

Despite its provocative title, Hockin's work is not a collective effort to convince readers that the Canadian prime minister is indeed that powerful. Not only does Hockin begin in the introductory chapter with the "restraints and imperatives" faced by Canada's leader,[77] but Joseph Wearing also explicitly attempts to counter Smith's argument that the Canadian prime minister is little different from the American president.[78] Moreover, R.M. Punnett's The Prime Minister in Canadian Government and Politics, published in 1977, which takes an overview of the office of the prime minister in Canada similar to Byrum Carter's work in the British context two decades earlier, emphasizes the limitations placed on Canada's leader.[79] In that

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[75]Denis Smith, "President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada," in Apex of Power, p. 234.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Thomas Hockin, "The Prime Minister and Political Leadership: An Introduction to Restraints and Imperatives," in Apex of Power, p. 2-21.

[78]Joseph Wearing, "President or Prime Minister," in Apex of Power, p. 242-260.

[79]R.M. Punnett, The Prime Minister in Canadian Government and Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977).

sense, unlike Carter's work, Punnett's overview does not even invite further study of the Canadian prime minister. Perhaps that is why apart from a comparative look at the Canadian head of government, included in such works, not aimed primarily at Canadian audiences, as Richard Rose and Ezra Suleiman's Presidents and Prime Ministers[80] and Patrick Weiler's First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Systems,[81] the next systematic attempt at examining the prime minister does not come out until 1988 with Leslie Pal's and David Taras' edited work, Prime Ministers and Premiers: Political Leadership and Public Policy in Canada.[82]

One reason why there not been sustained interest in the role of the Canadian prime minister in the political process is the rejection by many scholars of the idea of prime ministerial government in Canada; this rejection is evident in three principal ways. First of all, many scholars have argued that cabinet government is alive and well in Canada. Few have accepted the view, for example, that a discussion of the political executive in Canada entails an examination of the prime minister in the way that a discussion of the political executive in the United States entails an examination of the president. W.A. Matheson's The Prime Minister and the Cabinet is illustrative of studies of the political executive and despite its title the book is about cabinet

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[80]Richard Rose and Ezra Suleiman, eds., Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980).

[81]Patrick Weller, First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Westminister Systems (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985).

[82]Pal and Taras, eds., Prime Ministers and Premiers.

government in Canada.[83] Works on cabinet government, dating back to R. MacGregor Dawson's "The Cabinet--Position and Personnel" in 1946, accept the idea that the prime minister holds a dominant position in cabinet but also argue that decision-making in the executive body is generally collective as opposed to strictly unilateral.

Not only has Smith's argument of the "president" in parliament produced few converts but it has also sparked little debate. We can maintain that there has been only passing interest in his argument partly because edited works on Canadian government and politics which initially included his article dropped it from subsequent editions.[84] We have not seen the kind of debate on the power of the prime minister evident in Great Britain.[85]

The reason for this may simply be found in the second facet of scholarly resistance in Canada to the concept of prime ministerial government which is grounded in the beliefs about the relationship between politicians and civil servants. The assumption of adherents to both sides of the debate--whether dominance of prime minister or of cabinet--is political control over the bureaucracy. According to Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W.

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[83]W.A. Matheson, The Prime Minister and the Cabinet (Toronto: Methuen, 1976).

[84]For example, see Paul Fox, ed. Politics: Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1970) and Orest Kruhlak, Richard Schultz, and Sidney Pobihushchy, eds., The Canadian Political Process (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

[85]See the literature review by Jones as well as by Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, "Core Executive Studies in Britain," Public Administration Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring 1990): 3-28. See also Anthony King, "Review Article: Prime Minister and Cabinet," Contempory Record Vol. 4, No. 1 (September 1990): 22-23.

Rhodes, the focus on the relationship between the prime minister and the cabinet and the lack of attention to the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats have limited what they call "core executive studies" in Great Britain.[86] However, this sort of criticism cannot be easily levied against Canadian scholarship because there has been wide recognition in Canadian literature of the power of the bureaucracy. Schindeler's view of the historical progression of parliamentary government accounts for the dominance of the civil service. It is only when it appeared that the prime minister, namely Trudeau, demonstrated control over the civil service did Schindeler argue that prime ministerial government had emerged in Canada. Other scholars have not been convinced and the relationship between political masters and civil servants remain a central focus of Canadian work, even in foreign policy study.

The third and final facet of scholarly resistance to the idea of prime ministerial government in Canada is the extent to which an individual can make a difference. Socioeconomic forces are seen as more important in determining political behaviour. Canadians tend to focus on constraints created by systemic forces, rather than possibilities. Punnett's The Prime Minister in Canadian Government and Politics is a clear example of this. This kind of resistance can even be traced to anecdotal evidence provided on a question such as: "What does it mean to be a 'Canadian'?": polite, low-key, unassuming. In the foreign policy

[86]Dunleavy and Rhodes, p. 5.

field, it can be traced to the geopolitical reality of Canada's international behaviour. The Canadian-American relationship forces scholars to look at systemic determinants; that is why the central debate in the study of Canadian foreign policy is the position or status of the Canadian state in the international system.

Another, and compellingly more important, reason for the lack of interest in the office of the prime minister has been the focus simply on prime ministerial government so far as this focus has been maintained. The whole notion of prime ministerial government is predicated on the examination of only one of Canada's political institutions: parliamentary government. Canada is characterized by the twin pillar institutions of parliamentary government and federalism.[87] Most studies of the prime minister have dealt with the parliamentary institution of which the prime minister is part; little is written—from the viewpoint of the office of the prime minister—on the federal instititution of which the

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[87]The 1985 Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (the Macdonald Commission) identifies three pillars of the Canadian constitutional or institutional order: parliamentary government, federalism and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Vol. III, Donald S. Macdonald, Chairman (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985), p. 11. Accordingly, it appears short-sighted to disregard the third pillar—the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—in any discussion of Canadian government. In particular, with the outcome of the case of Operation Dismantle v. the Queen comes a challenge to the traditional functioning of Canada's parliamentary executive. Justice Dickson, in writing the Supreme Court's 1985 decision for the majority, stated that although cruise missile testing did not violate section 7 of the Charter, the scope of cabinet decisions could be limited by the Court under section 32 of the Charter. The Charter illustrates the capacity of political leaders and, in particular, the prime minister, to build institutions but, interestingly enough, as evident in the Supreme Court's decision, political leaders can also build institutions (perhaps unknowingly) that limit their power. We should note that the Charter has only been part of the Canadian institutional order since 1982; for almost all of Trudeau's tenure as prime minister, the Charter was non-existent.

prime minister is also part, although the body of literature on Canadian federalism is enormous.[88] Even Patrick Weller's 1989 provocatively entitled article, "Federalism and the Office of the Prime Minister," which compares the impact of federalism on the offices of the Canadian and Australian prime minister, does not capture the kind of constraint placed on Canada's federal leader by the provinces.[89] In Canada's decentralized federal state the prime minister's relationship with the provincial premiers deserves as much, if not greater, attention than the prime minister's relationship with his or her cabinet members. The notion of "executive federalism," which also emerged in the early years of Trudeau's tenure, would settle without due thought the question of "prime ministerial government" on the side of the prime minister.

David J. Bercuson in a recent article defines "executive federalism" as: "the process of policy-making by unanimous agreement of the premiers and prime ministers at regular first

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[88]One of the great benefits that came from the Macdonald Commission (see prior footnote) was the number of thoughtful studies done as background reports for the commission. In particular, see the volumes on Federalism and the Economic Union (vols. 58-72) and D. V. Smiley and R. L. Watts, Intrastate Federalism in Canada, vol. 39, which was included in another section. All were published by the University of Toronto Press for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. The crucial work on the impact of federalism on Canadian politics is D. V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987); here, Smiley also discusses many of the the contributions of the Macdonald Commission reports in a thorough and flawless manner.

[89]Patrick Weller, "Federalism and the Office of the Prime Minister," in Federalism in Canada and Australia: Historical Perspectives 1920-1988, edited by Bruce W. Hodgkins, John J. Eddy, S. J., Shelagh D. Grant, and James Struthers (Peterborough, Ont.: The Frost Centre for Canadian Heritage and Development Studies, Trent University, 1989), p. 147-157.

ministers conferences."[90] A decade earlier, Donald Smiley had offered a broader definition of the term which tended to consider executive federalism less as federal-provincial policy-making and more as intergovernmental consultation. Executive federalism, according to Smiley, is "the relations between elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government in federal-provincial interactions and among the executives of the provinces in interprovincial interactions."[91] Although Smiley's interpretation reflects the complex nature of executive federalism, Bercuson's definition captures the centrality of the prime minister's relationship with the provincial premiers which has become the defining characteristic of the Canadian federal state. We need only look at the arguments that the Meech Lake process was undemocratic because eleven men had essentially decided Canada's constitutional future in order to verify such an observation. The First Ministers' Conference, which is the most visible manifestation of executive federalism, is essentially a summit of eleven heads of government. Here, the prime minister as the "defender of the federal faith" must face ten provincial premiers in competition for the allegiance and loyalty of Canadians as if defending "Canada" was different from defending "Nova Scotia" or "Quebec."

Executive federalism, which emerged in the 1970s, differed from "cooperative federalism" of earlier years.

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[90]David J. Bercuson, "The Failure of Executive Federalism," Parliamentary Government, Vol 9, No. 2 (1990): 9.

[91]D. V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), p. 91.

Cooperative federalism, a term coined during the Pearson years, was a time of consensus among federal and provincial policy-makers; essentially, both levels concurred on the need for social welfare programs for Canadians. Consequently, bureaucratic as opposed to political actors played a dominant role in the process. Although bureaucrats had to work out what the politicians agreed to in principle, negotiation in a low profile atmosphere was more conducive to reaching a mutually accepted policy. Not only did bureaucrats have a common frame of reference (i.e., belonging to the same profession, they had common interests, goals and values), but they were also concerned with creating a particular program or policy than enhancing the influence of their respective governments.[92] Moreover, the era of cooperative federalism was in many ways dominated by the federal government. Not only did it control the purse strings but it was the one intervening and deciding on provincial matters. Through conditional grants, Ottawa was able to dictate priorities as well as programs to provincial capitals. In addition, the federal bureaucracy, attracting more competent professionals at this time than its provincial counterparts, tended to dominate negotiations. Yet, even in this more conciliatory atmosphere, the federal government negotiated with the provinces in a way similar to international diplomacy, which demonstrated that Ottawa did not dominate the provinces in the way Washington dominated the

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[92]Donald Smiley, "Cooperative Federalism: An Evaluation," in Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality?, edited by J. Peter Meekison (Toronto: Metheun Publications, 1977), p. 262-263.

American states.[93] Policy-making may not have been done by "eleven suits," per se, but it was done by eleven governments.

With the emergence of executive federalism in the early 1970s came a more conflictual and politicized relationship between the federal and provincial governments.[94] Executive federalism differs from cooperative federalism in fundamental ways: politicians rather than bureaucrats undertake negotiations; negotiations focus on jurisdictional rather than program or policy concerns, focusing, in particular, on constitutional change; the judiciary is called on more often to settle jurisdictional disputes which further demonstrates the adversarial nature of the federal-provincial relationship; and the federal government is less dominant, if at all. The provinces, especially Quebec, want to protect their jurisdiction over health, social and educational matters, which had been encroached upon by Ottawa in the past, as well as ensure control of their jurisdiction over natural resources. The provincial governments have developed the bureaucratic, technical and political expertise to confront the federal government,[95] and control over natural resources, such as

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[93]R. J. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Public Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). Simeon contrasts the policy-making process involved in establishing Canada's pension program where the provinces were central actors and the process involved in establishing the United States' social security program where the states were not even consulted.

[94]Ronald L. Watts argues that executive federalism is the logical conclusion of the marriage of the federal and parliamentary systems of government which has been true not only of Canada but of other states as well. See Watts, Executive Federalism: A Comparative Analysis (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1989).

[95]Edwin Black and Alan Cairns, "A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism," in Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality?, p. 44-45.

oil, have given certain governments an alternate source of revenue.

Although the fathers of confederation had created in Canada what K.C. Wheare[96] calls a "quasi-federal" constitution because unitary elements exist, such as the powers of disallowance and reservation given to the federal government, the Canadian state is extremely decentralized. Since the 1960 quiet revolution and the rise of separatist sentiment in Quebec, marked by the election of the Parti Québécois in 1976 and the referendum on sovereignty-association in 1980, Canadian governments have been faced not only with a decentralized federal state, but also, arguably, with an unstable one. A. B. Akinyemi in his examination of Nigerian foreign policy nearly two decades ago argued that "a dynamic foreign policy is almost impossible in a federation (because) (f)ederalism itself is a recognition of very strong interests which are almost irreconcilable."[97] Although W. Scott Thompson in his review of Akinyemi's book points out this argument may be called into doubt because other federations, like the United States, have active foreign policies and that perhaps Akinyemi is looking at the implications of a diffusion of power in a state rather than its federal character,[98] he nevertheless admits

[96]K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[97]A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1974), p. 199.

[98]W. Scott Thompson, American Political Science Review Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 1977): 1737-1738.

that this kind of internal constraint has great ramifications for the conduct of a state's affairs.

What Thompson's review of Akinyemi's work does not address is the distinction between "interstate" and "intrastate" federalism.[99] Akinyemi is examining the foreign policy implications of a diffusion of power of a state characterized by interstate federalism which means that the constituent parts of the federal state (unlike the American states) continue to play a dominant role in the making of policy.[100] Hans Michelmann picks up on the distinction between intrastate and interstate federalism in his comparison of the impact of federalism on foreign policy in Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany.[101] Michelmann argues that the federal government in Germany dominates the conduct of external affairs because Länder differences are accommodated within central institutions. The internal distribution of power of a federal state grounded in the strength of its constituent parts affects its foreign policy and, in a fundamental way, a state beset with internal difficulties would have widespread complications in the conduct of its external

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[99]According to Smiley (a distinction borrowed from Karl Loewenstein): "Interstate federalism involves the constitutional distribution of powers between the central and regional governments, intrastate federalism the channeling of territorial peculiarisms within the central government itself." See Smiley, "Federal-Provincial Conflict in Canada," in Canadian Federalism Myth or Reality, p. 9.

[100]Akinyemi's observations regarding the impact of federalism on Nigerian foreign policy are also supported by R. A. Akindele and Oye Oyediran, "Federalism and foreign policy in Nigeria," International Journal Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1986): 600-625.

[101]Hans J. Michelmann, "Federalism and international relations in Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany," International Journal Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1986): 539-571.

affairs. In Canada, the evolution of a decentralized federal state not only has resulted in calls for an independent Quebec which threatens the continued existence of the Canadian federation, but also has made the prime minister the principal spokesperson and defender of the federal government, if not the federation itself.

Students of Canadian foreign policy have recognized the link between federalism and foreign policy.[102] Since the Judicial Commitee of the Privy Council decided that the treaty-making power in Canada was a dual process which invited provincial participation, constitutional jurists have been debating whether Canada's then highest court had essentially prevented the federal government from acting in the international arena as one sovereign entity. In the post-World War II era, the contributions of Canadians to the creation of the United Nations, the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the resolution of the Korean War, and the end of the Suez crisis, for which Canada's then secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, received the Nobel Peace Prize, seemed to dispel fears of Canadian ability to act abroad. However, when after the quiet revolution, successive Quebec governments attempted to challenge the supremacy of the federal government in foreign policy, students of foreign policy began taking greater notice of the link between federalism and foreign policy. The link has become even more stark because, as scholars have pointed out, international relations since the 1970s has had less to do with

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[102]See Howard A. Leeson and Wilfried Vanderelst, External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

"high politics," national security and defence matters under the sole prerogative of the federal government, but more to do with "low politics," economic, energy, environment, and educational matters under provincial jurisdiction.[103] According to Brian Hocking, the international activities of sub-national parts in federal states are not simply consitutional matters; they have become practical problems for the management of foreign policy by the central government.[104]

While students of Canadian foreign policy have directed their attention to the level of provincial activity abroad and its implication for the nature of Canadian external affairs, they have not examined the assumption underlying provincial strength abroad and its implication for the nature of Canadian domestic affairs. Canadian federalism is highly decentralized in those connections in which provincial governments claim to be the legitimate voices of their respective territories both at home and abroad. In 1978, Pierre Trudeau faced with increasing provincial demands asked: "But who will speak for Canada?" With that, he underscored what has always been understood in the post-war era of Canadian politics: the federal government speaks for "Canada" as if Canada was territorially different from its provincial parts. It

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[103]See the special issue, entitled "Foreign Policy in Federal States," in International Journal Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1986) and Tom Keating and Don Munton, eds., The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1986). Gordon Robertson reviews the articles in both these works and laments the divisiveness in Canadian foreign policy created by provinces demanding and playing such a great part in external affairs. See International Perspectives (September/October 1987): 3-5.

[104]Brian Hocking, "Regional governments and international affairs: foreign policy problem or deviant behaviour?," International Journal Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1986): 477-506.

is in this capacity that the role of the prime minister has been defined as the champion of federalism or the defender of the federal faith and it is in this capacity that Canadian domestic policy and Canadian foreign policy cannot be analytically separated if we are to understand the role of the prime minister.

CHAPTER FOUR: TRUDEAU AND DEFENCE POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The defence of the Canadian state is clearly the responsibility of the federal government in Ottawa.[1] It is an area of competence that not only has never been challenged by the provinicial governments but, as was evident in the two world wars in the first part of this century, has also allowed the federal government to centralize power in the federation. The Balfour Declaration of 1926 and its reinforcement by the Statute of Westminster in 1931 finally gave Canada control of its external and defence affairs. However, until the end of the Second World War, the defence of Canada was inextricably linked to the defence of Great Britain, first, since Canada was part of the Empire and, then, since Canada was part of the Commonwealth.

As Peter Waite has observed, there was little national consensus in the conduct of Canadian external affairs in the years after the passage of the Statute of Westminster and prior to the outbreak of the Second World War; rather, there was a "compromise, but not in the usual sense of an agreed middle ground...(but rather) an ellipse around two widely separated positions" between English-Canada and French-Canada.[2] The British tie was a divisive element between English-Canadians and

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[1]This is evident in section 91(7) of the Constitution Act, 1867 where the "Militia, Military and Naval Services, and Defence" are placed under federal jurisdiction.

[2]Peter B. Waite, "The Two Foci of an Elliptical Foreign Policy: French-Canadian Isolationism and English-Canada, 1935-1939," in Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft fur Kanada-Studien 1 (January 1981): 121.

French-Canadians as evident in the conscription crises during the wars. Waite states that although Prime Minister Mackenzie King was extremely sensitive to French-Canadian concerns and attempted to avert another national crisis prior to Canada's declaration of war against Germany in 1939, the "British empire was for a King a family affair: children when they grow up do not abandon their family."[3]

Since the end of the Second World War, defence policy analysts agree that "Canada's security (has been) considered indivisible from that of the United States."[4] However, allied strategy has always shaped Canadian defence policy as the Canadian government moved from the British empire to the American (Western) alliance.[5] This has meant that Canadian defence policy, although indisputably in federal hands, has always been constrained by the country's tie to a larger state in the international system. In the post-war era, the emergence of superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and the change in war strategy due to nuclear technology and the immense destructive capability of weaponry have limited Canadian options in defending itself against a military-security threat. It is not surprising, then, that Canadian defence policy

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[3]Ibid. p. 124.

[4]Colin S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1972), p. 22.

[5]Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out The Washington Papers 121 (New York: Praeger with The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 42.

analysts and practitioners have questioned the extent to which Ottawa exercises control over the making of its defence policy.

In our examination of Trudeau's influence on defence policy in this chapter, we need to illustrate, first of all, the constraints that the prime minister labours under and opportunities that she faces at the level of the international security system. If, as some observers have asserted,[6] the influence of the United States on Canada's defence policy has been so extensive that it makes little sense to speak of a Canadian defence policy distinct from American defence policy, then there is little need to discuss prime ministerial influence on Canada's defence policy.

However, Trudeau came into office specifically questioning Canadian defence commitments, and, it appeared, he was able unilaterally to change the state's defence priorities. We discuss the conventional wisdom as our second task in the chapter. Analysts assert that the government's 1969 NATO decision followed by the 1971 defence white paper, which was rooted in the 1970 foreign policy white paper, exemplified Trudeau's idiosyncratic priorities in defence policy (this is what we have called a type [II.b.] explanation within the framework). This has to be only part of the picture because why, then, did NATO re-emerge as Canada's first priority in defence policy? We find that either analysts have to say that Trudeau simply changed his mind about the value of NATO, which begs the question as to why the

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[6]This is a popular theme amongst journalists. See, for example, James Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960) and John W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1970).

prime minister's idiosyncratic priorities changed, or they have to argue that macro system-governed priorities determined Trudeau's defence policy behaviour, which then undermines the significance of the 1969 NATO decision and the 1971 defence white paper from the viewpoint of the individual.

Moreover, the central ideas and policies in Trudeau's foreign policy review, which not only justified the 1969 NATO decision but also became the governing rationale of the 1971 defence white paper, had their roots in the Pearson government. This is evident in the Robertson Report, an important document from the last part of the Pearson era which has received scant attention in the academic literature and which we examine in the third part of the chapter. There were also, it appeared, micro state-governed priorities that determined Trudeau's initial actions in defence policy. Trudeau's supposed "break from the past" in foreign policy was perhaps not as stark as scholars have traditionally believed. Questions were already being asked within the external affairs bureaucracy about the conduct of Canadian foreign policy and, in particular, the country's contribution to NATO and the nature of its defence policy. This is important to point out because these policies, then, were not simply grounded in Trudeau's individual beliefs or preferences.

The prime minister was vocal, at any rate, about the need to review Canadian foreign and defence policies when he first took office. It is difficult to dispute that Trudeau was not central to the two-year review process. Neither macro system-governed nor micro state-governed priorities can fully explain his behaviour at

this point. At the same time, students of defence policy have argued that Trudeau rejected collective defence, which centred on Canada's NATO commitment, only to embrace it in later years and this was reflected in the government's major procurement decisions which was predicated on the Canadian military performing NATO tasks. Thus, the prime minister did not appear, in the final analysis, to make a difference in defence policy.

Did role-governed priorities also determine Trudeau's actions? Our fourth task in the chapter utilizes the role level of analysis in two ways in order to bring out how Trudeau's role in defending the federal interest affected defence policy. We focus, first of all, on the prime minister's priority on national sovereignty protection and the extent to which this was directed as much internally as externally. In what sense did the protection of the federal interest determine Trudeau's decision to lessen Canada's NATO commitment and emphasize national sovereignty protection? Secondly, we examine Trudeau's conception of his role and the manner in which he promoted, and not simply protected, the federal interest by addressing the problems of language and regional disparity in the country. To what extent did Trudeau's linguistic and regional development concerns determine Canadian defence policy?

As we stated in the second chapter, Trudeau was much less constrained by role factors near the end of his long tenure in office and the 1983-84 peace initiative was largely determined by his idiosyncratic priorities. Trudeau's attempt to ease tensions

between the superpowers and bring the United States and the Soviet Union back to the bargaining table is addressed in the fifth part of the chapter. Even this particular attempt, we assert, had been shaped by Trudeau having held the position of prime minister and, thus, having participated in international summits. Finally, most observers have accepted that the re-emergence of NATO as a priority in Canadian defence policy was connected to the goals and objectives of the government's third option strategy; this leads on to the examination of Trudeau's influence on trade policy and to the next chapter.

THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

The division between East and West centring on the military superiority of the Soviet Union and the United States became evident soon after the end of the Second World War. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech in 1946 marked Western fears and suspicions of Soviet actions in the European continent.[7] War-torn Europe unable to defend itself turned to Washington in order to prevent further expansion of Moscow in the continent and the seeds for the trans-atlantic alliance began to take shape. With the emergence of Communist China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, American "containment" of Soviet actions moved from an

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[7]A short historical account of "Cold War Canada" can be found in Desmond Morton, Canada and War (Toronto: Butterworth and Co., 1981), p. 150-177. Morton states that Churchill's speech on the iron curtain "had given the democracies a new phrase" to describe the expansion of the Soviet Union in the European continent (p. 157).

European to a global scale.[8] The hostile relations between Moscow and Washington continued to dominate the international system. Smaller states, like Canada, found themselves subsumed in superpower politics.

At the same time, the Soviet-American confrontation was very different from past conflicts characterizing the international system. The change in war strategy due to nuclear technology resulted in the "cold war" between the two superpowers. Because of the immense destructive capability of nuclear weapons, war strategy was fundamentally altered in the post-war period. In the 19th century Karl von Clausewitz could argue that war was a rational instrument of national policy and that the objective of the state was to win the war.[9] In the nuclear age total war was highly irrational because war was no longer winnable. The development and production of nuclear weapons by Moscow and Washington, then, only made sense if the weapons were never used in war, and peacetime military strategy became not one of defence but one of deterrence.[10] Thus, the Soviet Union

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[8]The strategy of "containment," according to John Lewis Gaddis, was the central preoccupation of postwar American national security policy. See Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[9]Karl von Clausewitz, War, Politics and Power: Selections from *On War*, and *I Believe and Profess*, translated and edited with an introduction by Edward M. Collins (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962).

[10]Compare the works of Raymond Aron and Thomas Schelling on the use of "threat" between the two superpowers, Schelling being influential in the evolution of American strategic thinking. Aron is wary about the use of threat between nation-states. He asserts that the nuclear deterrence practiced by the United States and the Soviet Union upsets the bipolar equilibrium in the international system because one of them, relying simply on its nuclear threat to maintain power, may not maintain its military forces to keep parity with the other. Because Aron believes that diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of war and, in that way, threats usually turn into actions, he fears that in the case of a nuclear threat, a nuclear war will most likely ensue. Schelling, on the other hand, sees the exact opposite—war occurs in the shadow of diplomacy. Threats,

and the United States found themselves as the two dominant powers in the international system because they possessed extraordinary military capability but, at the same time, they could never use the full extent of their military capability against each other without destroying themselves (and the world) in the process.[11]

A state's defence policy is predicated on the identification of a threat to the state which requires armed personnel, the necessary men[12] and materiél, to address the threat. Confronted with the "balance of nuclear terror" between the United States and the Soviet Union, how could the Canadian government ensure the security of the Canadian state in the post-war era? The

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unlike in war where they translate into actions, are meant not to be used in coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is the use of threat or limited force by one party in order to persuade or deter another to comply with its demands. According to Schelling, the injury or harm caused by a military confrontation, believed by traditional military strategists to be incidental to the attainment of political objectives, can actually be essential to their fulfillment. Because human beings can feel pain from violent actions and war causes death and suffering, people are naturally motivated to avoid it. This motivation to avoid war can be exploited for political purposes. A party can coerce the other's decision and deter its behaviour by simply possessing the ability to inflict harm. In the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, they deter each other from going to war ("mutual nuclear deterrence"). See Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966) and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[11]The notion of "mutual assured destruction" was the initial foundation of nuclear deterrence; that was why the protection of a "second-strike capability" was vital to the balance of nuclear terror between the two superpowers. Questions of credibility arose, however, particularly with regard to the American nuclear umbrella over Western Europe (e.g., the classic dilemma of whether Washington would trade New York for Paris), leading to the developments of the strategy of "flexible response" and the conception of a "limited" nuclear war in American thinking. This is discussed later in terms of the Canadian context.

[12]This use of "men" is simply in keeping with the received language of defence politics. Since the February 1989 decision by the government to open up combat roles (i.e., to serve in naval destroyers, infantry units and fighter planes) regardless of gender, the Canadian Forces has allowed women to serve in all occupations, with the exception of submarine postings. See Canada, Department of National Defence, Backgrounder "Women in the Canadian Forces," February 1990.

United Nations had quickly proven unsuccessful in ensuring collective security as the Security Council became a forum for the cold war. The clear division between East and West placed Canada in the Western camp and Ottawa's alliance with the United States became formalized in both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1958. Placed under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the Canadian government identified the Soviet Union as the threat to its national security and collective defence became the hallmark of Canadian defence policy. The government rotated its ships, one at a time, as part of NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic; it committed both land and air troops to NATO forces in Europe; and it participated in developing early warning systems and air defence plans in North America as part of NORAD. The integrated efforts of the Canadian military with its American counterpart, evident during the war years, began to flourish in the post-war period. Given the gravity of the Soviet threat, security through alliance seemed the only plausible choice for successive governments in the making of Canadian defence policy and, for Canada, security through alliance focused largely on its commitment to NATO.

In the immediate post-war era Canada was in complete agreement with other Western countries that the Soviet Union was a threat to their collective security. Canada helped create the North Atlantic alliance, and during the negotiations, Canadians fought hard for Article 5 of the treaty -- the so-called "American pledge" -- because they understood that the commitment of the

United States would be the fundamental deterrer within the alliance.[13] That attack against one party of the treaty would constitute an attack against all meant little without the participation of Washington. If Western security was to be ensured, the American guarantee was vital.

At the same time, Ottawa fought equally hard for the inclusion of Article 2 in the treaty. Faced initially by American and European opposition, the so-called "Canadian article" (indicative of Ottawa's persistence) on non-military cooperation, was an important objective during the meetings leading to the creation of the Atlantic alliance. Why did NATO have to be more than just a military alliance? First of all, Canadian negotiators at the time argued that the Canadian public would not support a purely military alliance. According to Escott Reid: "This (reason) enabled (Prime Minister) St. Laurent, in his talks with (U. S. President) Truman in February 1949, when all other arguments had failed, to bring forward an argument which was appropriate for one practical politician to put to another, the argument that the realities of domestic party politics in Canada made it essential for him to have substantial non-military provisions in the treaty."[14] Secondly, Ottawa saw a more than military NATO as countervailing American influence in Canada; the European

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[13]See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) and Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977) for Canadian perspectives on the negotiations leading up to the creation of NATO. Reid was a participant in the process.

[14]Escott Reid, "Forming the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949," in Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, p. 38-39.

connection could prevent American dominance. Indeed, Lester Pearson who was then the secretary of state for external affairs saw that by cultivating political and economic ties among the Atlantic states, NATO could be a stepping stone to the creation of an Atlantic community where clearly Canada would fare better than in a North American one.[15] If the inclusion of Article 5 in the treaty could ensure Canadian security against the Soviet Union, the inclusion of Article 2 could ensure Canadian "sovereignty" against the United States. If the first addressed Ottawa's military concerns, the second addressed its political ones.

From the very beginning Canada's geopolitical reality of neighbouring the United States has coloured its defence policy. That is why we talk about the protection of both security and sovereignty in Canadian defence matters. From a security perspective, the country's geopolitical reality might explain why it is that Canada has been spending so little on defence. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent has never been questioned by Canada. NATO's flexible response strategy arose because Western Europe expressed concerns regarding the extension of the American nuclear umbrella across the Atlantic. Joseph Jockel argues that "central nuclear deterrence" which focuses on the protection of the American homeland dominates Canadian strategic thinking because "extended nuclear deterrence" which centres on American protection of its NATO

[15]Lester Pearson, Mike, Vol. II: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson 1948-1957, edited by John A. Munro and Alex Inglis (Toronto: New American Library [paperback edition], 1975), p. 59.

allies across the Atlantic Ocean is largely irrelevant to Ottawa.[16] By virtue of sharing a common border, Canadian territory is also covered by central deterrence. Because extended deterrence has resulted in doubts about credibility whereas central deterrence has been virtually unquestioned, Ottawa has had a sense of security unmatched in Western European capitals.[17]

At the same time, it might be that Canada's geopolitical reality has been a source of insecurity. Jockel states that Canada has subscribed to an "apocalyptic" view of nuclear strategy as opposed to a more "flexible" approach.[18] That the use of nuclear weapons would lead to the destruction of the world may have given Ottawa little incentive to direct energies or resources to Canadian defence.[19] The flexible approach to nuclear strategy in the United States which centres on the relative or limited outcomes of both conventional and nuclear wars has never been part of Canadian strategic thinking. Ottawa might have spent little money on defence because Canada was too small a power either to make any substantial contribution to nuclear deterrence or to make any real difference should nuclear war break out.

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[16]Joseph Jockel, Security to the North: Canada-U.S. Defence Relations (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1991), p. 67-93.

[17]See also Charles F. Doran, Forgotten Partnership: U. S.-Canadian Relations Today (Markham, Ont.: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1984), p. 161-173.

[18]Ibid.

[19]This, I think, is what underlines the thinking that Canada does not have a military for "defence" reasons, i.e., the Canadian military cannot defend Canada. See, for example, James Eayrs, "The Military Policies of Canada: Principles, Problems, Precepts, Prospects," in Contemporary Canada, edited by Richard H. Leach (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 225-269.

From a sovereignty perspective, the challenge to Canadian interests comes as much from south of the border as from across the Arctic. In part, neighbouring the United States accounts for the northern orientation of Canadian foreign policy and why it is that "Arctic sovereignty" is deemed vital to Canadian defence policy.[20] In part, this also means that Ottawa undertakes defence efforts in order to prevent Washington from doing so. "Defence against help" is partly why Canada joined NORAD; the United States deemed that the protection of North America was vital to its security interests and Otawa's participation in NORAD at least ensured that Canadian interests would be heard in Washington.[21] Canada's bilateral relationship with the United States has meant that Ottawa has historically sought multilateral counterweights; in this context, "NATO's importance to Canada has always been political."[22] Thus, defence policy for Ottawa has been as much about the protection of Canadian sovereignty as it has been about the preservation of Canadian security, although the protection of sovereignty is directed principally against the "danger" of the United States whereas the preservation of security is directed against the threat of the Soviet Union.[23]

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[20]See W. Harriet Critchley, "The Arctic" International Journal Vol. 42, No. 4 (Autumn 1987): 769-788.

[21]See Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Defence (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987).

[22]Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1982), p. 249.

[23]Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 147-155.

THE TRUDEAU GOVERNMENT'S DEFENCE POLICY

On April 3, 1969 Prime Minister Trudeau issued a statement to the press confirming the anticipated changes in Canada's defence policy, a process which he had begun a year earlier after he won the leadership of the Liberal Party. In the press statement, Trudeau stated that Canada's armed forces would be employed to perform in order of priority: "a) the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines—i.e., the protection of our sovereignty; b) the defence of North America in co-operation with United States forces; c) the fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and d) the performance of such international peace-keeping roles as we may, from time to time, assume."[24] Included in the prime minister's statement, notably, was the intent by his government "to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe."[25] On September 19, 1969 Minister of National Defence Léo Cadieux announced the form of the NATO reduction. The government would withdraw half of its military commitment in Europe and reorganize the remaining 5,000 troops by 1972 into a land and air force, positioned in the same geographical location in southern Germany, away from the front lines, and armed only with conventional weapons.[26] Two years after

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[24]"Statement to the Press by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, on April 3, 1969," in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, ed. Arthur E. Blanchette (Ottawa: Gage Publishing Limited for the Carleton Library Number 118, 1980), p. 48.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Léo Cadieux, "Canada Adopts a New Defence Posture," Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 69/15, September 19, 1969.

Cadieux's announcement the government released its white paper on defence, entitled Defence in the 70s,[27] which reaffirmed, verbatim, Trudeau's defence priorities as outlined on April 3, 1969.

The decision by the Canadian government both to reduce its NATO forces in Europe and to accord primary attention to national sovereignty protection, which together demonstrated a lesser priority given to the North Atlantic alliance, appeared to defy the international systemic constraints on the making of Canadian defence policy. The NATO decision has been heralded by scholars as the prime example of Trudeau's ability to impose his individual beliefs and preferences on Canada's defence policy. Moreover, Trudeau's overall foreign policy review had centred on the NATO decision. According to the prime minister, Canada's foreign policy had been dictated too long by its defence policy and its defence policy had been determined primarily by its commitment to the North Atlantic alliance; and "as a result of that, NATO became practically all of (Canada's) foreign policy."[28]

Bruce Thordarson's analysis of foreign policy decision-making in Trudeau's early years remains a central study of Trudeau's part in the NATO decision. According to Thordarson, without the consultation of Canada's allies, against the advice of the Canadian foreign and defence bureaucracies, and in

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[27]Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).

[28]"Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, to the Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, April 12, 1969," in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 344.

opposition to the views of both his external affairs and defence ministers, Trudeau changed the nature of Ottawa's NATO commitment by undertaking a partial withdrawal of Canadian troops in Europe.[29] Thordarson examines the advice of Canada's NATO allies, the reports of the External Affairs and National Defence departments, the arguments and discussions in cabinet, the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee Report on NATO, the criticisms from the academic community; and concludes:

> The idea that defence policy should be determined by a foreign policy that was based on such national interests as the promotion of a Canadian identity explains why sovereignty became the country's first defence priority, a decision that seems to have no other source than the Prime Minister. And the most notable change in foreign policy—the decision to relegate peacekeeping to last place in the new list of priorities, which was a conscious attempt to focus the attention of Canadians on more important national objectives than an idealistic search for international glory—seems clearly insprired by Trudeau.[30]

The NATO decision was primarily influenced by the former prime minister's political philosophy according to Thordarson, and this philosophy was made up of Trudeau's "philosophical beliefs"—his general philosophy and his attitude regarding specific foreign policy issues—and his "instrumental beliefs"—his view of government as a means of achieving his philosophical objectives.[31]

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[29]Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 121-166. The inclusion of Thordarson's analysis of the NATO review process in Don Munton and John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), a recently published collection of case-studies in Canadian foreign policy, attests to the continuing significance of this work.

[30]Thordarson, p. 162-163.

[31]Ibid, p. 54.

Thordarson acknowledges that the task of understanding Trudeau's political philosophy was made easier because the analyst could consult political writings and statements made by Trudeau before entering politics.

Granatstein and Bothwell's examination of the 1969 NATO decision likewise stresses Trudeau's background in explaining his decisions on defence policy. They assert that Trudeau had little appreciation for the purpose of the Canadian Forces and the nuances of Canada's defence policy, pointing out that the former prime minister never served in the military even during the World War years. In addition, before entering public life Trudeau had written a scathing article in Cité Libre which criticized the Liberal Party's decision under Lester Pearson to accept nuclear weapons for Canada's forces and perhaps signified his views on military matters. Trudeau did not possess any special defence knowledge or experience prior to entering politics. That was in large part why, according to Granatstein and Bothwell, the prime minister disregarded the advice of the external affairs and national defence departments and their ministers who had opposed any change to Canada's NATO commitment; and why he succeeded, in the process, not only in showing his dominance of the policy-making machinery but also in demoralizing the Canadian forces.[32] According to D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky, after Trudeau's 1968 election, the defence budget decreased in real terms after accounting for inflation, only rising

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[32]J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 234-260.

from $1.7 billion in 1968-69 to $1.9 billion in 1972-73; military strength dropped from 98,473 in 1968 to 81,626 in 1972; and money for equipment at one point only accounted for 8 percent of the defence budget.[33] The analysis of both Thordarson and Granatstein and Bothwell of Trudeau's defence policy is at the idiosyncratic level; they account for Trudeau's defence policy actions in terms of his beliefs, interests and knowledge (or lack thereof).

However, there have been attempts by some Canadian defence policy analysts to regard Trudeau's NATO decision as a sign of the Canadian prime minister's capacity to "initiate" defence policy and, thus, approximate the kind of role level of analysis in which we are interested. For example, Tom Axworthy differentiates between the prime minister's ability to "initiate," "adjudicate," and "mediate" in defence matters and argues that Trudeau's 1969 decision was the prime example of the prime minister's power to initiate defence policy.[34] Similarly, Middlemiss and Sokolsky categorize Canadian political executive behaviour but broaden the scope to account for the actions of cabinet members and not simply the prime minister. They differentiate between "initiators," "brokers," "arbiters," "inhibitors," and "caretakers," and argue that Trudeau was an

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[33]D. W. Middlemiss and J. J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), p. 35.

[34]Tom Axworthy, "Soldiers without Enemies: A Political Analysis of Canadian Defence Policy 1945-1975," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Kingston: Queen's University, 1979), p. 772-782.

initiator in both the 1969 NATO decision and the 1971 defence white paper.[35]

Both the arguments of Axworthy and Middlemiss and Sokolsky are predicated on the power inherent in the position of the prime minister in defence matters. Although section 15 of the British North America (BNA) Act names the Queen and, thus, the Governor-General as commander-in-chief of the Canadian forces, the devolution of authority, as in other matters of public policy, has placed the power to make defence policy in the hands of Canada's political executive. In particular, as evident in the historical-descriptive tradition of Canadian foreign policy study, the prime minister is considered pre-eminent in deciding policy. The categorization utilized by both Axworthy and Middlemiss and Sokolsky is grounded in the assumption that, if the prime minister wants to influence defence policy and "initiate" matters, she can. "The impetus for change in these cases (according to Middlemiss and Sokolsky) is derived from personality factors relating to ambition, the desire to 'leave a mark,' interest, and sheer force of personal will."[36] Because Middlemiss and Sokolsky's categorization includes cabinet members, the Minister of National Defence, like Paul Hellyer, who was responsible for unifying the Canadian military, or Perrin Beatty, who was the driving force behind the 1987 defence white paper, can also figure as an "initiator." In this case, however, the defence minister's ability to initiate is predicated on both personal desire

[35]Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 74.

[36]Ibid.

and relations with the prime minister, the latter criterion further confirming the dominant power of the prime minister. Thus, even more than the minister who holds the defence portfolio, when the prime minister so desires, she can make an impact on defence policy. Prime ministerial power was never so evident as in the case of Trudeau when he unilaterally decided to change Canadian defence priorities in 1969; the defence minister, Léo Cadieux, was but one of many who unsuccessfully opposed the prime minister's decision.

However, this seemingly blatant example of prime ministerial power was short-lived. Scholars agree that Trudeau's defence priorities which placed primary importance on sovereignty protection and tertiary consideration to NATO roles did not translate into any measurable impact on defence policy. Middlemiss and Sokolsky point out that in the June 1974 NATO Council meeting in Ottawa, Trudeau reaffirmed the importance of the presence of the Canadian military in Europe, and the following year, in the May 1975 meeting in Brussels, he reassured Canada's allies that the government would not again decrease the number of troops.[37] Moreover, with the procurement decisions of the Defence Structure Review (DSR), established by the government in 1974, there was little question that Canada's NATO commitment had become the government's "*de facto* top defence priority."[38] The DSR firmly launched the long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA), the C-1 Leopard tank, the new fighter

[37]Ibid, p. 40.

[38]Ibid.

aircraft (NFA) and the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) programs and all these new equipment were based on the Canadian military performing tasks within the context of NATO's collective defence. Although the 1971 defence white paper which focused on sovereignty protection remained the formal basis of the government's defence policy, Canada was back in the NATO fold by the mid-1970's, ready to undertake major acquisitions to meet its allied commitments.

Why, within a few years after the release of the government's defence white paper, did NATO once again become Canada's defence priority? At the idiosyncratic level, as Granatstein and Bothwell assert, Trudeau not only lost interest in defence and foreign policy matters, but, moreover, he perhaps gained understanding of military issues. Because Trudeau did not have a defence plan nor, more importantly, did he have adequate knowledge or expertise, his impact on defence policy waxed, and then waned, as he learned about the intricacies of Canadian defence matters. According to Granatstein and Bothwell, Trudeau "came to office mistrustful of NATO and not a little ignorant of the arguments for and against the alliance."[39] Trudeau's lack of knowledge is important for understanding the resurgence of NATO in his government's thinking because, Granatstein and Bothwell state, the former prime minister had to discover that even a good social democrat, like Germany's Helmut Schmidt, found value in military commitments.[40]

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[39]Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 378.

[40]Ibid.

Harald von Riekhoff also follows this line of argument. He states that Trudeau greatly valued the "learning experience itself" and that "this explains certain shifts in (the former prime minister's) foreign policy orientation."[41] Trudeau, after all, was an intellectual who undertood and valued the pursuit of knowledge. His ignorance of the consequences of his defence decisions was offset by his capacity to learn and change his mind. This was clearly apparent when Western Europe's initial resistance to Canada's trade overtures came up. This resistance was traced, in part, to the disapproval of European allies, particularly West Germany, of the Canadian government's 1969 troop reduction. This resistance was met with the reaffirmation of Canada's NATO commitment. It seems, then, that by examining Trudeau's beliefs at the idiosyncratic level, we can account for the shifts in Canada's defence priorities.

Yet, does not such an account assume too much about Trudeau's capacity to influence defence policy? The central debate in the study of Canadian defence policy is whether Canadian policy-makers have any choice in making defence decisions because of the constraints placed on the Canadian state by the international system. According to Paul Viotti, anarchy in the international system is the source of every state's security problem because without a centralized world authority each state must be responsible for its own national security.[42] Canadian

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[41]Harald von Riekhoff, "The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Foreign Policy" International Journal 33 (Spring 1978): 276.

[42]Paul R. Viotti, "International Relations and the Defence Policies of Nations: International Anarchy and the Common Problem of Security," in The Defense

security policy in the post-World War II era makes little sense without reference to the "balance of nuclear terror" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given the enormity of the Soviet threat relative to Canadian military capabilities, Trudeau's initial NATO decision must be placed within the larger context of Canada's security policy. By allying itself with NATO and NORAD, Middlemiss and Sokolsky assert that "Canada has already made its fundamental strategic decisions;"[43] in that way, they assert that choices in defence policy would only be evident only in posture and procurement decisions. Trudeau's defence priorities centring on sovereignty protection did not (and indeed could not) change Canada's strategic outlook, but as became evident in the major equipment acquisition programs undertaken by his government following the Defence Structure Review, his priorities also did not affect procurement decisions either. Can we explain this only by resorting to the idiosyncratic level and arguing that Trudeau simply changed his mind?

Trudeau's conception of national sovereignty protection was in some ways compatible with Canada's collective defence commitments and this was evident in his government's defence white paper. Defence in the 70s claimed that sovereignty protection which entailed the surveillance and control of Canada's space, land mass and territorial waters actually contributed to allied security.[44] The paper contends that the withdrawal of

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Policies of Nations, eds. Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 10-22.

[43]Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 213.

[44]Defence in the 70s, p. 17, 20.

Canadian forces from Europe was simply a redistribution of effort from one part of NATO (Western Europe) to another part of NATO (Canada).[45] The government remained committed to collective defence and saw its efforts to protect Canada as protecting the alliance because Canadian territory was NATO territory. That was why the Defence Structure Review (DSR) could assume that sovereignty protection was compatible with allied commitments. Although the DSR reaffirmed the priorities outlined in the 1971 paper, it decided to procure weaponry for "combat capability" to fulfill NATO and NORAD demands rather than sovereignty tasks because it saw sovereignty protection, like peacekeeping, as involving only "residual capability."[46] According to General J. A. Dextraze, then Chief of Defence Staff, the DSR had established the "bare bones" requirements for the Canadian military, based on the conclusion that the Canadian Forces required two establishments: a "war establishment" and a "peace establishment."[47] In short, the Canadian military, as long as it was equipped and trained for collective defence, would also be able to undertake sovereignty protection.

The problem, however, is that the white paper had questioned the specialized tasks of the Canadian military in

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[45]Ibid, p. 33.

[46]Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 39.

[47]Speech of the Chief of Defence Staff, General J. A. Dextraze to the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1977, in The Proceedings of the Conference of Defence Associations 40th Annual Meeting, Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, Jan 13, 14, 15, 1977 (Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, Ottawa, 77/186).

NATO. According to Defence in the 70s, Canada would have "versatile forces" and "multi-purpose equipment" to meet its differing defence priorities and these centred on the preservation of national sovereignty.[48] Decisions on equipment purchases would be based on this criterion rather than on the collective defence needs of the past. The paper states that Canada's Centurion tanks in Western Europe would be replaced by light, tracked, direct-fire-support vehicles so that the country's Canadian-based and European-based land forces would be more compatible, and thus Canada would abandon its heavy-armour role in Europe.[49] The paper also highlights the centrality of the surveillance and control of Canada's airspace by Canadian rather than American aircraft in protecting national sovereignty and, thus, finds value in the interceptor and reconnaissance capability of the Canadian air force.[50] The governing thinking in maintaining this capability, however, is national sovereignty protection and not collective defence. For example, the 1971 paper states that in defending North America against the Soviet threat, the government would close all BOMARC missile sites in Canada. However, it would retain interceptor aircraft, not principally to deter Soviet bombers, but because "interceptor aircraft are required for peacetime identification and sovereign control of airspace."[51] In addition, asserts the white paper: "(A)

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[48]Defence in the 70s, p. 16.

[49]Ibid, p. 35.

[50]Ibid, p. 20.

[51]Ibid, p. 29.

general purpose capability for Canada's maritime forces...(will) govern both the acquisition of new equipment for the maritime force, and where applicable, modifications to existing equipment."[52] The paper questions the Canadian navy's specialization in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, a specialized capability developed for NATO, and states that Canada requires, instead, general purpose maritime capability.

Given the government's intention that Trudeau's priorities dictate defence procurement policy, the decisions made by the Defence Structure Review to buy equipment geared primarily for NATO and NORAD tasks question Trudeau's ability to influence defence policy. The government purchased C-1 Leopard tanks and retained the army's heavy-armour role in Europe; it bought the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft and fitted it with anti-submarine warfare equipment; it procured the CF-18 fighter and tasked it primarily for NATO and NORAD as opposed to sovereignty roles; it decided to construct the Canadian Patrol Frigate in Canadian shipyards and arm it with anti-submarine warfare and anti-aircraft capabilities which were required by NATO.[53] From the viewpoint of Canada's security policy, the needs of collective defence outweighed Trudeau's defence priorities. Ultimately, then, do we find that international systemic constraints dictate the choices of Canadian defence policy-makers, and that the re-ordering of Canadian defence

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[52]Ibid, p. 28.

[53]Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 40.

priorities in the mid-1970s, despite Trudeau's emphasis on national sovereignty protection, was a manifestation of these constraints? In short, do we find that macro system-governed priorities, in the long run, determined Trudeau's actions in defence policy?

Prime ministerial "initiatives," then, from what amounts to a systemic level of analysis are not really initiatives at all in terms of ultimately influencing defence policy. Middlemiss and Sokolsky's characterization of the empowerment of the prime minister's position through his dominance of the policy-making process and the exercise of strength in personality with political will was not, in the end, borne out by Trudeau's influence on defence policy.[54] The dictates of collective defence continued to determine Canada's defence policy. As scholars have recognized, NATO has been a constant factor since Ottawa's participation in the creation of the alliance in 1949. Whether NATO is seen as simply "the most important external influence on Canadian defence policy decision making,"[55] or as a "defence trap,"[56] scholars agree that the alliance is an "invariant."[57] NATO is a

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[54]I am, of course, only pursuing this one part of Middlemiss and Sokolsky's argument. They look at three different "environments" for Canadian defence policy decisions, and given their central argument in the text, i.e., Canada does exercise choice in defence policy, particularly in making funding and procurement decisions, they see NATO as a factor that sets the parameters of, but certainly does not fully determine, Canadian defence policy.

[55]Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 137-177.

[56]Howard Peter Langille, Changing the Guard: Canada's Defence in a World in Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 33-37.

[57]In The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy Nossal argues that "(b)ecause breaking with a functioning alliance is always made costly by other members, membership becomes a relative invariant, particularly for a smaller and less powerful member of the group" (p. 35).

given fact in the making of defence policy in Canada, and whether Ottawa remains in the alliance out of choice or coercion, because of the imperatives of the international security system it has never seriously contemplated withdrawal from the alliance.

Canada's pursuit of security through alliance is the logical line for a small state to take in a bipolar international system. Security or strategic studies are grounded in realist thought[58] which means that the notion of a rational, unitary state actor is a compelling analytical tool for explaining defence policies. By arguing that Trudeau's defence policy was driven by Canadian security requirements, we have explained the behaviour of the Canadian state and not, specifically, of Trudeau in defence matters. Interestingly enough, the only way that Middlemiss and Sokolsky's conception of the prime minister as "initiator" can account for the fact that the government's procurement decisions did not reflect Trudeau's priorities is to resort to the idiosyncratic level of analysis. Because their notion of initiator is predicated on personality factors, they could account for the shift in policy by arguing, as Granatstein and Bothwell and von Riekhoff have, that Trudeau "learned" of the importance of the alliance through the years and, accordingly, made NATO his defence priority.

Ultimately, Middlemiss and Sokolsky explain Trudeau's NATO policy, including the 1969 NATO decision and the

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[58]See Michel Fortmann and William L. George, "Bridge over Troubled Waters: Linking Strategic Studies and International Relations," in World Politics, ed. David G. Haglund and Michael Hawes (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), pp. 456-481.

procurement decisions that followed the Defence Structure Review, either at the idiosyncratic level, tracing Trudeau's policy to personal factors, or at the systemic level, questioning Trudeau's ability to change Canada's defence priorities in any substantive manner. What their concept of initiator does fit is the fact that the prime minister dominates the policy-making process, but it does not account for Trudeau's defence policy actions in terms of the role of the prime minister. The source of Trudeau's priorities is either Trudeau himself or the Canadian state's pursuit of national security. Even the pursuit of sovereignty, dictated by Canada's geopolitical reality, is a result of international systemic constraints. Thus, as defined in the current literature, we are left with idiosyncratic or macro system-governed priorities determining Trudeau's actions in defence policy.

THE ROBERTSON REPORT

It is almost unaccepted uncritically in the literature that Trudeau demanded changes to Canadian foreign and defence policies amidst opposition from the external affairs and national defence bureaucracies. If the prime minister was listening to advice, it was coming from Ivan Head, the constitutional law professor whom he appointed as his legislative assistant in the Prime Minister's Office and, in 1970, formally became his personal advisor on foreign policy matters,[59] or from academics outside of

[59]George Radwanski, Trudeau (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1978), p. 18. In a letter to the author, dated 1 October 1993, Mr. Head directed me to read Radwanski's depiction of his foreign policy role after I had queried him about it in an earlier letter.

the government circle who, at the time, were extremely critical of Canadian foreign policy actions, geared as these actions were, the critics argued, toward "defence" rather than "aid" matters.[60] Trudeau's apparent disregard for the professional advice of the bureaucracy caused uncertainty about the future of defence commitments. It appeared that Trudeau's changes to Canadian defence policy, beginning with the 1969 NATO decision had been the unilateral imposition of the prime minister on an unsuspecting bureaucracy.

The foreign policy review undertaken by Norman Robertson has received scant comment in the academic literature;[61] yet it sheds light on the origins of the central policies and ideas found in Trudeau's two-year defence and foreign policy review and, in particular, his 1969 NATO decision. Both Thordarson[62] and Granatstein and Bothwell[63] treat it as a review done under the Pearson government that advocated the status quo, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of Canadian NATO forces from Europe, and for that reason, they argue, it was quickly dismissed by the new government under Pierre Trudeau. The Robertson Report,[64] however, was not completed until April 5, 1968, which

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[60]See the contributions in Stephen Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada.

[61]Granatstein does discuss certain elements of the review in his biography of Robertson. See J. L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1981), p. 374-379.

[62]Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 26-27.

[63]Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 10-11.

[64]N. A. Robertson, Foreign Policy Review, prefaced with a Memorandum to the Minister (Secret) apologizing for the delay in reporting due to illness, 210 pgs.,

would have been in the midst of the Liberal leadership convention being held April 4-6. Although in a Memorandum for the Minister on April 22, 1968, Marcel Cadieux, the under-secretary of state for external affairs, noted that he sent a copy each to then Prime Minister Pearson and then Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin who, in turn, sent a copy to Trudeau,[65] the Pearson cabinet could not have considered the report and no cabinet or ministerial reply could have been forthcoming.

The Robertson Report was not a review undertaken by External Affairs. It was meant to be an endeavour independent from the department. That was why Norman Robertson was appointed by Martin to undertake it, although Robertson was assisted by two officers in External Affairs, Geoffrey Murray and Geoffrey Pearson. In a note on October 6, 1967, from Murray to Pearson, as they were dividing up the tasks for the review, Murray asked whether the heads of the divisions of the department would know about the report, admitting that if the heads of the divisions were left unaware (highly unlikely, according to Murray), the reviewers would not have the necessary access to the relevant papers in each division.[66] At any rate, concluded Murray, they would have to clear the question with

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sprial bound (National Archives, RG 25, Acc 80-81/022, Box 21, File 20-1-2-1968 F.P.).

[65]Memorandum for the Minister (by then, Mitchell Sharp), dated 22 April 1968, entitled Foreign Policy Review (National Archives, RG 25, Acc 80-81/022, Box 21, File 20-1-2-1968 pt. 2).

[66]Note to G. A. H. Pearson, dated 6 October 1967, signed G. S. M. (National Archives, RG 25, Acc 80-81/022, Box 21, file 20-1-2-1968 pt. 1).

Robertson.[67] Division heads in External Affairs, although they did know about the review, had no hand in its writing or analysis.[68]

The Robertson Report was a 210-page, spiral-bound document, entitled Foreign Policy Review,[69] that was more contemplative, if not more critical, of current foreign policy under the Pearson government than the secondary literature makes out. It can be seen as the basis of the comprehensive foreign policy review undertaken by the Trudeau government that led to the publication of Foreign Policy for Canadians. In a Memorandum for the Minister on April 26, 1968, Marcel Cadieux outlined the changes in foreign policy envisioned in the Robertson review and suggested to Mitchell Sharp that the external affairs minister discuss the matter with the Prime Minister.[70] Subsequently, in a memorandum to senior officers and heads of posts on May 9, 1968, Cadieux sent them each a copy of the Robertson Report, stating that they use it as a starting point for the comprehensive review under the new Trudeau government and warning that they treat it in strict confidence, on a need-to-know basis, and ensure that neither the public nor

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[67]Ibid.

[68]This is clearly evident in the different drafts of the Robertson Report. Communications regarding the Report were between Robertson, Murray and Pearson. (National Archives, RG 25, Acc 80-81/022, Box 21, file 20-1-2-1968 pt. 1).

[69]Robertson, Foreign Policy Review.

[70]Memorandum for the Minister, dated 26 April 1968, signed M. C. (National Archives, RG 25, Acc 80-81/022, Box 21, file 20-1-2-1968 pt. 2).

the press see its contents (because there was already great speculation in the press regarding the report).[71]

External Affairs had fore-seen three possible reactions to the Robertson Report by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs: (1) Trudeau and Sharp could read the report and indicate their views on it; (2) they could indicate exactly what areas of foreign policy worried them without necessarily reading the report; or (3) they could ask for a totally new review.[72] Although it was evident that Trudeau asked for a totally new review, not only did Cadieux go on to send copies of the report to senior officers of external affairs, but Geoffrey Murray also went on to head the subsequent review undertaken by the Trudeau government.

The contents of the Robertson Report and the 1970 white paper on foreign policy are strikingly similar. Many journalists and academics criticized Foreign Policy for Canadians when it was released because it did not go beyond Trudeau's May 29, 1968 statement which launched the review process.[73] At the same time, as compellingly argued by Thordarson and implicitly accepted by Granatstein and Bothwell, this was a clear indication

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[71]Memorandum, dated 9 May 1968, to Senior Officers and Heads of Posts, from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (National Archives, RG 25, Acc 80-81/022, Box 21, File 20-1-2-1968 pt. 2). Cadieux also sent a separate letter to Maurice Strong, Director-General, External Aid Office, with the same contents.

[72]Memorandum, dated 24 April 1968, to Murray from H. B. Robinson, entitled Review of Foreign Policy (National Archives, RG 25, Acc 80-81/022, Box 21, file 20-1-2-1968 pt. 2).

[73]"Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, issued on May 29, 1968," in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 335-341.

that the foreign policy review was a product of Trudeau. His 1968 rise to the Liberal Party leadership and victory at the polls marked a clear change in foreign policy direction. He rejected Canada's "helpful fixer" role; he stressed Canadian aid programs; he argued for the recognition of the People's Republic of China; and, moreover, he maintained that foreign policy had simply become an extension of defence policy which he intended to change. He was criticized not only for what was seen to be the nationalist, economically-oriented tone of the foreign policy paper, but also for demanding that foreign policy have a blueprint, a conceptual framework; that foreign policy be planned.[74]

The Robertson Report, commissioned by Pearson and Martin in late summer 1967, states that the foreign policy review was prompted by the "rising uncertainty about Canada's place and role in the world."[75] In the chapter, "Criticism of Canadian Foreign Policy," it responds to the different kinds of academic criticism (and, in fact, categorizes the different critics) levied against Canada's foreign policy; this chapter substantiates speculations that the Robertson review was prompted by the academic community. The report does not accept the status quo uncritically; it recognizes the need for establishing a policy planning and coordination machinery for external affairs.[76] It

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[74]Peyton Lyon, "A Review of the Review" Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. V, No. 2 (May 1970): 34-47.

[75]Robertson, p. 1.

[76]Ibid, p. 3.

warns that Canada's role as a "helpful fixer"[77] (and this is the term used in the report)[78] as an explanation of government policy may no longer be relevant in global politics and "the thread of this problem runs through (the) review of policy areas."[79] The report states that Canada's position in the United Nations had slipped in recent years,[80] and, with regard to peacekeeping, Canada "shall be well advised to look carefully at all the circumstances surrounding operations in the future."[81] The report looks at international aid and relations with Latin America. Moreover, it identifies Canada's national interests as, first and foremost, its "political survival as a federal and bicultural state and, to this end," its participation in international security arrangements and its promotion of international economic cooperation.[82] According to the report, Canada's survival as a state rested on both living with the United States and living with Quebec.

What is most interesting about the Robertson Report from the viewpoint of defence policy is what it states about Canada's relations with Europe and its NATO forces on the continent because this is the reason given by analysts for the rejection of

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[77]This, of course, was one of the more controversial terms used in Foreign Policy for Canadians (p. 8).

[78]Geoffrey Pearson claims that he, in fact, coined the term. Interview with author, Ottawa, Ontario, June 29, 1993.

[79]Ibid, p. 46.

[80]Ibid, p. 108-124.

[81]Ibid, p. 47.

[82]Ibid, p. 19.

the report by the Trudeau government. The report does emphasize that the principal counterpoise for Canada against the United States is Europe, needed particularly given the closeness of the Canadian-American economic relationship.[83] The report was not opposed to a withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe; rather, it argued that "it would make little sense to withdraw Canadian forces from Europe simply in order to keep them in Canada but assigned to the same role on the Central Front."[84] According to the report, if that were the case, then the government would have to not only purchase additional air transport equipment but also consider the uncertainty of getting Canada's forces back in time if war should arise.

The report states, on the other hand, that there might be a need to withdraw Canadian NATO forces in Europe for peacekeeping tasks, stressing that withdrawal would make sense if the forces could be better employed elsewhere (i.e., taking on another role besides the NATO one). The problem, according to the report, is that the principal direct threat to Canada is an air attack directed at the United States and the defence against this is primarily an American, and not a Canadian, responsibility. The report states: "It is generally true that the primary purpose of Canadian defence policy is to support Canadian foreign policy and apart from whatever contribution it can make to surveillance of Canadian territory and coasts has little, if any, autonomous

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[83]Ibid, p. 31.

[84]Ibid, p. 137.

justification."[85] The surveillance of Canadian territory and coasts, however, is exactly the role of the military that the Trudeau government emphasizes to justify the partial troop withdrawal from Europe.

The principal difference between the Robertson review and Trudeau's foreign policy review is the decision to withdraw half of Canada's forces from Europe, but not because the Robertson Report defended the status quo. Geoffrey Murray writing in 1984 lamented the general perception that the Robertson review was uncritical of the conduct of Canadian foreign policy at the time. He states: "That it was not (a defence of the status quo) is quite clear from any ordinary reading of the report, even today, but it died stillborn of calculated neglect."[86] Indeed, Murray asserts that Trudeau's May 29, 1968 speech was taken from a draft prepared by External Affairs which was, in turn, based on the Robertson Report.[87]

We can see in the Robertson Report questions being raised about Canada's foreign policy under the Pearson government; notably, it questions the "helpful fixer" role and it emphasizes greater policy planning. This undermines conventional thinking that Trudeau was solely responsible for attempting to change the status quo and turning away from Pearsonian internationalism; and that his idiosyncratic priorities were the primary

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[85]Ibid, p. 28.

[86]Geoff Murray, "In Search of Foreign Policy," Bout de Papier, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1984): 1, 5.

[87]Ibid.

determinants of his actions. The Report states that there were changes occurring in the international system, namely the economic recovery of Europe and Japan and the increasing number of newly independent states, that Canadian foreign policy would have to address.[88] Moreover, during the Liberal leadership campaign, Dave Golden, a deputy minister of defence production, had sent to Trudeau a piece, entitled "Notes Relating to Some Aspects of Canadian Defence Policy."[89] Here, Golden asserts that Canadian NATO troops should be withdrawn from Europe because Europe had recovered; that the Canadian military should play a greater role in the defence of North America in order to protect Canadian sovereignty; and that peacekeeping should be re-examined as a task of the military. Micro state-governed priorities, it appeared, were also important determinants in Trudeau's decision to launch the two-year review. The prime minister's questioning of Canada's NATO commitment and the traditional focus on East-West issues was not altogether unheard of within the external affairs bureaucracy.[90]

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[88]The idea that international changes also prompted Trudeau's two-year foreign policy review is the argument taken by Denis Stairs, "Pierre Trudeau and the Politics of the Canadian Foreign Policy Review," Australian Outlook Vol. 26, No. 3 (December 1972): 274-290.

[89]Note from H. B. Robinson to Mr. Nutt (with a copy sent to Geoff Murray), dated 10 May 1968, National Archives, RG 25, File 20-1-2-1968 pt.2.

[90]Geoffrey Pearson states that there are probably two reasons why the Robertson Report has been neglected by students of Canadian foreign policy. He agrees with my interpretation that the Robertson Report had many similarities with Trudeau's 1970 foreign policy paper. First of all, the Report was heralded by Paul Martin as the defence of the status quo and the vindication of his time as external affairs minister, pre-empting any idea that the Report was critical of foreign policy. However, as Pearson states, Prime Minister Lester Pearson was "not happy" with Martin's actions in external affairs and that was partly why he asked for the Robertson review. Secondly, Prime Minister Trudeau and his advisors wanted to distance themselves from the Pearson era and create the idea

ROLE-GOVERNED PRIORITIES

The role-governed priorities of the prime minister centre on defending the federal interest. In the second chapter, we argued that, in Trudeau's case, defending the federal interest meant preventing the disintegration of the Canadian confederation (the only option ruled out in the performance of his role) by directing his attention to Quebec's accommodation through constitutional change. We also pointed out that in making such an argument we could not, at the same time, accept the contention that the 1969 NATO decision and the 1971 defence white paper were indicative of Trudeau's successful attempts to defy the constraints and make a particular imprint on defence policy. The contention that Trudeau's idiosyncratic priorities were the primary determining factors of defence policy (a type [II.b] explanation within the framework) conflicts with our central contention that the prime minister's role-governed priorities were the primary determining factors explaining his actions during his tenure as prime minister. These priorities distracted him from foreign policy matters (a type [III] explanation). How can we explain Trudeau's actions in defence policy that would allow for complementarity between role-governed and idiosyncratic priorities?

We can offer two kinds of explanations within the framework. First of all, we have seen in this chapter that the

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that everything was "new" in their foreign policy review. Interview with author, Ottawa, Ontario, June 29, 1993.

procurement decisions made by the Trudeau government direct our attention to the international systemic constraints placed on the prime minister's defence policy priorities, as expressed in the 1969 NATO decision and the 1971 defence white paper. We have also seen that even before Trudeau came to power, there were already questions being raised about the nature of Canadian defence commitments. By utilizing the role level of analysis, we can complete the picture and see how his role-governed priorities determined his actions in defence policy in a manner that complemented his macro system-governed, micro state-governed, and idiosyncratic priorities (a type [I] explanation within the framework). In what sense, we ask, did the protection of the federal interest determine Trudeau's emphasis on national sovereignty protection?

Secondly, we can take an entirely different tack, one that focuses not on Trudeau's initial defence decisions as above, but on his conception of the role of prime minister in a domestic context. Defending the federal interest is not simply a reactive measure; it can also entail an activist stance. As Trudeau states, "the dominant theme of the election campaign in the spring of 1968—a strong and united Canada founded on a policy of equal opportunity for all—was the one (he) approached with the greatest conviction...(W)ithout a doubt, the two main facets of the policy lay in equality of opportunity for all Canadians regardless of the economic region in which they lived, and regardless of the language that they spoke."[91] With those statements, the prime

[91]Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," p. 359-360.

minister underscored what Smiley talks about as the two problems facing national unity in Canadian federalism: the French-English linguistic duality centred on the accommodation of Quebec and the centre-periphery division centred on regional economic inequality.[92] The prime minister's role as the champion of federalism would entail that he address both these problems. To what extent, we ask, were linguistic and regional development concerns reflected in Trudeau's defence priorities and did these determine his policy actions? Here, what we are looking at is the prime minister's domestic priorities determining in part his defence ("foreign") policy behaviour and, in this case, international systemic constraints would not figure in our explanation (a type [III] explanation within the framework).

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTION

As we stated earlier, the Robertson Report advocated withdrawal of the Canadian forces in Europe if the military was to take on another function. Trudeau stated in his 1969 announcement on the country's new defence priorities that this function was the protection of Canadian national sovereignty. The 1971 defence white paper, released two years later, stated explicitly why NATO was no longer Canada's top priority. The government had reduced its level of troop contribution in Europe not only because Europe, having fully recovered from the devastation of World War II could now defend itself, but also because Canada, having to

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[92]Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada, p. 125-176.

foster economic growth and safeguard sovereignty and independence, needed to use its forces to protect Canadian territory.[93] Fostering economic growth and safeguarding sovereignty and independence were the first two priorities listed in Foreign Policy for Canadians, the government's white paper on foreign policy. In an attempt to address Trudeau's main criticism of the conduct of external affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians served as the basis for Defence in the 70s.[94] In this manner, Canada's defence policy was explicitly determined by its foreign policy[95] and foreign policy, as an extension of domestic policy, would reflect Canadian national interest.

Why was Trudeau preoccupied with the national interest and the importance of national sovereignty protection in defence policy? From the viewpoint of his macro system-governed priorities, as outlined earlier, the protection of sovereignty points outward in terms of the challenges presented by the United States. This conception of national sovereignty protection, however, depends on the degree to which the preservation of Canadian security necessitates a common Western front against the designated Soviet threat. The 1971 defence white paper argued that the increasing stability in nuclear deterrence had lessened tensions between the two superpowers in the

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[93]Defence in the 70s, p. 32.

[94]Ibid, p. 3.

[95]Although, of course, this kind of reasoning was why the government ran into problems in 1969 when it tabled its NATO policy in the House of Commons. Opposition Leader Robert Stanfield asked why the government was making defence policy when the foreign policy review was not yet completed. See Canada, House of Commons, Debates, April 23, 1969, p. 7873-7874.

international system.[96] The withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe made sense because the government could use its military for purposes other than collective defence. At the same time, the government did not reject the continuing Cold War system which meant that the Soviet Union remained a threat to Canadian security. That was why the government remained in NATO and why it left forces in Europe. In other words, Canadian strategic thinking had not changed with Trudeau's new priorities outlined in 1969. It is not surprising, then, that the Canadian military would procure equipment for collective defence tasks and the performance of sovereignty protection by the military could ultimately be subsumed to the requirements of NATO and NORAD. In this case, the rational actor model as used in security and strategic studies is an appropriate analytical tool for understanding the Trudeau government's strategic and procurement decisions.[97]

However, does Trudeau's emphasis on national sovereignty protection simply point outward in terms of challenges presented by the United States? What do we mean by national or state sovereignty? Conceptually speaking, modern state sovereignty has both internal and external dimensions. As international relations scholars argue, individual nation-states not only exercise complete jurisdiction over a given set of territory and population (internal) but enjoy also total autonomy in their relations with

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[96]Defence in the 70s, p. 4.

[97]This model is examined in Harriet Critchley, "Does Doctrine Precede Weaponry?" International Journal Vol. 33, No. 3 (Summer 1978): 524-556.

other states (external).[98] Internal sovereignty means that domestic order prevails because the national government with its coercive power enforces domestic rules and laws. In contrast, external sovereignty means that international anarchy prevails because no government higher than the nation-state exists which enforces international rules and laws.[99]

To what extent did the maintenance of Canadian internal sovereignty necessitate the coercive power of the federal government? Might this explain, in part, why the government withdrew part of its military force from Europe? In between Trudeau's 1969 NATO decision and the release of his government's defence white paper was the 1970 October crisis. The kidnapping of British diplomat James Cross and Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte by the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) demonstrated that that there were radical elements in the Canadian society, taking a lead in Quebec's quest for independence. FLQ activities had been going on for a number of years. Mitchell Sharp, then secretary of state for external affairs, states that during the FLQ crisis the cabinet simply did not know the severity (or insignificance) of the situation; Jean Marchand, in

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[98]Donald Puchala, "Origins and Characteristics of the Modern State," in International Conflict and Conflict Management, 2nd ed., edited by Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff and Janice Gross Stein (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 105-109.

[99]This distinction is aptly illustrated by Waltz in his comparison of domestic and international political structures; the first being ordered by "hierarchy" and second by "anarchy." Hierarchy in the domestic political structure results in the state (the government) exercising legitimate power over its domestic society. Anarchy in the international political structure results in the security dilemma for every state where the state, alone, becomes responsible for its own survival in the system. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 79-101.

particular, was concerned about the support given to the FLQ by trade unions in Quebec.[100] Sharp states that although Trudeau had adamantly opposed the way the secretary of state for external affairs had handled matters in the beginning of the crisis (i.e., Sharp had allowed the FLQ manifesto to be broadcasted on CBC), the prime minister did not interfere with Sharp's handling of an "external" matter because at that point only James Cross had been kidnapped.

However, when Pierre Laporte was subsequently taken by the FLQ, the cabinet realized that it faced a "national crisis" and the prime minister became the spokesperson for the federal government.[101] To what extent did the government believe that violence, fuelled by separatist aspirations, would erupt throughout Quebec? What kind of measures or plans did the government have in dealing with such violence? The Trudeau government imposed the War Measures Act on October 16, 1970, creating a war-like atmosphere in the country; in retrospect, it may have been too harsh an action to take given the extent of the threat. Sharp states that there was an official in the Prime Minister's Office who had developed a scenario of different ways to deal with a revolutionary movement in Canada, complete with colour charts and indications of bold action to be taken by the government.[102]

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[100]Interview with author, Ottawa, Ontario, June 15, 1993.

[101]Ibid. Mr. Sharp also allowed me to read his unpublished memoirs and he talks about the Trudeau cabinet's response to the FLQ crisis stemming from its ignorance about the extent of FLQ operations.

[102]Sharp, unpublished memoirs. Interview with author.

Dan Loomis argues, on lines difficult to appreciate at this distance in time, and maybe as far-fetched as it now seems, that Trudeau's emphasis on national sovereignty was meant to address internal threats and to address them with Canada's military power.[103] He states that changes in Canadian defence policy during the Pearson and Trudeau years, aimed at training the military for "low-intensity warfare," were deliberately taken in order to prepare the Canadian forces to fight revolutionary activity at home. Loomis asserts that both the 1964 white paper, which emphasized peacekeeping activity, and the 1971 white paper, which stressed national sovereignty protection, indicate that "high-intensity warfare" (i.e., preparations for conflict against the Soviet Union within NATO and NORAD) had become less important for successive Canadian governments in order to redirect military efforts and training. Although Loomis' reading of the defence white papers is undoubtedly selective, the 1971 defence white paper does state that the military has a role to play in maintaining internal security by aiding civil authorities.[104] Aid of the civil power is an important task of the Canadian Forces,[105] witnessed recently by the Oka crisis in the summer of 1990; it is

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[103]Dan G. Loomis, Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1984).

[104]Defence in the 70s, p. 11.

[105]See also Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977), p. 243-252, and Desmond Morton, "Bayonets in the Streets: The Canadian Experience of Aid of the Civil Power 1968-1990," Canadian Defence Quarterly 20 (April 1991).

a task made more important because Canada does not have an equivalent to the National Guard of the United States.[106]

The connection that we have made between internal sovereignty protection and the use of the Canadian forces for military action at home (justifying the 1969 NATO withdrawal) would indicate that Trudeau was defending the federal interest (and, literally, defence of the federal interest against destabilizing elements). The connection, admittedly, is tenuous at best, but it does direct our attention to the assumption made, in the use of the rational actor model to explain Canadian defence policy, that the country's internal sovereignty is settled. Is the assumption of a monolithic, unitary actor driven by considerations of the international security system the best way to explain Canadian defence policy?

John Kirton has questioned the strict applicability of realist concepts to the study of Canadian foreign policy. He asserts that both the character and the cohesiveness of the unit as theoretical issues in international relations have led realists to conceptualize the centrality of the "nation-state" (character of the unit) and "sovereignty" (cohesiveness of the unit) in foreign policy analysis. In contrast, Kirton states, the Canadian reality is quite different: the "multicultural federation" is the character of the unit and "divided authority" is indicative of its cohesiveness.[107] It is interesting that Kirton's characterization emphasizes domestic

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[106]Brigadier General H. A. McLearn, "Canadian Arrangements for Aid of the Civil Power," Canadian Defence Quarterly 1 (Summer 1971).

[107]John Kirton, "Realism and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," International Perspectives (January/February 1987): 7.

and, specifically, role, considerations to understanding Canadian foreign policy rather than international systemic ones. This leads us to consider how Trudeau's protection of the federal interest in the domestic context permeated his defence policy.

BILINGUALISM AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Not only did the Trudeau government introduce the Official Languages Act on October 17, 1968 shortly after taking power, because French-speaking Canadians, according to Trudeau, needed linguistic recognition in federal Canada,[108] but it also established the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) in 1969 because, "(r)egional development formed a core element of Pierre Trudeau's quest for national unity."[109] The passage of the Official Languages Act, by entrenching the equality of English and French in Canada's public service, gave rise not only to the notion of "institutional bilingualism," but also to greater insistence on French-Canadian representation in federal institutions. The establishment of DREE was one of many attempts by the Trudeau government to institutionalize regional development policy, ensuring a prominent part for the federal government in addressing economic disparities between the provinces.[110] Both Trudeau's policies on bilingualism and

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[108]Canada, House of Commons, Debates, October 1968, p. 1481-4

[109]Lloyd Axworthy, "Regional Development: Innovations in the West," in Towards a Just Society, p. 241.

[110]See Peter Aucoin and Herman Bakvis, "Regional Responsiveness and Government Organization: The Case of Regional Economic Development Policy in Canada," in Regional Responsivess and the National Administrative State, Vol. 37, Peter Aucoin, Research Coordinator, Report Prepared for the Royal

regional development as means of promoting the federal cause had lingering effects beyond those of simply "domestic" matters.

The 1971 defence white paper specifically states: "The Canadian Forces have a major role to play in promoting national unity. It is essential therefore that they reflect the bilingual and bicultural nature of the country."[111] According to the white paper, francophone members should constitute 28 percent of military strength (roughly the percentage at the time of French-speaking Canadians in the country). Because the military had historically been dominated by anglophones, Trudeau argued that "equal opportunity is closely related to the merit principle which cannot be said to be fully operative unless it extends to qualified francophones, with little or no knowledge of English, a recognition equal to that which it accords to anglophones whose knowledge of French is similarly limited."[112]

The institutionalization of bilingualism in the Canadian military continued during the Trudeau years, with francophone strength reaching nearly 27 percent by the time Trudeau left office, but the process had begun before 1968. Beginning with the Glassco Commission, followed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the language issue in Canada's militiary had become particularly acute. Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, two historians in National Defence, have documented the

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Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985),, p. 51-118.

[111]Defence in the 70s, p. 46.

[112]House of Commons, Debates, June 23, 1970. Quoted in Defence in the 1970s, p. 47. This "guiding principle" came from the prime minister.

evolution of bilingualism policy in the Canadian Forces.[113] The Department of National Defence had adopted a policy of bilingualism and biculturalism even before the 1969 passage of the Official Languages Act. In 1964, the military began producing manuals in French for Army training; in 1965, a directive from the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS P3/65) ordained the use of both French and English in National Defence establishments; in 1966, the Study Group on the Recruitment and Retention of French-Speaking Personnel in the Armed Forces, headed by Colonel Armand Ross, was created; and in 1967, the Office of the Chief of the Defence Staff established a Bilingualism Secretariat. According to Pariseau and Bernier, the appointment of General Jean Allard as Chief of Defence Staff in 1966 was a significant milestone in the realization of a bilingual military for Canada. In addition, Léo Cadieux was appointed Minister of National Defence in 1967.

Pierre Trudeau's commitment to bilingualism when he took office solidified the efforts to create a bilingual military for Canada. In response to the Official Languages Act coming into force in September 1969, General Allard issued directive CDS 28/69, entitled "Long Term Bilingualism Program for the

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[113]Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, French-Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces: Volume I 1763-1969: The Fear of a Parallel Army (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1986). The second volume is still out only in French. See Serge Bernier et Jean Pariseau, Les Canadiens français et le bilinguisme dans les Forces armées canadiennes: Tome II 1969-1987: Langues officielles: la volonté gouvernementale et la réponse de la Défense nationale (Ottawa: Ministre des Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1991).

Caandian Forces."[114] Here, Allard outlined what have become the hallmarks of bilingualism policy in the military: the percentage of francophones in the military (at all ranks and classifications) should reflect their demographic representation in the Canadian society; second-language training should be available, in particular, to anglophones in order to allow them to compete for bilingual positions; "all officers, warrant officers and sergeants would have to be functionally bilingual as defined in CFAO 9-21" (Allard's target date then was 1980); and French-language units (FLUs) should be protected from being drained of their cadre under the provisions of the Official Languages Act which increased the number of bilingual positions since most bilinguals in the military were then francophones, many in the FLUs.[115]

Pariseau and Bernier point out that the implementation of bilingualism in the Canadian military encountered problems; not least of all was the question of how the creation of French-language units would affect the operational effectiveness of units.[116] That problem seemed to have been overcome,[117] and

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[114]Pariseau and Bernier, French-Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Forces: Volume I, p. 238. See also Jean V. Allard, Memoirs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), p. 287-288.

[115]Pariseau and Bernier, p. 238-239.

[116]It is interesting how the debate on what I would call "linguistic equality vs. operational effectiveness" in the Pariseau and Bernier work mirrors the debate on "gender equality vs. operational effectiveness" prior to the Mulroney government's decision to open all occupations, including combat roles, to women. To what extent is the military's argument regarding operational effectiveness simply a reflection of a traditional, conservative institution rejecting change? And to what extent is its argument on operational effectiveness a lone argument in the political wilderness? Here, I am thinking of works like Douglas Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye and Company, 1987), which assert that Canadian politicians simply do not listen to military advice and, in fact, have taken steps to "civilianize" the defence bureaucracy. Although it is clear that there were individuals in National Defence,

according to Joel Sokolsky, "the unified armed forces (through the adoption of bilingualism) did transform themselves to accommodate the new Canadian nationalism of the post-1960s period and in so doing became very much a national institution."[118] Although there were elements in the defence bureaucracy advocating a bilingual force for Canada both before and during Trudeau's tenure, it was not until the passage of the Official Languages Act by the Trudeau government and the importance placed on bilingualism in the 1971 defence white paper that French and English became the languages of the Canadian military.

The Trudeau government was also committed to the elimination of regional economic disparities in order to strengthen the federation. Regional economic policy became part of its general industrial strategy which, in turn, permeated federal procurement of goods and services, including military hardware. Rod Byers asserts that Canadian procurement decisions are dictated by an "economics-as-defence" model which means that the Canadian government does not buy equipment based on how best it can ensure national security but

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including the Chief of Defence Staff, Jean V. Allard, who advocated bilingualism in the military, it is not at all evident that the policy has been a success.

[117]Col. P. G. Addy, "Institutional Bilingualism of the Regular Force: An Operational Necessity," National Defence College of Canada Course Paper, May 1984 (Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, Ottawa, 90/323).

[118]Joel Sokolsky, "'In Aid of the Civil Power': The Military, Politics and Political Culture in Canada," Paper Presented to the Biennial Meeting of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States," Boston, Massachusetts, November 20-23, 1991, p. 32.

on how best it can produce economic development in Canada.[119] According to Byers, the Trudeau government's four major defence acquisition programs, namely, the long-range patrol aircraft, the C-1 Leopard tank, the new fighter aircraft, and the Canadian patrol frigate, all involved domestic industrial benefits and offsets.[120] In the case of the long-range patrol aircraft, the prime contractor, Lockheed, agreed to a contract price of $950 million (1976 dollars) with the requirement that it purchase $914 million of goods and services from the Canadian economy to offset the contract price and an additional $522 million on a best-effort basis. In the case of the C-1 Leopard tank, the prime contractor, Krauss-Maffei, agreed to a contract price of $187 million (1976 dollars) with offset requirements of $74.8 million and an additional $37.4 million on a best-effort basis. In the case of the CF-18, the prime contractor, McDonnell Douglas, agreed to a contract price of $2,300 million with offset requirements of $2,910 million. Finally, in the case of the Canadian patrol frigate, the prime contractor, Saint John Shipbuilding, agreed to a contract price of $2,400 million not only with offset requirements of $763 million but also with Canadian content set

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[119]R. B. Byers, "Canadian Defence and Defence Procurement: Implications for Economic Policy," in Selected Problems in Formulating Foreign Economic Policy, Vol. 30, edited by Denis Stairs and Gilbert Winham, Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 131-195.

[120]According to W. M. Dobell: "Industrial offsets are the contracts placed in Canada by foreign corporations to offset the employment and foreign exchange lost to Canada as a result of the external procurement of major defence equipment." See Dobell, "Defence procurement contracts and industrial offset packages," International Perspectives (January/February 1981): 14.

at 67 percent.[121] Unlike the two types of planes and the tanks which were purchased off-the-shelf by the government, the ships were to be built in Canada.

That is not all, however. Although Canada is not unique in using military expenditures to generate economic growth in the society,[122] the procurement process in the Trudeau years was coloured by demands that industrial benefits be regionally distributed. According to Dan Middlemiss: "Lured by the prospect of substantial contracts for industries within their borders, provincial and even municipal governments, aided and abetted by local industry and media, have become active and increasingly vocal participants in staking out industrial benefits claims in (the National Defence department's) larger procurement programs."[123] Middlemiss states, for example, that Manitoba Premier Ed Schreyer believed that his province was treated unfairly by the federal government during the Aurora purchase because Manitoba's "fair share of aerospace work in proportion to the province's share of the national population" was not met.[124] As well, during the new fighter aircraft competition, Quebec Premier René Lévesque lobbied for the acquisition of the F-16 built by General Dynamics rather than the F-18 by

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[121]Ibid, p. 184-186. See table on p. 185.

[122]This is what John Treddenick calls "military keynesianism." See Treddenick, "The Arms Race and Military Keynesianism" Canadian Public Policy II (1985): 77-92.

[123]Dan Middlemiss, "Defence Procurement in Canada," Paper Presented to the Conference, "Canada's International Security Policy," York University, North York, Ontario, October 21-23, 1992, p. 17.

[124]Ibid.

McDonnell Douglas on the grounds that General Dynamics offered a better industrial benefit package for Quebec.[125] Similarly, the successsful bidding of Saint John Shipbuilding for the Canadian patrol frigate program resulted in part because the shipyard agreed to build three ships in New Brunswick and the other three in Quebec (although the split contract would cost an additional $58 million).[126]

The Department of National Defence was not left to itself to decide between competing bidders on the long-range patrol aircraft, the new fighter aircraft or the Canadian patrol frigate programs. The Departments of Finance, Supply and Services, and Industry, Trade and Commerce all played a prominent part because of the requirement for industrial benefits. Michael Tucker argues that in the case of the long range patrol aircraft, the criterion of industrial offsets in Canada was a central factor in the decision to procure the Aurora.[127] Michael Atkinson and Kim Richard Nossal in their examination of the CF-18 decision assert that the cabinet had set the parameters (what they call "structuring decisions") of the procurement process, centring as much on cost-limitations as industrial benefit demands, and effectively muted bureaucratic conflict.[128] The Trudeau cabinet

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[125]Sister Maureen Cronin, "A Case of Hornets: The Controversial CF-18A," The American Review of Canadian Studies (Fall 1982): 23-25.

[126]Middlemiss and Sokolsky, p. 202-203.

[127]Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 162.

[128]Michael Atkinson and Kim Richard Nossal, "Bureaucratic Politics and the New Fighter Aircraft Decisions," Canadian Public Administration Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter 1981): 531-562.

had highlighted the centrality of regional industrial benefits and offsets in the acquisition of defence equipment and, thus, established the priorities governing these procurement decisions. According to the 1971 defence white paper, "to assist in the attainment of the Government's objective of regional economic equality, further decentralization of defence procurement into all regions of Canada will be encouraged."[129] Like the bilingualism policy, we can trace the importance of regional economic policy to the prime minister's role of promoting, and not simply protecting, the federal interest. Canada does have a bilingual military and a highly politicized procurement process; this explains Trudeau's part in defence policy quite different from our explanation above (a type [III] rather than a type [I] explanation within the framework). In particular, our explanation of Trudeau's influence on defence procurement decisions makes no reference to systemic constraints placed on Canadian defence policy, which leads us to make an important point regarding the different kinds of explanations.

One of the major shortcomings of applying the rational actor model to explaining defence policy under the Trudeau government is that the model cannot capture the extent to which Canada's defence procurement process had changed. Defence policy analysts recognize that the government's decision to acquire planes, tanks and ships for the Canadian forces was not

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[129]Defence in the 70s, p. 14. See also the Remarks by the Honourable Barney Danson, Minister of National Defence, "Defence Procurement: Cornerstone of a New Technological Thrust," to the Canadian-American Committee, Four Seasons Hotel, Toronto, September 29, 1978.

simply a procedure of "deciding" on the strategy (i.e., collective defence) and, then, buying the equipment. Middlemiss argues that "there has always been a tension between the external, military-oriented determinants and the domestic political-economic determinants...(but) lately it appears to have led to increasing competition between these sets of determinants as the domestic politics of federalism became progressively institutionalized in the processes of Canadian defence procurement."[130] Similarly, R. B. Byers contends that it is this kind of politicization of the procurement process that undermines the ability of the military to acquire cost-effective equipment; indeed, if "in the first and final analysis, resources for defence are to purchase national and international security" for Canada, the procurement process questions the "rationality" of the decisions made by the Trudeau government.[131] To defence policy analysts, particularly Byers, the manner in which Canada bought equipment under the Trudeau government did not seem to conform to the actions of a sovereign state living in an anarchical world where, in the final analysis, the state was responsible for the preservation of its own national security. The frustration expressed by defence analysts and practitioners alike in making sense of the Trudeau government's priorities in defence policy may stem in part because their explanations demand an examination of the constraints of the international

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[130]Middlemiss, "Defence Procurement in Canada," p. 5.

[131]Byers, "Canadian Defence and Defence Procurement: Implications for Economic Policy," p. 191.

security system (either a type [I] or a type [II.a] explanation). This leads analysts to conclude that the Trudeau government's highly politicized defence procurement process had undermined the government's strategy or ability to protect national security, which does not make sense. Our explanation of Trudeau's influence on defence procurement decisions looks at domestic, specifically role, considerations with no reference to the constraints of the international security system (a type [III] explanation). This leads us to conclude that the government's highly politicized procurement process reflected Trudeau's role as the defender of the federal interest, which does make sense.

THE 1983-84 PEACE INITIATIVE

We stated in the beginning of this chapter that Trudeau's attempt to defy the constraints of the international security system and make a particular imprint in Canadian security (defence) policy came not at the beginning of his tenure but at the end. By then, the constitution had been repatriated and, in Trudeau's mind, the accommodation of Quebec in the Canadian confederation had finally been settled. Role constraints no longer distracted him from foreign policy matters.

On October 27, 1983 in a speech at the University of Guelph, Trudeau outlined his strategies for peace and security in the nuclear age and, thus, initiated what scholars have accepted was his personal attempt to bring the United States and the Soviet Union back to the bargaining table after disarmament talks

had broken down between the two superpowers.[132] Trudeau stated that although he supported NATO's "two-track" strategy, he was adding a "third rail" in order to address the strain in Soviet-American relations. It was a formidable effort, one met with a great deal of skepticism both at home and abroad. At best, his peace initiative seemed like a misguided attempt by a relatively insignificant player in the superpower game; at worst, it appeared like an expensive world tour at the public's expense by a retiring politician.

Trudeau's peace initiative rested on five proposals: (1) to focus political attention on the Stockholm Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; (2) to stimulate discussions in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR); (3) to establish a new forum for the five nuclear powers; (4) to ban anti-satellite weapons; and (5) to reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[133] The initiative did take Trudeau all over the world. He went to Paris, The Hague, Brussels, Rome, the Vatican, Bonn, London and Zurich to elicit Western European support; he went to New Delhi to ask for the endorsement of the Commonwealth members; he went to China in an attempt to get Beijing's agreement to a five-power summit; he went to the United States, the United Nations and Eastern Europe; and he was finally able to visit the Soviet

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[132]See Richard and Sandra Gwyn, "The Politics of Peace," Saturday Night (May 1984): 19-32; Harald von Riekhoff and John Sigler, "The Trudeau peace initiative: the politics of reversing the arms race," in Canada Among Nations—1984: A Time of Transition (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1985), p. 50-69; Geoffrey Pearson, "Trudeau peace initiative reflections," International Perspectives (March/April 1985): 3-6; and Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 363-376.

[133]Pearson, "Trudeau peace initiative reflections," p. 4 and interview with author, Ottawa, Ontario, June 29, 1993.

Union when he attended the funeral of Yuri Andropov. Within the span of four months, Trudeau met with dozens of world leaders, and although he unofficially ended his attempt at peace in a speech to the House of Commons on February 9 by declaring the world a better place,[134] his peace initiative was decried by many critics. Was there no chance for success? If so, why did Trudeau attempt it in the first place?

Geoffrey Pearson states that Trudeau undertook the peace effort because he observed the rising tension between Washington and Moscow and believed that, as the senior statesman in the Western world, he had an obligation to do something about it.[135] The prime minister turned to External Affairs and, drawing on the talents of Klaus Goldschlag, the department presented him with a series of proposals to launch his peace initiative. Although Trudeau accepted the proposals on the whole, the United States was against most of them. Persistent American opposition entailed the inevitable failure of the prime minister's initiative. In particular, the Chinese, the British and the French would not agree to the five-power nuclear summit unless the Americans and the Soviets agreed to it first. The non-nuclear powers, like India, would not agree to a strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty unless the nuclear powers agreed to the dismantling of their weapons. The initiative, it seemed, was doomed from the beginning.

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[134]"Initiatives for Peace and Security," Remarks by the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, Ottawa, February 9, 1984, Statements and Speeches 84/2 (External Affairs Canada).

[135]Interview with author, Ottawa, Ontario, June 29, 1993.

However, according to Geoffrey Pearson, the original plan of the initiative was undermined by Trudeau's inability to visit Moscow before visiting Washington because Trudeau wanted to meet with President Ronald Reagan with what the prime minister believed would have been Soviet agreement to parts of the plan.[136] As it was, Trudeau's visit to Washington was anti-climactic because he was not able to meet with the Soviet premier. Pearson, who was Canada's ambassador to Moscow from 1980-83, asserts that there was Soviet interest in the Canadian initiative; according to Pearson, the Soviets were afraid that when Reagan was elected war between the two superpowers became more of a possibility and they welcomed any sign that there might be a turnabout.[137] The Soviet leaders, states Pearson, regarded Trudeau as balanced and objective and would have listened to what the Canadian prime minister would have had to say.[138] The problem is that we will never know whether the initiative would have been more successful had it gone according to plan but, at least, there appeared initially to be some chance of success.

What is interesting from our viewpoint is that Trudeau's original plan—using Moscow's agreement to influence Washington's response to his plan—was indeed an explicit

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[136]Ibid.

[137]Ibid.

[138]Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Union's longest-serving Foreign Minister, writes: "Trudeau was a man of great ability and tact. He would not skirt around a problem but would express his opinion straightaway...I found him well informed on international matters...(I)n international affairs, he stood head and shoulders above statesmen of other NATO countries." See Gromyko, Memories, translated by Harold Shukman (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 228.

attempt to defy the constraints of the international security system. We have characterized the constraints of the East-West conflict on the options for Canadian security and it has been accepted that Canadians act on security matters through the Western alliance. Trudeau knew that he would run across opposition from the Reagan administration, but the success of the initiative apparently did not rest on influencing NATO allies to convince the United States to change its position. Trudeau, it seemed, believed he could influence the East, and by getting Moscow's agreement, he could get Washington's agreement.

Moreover, Trudeau's preference for face-to-face meetings with world leaders in "selling" his peace plan was in keeping with his having sat as prime minister in international summits. Although we have argued that Trudeau's role-governed priorities distracted him during most of his tenure as prime minister from foreign policy matters, he as prime minister attended countless international summits and meetings. In these, coupled with the many first ministers' conferences that he attended, Trudeau would perhaps have become so accustomed that, as prime minister, leader-to-leader meetings became his procedure of choice for resolving conflicts. It was a behaviour that he learned because he was Canada's leader. In that way, we find it hardly puzzling why Trudeau chose the process that he did. He believed that he could inject "high political energy" in the East-West process, and he did it in the way that he knew how: leader-to-leader meetings.

TRUDEAU'S DEFENCE AND TRADE POLICIES

Finally, scholars have almost universally recognized the link between the resurgence of NATO in Canadian defence policy and Ottawa's pursuit of trade relations with Western Europe. According to Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky:

> When Canada approached Germany with the request for a contractual link with the European Community, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt allegedly told Prime Minister Trudeau bluntly, 'No tanks, no trade,' a reference to Canada's reluctance to outfit its forces in Germany with German tanks and, more generally, to make the point that Canada could not expect to obtain special standing with the Community while reducing its commitments to NATO.[139]

Michael Tucker argues that the procurement of West German Leopard tanks was clearly one of the Canadian government's "bargaining chips" in negotiating the agreement with the European community.[140] According to Stephen Clarkson, when the Trudeau government made its NATO decision in 1969, it "did not understand the link between military and political influence."[141] The "government," in this case, is a short-hand term for prime ministerial dominance because the general consensus in External Affairs and National Defence was to stay with the status quo. In particular, Mitchell Sharp, who had advocated trade links between Canada and Western Europe since his appointment to the external affairs portfolio in 1968, understood that the government's "commitment to NATO was

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[139]Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out (New York: Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 53.

[140]Tucker, p. 126-142.

[141]Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1982), p. 250.

the primary medium through which such a trade relationship could be fostered."[142] Indeed, this linkage between defence and trade matters introduces the importance of micro state-governed priorities in explaining Trudeau's defence policy. What is interesting, of course, is that these priorities did not stem from National Defence with international security concerns, but from External Affairs with international trade concerns. With that, let us continue on to our discussion of Trudeau's influence on trade policy.

[142]Tucker, p. 37.

CHAPTER FIVE: TRUDEAU AND TRADE POLICY

INTRODUCTION

According to section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 the federal government has jurisdiction over "the regulation of trade and commerce." As we saw at the end of the last chapter, the power to make trade policy led to efforts, in the case of the Trudeau government, to diversify Canada's trading relationships away from the traditional pull of the North American economy and Canada's perceived dependence on the United States. It was these efforts at trade diversification that led in part to the resurgence of Canada's NATO commitment in defence policy.[1] The Department of External Affairs and its minister, Mitchell Sharp, opposed Trudeau's initial defence policies because they perceived an intimate connection between Canadian defence and trade relations with Europe; the perception was borne out later as the government encountered European resistance to its trade overture.[2] To what extent did Trudeau play a part in his government's trade policy? Was trade policy consistent throughout his tenure as prime minister? These

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[1]The link is widely accepted by defence policy analysts, although for different reasons. Compare Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, p. 38, and Langille, Changing the Guard: Canada's Defence in a World in Transition, p. 63.

[2]The true legacy of the Robertson Report was that it recognized the connection between Canadian trade and defence relations with Europe. The Report states: "(M)arket diversification may be important if Canada is not to become so dependent on commercial relations with the the U. S. A. that she has little incentive to look elsewhere. The other markets are primarily in Europe...suggesting another dimension to the Atlantic (NATO) framework." Robertson, Foreign Policy Review, p. 31.

are questions made more important because of events after Trudeau left office.

After a brief Liberal interim under John Turner who had succeeded Trudeau as the party's leader, Brian Mulroney came into power in 1984 and fought an acrimonious election four years later on the issue of free trade. Not only had we witnessed the prime minister's prominent part in ensuring the initiation and completion of bilateral trade negotiations with the United States, but we also had to take note of the organizational changes in External Affairs that preceded the Mulroney government's decision to adopt a free trade policy. In particular, critics of free trade pointed out that in 1983 then opposition leader Brian Mulroney opposed further economic integration with the United States. To what extent did the merger of External Affairs with the trade component of Industry, Trade and Commerce, undertaken during the Trudeau years, play a part in the Conservative government's adoption of a free trade stance?

We stated in the last chapter that the re-emergence of NATO as a priority in Canadian defence policy was related to the goals and objectives of the Trudeau government's trade policy. The government had embraced trade diversification in its third option strategy and had looked to Europe as a counterweight to American economic influence. Trudeau, in particular, played an important part in achieving Canada's contractual link with the European Community. Yet, a little over a decade later, the Liberal government released a discussion paper, entitled Canadian Trade Policy in the

1980s.[3] under the auspices of the newly organized Department of External Affairs, which had taken over responsibility for international trade; it suggested initiating closer economic ties with the United States through the negotiation of sectoral free trade pacts. A year or so later, after the election of a Conservative government under Brian Mulroney, the notion of sectoral free trade gave way to the notion of comprehensive free trade with the United States.

In this chapter, because we have already recognized the link between the Trudeau government's defence and trade policies, we begin with an examination of its third option strategy which had centred on trade diversification. We see that trade policy in Canada has not simply been an "economic" problem; it is embedded in the contentious political nature of the Canadian-American relationship that has historically pitted economic nationalists against continentalists[4] in both government and academic circles. We then look at two reasons given for the inability of the Trudeau government to diversify Canada's trade and the failure of the third option. The first lay in the constraints of the international political economy. These constraints apparently led to the movement of Canada towards free trade with the United States in order to secure markets in an increasingly protectionist world. The second lay in the lack of an industrial strategy to encourage trade diversification. Without an

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[3]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canadian Trade Policy in the 1980s (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1983).

[4]For a general discussion of these opposing views on Canadian-American economic relations, see Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite?, p. 20-32.

industrial strategy by the federal government, so it is argued, diversification remained "foreign" to Canadian businesses drawn to the proximity of the country's southern neighbour.

At the same time, the change from the third option to the "second option"—i. e., free trade—in Canadian trade policy came after the 1982 reorganization of External Affairs. Why was External Affairs given responsibility for international trade? Was it simply an organizational response to changes in the international political economy or in Canada's domestic political scene? Scholars of public policy and public administration have pointed out that Trudeau organized and reorganized Canada's administrative machinery when he was prime minister in order to create a "rational" policy-making process.[5] From the viewpoint of explaining Trudeau's actions, might there be other reasons why the reorganization of Exernal Affairs took place? To what extent did the prime minister's role-governed priorities influence the 1982 amalgamation of External Affairs? We see in the final part of the chapter, by looking into the idea of External Affairs as a "central agency" for foreign policy in Canada, that the reorganization may have occurred in part to curb independent provincial actions abroad. This leads us to ask: Is the role of defending the federal interest also one undertaken generally by individuals in federal institutions, especially External Affairs with

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[5]See G. Bruce Doern, "The Policy-Making Philosophy of Prime Minister Trudeau and His Advisers," in Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, 2nd ed., edited by Thomas Hockin (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 189-196; Peter Aucoin, "The Machinery of Government: From Trudeau's Rational Management to Mulroney's Brokerage Politics," in Prime Ministers and Premiers: Political Leadership and Public Policy in Canada, edited by Leslie A. Pal and David Taras (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 50-68; Colin Campbell, Governments Under Stress (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 77-99.

regard to foreign policy matters? This is the kind of question that we pose, as well, in the next chapter when we examine Trudeau's influence on aid policy.

THE THIRD OPTION

In the fall of 1972, under the authorship of the External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, the Trudeau government released its trade policy paper, entitled, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future."[6] The paper outlined three choices for Canada in dealing with the United States: it could preserve the status quo between the two countries; it could foster further integration with the United States; or it could build relations with other countries and thus avoid closer ties with its powerful neighbor. The Trudeau government elected to pursue the "third option" and diversify Canada's trading relations abroad.[7] In particular, the government looked to Europe to countervail American influence and, two years later, formally began pursuing a "contractual link" with the European Community. After two years of negotiation, the Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation

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[6]Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," International Perspectives (Autumn 1972) Special Issue.

[7]Two interesting "analytical" studies of the third option can be found in Canada's Foreign Policy: Analysis and Trends, edited by Brian W. Tomlin (Toronto: Methuen, 1978. Harald von Reikhoff, in "The Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy," p. 87-109, assesses the success of the third option by looking at social and economic transactions between the two states. Don Munton and Dean Swanson, in "Rise and Fall of the Third Option: Forecasting Canadian-American Relations into the 1980s," p. 175-213, attempt to predict the future of the Canadian-American relationship by employing the "Delphi" exercise; "Delphi is essentially a method of obtaining and refining, by means of a questionnaire, the judgments or hunches of a group of experts as to future developments in a given area. The primary purpose in using it here is to obtain a basis for assessing the prospects for the Third Option" (p. 177).

between Canada and the European Community was signed on October 1, 1976. The agreement highlighted not only the reconfirmation of Europe as Canada's historical counterweight to the United States, but also the importance of Trudeau's personal intervention and efforts in the negotiating process. By injecting "high-level diplomacy" through visits to the different European capitals, Trudeau ensured the success of what Robert Boardman called was an important "initiative"[8] in Canadian foreign policy; the initiative centred on preserving Canada's transatlantic link to stave off continentalist pressures.

Counterweights against American economic influence appeared particularly necessary after the "Nixon shock" in August 1971 brought home to Ottawa how vulnerable the Canadian economy was to the domestic economic policies of Washington. Although barely lasting six months, the crisis created by the American government's decision to impose a 10 percent import surcharge on foreign goods—and the "shock" that Canadian products were not exempted as they had been in the past—prompted the Trudeau government to re-examine Canadian-American relations.[9] Mitchell Sharp states that he, as then Secretary of State for External Affairs, was directed specifically by Cabinet to undertake a "special study" of Canada-U. S. relations.[10] What

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[8]Robert Boardman, "Initiatives and Outcomes: The European Community and Canada's 'Third Option'," Journal of European Integration 3 (September 1979): 5-28.

[9]See Peter Dobell, Canada in World Affairs, 1971-1973 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985).

[10]Sharp, unpublished memoirs and interview with author.

emerged was a study that attempted to address the calls for Canada to deal with its economic dependence on the United States in order to preserve the country's national sovereignty.[11]

Denis Stairs argues that Canadians "historically have found it difficult to separate their relationship with the United States from their concern to preserve their autonomy and independence in other areas of public policy."[12] From Robert Borden's anti-reciprocity campaign launched against the Laurier government in 1911, to William Lyon Mackenzie King's decision to reject a customs union with the United States in 1948, Canadian politicians have been wary of trade deals with Americans that might encroach on Canadian sovereignty.[13] In its rejection of the "second option," the Trudeau government embraced the views of past governments. However, in its espousal of the third option, the Trudeau government essentially asserted that it could do something about Canadian economic

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[11]See the reports dealing specifically with the high levels of foreign (mainly American) ownership and investment in Canada (the so-called Watkins and Gray Reports): Canada, Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1968) and Government of Canada, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1972). See also Walter Gordon, Storm Signals: New Economic Policies for Canada, who was a strong economic nationalist in the Pearson government. For a discussion of the nature of Canadian-American economic relations leading up to the third option, see Margaret Royal, "Canadian-American Relations: The Last Option: A Study of the Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Kingston: Queen's University, 1984), p. 77-89.

[12]Denis Stairs, "Canada's Trade Relations with the United States: The Non-Economic Implications of an Economic Issue," in Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement, edited by Lee H. Radebaugh and Earl H. Fry (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1986), p. 53.

[13]For a historical perspective, see J.L. Granatstein, "The Issue That Will Not Go Away: Free Trade Between Canada and the United States," in Denis Stairs and Gilbert Winham, The Politics of Canada's Economic Relationship with the United States, Vol. 29, Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

dependence; that it could arrest what appeared to be the momentum of continental economic integration. That is why to Dewitt and Kirton, the third option was an example of Canada emerging as a principal power.[14] In the fashioning of its trade policy, according to Dewitt and Kirton, Ottawa was preserving the national interest and acting in a unilateral manner indicative of a position of strength in the international system.

The third option had three components: Canadian ownership of the economy, cultural protection and trade diversification.[15] Taken together, the third option appeared to be an "economic nationalist"[16] strategy, particularly in terms of the policies that the government eventually adopted regarding the promotion of Canadian economic ownership and the protection of Canadian cultural industries. The third option led arguably to the establishment of the Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1974, the founding of Petro-Canada in 1975, and the creation of the National Energy Program in 1980; all of these efforts addressing the problem of foreign ownership, like cultural protection, were apparently matters of domestic public policy. It was trade diversification, as the foreign policy component, that was to govern the conduct of Canada's

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[14]Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, p. 72.

[15]Thomas Axworthy, "'To Stand Not So High Perhaps but Always Alone': The Foreign Policy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau" in Towards A Just Society, edited by Thomas Axworthy and Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 33.

[16]For a defence of the Trudeau government's economic nationalist policies, see "Economic Nationalism," An Address by the Honourable Gerald Regan, Minister of State (International Trade), to the Banker's Association for Foreign Trade, San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 13, 1983, Statements and Speeches 83/5 (External Affairs Canada).

international economic affairs; and it was a manifestation, according to Thomas Axworthy, of Trudeau's personal political philosophy: "create counterweights."[17]

The distinction between domestic and foreign policies in the third option strategy is clearly artificial.[18] The government's attempt to increase Canadian ownership and investment in the economy became the most problematic aspects of the third option for the Canadian-American relationship. This was evident in Mark MacGuigan's speech, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Centre for Inter-American Relations in September 1981. MacGuigan recognized that the Foreign Investment Review Agency and the National Energy Program had become major irritants in Canadian-American relations, but he defended the government's policies based on the "country's growing determination to have the necessary amount of control over its own destiny."[19] Economic nationalist policies, although having external ramifications, were undertaken for domestic reasons. MacGuigan states: "For Canada, the state of relations with the United States is a crucial matter, full of political sensitivity. Energy and investment questions lie at the heart of the relationship between our two countries. The Canadian

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[17]Axworthy, p. 32.

[18]The linkage between foreign and domestic policies is the point often made by those who study the third option strategy. For an academic viewpoint, see Royal, "Canadian-American Relations: The Last Option: A Study of the Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy," and for a governmental (official) viewpoint, see A. E. Gotlieb and Jeremy Kinsman, "Reviving the Third Option," International Perspectives (January/February 1981).

[19]"The Canadian Perspective on Foreign Investment and Energy Questions," An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Centre for Inter-American Relations, New York, September 30, 1981, Statements and Speeches 81/24 (External Affairs Canada), p. 6.

government has developed policies in these areas which command broad national support. The government has sought to take American concerns into account...but the main lines of our policies are set. They are set because they correspond to the firm wish of the people of Canada."[20]

Allan MacEachen had made similar statements years earlier when he was external affairs minister. Discussing the "new balance sought in Canada-U.S. relations," MacEachen stated:

> (T)o chart the direction of its own national development, Canada has taken a number of policy initiatives that are not directed against, but affect most, its closest friends in the United States...Of course, depending on one's perspective of change, I suspect that Canada's efforts to seek a new balance can be misconstrued. Perhaps this accounts for the conclusion of some observers that Canada-U.S. relations are somehow moving out of phase in certain areas, or that Canadian actions are chipping away at the traditional harmony between the two countries...It does not seem warranted to take the position that our bilateral relations are somehow less successful because of Canada's efforts to achieve national goals that Americans take for granted."[21]

It is widely recognized that the steps taken by the Trudeau government to redress the high levels of foreign ownership and investment strained Canadian-American relations.[22] Given the three components of the third option strategy outlined earlier, trade diversification was the least problematic aspect for the Canadian-American relationship. In fact, to the extent that the Trudeau

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[20]Ibid.

[21]"New Balance Sought in Canada-U. S. Relations," Remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, at a Dinner Given in His Honour by the United States Secretary of State, the Honourable Henry A. Kissinger, Washington, D. C., August 17, 1976, Statements and Speeches 76/22 (External Affairs Canada).

[22]See, for example, Joseph T. Jockel, "The Canada-United States relationship after the third round: the emergence of semi-institutionalized management," International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985): 690-691.

government's trade policy led to the resurgence of its NATO commitment, the Americans welcomed the initiative.[23]

The third option was not Trudeau's idea but, instead, the brainchild of the Department of External Affairs under the ministerial direction of Mitchell Sharp. It was drafted, specifically, by Klaus Goldshlag within the Policy Analysis Group (PAG) of External Affairs.[24] There appears to be some question about how committed or how unified the Trudeau cabinet was on the third option policy because it was released under Sharp's authorship in a special autumn issue of International Perspectives rather than as a government white paper.[25] According to Sharp, "the cabinet was not quite sure how the third option would work out" because the policy involved difficult decisions to implement; as well, the Ministers of Finance and Industry, Trade and Commerce preferred the first option and the maintenance of the status quo.[26] However, Trudeau undoubtedly supported the new strategy. The former Secretary of State for External Affairs states that the prime minister participated actively in the cabinet debates and advocated strongly for the publication of the third option strategy as an indication of the

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[23]See Donald Barry, "The United States and the Development of the Canada-European Community Contractual Link Relationship," American Review of Canadian Studies 10 (Spring 1980): 63-74.

[24]Sharp, unpublished memoirs and interview with author.

[25]These reservations are brought out by four analysts of Canada-U.S. relations invited by International Perspectives (January/February 1973) to comment on the options paper. See Dale C. Thomson, "Option Three: what price tag?...," p. 3-6; Louis Balthazar, "Achieving a stronger identity...," p. 7-9.; Harry G. Johnson, "The advantages of integration...," p. 9-12; and Abraham Rotstein, "Shedding innocence and dogma...," p. 12-13.

[26]Sharp, unpublished memoirs and interview with author.

government's determination to maintain Canadian independence. In addition, according to Sharp, the third option was an alternative rather than an espousal of the kinds of extreme economic nationalism then expressed at the time, and that was why it came to be accepted as government policy.[27]

The most visible manifestation of the attempt at trade diversification within the third option policy was the contractual link between Canada and the European Community.[28] It took two years to negotiate the Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation between Canada and the European Community,[29] and some scholars have pointed out that Trudeau's personal intervention and diplomacy by visiting Brussels in October 1974 and, then, the individual Western European capitals in a whirlwind tour in March 1975 may have helped lead to the

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[27]Ibid.

[28]The Trudeau government also signed the Framework for Economic Cooperation with Japan during the prime minister's October 1976 visit to Tokyo. We leave it aside in our discussion of the government's attempt to diversify Canada's trade for two reasons. First of all, although it was very similar to Canada's agreement with the European Community, the agreement with Japan was much less contentious. Not only did Japan already have an existing commerce agreement with Canada, but it was also a recognized state. Part of the problem that arose during the contractual link talks with the European Community was whether the Community could actually conduct "foreign" policy because it was not a sovereign entity (and there was opposition by members to see the Community as such). Secondly, we are establishing the connection between Canadian defence and trade policies during the Trudeau years, and we see this clearly in Canadian relations with Europe. For more on the Canada-Japan agreement, see Royal, p. 175-181 and Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 172-177.

[29]See Robert Bothwell, "The 'Canadian Connection' : Canada and Europe," in Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, edited by Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 24-36; Robert Boardman, "Initiatives and Outcomes: The European Community and Canada's 'Third Option'," p. 5-28; E. E. Mahant, "Canada and the European Community: The First Twenty Years," Journal of European Integration 4 (Spring 1981): 263-279; and Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette: Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 162-170.

successful conclusion of negotiations.[30] Trudeau conveyed to European leaders that the agreement was central to Canadian national life. In particular, he apparently convinced Helmut Schmidt of the seriousness of Canadian commitment to Europe by agreeing to purchase West German C-1 Leopard tanks for the Canadian Forces.[31] Although it was more than a year later when the Canadian-European agreement was signed, Trudeau's part in the process was a turning point: "Once Mr. Trudeau finally put his authority behind the government's policy of strengthening relations with Western Europe, efforts to conclude a framework agreement began to bear fruit."[32]

Indeed, as Peter Dobell points out, Trudeau had visited British Prime Minister Edward Heath in London in December 1972 and related to Heath, then, how vulnerable Canada was to continentalist pressures. The next logical step would have been a visit by the Canadian prime minister to Brussels to convey similar messages to the European Community.[33] Dobell states that there was both parliamentary and media support for the prime minister to visit Brussels.[34] The External Affairs department had already initiated talks with the European Community in January 1972 and the talks had stalled later in the year with the Community's rejection of Sharp's proposal for the establishment of joint ministerial

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[30]Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 168, 170.

[31]Tucker, p. 130-133.

[32]Dobell, p. 133.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

committees. According to Dobell, a visit by Trudeau to Brussels at this time would have aided Canadian negotiating efforts, as borne out by the success of the talks years later, but the the prime minister did not visit the European continent until after he was re-elected in 1974. Trudeau waited because at the time he was concerned that his first official visit to Western Europe would not include a visit to France.[35] It was not until October 1974 that French President Giscard d'Estaing gave a formal invitation for the Canadian prime minister to visit Paris. Immediately afterwards Trudeau went on to Brussels and, four months later, the prime minister visited the rest of the Western European capitals.

From Dobell's account, it appears that the timing of Trudeau's intervention was guided by the status of Franco-Canadian relations which would relate, in turn, to the status of Ottawa-Quebec relations. As we will see in the next chapter, France had fuelled Quebec's aspirations for independence, thereby straining French relations with the federal government in Ottawa. In 1972, the Trudeau government was attempting to improve its relationship with both France and Quebec; Ottawa and Quebec City had come to an agreement regarding provincial presence in la francophonie (Paris had opposed any attempt to subsume Quebec's standing in the French-speaking organization under Ottawa).

We stated in the second chapter that our application of the framework accounts for why the prime minister was preoccupied with domestic matters during most of his tenure but that there were

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[35]Ibid.

two caveats in our finding. One caveat was the recognition that formal constitutional talks were not going on between 1971-1975, although we argued that not only did Trudeau have a minority government (1972-1974), but other problems related to federalism, namely issues of energy and rising Western dissatisfaction, became more prominent. However, during this period, although we expected that role constraints on the prime minister would be less pressing, we can see that, even here, Trudeau's personal intervention in the contractual link talks (in terms of timing) may have been determined in part by his role-governed priorities.

Other than the reciprocation of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status between Canada and the European Community and the establishment of the Joint Cooperation Committee, the agreement did not embody any sustantial commitment between the two parties. Scholars agree that the contractual link, although it attested to the persistence of Canadian diplomats in obtaining an agreement that was beset by difficulties from the start, was a modest achievement at best, producing very marginal benefits for Canada.[36] N. G. Papadopoulos examines the factors explaining the declining importance of Canadian-European trade relations despite the framework agreement, pointing out that in 1960 Canadian exports to Great Britain alone accounted for 33 percent of the country's total exports whereas twenty-five years later, Canadian exports to the

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[36]See Bothwell, "The 'Canadian Connection': Canada and Europe," p. 24-36; Boardman, "Initiatives and Outcomes: The European Community and Canada's 'Third Option'," p. 5-28; and Mahant, "Canada and the European Community: The First Twenty Years," p. 263-279.

entire European Community accounted for only 6 percent of the country's total exports.[37]

The third option's call for diversification did not alter Canadian trading patterns. The United States continued to account for the majority of Canadian total exports and imports in the decade following the announcement of the third option. The head of the Canadian mission to the European Communities, Richard Tait, stated in October 1979, that the Canadian-European framework agreement or any trade link "depends ultimately for its success not on the goodwill and aspirations of its signatories, which are governments, but upon the decisions of individual businessmen, industrialists and investors."[38] Trading with the United States simply remained more attractive to Canadian businesses.

On January 1981, Secretary of State for External Affairs MacGuigan announced a "new policy of bilateralism."[39] There, he stated: "(O)ur national self-interest now calls for a new look at the conditions in which we have to do business and at the relationship between business and government in Canada in the years ahead," adding that the "most obvious bilateral relationship of benefit to Canada is that with the United States."[40] Shortly before Trudeau

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[37]N. G. Papadopoulos, Canada and the European Community: An Uncomfortable Partnership? (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986), p. xx.

[38]"Canada and the European Communities," A Speech by Mr. Richard Tait, Head of Mission, Canadian Mission to the European Communities, to the Ontario Chamber of Commerce, Toronto, October 24, 1979, p. 4.

[39]"Bilateral Approach to Foreign Policy," A Speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Empire Club of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, January 22, 1981, Statements and Speeches 81/2 (External Affairs Canada).

[40]Ibid, p. 1, 5.

left office, External Affairs released a discussion paper which suggested closer trade relations with the United States on a sector-by-sector basis.[41] Free trade with the United States had been called for by the Economic Council of Canada in 1975[42] and recommended by the Senate Standing Committee in 1982;[43] this recommendation was echoed in 1985 by the Macdonald Commission,[44] a body appointed by Trudeau to examine the economic prospects of Canada. The winds of change had blown and continental economic integration with the United States appeared to be the best option for Canadian trade even before the Mulroney government took power. Once in power, the Conservative government tabled its "green paper" on foreign policy in May 1985 and argued that a Canada-U. S. free trade agreement "could provide a stable and long-term solution to Canada's vital objectives of secure market access and enhanced international competitiveness."[45]

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[41]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canadian Trade Policy in the 1980s. See also Department of External Affairs, A Review of Trade Policy: A Background Document to Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980s (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1983).

[42]Economic Council of Canada, Looking Outward: A New Trade Strategy for Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).

[43]Canada, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada-United States Relations: Canada's Trade Relations with the United States, 3 vols. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1975, 1978, 1982).

[44]Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 3 vols., Donald Macdonald, chairman (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985).

[45]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985), p. 31.

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Anthony Westell asserts that the third option was a policy for a different time in Canadian history when the country was prosperous and self-sufficient; and that the reason for the failure of the third option could be found in the nature of the international economic system, or the international political economy.[46] Other scholars have also argued that the Trudeau government's trade policy was not in keeping with international economic reality.[47] Basically their argument rests on four points: (1) Canada is a trade-dependent state; (2) Canada trades mostly with the United States; (3) Canada is facing a protectionist international economic environment; and (4) Canada must secure market access. We will address these points, in turn, to flesh out why the constraints of the international political economy, in effect, signalled the failure of trade diversification despite the European (and Japanese) links established by the government.

International trade is vital to the Canadian economy. International Trade Minister Edward Lumley stated on July 1982: "Of the major industrialized countries represented at the annual economic summits...none is more dependent than Canada on the trade dimension for economic growth."[48] In 1960, Canadian total

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[46]Anthony Westell, "Economic Integration with the USA," International Perspectives (November/December 1984): 2-22.

[47]See, for example, Richard G. Lipsey, "The Economics of a Canadian-American Free Trade Association," in The Future on the Table, edited by Michael D. Henderson (North York, Ont.: Masterpress, 1987): 35-53.

[48]"Canada-United States Trade Issues and Concerns," An Address by the Honourable Edward Lumley, Minister of State for International Trade, to the National Foreign Trade Council, New York, July 22, 1982, Statements and Speeches 82/21 (External Affairs Canada).

exports and imports accounted for, respectively, 17.3 percent and 18.5 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP); by 1980, the share of exports and imports had grown, respectively, to 28.2 percent and 26.4 percent of Canada's GDP.[49] In addition, of the total Canadian trade, over two-thirds in 1981 was done with the United States, accounting for over $107 billion (Cdn.) in two-way trade between the two countries.[50] The extent of Canadian-American trade relations was what initially prompted the Trudeau government to adopt a policy of diversification, but as Axworthy admits, the Trudeau government may have assumed too much in thinking that it could redraw the country's international trading patterns.[51]

Moreover, Canada experienced a decline in growth in the 1970s beginning with the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange-rate system and then faced a worldwide recession in the 1980s. This economic decline not only meant that Canada could no longer afford the kind of economic nationalist policies evident in the third option, but also resulted in rising global protectionism.[52] Other states, also experiencing difficult economic times like Canada, turned away from additional attempts at trade liberalization within GATT and began undertaking protectionist measures.[53] The failure

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[49]Jock Finlayson, "Trade and Global Interdependence," in World Politics, edited by Haglund and Hawes, p. 286 (table 3).

[50]"Canada-United States Trade Issues and Concerns," An Address by the Honourable Edward Lumley.

[51]Axworthy, p. 36.

[52]This is the central argument in Westell, p. 2-22.

[53]Finlayson, p. 301-303.

of the framework agreement between Canada and the European Community, some have argued, can be accounted for by worsening economic times being experienced globally.[54] It is not surprising that both parties should address their own economic problems first before undertaking further economic relations.

A protectionist international economic environment presented problems for a trade-dependent state like Canada, and it had little choice but to secure market access to the United States, its largest trading partner. According to Gil Winham, continental economic integration as evident in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, negotiated by the Mulroney government, "is based on economic realism (because the) reality of Canada's trade position is bilateral."[55] The trade diversification strategy was in some sense doomed to failure because "it is the smaller countries, whose domestic economies are more integrated with an international economy (and in Canada's case, a continental economy) over which they exercise little influence, that experience the most pronounced loss of national autonomy in economic decision-making."[56] In this context, this part of the third option was perhaps never really an option.

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[54]See Mahant, p. 263-279.

[55]Gil Winham, Trading with Canada: The Canada-U. S. Free Trade Agreement (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1988), p. 67.

[56]Finlayson, p. 284.

THE LACK OF A DOMESTIC INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY

In her study of the third option, Margaret Royal argues that the trade strategy failed because the Trudeau government only gave it a foreign policy application, i.e., trade diversification, and not a domestic policy application, i.e., industrial strategy.[57] Royal points out that had the Trudeau government undertaken steps to encourage Canadian businesses, through tax incentives, export grants, and other measures, Canadian trade may have been more diversified than proved otherwise.[58] The linkage that Royal makes is interesting because trade policy is a federal prerogative, but industrial strategies are undertaken by both the federal and provincial governments.[59] Industrial strategies are expensive undertakings by governments, usually through subsidies or adjustment policies,[60] to enhance economic productivity and growth; such a strategy was evident, as we saw, in the kinds of measures undertaken by the federal government in defence procurement.

According to Sharp, although the third option had indeed contemplated some kind of industrial strategy, the Trudeau government never seriously attempted one because it would have been "far too difficult an undertaking for any federal government of Canada given the crucial role of the provinces with respect both to

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[57]Royal, p. 284-323.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Kenneth Woodside, "Trade and Industrial policy: Hard Choices," in Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, edited by Michael M. Atkinson (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), p. 272-273.

[60]Ibid, p. 242-248.

resources and industry."[61] Monetary constraints were not the sole deciding factors preventing the Trudeau government from implementing a concomitant industrial strategy to the third option. Provincial reactions, both actual and potential, according to Sharp, were always in the minds of federal policy-makers.[62]

There is more in the connection between trade and industrial policies that takes us into the federal government's decision to pursue free trade. According to Kenneth Woodside: "Trade policy can be considered a form of industrial policy, one that is less demanding of public institutions and more dependent on market incentives for its success."[63] Woodside states that the movement to free trade in the early 1980s must have been particularly attractive to federal policy-makers because they could act alone without formal provincial participation.[64] Trade policy is indeed a federal prerogative,[65] and "as the scale and scope of the FTA suggest, Canada had firmly moved to discipline many potential industrial policy measures through its nearly irreversible commitment to trade

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[61]Sharp, unpublished memoirs.

[62]Sharp, interview with author. Interestingly enough, in stating the extent to which the third option had succeeded, Mr. Sharp gives the example of bilingualism. He states that anything that helped to define Canadian culture and identity attests to the success of the third option. I find it interesting that Mr. Sharp would include bilingualism in the third option strategy, highlighting perhaps that the need to accommodate Quebec aspirations was first and foremost in the minds of federal policy-makers.

[63]Woodside, p. 251.

[64]Ibid, p. 273.

[65]Although the process, itself, as evident in the mechanisms established to prepare for the Canadian position during the Tokyo Round of GATT talks (1973-79) may be considered "federalized." The key point, however, is that provincial interests are funneled through federal bodies (which we also witnessed during the free trade talks). See Gil Winham, "Bureaucratic Politics and Canadian Trade Negotiation," International Journal, Vol 34, No. 1 (Winter 1978-79): 64-89.

liberalization."[66] It appears, then, that, through the free trade agreement, the federal government may have essentially usurped provincial ability to carry out industrial strategies. To the extent that provincial industrial strategies have been used for "province-building,"[67] leading to greater regionalization of the Canadian economy, the free trade agreement may have worked to defend the federal interest.

THE 1982 REORGANIZATION

In January 1982 the Department of External Affairs was combined with the Trade Commissioner Service, the trade component of Industry, Trade and Commerce, the Export Development Corporation, and the Canadian Commercial Corporation to create a newly-expanded department responsible for external affairs and international trade.[68] With the Department contemplating "sectoral free trade" shortly thereafter, it is difficult to imagine that the amalgamation did not somehow signal a re-thinking of Canadian trade policy.[69] Royal states that another reason for the failure of the third option was because External Affairs did not have any

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[66]Woodside, p. 266.

[67]Ibid, p. 264.

[68]The 1982 reorganization has been the subject of a number of recent works. See Ernie Keenes, "Rearranging the deck chairs: a political economy approach to foreign policy management in Canada," Canadian Public Administration 35 (Autumn 1992): 381-401; Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers, p. 36-42; and Nossal, "Contending Explanations for the Amalgamation of External Affairs," unpublished paper.

[69]See Stairs, "Canada's Trade Relations with the United States: The Non-Economic Implications of an Economic Issue," p. 56.

authority to impose its will on other departments; in particular, Industry, Trade and Commerce was hostile to the idea.[70]

The prime minister was the one who announced the reorganization of External Affairs and Trudeau had undertaken countless changes to Canada's administrative machinery, including the external affairs bureaucracy,[71] during his tenure as prime minister. Thus, it seems relevant to ask: Why did Trudeau reorganize External Affairs in 1982?

We have already seen, to some extent, how macro system-governed and micro-state-governed priorities would have determined his actions. In terms of macro system-governed priorities, the prime minister was subject to the constraints of the international economic system. Ernie Keenes argues that the amalgamation took place as a necessary institutional response to the changes occurring in the international political economy.[72] Keenes traces the amalgamation to the end of the Bretton Woods era when international economic issues, e.g., trade, became more "political." Gone was the liberal consensus that trade liberalization leading to specialization of industrial production and comparative advantage in the global arena was a "technical" issue not dealt with by politicians. Indeed, according to Keenes, the third option strategy was the Trudeau government's first step in explicitly combining domestic economic development with international trade policy.[73] The government had

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[70]Royal,p. 331-335.

[71]Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 210-216.

[72]Keenes, p. 381-401.

[73]Ibid, p. 394-395.

to set up the mechanisms to respond to changes in the international political economy.

In terms of micro state-governed priorities, Trudeau was subject to the constraints of the domestic process. If, as Royal argues, External Affairs did not have the authority to impose its will on the other governmental departments, leading to the demise of the third option, then the amalgamation was the logical next step in giving the Department control over trade policy. Tucker outlines how the policy-making role of External Affairs had declined substantially in the first decade of the Trudeau years: the Department experienced a "loss of rank" because it had to compete with other departments for access to the Prime Minister; a "lack of expertise" because it did not have the technical knowledge of "low politics" within the Department; and a "communications barrier" because other departments, such as Energy and Fisheries, did not collaborate with External Affairs.[74] In 1979 Allan Gotlieb, then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, had made the same kind of observations. Gotlieb stated that with changes in the international economic system, there was a need to re-assess the role of the Department: "A 'taking stock' of these changes and the determination of the appropriate departmental response, both in organizational and substantive terms, was (his) highest priority in (his) return to External Affairs (in 1977)."[75] The organizational

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[74]Tucker, p. 61-65.

[75]A. E. Gotlieb, USSEA, Canadian Diplomacy in the 1980s, A public lecture under the joint sponsorship of the Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, February 15, 1979 (National Archives, RG 25, 1-1-11-Central Agency).

changes were put on hold until after Trudeau's return to power in 1980. In 1981 Gotlieb was appointed Ambassador to the United States and Gordon Obaldeston, once a deputy minister in Industry, Trade and Commerce, headed the reorganization as the new Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.[76] The idea for amalgamation largely came from the bureaucrats and not the politicians,[77] only adding to the importance of Trudeau's micro-state governed priorities as determinants of his actions.

The reorganization of External Affairs can also be explained by the prime minister's idiosyncratic priorities; "the elimination of separate ministries for 'diplomacy' and 'trade' (was in part) the consequence of Trudeau's own personal scepticism about the utility of a traditional foreign ministry."[78] Nossal offers a compelling account of Trudeau's desire not only to turn the external affairs bureaucracy into a "rational" body, but also to give it a "relevant" function to play "in an era of instantaneous, world-wide communications, in which there is increasing reliance on personal contacts between senior members of government, and in which international relations are concerned with progressively more complex and technical questions."[79] Since coming to office, Trudeau

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[76]See Nossal, "Contending Explanations for the Amalgamation of External Affairs," p. 15; and Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 231-233.

[77]Sharp, interview with author.

[78]Nossal, "Contendng Explanations for the Amalgamation of External Affairs," p. 2.

[79]Pierre Trudeau letter to Pamela McDougall, 28 August 1980, reprinted in Canada, Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service, Pamela A. McDougall, Commissioner, Report (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1981), p. viii, as quoted in ibid, p. 5.

was concerned about the reactive nature of the foreign policy-making process as well as the out-moded function of traditional diplomacy. The amalgamation, arguably, was a logical extension of the prime minister's concerns about External Affairs.

We can identify maco system-governed, micro state-governed and idiosyncratic priorities as determinants of Trudeau's action. Can we offer a more complete account of the prime minister's behaviour by also finding role-governed priorities (a type [I] explanation within the framework)? In order to do so, we need to go back to why bureaucrats in External Affairs favoured reorganization.

Gotlieb's speech, quoted above, introduced the notion of External Affairs as a "central agency."[80] The idea, it appears, was pursued by the then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in order to claim for External Affairs the primary (and final) responsibility for international affairs.[81] In a circular document, dated November 15, 1978, Gotlieb discussed with the Department the notion of External Affairs as a "modern central policy agency."[82] Here, Gotlieb states:

> The government considers the Department of External Affairs to be a central agency because it has a responsibility to provide other departments with coherent policy and priority guidance covering the full range of Canadian international relations...We are obliged to take action if domestic policies with foreign dimensions are improperly coordinated with external policies or

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[80]Gotlieb, "Canadian Diplomacy in the 1980s," p. 13.

[81]This is evident in the letter to Allan Gotlieb, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, from Gordon Smith, Senior Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Cabinet (Privy Council Office), dated March 10, 1978 (National Archives, RG-25, 1-1-11-Central Agency).

[82]Circular Document, Admin. No. 56/78 [USSEA] (National Archives, RG 25, 1-1-11-Central Agency).

> are inconsistent with Canada's international goals and objectives."[83]

As indicated by our discussion above of the prime minister's micro state-governed priorities, the central agency concept was meant to reclaim from other federal departments the right of External Affairs to make foreign policy. Were other federal departments, however, the only ones challenging External Affairs in the conduct of international affairs?

In May 1979 Vernon Turner, Chair of the Policy Planning Secretariat in External Affairs presented the idea of the Department as a central agency to a Public Service Commission seminar,[84] and solicited comments from present and former senior members of External Affairs on the idea. Canada's former Ambassador to Sweden (who had played an important part in negotiating Canada's recognition of Peking) A. J. Andrew responded, agreeing with the notion of External Affairs as a central agency, and then adding: "The next battle, and it will be a lulu, is to try to recapture from the provinces, the department's right to apply precisely the same criteria to provincial government operations abroad as it claims in respect of other federal departments...The veto on Provincial operations implied here would not give the Feds the power to implement domestically contracts it had entered into externally. It would however stop the reverse tendency by which the provinces in applying their domestic powers in the external environment have invaded a Federal

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[83]Ibid, p. 3.

[84]Schedule for Public Service Commission Seminar on the Machinery of Government, Touraine, Quebec, May 14-17, 1979 (National Archives, RG 25, 1-1-11-Central Agency).

jurisdiction. Moreover, this is the ultimate area in which Canadian unity will be either reasserted or vanish."[85] To what extent did Andrew's comments characterize another side of the central agency principle--federal assertion over the provinces to make foreign policy? It is interesting to note that in October 1966 Gotlieb, then Head of the Legal Division in External Affairs, was appointed by Marcel Cadieux as the first Special Adviser to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on Federal-Provincial Matters.[86] In that capacity, Gotlieb also headed the Task Force on International Aspects of Federal-Provincial Relations[87] which went on (although not under his tutelage) to write the two white papers on federalism and foreign policy (which we discuss in the next chapter).

Elliot Feldman and Lily Gardner Feldman argue that there were three main principles underlying the 1982 reorganization of External Affairs: (1) the federal government could no longer give secondary attention to matters of "low politics"; (2) the federal government had too many agencies conducting foreign policy without coordination; and (3) the provincial governments were undertaking international activity that rightfully belonged to Ottawa.[88] According to Feldman and Feldman, the foreign actions of

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[85]Letter to Vernon Turner from A. J. Andrew, dated March 27, 1979 (National Archives, RG 25, 1-1-11-Central Agency). The letter was marked up and initialed, indicating that other officials in External Affairs had read the letter.

[86]Administrative Notices, No. 43, "Appointment of Special Adviser on Federal-Provincial Matters," dated October 7, 1966 (National Archives, RG 25, 80-81/031, Box 1, File 30-2-1 pt. 1).

[87]Memo to All Heads of Division from USSEA, dated January 30, 1967 (National Archives, RG 25, 80-81/031, Box 1, File 30-2-1 pt. 1).

[88]Elliot J. Feldman and Lily Gardner Feldman, "The Impact of Federalism on the Organization of Canadian Foreign Policy," (originally in Publius: The Journal Of Federalism Vol. 14, No. 4 [1984]: 33-59) in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism,

provinces had largely been in economic affairs and External Affairs was not equipped at the time to deal with this kind of challenge. The "reorganization of the Department of External Affairs is a clear signal that low politics are central to Canada's foreign policy and that the activities of the provinces, like the activities of other federal departments and agencies, must be monitored and perhaps controlled...(because the) uncoordinated economic endeavours of the provinces are potentially as threatening (for the federation) as Quebec's search for political recognition."[89]

What Feldman and Feldman's analysis offers is the notion that the role of defending the federal interest in foreign policy matters may be one that is also undertaken by individuals in External Affairs in general. Do we need to show explicitly that it was Trudeau's role-governed priorities that determined the 1982 reorganization? Or is it enough to show that there was an institutional imperative to defend the federal interest on the part of federal actors (the prime minister included) in this case? If, for analytical purposes, we could see the state as a rational, unitary actor, in some instances, in order to illustrate foreign policy behaviour as defending the national interest, could we not see the federal government as a unitary actor, in some instances, in order to illustrate policy behaviour as defending the federal interest? To the extent that we can, we can identify Trudeau's role-governed priorities as a determinant in the reorganization of External Affairs.

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edited by R. D. Olling and M. W. Westmacott (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 270.

[89]Ibid, p. 272, 273.

We have already mentioned the Task Force on International Aspects of Federal-Provincial Relations established by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1967, a clear indication of the moves taken by the bureaucracy to defend the federal interest. This kind of institutional imperative by External Affairs along with the explicit role played by the prime minister to defend the federal interest are clearly evident in the next chapter on Trudeau's influence on aid policy.

CHAPTER SIX: TRUDEAU AND AID POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Canadian official development assistance (ODA) policy is an important dimension of the study of Canadian foreign policy. Not only does aid policy to the third world invite questions of international morality and obligation, but it also yields notions of empowerment and status in the international arena. On the one hand, the plight of the developing states against starvation, impoverishment, overpopulation and sickness necessitates the participation of the developed states to remedy the great North-South divide. In particular, when the North's historical policy of imperialism and its present control of the international economic system are held responsible for the economic malaise of the South, the moral obligation of the North becomes even more acute.

On the other hand, a sense of morality is rarely the sole reason why states give aid. States accomplish a purpose or goal in their international development assistance policies and, in this realist conception, aid is simply seen as a "tool" of the state. In this instance, aid policy is less about meeting the needs of recipient states and more about reaching the objectives or goals of donor states. The examination of objectives or goals leads to attempts to analyze the reasons or motives for why states give aid and the analysis of motives has been central to the study of Canadian foreign aid policy.[1]

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[1]See, for example, Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966); Peyton Lyon, "Introduction," in Canada and the Third World, edited by Peton Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976); Robert Carty, "Giving for Gain: Foreign Aid and

Canada, it is argued, dispenses international assistance, like other states, for primarily three reasons: (1) humanitarian, (2) economic, and (3) political. By beginning this chapter with a discussion of Canadian motives for giving aid, we can analyze Trudeau's idiosyncratic, micro state-governed and macro system-governed priorities as determinants of his actions and see why it was that, despite Trudeau's efforts, principally in launching the North-South initiative in 1980-81, the prime minister's "rhetoric" did not conform to the "reality" of Canadian aid policy.

This first task will be brief because it is meant less as an overview, and more as a background, for the real task at hand: the discussion of the creation of la francophonie. This is an example not only of Trudeau's rhetoric matching the reality of Canadian aid policy, but also of the prime minister's role-governed priorities determining his actions. In this case, the role of defending the federal interest not only transcends the distinction between the prime minister's domestic and foreign policy actions but also explains the behaviour of two prime ministers. For both Pearson and Trudeau, the preoccupation with concerns regarding the future of the Canadian confederation did not distract either of them from foreign policy matters; rather the defence of the federal interest was clearly played out on the international stage.

CIDA," in Ties That Bind: Canada and the Third World, edited by Richard Swift and Robert Clarke (Toronto: Between The Lines, 1984), p. 149-211; and Kim Richard Nossal, "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's Interest in Development Assistance," Canadian Journal of Political Science 21 (March 1988): 37-56. Nossal's piece also acts as a good overview of the different mix of motives evident in the literature on Canadian aid policy.

Our second task in the chapter, then, requires an examination of the Pearson years. The emergence of la francophonie as the French-speaking equivalent of the Commonwealth is an important legacy of the Trudeau years; however, it is one that pre-dates Trudeau's election as prime minister and highlights both the nature of the domestic political situation inherited by Trudeau and, moreover, the actions of Prime Minister Lester Pearson as also exemplifying role-governed behaviour. Our third task is the examination of the Trudeau years and the new Liberal prime minister's continuing efforts to protect the federal interest on the international stage. Here, we clearly see Trudeau's role-governed priorities determining his actions.

At the same time as the federal-provincial game was played out at the highest level, the Department of External Affairs also acted to protect the federal interest. The two white papers reacting to Quebec's international activities, namely Federalism and International Relations[2] and Federalism and International Conferences on Education,[3] (the second, released just three months later, was a supplement to the first) spanned both the Pearson and Trudeau governments. The white papers reflected the difficulties encountered by both elected and unelected officials at the federal level in defending the federal prerogative in international affairs against the onslaught of Quebec activism abroad. The problem with

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[2]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Federalism and International Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968).

[3]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Federalism and International Conferences on Education: A Supplement to Federalism and International Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968).

Quebec's presence in the emerging French-speaking organization was not simply a question of international norms and the indivisibility of Canada's external sovereignty, but also an issue of constitutional ambiguity and the nature of the Canadian treaty-making process.

Our fourth task in the chapter is a discussion of the Canadian treaty process and the extent to which the actions of bureaucrats in External Affairs were also determined by role-governed priorities. We had begun to explore this notion in the last chapter. This might give us some insight into the importance of the role of defending the federal interest as a federal institutional imperative, and not only a prime ministerial one, an idea we explore further in the next chapter.

TRUDEAU'S PRIORITIES IN AID POLICY

It was in aid and development, as many scholars have pointed out,[4] that Trudeau's personal foreign policy concerns were clearly evident. In fact, the announcement of the foreign policy review on May 28, 1968 was not the prime minister's first speech on international affairs. Two weeks earlier, Trudeau had spoken about the importance of Canadian assistance to the third world, underscoring that it was in the Canadian state's interest to address North-South relations. According to the Prime Minister, Canadians "must

[4]See, for example, Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972), p. 136-142; Peyton Lyon, "Introduction," p. xx; Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents The Carleton Library No. 118 (Ottawa: Gage Publishing Limited, 1980), p. 227; von Riekhoff, "The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Foreign Policy"; Nossal, "Personal Diplomacy and National Behaviour: Trudeau's North-South Initiatives," Dalhousie Review 62 (Summer 1982): 278-291; and Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 286-307.

recognize that, in the long run, the overwhelming threat to Canada will not come from foreign investments, or foreign ideologies, or even—with good fortune—foreign nuclear weapons. It will come instead from the two-thirds of the world who are steadily falling farther and farther behind in their search for a decent standard of living."[5] "International development" was one of the five sectors addressed in the government's 1970 foreign policy paper and, as evident in the Prime Minister's formal responses to the Secretary of State for External Affairs during the drafting of the paper,[6] this was one of his personal priorities in external affairs. In one of his letters to Mitchell Sharp, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Trudeau stated that the government's 1969 NATO decision, for example, should be explained, not as a "reduced emphasis on peace and security," but as an "increased emphasis on international development aid and disarmament."[7] There were "trade-offs in every policy choice made," according to the prime minister, and these trade-offs had to be conveyed properly in the foreign policy paper.[8]

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[5]"New Approach to Aid," Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, to a Convocation Ceremony marking the Diamond Jubilee of the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, May 13, 1968, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-196: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 234-235.

[6]Confidential. [Department of External Affairs, File 20-1-2-1970, 6 vols.]

[7]Confidential. [Letter from the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, dated April 14, 1970, Department of External Affairs, File 20-1-2-1970, 6 vols.]

[8]Ibid. [The thinking expressed in Trudeau's April 14 letter to Sharp became the explicit basis of the foreign policy paper. See the letter from G. S. Murray to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, dated April 28, 1970, and the letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, dated April 30, 1970, Department of External Affairs, File 20-1-2-1970, 6 vols.]

Trudeau's concern for the third world led, for example, to initiatives like the establishment of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in 1970,[9] which attempts to see the definition and resolution of development problems from the perspective of recipient states, and it underlines the humanitarian motive or reason for the prime minister's actions. Commitment to international development, according to Trudeau, "relate not only to economic assistance," but also "to assistance in any form that will create the political, economic and human climate most conducive to the nurturing of human dignity."[10] This commitment was echoed in his March 1975 speech at Mansion House in London and reached a high point with the prime minister's efforts to bring North-South issues to the forefront of the international agenda in 1980-81. As we stated in the second chapter, Trudeau was by then largely freed from the role constraints that had distracted him from foreign policy matters.

In 1981, the prime minister had chaired the Group of Seven economic summit in Ottawa (Montebello), the North-South meeting in Cancun, and the Commonwealth conference in Melbourne; and in all these international forums he directed the world's attention to the plight of the third world.[11] In particular, at the G-7 summit (where third world countries had no representation) Trudeau pushed for the inclusion of North-South issues in the agenda. As we found in his

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[9]Lyon, "Introductiuon," p. xvii.

[10]"New Approach to Aid," p. 232.

[11]David Cox, "Trudeau's foreign policy speeches," International Perspectives (November/December 1982): 7.

1983-84 peace initiative, the use of summits and leader-to-leader contact was the manner in which Trudeau, as prime minister, was perhaps "institutionalized" into dealing with problems. Yet, despite his efforts, the prime minister's personal commitment to closing the North-South gap evident in his 1980-81 initiative did not translate to substantial changes in Canadian aid policy.[12] Although his idiosyncratic priorities, emanating from humanitarian concerns, may have largely determined his activism in international affairs (when he was no longer preoccupied with domestic matters), these priorities were not, in the end, reflected in the workings of Canadian international development assistance at the latter part of his tenure.

Part of the problem with Canadian aid policy during the Trudeau years was the protectionist nature of Canadian trade policies toward the third world. "Trade, not aid" was part of the rallying cry of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) which had pitted the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries of the North against the Group of 77 states of the South. Canadian economic policies did not conform to the demands made by the third world for the North to open up its markets to third world products. Indeed, "while aid levels and the rhetorical support of Prime Minister Trudeau indicated a strong commitment to the position of Third World reformers, specific policies (particularly in areas such as textiles, shoes, and clothing) suggested conformity with some of the hardline members of the OECD."[13] As argued by Cranford Pratt, the Canadian bureaucracy

[12]Nossal, in "Personal Diplomacy and National Behaviour: Trudeau's North-South Initiatives," p. 278-291, grapples with why this was the case.

[13]Tom Keating, Canada and World Order, p. 199.

was motivated by economic interests, reflecting the influence of the country's business sector,[14] thus undermining aid efforts to the third world. As a result, according to Tom Keating, there emerged a "contradictory approach to North-South relations during the 1970s and early 1980s,"[15] and, in that way, Trudeau's micro state-governed priorities often outweighed his idiosyncratic ones in the attempts to alleviate third world hardship.

In addition, Canadian protectionist policies were, in many ways, responses to the changing international economic system. The slow growth of the Canadian economy coupled with the worldwide recession brought demands for the government to foster internationally competitive industries which, in turn, "focused increasing attention on the expanding market potential of Third World countries."[16] There was a noticeable shift in Canadian aid policy from a strategy in the 1970s of alleviating poverty to a strategy in the 1980s of linking aid to trade.[17] David Gillies contends that because of the "commercialization of Canada's aid programme"

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[14]Cranford Pratt, "Canadian foreign policy: bias to business," International Perspectives (November/December 1982): 3-6. See also Cranford Pratt, ed., Internationalism Under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989 and Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). In these two edited collections by Pratt, scholars attempt to transcend the realist notion of national self-interest by asserting that middle power internationalism bears great similarity to "humane internationalism" which is an important vehicle in the eradication of the North-South divide in global politics.

[15]Keating, p. 201.

[16]Martin Rudner, "The Evolving Framework of Canadian Development Assistance Policy," in Canada Among Nations: 1984—A Time of Transition, edited by Brian Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Lorimer, 1985), p. 126.

[17]Ibid, p. 125-145.

through, for example, linkages between the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Export Development Corporation (EDC) achieved primarily through the 1982 reorganization of External Affairs, commerce rather than conscience has governed Canadian thinking on aid policy.[18] The tie of aid to trade has been a continuing reflection of the challenges posed by the international economic system on Canada, and these challenges formed the basis of Trudeau's macro system-governed priorities in aid policy.

In addition to humanitarian and economic motives, there is a final set of motives given as to why states give aid. Political motives have been much less important in the study of Canadian aid policy and, indeed, in the aid policy of smaller states generally in the international system. Political motives centre on the desire by the donor state to influence the actions of its aid recipients and these motives have been central to the study of American and Soviet aid policy as a mechanism of cold war politics. Canada rarely engages in such widespread manipulation of international political reality through the provision of development assistance.

Humanitarian or economic motives dictate Canadian aid policy, which we see in the Trudeau years, and even when political motives are apparently evident, as in the cessation of aid because of human rights violations, there is a higher (humanitarian) motive behind the attempt to change the actions of the recipient state. Political motives in aid policy are about meeting political objectives,

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[18]David Gillies, "Commerce over conscience? Import promotion in Canada's aid programme," International Journal Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1988-89): 102-133.

i.e., reaching goals set by the state and for the state. Such motives found in the American case include warding off communism (as in the Marshall Plan) and keeping friendly allies (whether or not states are democratic). In contrast, when scholars talk about the self-serving nature of Canadian aid policy,[19] they are referring to the economic interests of the state in promoting Canadian business activities abroad.

Kim Richard Nossal finds that the study of motives in Canadian aid policy has failed to account for the interests of the state in terms of state-defined political objectives.[20] He argues that the Canadian state's desires for prestige, bureaucratic maintenance, and limitation of real expenditure are the real motives behind Canada's aid policy; yet, even these motives are not grounded in the desire to influence the actions of recipient states. Canadian development assistance is not defined by over-arching political objectives, such as preventing the spread of communism, because the Canadian government rarely uses its aid policy as a "tool" to persuade third world states to act in a certain manner defined by Canada. One notable exception, as many scholars point out, was the clear political motive behind the expansion of Canadian aid to francophone Africa in the late 1960s but, here, the state-defined goal was not externally-directed (i.e., to ward off an adversary) but internally-driven.

The decision by the Trudeau government to expand foreign aid to francophone African countries was a complex issue that began

[19]See Pratt above (note # 14).

[20]Nossal, "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's Interest in Development Assistance."

with concerns by the previous government under Lester Pearson regarding Quebec's encroachments into foreign policy matters[21] and involved the explicit support of the French government, in particular, President Charles de Gaulle for Quebec's international aspirations. The issue was as much about the international recognition of Quebec as an entity independent from the federal government as it was about the legal and constitutional competence of Quebec in external affairs, an area of politics traditionally held exclusively by Ottawa. On the latter point, the federal government realized that as issues of "low politics," for example, matters of economics, energy, environment, or education, came to the forefront in international relations, greater provincial participation would increasingly mark the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. The problem, however, evident in Quebec's case between 1965 and 1971 was whether or not provincial activity in the international arena was simply a smokescreen for Quebec independence. The federal government's position was clear: Quebec in no way would be recognized as a sovereign entity in the international arena. As the differences between Ottawa and Quebec City were played out internationally, both Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau, in turn, took the lead in defending the federal interest.

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[21]There was a debate, for instance, between Ottawa and Quebec City regarding the status of Quebec francophone teachers in third world countries, resulting in an extensive letter exchange between the two sides. The province argued that the teachers were sent abroad under the auspices of its Ministry of Education; the federal government contended that the teachers had to be sent under the direction of the External Aid Office. See National Archives, RG 25, 80-81/031, Box #1, 30-12-Que-Part 1, for the documentation of External Affairs regarding the issue.

PRIME MINISTER PEARSON

In the study of Canadian foreign policy, scholars refer to the "golden age of Pearsonian internationalism" as a time when Canada's international presence was at its peak—the Canadian delegation to the United Nations proved succesful in attaining recognition for "middle powers" as important international actors; Canada was party to the original tripartite negotiations (along with the United States and Great Britain) leading up to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Canadians expressed their reservations regarding United Nations actions during the Korean War without disrupting allied unity against the communist threat; and, most notably, Canadians played an explicit part in resolving the Suez crisis and created, in the process, the first United Nations peacekeeping force to separate belligerents in an international conflict. The time was called "Pearsonian" because, through it all, Pearson was a central presence in the creation of foreign policy undertaken almost exclusively by the Department of External Affairs, first, as civil servant and, then, as minister. Pearson's central part in Canadian external affairs was clearly evident; in 1957 he won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in resolving the Suez dispute.

Yet, when Pearson became prime minister in 1963 after the defeat of the Conservative government under John Diefenbaker, the former secretary of state for external affairs did not take the lead in foreign policy. Arguably, his respect for both the Department of External Affairs and Paul Martin, his appointed minister, would have led him confidently to delegate authority, but it seems more than

curious that a man renowned for his foreign policy knowledge and background would not have in some way remained active in his area of expertise and interest after he had attained the country's highest office. After five years in office, Pearson's lack of action in international affairs might have been curious, but understandable. In his Memiors Pearson writes: "My passionate interest when I was in government, apart from the ultimate question of peace and war, was in the national unity of our country. In some respects this was the most important issue of my career."[22]

Canadian national unity was central during Pearson's tenure. The 1960 quiet revolution in Quebec had produced aggressive, nationalist-minded governments that sought greater provincial independence not only at home but also abroad. The attempts by the Quebec provincial government to establish an independent international presence, aided and abetted by France under de Gaulle, began and peaked in the Pearson era.

Although the Pearson government had appointed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to address the accommodation of Quebec aspirations in the Canadian confederation, the Quebec government itself had already begun redefining its place in the Canadian federal state. For Ottawa, a major part of the difficulty in Quebec's re-definition of its place was the support of France in the province's attempts to receive international recognition as an independent actor. Paris not only signed international agreements with Quebec City without Ottawa's

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[22]Lester Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3 1957-1968, edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis (Scarborough, Ont.: New American Library [paperback edition], 1975), p. 254.

prior approval[23] but also encouraged the secessionist tendencies in Quebec. Most notably, during Canada's centennial celebrations, French President Charles de Gaulle, who visited Quebec City and Montreal without first visiting Ottawa, yelled out the phrase that has gone down in infamy in Canadian history: "Vive le Québec libre!"[24] This slogan, clearly associated with the separatists in Quebec, was met with a quick and harsh reply from Lester Pearson who, as prime minister, asserted most pointedly that the French president's remarks were "unacceptable" to Canada and the Canadian people.[25] As Ottawa and Quebec continued to debate the role of provinces in international affairs, particularly in areas under provincial competence, the Gabon incident arose which centred on Libreville's invitation to Quebec to attend an international francophone conference on education in February 1968 without a similar

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[23]On February 27, 1965, Quebec under Jean Lesage signed an entente with France in the field of education, originally without the federal government's sanction (thus setting a precedent for provincial independence in international affairs); this was quickly rectified by Ottawa with an exchange of letters with France's Canadian Ambassador that same day. Although the federal government had reached an "umbrella agreement" with the French government later that year (November 17, 1965) to encourage contact between France and all of Canada under which the provinces could make their own agreements, thus recognizing Ottawa's supremacy in international affairs, the Quebec government ignored the umbrella agreement and, six days later, reached another agreement with France which had to be met with another exchange of letters between Ottawa and the French ambassador. See Howard A. Leeson and Wilfred Vanderelst, External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma (Toronto: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 97-98.

[24]See "Vive Le Québec Libre," Discours de Charles de Gaulle, le 24 juillet 1967, à l'Hôtel de Ville, Montréal," in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 304.

[25]Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume 3 1957-1968, p. 289. See also "Canada, Quebec and France," Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in the House of Commons, November 28, 1967, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 304-306.

invitation extended to the federal government.[26] Moreover, Quebec, as the only non-sovereign actor, was accorded the same status, along with flag, pomp and circumstance, as the other sovereign states.

The Pearson government reacted in two ways: it suspended diplomatic relations with Gabon, and it sent Lionel Chevrier, a former federal cabinet minister and London High Commissioner, to francophone Africa with explicit instructions to give development aid to those countries that supported Ottawa's position in the emerging association of francophone states and to make clear that Ottawa, not Quebec City, was the greater source of foreign aid. With regard to the first, it was Prime Minister Pearson who approved the course of action that the government took in response to the Libreville conference: "(a) that a note of protest be sent to the Ambassador of Gabon in Washinton; (b) that an oral protest be made by Mr. Léger to the Quai D'Orsay; (c) that a statement should be released explaining (the government's) position on the Libreville conference and describing actions taken by Gabon; a copy of the note to the Gabonese Ambassador (a) should be attached to the statement."[27] Pearson released the statement on March 4, 1968, confirming

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[26]See John Schlegel, The Deceptive Ash: Bilingualism and Canadian Policy in Africa: 1957-1971 (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1978). We use the works principally of Schlegel, Blanchette (Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents) and Leeson and Vanderelst in our reconstruction of the emergence of la francophonie.

[27]Memorandum for File, "Libreville Conference: Action re. Gabon, France and Quebec," dated February 17, 1968, signed M. C. [Marcel Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs] (National Archives, RG 25, Vol. 80-81/022, Box 6, File 20-1-2-Gabon pt. 1).

suspension of Canadian relations with Gabon.[28] The Pearson government took such action because, it argued, although "Canadians (were) aware that the federal and provincial governments (had) to resolve their differences," it was not up to a foreign government to "judge beforehand whose interpretation (was) correct."[29] Pearson had attempted to contact Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson before the Libreville conference regarding the province's presence in Gabon and the Prime Minister made further attempts before another conference hosted by Paris in April 1968;[30] neither conference to which the federal government was invited.

The Pearson government also reacted by sending the Chevrier mission to seven francophone states in Africa, a mission that the federal government had been preparing for six months before the Gabon incident.[31] External Affairs knew that not all the African francophone states were supportive of the creation of an international French-speaking organization, although the idea had come from President Senghor of Senegal and President Bourguiba of

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[28]"The Gabon Affair--Libreville," Text of Statement issued by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Ottawa, March 4, 1968," in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 308-310.

[29]Message from External Ottawa to Embassies and Division--Francophone Countries (regarding Canadian suspension of diplomatic relations with Gabon), signed M .C. [no date] (National Archives, RG 25, Vol. 80-81/022, Box 6, File 20-1-2-Gabon pt. 1).

[30]The three letters from the Canadian Prime Minister to the Quebec Premier, dated December 1, 1967, March 8, 1968, and April 5, 1968, are reproduced in Federalism and International Conferences on Education, p. 62-72.

[31]"The Chevrier Mission to Francophone Africa," Statement by the Director General of the External Aid Office, Februry 14, 1968, to the Senate Standing Committee on External Relations, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 308.

Tunisia.[32] For example, there was some indication that Algeria was indifferent, if not hostile, to the idea: "Le français leur avait été imposé dans un but d'assimilation. Le premier objectif de l'Algérie indépendante est donc de récupérer la langue arabe. La conséquence logique de l'arabisation sera la diminution de l'importance du française."[33] This meant that not all the francophone states, like Gabon, were "demonstrably susceptible to French influence,"[34] and, therefore, would perhaps be receptive to Ottawa's overtures. Right after the Libreville conference, the Chevrier mission committed "on the spot" another $30 million to 49 projects in Morocco, Tunisia, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Algeria and Cameroun in February-March 1968. Called the "Independent French-Speaking African States (IFAS)" program,[35] it demonstrated not only the Pearson government's commitment to the substantial expansion of aid to francophone Africa, but also the greater amount of wealth and resources held by Ottawa than Quebec City. The Chevrier mission, of course, did not visit Gabon; the federal government, subsequently, was invited to the future francophone conferences.

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[32]Memorandum to Francophonie Division from African and Middle Eastern Division, "Subject: Chevrier Aid Mission--Francophonie," dated January 30, 1968, signed G. G. Riddell (National Archives, RG 25, Box 40, File 20-Cda-9-Chevrier [1]).

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Canadian International Development Agency, Annual Review 1967-1968, p. 20. (In late 1968, the External Aid Office was re-named the Canadian International Development Agency.)

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

There were three additional conferences in Africa: Kinshasa in January 1969, Niamey in February 1969, and Niamey (again) in February 1970 and, in all three conferences, a single Canadian delegation was present although there remained disagreements between the federal and Quebec governments regarding the status of the province. By then, Trudeau was prime minister, and until l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (ACCT) was firmly established in the second Niamey conference, Trudeau's objectives clearly had differed little from Pearson: the francophone organization must recognize that Ottawa, not Quebec City, was the sovereign government.

There were a series of exchange of letters between Prime Minister Trudeau and Quebec Premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand, who had succeeded Daniel Johnson, regarding the composition of the delegation and the status of the province, both within the Canadian delegation and within the emerging French-speaking organization.[36] Trudeau wanted to protect "la personnalité internationale du Canada" and made a series of proposals to the Quebec Premier that would ensure the unity of the Canadian delegation to the various conferences. In February 1969, the Quebec government released its "white paper" on Quebec-Ottawa relations in international affairs, which indicated the province's continuing commitment to a separate delegation for Quebec that, although remaining formally within the

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[36]Some of these letters are reproduced in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 315-320.

Canadian delegation, would be responsible for its own affairs.[37] However, by then, there were indications that the African francophone states wanted to deal more with Ottawa than Quebec City. In particular, President Diori Hamani of Niger visiting Canada in September 1969 "indicated that if any one of the Canadian provinces wanted to assist Niger in its development projects, their assistance would be most welcome provided that it had been cleared and coordinated with Ottawa."[38] On the occasion of the President's visit, Prime Minister Trudeau stated:

> Canada, with six million French-speaking citizens, is naturally a part of the francophone family. For Canada, the active participation in *la Francophonie* (sic) that is being organized is a necessity...This is true for the French-Canadian people in the Province of Quebec, which is the home *par excellence* (sic) of French culture in Canada. It is also true for one million French Canadians in other Canadian provinces. This participation in *la Francophonie* (sic) is, moreover, an extension of Canadian bilingualism on an international scale. It is thus a fundamental element, and a permanent one, in our policy.[39]

The prime minister was successful in defending the federal interest, and Ottawa's sovereignty (and supremacy) in foreign policy was given formal recognition in the founding charter of the ACCT. Article 3.3 of the Charter states: "Dans le plein respect de la souveraineté et de la compétence internationale des Etats membres, tout gouvernement peut être admis comme gouvernement participant aux institutions, aux activités et programmes de

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[37]John Schlegel, "Containing Quebec Abroad: The Gabon Incident, 1968," in Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, edited by Don Munton and John Kirton (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 165.

[38]Ibid, p. 165-166.

[39]"Canada and La Francophonie," Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, on the occasion of the signing of agreements with the President of Niger, Mr. Diori Hamani, Ottawa, September 19, 1969, in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 322.

l'Agence, sous réserve de l'approbation de l'Etat membre dont relève le territoire sur lequel le gouvernement participant concerné exerce son autorité et selon les modalités convenues entre ce gouvernement et celui de l'Etat membre."[40] With that, the new francophone organization recognized that a government, like Quebec, could participate in the Agency provided that it had the approval of the national government.

By the time the second ACCT general conference met in Canada in October 1971, Trudeau had reached agreement with Premier Robert Bourassa that Quebec could act as a participatory government in the ACCT, but that such a status was conferred by the federal government and not by the ACCT. The agreement was entitled: "Modalités selon lesquelles de Gouvernement du Québec est admis comme Gouvernement Participant aux Institutions, aux Activités et aux Programmes de L'Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique, Convenues le 1 octobre 1971 entre le Gouvernement du Canada et le Gouvernement du Québec."[41] The agreement had nineteen articles and a preamble referring to Article 3.3 of the ACCT Charter; it allowed participating governments to have a seat, nameplate, and voice in the Agency within the Canadian delegation.[42] New Brunswick was accorded the same status in 1977. The ACCT has been the most important aspect of Canada's

[40]The wording can be found in Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 326-327.

[41]Ibid, p. 326.

[42]Françoise Coulombe, "Canada and the International French-Speaking Community, Current Issue Review (Library of Parliament, Research Branch, September 1, 1987), p. 4-5.

bilingual expression abroad.[43] In the November 1975 meeting in Mauritius, Canada proposed, in the face of French opposition, the establishment of a Special Development Program to aid francophone countries in their development projects, with Ottawa providing more than three-quarters of the program's budget between 1978 and 1987.[44]

The expansion of Canadian aid to francophone Africa, leading to the formal establishment of la francophonie through the ACCT, was "the natural step in Ottawa's bilingual external policy."[45] Between 1962-65, Canada gave francophone Africa $1.57 million in aid in comparison to $16.87 million to Commonwealth Africa.[46] In 1969-70, Canada gave $32 million and $22 million to francophone and Commonwealth Africa, respectively, in terms of both bilateral and special allocations. In 1970-71, the numbers were $64.1 million and $65.8 million; 1971-72: $50.7 million and $56.4 million; 1972-73: $68.9 million and $58.8 million, respectively.[47] The amount of allocations between "French-speaking" Africa and "English-speaking" Africa has remained relatively in parity. Both Pearson and Trudeau, as widely recognized, played an important, explicit part in

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[43]According to Blanchette, the subsequent arrangements reached between the federal and provincial governments regarding francophone conferences "tend to make Canadian delegations to such conferences by far the largest and most colourful of all, since Ottawa and each province have the right to be identified by plaques, flags, etc. These manifestations of Canadian tribalism are said to amuse the Africans to no end." See Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-1976: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 301.

[44]Coulombe, p. 6-7.

[45]Schlegel, "Containing Quebec Abroad: The Gabon Incident, 1968," p. 170.

[46]Canadian International Development Agency, Annual Review 1969.

[47]CIDA, Annual Review 1971-1972, p. 74.

negotiating with the Quebec Premier (Pearson with Daniel Johnson and Trudeau with Jean-Jacques Bertrand) regarding Quebec's status in international conferences dealing with matters under provincial jurisdiction, such as education, and, specifically, with Quebec's status within the newly-emerging la francophonie. Both Pearson and Trudeau used Canadian aid policy as a mechanism to confirm Canada's bilingual nature abroad and, in the process, prevented Quebec from being the sole (and, in terms of international perception, independent) voice of French-Canada abroad. The two prime ministers were clearly defending the federal interest.

What were the source of the "political" motives of both Pearson and Trudeau? What accounted for the similarity in their actions? The argument that both men acted as agents of the Canadian state presupposes the notion of political motives in the study of Canadian aid policy. The problem, however, is that the Canadian state, in this case, was clearly not unified and, thus, it does not make sense to assume a rational state actor pursuing its interest in the international arena. It was not the Canadian state that was seeking to influence the actions of the francophone African states; it was the Canadian federal government. The Canadian government's decision under both Pearson and Trudeau to expand aid to francophone Africa was clearly about roles rather than reasons. The centrality and similarity of the actions of both men were indicative of role-governed behaviour. As prime minister, both Pearson and Trudeau, in turn, acted as defenders of the federal faith, not only in their exchanges with the states in francophone Africa, but also in their

negotiations with successive Quebec premiers. Their priorities or motives stemmed from holding the office of prime minister.

THE TREATY PROCESS IN CANADA

Was this role-governed behaviour also evident in the bureaucracy? To what extent were officials in External Affairs also defending the federal interest? The idea for the white paper on international relations and federalism had come from External Affairs in May 1967, proposing it to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin who, in turn, proposed it to the Prime Minister, Lester Pearson.[48] The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Marcel Cadieux, had established the Task Force on International Aspects of Federal-Provincial Relations in January 1967, which met every week to deal with the challenges coming from the provinces.[49] Two years earlier, Cadieux had told all the heads of division in the department that all "copies of correspondence...originating with provincial matters should henceforth be referred to Legal Division for information," and it would be the legal division who would respond to the provinces.[50] To External Affairs, the international involvement of provinces was indeed a legal or constitutional matter,

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[48]Memorandum for the Minister, signed M. C. (Marcel Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs), May 29, 1967—No change in text, became Memorandum to the Prime Minister (National Archives, RG 25, Acc. 80-81/031, Box 1, File 30-2-1 pt. 1).

[49]Memorandum to All Heads of Division, from USSEA, dated January 30, 1967 (National Archives, RG 25, Acc. 80-81/031, Box 1, File 30-2-1 pt. 1).

[50]Memorandum to All Heads of Division, from USSEA, signed M. Cadieux, dated May 17, 1965 (National Archives, RG 25, Acc. 80-81/031, Box 1, File 30-2-1 pt. 1).

but the department sought a solution within the practices of both the Canadian constitution and international law.[51]

The problem with the treaty process in Canada is that there is no constitutional clause defining the power. Section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 makes reference only to the implementation of British imperial treaties. Through judicial interpretation, primarily the landmark Labours Conventions case, "treaty-making" has become a federal prerogative but "treaty-implementing" has become both a federal and a provincial responsibility.[52] In the United States, for example, the treaty process is not divided between the two levels of government; rather the American executive can both create and enact a treaty with a two-thirds vote of support from the Senate; and ratified treaties become the supreme law of the land and they override any conflicting state laws.

The importance of the treaty process enters into the government's first white paper, Federalism and International Relations, as Ottawa argues for supremacy in both international law and the making of treaties. The white paper states:

> In international law, the conduct of foreign relations is the responsibility of fully independent members of the international community. Because the constituent members of the federal union do not meet this criterion, the direction and control of foreign relations in federal states is generally acknowledged to be the responsibility of the central authority. Accordingly, the members of the federal states have no independent or autonomous capacity to conclude treaties, to become members of international organizations in their own right, or to accredit and receive diplomatic and consular agents.[53]

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[51]See National Archives, Acc. 1980-81/022, Box 23, Files 20-3-1-1; 20-3-1-2; 20-3-4-Cda, which cover some of the efforts of External Affairs (between 1965 and 1968) to deal with the treaty process in Canada.

[52]See Leeson and Vanderelst, External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma, for an excellent overview of this question.

[53]Federalism and International Relations, p. 11.

The very fact that the federal government had to defend its pre-eminence in external affairs tells us that the role of defending the federal interest may be an important determinant of the behaviour of federal actors in general. It is interesting that the 1970 foreign policy paper was criticized for stating that foreign policy was "the extension abroad of national policies,"[54] and that statements like this were indicative of Trudeau's new inward-looking approach to international affairs. Federalism and International Relations opens with (as a bold sub-heading): "Foreign Policy as an Expression of the National Interest."[55] According to the 1968 white paper, although the federal government must take provincial interests into account, "foreign policy cannot be fragmented and...parts of it cannot be sifted off or treated in isolation from the larger considerations which lie at the roots of national policy."[56] In other words, the paper recognized that only the federal government could define the "national interest" because it alone was responsible for Canada. Furthermore, this paper was directed at the provinces and not other states in the international system. Ottawa was not defending the national interest, per se, in the realist sense, but the federal interest.

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[54]Foreign Policy for Canadians, p. 9.

[55]Federalism and International Relations, p. 7.

[56]Ibid, p. 9.

CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

We began our study by introducing a framework of four levels of analysis to show the determinants of prime ministerial behaviour in Canadian foreign policy. We also outlined three types of explanations found within the framework to guide our study of Trudeau's defence, trade and aid policy actions. The three types of explanations point to the importance of adding the role level of analysis and, thus, of examining Trudeau's role-governed priorities in foreign policy. In that context, we analyze in this chapter our findings on how Trudeau's role as the defender of the federal interest determined his actions. As a reminder, our modified schema of the determinants of prime ministerial behaviour in Canadian foreign policy and the three types of explanations found within the framework are as follows:

International system	**Macro system-governed priorities**
vs.	**vs.**
Nation-state	**Micro state-governed priorities**
vs.	**vs.**
Role of the prime minister	**Role-governed priorities**
vs.	**vs.**
Individual	**Idiosyncratic priorities**

Fig. 7.1: Modified schema:
Determinants of prime ministerial behaviour in Canadian foreign policy

THREE TYPES OF EXPLANATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK: COMBINING THE SYSTEMIC, STATE, ROLE AND INDIVIDUAL LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

(I.) The levels of analysis provide complementary explanations.
(II.) The levels of analysis provide conflicting explanations and one or more levels are determinative against the others.
(a.) Higher level is determinative against lower level(s).
(b.) Lower level is determinative against higher level(s).
(III.) The levels of analysis do not provide conflicting explanations and the higher levels of analysis are not determinative.

We found that, as the defender of the federal interest, Trudeau directed most of his attention during his tenure as prime minister to domestic affairs, principally to matters relating to the constitution and the accommodation of Quebec in the Canadian confederation. This type (III) explanation accounts for why Trudeau was distracted from foreign policy matters until his last years in office. It was also why we could not accept Thordarson's type (II.b) explanation of the two-year foreign policy review and why we set out to find other types of explanations of Trudeau's defence, trade and aid policy actions. The 1980-81 North-South initiative and the 1983-84 peace initiative, we stated, were the first actions that pointed to the centrality of Trudeau's idiosyncratic priorities determining his foreign policy behaviour. By then, the question of Quebec's place in the Canadian confederation had led to a federalist (rather than a separatist) answer and Trudeau was less constrained by role factors.

We also noted that with the rise of low politics in the international system and the ambiguity of constitutional jurisdiction over foreign policy matters, part of the federal-provincial game entered into the global arena. It was in this context, we stated, that we would see Trudeau's role-governed priorities determining his foreign policy actions. What kinds of opportunities and resources did Trudeau have in defending the federal interest in foreign policy? What kinds of systemic constraints were placed on his actions? Why did the external affairs bureaucracy also act to defend the federal interest? Having added the role level of analysis, can we offer at this juncture not

only a more complete explanation of Trudeau's foreign policy behaviour, but also a slightly different assessment from that given in the literature on the question: Does the prime minister make a difference in Canadian foreign policy?

OPPORTUNITIES AND RESOURCES

The prime minister is in a unique position; she is the only national actor in the federal-provincial game between first ministers. Our case-studies show that the prime minister's ability to defend the federal interest in foreign policy rests on the kinds of opportunities and resources that the prime minister has at her disposal, the kinds which are not necessarily available to the provincial premiers. Let us begin with opportunities. In our study of Trudeau's defence policy actions, there was evidence that the prime minister's policies on bilingualism and regional development found expression in the defence arena. The establishment of a bilingual military and the institutionalization of industrial and regional benefits in the procurement process, we stated, were indications of an activist stance taken by Trudeau to defend the federal interest. It appears that the prime minister made use of the opportunities in having jurisdiction over defence matters to address both the French-English linguistic duality and the centre-periphery economic division which plague the Canadian confederation. He did not need to consult the provinces on either of these matters, nor, might we add, was he constrained by Canada's alliance.

In terms of the resources available to the prime minister in defending the federal interest, Ottawa's aid money appeared to have influenced the positions of the African francophone countries to recognize federal supremacy in la francophonie. In this case, for both Pearson and Trudeau, the preoccupation with concerns regarding the future of the Canadian confederation did not distract either of them from foreign policy matters because Quebec's attempt to establish an independent presence abroad was both a constitutional and an international matter. Although the problem was further complicated by the part played by France in encouraging Quebec's aspirations, Ottawa's greater resources ensured that one Canadian delegation would be sent to international meetings and that the voice of French-Canada would not be Quebec's alone.

SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS

Our discussion above showed that Trudeau's opportunities for defending the federal interest came in the defence arena. We stated earlier that given the Canada's economic strength relative to its military capabilities, we would expect that the international security system would place more constraints upon the state and the prime minister than the international political economy. In that way, the prime minister would have more opportunities to act in aid policy, less so in trade policy, and even less so in defence policy. However, in Trudeau's case, it appears that the international political economy was a greater constraint on his actions than the international security system.

We saw that the main difference between the Robertson review and Trudeau's foreign policy review was the decision to withdraw half of Canada's NATO forces from Europe, although not because the Robertson Report defended the status quo. Although Trudeau could not change Canada's strategic posture, i.e., withdraw Canada from the NATO alliance,[1] he was able temporarily to downplay the importance of the alliance and, perhaps more importantly, to cut defence spending to the point that his government never spent more than 2.2 percent of Canada's gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, to a low point of 1.7 percent GDP in 1981.[2]

How little Canada spends on defence is an important factor to point out in the discussion of systemic constraints on Canadian defence options. Jockel and Sokolsky have argued that Canada is "the odd man out" in the NATO alliance because of the "sorry state" of its armed forces, and that the United States and other allied members should "raise the possibility that Canada will pay penalties in the immediate future unless it does something about the state of its (defence) posture."[3] They state that the alliance should undertake steps to "persuade" Canada to live up to its military commitments, adding that the "most effective way to exercise such persuasion would be to restrict Canadian

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[1]It still is not altogether clear whether Trudeau did want to withdraw Canada from the alliance. General Jean Allard writes in his memoirs that he believed the prime minister was in favor of neutrality, but Mitchell Sharp states that, to this day, he still does not know what was Trudeau's position on NATO. Allard, Memoirs, p. 291; Sharp, interview with author.

[2]Jockel, Security to the North, p. 11-12.

[3]Jockel and Sokolsky, Canada and Collective Security, p. 105.

participation within NATO and NATO-related activities."[4] However, as Jockel has pointed out since then, such a punitive approach to the "Canadian spending problem" would gain little, if any, support from allied members: "Playing tough on such issues has never been the NATO way."[5] Given Canadian defence spending habits, it appears that allied constraints have not been as extensive on the country's defence policy as we might have anticipated from Canada's position as a military power.

Why, then, did we witness the resurgence of NATO as a defence priority despite the Trudeau government's 1969 decision? First of all, we saw that the prime minister's emphasis on national sovereignty did not necessarily mean that the Defence Structure Review could not procure equipment for collective defence tasks. Secondly, the government, itself, had sent a clear signal that NATO had become more important with its 1975 decision to purchase C-1 Leopard tanks from West Germany. But, it was here that we found the link between Canadian defence and trade policies. That meant that the resurgence of NATO was not due primarily to the constraints of the international security system but those of the international political economy. The tank purchase was part of the Trudeau government's attempt to establish greater economic links with Western Europe amidst continentalist pressures placed on the Canadian economy by the United States.

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[4]Ibid.

[5]Jockel, Security to the North, p. 17.

Although the framework agreement on economic cooperation was signed by Canada and the European Community, the failure of the trade diversification strategy pointed to further constraints of the international political economy on Canadian actions. As Axworthy stated, the Trudeau government may have assumed too much in thinking that it could redraw the country's international trading patterns.[6] Canada had experienced a decline in economic growth beginning with the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange-rate system. The situation was worsened by the worldwide recession in the 1980s, resulting in the apparent need for Canada to secure markets in the face of increasing protectionism. The constraints of the international political economy carried over in aid policy as we saw Canada restricting the access of third world products despite Trudeau's personal commitment to address, if not redress, the problems of the South. As well, aid increasingly became tied to trade in the attempt to increase the export potential of Canadian industry. The main constraint at the systemic level in the future for any prime minister would be Canada's global economic position.[7]

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[6]Axworthy, "'To Stand Not So High Perhaps But Always Alone'," p. 36.

[7]This seems to be borne out by the emphasis placed on the international political economy in the Canada Among Nations series produced by the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. In addition, as we stated in the second chapter (p.52-53), the rise of summitry--clearly evident in the creation of the Group of Seven--can be seen as an institutional response to the fundamental changes that had occurred in the global economy.

THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAUCRACY

The Canadian state is not a monolithic, unitary entity. We focused our attention in the case-studies on the part played by the external affairs bureaucracy in determining Trudeau's foreign policy behaviour. We saw that the similarities between the Robertson review and the 1970 foreign policy review raised questions about the "newness" of Trudeau's foreign and defence policy; this finding allowed us to question the extent to which the prime minister's idiosyncratic priorities, as evident in Thordarson's analysis, were the primary determining factors of the two-year review. We also saw that both the 1982 reorganization of External Affairs and the two white papers on federalism and foreign policy indicated attempts to defend the federal interest; these findings allowed us to explore the notion of role-governed priorities as factors also determining the behaviour of federal actors in general.

Our findings regarding the external affairs bureaucracy brings into question the way we set out to look at the foreign policy-making process. The reason that we focused our attention on the external affairs bureaucracy was because we accepted the standard micro view of the state that divides politicians and bureaucrats in the making of policy. We assumed that the civil servants in External Affairs would attempt to influence Trudeau in the making of policy because, as part of the bureaucracy, they would have their own interests and preferences. For example, we found that the 1971 options paper was largely the brainchild of External Affairs under the ministerial direction of Mitchell Sharp,

and it reflected the Department's traditional view of maintaining links, principally with Europe, to countervail American influence. Similarly, we found that the 1982 amalgamation of External Affairs was in part due to the department seeking to re-establish its control over other departments in the making of foreign policy.

At the same time, we pointed out that the amalgamation might have resulted because of the inability of External Affairs to exert control over provincial activities in the international arena. This results in a quite different way of looking at the policy-making process as a determinant of Trudeau's foreign policy behaviour. Indeed we argued that it was this kind of institutional imperative in defending the federal interest that we accepted as evidence of Trudeau's role-governed priorities. Similarly, we saw External Affairs defending the federal interest in the formulation of the two white papers on foreign policy and federalism, the idea of which came from the Department as it witnessed increasing provincial activity in the international arena.

For analytical purposes, could we see the federal government as a unitary actor in order to illustrate foreign policy behaviour as defending the federal interest? Indeed, the complementarity in the actions of both Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau, and the actions of the external affairs bureaucracy during the establishment of la francophonie illustrated that bureaucrats may also act to defend the federal interest. The reason why takes us back to the constitutional ambiguity governing the foreign policy process in Canada. Thus, should we

see the Canadian foreign policy-making process, not as one divided between federal politicians and federal bureaucrats, but one divided between federal and provincial actors? This appears to be exactly what John Kirton was trying to get at when he questioned the strict applicability of realist concepts to the study of Canadian foreign policy; he asserted that the concept of "divided authority," rather than "sovereignty," more properly characterized the cohesiveness of the Canadian state.[8] What exactly, then, do we mean by the Canadian national interest?

THE PRIME MINISTER AND CANADIAN NATIONAL INTEREST

This study has focused on policy papers and policy initiatives in the attempt to discern Trudeau's foreign policy behaviour. David Dewitt and John Kirton characterized almost all of the Trudeau years (1968-1980) as the era of "national interest,"[9] because the emphasis on the national interest was clearly evident in the government's major foreign policy papers and initiatives. As we saw in the last chapter, the two white papers on foreign policy and federalism, both of which asserted that foreign policy was an extension of the national interest, were directed at the provinces and not other states in the international system. The Pearson and Trudeau governments were making a jurisdictional claim: only the federal government can speak on the national interest.

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[8]Kirton, "Realism and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," p.7.

[9]Dewitt and Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power. They characterize the period of 1980 on (their work was published in 1983) as the era of "bilateralism."

In the study of international relations, we assume that encroachments on the state's sovereignty come from outside the state's borders. For example, in the study of Canadian foreign policy, our attention has been focused on governmental responses to American challenges to Canadian sovereignty. In the case of the Trudeau government, the 1971 defence white paper proclaimed the importance of the Arctic to Canadian interests, and the 1972 options paper focused on strengthening Canadian national life and reducing its vulnerability. But, even in these two papers, there were indications that the priorities placed on "national sovereignty" and "national life" were to stave off internal pressures.[10] To what extent should we be directing our attention in Canadian foreign policy to governmental responses to encroachments on the state's sovereignty from inside the state's borders?

We stated at the outset of this study that the prime minister is charged, first of all, with preventing the disintegration of the Canadian state (the only option ruled out in the performance of her role) and, secondly, in speaking for Canada both at home and abroad. On the first point, we have argued that the fragility of the Canadian state compelled Trudeau to direct most of his attention to domestic affairs, and that is why he was distracted from foreign policy matters. On the second point, we saw that Trudeau acted to defend the federal interest in the international arena and, in

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[10]To the extent that internal threats of disunity from the provinces and external threats to independence from the United States are related, see Garth Stevenson, "Continental Integration and Canadian Unity," in Continental Community?, edited by Andrew Axline, et. al. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 194-217.

the case of la francophonie, ensured that Canada spoke with one voice abroad. In A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation, which launched his renewed efforts in 1978 for constitutional change, the Prime Minister stated: "In the forum of nations Canada must speak and act as one: its international sovereignty is indivisible. This international sovereignty is therefore vested in the federal authority. Provincial authorities may make use of this sovereignty, but within the framework of the Federation."[11]

Students of Canadian foreign policy have recognized the intimate link between federalism and foreign policy, and would appreciate the importance of Trudeau's efforts on the second point: Canada must speak with one voice abroad. However, we also need to bring out the importance of Trudeau's efforts to keep the country together and focus more on the first point: Canada must not disintegrate. This became the key element of Trudeau's performance of his role as prime minister, faced, as he was, with the prospect of Quebec's separation from the confederation. The question: "Did the prime minister make a difference in external affairs?" should be preceded with: "Did he prevent the disintegration of the Canadian state?" The role of keeping the country together alone should be enough to say that the prime minister makes a difference in external affairs. Part of the reason why analysts of Canadian foreign policy have had difficulty with the realist concept of state sovereignty stems from the fact that

[11]The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federation (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1978), p. 12.

Canadian internal affairs remain to be settled. To the extent that these internal divisions also find expression in the international arena only augment the challenges faced by the prime minister (and federal actors in general) to defend the federal interest. The importance of this role means that students of Canadian foreign policy can never take for granted the existence of internal threats to the Canadian state.

CHAPTER EIGHT:
CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

In its most compelling application, the notion of role-governed priorities determining prime ministerial behaviour in foreign policy explains, in Trudeau's case, why he could not deal with foreign policy matters separately from domestic ones during most of his tenure. It also explains his behaviour during the creation of la francophonie when the problems of the Canadian confederation were played out in the international stage and, though not as strongly, the actions that he and his government took in the defence and trade arenas. Here, in the concluding chapter, we would like to return to the study's theoretical focus on the notion of "role" and address possible objections to the work, thus pointing, perhaps, to future directions for research.

We see two important kinds of questions arising from our study: (1) Would the role of the prime minister as the defender of the federal interest explain the behaviour of other prime ministers, such as Brian Mulroney?; (2) Have we fully explained the notion of the individual following rules in our discussion of role? The first question touches upon the study of foreign policy and the second on the study of political behaviour.

The role of the prime minister as the defender of the federal interest, we found, in the case of the events leading up to the establishment of la francophonie, explained the behaviour of both Pearson and Trudeau. This was an indication that role-governed priorities could explain the actions of prime ministers

generally. However, it would seem to us that although role-governed priorities would indeed explain Prime Minister Mulroney's foreign policy behaviour, in the context of the four levels of analysis that we offered in the framework, it is not altogether clear that Mulroney's role would be defined as the defender of the federal interest. With the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada added the third pillar to its institutional order: the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In essence, the Charter states that there are certain rights that individual Canadians have that are beyond the purview of both the federal and provincial governments. It has invited increasing litigation and, thus, a greater role for the courts to play; we talk now of a "Charter culture" to capture the changes brought about by its passage. To some extent, the Charter signalled that the "rules" of the political game in Canada had changed which meant challenging the nature of executive federalism. As some observers have asserted, with the failure of both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, we no longer have "eleven suits" deciding Canada's future because the "people" have rejected the elitist process of constitution-making.[1] Thus, the analysis of Mulroney's role as prime minister would have to include the effect of the Charter.

The passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms also shows how institutional actors, like the prime minister, can also create institutions. Had Trudeau stayed on for another decade,

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[1]David J. Bercuson, "The Failure of Executive Federalism," Parliamentary Government Vol. 9, no. 2 (1990): 9-10.

we would have witnessed changes in his role. Our contribution in the study that role-governed priorities are important determinants of prime ministerial behaviour is not merely that the role of the prime minister is to defend the federal interest (as it was in Trudeau's case), but rather that the use of institutional analysis can bring out the prime minister's role-governed priorities which, in turn, are important determinants of her behaviour.

Secondly, have we fully explained the notion of the individual following rules in our discussion of role? Hollis and Smith's work is entitled Explanation and Understanding International Relations; we have only been using one part of their inquiry: explaining. They assert that the other kind of inquiry, "understanding," is based on the interpretation of human actions, reasons, motives and intentions. In this interpretative tradition, we analyze human action (not behaviour) based on the individual following rules. It is not merely an exercise in semantics; those in the interpretative tradition often reject the application of scientific methods to the study of human actions.[2] Our work is a theoretical enterprise, and since Rosenau's "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,"[3] role has been accepted in the scientific tradition in the study of foreign policy. The examination of rules (as opposed to regularities) connects the

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[2]For an example of this in the study of international relations, see Charles Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1973).

[3]James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, edited by R. Barry Farrell (Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

notion of role with inquiries different from those that we have pursued here--e.g., with inquiries into narrative as opposed to hermeneutics.[4]

In addition, we have examined the individual following rules only in the context of domestic institutions. There is a rich literature to draw on international organization which places the individual and the state in the context of international institutions.[5] The assumptions here are different, however; these "liberal" scholars reject realist premises. By focusing on the importance of "process" (interaction and learning) and institutions as determinants of state action, they reject the value of "structure" (anarchy and the distribution of power) which is central to realist work.[6] We assumed the latter in our discussion of the prime minister's macro system-governed priorities. In this case, our notion of role-governed priorities would have to take into account the relationship between domestic and international institutions in shaping the prime minister's role.

The study of institutions and of individuals following rules has spawned a new critical movement. This is the work of post-

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[4]However, the inquiries into rules and regularities may in fact be complementary. David Braybrooke argues that a unified inquiry exists in social science; he states that explanation and interpretation, rather than being mutually exclusive, are necessarily cooperative in the logic of social scientific inquiry. See Braybrooke, Philosophy of Social Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1987).

[5]For an overview, see Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International organization: a state of the art and the art of the state," International Organization Vol. 40, No. 4 (Autumn 1986): 753-813.

[6]Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," International Organization Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 392-425.

positivists (or post-structuralists) in international relations.[7] What they would demand from our work is, at the minimum, an understanding of why the institutions that we have studied have been set up. They would point out that executive federalism is elitist in conception and exclusive in practice. They would argue that the role of the prime minister as the defender of the federal interest, as we have studied it, does not deal with the "real" power structure behind these institutions, i.e., the propagation of the position of the privileged few based on race and gender.

How unsettling are these questions for our study? What are our future directions for research? The first question: "Would the role of the prime minister as the defender of the federal interest explain the behaviour of other prime ministers, such as Brian Mulroney?" is an empirical one although, as we stated, the role of the prime minister may have changed with the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Any future work that we undertake on the role of the prime minister must take into account what appears to be a significant institutional change undermining executive federalism. The second question: "Have we fully explained the notion of the individual following rules in our discussion of role?" is a theoretical one. Although the

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[7]For an overview, see Josef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 235-254; K. J. Holsti, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All?" International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 255-261; Thomas J. Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 263-267; and Jim George, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate," International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 269-279. For a feminist view, see Sarah Brown, "Feminism, International Theory, and International Relations of Gender Inequality," Millenium Vol. Vol. 17, No. 3 (1988): 461-475.

"liberal" (as opposed to realist) and critical traditions in international relations demand that we look further into the nature of institutions and rules governing prime ministerial actions, they would agree that we have looked in the right direction in our study of the role-governed (as opposed to the rational) behaviour of the prime minister. In that way, our framework would be one to build on rather than take apart.

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