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THE CAPRICORN AFRICA SOCIETY: A STUDY OF LIBERAL POLITICS
IN NORTHERN RHODESIA/ZAMBIA, 1949-1972.

By

BIZECK JUBE PHIRI

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy
(History)

at

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by   Bizeck Jube Phiri

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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
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To my mother, Egereti Nyangulu, who laboured to see me through Primary, Secondary and University, and my late father, Jube Phiri, who did not live long enough to witness and share my achievements.

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Abstract.

The study examines multi-racial liberalism in Central Africa through the examination of the Capricorn Africa Society, a multi-racial organization founded in Southern Rhodesia in 1949. The study is situated in the context of nationalist fervour in Northern Rhodesia. Because Capricorn ideas generated debate about liberal democracy and political pluralism, the study also examines the first eight years of Zambia's independence in order to provide an overview of the failure of liberal democracy, which is assessed in relation to the nature of the colonial experience and the way the Northern Rhodesian colonial state functioned.

This is not a thesis on decolonization *per se*. It is about the contribution of liberal activism to that process. The main interest is the conception of liberalism as understood in the contemporary British Central Africa, and the crucial role it played in generating ideas about the future of liberal democracy.

This revisionist-post-nationalist interpretation of both Capricorn and liberal activism in Northern Rhodesia concludes that although liberalism had faded by 1964, Capricorn conceptions about democratic principles and the need for good government continued to inform political processes. The thesis sees multi-racialism as an attempt to foster new forms of civil society which were capable of coping with demands of the colonial and post colonial politics. The study also concludes that the failure of liberal democracy after 1964 reflects the legacy of colonial rule, and not necessarily a problem of post-independence leadership.

Abbreviations

ALC	African Labour Corps
ANC	African National Congress
ANIP	African National Independence Party
ARC	African Representative Council
BNP	Barotse National Party
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAA	Capricorn Africa Association
CAC	Central African Council
CAI	Capricorn Africa Institute
CAP	Central Africa Party
CAS	Capricorn Africa Society
CO	Colonial Office
CP	Constitution Party
CPP	Conventional Peoples Party
FAS	Federation of African Societies
FUCA	Federal Union of Capricorn Africa
HM	Historical Manuscripts
Legco	Legislative Council
LP	Liberal Party
MASA	Mines African Staff Association
MLC(s)	Member(s) of Legislative Council
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
MP(s)	Member(s) of Parliament
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia
NAZimb	National Archives of Zimbabwe

NPP	National Progress Party
NRAC	Northern Rhodesia Africa Congress
PA	Party Archives
PAFMECSA	Pan-African Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa
PRO	Public Record Office
RACM	Roan Antelope Consolidated Mines
RRP	Rhodesian Republican Party
RST	Rhodesian Selection Trust
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference
UCAA	United Central Africa Association
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	United Federal Party
UNFP	United National Freedom Party
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNRA	United Northern Rhodesia Association
UP	United Party
UPP	United Progressive Party
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress

CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION.

As we look back at the years 1949-1972 in Zambia's[1] colonial and post-independence history from the perspective of the early 1990s, we can sense, in ways denied to contemporary historians and political scientists, the relevance and impact of liberalism as an ideology for the transfer of political power from metropolitan to local control. It should be remembered that "to the extent that liberalism provides a foundation of modern democracy, it does so also with regard to modern nationalism."[2] Previous discussions of liberal activism in Central Africa have tended to emphasize the shortcomings of liberalism, seeing in it merely the story of a failure which had neither utility nor significant influence during the decolonization of Northern Rhodesia. This thesis does not take such assumptions as axiomatic. Instead, it seeks to show the utility and influence of liberalism during the decolonization of Northern Rhodesia. It will be shown that "liberalism is no independent phenomenon; its essence can be adequately described only in terms of its confrontation with other phenomena."[3]

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[1] In a study of this kind there is the problem of deciding how to refer to the country. The practice in this study will be to use Northern Rhodesia for the period up to independence and then Zambia for the period following independence in order to conform to normal usage inside the country. Throughout the study pre-independence names for towns have been retained.

[2] M. Seliger, "Locke, Liberalism and Nationalism," in John W. Yolton (ed.), John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, A Collection of New Essays, (Cambridge, At the Cambridge Press, 1969), p. 19.

[3] Eric Voegelin, "Liberalism and Its History," Review of Politics, 36, 4 (October, 1974), p. 505.

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Liberalism as understood in Europe is concerned with the individual. The central intellectual figure in the evolution of the liberal idea was the seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke. He was the "first to elaborate modern liberalism in a comprehensive and influential system of thought...."[4] He was preoccupied with politics as the means to safeguard a set of values which were later labelled "liberal". Locke's system of thought reflected "fully the recognition of men's obligation to abide by a 'higher law' than that devised by humans."[5] The central thesis of Locke's system of thought was that politics can and must be guided by the injunctions of reason contained in a "law of nature," in which popular participation was held to be in accord with reason and with the different abilities of men to ascertain and apply its universal precepts.

A century later, the ideas associated with liberalism were taken up by *philosophes* in France where they were considered the primary legacy of the "Enlightenment".[6] In economics, liberalism became associated with the freedom of capital or *laissez-faire*, while in politics it became linked to ideas asserting the freedom of individuals from external constraints. Measured against conservatism or socialism, liberalism has always been more concerned with the liberty of the person

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[4] Martin Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locke, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 45.

[5] Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locke, p. 45.

[6] Anthony McAdam, "Rhodesia's Phantom 'Liberalism': Imperialism, Federalism and Rebellion in British Central Africa," African Perspectives, (1976), p. 48.

than with the well being of the collective.[7] It is therefore logically connected with the capitalist economic system.

Although presented as a universal philosophy, liberalism itself is hardly monolithic. Different economic, political and social settings have over time produced a number of different "liberalisms". As a political movement, liberalism has been influenced by its surroundings, and its meaning has altered in response changing circumstances. Liberalism has often taken on various functions and shades of meaning according to the social context.[8] Thus an assessment of liberalism "must not be guided by ... the simple ability to keep certain political values intact, but by the way particular historical situations are confronted."[9]

Although the Cape liberal tradition influenced the thought and behaviour of some Central African liberals,[10] it was unique to South Africa and was not reproduced elsewhere. Also, liberalism in Canada and the United States of America has specific connotations. In these two countries, the central political commitment of liberalism is "to respect autonomy in each person ... by minimizing restrictions and interferences in each individual's life and decisions ... by maximizing each individual's

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[7] Though this has proved to be shaky ground for liberalism. First the radical liberals, and then democratic socialists, argued that the state must be used to create equality of opportunity for underprivileged individuals by redistributing wealth through taxation into social services if liberalism were not to degenerate into oligarchy. The problem is similar to that faced by liberal economic theory of free competition when confronted with the emergence of cartels and monopolies.

[8] Voegelin, "Liberalism and Its History," p. 508.

[9] Paul B. Rich, White Power and the Liberal Conscience: Racial Segregation and South African Liberalism, 1921-1960, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 123.

[10] McAdam, "Rhodesia's Phantom 'Liberalism'," p. 49.

liberty."[11] It is a philosophy, an approach to life rather than the monopoly of any single political party though individual liberty differed according to which class in society it was targeted to.

In a colonial situation like British Central Africa, where racial tension dominated political and social intercourse, liberalism was committed to multi-racialism and reform. The liberal therefore generally sympathized with Africans and sought to improve their living and working conditions.[12] There were several types of "liberals" in Central Africa ranging from the "conservative liberal" to the "radical liberal".[13] Not all believed in multi-racialism. Most "conservative liberals", for example, expressed sympathy for Africans paternalistically, and generally opposed the idea of racial mixing. This category frequently included "Native" Commissioners, and in Northern Rhodesia specifically, some European Legislative Council representatives for African interests.

In contrast, "radical liberals" endorsed political emancipation of the Africans and the creation of a multi-racial society. There were only a handful of "radical liberals" among white settlers in Central Africa. Most of them were associated, at one time or another, with the Capricorn Africa Society (from now on referred to as

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[11] D.J.C. Carmichael, "Political Ideologies and Values," in T.C. Pocklington (ed.), Liberal Democracy in Canada and the United States: An Introduction to Politics and Government, (Toronto, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), p. 64.

[12] C. A. Rogers, "The Organization of Political Attitudes in Southern Rhodesia," Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, (March 1959), p. 25.

[13] McAdam, "Rhodesia's Phantom 'Liberalism'," p. 50. See also Ian Hancock, White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia 1953-1980, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984), especially pp. 79-104. However, Hancock's classification is vague and does fit well into this analysis. This thesis therefore adopts McAdam's classification.

Capricorn or the Society).[14] This study is particularly concerned with this group of liberals because in the Northern Rhodesian context "radical liberals" stood for multi-racialism. In this study, therefore liberalism was synonymous with multi-racialism. As a result, throughout this study the two words will be used interchangeably as they were used and understood during the fervour of nationalist politics. Moreover, in this study, multi-racialism is identified with progressive rather than conservative ideas. Multi-racialism did not seek to preserve the *status quo*, but to provide a smooth transition from a political system dominated and run by Europeans to one which would eventually be run by Africans.[15]

No one has yet studied the political significance of this specific form of liberalism *vis-à-vis* the decolonization of Northern Rhodesia. Until recently it was generally assumed that in the late colonial period European settlers and colonial regimes responded to African nationalism with a monolithic opposing voice. This study of European politics during the height of nationalist activism in Northern Rhodesia, however, suggests that this view is simplistic. Indeed, Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler have argued that "colonial regimes were neither monolithic nor omnipotent, [and that] closer investigation reveals competing agendas for using power, competing strategies for maintaining control, and doubts about the legitimacy of the venture."[16] European settlers were divided into a number of competing

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[14] The Capricorn Africa Society was active in five countries: Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. (See Appendix V, Map 1). This thesis focuses on Capricorn activities in Northern Rhodesia.

[15] Sir John Moffat, "The Role of the Liberal in Rhodesian Politics," <u>Central African Examiner</u>, (24 September, 1960), p. 12.

[16] Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, "Introduction, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule," <u>American Ethnologist: The Journal of the American Ethnological</u>

groups, with various attitudes towards the African nationalists—ranging from outright opposition to close collaboration. Some of these groups were conservative and racist, opposed to African aspirations and wedded to autocratic colonial rule. Other Europeans adopted liberal ideas, embracing notions of rule embedded in the liberal commitment to individual achievement and multi-racial democracy for those who had earned the right to govern themselves.

The Capricorn Africa Society and other liberal influences in Northern Rhodesia were bound to adopt the political strategy of racial collaboration, which they called "multi-racialism", if they were to remain liberal, for liberalism stresses the evaluation of individual worth in terms of achievement and merit, not race. Liberals therefore sought means of recruiting Africans into a political grouping based on class and ideology rather than race and saw this technique as a means of blunting and eventually undermining racial politics altogether.

The emergence of liberal activism in Central Africa reflected class struggle and class interests—whereby race began to play a less pronounced, but still important political role. It should be remembered that in Central Africa, liberalism was an urban phenomenon among both Africans and Europeans. Interests of white collar clerks, blue collar workers, or merchants were extremely varied and could not be easily contained in one political movement. It is in this respect that the "convergence theory," which assumed that there were common interests between African trade unions and nationalists, is disproved.[17] In fact, the evidence suggests that African nationalist politics were not at all inclusive, but often divided along

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Society, 16, 4 (Nov. 1989), p. 609.

[17] For a detailed discussion of the "convergence theory" see, Ian Henderson, "Wager-Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa: The Case of the Copperbelt," African Affairs, 72, 287 (1973), pp. 288-299.

ethnic, regional and class lines. Evidently most Africans who embraced liberalism came from the middle class. They were generally senior clerks like Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika,[18] Gabriel Musumbulwa or businesspeople like S. H. Chileshe or church leaders or teachers like Dauti Lawton Yamba.[19]

In Central Africa, liberal activists sought to eliminate racial divisions by encouraging multi-racialism, in which class values and interests replaced race as criteria for awarding political privileges. African liberals in particular, sought to use the established channels as fora "for articulating their grievances and be able to confront white settlers on issues relating to the social, economic and political advancement of the Africans."[20]

It will be shown that the class nature of liberalism attracted the support of influential business personalities in Central Africa and abroad. After 1953, mine managers for example, openly embraced and encouraged class divisions between and among their employees as opposed to ethnic and racial divisions. Thus when African supervisory workers, whose work was of a similar general nature to that done by European staff employees formed the Mines African Staff Association (MASA), mine

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[18] Mbikusita Lewanika's position was unique because he was also an aristocrat from Barotseland.

[19] On Yamba's contribution as an African liberal or moderate politician see Mwelwa C. Musambachime, "Dauti Yamba's Contribution to the Rise and Growth of Nationalism in Zambia, 1941-1964," African Affairs, 90, 359 (1991), pp. 259-282; and on teachers support for multi-racialism in general see NAZ, HM 47, The Harry Franklin Papers, Letters to Harry Franklin, 1959.

[20] Musambachime, "The Rise and Growth of Nationalism in Zambia," p. 273.

management quickly gave them support.[21] This was reinforced through special privileges for African staff miners. Wives of staff Africans attended special classes to teach them "middle class" living habits.[22] Some of these workers and their wives supported liberal multi-racial politics.

Thus an analysis of liberal activism has to consider the class nature of liberals and their programmes. The burden of this study——the role of multi-racialism in the era of nationalist politics——suggests that multi-racialism largely represented middle and elite working class interests. Although the United National Independence Party (UNIP) sought an alliance with the masses. it was led by an elite just like the African National Congress (ANC). Thus UNIP versus liberal politics represented competition between competing factions of the elite, but UNIP was able to mobilize the masses and consequently triumphed. This thesis argues that the least economically minded Africans joined UNIP and used mass grievances against the more prosperous Africans to destroy the liberal multi-racial coalition. Kenneth Kaunda described the African society as communal in which individualism was discouraged.[23]

Thus nationalist victory represented the failure of class division as a tool for gradualism and liberal activism. Capitalism was considered un-African. Yet the

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[21] Jane L. Parpart, Labour and Capital on the African Copperbelt, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1983), pp. 140-146.

[22] Parpart, Labour and Capital, p. 152. The Capricorn Africa Society organized similar programmes for wives of educated Africans and women in general. The Capricorn Mobile Unit was established to assist African women in their struggle to achieve a higher standard of living as well as to promote good citizenship. (Capricorn Papers, File 62, Capricorn Mobile Unit).

[23] Kenneth Kaunda, "Ideology and Humanism," Pan-African Journal, 1, 1 (1968), p. 5.

origins of African national consciousness clearly suggest the primacy of capitalism. The geographical entity Northern Rhodesia was a creation of capitalist interest represented initially by the British South Africa Company (BSAC). More importantly, Ian Henderson has shown that national consciousness in Zambia was enhanced by "the inability of the British Government to perform the conjuring trick of stepping up production while adjusting political institutions and social policies to new conditions [which is] the key to understanding at least part of the process of decolonization."[24] Thus, it was frustration with capitalism's slow process, and the need to broaden capitalism's benefits rather than commitment to socialism, which underlay the nationalist vision for Northern Rhodesia's future.

Anderson's observation "that the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation,"[25] is applicable to Northern Rhodesia. The first, and even later nationalists were bound together by the language of their colonizers——English. Their meetings deliberated in English.[26] English became the official language at independence. African vernaculars could not and have not created national consciousness——or at least not the consciousness of a nation which happened to coincide with the frontiers of the colony. African vernacular languages, particularly after their standardization and rendering into print by missionaries, invoked the

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[24] Ian Henderson, "The Economic Origins of Nationalism in Zambia 1940-1945," Rhodesian History, (1974), p. 49.

[25] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, (London, Verso, 1983), p. 49.

[26] Wittington K. Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, (Lusaka, Neczam, 1978), p. 20. It should be noted that in urban areas both ANC and UNIP leaders used English during political rallies.

emotional nationalism of the classical European brand with its dangerous assumptions that all those speaking a common mother tongue had the inalienable right to live together in a single nation-state. In Africa such "ethnic nationalism" was dismissed by "modern nationalists" and imperialists alike as "mere tribalism" and "too narrowly focused and for assisting in the Balkanization and fragmentation of Africa."[27] More often than not, vernaculars invoke feelings of ethnic nationalism in which the imagined community is much smaller than that of modern nationalists.

The study therefore looks at multi-racial liberalism in Central Africa through an examination of the Capricorn Africa Society, a multi-racial organization founded in Southern Rhodesia in 1949. Capricorn operated at the height of nationalist fervour among Africans in Northern Rhodesia during the period 1949-1964. Since Capricorn ideas stood for liberal democracy—a political system which guaranteed political pluralism—the study also examines the first eight years of Zambia's independence in order to provide an overview of the failure of liberal democracy. Questions about the short transition period from colonial rule to independence, and whether Northern Rhodesia's colonial experience prepared the country for liberal democracy are discussed. The background to the formation of the one-party state in 1972 is assessed in relation to the nature of the colonial experience and the way the Northern Rhodesian colonial state functioned.

This is not a thesis on decolonization *per se*. It is about the contribution of liberalism to that process, specifically the contribution of a pressure group like Capricorn. The main interest in the thesis is the concept of "liberalism" as understood in contemporary British Central Africa, and the crucial role played by

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[27] Richard Hodder-Williams, An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 71.

multi-racialism in new forms of civil society.[28] The thesis examines the history of

"liberalism" in Central Africa, and Northern Rhodesia in particular from 1949-1964.

Although liberalism had faded by 1964, Capricorn conceptions about

democratic principles and the need to ensure good government continued to be

pursued by those few white and black liberals who had joined the nationalist parties.

The thesis also discusses the historical roots of the failure of liberal democracy as

part of the on-going debate.[29] While the emphasis is placed upon the ideas and

activities of Capricorn, it is not disputed that liberalism was also represented by

individuals and groups outside Capricorn. When and where it is appropriate to do

so, these are discussed. The thesis endeavours to show the variety, vibrancy and

fascination of liberalism in the era of decolonization in Northern Rhodesia.

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[28] Here I use the term "new forms of civil society" because I do recognize that precolonial cultures in Africa did not lack civil societies—"a bevy of institutions for protecting collective interests and resolving disputes." (Michael Bratton, "Beyond Autocracy: Civil Society in Africa," Beyond Autocracy in Africa: the Inaugural Seminar of the African Governance Program, The Carter Centre of Emory University, Working Paper Series, Atlanta, February 17-18, 1989, p. 29). See also Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.) Democracy in Developing Countries: Vol. 2, Africa, (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 1-32.

[29] See Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, (Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1988); Larry Diamond, Juan L. Linz and Seymour Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2 Africa; Richard Joseph, "The Challenge of Democratization in Africa: Some Reflections," African Governance in the 1990s: Objectives, Resources and Constraints, The Second Annual Seminar of the African Governance Program, The Carter Centre of Emory University Working Paper Series, March 23-25, 1990, pp.17-21.

Analyses of Capricorn and liberalism in Zambia's colonial history have largely been incidental and based on secondary sources.[30] None of these studies have used Capricorn Papers or records of the multi-racial liberal parties and groups which emerged in Northern Rhodesia. Instead, they have tended to enhance contemporary misconceptions about liberalism and the Capricorn Africa Society. Mwelwa Musambachime, for example, incorrectly labels the Society a political party.[31] Musambachime's view that Capricorn was one of the "white-led parties" to which "a few educated Africans holding responsible jobs belonged"[32] is inappropriate. While Capricorn supported the Constitution Party (CP) and then the Central African Party (CAP), it was not itself a political party in the sense in which Musambachime suggests. He discusses Capricorn in relation to the *Banyama* (Vampire Men) scare in which the terms "Capricorn" and *Banyama* were "synonymous and inseparable" as

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[30] Robert I. Rotberg, <u>The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964</u>, (Harvard, Massachusetts, Yale University Press, 1965), p. 244; Fergus MacPherson, <u>Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and the Man</u>, (Lusaka, Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 115-116; Mwelwa C. Musambachime, "The Impact of Rumour: The Case of the Banyama, (Vampire men), Scare in Northern Rhodesia, 1939-1964," <u>The International Journal of African Historical Studies</u>, 21, 2, (1988), pp. 201-215; Wittington K. Sikalumbi, <u>Before UNIP</u> (Lusaka, Neczam, 1977), p. 14.

[31] Musambachime, "The Impact of Rumour," p. 211.

[32] <u>Ibid.</u>.

in Stephen Mpashi's fictional novel *Uwauma Nafyala*.[33] Yet available evidence strongly suggests that there was no link between Capricorn and *Banyama*.

Wittington K. Sikalumbi's Before UNIP displays little understanding of the Society. Sikalumbi, a nationalist in the 1950s and 1960s, does not differentiate between the proponents of the Society on the one hand, and those who sought to use it on the other. He therefore wrongly identifies Sir Roy Welensky as one of the Society's leaders.[34] Sikalumbi also alleges that Capricorn paid Africans who "falsely gave their masters names of Africans who were supposed to have accepted federation as a good scheme."[35] Yet no real evidence exists that this was the case.

J.R.T. Wood mentions Capricorn in connection with the campaign for federation. There is no attempt to assess its significance except to say that Sir Roy Welensky used it as a cover.[36] In Black Heart, Rotberg contrasts the Society's

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[33] Stephen Mpashi, Uwauma Nafyala, (Lusaka, 1959), 31-32, cited in Musambachime, "The Impact of Rumour", p. 212. In Uwauma Nafyala Mpashi deals with characteristics which promote or destroy social relationships. The emphasis is on the destructive power of negative characteristics of suspicion. The suspicion was directed at Africans who conspicuously displayed wealth, expressed political opinions which were not popular, and those who held steady jobs. These kind of people were suspected of being political informers for the colonial government and therefore working against the aspirations of Africans. Mpashi, like most Africans, linked Capricornists to Banyama as a ploy to scare people from associating with a movement allegedly involved in vampire men activities. Apart from the mere coincidence that vampire men stories began when Capricorn intensified its activities in Northern Rhodesia, there is no real evidence linking the two.

[34] Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 14.

[35] Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 14.

[36] J.R.T. Wood, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983), p. 234.

"liberal conceptions" with Gore-Browne's variant of white liberalism——one which accepted the inevitable triumph of African nationalism.[37]

This thesis will show that Capricorn also acknowledged the inevitable triumph of African nationalism but sought ways of diverting the process away from racial exclusiveness.[38] The Society was concerned with the development of liberal democracy——a democracy in which the qualified franchise was necessary to safeguard efficiency and high standards in government. The Society therefore, supported African self-determination, but only when Africans were ready for it. Unlike many of their critics, Capricorn members fully expected eventual African majority rule in Africa.

Liberalism has also received only casual references in the historiography of Central Africa.[39] Detailed studies which exist take it as their task to prove the "foreign" nature and futility of liberal politics and liberalism.[40] More specifically,

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[37] R.I. Rotberg, Black Heart: Gore Browne and the Politics of Multi-racial Zambia, (Berkeley, Yale University Press, 1977), p. 297.

[38] Microfilms of Papers of the Capricorn Africa Society held at the J.B. Morrell Library, University of York, U.K. held at the Centre for Research Library, Chicago (hereafter referred to as CAS Papers, unless otherwise stated) File no. 128, Chairman's Report, 27 February, 1960.

[39] Zimbabwe on the other hand has received some attention in this area. See, for example, Hancock, White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals.

[40] See Tafataona P. Mahoso, "Between Two Nationalisms: a Study in Liberal Activism and Western Domination, Zimbabwe 1920-1980," Ph. D. Thesis, Temple University, 1987; and Harris B. K. Sondashi, "Politics of the Voice: an Examination and Comparison of British Pressure Groups (Capricorn Africa Society, Africa Bureau and the Movement of Colonial Reform) which sought to Influence Colonial Policies and Events: the Case of Central Africa, 1949-1962," M. Phil. Thesis, University of York, (UK), 1980. The titles of both studies clearly suggest that the authors did not consider liberalism

liberalism was characterized as foreign engineered and designed to perpetuate European rule. According to Mahoso, liberalism emerged in response to demands for a new imperialism and a new colonialism.[41] In the end therefore, liberalism has been anathematized by scholars in much the same way it was anathematized by African nationalists.

This thesis, however, is written by a Zambian too young to have experienced the emotional fervour of the nationalist years, a member of a generation whose expectations and hopes extend beyond the long accomplished removal of formal colonial rule. Every generation rewrites, and it is to be hoped enriches, history in the light of its own problems. This thesis therefore seeks to provide a revisionist, and post-nationalist interpretation of both Capricorn and liberal activism in Northern Rhodesia.

The thesis is based on materials from the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), United National Independence Party Archives (UNIP, PA), the Public Record Office (PRO) and Microfilms of Papers of the Capricorn Africa Society held at the University of York (UK) from the Centre for Research Libraries in Chicago. The last two chapters of the thesis also rely heavily on Keesing's Contemporary Archives and Africa Research Bulletin[42], which contain valuable information on the

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and the liberal groups they were assessing as locally inspired. Detailed discussion of the two authors follows in the relevant sections of the thesis because they specifically deal with the topic of this study.

[41] Mahoso, "Between Two Nationalisms," p. 167.

[42] Both Keesing's Contemporary Archives and Africa Research Bulletin are a sort of collection of press cuttings. Most entries were cited from several Newspapers and/or official press releases. It has been the practice in this thesis to cite only the relevant Keesing's Contemporary Archives or Africa Research Bulletin issue without showing what either was citing because such information is scant.

politics of decolonization and after. These two sources covered much of what is usually contained in local newspapers. However, the <u>Northern News</u> was quite informative for part of the period covered in the thesis. Gabriel Musumbulwa was gracious enough to grant me an important interview, which threw significant light on the views and ideas of African "moderates" of the time.

CHAPTER TWO

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY AND SETTLER POLITICS IN
NORTHERN RHODESIA 1924-1954: BACKGROUND TO LIBERAL POLITICS.

Northern Rhodesian colonial history is essentially a story of race relations characterized by the doctrines of paramountcy, then partnership; European demands, first for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and later for a federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland; and African responses to these initiatives. The stage for these political events was largely the Copperbelt and the line of rail which formed the economic base of the territory. Though the seeds of African and European nationalisms were sown as the territory developed and as the two communities became increasingly interdependent, it was the European[1] assault on the doctrine of paramountcy and the demands for closer association which gave prominence to the two nationalisms. The emergence of liberalism as a political force in the late 1940s and early 1950s was an attempt to bridge the gap and provide a middle ground in the racially polarized political development of the territory.   Therefore, to appreciate the development of liberalism, with its commitment to multi-racial politics in Northern Rhodesia in the late 1950s, it is necessary to examine the period before 1953. In this earlier period the economic, political and social structures which determined Northern Rhodesia's colonial and post-colonial history were established. The colonial state[2] *par excellence* emerged after 1924 with the Colonial Office

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[1] The term "European" as applied to the white community in Central Africa included white South Africans. Further, throughout this study, the terms "European" and "white" will be used interchangeably.

[2] For a detailed discussion of the nature and characteristics of the colonial state, see Crawford Young, "The Colonial State and its Connection to Current Political Crisis in Africa," Draft paper given at a conference on

takeover of Northern Rhodesia from the British South Africa Company. The African

colonial state was a particular form of imperial dependency and existed largely as an

appendage of sovereign European states.

> It lacked a pre-existing revenue base; was organized swiftly in an
> intensely competitive imperial environment; contained a more
> extensive cultural project than most other forms; and was organized at
> an historical moment when European states themselves were far more
> comprehensive, institutionally and doctrinally elaborated polities than
> in earlier centuries.[3]

During the formative stages of the colonial state many changes occurred in British

colonial policy in Northern Rhodesia, especially between 1924-1948. These changes

included the de-emphasizing of paramountcy of African interests and the adoption

of the partnership principle as a prelude to multi-racial liberal politics.

The changes also reflected the entry of Africans into wage labour which

created new relationships and attitudes among Africans themselves. These new

relationships and attitudes not only determined how efficiently Africans worked but

also their relationship with employers of African labour and the colonial

administration. By the 1940s African workers had discovered their power which

forced colonial officials to begin thinking of articulating "a forward-looking colonial

social policy——while trying to contain workers' reaction to the strains of their daily

lives...."[4] Indeed, the change from African paramountcy to partnership should be

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African Independence, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, January, 1985, or the published version, "The African Colonial State and its Political Legacy," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, (Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1988), pp. 25-66.

[3] Young, "The Colonial State," pp. 1-2.

[4] Frederick Cooper, "From Free Labour to Family Allowances: Labour and African Society in Colonial Discourse," American Ethnologist: The Journal of the American Ethnological Society, 16, 4 (November, 1989), p. 746.

assessed in terms of officials' belief that "Africans could be modern...."[5] From an earlier feeling for the superiority of the "untouched" rural Africans over the urbanized, semi-skilled, semi-literate and semi-Europeanized, officials gradually changed their attitudes and developed an increasingly negative view of Africans who were not modern. Thus "the focus on social and economic development legitimized the European standards of living as a reference point for the aspirations of Africans,"[6] as well as a basis for partnership.

The Founding of Northern Rhodesia.

Northern Rhodesia was one of the territories in Africa occupied by Britain during the late-nineteenth-century scramble for Africa. The initial inroads were made in Barotseland with the 1890 Barotse Concession to Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC) ostensibly as a representative of Queen Victoria. Through a series of dubious treaties by BSAC representatives, the Company gained the rest of Northern Rhodesia which was officially created in 1911 when the separate administrations of North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, first divided by the Kafue River and then by the line of rail, were amalgamated by the BSAC to economize. For three decades the BSAC ruled Northern Rhodesia for the British Crown.[7] It was never envisaged that Northern Rhodesia would develop into a white colony in the same way as in Kenya, where European settlement was adopted as an

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[5] Cooper, "From Free Labour to Family Allowances," p. 757.

[6] Cooper, "From Free Labour to Family Allowances," p. 758.

[7] See L. H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, Early Days to 1953, (London, Oxford University Press, 1964).

official colonial policy as early as 1902.[8] In fact, as Ian Henderson ably argued, Northern Rhodesia's "original *raison d'être* was as a labour reserve for the developing white areas of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa,"[9] at least up to the mid-1920s. Since then Northern Rhodesia's position began to shift from that of a purely black colony like British colonies in West Africa to the uncomfortable middle position of a multi-racial colony. The man responsible for this change was the first governor of the protectorate after the BSAC had relinquished its rule on April 1, 1924. Governor Herbert Stanley, who began his African career in South Africa, envisaged a large white-controlled dominion stretching from the Cape to Kenya in which the Rhodesias were to play a key role. To encourage white settlement in Northern Rhodesia he set aside blocks of land for European use.[10]

Within a year of Colonial Office rule, sulphide deposits yielding a high proportion of copper were discovered at Ndola on the Congo border. This stimulated capital investment, immigration and markets for agricultural produce. The development of the copper mines ushered in a new era of race relations between Africans and Europeans, which rendered the doctrine of African paramountcy (trusteeship) even more problematic.[11] Imperial intentions and settler aspirations

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[8] See Levi I Izuakor, "Kenya: The Unparamount African Paramountcy, 1923-1939," Transafrican Journal of History, 12 (1983), p. 33.

[9] Ian Henderson, "The Limits of Colonial Power: Race and Labour Problems in Colonial Zambia, 1900-1953," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2, 3 (May 1974), p. 295.

[10] Jane L. Parpart, Labour and Capital on the African Copperbelt, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1983), p. 17.

[11] See below for the background to the doctrine of paramountcy, pp. 34-44.

began to drift apart. Although the Passfield Memorandum[12] attempted to "import" the doctrine into Northern Rhodesia after 1930, circumstances had so dramatically changed that paramountcy of African interests began to fade. These changes made Northern Rhodesia governors more conscious of settler and mining interests in the implementation of policy. Governors were increasingly under pressure to ensure that both settler farmers and the mining industry were not starved of African labour.[13] To meet this need, colonial administrators put in place administrative instruments which guaranteed availability of labour for both sectors of the economy.

The Emergence of the Mining Industry.

Mining in Northern Rhodesia started at Broken Hill about the turn of the century and by 1906 minerals had become the colony's chief export. Nevertheless, until the discovery of the full potential wealth of the Copperbelt in the mid-1920s, mining remained small scale. The growth of the mining industry coincided with the development of the railroad from the south to the north. By 1906 the railroad had reached Broken Hill, linking with the Belgian Congo system in 1909. The railroad also helped in the development of agriculture in the colony besides improving mining prospects. As a result an increasing number of white immigrants set up farms on land alongside the line of rail. The discovery of large quantities of copper sulphide ores in 1925 at Ndola, in the area just to the south of the Belgian Congo

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[12] See below for a detailed discussion on the Passfield Memorandum.

[13] For a detailed discussion of labour problems on the Copperbelt see Elena L. Berger, Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule: The Copperbelt from 1942-Independence, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974) and Parpart, Labour and Capital.

border, allowed use of the so-called "flotation" process discovered in 1911, for the profitable mining of sulphide ores. The rise in copper prices in the 1920s made investment in the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia economically feasible. Large mining companies were attracted to the area, which developed into Northern Rhodesia's Copperbelt. The emergence of the Copperbelt had three important consequences.

First, it attracted increased white migration including large numbers of skilled and semi-skilled mine workers, many of whom came from South Africa.[14] Table I summarizes the composition of the European population in Northern Rhodesia by country of birth between 1911 and 1956.

TABLE I
European Population By Country of Birth, 1911 to 1956.

Country	1911	1921	1931	1956
Northern Rhodesia	83	397	1,291	11,319
Southern Rhodesia	43	193	906	3,398
South Africa	366	1,321	5,776	26,569
Great Britain	679	1,317	4,219	17,088
European Countries	205	217	798	3,955
Other Countries	121	189	856	2,948
TOTAL	1,497	3,634	13,846	65,277

Source: George Kay, A Social Geography of Zambia: A Survey of Population Patterns in a Developing Country, London, University of London Press, 1967, p. 29.

Many British-born persons crossed the Zambezi after spending some time in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia or both, and they were thus subjected for a period to the climate of opinion in a settler-dominated country before coming to Northern

[14] PRO CO 537/5896/16 Acting Governor, Northern Rhodesia, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 July, 1950.

Rhodesia. Almost all shared the determination to protect their privileged financial position by preserving a white monopoly of the more highly paid jobs.

Secondly, copper mining stimulated trade, leading to considerable development not only on the Copperbelt towns but also of the whole area along the line of rail. The line of rail from Livingstone in the south to the Belgian Congo border in the north became an area of intense economic development and white domination. Uneven development grew as the line of rail flourished while most of the country remained poverty-stricken, though much less directly affected by white domination and racialism.

Lastly, the development of the Copperbelt attracted a large African labour force, first for short periods, but then many settling almost permanently in towns. The demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour, with competition from neighbouring mines, led to labour stabilization on the Copperbelt. J. W. Davidson estimates that about 30,000 Africans worked in the mines in 1930.[15] The urbanization process had began. Women and children were part of the Copperbelt population.[16]

With insufficient white workers in Northern Rhodesia during this period, some African workers had better opportunities in skilled and clerical work than was the case in the countries to the south. African participation on the labour market, both on the mines and in the clerical ranks of the civil service, led to the emergence of

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[15] J. W. Davidson, The Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, (London, Faber and Faber, 1948), p. 19.

[16] See Jane L. Parpart, "Class and Gender on the Copperbelt: Women in Northern Rhodesia Copper Mining Communities, 1926-1964," in Claire Robertson and Iris Berger (eds.), Women and Class in Africa, New York, London, Africana Publishing, 1986, pp. 141-160.

a "small elite with the education to understand modern political methods" and ready to take a lead in the development of modern African nationalism.[17]

The mining industry is central to the history of Northern Rhodesia. Since the development of the industry, copper revenues have always determined the state of government coffers. Thus reduced earnings by the mining companies usually translated into reduced government revenue and expenditure. As Parpart correctly observed:

> The dependence upon copper revenues shaped Northern Rhodesian Government and Colonial Office policies. While settler complaints spurred the Colonial Office takeover of Northern Rhodesia in 1924, the colonial state was primarily concerned with facilitating primitive accumulation and the transfer of surplus to the metropole.[18]

To encourage economic development, the Northern Rhodesian Government attempted to mollify both the mine owners and the settlers by providing them with sufficiently cheap and controllable labour.

Labour policy in Northern Rhodesia developed around the theory that urban wage levels should be held back to reduce unemployment and encourage development in the poverty-stricken rural areas where most of the people lived. The theory was supported by the government and the mining companies from the earliest days because it was meant to operate as a self-sustaining and cost free insurance for the migrant labourers. Both the government and the mining companies envisaged little expenditure on social programmes, thus encouraging African workers to return to their home areas. In 1939 the Executive Council of Northern Rhodesia passed a resolution endorsing the policy that:

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[17] J.. D. Omer-Cooper, et. al., The Making of Modern Africa: Vol.2 The Late Nineteenth Century to the Present Day, (London, Longman, 1971), pp. 285-86.

[18] Parpart, Labour and Capital, p. 26.

> ... in principle every avenue should be open to the native though it was recognized that the training of natives by this government was directed towards their return to their Reserves to raise the standard of living therein.[19]

The policy, which some Africans supported, was implemented through the principle of wage differentials between Europeans and Africans. Chief Musokotwane pointed out that since "the standard of living of the Europeans" was higher than that of the Africans, it was unrealistic for Africans to demand equal pay with Europeans.[20] The Dalgleish Commission supported the theory in 1948 as did the Guillebaud Wage Tribunal and the Forster Commission in 1953 and 1954 respectively. These bodies agreed that the wage differential suited the needs of the country.[21] Nevertheless, this did not stop Africans from seeking work in the mines in increased numbers despite the fear of underground jobs.[22] Originally Africans were reluctant to work underground, resulting in the use of labour recruiting agents. After the depression, however, labour became abundant and recruitment for the mines was no longer needed.

Governor Sir James Maxwell showed his interest in labour issues when he created within the Department of Native Affairs a sub-division of the department consisting of the Labour Commissioner and two labour officers, one each for the Copperbelt and the Southern farming area around Mazabuka. Introducing the sub-

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[19] NAZ, SEC NAT/92: Extract from Executive Council Minutes, 16 June, 1939. cited in Berger, Labour, Race and Colonial Rule, p. 44.

[20] NAZ, NR/ARC, The Proceedings of the First Session of the Council, November, 1946.

[21] Berger, Labour, Race and Colonial Rule, p. 228.

[22] Berger, Labour, Race and Colonial Rule, p. 13.

division in the Legislative Council at the end of 1930, Governor Maxwell said he expected it:

> ... to study questions of supply and demand; devise means whereby waste of labour may be avoided; report on and to make recommendations on recruitment; study the effect on health and prepare vital statistics; study the effect of labour on tribal life; collect information with regard to wages; inspect and report, collect, collate and analyze statistics; study and advise on proposed legislation; keep in touch with labour departments and legislation in other territories; compile an annual report giving information with regard to native labour.[23]

This was obviously a challenging assignment for three people. These ambitious plans were abandoned by April 1931 because the depression reduced revenues for government bureaucracy.

Since mine labour was better paid than farm labour, the mines attracted most of the available African labour. Nonetheless, because not all who went to the Copperbelt could be absorbed by the mines, many became unemployed "loafers." This excess labour on the Copperbelt contrasted sharply with the permanent shortage of farm-labour. Partly in response to this shortage, and partly as a wartime measure to increase agricultural production, the government established the African Labour Corps (ALC) in May 1942 at the suggestion of Gore-Browne.[24] The ALC was essentially designed to make African labour available to settler farmers at government expense. The operations of the ALC were evidently incompatible with the principle of paramountcy of African interests because the system was largely

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[23] Legislative Council Debates, 12, 2 December, 1930, 151. Cited in Berger, Labour, Race and Colonial Rule, p. 26.

[24] For a full discussion of the African Labour Corps and its abuses, see Kusum Datta, "Farm Labour, Agrarian Capital and the State in Colonial Zambia: the African Labour Corps, 1942-52," Journal of Southern African Studies, 14, 3 (April 1988), pp. 371-392.

coercive.[25] Kusum Datta has shown that when police stopped blackmailing Africans "recruitment predictably dropped to nil" on the Copperbelt.[26] The ALC was dissolved in December 1952 when it became impossible to recruit any significant numbers of Africans under the scheme.

Colonial governors in Northern Rhodesia were usually sympathetic to settler interests from the early days of Colonial Office rule. Although colonial governors and officials were Colonial Office appointees, they were initially members of the former BSAC administration.[27] When the Ormsby-Gore Report on East Africa, published in 1925,[28] recommended leasehold rather than freehold tenure for white settlers in Northern Rhodesia, Governor Stanley protested and wrote to the Secretary of State for the colonies that the settler in Northern Rhodesia was not an interloper, but that the colony was his permanent home.[29] He therefore became instrumental in encouraging white settlement in the North in the hope of bringing "prosperity and a balanced budget to a poverty-stricken African protectorate."[30] Through his

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[25] The scheme was generally perceived as Chibalo (forced labour) by Africans. It was therefore not uncommon for African men to go into hiding when word went round that the labour recruiters were on the way to their village. Also see Kenneth P. Vickery, "The Second World War Revival of Forced Labour in the Rhodesias," The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 22, 3 (1989), pp. 423-437.

[26] Datta, "Farm Labour," p. 382.

[27] Davidson, The Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, p. 37.

[28] Cmd. 2387, Report of the East African Commission, 1925, p.10.

[29] PRO, CO 795/10 Governor Stanley to Secretary of State, 12 January, 1926. Cited in Henderson, "The Limits of Colonial Power," p. 295.

[30] Henderson, "The Limits of Colonial Power," p. 297.

initiative and aided by the fortunes of the mining industry, the European population grew steadily. By 1948 there were 4000 Europeans working in the mines and some 600 more in agricultural-related occupations out of an estimated European population of 32,000.[31]

Background To Paramountcy.

Colonial officials in Northern Rhodesia suggested that the origins of the doctrine of the paramountcy of African interests in the territory were to be found in the BSAC Charter granted by Queen Victoria in 1889, and upon which future policy was based. The relevant clause read:

> The Company as such or its officers as such, shall not in any way interfere with the religion of any class or tribe of the people of the territory aforesaid or of any of the inhabitants thereof, except so far as may be necessary in the interest of humanity, and all forms of religious worship, or religious ordinances may be exercised within the said territories and no hindrance shall be offered thereto as aforesaid.[32]

The underlying principle behind this humanitarian rhetoric was part of the imperial trusteeship philosophy under which Britain saw itself as the protector of the weak societies of the world. Yet, the above statement which arguably represented the origin, nature and later exposition of British colonial policy towards Northern Rhodesia was being challenged by Governor Stanley.

The terms of the charter, though not taken seriously by the company, recognized the traditional authority of the chiefs and, therefore, became the cornerstone for the application of the doctrine of paramountcy of African interests

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[31] PRO CO/537/4690/19 Acting Governor, R.C.S.Stanley to Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State, 16 February, 1948.

[32] Cited in NAZ, SEC 5/441, Some notes on Paramountcy, 1949.

above those of the immigrant communities since 1923.[33] The paramountcy doctrine was itself embedded in the doctrine of trusteeship——an official Colonial Office tradition of trying to provide protection for African interests against the "vociferous and importunate" demands of white settlers.

The two words——"paramountcy" and "partnership"——which came to summarize British colonial policy in the multi-racial territories of Africa were the responsibility of one man, Joseph Houldsworth Oldham.[34] In the words of Bennett, Oldham was "the real father of the paramountcy declaration." He had earned respect as an international missionary and was to serve on several government commissions.[35] When the quarrel between Europeans and Indians in Kenya reached a climax in late 1922, and the Imperial Government summoned both sides to London, Oldham insisted that they should first consider the paramountcy of "native" interests.[36] The idea found a wider application, especially in the famous White Paper of July 25, 1923.

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[33] Cmd. 1922 of 1923, _Memorandum Relating to Indians in Kenya_, pp. 9-10.

[34] See George Bennett, "Paramountcy to Partnership: J. H. Oldham and Africa," _Africa_, 30 (1960), p. 359. Oldham was a clergyman and Secretary of the International Missionary Council. He was closely connected to the Archbishop of Canterbury and could mobilise bishops in the House of Lords. He devised the formula about the "paramountcy of native interests" in 1923 and persuaded the Duke of Devonshire to make it the central point of his famous declaration. In 1927 Oldham served on the Hilton Young Commission which was appointed to examine closer union in East Africa. Later he lobbied the British Government to switch from "paramountcy of native interests" to the "partnership" principle.
In 1955 Oldham published his _New Hope In Africa_, which he described as a faithful interpretation of the Capricorn Africa Society's goals and objectives.

[35] Bennett, "Paramountcy to Partnership," p. 359.

[36] Bennett, "Paramountcy to Partnership," p. 357.

Pronouncing paramountcy of "native" interests as an official imperial policy towards multi-racial colonies was easy. Enforcing the principle of paramountcy was not easy because the implementation of the principle depended on the government's ability and commitment to exercise the trusteeship on behalf of the African population. However, settler influence in multi-racial territories, aided by colonial governors' own attitudes towards the paramountcy principle, was so great that the sole trusteeship of the imperial government could not operate. Besides, as Henderson correctly observed, "no governor could afford to collide with settlers head on."[37] In fact up to the 1950s governors were appointed who were sympathetic to settler views. Small wonder that Governor Stanley claimed that settlers were indispensable in the exercise of the "sacred trust" and drawing from his experience could write:

> European settlers developed the country (Northern Rhodesia) ... they
> set up standards ... which are valuable object lessons to the natives ...
> generally speaking they are a power and a beneficent civilizing
> agency.[38]

Therefore, whatever the official declarations of the imperial government towards white settlers, officials on the spot were committed to giving them an increasing share in political power. Officials in London soon realized that the 1923 declaration bore no relationship to the facts of the situation and agreed that a new policy statement which would associate the settlers in the trust was necessary. Consequently, the majority report of the Hilton Young Commission recommended that "what the

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[37] Henderson, "The Limits of Colonial Power," p. 299.

[38] Cited in Levi I. Izuakor, "Kenya: the Unparamount African Paramountcy," p. 40.

immigrant communities may justly claim is partnership, not control."[39] The

Commission's Report sympathized with African fears of white domination noting

that:

> The chief need in Eastern and Central Africa today is that there
> should be applied throughout the territories as a whole, continuously
> and without vacillation, a "native policy" which, while adapted to the
> varying conditions of different tribes and different localities, is
> consistent in its main principles.[40]

Nevertheless, they hoped to give the European community definite political

prerogatives within prescribed spheres and by that create a peaceful "mixed state" in

which each main ethnic group developed along its own lines.

The commissioners, led by Joseph Houldsworth Oldham and Sir George

Schuster, defended their conclusions at length:

> Our idea is that, while each (race) pursues its own distinctive and
> natural line of development, they may be able to settle down together
> in a single state without the fear of a struggle for domination, provided
> that there is available an impartial arbiter to decide issues in which
> there is a conflict of racial interests. It can be the destiny of the
> Imperial Government to fill this role.[41]

The ideas expressed in these words were transformed into the partnership principle

and later became the foundation of Capricorn Africa Society ideology. Oldham

became advisor to the Capricorn Africa Society and his influence on it was

significant.

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[39] Cmd. 3234, Report of the Commission on Closer Union, (1929), p. 239.

[40] Cmd. 3234, Report of the Commission on Closer Union, (1929), p.7; cited in Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, p. 99.

[41] Cited in Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa; the Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964, (Harvard Massachusetts, Yale University Press, 1971), p. 100.

The constitutional development of Northern Rhodesia during this period also reflected the change from a commitment to paramountcy of African interests to the partnership principle. This was evident in the way the two main themes which dominated Northern Rhodesia's political history (the movement by white settlers for Closer Union or amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, and the demand for responsible government) were handled by the imperial government. Since 1924 when the Colonial Office took over the administration of Northern Rhodesia, colonial policy was officially regarded as one of trusteeship assisting the peoples of the colonies who were not able to stand on their feet in the modern world. This was the theoretical justification for the paramountcy of African interests doctrine.

Paradoxically, as already alluded to above, the factors which led to the 1923 declaration were not even peripherally connected with the incipient African political consciousness of the time. The circumstantial declaration was a sequel to what became known as the "Indian Question" in Kenya. Hence the difficulties of putting into effect the doctrine in Northern Rhodesia where an "Indian Question" did not exist *per se*. As George Kay observed of the European population, "since the late 19th century they largely controlled all economic, social and political power and their interests were always paramount."[42] Any attempt to reverse that policy was vigorously resisted by the few European immigrants in the territory.

The immigrants, who had always regarded themselves as dominant in the imperial mission, felt betrayed by the 1923 pronouncement. As a result of their protests the doctrine was reexamined, but reaffirmed in 1927 (Cmd. 2904). Indeed, the 1927 White Paper did more than merely reaffirm the paramountcy doctrine, it acknowledged and supported the principle of "Dual Policy," which was first

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[42] Kay, <u>A Social Geography of Zambia</u>, p. 26.

recommended by the Conference of East African Governors. The principle of "Dual Policy" was expected to reflect and recognize the role and interests of the immigrant communities while maintaining the paramountcy of the indigenous people, at least in official pronouncements. This did not satisfy the European community, which continued to resist the term "paramountcy of African interests." The principle was therefore reexamined by the Hilton Young Commission whose report was published in 1929.

The Report concluded that "native" interests were not intended to prevail to the extent of destroying the interests of the immigrant communities already established and that their paramountcy must be subject to this limiting condition.[43] The Commission gave a new meaning to the doctrine of paramountcy by which "paramountcy of native interests" were interpreted in the sense that:

> ... the creation and preservation of a field for the full development of native life was a first charge, and that the government having created that field had the duty to devote all available resources to assisting the natives to develop within it.[44]

Yet, nothing positive was done to carry out the doctrine effectively in this sense. Evidence suggests that European interests became even more dominant.

Although the European community in Northern Rhodesia had voiced its concern over the paramountcy doctrine before 1930, it was widely believed by both officials and unofficials that Northern Rhodesia would achieve self-government on the same basis as Southern Rhodesia. However, the publication of the Passfield Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa (Cmd. 3573 of 1930), which was the first real attempt at extending the doctrine of "native paramountcy" to Northern

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[43] Cmd. 3234, <u>Report of the Commission on Closer Union</u>, 1929.

[44] Cmd. 3234, <u>Report of the Commission on Closer Union</u>, 1929.

Rhodesia, undermined settler confidence in the Colonial Office. In response, settlers began to seek ways of securing release from the principle of paramountcy of African interests. The Passfield Memorandum was intended to affirm Britain's policy that its main responsibility was that of trustee for the "native" people and the declaration that the "ultimate responsibility" for the exercise of that trusteeship rested with Her Majesty's Government alone.[45] European settlers protested vehemently against the memorandum, which they interpreted as a clear manifestation of the imperial government's desire to undermine their interests in the territory.

Governor Maxwell immediately summoned the unofficials[46] to a meeting and assured them that he proposed to place his interpretation of the White Paper before the Secretary of State for the colonies and that he expected the Secretary of State to indicate whether he accepted that interpretation or not. Continuing to reassure the unofficials, Governor Maxwell added:

> There is nothing in it which in my opinion is detrimental to the interests of the white settlers or to the other people of European origin who have come to, and are working in this country. Paramountcy of native interests did not mean racial discrimination. Where you have the interests of a group of Europeans conflicting with the interests of a group of natives, it does not mean that the interests of that group of natives is to prevail simply because they are natives, but in my opinion it does mean that if you have some question arising in which the interests of the natives as a whole are at variance with the interests either of the Europeans as a whole, or of a group of Europeans, that the interests of the majority of the population, that is the natives, must prevail ... To say that we can develop this country entirely in the

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[45] Cmd. 3573, 1930 Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, cited in NAZ, SEC 5/441, "Some notes on paramountcy," 1949.

[46] Since 1924 when the Colonial Office took over Northern Rhodesia, the administrative machinery was composed of officials and unofficials. Officials were Colonial Office appointees while unofficials were settlers elected to the legislature as independents to represent settler interests. See below for details of the composition of the Legislative Council.

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interests of the European population would be to state a fatal policy; to attempt to develop it purely in the interests of the natives would be as fatal ... It is through co-operation that the country will advance.[47]

Governor Maxwell's interpretation of the Passfield Memorandum not only reassured Europeans in Northern Rhodesia of the "paramountcy" of their interests, but also reveals the independent mind and influence that colonial governors could exercise over decisions and policy statements coming from Whitehall. Nonetheless the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council (Legco) condemned the White Paper on 28 November, 1930.[48]

Although in practice African interests were generally sacrificed, the paramountcy doctrine remained a subject of attack by Europeans. Consequently the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, having reviewed all previous declarations on "native" policy, came to the conclusion that:

[This] principle (that of paramountcy discussed in Command Paper 3234 and the Memorandum of 1930) does not imply that the responsibility of the Government towards European settlers should be disregarded. On the contrary, the fullest security must be given to their legitimate interests. They should have the right to effective representation, and to protection against legislative and administrative policy which would fundamentally change the economic conditions on the basis of which they settled in the country. The principle of paramountcy was intended in 1930 as in 1923, to meet those particular cases which might arise, especially in connection with land and labour questions, in which there might be a definite conflict between the interests of non-native community and those of the native population. The Committee considers that the matter may be summed up briefly by saying that the doctrine of paramountcy means no more than that the interests of the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population should not be subordinated to those of a minority belonging to another race, however important in itself.[49]

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[47] Cited in NAZ, SEC 5/441 "Views of Northern Rhodesia Governor on 1930 Memorandum."

[48] NAZ Legco Debates, 18 November, 1930.

[49] Cited in NAZ, SEC 5/441, "Some notes on Paramountcy," 1949.

This was in fact a restatement of the dual responsibility of the imperial government towards the colonial peoples (both black and white), but theoretical paramountcy of African interests again emerged triumphant.

The problem with the 1923 pronouncement and subsequent discussions about paramountcy was that the doctrine would only be enforced where it was necessary. The Joint Select Committee Report of 1931 recognized this problem and recommended that policy should reflect the dual responsibility of the imperial government though with "native paramountcy" preserved as a final principle in case of irreconcilable interests. That recommendation was accepted as authoritative by the United Kingdom Government. After 1931 the theoretical debate on policy issues in Northern Rhodesia temporarily abated until after the Second World War.

African Paramountcy To Partnership, 1924-1953.

There were practical difficulties of putting into effect the principle of paramountcy of African interests over those of the immigrant communities. The principle did not reflect the reality of the duality of imperial responsibility, neither did it acknowledge the fact that European interests were, and would always remain dominant for some time to come. In fact each discussion of paramountcy from 1923 up to 1931 suggested very strongly that those involved in defining policy were seeking a doctrine or a principle which would, at least in theory, express the duality of imperial responsibility and acknowledge, albeit silently, the preeminence of European interests. Paramountcy of "native" interests above those of the immigrant communities was a misnomer, both in theory and practice. The whole idea was a myth in the colonial history of Northern Rhodesia. There was need for a

compromise——the idea of co-operation of the races as first suggested by Governor Maxwell in 1930.

It was the policies of Governor Hubert Young (1934-38) however, (perhaps responding to the political muscle of the settlers) which helped to clarify the meaning of "native paramountcy." When he became governor in 1934 he began involving white unofficials in policy formulation.[50] This was aided by the brightening prospects of the copper mines. By the late 1930s the paramountcy doctrine was seen to be increasingly incompatible with mining interests. Governor Young therefore, did all in his power to dilute the doctrine in the interest of economic progress.[51] By this time the colonial state had become committed to mining and settler causes. Even the Colonial Office had grudgingly accepted the idea of European settlement in Northern Rhodesia.[52] Field officials were more sympathetic to settler farmers and their labour problems. To address this problem a policy or principle of race relations had to be established——one which would facilitate economic development. Hence co-operation between the races became official doctrine, considering the fact that Europeans (farmers especially) were already exerting influence disproportionate to their numbers.

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[50] Davidson, The Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, pp. 43-4, and pp. 53-7.

[51] For a detailed discussion of this see, Kusum Datta, "Governor Young and his role in Central Africa, 1932-38," University of Zambia, History Staff Seminar Series, 1979.

[52] NAZ, SEC 1/48 Calder, C.O. to Acting Governor, C. Dundas, 23 November, 1935.

The idea of "co-operation of the races" as a principle of policy was further implied in Major H. K. McKee's motion in the Northern Rhodesia Legco in 1945.[53] The motion, which was unanimously carried read:

> That this Council recognizes that the interests of Africans and Europeans in the territory are interlocked, and considers that the policy of subordinating the interests of either section of the community to those of the other would be fatal to the development of Northern Rhodesia.[54]

By voting unanimously in favour of the motion, the Legco officials showed their disapproval of the paramountcy doctrine emanating from London, in favour of a principle which declared African and European interests interlocked. The Chief Secretary, Cartmel-Robinson, in accepting the motion, drew attention to the 1931 Joint Select Committee statement, and emphasized its authoritative position. He further explained that far from expecting a clash of interests between African and European communities, the government "looked for a common effort on the part of both communities on the joint endeavour of which the future prosperity of the territory must depend."[55] The record of the debate and the Chief Secretary's statement were cabled to the Secretary of State for the colonies who telegraphed his approval of the general policy as outlined by Cartmel-Robinson.[56]

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[53] Major McKee was one of the first unofficials brought into government because of the war. In 1942 he became Director of Civil Supplies. (J. T. R. Wood, The Welensky Papers: a History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983, p. 72).

[54] Cited in PRO, CO 1015/553/46 The Doctrine of Paramountcy in relation to Northern Rhodesia, by D. Williams, August, 1951.

[55] PRO, CO 1015/553/46 The Doctrine of Paramountcy in Relation to Northern Rhodesia.

[56] Cited in NAZ, SEC 5/441 Secretary of State's attitude to Chief Secretary's statement on partnership, 1945.

Nevertheless, the question of interpreting the doctrine of paramountcy in the Northern Rhodesian context came to the fore several times after 1945, usually in connection with discussions on constitutional development. Roy Welensky raised the issue again in 1948 when unofficials put forward proposals for constitutional changes and at meetings held in London with the Labour Government's Secretary of State for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones. Following these discussions the following statement agreed to by all participants was issued:

> Much public discussion has taken place in Northern Rhodesia in recent years on the subject of the doctrine of paramountcy. The Government believes that it is essential to give a clear and simple definition of the relationship between Europeans and Africans in the development of Northern Rhodesia. The operative document in this connection is not the White Paper of 1923, but paragraph 73 of the Report of the Joint Select Committee in Parliament of 1931 which was accepted as authoritative by the United Kingdom Government at the time and remains the policy of His Majesty's Government.

The statement further added that:

> The important point is that the development of Northern Rhodesia is based on a **genuine partnership** between Europeans and Africans. As we accepted in 1945 there can be no question of the government adopting a policy of subordinating the interests of either community to those of the other. The present and future interests of Northern Rhodesia can be served only by a policy of wholehearted co-operation between the different sections of the community based on the real interests of both sections.[57]

This statement made with the "approval" of the two African members of the Legco,[58] Safeli Chileshe and Moses Mubitana, drove the last nail into the coffin in which paramountcy of African interests was buried. Paramountcy of African interests was henceforth "a dead letter," since it had been eloquently reinterpreted out of existence. Subsequently in August 1948 the Secretary for Native Affairs, R.S.

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[57] Cited in PRO, CO 1015/553/46, The Doctrine of Paramountcy in Relation to northern Rhodesia (Emphasis added).

[58] Africans were first appointed to the Legco in 1948.

Hudson, reiterated the policy regarding paramountcy in his statement to the African Representative Council (ARC) and was supported by Chileshe who urged the Council (ARC) to appreciate that there could be no separation of interests and that the two races were mutually interdependent.[59] Unfortunately, the press published his statement under such headings as "Native interests no longer paramount" and "Paramountcy is dead" thereby creating the impression that a major change of policy had taken place. Not even Creech Jones' explanation in September could remove that impression, especially among Africans who found it difficult to understand that the paramountcy doctrine was counterproductive in a multi-racial country like Northern Rhodesia.

The significance of the London 1948 statement is that it not only reinterpreted paramountcy out of existence, it actually advocated partnership——a term first used in 1929.[60] Although the principle involved had been referred to earlier, partnership had not been taken up seriously as a principle of policy in Northern Rhodesia. From 1948 however, there was a major shift in emphasis. There was less and less emphasis on paramountcy of African interests and frequent emphasis on partnership.[61] On 8 December, 1949 Lord Listowell, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, gave a statement on government policy which he described as one of helping the peoples of the colonies "after consultation and by agreement with them, to reach as soon as

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[59] PRO, CO 1015/553/46 The Doctrine of Paramountcy in Relation to Northern Rhodesia.

[60] Cmd. 3239, Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in East and Central Africa, (1929), p. 239.

[61] The partnership principle emerged publicly from the Lord Hailey's Report of 1940. The report argued that "trusteeship" was much too patronizing and that it was time for colonial governments to take Africans into partnership. In fact, Oldham's lobbying for partnership was based on this earlier recommendation by Lord Hailey.

possible the successive stages along the road to responsible government within the Commonwealth."[62] Lord Listowell drew attention to the main difference between West Africa and East and Central Africa——the existence of considerable settled immigrant communities in the latter——and concluded that:

> Our policy for helping these countries to achieve responsible government in this part of Africa must, of course, embrace these communities as well as the indigenous African population. It is our task——as I know the immigrant communities themselves recognize——to help the Africans to develop politically, socially and economically so that they can take their full part in the administration and development of the countries concerned and in local and central politics ... What we want is a partnership between all who have made their homes in these territories.[63]

Lord Listowell's qualification of the position in East and Central Africa reflected Colonial Office concern about settler demands that they should take over sole control of government. This was a further restatement of the dual responsibility of the imperial government towards the colonial peoples (here Africans and Europeans). Government official representatives in both the United Kingdom and Northern Rhodesia avoided the term paramountcy and emphasized instead the term partnership. On 30 December, 1950 the Secretary of State for the colonies addressing the House of Commons expressed the hope that:

> ... all persons who are concerned with the future of these territories will work together towards that goal of true partnership on which, and on which alone, the future prosperity and happiness of all in East Africa must depend.[64]

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[62] Cited in NAZ, SEC 5/441, 8 December, 1949. Lord Listowell's statement on government policy.

[63] NAZ, SEC 5/441 Lord Listowell's Statement on British Government Policy.

[64] Cited in PRO, CO 1015/553/46, The Doctrine of Paramountcy in Relation to Northern Rhodesia.

Unfortunately, **true partnership** meant different things to different people and was understood differently in the United Kingdom and in the colonies. Policy statements which came out of Whitehall were usually at the mercy of local officials who exerted more influence than Colonial Office officials in London. The evidence regarding partnership in Northern Rhodesia is most revealing——especially in constitutional development. To local officials and the unofficials especially, partnership was nothing but a safer word for European leadership. Hence the insistence on senior and junior partners——Europeans being the senior partners for the foreseeable future.

Yet, a meeting of Africans held in Kitwe on 28 October, 1951 expressed fears that if responsible government, which unofficials were demanding, was granted to Northern Rhodesia at that stage, the interests of Africans would cease to be paramount. The meeting also rejected partnership because its adoption "would cut direct links" with the Colonial Office, their "Trustee on behalf of His Majesty's Government."[65]

In the aftermath of the Kitwe meeting, Roy Welensky as leader of the unofficials seized the opportunity to raise again (as he had done several times in the past) the question of paramountcy and called for clarification of the position. Africans did not welcome the restatement of the paramountcy principle, especially the idea that settlers were to be associated in the "sacred trust." They had always looked to Britain for their redemption and had never trusted the settlers. On the other hand European settlers were increasingly becoming impatient with African reluctance to adjust their relations with the immigrant races.

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[65] NAZ, SEC 5/441 Memorandum from a Joint Conference of Members of African Urban Advisory Council of the Copperbelt and other African Leaders, Kitwe to Secretary for Native Affairs, 28 October, 1951.

Partnership was the official rationalization of a serious racially polarized confrontation of interests. The partnership principle grew out of a series of motives, which were necessary in the prevailing circumstances. These motives ranged from political and constitutional, to economic, socio-cultural, racial, and ideological. For political and economic reasons, partnership became the imperial government's way of dealing with race relations in the region as a whole. Partnership as a principle of policy involved the least threat to settler political power and standards. Ideologically partnership reassured imperial authorities that they were in control in the multi-racial territories and were therefore able to deal with critics of imperial policy.

Although in practice there was no change in policy, the emphasis on partnership had two consequences. First, among the European unofficials it produced demands for a definition of what the policy of partnership implied. Further the unofficials in Northern Rhodesia complained of lack of consultation by the United Kingdom Government. To this effect the Secretary of State for the colonies informed the Northern Rhodesia governor in 1950 that he rejected Legco members' proposal that they should be consulted on the actual terms of the policy of partnership. The issue was however, temporarily shelved after the London discussions in April 1951, but not before Welensky had made it known that unofficials interpreted the policy in terms of senior and junior partners.

Among Africans, the emphasis on partnership as opposed to "paramountcy of African interests" produced the fear that the only obstacle to the settler demand for political control and independence from London had been removed. Somehow Africans believed in the paramountcy doctrine as it was first pronounced in 1923. Therefore, the emphasis on partnership, vague as it was, not only represented a betrayal of African interests, but was seen as a major change of policy taken surreptitiously without proper consultation. When criticizing partnership policy

Africans did not consider the fact that African Members of the Legislative Council (M.L.C.) Chileshe and Mubitana had not only participated in the London conference which drew up the statement on the partnership principle, but had supported it as well. In fact, the meeting of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in late 1948 denounced the African Legco members for taking part in the London conference.

African indignation with the new policy was expressed through their reluctance to participate in efforts to define partnership. Although the Colonial Office interpreted partnership in terms of setting Africans on the path of economic, social and political progress (in that order) and to help them forward in that development, Africans still felt betrayed.[66]

However, an assessment of African response to the emphasis of partnership is not a straightforward affair because of the many and divergent views involved. Some favoured the policy, and some opposed it. At a meeting of the representatives of the Copperbelt Urban Advisory Council Pascale Sokota and Dauti Yamba (both African Members of Legco.) asked the meeting to agree to their putting forward a set of partnership principles in the legislature. The meeting rejected the proposal and agreed instead that there should be no support for partnership principles in the Legco and that both Sokota and Yamba were not to participate in the debate on the subject. Another suggestion by Godwin M. Lewanika, at the same meeting, that a committee of mixed races should be appointed to enquire into the whole matter and draw up a definition of partnership was also flatly rejected.[67] Nevertheless, Yamba later begged to oppose a motion in the ARC which called upon the council not to

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[66] PRO, CO 1015/553/7 Telegram Secretary of State to the Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 16 November, 1951.

[67] PRO, CO 1015/553/13 E2 Statement by Bush, Secretary for Native Affairs, 12 November, 1951.

participate in the preliminary definition of the partnership principle. The motion wished a government definition to be referred to Native Authority Councils, Provincial Councils, Urban Advisory Councils and finally to be debated in the ARC. Opposing the motion, Yamba noted that he failed to understand the wisdom of the ARC members who did not trust a European to represent African interests in the Legco, but chose the same Europeans to define partnership for them.[68] The ARC nevertheless voted in favour of the motion.

While the representatives of the Copperbelt Urban Advisory Council[69] flatly rejected participation in any debate on the subject until Native Authorities, African Urban Advisory Councils and the ARC had been consulted, the Ndola Anti-Federation Action Committee on the other hand, felt that Africans could neither accept nor reject the policy of partnership at the time because the policy had never been defined.[70] More importantly, the committee acknowledged that partnership had been the declared policy of the Colonial Office since 1948, but that the existing relationship between races in Northern Rhodesia could hardly be called partnership. The Action Committee then made suggestions on how partnership could be put into effect. The suggestions were "too extreme" for the government to consider. The

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[68] NAZ, NR ARC No.8 The Proceedings of the 5th Session of the 2nd Council Held on 3-6 December, 1951.

[69] African Urban Advisory Councils were first established on the Copperbelt in 1938 as a means of giving Africans a share in local government. They were the urban version of the "Native" Authorities which came into existence in 1929 as part of the Indirect Rule system.

[70] PRO, CO 1015/553/13/E4 The Road to Democracy: an examination of the question of partnership, by the Ndola Anti-Federation Action Committee.

Action Committee proposed the enfranchisement of British Protected Persons and an African majority in the Legco.[71]

On 28 January, 1952 Godwin M. Lewanika sent a confidential letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs saying he had decided to state his support for the idea of defining partnership "openly and publicly" without delay. Lewanika added that:

> There is one thing the Government should try to discourage among European politicians, most especially at this time when we are trying to find ways and means of bringing Europeans and Africans together. It is not political tact to call every African who opposes European politics or Government policy a "communist."[72]

Lewanika was one of the few African moderates at the time who believed in the possibility of putting into effect the partnership principle. This made him unpopular among the African nationalists who labelled him a stooge. The Lusaka Urban Advisory Council too, believed that the people could neither accept nor reject the policy of partnership at that stage because the policy had never been defined.[73]

The crisis over definition of partnership arose, in part, because of the reluctance by Colonial Office officials to give too specific a meaning to the policy. D. Williams, of the Colonial Office, drawing upon the experience over the 1923 pronouncement suggested in 1952 that if partnership policy had been defined in some legalistic document Africans would have been impressed, but the document would have become Northern Rhodesia's "Magna Carta" and therefore too inflexible and

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[71] PRO, CO 1915.553/13/E4 The Road to Democracy.

[72] NAZ, SEC 5/441,Lewanika to Secretary for Native Affairs, 28 January, 1952.

[73] NAZ, SEC 5/441, Lusaka Urban Advisory Council Meeting, 5 May, 1952. These views were similar to those expressed by the Ndola Anti-Federation Committee earlier.

incapable or difficult to modify subsequently in the light of changing circumstances.[74] This is the only evidence I have come across which explains the long debate which characterized the shift from "paramountcy of African interests" to partnership.

Yet, it was not Africans whom Colonial officials were worried about in Central Africa during this period. They were more worried about how to contain white nationalism, more especially Afrikaner nationalism which was viewed both in Central Africa and the United Kingdom as a menace to good race relations—but more important a menace to overall British supremacy in the subcontinent.

Secondly, this decision (or indecision) suggests considerable ambiguity in colonial policy towards Central Africa. The only thing which seemed clear was the urgent need to develop and encourage multi-racial liberal politics in the region. The Colonial Office hoped that the development of multi-racial liberal politics would safeguard imperial interests in the region.

Since the partnership principle was closely associated with the discussion of the proposed federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, most "informed Africans" feared that if they accepted partnership they would be accepting federation. Reports received by the Secretary for Native Affairs from the districts in 1952 clearly indicated this fear among Africans. Consequently the Secretary for Native Affairs acknowledged and recorded that "the timing for the discussion of partnership was as unfortunate as it was inevitable"[75] and concluded that:

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[74] PRO, CO 1015/553 Minute by D. Williams, 16 January, 1952.

[75] NAZ, SEC 5/441/9/3 Notes by Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 May, 1952.

> In general the attitude has been that the question is one which is overshadowed by federation and it has not been possible to dissociate the two questions. The fact that the policy of partnership was defined as a result of the Victoria Falls Conference has linked it to Federation and Africans fear that formal acceptance of one will be taken as accepting the other. Another difficulty is that the term itself is one which to Africans implies equality. Press reports of statements by politicians that partnership is on a strictly "senior" and "junior" basis has not assisted discussion.[76]

Nonetheless, when the government drew up a set of principles in 1953 for the implementation of the partnership policy, the ARC considered them and came up with its own set of principles for discussion with the government.[77] The African Representative Council Draft Statement on Principles of Inter-Racial Policy was almost an abridged version of the government's Draft Statement on Partnership.[78]

The Second World War and the Rise of African Nationalism.

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[76] NAZ, SEC 5/441/9/3 Notes by Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 May 1952. Although the Secretary for Native Affairs said "partnership was defined as a result of the Victoria Falls Conference," there was actually no definition of partnership. The conference agreed that partnership should be the aim of policy. One of the conclusions read: ". . . The representatives of African interests in Northern Rhodesia explained that Africans would be willing to consider the question of federation on the basis of the Report of the London Conference of Officials after the policy of partnership in Northern Rhodesia had been defined and, as so defined, put into progressive operation." (NAZ NR 8/5 Closer Association Conference, Victoria falls, September, 1951).

[77] NAZ, SEC 5/441/129/2 ARC Draft statement on principles of inter-racial policy, July, 1953. See Appendix II. Discussions were held on 29, 30 and 31 July, 1953 and the two documents were compared with agreement on the second and third principles. Discussion on the first principle was deferred because of lack of consensus. The timing and the circumstances under which the partnership principle was evolved undermined the success of the debates.

[78] See Appendices I and II.

It is a truism that the Second World War greatly altered the labour relations in the Rhodesias and helped to precipitate nationalist consciousness. In response to the imperial cause, many whites joined the imperial forces. Many Africans too, were enlisted and shipped to South East Asia where African troops were used in the Burma campaign. In Northern Rhodesia, the departure of some white workers opened up some jobs, previously reserved for whites, to Africans.

On another level, the Northern Rhodesia Government greatly expanded public information services; publications in African languages, as well as in English, broadcasting[79] and mobile cinemas mixed propaganda films with Charlie Chaplin.[80] The propaganda was intended to enlist African sympathy for the imperial war effort. Inadvertently, as Smyth argued, the war news and propaganda "hastened the emergence of an African political voice."[81] The government began to pay more attention than ever before to African opinion. The imperial authorities, on their part were eager to show and perhaps prove that they were custodians of the ideas of liberty. In a parliamentary statement of 13 July 1943 Oliver Stanley defined his goal as "self-government within the framework of the British Empire."[82] The famous Hailey Report vividly described the rising tide of "African racial consciousness" in the absence as yet, of nationalist movements. He suggested that there was an urgent

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[79] For a detailed discussion on this see Rosaleen Smyth, "War Propaganda During the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia", African Affairs, 83,332 (July, 1984), pp. 345-358.

[80] John D. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, (Longman, London, 1988), p.57.

[81] Smyth, "War Propaganda During the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia," p. 345.

[82] Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, p. 57. Although there was no thought of independence then, Britain was concerned with the state of colonial rule and what would happen after the war.

need to create an African political class, which was more capable of managing a modern state than the existing Native Authorities and local councils.[83] In Northern Rhodesia the concern was addressed through the establishment of the African Representative Council (ARC) in 1946. The ARC was expected to provide the training of African politicians as much as it was intended to inculcate into them liberal ideas and values.[84]

Meanwhile the settler community, whose contribution to the war effort had earned it enhanced influence within the colonial state, began to claim more political power and responsibility for African affairs. In fact the shortage of manpower during the war led to the appointment of settlers to important civil service jobs.[85] On another level they intensified their campaign for federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in the interest of economic development and political stability. These developments, together with the awareness aroused by war propaganda, gave rise to modern African nationalism——first to resist settler demands for responsible government in Northern Rhodesia, and to oppose European proposals for closer association of the Rhodesias and, later to demand independence. The Africans' vicarious experience of war accelerated the ripening African political consciousness

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[83] Ronald Robinson, "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power in Tropical Africa, 1940-1951", in W.H. Morris-Jones and George Fischer (eds.), Decolonization and After: The British and French Experience, (London, Frank Cass, 1980), p. 52.

[84] Interview with Gabriel Musumbulwa at Luanshya, 15 May, 1989; Dot L. Keet, "The African Representative Council 1946-1958: A Focus on African Political Leadership," M.A. Thesis, (University of Zambia, 1975), p. 13. See above, pp. 3-8. PRO CO 795/130 Oliver Stanley to Arthur Creech Jones, 7 May 1945. The ARC was the apex of political institutions created by the colonial government to provide platforms shared by the educated elite and traditional elites. In time the educated elite were to replace the traditional elite.

[85] Wood, The Welensky Papers, p. 72.

in Northern Rhodesia. War propaganda further made Africans familiar with the grammar of western politics thereby making them politically strong.

Nonetheless the origins of nationalist activity in Northern Rhodesia are somewhat fluid. As in West Africa, nationalist activities were in response to Colonial Office policy as well as to local conditions. Lord Hailey observed in 1938 that there was a noticeable absence of nationalists, ("emergent Africans" as leaders of development) while the future of the trusteeship system which relied on Native Authorities (Indirect Rule) appeared bleak.[86] The "Native" Authority system was deemed less efficient as an agent of development and called for urgent revamping if it were to fit in any scheme involving an elected legislature.

In Northern Rhodesia the "Native" Authority system was first introduced in 1929. It was later extended to the Copperbelt in 1938 when Urban Advisory Councils were established.[87] The Urban Advisory Councils on the Copperbelt were composed of members partly elected by tribal representatives and by boss boys, and partly of members nominated by the District Commissioner. The function of the councils was to keep the District Commissioner in touch with African opinion, to advise him on matters of African welfare and to make government policy known to Africans generally.

In keeping with the concerns raised by Lord Hailey in his 1940-41 report, submitted in November 1940 and partly "to enable Africans to contribute more effectively to the development of general, as distinct from purely local policy," eight regional councils were formed in 1943-44. The regional councils were composed of

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[86] Lord Hailey, African Survey, (London, Oxford University Press, 1938, Revised Edition. 1956), p. 252.

[87] Davidson, The Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, p. 21.

urban delegates elected by Urban Advisory Councils and of rural delegates chosen

by "Native" Authorities. The sessions of these Regional Councils were chaired by

Provincial Commissioners. The system was further developed in 1946 with the

creation of the African Representative Council (ARC) for the whole territory. Its

membership was drawn from the eight regional councils. In 1948 the ARC began to

elect two of its members for appointment by the governor to the Legislative Council

(Legco).

Meanwhile, alongside these government initiatives, Africans developed their

own political bodies which sought to participate in the political process. In May 1946

representatives of fourteen welfare associations scattered across the country met at

Broken Hill and formed the Federation of African Societies of Northern Rhodesia

(F.A.S.).[88] The meeting elected Dauti Yamba, a school teacher of Luanshya, as the

first president of F.A.S., which was established in order:

> ... to create cooperation and mutual understanding between constituent
> societies of rural and urban areas in Northern Rhodesia ... to speak for
> and on behalf of Africans ... and ... to cooperate as much as possible
> with the Government of Northern Rhodesia with a view to the
> continuance of good government ... to promote and support any work
> which is calculated to ensure good feeling between Europeans and
> Africans in general.[89]

The fundamental aim of F.A.S. was to secure improved positions for its members

within the colonial system. F.A.S. was not a nationalist movement in the strict sense

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[88] Welfare associations had been in existence in the
territory since the 1920s, ostensibly as avenues for
addressing African problems which arose in the racially
polarized political system. For a good discussion see Robert
I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, pp.
115-134.

[89] NAZ, SEC NAT/353 Minutes of the Meeting of the
Executive Committee of the Federation of African Societies,
18-19 May 1946, cited in Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in
Central Africa, p. 207.

of the word. It only served as the base upon which the first African nationalist party was to be built.

F.A.S. held its first general meeting in Lusaka in late October, after which a deputation met the Assistant Chief Secretary for Native Affairs to request official recognition by the government and five seats on the newly formed ARC. The government was reluctant to give the F.A.S. official recognition, though the Executive Council "decided that a special effort should be made not to antagonize the Society's leaders."[90] In the end, however, the demands were rejected after the government's position was personally explained by the Secretary for Native Affairs. Nevertheless, there was always an overlap between the officially instituted bodies and those which arose purely from African initiatives. Most of the founders of the F.A.S. were also associated with various Provincial Councils and Urban Advisory Councils.

F.A.S. spent the next two years dealing with two explosive issues, the settler demand for self-government and for closer association with Southern Rhodesia. African nationalism was given a jolt in January 1948 when Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, who since 1938 had served as one of the unofficial members in the Legco nominated to represent African interests, surprised both Africans and the government by moving a motion demanding responsible government for Northern Rhodesia. The demand was coupled with a threat that unofficials might be forced to use their existing power to paralyse the government if their demands were not met.[91] In March, Gore-Browne again shocked Africans when he came out in support of federation between

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[90] David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964, (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 15.

[91] John B. Stabler, "Northern Rhodesian Reaction to 1948 Responsible Government Proposals: Role of Sir Stewart Gore-Browne", Journal of Southern African Affairs, 3, 3 (July 1978), p. 295.

the two Rhodesias as the only arrangement which would satisfy Central Africa's whites, protect the rights of Africans and secure the advantages of mutual cooperation.[92] These demands antagonized both the ARC and F.A.S.. Both organizations condemned them. A nominated member representing African interests might be forgiven for exercising his personal judgement when and if African opinion was split and divided on any issue. However on no other issues could Africans have been more united than opposing responsible government as then envisaged and federation. Gore-Browne symbolized the arrogance of "the white man knows best," dramatized the African conviction that settlers could not be trusted and demonstrated the necessity for a louder and stronger African unity to change the system.

F.A.S. held its second and last general meeting in July 1948 during which it was decided by a unanimous vote to rename the organization the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (N.R.A.C.) with Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika, an aristocrat from Barotseland, as the first president. The other officials of the congress were Robinson N. Nabulyato, a school teacher at Kafue Training Institute as General Secretary, Mateyo Kakumbi (Treasurer), L.M. Lipalile (Vice-President), J. Richmond (Assistant Secretary), and George W. Charles Kaluwa (Assistant Treasurer).[93]

In spite of the circumstances which precipitated the founding of the congress, the organization remained essentially reformist. It sought not the overthrow of the system, but its liberalization. The N.R.A.C. became the African National Congress (ANC) in August 1951 when Lewanika was replaced by Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula

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[92] Mulford, Zambia, p. 16.

[93] Kaluwa was one of the Mazabuka African community which attempted to form the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in 1937. The 1937 Congress was denied sanction by the Secretary for Native Affairs.

following a nineteen to five vote victory for the party leadership. Lewanika's defeat was attributed to his lukewarm attitude towards the closer association proposals of that year. While the congress opposed federation, it still affirmed its loyalty to the British Crown and "very politely asked for some petty reforms."[94] It was not, therefore, until after 1953 that congress attempted to become a radical political party.

Constitutional Development, 1924-1954.

While African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia was a post-Second World War development, it was white nationalism which had played a key role in the constitutional development of the territory since the 1920s. When the Colonial Office took over the administration of Northern Rhodesia from the BSAC administration in 1924 it replaced the Advisory Council which was established in 1918 by a Legislative Council (Legco) with a colour blind franchise with property qualifications and limited to British subjects, which ensured that few African voters would qualify given that virtually all were British Protected Persons. The colour blind franchise effectively guaranteed the tiny group of settlers control of the five elected seats in the fourteen member-house. The constitution of Northern Rhodesia was laid down by Her Majesty's Government in an Order in Council of 1924 and provided for an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. Constitutional development over the years gave the unofficials (European settlers) first an equal strength (in 1938) and later a majority (in 1945) on the Legco. Special representation for Africans was not introduced until 1938 when a European member (Sir Stewart Gore-Browne) was nominated by the governor, according to the

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[94] W.K. Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, (Lusaka, Neczam, 1978), p. 2. Sikalumbi was a founding member of the Congress.

constitution, to represent African interests on the Legco. It was not until 1948 that two Africans were first appointed on the council to represent African interests. In the same year the number of European unofficials nominated to represent African interests was reduced to two, thus bringing the total number of members representing African interests to four. During the same time there were ten elected European members and ten officials on the Legco. In 1954 the number of African members on the council was increased to four. This brought the number of African representatives to six, including the two nominated European unofficials.

There is no doubt whatsoever that European settlers were in a powerful position on the Legco. Nonetheless, "the formal power of the whites on the Legislative Council was not so important as their informal power, through public opinion and through membership of government advisory committees ..."[95] or through interest groups such as the Capricorn Africa Society (CAS). Table II summarizes the changes in the composition of the Legislative Council from 1924-1954.

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[95] Henderson, "The Limits of Colonial Power," p. 298.

TABLE II
Legislative Council, 1924-1954.

	1924	1929	1938	1940	1945	1948	1954
Official Members: (Including the Governor who was President of Council until 1948)	9	9	8	9	9	10	8
Unofficial Members: Elected Members	5	7	7	8	8	10	12
Nominated unofficial members			1	1	5*	2	2
African Members						2	4
TOTAL	5	7	8	9	13	14	18
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP	14	16	16	18	22	24	26

* Including 2 Members nominated to represent special interests other than those of Africans.
Source: PRO DO 35/4636/333 Revised Draft White Paper, Constitutional changes in Northern Rhodesia, February 1958. Executive Council, 1924-1954.

It is evident from the above table that the frequent constitutional changes since 1924 had one major purpose and consequence——the increase of European unofficial participation in the Legco. It is plausible to suggest that the Colonial Office was using the Legco arithmetic to prevent the emergence of a simple majority of European elected unofficials, which would have made responsible government seem obviously the next step.

The position on the Executive Council was equally revealing. Until the end of 1939 when European unofficial members were first appointed to the Executive Council, the government was conducted entirely by officials. It was ten years later that an unofficial first held a portfolio. Their number was increased to four in 1954 and they all held ministerial positions.[96] Table III summarizes the composition of the Executive Council from 1924-1954.

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[96] PRO, DO 35/4636/333 Revised Draft White Paper, February, 1958.

Table III
Executive Council, 1924-1954.

	1924	1929	1938	1940	1945	1948	1954
Official Members	4	5	5	5	5	7	5
Unofficial Members without portfolio	-	-	-	4	3	4*	-
Unofficial Members with portfolio	-	-	-	-	-	-	4*
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP	4	5	5	9	8	11	9

*Including one M.L.C. nominated to represent African interests. Two elected
Members undertook portfolios in 1949. None of the Members of the Executive
Council was an African during this perioa.
Source: PRO DO 35/4636/333 Revised Draft White Paper, February, 1958.

Until 1958 the franchise law in Northern Rhodesia practically excluded Africans, all of whom (save for those who had been granted naturalisation) had the status of British Protected Persons. Further, the qualification for registration as a voter remained almost unchanged since 1925. Although the value of money in 1954 was much lower than it was in 1925, the income qualification of £200 (two hundred pounds) a year was very much above the earning power of the vast majority of the African population. This, coupled with the requirement that a voter must be a British subject, resulted in the somewhat ludicrous figure of only eleven Africans on the voters' role.[97] Consequently all seats on the Legco filled by direct election were occupied by Europeans. African members on Legco were returned through an electoral college system culminating in the ARC. The governor was bound to appoint those whom the ARC selected from among its members to be members of Legco.

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[97] PRO, DO 35/4636/282 Brief for Secretary of State's visit to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, December, 1956-January, 1957.

Inevitably, the franchise law was among the most contentious issues in the constitutional development of Northern Rhodesia. In fact, the nature of constitutional development regarding the franchise pointed the direction in which the country was going politically. That was the essence of the dilemma between continued racial representation on the Legco or the introduction of modern western democracy.

Perhaps it ought to be pointed out that party politics never really developed in Northern Rhodesia during this period.[98] The race question therefore dominated the constitutional development of the country. Racial representation on the Legco was not exactly conducive to party politics. The Northern Rhodesia African Congress formed in 1948 was inspired more by the closer association issue than by territorial politics.[99] This is why in 1944 when Gore-Browne suggested that Africans should be elected by African Regional Councils for nomination as African representatives on the Legco, Governor Eubule John Waddington thought that suggestion premature. The governor argued in his response that the proposal if accepted would necessitate canvassing, thus importing "politics" into "native" representations prematurely. He further pointed out that if elections were adopted many Africans would want African rather than European representatives and that it was also premature to expect them to represent themselves effectively on the Legco.[100]

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[98] The first political party, the Northern Rhodesia Labour Party, was founded by Roy Welensky in 1941. It contested and won five of the eight elective seats during that year's Legco elections. Welensky wanted to ensure the protection of the interests of white workers and to introduce party politics into the council to which hitherto all unofficials were elected as independents. (Wood, The Welensky Papers, p. 72).

[99] See Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 3.

[100] PRO, CO 595/133 Northern Rhodesia Constitution, 1944.

Simply stated, Governor Waddington did not think that the country was ready for a modern form of constitutional democracy because Africans and the few Europeans in the territory had not yet met the requirements of the "cardinal principle of British policy"—that colonies with politically advanced populations could not continue to be administered from London.

The settlers on the Legco believed otherwise. As far as they were concerned they were sufficiently prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of self-government. Actually they were already exercising a disproportionate influence in the politics of the territory.[101] In fact whatever the feeling of the government about settlers, it was already giving them an increasing share in political power. Despite this, settlers continued to demand responsible government.

The 1948 demand moved by Gore-Browne in the Legco induced sharp reactions from both Africans and white settlers. A public meeting of the Kitwe African Society held on 5 February, 1948 unanimously passed resolutions opposed to unofficial members' demand for responsible government and the control of the government. The meeting called upon Gore-Browne and other European representatives of African interests to cease at once from taking part in the discussion of responsible government since "no African welcomed it."[102]

The African reaction was prompted by a strong belief that self-government at that stage would strengthen European control of the government. There was,

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[101] PRO, CO 537/4690/19 Stanley to A. Creech Jones, 16 February, 1948.

[102] PRO, CO 4690/17 E1 Minutes of a public Meeting of the Kitwe African Society held on 5 February, 1948.

however, a minority African voice which was favourably disposed to self-government.

Nelson M. Nalumango[103], representing this section wrote:

> I personally believe that Responsible Government in its own sense is the most democratic Government which would suit both Europeans and Africans in this territory, but in this case this is not the real picture as far as I can see it myself.[104]

Nalumango's doubts rested on the feeling that European demands for responsible government were designed as a step towards amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Nonetheless, P.D. Chella and Safeli Chileshe, both members of the ARC, believed that responsible government should be thoroughly explained before rejection. Privately, they suggested that perhaps with the two Africans soon to be seated on Legco, it might be possible to convince Africans of the merits of responsible government.[105] There were not many Africans during this time who were as open minded as these two to give the proposed responsible government a fair debate.

Perhaps the most striking reaction to Gore-Browne's demand for responsible government came from the European community. The response ranged from extreme lack of interest on the subject to severe criticism of the author of the demand. Some felt that Gore-Browne had no right to make a generalization, coupling it with a threat, without a mandate from the electorate.[106] Reggie Taylor, Chairman of the North Eastern Rhodesia Agricultural and Commercial Association,

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[103] Nelson Nalumango was one of the first two African M.L.C. He and Reverend Henry Kasokolo were succeeded by Pascale Sokota and Dauti Yamba in 1951.

[104] NAZ, HM 53/1 Nalumango to Nightingale, 4 February, 1948.

[105] Cited in J.B. Stabler, "Northern Rhodesia Reaction to 1948 Responsible Government Proposals," pp. 301-02.

[106] PRO, CO 537/4690/14 ENC. 1 (ii) Extract from Glennie (Provincial Commissioner), Barotse Province, 31 January, 1948.

thought Europeans in Northern Rhodesia could not rule themselves yet.[107] European public response to responsible government demands appear to have been generally one of surprise and many thought there were no unofficials in the territory who were fit to govern. These views were supported by the then Acting Governor, R.C.S. Stanley, who wrote to the Secretary of State for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, that he saw no prospect, even if politically desirable, of enough qualified Europeans forming a government and an opposition under any form of responsible government. He concluded that "responsible government for Northern Rhodesia was not politically justifiable for many years to come, at least not until a body of **educated African opinion had emerged**."[108] Stanley was concerned with the strength of settlers to run a government which was strong enough to withstand external pressure, especially from the Union of South Africa. He also recognized the fact that African political participation could no longer be withheld since a strong Northern Rhodesia needed the cooperation of the two races. This attitude reflected the traditional Colonial Office resistance to settler self-government.

Apparently Gore-Browne did not represent African interests on this issue. Interestingly, the other European representative for African interests on the Legco, the Reverend E. G. Nightingale, although opposed to amalgamation was in favour of some form of responsible government for the country.[109] Correspondence between the two reveals some ambivalence regarding their support for motions put

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[107] PRO, CO 537/4690/14/ENC. 1 (iii) Extract from Mr. Bush's letter, 28 January, 1948.

[108] PRO, CO 537/4690/19 R.C.S. Stanley to Creech Jones, 16 February, 1948 (Emphasis added).

[109] NAZ, HM 53/1 Nightingale to Gore-Browne, 18 January, 1948.

up by Africans which they would otherwise not support if they had not been representing African interests.

Throughout 1949 and 1950 the question of franchise for British Protected Persons dominated debate in both the ARC and the Legco. Unofficials were instrumental in opposing the enfranchisement of British Protected Persons because they felt that doing so would be detrimental to the development of the country. They consistently argued that not many Africans were able to take an intelligent part in politics.[110] Although this may have been true, the real reason, however, was the fear by white settlers that extending the vote to British Protected Persons would ultimately remove their political dominance. Therefore, from 1945 onwards, the constitutional changes which took place in Northern Rhodesia reflected that objective. The Colonial Office was equally reluctant to give political power to what they believed were "politically immature" Africans.

The grant of an unofficial majority in 1945, though designed to buy-off settler demands for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, certainly gave momentum to the process of settler ascendancy to political power in Northern Rhodesia. It was felt that the gentleman's agreement during the war, by which unofficials did not raise the question of amalgamation, was not going to hold for very long. In anticipation, the United Kingdom Government decided in 1944 to grant a new constitution which gave the unofficials a majority on the Legco.[111] Later the Secretary of State for the colonies informed the Northern Rhodesia governor that Africans would continue to be represented by members nominated by him (the governor) until the recently created regional councils had gained sufficient experience. Once a territorial council

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[110] NAZ, HM 53/2/Legco 2978 Nightingale to R. P. Bush, Secretary for Native Affairs, 16 August, 1950.

[111] PRO, CO 795/130, Minute by Creasy, 16 March, 1944.

was set up it would send African members to the Legco.[112] It was hoped the ARC would provide the necessary training to Africans before entering national politics. The idea was to inculcate into ARC members values and principles of parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model. The emphasis was squarely placed on multi-racial politics so that ARC members could emerge as champions of liberal politics in the country.[113]

Yet another limiting factor in the constitutional development of Northern Rhodesia was the dilemma between adopting a modern form of franchise on the Westminster model and maintaining racial representation. The former option would have led to African voters swamping European voters (a threat to European dominance), while the later would have led to an "arthritic condition" for Africans.[114] The 1953 constitutional talks in London failed to resolve the initial dilemma and the talks failed. Africans and Europeans wanted diametrically opposed changes in the constitution. During the preliminary and private talks Africans put forward to the Colonial Secretary "extreme" demands which would have given them a complete majority on the Legco. Africans wanted the enfranchisement of British Protected Persons and an African majority on the council.

When the Secretary of State asked Africans to modify their demands, they settled for parity with the elected members. Although parity was an eventual goal of colonial policy towards Northern Rhodesia, it was not considered practical politics in 1954 and was therefore rejected. On the other hand elected members opposed

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[112] PRO, CO 795/130/19 Telegram from Secretary of State to the Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 29 June, 1944.

[113] Musumbulwa, Interview, 15 May, 1989.

[114] PRO, CO 1015/1014 "Northern Rhodesia's Dilemma" by Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State, 13 January, 1954.

the admission of British Protected Persons to the common voters' roll. They in turn wanted an increase in the number of elected members of Legco by two and a reduction of officials on the Executive Council from seven to four.

Because the views of the two sides were irreconcilable, the Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton made an arbitral award which both sides asserted was highly unsatisfactory, as was perhaps inevitable under the circumstances. The award involved no political transfer of power as such—officials still held the balance between unofficials and Africans. The award made the following provisions:

(a) Legislative Council.
Elected Members (Europeans) were increased from ten to twelve and African Members from two to four (and a fifth would be nominated as one of the unofficials when it was appropriate to do so). Officials were reduced from nine to eight.
(b) Executive Council.

All members of the Executive Council were to hold portfolios.

Lyttelton argued that the performance of African members on Legco was rather unimpressive and that therefore they should not join the Executive Council, which effectively formed a government front bench in the Legco.[115]

A communique issued after the talks announcing the award revealed the long term objective of the United Kingdom Government, namely that it looked forward to the day when racial considerations in the affairs of the territory would sink to a negligible level. Then it would be possible to move towards a democratic system based on a widened franchise.[116] Essentially the Colonial Office was advocating a system by which Africans advanced gradually towards equal representation. Meanwhile property and education qualifications would be adjusted from time to

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[115] PRO, DO 35/4635 Statement by O. Lyttelton, 13 January, 1954.

[116] PRO, DO 45/4634/11 Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), 15 September, 1953.

time to avoid one race (Africans) swamping the other.[117] This emphasis on qualified franchise as opposed to universal adult suffrage was to become the basis for the development of liberalism in the country.

Although under this arrangement the *status quo* would be maintained and effectively safeguarded, Welensky still complained and threatened to resign from the government to form an opposition to fight for settler political power in the country. He saw the award as an act of appeasement towards Africans and an affront to Europeans.[118] Sokota and Yamba, the two African members of the Legco were equally unhappy with the contents of the award, which they saw as a surrender to the settler community in the country. Worse still, they were disappointed that the award made no provision for an African to join the Executive Council.[119] Evidently, both camps returned to Northern Rhodesia quite dissatisfied and ready for a showdown.

Sokota and Yamba did not waste time. In early 1954 they proposed that British Protected Persons should be enfranchised without first becoming British subjects, as was currently the constitutional requirement. In response, the Colonial Secretary pointed out that Africans could not have it both ways: they were asking for the franchise to be extended to them while asking for guarantees that there should be no increase in qualifications. In this regard the Colonial Secretary observed that:

> Both races were necessary to the country and capital should not be frightened away. Advance must come by evolution and should be worked out ... Universal adult suffrage would add nothing to Northern Rhodesia. Capital would go. That was not to say that there would be no change, but Africans could not have it both ways and must see the

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[117] PRO, DO 35/4634 Minute by D. Williams, 21 December, 1953.

[118] PRO, DO 35/4634/37 Northern Rhodesia Constitution: Notes of meeting with Sir Roy Welensky, 21 September, 1953.

[119] PRO, DO 35/4634/35 Telegram from African National Congress (ANC) to Secretary of State, 22 September, 1953.

difficulties. It was absurd for Africans to seek a majority on the Executive Council. Our problems could not be solved by reiteration of ideas that would mean ruination of Northern Rhodesia.[120]

This statement was significant for two reasons. First, it reflected the economic concern of the Colonial Office, and the responsibility of the Colonial Secretary to ensure that colonies were developed for the benefit of the empire and of the world economy.[121] Hence the reluctance to recommend constitutional changes which would "frighten away" capital. Secondly, the statement reflected the liberal character of the Colonial Office regarding the process of change and devolution of political power in multi-racial colonies——hence the emphasis on carefully worked out evolutionary advancement of Africans. The African representatives were not at all impressed and wanted to discuss further constitutional changes, but they were told that they had to wait for 1959 when further constitutional changes would be considered. Meanwhile they were advised that they had five years to show their maturity, learn to get used to being unpopular and saying "No".[122]

Conclusion.

This chapter has discussed the characteristics and nature of colonial policy, constitutional development and the rise of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. The main theme which runs through the extended political manoeuvring from 1924 to 1954 is the emergence of the colonial state (with all its different components) in

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[120] PRO, CO 1015/1013 Discussion with Sokota and Yamba, 11 January, 1954.

[121] PRO, CO 537/6685, Responsibilities of the Colonial Office in the economic field, 1950.

[122] PRO, CO 1015/1013, Secretary of State for the Colonies, discussion with Sokota and Yamba, 11 January, 1954.

the territory and its struggles to reconcile African and European interests. After 1948 partnership became the principle aim of policy as a prelude to multi-racial liberal politics, albeit under European control. African nationalists deeply resented this and did all they could to sabotage any attempts to put in place a liberal mechanism which would have slowed their ascendancy to political power. The nature of the constitutional changes and the move from the paramountcy principle to partnership represented the concerns of the United Kingdom Government as much as those of the local administration about the necessity for liberal politics. The granting of the unofficial majority on the Legislative Council in 1945 coincided with the imperial government's realization that imperial policy could not carry on without the cooperation of the settler community. The settler community had evidently defied the theories of multi-racial equality as they were being generated from the Colonial Office, and had reverted to *de facto* white supremacy. The imperial trustees were obviously impotent in dealing with the spreading colour bar which had developed in the territory. It was becoming much harder for the imperial government to promote "native" interests in the face of a defiant settler community which had an obvious advantage in terms of political options. Britain could not use force to secure its policies. As Ronald Robinson correctly pointed out, the imperial government could not risk losing a large part of the white African Commonwealth by sending troops to enforce official policy.[123] Thus the grant of an unofficial majority should be understood in part along these lines. It was a way of dealing with the increasing power of the settler community while maintaining a measure of "control".

However by 1948 the imperial authorities realized that they needed the cooperation of the Africans as well, to discharge their imperial duties. While the

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[123] Robinson, "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power," p. 53.

1931-45 period had been characterized by white nationalism,[124] the period after was characterized by a combination of both. The Colonial Office therefore sought to encourage the development of a "multi-racial political local elite" which would ensure political and economic progress while remaining strong enough to resist Union influence. Therefore without going into the gist of Andrew Cohen's May 1947 Report which recommended four stages in the transfer of power as circumstances in each territory required it,[125] the adoption of the partnership principle as opposed to the paramountcy doctrine was Northern Rhodesia's way of meeting Cohen's blueprint and reconciling the two nationalisms. It was also in the same year that two Africans were first appointed to the Legco. These were not just coincidences, but well-calculated political changes. Africans were to receive their political training through the African Representative Council.[126] It is important to realize too, that during the period covered in this chapter, imperial policy was not designed to transfer political power as such. In Robinson's words, "'Trusteeship' seemed too paternal, too unprogressive for American consumption" and was therefore overprinted with the title of partnership.[127]

[124] John E. Flint, "The Colonial Office and white settler nationalism in Central Africa, 1923-39," Unpublished Paper, 1989, p. 1.

[125] Robinson, "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power," p. 63.

[126] See D. L. Keet, "The African Representative Council, 1946-1958: a Focus on African Politics in Northern Rhodesia," M.A. Thesis (Lusaka, University of Zambia, 1975).

[127] Robinson, "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power," pp. 57-58.

This represented no "shift in the spirit and confidence of British imperialism"[128] but was merely a new label for the imperial ethic. In part, therefore, the change from paramountcy to partnership was a response to external criticism of imperial policy. Nonetheless, internal circumstances influenced most of the changes. Policy was essentially designed to strengthen, rather than weaken the position of the settler community, in as much as it was meant to ensure economic development in Northern Rhodesia and Central Africa in general. From 1948 there was an increased concern about the need to develop and encourage multi-racial liberal politics in Central Africa. The Capricorn Africa Society's federal scheme was designed along these lines.

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[128] Robinson, "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power," p. 57.

CHAPTER THREE.

THE CAPRICORN AFRICA SOCIETY: THE CAMPAIGN FOR CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION AND AFRICAN RESPONSE, 1949-1953.

The creation and disintegration of the Central African Federation (1953-1963) has received considerable study and several attempts have been made to explain "how an error so interesting and surprising, so large and portentous, came to be made."[1] There is a consensus in these studies that Africans overwhelmingly opposed federation (or its earlier form, amalgamation) and that federation was a mistake. Yet studied from the perspective of the 1990s, particularly considering the formation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1979, the principle of federation does not seem necessarily to constitute such a mistake after all.[2] The federation was an excellent idea——except that its timing was bad and it reinforced the political power of the white settlers. That was the mistake. Indeed,

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[1] Ronald Hyam, "The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948-1953," The Historical Journal, 30, 1 (1987), p. 145. On the origins of the federation see also Prosser Gifford, "Misconceived Dominion: The Creation and Disintegration of Federation in British Central Africa," in Prosser Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds.), Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960, (Yale, 1982), pp. 387-416; Harry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1963); and J.R.T. Wood, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Durham, Graham Publishing, 1983).

[2] On Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, see Christopher R. Hill, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa," African Affairs, 82, 327 (April 1983), pp. 214-239; Roger Leys and Arne Tostensen, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa: the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference," Review of African Political Economy, (January-April), pp. 52-71.

it is plausible to suggest that a worse mistake was the unscrambling of the federation in 1963.

As W.F. Gutteridge pointed out, the idea of federation or amalgamation was as old as Rhodesia itself. It was the protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which proved to be the stumbling block.[3] The advantages of contiguous territorial expansion had been articulated by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) as early as 1905 when the Company sought permission to amalgamate North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia.[4]

This initial request was not granted until 1911 when both the Colonial Office and the Paramount Chief of the Lozi (particularly the latter) accepted the Company's assurances that the Barotse Valley would be reserved against white settlement. There is a sense, therefore, in which the Colonial Office established a tradition of consulting (however defined) the indigenous community before granting requests by the local administration.

The origins of amalgamation or federation are well documented. This study does not, therefore, intend to dwell on the debate which preceded the creation of the Central African Federation, except in as far as it relates to the role of the Capricorn Africa Society, and African responses to Capricorn and the closer association issue. The emergence of the Capricorn Movement in Central Africa is closely associated

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[3] W.F. Gutteridge, "The Debate on Central African Federation in Retrospect," Parliamentary Affairs, 10, 2 (1957), p. 213.

[4] John B. Stabler, "The British South Africa Company Proposals for Amalgamation of the Rhodesias, 1915-1917: Northern Rhodesian Reaction," African Social Research, 7, (June 1969), p. 494. The territory north of the Zambezi was initially divided into two administrative units; North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, with the Kafue River and later the line of rail as the dividing line.

with the rise of African nationalism in the region. Both emerged around the same time and were galvanized by similar forces. Initially both movements sought the creation of a multi-racial democratic government as the ultimate goal.

The Capricorn Africa Society and African nationalism constantly influenced each other. Both emerged in response to the changes initiated in the Colonial Office—popularly known as the Colonial reform movement which began in 1938-39 and was revitalized by the Cohen Report of May 1947,[5] which looked to the future of colonial development and attempted to match economic needs with political requirements.[6] The 1947 Report was an ambitious Colonial Office strategy of nation-building in Africa. It was this colonial reform movement and the "constitution-mongering" it inspired which, in part, accounts for the rise of both Capricorn and African nationalism in Central Africa. This chapter seeks therefore, to show, not the futility of liberalism, but its utility, in championing both the cause of federation and early African nationalist activity.

The Origins of Capricorn.

Capricorn was Southern Rhodesian in origin, but its philosophy and ideology was Central African in orientation. Its history is therefore relevant to Northern Rhodesian social and economic history during the years leading to federation and decolonization. The Society's history unfolded in two main phases: the first phase

[5] See John E. Flint, "The Failure of Planned Decolonization in British Africa," African Affairs, 82, 328 (1983), pp. 389-411.

[6] Ronald Robinson, "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power in Tropical Africa, 1940-1951", in W.H. Morris-Jones and George Fischer (eds.), Decolonization and After: The British and French Experience, (London, Frank Cass, 1980), p. 62.

lasted from its formation in 1949 to 1953 when the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was created; the second phase lasted from 1954 until about 1963 when the Society was officially dissolved. This chapter will discuss the first phase, particularly the Society's origins and involvement in the campaign for federation. The next chapter will examine the second phase, with particular attention to its activities in Northern Rhodesia.

The formation of the Capricorn Africa Society raised much excitement and hope, both in the United Kingdom and Central Africa. Joseph H. Oldham wrote in May 1955 that "in the strictest confidence the Colonial Office, from the Secretary of State downwards, is prepared to take the Capricorn Africa Society seriously."[7] He later wrote in his book published in 1955 that:

> For the first time since the beginning of the fateful contact of Europe with Africa, there has come into existence on African soil and on a substantial scale a joint endeavour by members of different races to create an inter-racial integrated society in which differences of race and colour will cease to have any significance.[8]

The Society came into existence in Southern Rhodesia in 1949 under the leadership of Colonel David Stirling, "the Phantom Major" of the Second World War.[9] The

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[7] National Library of Scotland, ACC. 7548/340B, Joseph Oldham to Jim Dongall, Foreign Mission Committee, Edinburgh, 1 May 1955. I am indebted to Jane Parpart for bring this communication to my attention. (Personal Communication, 29 April 1991).

[8] Joseph H. Oldham, New Hope in Africa, (London, Longman, 1955), p. 13.

[9] David Stirling was born in 1915 of Roman Catholic Scottish landed gentry. He joined the army in 1939 and in 1940 established the Special Air Services Brigade (a guerilla organization raiding air bases behind Axis lines in North Africa). It was during the war that he earned the nickname "Phantom Major" because of his cheek and bluff while carrying out the raids. In 1946 he went to Southern Rhodesia and joined his brother Bill in business. He then founded and led the Capricorn Africa Society from 1949 to 1958. In 1967 Stirling

origins of Capricorn can be traced back to the short lived Federal Union of Capricorn Africa (FUCA) which was formed in July 1947 in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. FUCA's main objective was to campaign for a federation of Southern and Northern Rhodesia instead of the long desired, yet unobtainable amalgamation.[10] Very little is known about the FUCA, except that it emerged two years before Capricorn and that Colonel David Stirling was associated with it.[11] On 22 and 23 November 1948, Sir Godfrey Huggins, the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister, held discussions with Stirling and General Sir Francis de Guingand who were both representing FUCA. The aim of the meeting was to formulate strategies for influencing British colonial policy which was believed to be out of touch with current developments in the multi-racial colonies. The presence of Stirling on FUCA is the only evidence linking the two organizations.

The Capricorn Africa Movement, of which the Capricorn Africa Society was one of the three wings and the most prominent, was founded with four aims and objects in mind:

1. The cultural, political and economic establishment of Capricorn Africa as an integral part and pillar of western civilization;

2. The development of Capricorn Africa mainly by large scale European investment and immigration;

3. The political and economic closer association of all Capricorn Africa;

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founded Watch-guard International Limited which was a political security agency offering African heads of state a counter-coup service. In 1974 he founded the "GB 75"—a volunteer strike-breaking force.

[10] Wood, The Welensky Papers, p. 114.

[11] Wood, The Welensky Papers, p. 126.

4. The promotion of a just Race Relations policy, based on the Southern Rhodesian Two-Pyramid policy, and adaptable to the changing needs of time and place.[12]

The four aims and objects formed the basis of the Capricorn African Movement's philosophy and ideology, namely to encourage all races to develop and advance along Western cultural standards, albeit with constant adjustments to suit the changing circumstances. The movement chose to call itself the **Capricorn** Africa Movement because the territories with which it was most directly concerned were situated largely within the tropic of Capricorn. According to the Capricorn Handbook for Speakers, although Capricorn Africa consisted of territories which lay south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo, the scope of the movement was limited to Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.[13]

The Capricorn Africa Movement was essentially a pressure group launched by a "small group of men" who "formed themselves into a founding committee in 1950."[14] The founding committee then decided that the most effective organization would be a three-tiered one: the Capricorn Africa **Society** (CAS); the Capricorn Africa **Institute** (CAI); and the Capricorn Africa **Association** (CAA). The Capricorn African Society originally consisted of a few individuals in the important centres of Capricorn Africa "chosen by election." These individuals were expected to give a good deal of time and effort to the Capricorn cause as well as "undertaking to give their first loyalty" in all public matters to the promotion of the movement. These exacting demands obviously precluded any general appeal for membership.

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[12] NAZ NR/11/121/19 Greater Rhodesia, 1951.

[13] The Capricorn Africa Society Handbook For Speakers, (Salisbury, CAS, 1955), A 1. My research interest is confined to Central Africa, with special emphasis on Northern Rhodesia.

[14] NAZ, NR 11/121/19 Greater Rhodesia, 1951.

The Capricorn Africa Institute on the other hand was to be established as funds became available, first in Salisbury, and then branches were to be opened in London, New York, Nairobi, Lusaka and other suitable centres. The Institute was envisaged as a centre for the collection and dissemination of economic, political, industrial, geographical and historical information relating to Capricorn Africa. It was never established as planned.

Lastly there was the Capricorn Africa Association which was open to all those who supported or sympathized with the aims and objects of the movement, and wished to help in promoting them. The subscription for Association membership was set at £1 per annum.

The organizational structure of the Capricorn Africa Movement was impressive, but lack of adequate funding could not sustain the three-tiered structure. In the end Capricorn assumed the roles which were to have been played by CAI and CAA. The latter merged with the United Central Africa Association (UCAA) in 1952 which had began by then to campaign for federation, having abandoned amalgamation as its objective.

The merger enabled the founders of the Capricorn Movement to use all their energy and resources to strengthen and expand Capricorn. F.N.N. Parry of the Central African Council however, misinformed the Colonial Office when he wrote:

> You may be relieved to learn that there are moves afoot to put an end to the Capricorn Africa Society as such and to amalgamate it with the United Central Africa Association which as a supporter of federation has existed here for sometime under the chairmanship of Stanley Cooke.[15]

Several reasons account for this misinformation. The most obvious is that very little was known about the Capricorn Africa *Association*. The Capricorn Africa *Society*

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[15] NAZ, NR 11/121/98/1 F.N.N. Parry to C.E. Lambert, 7 March, 1952.

completely overshadowed the other wings of the movement. Related to this was the simple fact that the personalities in Capricorn were the same as those in CAA. It was therefore easy for a casual observer to miss the distinction. Inadvertently, however, the merger helped Capricorn to be easily identified.

Parry's misinformed letter to Lambert led Hancock[16] and Mahoso[17] to conclude that Capricorn merged with the UCAA in 1952 under the new name of United Central Africa Association. Ironically, however, both continue to discuss Capricorn——not the UCAA after 1952. Although Stirling met Sir Godfrey Huggins to discuss the impending merger, it was not the Capricorn Africa Society which Stirling intended to merge with the United Central Africa Association. Huggins' speech on the merger was very specific about the UCAA merging with Capricorn Africa Association.[18]

Ian Maclennan, who had a clear understanding of the organizational structure of the Capricorn Movement, wrote to G.H. Baxter that it was not "yet clear" whether Capricorn Africa *Society* which was the "inner directing body of the old Capricorn Africa *Association* would continue to exist separately."[19] He concluded that he strongly believed that Capricorn would continue to exist as a separate entity. Both Hancock and Mahoso do not refer to Public Record Office (PRO) Capricorn Files.

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[16] I.R. Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia," Rhodesian History, 9 (1978), p. 45.

[17] T.P. Mahoso, "Between Two Nationalisms: A Study in Liberal Activism and Western Domination, Zimbabwe, 1920 to 1980," Ph. D. Thesis, (Temple University, 1986), p. 177.

[18] PRO, DO 35/3603/55 Enclosure, Speech By the Prime Minister on the Formation of the United Central Africa Association, (n.d), p. 1. Also CAS Papers, David Stirling to Sir Godfrey Huggins, 26 February, 1952.

[19] PRO, DO 35/3603/55 Ian Maclennan to G.H. Baxter, 4 April, 1952 (His italics).

In the end, the unofficial recognition of Capricorn by the Colonial Office and consultations which went on privately do not come out in these works.

From its inception in 1949 Capricorn, like the parent body, remained essentially a pressure group predominantly under European leadership. The guiding philosophy was the need to define a "nationality" for the territories in which it operated——a "nationality" based on the principle of "equal rights for all civilized" people. The founders of the Society were predominantly post-World War II European immigrants who had come to Southern Rhodesia to start a new life.[20] These individuals were (on the average) more liberal than most pre-war settlers in their attitude towards members of other races. As such they tended to be ridiculed by most of the old timers. One such settler wrote:

> When we came here(S.R.) the Natives were like wild animals living in caves and running for their lives if they saw a stranger. To-day they are educated, live decently and many of them are extremely well off. Who accomplished this? It was the pioneers and their children, not the new comers who know nothing of the Native and want to make him the social equal of the Europeans who have only reached their present stage of civilization after thousands of years ... at Chipinga meeting we passed a motion of no confidence in the CAS, because we want nothing to do with people who want integration of the races. We are all for the advancement of the Native, but in his own sphere ...[21]

The society was evidently not welcome amongst most old settler communities.

Nonetheless there was a liberal element in Southern Rhodesia which belonged to the pioneer stock but remained outside Capricorn like Holderness. Most of these tended to be in the Labour Party. Others like Eileen Haddon and Mike Haddon who came to Southern Rhodesia in 1948 belonged to other multi-racial organizations

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[20] Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society," p. 44.

[21] Microfilms of papers of the Capricorn Africa Society held at the Centre for Research Libraries, Chicago (Originals are held at the J.B.Morrell Library, University of York, England) hereafter referred to as CAS Papers., File No.80, Letter to the Editor in Umtali Post, 20 December, 1957.

and remained outside Capricorn. There were evidently divisions among the established settlers and the post-world war II immigrants.

David Stirling is generally regarded as the founder of Capricorn. After the Second World War Stirling joined his brother in business in Southern Rhodesia where he soon became convinced of the economic potential of East and Central Africa. Stirling was hardly the first or the last to have such notions. His uniqueness lay in the way his plans were conceived. From the start his goal was to arouse local and metropolitan interest while simultaneously dampening fears of settler exploitation of Africans.

The Society was, however, managed by a governing body called the General Council which included a chairperson, three vice-chairpersons, a treasurer, a secretary and six representatives from each branch of the movement.[22] The president of the Society was by virtue of his office, the chairperson of the General Council. This meant that for the first eight years Stirling was president of Capricorn and chairperson of the General Council, hence the contention that during that period Capricorn and Stirling were inseparable. The Council had complete control over all matters concerning the Society as a whole. It interpreted the rules and principles and established committees as they were needed.

Nonetheless, Stirling found important associates who, like him, shared his belief that economic development and political stability rested with the creation of a large political and economic union of Capricorn Africa. In Salisbury the most

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[22] CAS Papers, "Constitution of the Capricorn Africa Society", p. 2.

important was N.H. Wilson, a resident of Southern Rhodesia since 1906. He was almost single-handedly responsible for the formulation of Capricorn's philosophy.[23]

Most of the founding members were recent arrivals who had come to Southern Rhodesia to start new economic ventures, but they were appalled by the "parochialism of the small-town society" they encountered. Among them was Brian O'Connell, an accountant, who was angry about the "useless drift and the living-in-the-pastiness" which he believed was characteristic of the administration and the European community in Southern Rhodesia.[24] O'Connell was also critical of the Colonial Office for its "ignorant political grip" over Central Africa and for the "misguided and highly dangerous experiment" of promoting African self rule. Then there was John Baines who joined Capricorn because it "seemed good business to build a Central African Federation." Both men, in the words of Hancock, were "practical men who brought to Capricorn the capacity and determination to get things done."[25] Initially the intention was to limit membership to one hundred, and to exclude other races and women. This position was abandoned because it made the society too restrictive and contradicted its general liberal ideology.

Nonetheless, during the first three years, the Society's activities were shrouded in secrecy. As a pressure group, Capricorn did not seek to take over the government but to influence its policies. This explains its lack of direct involvement in politics

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[23] N. H. Wilson, "Standing on the Threshold: Capricorn Africa in the Global Structure," The Northern News, 31 October, 1950; "Standing on the Threshold: Natural Resources of Capricorn Africa," The Northern News, 7 November, 1950; and "Standing on the Threshold: Capricorn Africa as the Key to the Future," The Northern News, 14 November, 1950.

[24] Brain O'Connell to Stirling, 4 January, 1951. Cited in Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa society in Southern Rhodesia," p. 44.

[25] Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society," p. 45.

during the initial phase, although the issues it was dealing with were largely political. As such, it never attempted to become a mass organization. The founders concentrated on investigating the racial problems of Capricorn Africa and trying to find solutions.

In London, the most important acquisition was Joseph H. Oldham, who became the special advisor to the Society. His
book, New Hope In Africa, which he described as a "faithful interpretation of its aims and purposes" reflects Oldham's influence on the Society.[26]

Philosophy and Ideology.

Where did the need for a Capricorn Africa Society brand of liberalism originate? The general tendency of liberal thought and activism when applied to Africa was to readjust the ideological hegemony of the west to changing African conditions. What attempts did Capricorn make to facilitate this readjustment? What was the perception of Capricorn about change?

The driving force behind the founding of the Capricorn Africa Movement was the belief that "a policy for Africa must come from within Africa" and that such a policy must be "sponsored by members of all races living in Africa." On 25 March 1952 the Rhodesia Herald published an article entitled "A Policy in Between" which summarized the Society's philosophy and ideology.[27] The philosophy involved the creation of a delicate balance between the interests of blacks on the one hand and

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[26] Oldham, New Hope In Africa, p. 7.

[27] Anonymous, "A Policy in Between," The Rhodesia Herald, 25 March, 1952, CAS Papers, File No. 66.

those of the whites on the other. The ultimate objective was to achieve a true partnership between the races by promoting the spiritual, economic, cultural and political progress of the different races.

The balance was to be created through a partnership of prominent people representing both races. The Society therefore sought to recruit Africans who were thought to be making a positive contribution to the development of their territories. African teachers, civil servants and traders were the obvious target because they were deemed capable of understanding and furthering the Society's ideology.

The Society was committed to establishing a Federation of East and Central Africa. As Stirling explained in 1953 in a letter to General Sir Francis de Guingand:

> The ultimate purpose of CAS is to establish a United States of Capricorn Africa founded on a political philosophy or ideology embracing the aspirations of all races and founded on a common citizenship open to all those of any race who have attained the qualifications necessary to protect Western civilization and standards.[28]

The emphasis on protecting Western "civilization" was the bedrock of the Society's philosophy and explains why Capricorn sought to attract only those Africans who were believed to have acquired Western values and were prepared to defend them.

This was a departure from white settler ideology of white supremacy which permanently relegated "Natives" to the lower echelons of society irrespective of the level of their education, whence the term "educated Native." For instance, Roy Welensky spoke for many settlers in 1938 when he expressed fears and insecurities concerning the role of Africans in the administration of justice. "He was shocked to

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[28] CAS Papers File No. 50, Stirling to General Sir Francis de Guingand, 10 June, 1953. A similar letter was sent to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Office, Patrick Gordon Walker on 11 June.

learn that in theory an African policeman could arrest a European ... and proposed its prohibition."[29] Welensky even asked for assurance that no African assessors would be used in cases involving the rape of a European woman and declared: "I don't think it right that any European woman should have to explain the details of a case of this kind in front of a native, no matter how educated."[30] Capricorn however, was prepared to accept educated Africans as equals socially and professionally.

Nonetheless, the use of the concept "western civilization" as a yardstick brought much condemnation and controversy to the objectives of the Society. While Capricorn sought to attract Africans imbued with western values and believed that harnessing those western liberal values would make it possible for democratic principles to operate in Capricorn Africa, it dreaded the thought of transferring political power to an African ruling elite which would abuse it. It was in this respect that Stirling wrote to the Times in 1951 saying:

> The Colonial Office policy will result in handing over of administrative responsibility to the Native before he is capable of sustaining that responsibility, thereby risking a situation in which the superficially educated Native will exploit his more backward brethren in a form of autocracy which will not even have the safeguard of the old tribe system.[31]

African nationalists did not take kindly to these views because they challenged the very foundation to their claim for greater political representation. The more radical

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[29] Kenneth Vickery, "Roy Welensky and the World of Central African Labour," University of Zambia, Department of History Seminar Series, 15 February 1989, p. 9.

[30] Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 6th Council, 1st Session, 17 December, 1938, Col. 481, cited in Vickery, "Roy Welensky and the World of Central African Labour," p. 9.

[31] PRO, DO 35/3603/ Copy of letter to the Times, 18 May, 1951.

African nationalists became increasingly suspicious of liberalism and moderate Africans. The African National Congress responded by replacing moderate leaders in 1951.[32] However, Roy Welensky and Godfrey Huggins supported this approach. Huggins later pointed out, regarding the nationalist demand for universal adult suffrage, that the idea of democracy did not normally take into account the quality of those qualified to vote. He argued that in a true democracy the quality of the voters was more important than the mere numbers. Thus Capricorn view of democracy fitted well with that of Southern Rhodesia at this time.

Although African nationalists were not yet demanding one-man one-vote the insistence on a qualitative, as opposed to a quantitative franchise by Capricorn significantly contributed to the unpopularity of liberalism as an ideology for the transfer of political power to a local elite. This emphasis on qualitative franchise was consistent with official colonial policy during this time.[33] The Secretary of State for the Colonies explained in 1951 that the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government in Central Africa was to prepare the region for:

> ... self-government within the Commonwealth, but self-government must include proper provision for both Europeans and Africans. We have set Africans on the path of political, social and economic progress and it is our task to help them forward in that development so that they may take their full part with the rest of the community in political and economic life of the territories.[34]

African nationalists initially accepted this position, but later began losing patience when promises of shared political power did not materialize.

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[32] See Chapter Two, p. 65 for a detailed discussion of this change in leadership.

[33] See Chapter Five.

[34] PRO, CO 537/7203 Statement made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 13 June, 1951.

Mahoso suggests that the emergence of "expatriate liberal groups" (Capricorn included) after World War II represented a massive intervention in the Rhodesian affairs.[35] Mahoso refuses to see Capricorn as a locally initiated liberal group and therefore maintains that it was just another imperialist front seeking to perpetuate imperialism and colonial rule. There is no evidence to suggest that Capricorn was in any way prompted or manipulated by British forces, even less by the Colonial Office.

The term "expatriate" normally applies to groups operating temporarily within a society and not intending to live there permanently. The elements which formed Capricorn were recent immigrants seeking permanent settlement and wishing to expand the local economy. There is simply no basis for applying complex centre-periphery theory, as Mahoso does, to explain their behaviour and more liberal political attitudes when simpler explanations serve better.

John E. Flint[36] has shown that the Second World War brought a considerable liberalization of popular and official attitudes to race in Britain, while attitudes in the colonial service remained ossified and isolated. One may apply this contrast even more forcefully to white settlers in East and Central Africa, who remained cut off from British influences during the war. The new immigrants after 1945 were naturally of a somewhat more liberal standing than most settlers of the pre-war vintage.

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[35] Mahoso, "Between Two Nationalisms," p. 161.

[36] John E. Flint, "Scandal at the Bristol Hotel: Some Thoughts on Racial Discrimination in Britain and West Africa and its Relationship to the Planning of Decolonization, 1939-47," Journal of Commonwealth and Imperial History, 12, 1 (October 1983), pp. 74-93.

However, it is also plausible to suggest that most of the post-1945 immigrants came into contact with urbanized Africans who were adequately conversant with European ways. Unlike the early arrivals, these new immigrants could easily find common cause with the educated urban Africans. Thus not only were the post-1945 immigrants of a more liberal stamp than most pre-1945 immigrants, but the urban Africans were also of a different type——educated and semi-educated. This accounts for the easy mixing which followed, leaving the impression that post-1945 immigrants were more liberal than early arrivals. It has to be remembered also that because most of the early post-World War I settlers had come to Northern and Southern Rhodesia after spending several years in South Africa, they were subjected to the climate of opinion in a settler-dominated country. Most of them therefore shared a commitment to protect their privileged position.[37]

N.H. Wilson supplied the philosophy of the society. His basic contention was that Capricorn Africa could become the key to the world's prosperity and help to protect the British Empire and other democracies from communism.[38] Capricorn lacked faith in the ability of Africans to up-lift themselves without European assistance. Thus the white minority, with its "superior" culture, was expected to provide leadership until Africans, through European assistance, had gained enough experience to exercise that role without looking to sectional interests. It is important to realize that Capricorn was opposed to the "barren racial" policy which was in force in the Union of South Africa. The society was committed to accepting advanced Africans as equals. Between 1949 and 1952 Wilson's writings expressed the Society's early ideas: the confidence in the moral superiority of western civilization and the

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[37] See Chapter Two, p. 27.

[38] N.H. Wilson, "Capricorn Africa in the Global Structure," The Northern News, 31 October, 1950.

British Empire, and the need in Africa to defend both; the emphasis on the material advantages of uniting East and Central Africa; and the proposal to encourage white immigration into the area to help economic development while encouraging African advancement.[39] Hancock[40] argues that Capricorn never intended to encourage African advancement——it would only acknowledge it when it occurred. What Capricorn really objected to was African advancement for its own sake. Capricorn favoured and emphasized individual ability as the criteria for advancement.

In the political area Capricorn was already aware of the shortcomings of trying to concentrate political power in the hands of one racial group. Capricorn was also beginning to develop its own ideas about how African nationalism could be diverted away from its extremist stance. It therefore envisaged the development of multi-racial politics by encouraging liberal activism in which members of different races participated.

Capricorn also sought to contribute towards the efforts of the mining companies and the Northern Rhodesia Government in promoting some advancement of Africans in the mining industry. It was this commitment to industrial harmony which led some mine management officials to make financial contributions to Capricorn programmes.[41] At the request of Sir Ronald L. Prain, Chairman of the Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST), Cornellius sent a cheque of £500 to Stirling which was drawn from the RST Chairman's funds.

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[39] N.H. Wilson, "Standing on the Threshold," The Northern News, 31 October, 7, 17 November 1950.

[40] Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society," p. 44.

[41] CAS Papers, File No. 30, Harold K. Hochschilds to David Stirling, 20 November, 1956; W. V. Cornellius to David Stirling, 16 November, 1960.

Ideologically Capricorn was opposed to the policy of racial exclusiveness (apartheid) which was being pursued by the Union Government of South Africa which it recognized as dangerous and an impediment to the development of the British way of life in Central Africa (or Capricorn Africa). Capricorn also rejected extreme nationalism based on race——both African and European——as well as the communist ideology which it identified as the second and third enemies to be eliminated in Capricorn Africa. Capricorn's ideology was based on the philosophy that:

> All men, despite their varying talents, are born equal in dignity before God, and have a common duty to one another ... the difference between men, whether of creed, or colour are honourable differences ... we wish to dissociate ourselves from the barren philosophy which determines racial legislation in lands beyond our boundaries.[42]

Although this was the guiding philosophy of Capricorn since its inception in 1949, it was only in 1952 that it was clearly propounded in the Declarations. The belief in this philosophy——equal rights for all men before God——enabled liberal Capricornists to accept individuals from other racial groups as equal partners in the pursuit of racial harmony in Central Africa.

Nevertheless, Capricorn recognized that European immigration in Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia had resulted in trade union practices which were designed to protect the European from the "unfair competition" of the African with his "lower standard" of living. Since the Society believed in the preservation of European standards, it regarded the principle behind that attitude as inevitable. Also because the Society never favoured the "horizontal colour bar," it sought to harness emergent Africans by creating advanced opportunities for them in both open and

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[42] CAS Papers, File No.134, The Capricorn Declarations, Salisbury, 1952.

"Native" areas.[43] Capricorn believed in the theory that the training which Africans received should be for the benefit of the rural areas where most the African population lived.[44]

The Society looked forward to the development of an African middle class with common interests with Europeans so that together they would strive for prosperity and political stability through the rejection of the principle of paramountcy of interests based on race. Since Capricorn believed in the "moral superiority of western civilization and the British Empire" and was motivated somewhat by the "need to defend both in Africa," Africans accused Capricorn of being an imperialist front for the preservation and consolidation of the colonial state. On the contrary, considering the general acceptance that the model of the constitutional state was the ideal polity to be replicated in the post-colonial state, Capricorn was justified in demanding the establishment of liberal democracy, albeit temporarily based on a qualified franchise. After all, not even the African nationalists were contemplating the abolition of the model of the colonial constitutional state. They wanted to step into the shoes of those who ran the system, but through universal adult suffrage.

Campaign For Federation: 1949-1953.

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[43] Open areas were largely in the urban and industrial centres where the Europeans were expected to be in control but in which advanced Africans would be accepted. "Native" areas were to be closed to Europeans except to perform duties which were directly to benefit the Africans. This reflected the "two-pyramid" policy of the Southern Rhodesia government.

[44] This reflected the labour policies which evolved in the 1920s and 1930s. See Chapter Two pp. 29-30.

In order for Capricorn to participate in the campaign for the creation of the Central African Federation, it had to find a common ground with protagonists of federation in both Central Africa and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government had resisted settler demands for amalgamation for over two decades.[45] Colonial Office resistance was based on the unwillingness to relinquish control over the northern territories. After the war, the settler community revived its campaign for closer union of the Rhodesias. New arguments emerged to strengthen the case for federation: the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in South Africa and the adoption of apartheid as that government's official policy in 1948 gave momentum to the federal cause. Alongside this fear was the argument that although African nationalism was increasingly becoming vocal, the Africans as a community by themselves were not, and could not for some time to come, effectively resist Union influence. Since amalgamation had been ruled out several times before and it was unlikely that Whitehall would change its stand on it, federation became the object of settler policy.

In a calculated move to undercut economic arguments for amalgamation the British government had decided in 1944 that it was going to implement one of the Bledisloe Commission's[46] recommendations and announced that it would establish

[45] See Robert I. Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in British East and Central Africa,1889-1953," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 2 (1963-64), pp. 141-160.

[46] The Bledisloe Royal Commission was appointed in 1939 to inquire on "whether any ... closer cooperation or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is desirable and feasible, with due regard to the interests of all the inhabitants, irrespective of race ... and to the special responsibility of Our Government ... for the interests of the Native inhabitants." Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 5940 (1939), cited in Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, p. 111.

a permanent inter-territorial council to co-ordinate policy in the three territories.[47] The 18 October announcement by Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, establishing the Central African Council (CAC) was the "death knell of amalgamation." The CAC was intended to undercut the economic arguments for federation. The CAC held its inaugural meeting on 24 April, 1945 in Salisbury.[48]

Although the CAC lacked executive powers and was mainly advisory, its performance within these limitations was so impressive that Governor Sir Gilbert Rennie reported in 1948 that:

> We are making useful progress under the Central African Council set-up, that each of the three territories concerned has so much on its plate that all of us should get on with the work of development to which we are committed, and that, so far as Northern Rhodesia is concerned, we have so few men available and offering themselves for public service that it would be difficult to find the personnel for membership of any form of Central Assembly, if such were established in addition to membership of Legislative Council.[49]

Evidently, economic arguments for closer union were no longer as forceful as they were before the establishment of the CAC. The Northern Rhodesia Government was obviously satisfied with the operation of the CAC. However, by 1950 the Southern Rhodesia Government, more desirous of federation, had decided it would no longer co-operate in the affairs of the CAC because of the supposed "shortcomings of the Council."[50] The case for federation again came to the fore.

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[47] Wood, The Welensky Papers, pp. 90-94.

[48] For a detailed discussion of the Central African Council and its dissolution, see Wood, The Welensky Papers, especially pp. 90-149.

[49] PRO, CO 537/3608/23 Governor Rennie to A.B. Cohen 17 July, 1948.

[50] PRO, CO 537/5885/101 A.B. Cohen to H. Nigel Parry, 2 August, 1950. and CO 537/5885/114 Memorandum on Closer Union of Central African Territories, 1950.

These developments led the United Central Africa Association, which had been campaigning for amalgamation for some time, to begin supporting federation. The ever perceptive Andrew Cohen, who was then Head of the Africa Division of the Colonial Office, received the information with relief and recorded that a very "important development in the political alignments in Central Africa" had taken place. The association, "sensibly enough" was "putting forward federation as a political aim...."[51] Cohen confessed that he had himself for "some time taken the view that federation" should be the "ultimate aim of policy," but had felt that federation could not come until the Africans in the north were "able to take an intelligent decision on the question and to play an effective part in the federal arrangement."[52] He began to wonder whether the Colonial Office was really right not to attempt a step forward towards federation.

Capricorn considered the creation of the Central African Federation as only the first step towards the eventual establishment of a larger Federation of East and Central Africa or Capricorn Africa. Its leaders were therefore anxious to further it in any way possible. However, while Andrew Cohen appreciated the urgency of the issue in view "of the Afrikaner menace," he pointed out that:

> Until we can be sure that we can protect Central Africa from erosion
> and infiltration from South Africa it would surely be unwise to say the
> least, to suggest any constitutional link between East and Central
> Africa.[53]

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[51] PRO, CO 537/3608 Minute by Andrew B. Cohen, 16 July, 1948.

[52] PRO, CO 537/3608 Minute by Andrew B. Cohen, 16 July 1948.

[53] PRO, DO 35/3603/12 Andrew B. Cohen to G. H. Baxter, 6 November 1951. Cohen was advising the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth Relations through the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Capricorn's envisaged federation of East and Central Africa.

Consequently, in February 1952, Capricorn explained its new program to Sir Godfrey Huggins. Stirling also held unofficial talks with members of the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office at the latter's office on 8 February 1952 at which the Society agreed temporarily to shelve plans for the larger federation.[54] The strategy was three-fold: (1) merging the Capricorn Africa Association with the United Central Africa Association; (2) raising funds for the campaign to win votes for the referendum in Southern Rhodesia; and (3) establishing solid African support not only for federation but for all the objectives of Capricorn.[55]

Meanwhile Northern Rhodesian settlers led by Roy Welensky intensified their campaign for federation. The debate emphasized political advantages as opposed to economic ones (these were no longer forceful because of the success of the CAC). The one major political factor which determined the course of events was the South African threat. Capricorn had already singled it out as enemy number one. In Northern Rhodesia some Afrikaners were already becoming politically noticeable. Their pro-South African views threatened imperial interests in the region.[56]

Therefore, when Capricorn emerged proclaiming that it stood for "the closer association of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland as a first step towards its greater aim" it obviously was making an important political statement which inevitably entangled it in the politics of the scheme. Capricorn spokesmen were among the

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[54] CAS Papers, "Notes on Meeting between members of Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office," 8 February, 1952.

[55] Joan Lorraine Watson, "The Capricorn Africa Society And its Impact on Rhodesian Politics," Ph.D. Thesis, St. John's University, 1982, p. 51.

[56] PRO, DO 35/3603/12 Andrew B. Cohen to G.H.Baxter, 6 November,1951; CO 1015/70/43 Stanley N. Evans to Oliver Lyttelton, 21 April, 1952.

most effective lobbyists for federation. The Society enjoyed the personal confidence

of the Colonial Secretary of the time, Oliver Lyttelton, not to mention that of

Andrew Cohen. The cordial relationship was evidenced through exchange of

information regarding the federal scheme. For example, after his tour of Central

Africa in 1952 Oliver Lyttelton wrote Stirling about African attitudes towards

federation:

> Large numbers were completely disinterested in the question altogether. Others said that they would be content if the Colonial Office told them straight out what was best for them and they would follow it with confidence. On the other hand African opinion on official representative bodies was opposed to federation.[57]

This exchange of views suggests very strongly that Capricorn was taken seriously

within the Colonial Office.

Andrew Cohen became even more supportive of the role of Capricorn in the

region. Although he did not agree with the Society's scheme of a federation of six

East and Central African territories, he nevertheless, acknowledged that Capricorn

was important in the political development of Central Africa and justified his four

"long meetings" with Stirling. Cohen wrote:

> Stirling represents a liberal and potentially valuable group among Southern Rhodesian Europeans and I have felt that there is everything to be gained from making close contact with him and his liberal efforts and at the same time seeking to influence him away from courses which are not likely to be profitable from our point of view.[58]

Andrew Cohen's views on Capricorn were consistent with Colonial Office liberal

ideas of the time. Cohen, in many ways the archetype of colonial reform policies as

revived after the war, appears to have recognized in Capricorn a useful ally. As

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[57] CAS Papers, Oliver Lyttelton to Stirling, 4 August, 1952. See also Oldham's views referred to above, p. 92.

[58] PRO, CO 1015/70 Minute by Andrew B. Cohen, 23 November, 1951.

elsewhere, the Colonial Office lost no opportunity to attempt to influence potentially "sound" political groups or movements in the "right direction." While Cohen tried to influence Capricorn, the process was of course double edged. Entry as advisors in the corridors of power in Whitehall was bound to enhance the status of the movement in Central African politics. For a while, therefore, Capricorn and the Colonial Office held a communion of interests.

Yet the Colonial Office decided to keep an officially neutral position on the question of federation. Colonial Office officials carefully worded their responses to letters from Capricorn to conceal their enthusiasm and support for the Society's efforts.[59] The Colonial Office therefore not only created the impression that it ignored Capricorn, but missed the opportunity to influence African opinion effectively towards the scheme. As F. Joelson of East Africa and Rhodesia pointed out, "the pretence of neutrality" was neither wise nor did "it help African leaders to understand the position properly."[60] Nationalists grabbed the opportunity and their views influenced the less articulate, amid threats and intimidation.

Stirling also enjoyed a certain amount of support among settler leaders in the region. Capricorn could play a useful part in educating the public on the advantages of federation, argued Stirling. Therefore, when the Society offered its services in this

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[59] PRO, CO 1015/70/11 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Office to Norman Hughes (CAS), 18 December, 1951. The letter was written on behalf of the Colonial Secretary; CO 1015/70 Note by A.B. Cohen, 11 December, 1951. Cohen minuted that "I am sure that it is right to encourage Colonel Stirling and his friends and to show the most friendly sympathy towards them... But ... I prefer that Colonel Stirling were not congratulated 'very much indeed'..."

[60] NAZ, NR 11/121/56 F. Joelson to Sir Gilbert Rennie, (n.d.).

capacity to the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, he urged them to lose no time in starting their operation.[61]

Capricorn kicked off the campaign for federation with the establishment of a Special Appeal Committee which included several leading settler politicians. The Committee immediately set to work, mounting advertisements in leading papers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia advocating support for the federal scheme. Its target was African opinion, and contrary to Sondashi,[62] Capricorn never for once ignored African opposition to the scheme. Capricorn acknowledged the fact that the vast majority of Africans opposed the federal scheme, but felt this was "in large measure due to deliberate misinterpretation of the proposals by the vociferous but small group of Native 'intellectuals' present in all the territories."[63]

Furthermore, Capricorn pointed out that it abhorred the Colonial Office assumption that it could impose federation against the unanimous opposition from Africans. "We, of CAS," declared the statement, "are most adamantly against this line of thinking."[64] Capricorn believed that European leadership in Africa could not "endure" and did "not deserve to endure," unless it was "capable of carrying with it

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[61] CAS Papers, File No.8 Stirling to Colonial Secretary, 22 November, 1951.

[62] Harris B.K. Sondashi, "The Politics of the Voice: An Examination and Comparison of British Pressure Groups (Capricorn Africa Society, the Africa Bureau and the Movement for Colonial Reform) Which Sought to Influence Colonial Policies and Events: The Case of Central Africa, 1949-1962," M.Ph. Thesis, (University of York, 1980), p. 6.

[63] CAS Papers, File No.8. A.B. McNalty, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 November, 1951.

[64] NAZ, NR 8/7/51/1 CAS. Central African Federation and the Salisbury Declarations, 30 May, 1952.

in major decisions affecting their common destiny, genuine and substantial African support."[65]

The Society maintained that African and European interests were indivisible and as such sought to deal with those aspects which created suspicion between the two races. It is incorrect to suggest that Capricorn "completely ignored African opposition"[66] to the federal scheme. Capricorn recognized the difficulty and therefore decided to deal with the "vociferous" African opposition. At the suggestion of John Baines in January 1952 the Society embarked on a training program for Africans who accepted Capricorn principles and favoured the establishment of the Central African Federation. These cadres would be dispatched to rural areas in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where they would hold meetings with local Africans and impress upon them the advantages of federation. Baines suggested that each of these cadres would be paid £50 a month to provide "moral courage" in the face of expected hostility.[67]

A Capricorn meeting of 31 January, 1952 approved Baines' plan and set up a budget of £5,000 but decided to reduce the payment to each African cadre from the proposed £50 to £25 per month. However, on 25 February the Finance Committee arranged to pay Abel Nyirenda £40 a month for six months to deliver the pro-federation message to Northern Rhodesian Africans.[68] Regarding the £25 payment, Mahoso commented:

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[65] NAZ, NR 8/7/51/1 Capricorn Africa Society: The Central African Federation and the Salisbury Declarations, 30 May, 1952.

[66] Sondashi, "The Politics of the Voice," p. 6.

[67] Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society," p. 46, fn. 14.

[68] Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society," p. 47.

> In a country where the majority of African workers made less than £2 per month, £25 per month was a great deal of money and could indeed make an organization seem necessary in the eyes of many Africans ... The sincerity of some of these members is questionable.[69]

Mahoso suggests that those Africans who became cadres under this scheme did so as a survival tactic because they had been, to borrow his phrase, "denied positions in the regular economy commensurate with their 'learning.'" While African grievances about the job market were real, the argument that Africans who joined Capricorn were self-seekers is purely an assertion.

Nonetheless, the literature on the nationalist period has condemned the role which liberal Africans played and relegated them to paid agents of Europeans. Rotberg, for example, wrote of the Northern Rhodesian Government's decision in 1952 to step up its campaign for federation among the Africans that "Welensky subsequently paid Frank Kaluwa, an agent of the Capricorn Africa Society, to 'sell' federation to rural Rhodesians."[70] Yet he knew nothing about Kaluwa's political convictions. Historians have scarcely deigned to imagine that Africans supporting federation might themselves have had genuine liberal views, or for that matter any individually thought out positions of their own.

One such person was Abel Nyirenda.[71] He was a Medical Assistant at the Native Disease Hospital in Salisbury when he first came into contact with Capricorn. This was a prestigious occupation for Africans in those days. Africans referred to these Medical Assistants as "Doctors" and they were widely respected. Therefore,

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[69] Mahoso, "The Politics of the Voice," pp. 189-90.

[70] Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, p. 244. This is the only place where Rotberg mentions Capricorn in the entire book, and offers no evidence of the allegations that Welensky paid Kaluwa to support federation.

[71] Abel Nyirenda was a son of Chief Tembwe of Lundazi District, Northern Rhodesia.

Nyirenda's decision to take Capricorn's banner to Northern Rhodesia should not be taken lightly. Evidence suggests that he genuinely believed in the Capricorn philosophy. He was perhaps the only Northern Rhodesian Capricorn member to have kept a record of his activities while "crusading" for the Society.[72] Historians will never know what his full experiences were as a Capricorn member. The little that remains of the diary tells the story of a person who honestly believed in the Capricorn ideology.

N.H. Wilson was in charge of the orientation programme for the cadres who were taken on in March 1952. At the completion of the orientation programme, Nyirenda was sent to the Eastern Province of Northern Rhodesia with instructions to get in touch with Africans on the Legislative Council and educated Africans. He was specifically asked to try to influence the African National Congress (ANC) policy towards federation.[73]

On his way to Fort Jameson, Nyirenda attended a meeting of the African National Congress after which he held "intensive" talks with Harry M. Nkumbula, leader of the ANC who "for the first time" told Nyirenda that federation was good but that as leader of ANC he was not "allowed to air his own views on federation."[74] Nyirenda also talked to Safeli H. Chileshe, a former teacher who was then running

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[72] Pages of the diary are located in the Party Archives, Lusaka, File ANC 3/24. What is noticeable about his diary is that it appears to have been deliberately tampered with. Many of its pages are missing resulting in an incomplete record of Nyirenda's activities in Northern Rhodesia. It is plausible to suggest that the missing pages contained information which might have confirmed Capricorn's claims that some influential Africans went along with its ideas.

[73] CAS Papers, File No. 29, Report on Africans, 31 March, 1952.

[74] PA, ANC 3/24 Abel R. Nyirenda to N.H. Wilson, 8 October, 1952.

his business enterprise in one of Lusaka's African residential areas.[75] Chileshe told Nyirenda that Africans who understood federation and were willing to see it come were afraid to support federal proposals openly because they feared harassment by the ANC.[76]

Nyirenda also toured the Copperbelt, holding more meetings and talking to Africans on the advantages of federation. While in Mufulira, he recorded in his diary that African opposition to federation on the Copperbelt was not as strong as it was in Lusaka. Several people he talked to were willing to become members of Capricorn: Mansford B.C. Mussah, Moses Mwale, L.B. Ng'ambi, and J. Zulu were among those who showed interest in Capricorn and said they would encourage others to join.[77]

Nyirenda's campaign was somewhat effective. In Fort Jameson, F.C. Moore wrote to Wilson:

> I am taking Abel Nyirenda to Lundazi ... I am sure that he has done some good here and if the African of this province turn back again to favour federation it will be a terrific setback to the Congress and it is quite probable that other districts, or even Provinces may follow the lead.[78]

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[75] Chileshe was vice-Treasurer and chairman of Lusaka branch of ANC (1951). In August 1951 he was reported in the press to be pro-federation when he said "reasonable" Africans in Northern Rhodesia would give the Closer Association Report and the Proposals on Federation their earnest consideration. The Northern News, 3 August, 1951. A few years later (1956) his shops were boycotted because of his pro-federation views.

[76] CAS Papers, File No.8, Wilson to Colleagues, November, 1952.

[77] PA, ANC 7/83 Correspondence on CAS, Extract from pages of Nyirenda's Diary, 24 July, 1952.

[78] CAS Papers, File No.8, F.C. Moore to Wilson (u.d.).

It was certainly going to be a "terrific setback" for ANC if Capricorn had succeeded in its campaign for federation and had drummed up enough African support for that cause. Already Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika had been replaced as leader of the Congress because of his favourable attitude towards federation. ANC leadership therefore, took the Society's campaign seriously and stepped up their campaign to oppose Capricorn and Federation.

African Opposition to Capricorn and Federation, 1951-53.

The emergence of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress in 1948 as a political party was stimulated more by African fears that amalgamation of the two Rhodesias would permanently ensure European domination than by African desire to wrestle political power from white hands. Africans in Northern Rhodesia disliked the "Native" policy in Southern Rhodesia which had been a self-governing colony since 1923. They feared amalgamation would eventually lead to the extension of Southern Rhodesia's "Native" policy into the protectorate and therefore dilute the powers of the Colonial Office, especially with regard to its "Native" policy. Initially African nationalists fought against giving more political power to settlers on the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council. They were not successful in this especially after 1945 when the Colonial Office became more committed to increasing unofficials' political power.[79]

Until 1953 the Congress was committed to preventing the establishment of the Central African Federation, which it believed was merely a stepping stone towards amalgamation. For Congress therefore, anyone or any organization which advocated

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[79] See Chapter Two.

the creation of federation became an enemy. While there was not much that could be done about European proponents of federation, African supporters (few as they were) faced a real danger.[80] This aspect has been overlooked by scholars as a major contributing factor for the low African membership in Capricorn and other liberal organizations. As Gabriel Musumbulwa pointed out, being an African liberal was not easy: there was even a risk of death.[81]

W. Sikalumbi wrote many years later of the way in which Congress dealt with people who supported the federal scheme. Congress formed a Supreme Action Council whose mandate was to organize opposition and spread propaganda against federation and it:

> ... trained Africans to ridicule people who were either lukewarm about federation or did not attend Congress meetings. They even went to the extent of training Africans to hate African civil servants and Africans who had responsible positions in private or with Native Authorities. As a mark of division those Africans who were not Congress supporters were called "Capricornists". Later these same type of people were called "informers".[82]

Under these circumstances it required great courage for an African to sympathize openly with Capricorn ideas, let alone accept Capricorn membership. Many Africans who were prepared to discuss federation were either "temporarily forced into

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[80] Interview with Gabriel Musumbulwa at Luanshya, 15 May, 1989.

[81] Interview with author, 15 May, 1989. Musumbulwa was one of the few Africans who accepted multi-racial politics. In 1957 he became a founding member of the Constitution Party. In 1958 he was appointed Minister of African Education, having been elected to the Legislative Council on a United Federal Party (UFP) ticket. Nonetheless, throughout the interview Musumbulwa carefully avoided discussing Capricorn, especially his role in it.

[82] W.K. Sikalumbi, <u>Before UNIP, A History</u>, (Lusaka, Neczam, 1978), p. 15.

oblivion" or left politics altogether. For example, A.B. Kazunga[83] and Thomas M.D. Mtine[84] were reported to have "insist[ed] that if federation proposals were to be rejected, they should be rejected on reasonable grounds."[85] Both men were members of Congress, though favourably disposed to the economic arguments of federation. Eventually they directed their energies into business and Mtine became the first Zambian indigenous millionaire. Small wonder that when Nkumbula wrote a circular letter[86] to several people asking them to confirm their membership in Capricorn and whether they were in favour of federation, he was flooded with letters denying such membership or preference for federation. The social and political cost of supporting federation was too high for most Africans.

L.B. Ng'ambi's letter to Nkumbula was characteristic of such disclaimers. He wrote:

> Nyirenda is proving to be a traitor to his own chieftainship and is also trying to damage other peoples names. TELL THE CAS THAT I AM NOT THEIR MEMBER AND SHOW THEM MY LETTER REFUTING THE STUPID ALLEGATION.[87]

Several other people who had recently held talks with Nyirenda took it upon themselves to "clear" themselves of the Capricorn stigma with the ANC president.

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[83] Kazunga was a trader, member of the Ndola Urban African Advisory Council and of the African Representative Council.

[84] Mtine was a book-keeper, member of the Ndola Urban Advisory Council's working committee on federation proposals and vice-chairman of the Ndola branch of the African General Workers Union.

[85] The Northern News, Friday, 24 August, 1951, p. 3.

[86] PA, ANC 7/83, Nkumbula's letter, 21 November, 1952.

[87] PA, ANC 7/83, L.B. Ng'ambi to Nkumbula, 26 November, 1952. Ng'ambi was a Headmaster at Upper Middle School in Mufulira (His capitalization).

Mansford B.C. Mussah said he had discussed federation with Nyirenda but strongly denied being a Capricorn member.[88]

Amidst these denials P. Chizuma and Frank Kaluwa, both known Capricorn members, were threatened with violence "with intent to murder."[89] The two lodged a complaint with the District Commissioner against the Munenga community for threatening them. Threats of this nature were not isolated incidents. Jeremiah Kabalata, a school teacher in Maramba Township in Livingstone, experienced similar threats for writing to the Livingstone Mail expressing support for the federal scheme.[90] His letter appeared in the paper on 15 August, 1952.

The Livingstone African Welfare Association took very strong exception to the contents of the letter and called a meeting on 8 October at which it was decided that if Kabalata was not dismissed from his teaching job, they would withdraw their children from the school. Things got out of hand when the District Commissioner told the meeting that he did not think Kabalata had committed any offense; he was merely expressing his personal views on the issue, which he thought they should have been doing. Some even went as far as suggesting that Kabalata was not a Northern Rhodesian, but an Angolan and should be deported. The District Commissioner then told the meeting that their threats "only showed why Africans were afraid to

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[88] PA, ANC 7/83 Mansford B.C. Mussah to Harry M. Nkumbula, 18 December, 1952. Mussah was a trader in the African township.

[89] PA, ANC 7/83, Letter to District Commissioner, Mazabuka, 4 March, 1953.

[90] NAZ, SEC 5/113 Closer Association: The Kabalata Affair, 1952.

speak their opinions."[91] The Kabalata Affair became so serious that police were deployed to patrol Maramba compound for a few days to maintain peace and order.

Then there was the case of Chief Musokotwane whose "misfortune" began on 19 August, 1952 when he travelled from his "palace" to Livingstone to pay his respects to the former British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. Attlee was on a tour of Central Africa to find out for himself African opinion on federation. It is not clear what Chief Musokotwane said during his meeting with Attlee. Afterwards when he travelled to Lusaka to attend a meeting organized by the Congress, he was assaulted for being in favour of federation after a session of the meeting addressed by Nkumbula. He was accused of being a member of the Capricorn Africa Society, which Nkumbula accused of being responsible "for spreading lies about intimidation."[92]

Chief Musokotwane was so shaken by the incident that when he was later interviewed by A. T. Williams (Native Affairs), he said Congress was using witchcraft on him. Consequently, on the advice of A.T. Williams the Colonial Office decided that the incident "was not good propaganda" from their point of view and Ministers were advised not to cite the incident in their public speeches.[93] In the end, the Colonial Office reduced the incident to acts of witchcraft. D. Williams of the Colonial Office, therefore, minuted on 13 September that "Chief Musokotwane far from having been beaten up for favouring federation was in all probability neither

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[91] NAZ SEC 5/113 Closer Association: The Kabalata Affair, 1952.

[92] Wood, The Welensky Papers, p. 298; NAZ, SEC 5/112/175/2 J. Lennon, District Officer in Charge to All Chiefs, 26 August, 1952.

[93] PRO, CO 1015/142/22 D. Williams to R.L.D. Jasper, 13 September, 1952.

beaten up nor in favour of federation."[94] There should be no mystery about the incident once it is realized that Congress had recently formed a Supreme Action Committee whose duties, among other things, was to "ridicule people who were lukewarm about federation."[95]

Nevertheless, reports of harassment and intimidation, amid accusations that some Africans had become agents paid by Capricorn to campaign for federation, could not be ignored by Colonial Office officials and politicians in London. James Johnson MP gave notice that he was going to ask the Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies on 29 October "if he was aware that CAS was paying 2s. 6d. to every African who signed a statement supporting federation." On receipt of the notice, the Colonial Secretary telegraphed the three governors in Central Africa on 23 October asking them to confirm whether they had any information on the allegation by 9.00 hours, on 27 October.[96] Governor Sir Gilbert Rennie telegraphed his reply to the Colonial Secretary on 25 October and said in part that:

> One person thought to be a representative of the Capricorn Africa Society has been discussing Federation with Africans in the Territory. He is reported to hold an honest belief in the advantages of Federation and he is trying to persuade his fellow Africans to accept it. I have no (repeat no) information about attempts to obtain signatures, or alleged payments to persons giving such signatures.[97]

The reply from Southern Rhodesia was brief, but pointed out that while ministers had found nothing to support the allegation, "if true, it was preferable to

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[94] PRO, CO 1015/142 Minute by D. Williams, 13 September, 1952.

[95] Sikalumbi, _Before UNIP_, p. 15.

[96] PRO, CO 1015/71/72 Telegram from Secretary of State to Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 23 October, 1952.

[97] PRO, CO 1015/71 Telegram from Governor Rennie to Colonial Secretary, 25 October, 1952.

intimidation." With this information, the Colonial Secretary accordingly dismissed the allegations during his reply in parliament. Nevertheless, the stigma remained, especially among Africans for whom Capricorn was a dirty word. Kenneth Kaunda was to remark many years later that "Capricorn was dirty because of the people using it."[98]

The Society's spread to Northern Rhodesia coincided with rumours about encounters with Vampire-men (*Amunyama*) who were allegedly involved in capturing people and sucking their blood until they were dead.[99] Reports about *Amunyama* had begun to appear in the press in late 1951 and continued in early 1952.[100] *"Acapricorn"* became synonymous with *Amunyama*, and an African was politically dead if identified with that term. Those Africans who were associated with Capricorn were considered to have been captured, but were turned loose to capture others for the European Vampire-men, otherwise why would they become members of Capricorn.[101]

The rumours that *"Acapricorn"* were Vampire-men spread like bush fires. They gained some "legitimacy" because for the first three years the Society's activities were shrouded in secrecy. Rumours were the single most effective propaganda against Capricorn. Africans became suspicious and impervious to liberal

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[98] Fergus MacPherson, Kaunda of Zambia: the Times and the Man, (Lusaka, Oxford University Press), 1974, p. 115.

[99] For a detailed discussion of Vampire-men see, Mwelwa C. Musambachime, "The Impact of Rumour: The Case of The Banyama (Vampire-men) Scare in Northern Rhodesia 1939-1964," The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 21, 2 (1988), pp. 201-215.

[100] The Northern News, 14, 18 December, 1951; 16, 23 January, 1952.

[101] Peter Frankel, Wayaleshi, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), p. 201.

ideas which Capricorn was trying to spread about the advantages of federation.[102] Coupled with this propaganda was the harassment of those who saw through the propaganda and decided to participate in the liberal cause. The effectiveness of these rumours, aided by intimidation tactics adopted by militant nationalists, resulted in most Africans remaining ignorant of the truth about Capricorn during this period.[103] Furthermore, the low level of education among most Africans made them easy targets for nationalist propaganda of the type discussed above.

African rejection of Capricorn was further strengthened because Africans wrongly identified people like Welensky and Huggins as Capricorn leaders. Sikalumbi, for example, wrongly identified Welensky as a founding leader of the Society.[104] Since Africans in the territory had long identified Welensky, leader of the settlers in the Legislative Council, as the main stumbling block to their political advancement, they could not imagine him supporting an organization which would be beneficial to Africans. The general idea of what the Society was and for what it stood was never correctly understood by most Africans. Evidently African suspicion and rejection of Capricorn was therefore not a response to and rejection of Capricorn ideology, but largely based on fear of the occult, or of harassment, or both.

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[102] NAZ, SEC 5/185/19/1 Godwin M. Lewanika's Address to The Central Africa Sub-Group of the Conservative Commonwealth Council, Wednesday, 1 August, 1956.

[103] I found during my fieldwork in Zambia in 1989 that many politically active Zambians were still reluctant to discuss Capricorn openly. For many, their evidence was heavily clouded with the Amunyama stories. Terence Ranger, who was briefly a member of CAS, thought "there was not much point in researching Capricorn . . ." Personal communication, 3 January, 1989 (erroneously dated 1988).

[104] Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 14.

Capricorn and Capitalist Interest.

Thus far this examination of Capricorn has illustrated the Society's commitment to the individual within the collective. While its political philosophy did not neatly conform to the classical meaning of liberalism as known in Europe, at the economic level Capricorn sought to defend the freedom of capital and laissez-faire economics. Capricorn believed in the ideals of free enterprise and its economic policy was formulated with that object in mind. The founders of Capricorn were generally well-placed Europeans "linked to the political and financial elites in London," who hoped to attract North American endorsement of the federal scheme. The Society felt that "it was possible to reconcile economic development and the proper trusteeship of Native interests."[105] Among the founders were people who did not like the way the settler colony was being administered. John Baines, for example, had founded an investment company and decided to join Capricorn because its economic agenda was attractive——it made good business sense in terms of the long term interests of "enlightened" entrepreneurs. People like Baines felt that the settler population was holding on to discriminatory policies of the pre-war era and had failed "to see the enormous economic potential of the African as a wage-earner and a consumer."[106]

The Society's economic agenda was particularly attractive to mining interests in Northern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST), a mining subsidiary of the American Metal Climax was particularly supportive of Capricorn. Sir William

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[105] Ian R. Hancock, White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953-1980, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 30.

[106] Hancock, White Liberals, pp. 30-31.

Murphy, who sat on the Board of the RST was a member of Capricorn. Sir Ronald L. Prain, chairman of RST used his position to arrange several anonymous financial contributions to further the activities of the Society. In 1952, for example, he gave Capricorn £1,000 on condition that his name was not mentioned.[107]

Why did business concerns find it attractive to support Capricorn financially? Capricorn played an important role in the racially polarized geopolitical economy of Central Africa. The mining companies believed that the Society's liberal program would have a mollifying effect on the radicalised African mine workers who had begun to challenge the colour bar seriously in the industry through strike action.[108] Both the colonial state and the mining companies could no longer ignore the question of African advancement on the mines. Capricorn therefore was seen as the only opportunity there was "of pre-empting opposition by reconciling the black middle class" with their white counterparts in the post-World War II period. In the words of Parpart, "the mining companies planned to neutralize labour protests ... by among other things counting on the growing support among liberal whites and Northern Rhodesian Government officials for the establishment of a black middle class."[109]

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[107] CAS Papers, File No. 12, Stirling to Arthur Stokes, 8 December, 1953.

[108] For details see Ian Henderson, "Wage-Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa: The Case of the Copperbelt," African Affairs, 72, 287 (1973), pp. 288-299; and also his "The Limits of Colonial Power: Race and Labour Problems in Colonial Zambia, 1900-1953," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2, 3 (May 1974), pp. 294-307.

[109] Jane L. Parpart, Labour And Capital on the African Copperbelt, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1983), p. 137.

Capricorn was also attractive to mining interests in Northern Rhodesia because of its support for the principle of equal pay for equal work. Capricorn favoured ending job reservation by skin colour——a principle which was too expensive for the mine owners. Ending the colour bar would have given mine owners greater flexibility in recruitment and would have inevitably led to a reduction in wage levels. In fact, this policy became one of the pillars of mine management's labour strategies in the 1950s.

Conclusion.

During the period 1949-1953 Capricorn gained valuable support among some Colonial Office officials. It was in the limelight in Central Africa. The three men, Stirling, Huggins and Welensky, had a common objective——the establishment of a federation in Africa. Capricorn's support for federation was obviously appreciated both in Central Africa and London.

The influence of Capricorn on the Southern Rhodesian referendum for federation is not easy to assess. It is equally hard to ascertain the Society's exact contribution towards the creation of the Central African Federation. One thing is certain, however. The Society's efforts cannot be ignored. Although the final decision lay with the United Kingdom Government, it cannot be denied that Capricorn put great energy into the campaign. The establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 should be seen as a collaborative effort of those who actively participated in the debates leading to its creation.

The establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in August 1953 marked the end of the first phase of the Society's history. Although Federation was a reality, partnership was yet to be effected. The Society's own philosophy of

"equal rights for all civilized men" was still not being taken seriously. The white ideology of white supremacy was still dominant in the minds of many whites. Yet the experience of campaigning for the federation and people's attitude towards Capricorn during the past three years taught Capricorn officials many valuable lessons. The experience was translated in the efforts to change the Society's policy in the period after 1953.

Hitherto Capricorn had remained essentially a Southern Rhodesia movement, occasionally sending emissaries to the north to campaign for Federation. The results had not been impressive. There was thus a need to review past policies to make the Society more effective. From 1954 therefore, Capricorn embarked on new course of action designed to strengthen liberal activism in the Federation by forming strong local branches.

CHAPTER FOUR.

THE CAPRICORN AFRICA SOCIETY AND NORTHERN RHODESIAN LIBERAL POLITICS: 1954-1961.

Our country, Padre, is faced with very difficult problems. In a way they are not peculiar to ourselves, but the point is a solution must be found to this peculiar problem and that is why I take a genuine interest in trying to meet you and others like you so that through discussion and mutual exchange of ideas we might find a way out of our present difficulties. As things are, *we all live in one and the same country, but entirely un- understanding of each other's point of view.*
I would be the last to disagree with what you said to me during one of those visits you paid me in prison, that there is a danger in an African nationalist leader of my standing being called all sorts of names if he frequently met Europeans. This is very true and yet I sincerely believe that it is essential for me at least to get to know what it is that is responsible for this sad state of affairs in this country. I believe too that one of the ways of getting a lasting solution is by this free exchange of ideas ... I do wish to know quite frankly what there is to fear where Europeans are concerned, in establishing constitutional democracy in this country.[1]

Kaunda's dilemma expressed in his words quoted above was also Capricorn's

dilemma, though for different reasons. The Capricorn Africa Society wanted to win

over the emergent moderate African elite to the grand political design of the

1950s——multi-racialism, which the British conceived as the panacea for all their

problems in East and Central Africa. Though elements of multi-racialism already

existed among Africans in Northern Rhodesia as early as 1946 when the African

Representative Council (ARC) was established, there was very little dialogue

between Africans and liberal Europeans. The Society's role in the campaign for

Federation had made it extremely unpopular among Africans. Since the success of

the multi-racial panacea depended on the willingness of the African educated elite

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[1] NAZ, HM 53/6 Kenneth D. Kaunda to E.G. Nightingale, Member of the Legco nominated to represent African interests, 18 February, 1954 (Italics added).

to participate in multi-racial party politics, it was imperative that Capricorn should

yield gracefully to non-white pressure and drop its original ideas.[2]

Two themes, therefore, dominated the Society's activities during the period

1954 to 1957. First, Capricorn engaged itself in a process of rethinking its ideas and

principles. This process culminated in the Salima Convention of 1956. Secondly,

after the Salima Convention, Capricorn moved into its next stage which was

characterized by the establishment of two branches in Northern Rhodesia and the

formation of the Constitution Party in 1957. Both developments were aimed at

publicizing the Capricorn philosophy to increase African involvement in the liberal

cause. It is necessary therefore, to examine the significance of this change of policy

to explain the emergence of Capricorn's liberal activism in Northern Rhodesia.

"Colour-conscious" African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia made a certain impact

on Capricorn, and was simultaneously affected by Capricorn liberal philosophy.

Capricorn Africa Society and the Federal Government.

Before discussing the rethinking which preoccupied the Society for nearly two

years after 1953, an understanding of the position of Capricorn in the federation is

essential. Once federation became a reality Capricorn looked forward to a period

of cooperation between itself on the one hand and the Federal Government on the

other. In this respect David Stirling urged Welensky:

> I do hope now that Federation is in the process of consolidation, you
> will feel that our Society can be of real value to you, in achieving our
> long-range objectives in Africa which I am convinced we all share.
> Looking back on last year, I feel that the activities of our Society and
> particularly myself ...must have exasperated you with our apparent

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[2] See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of
Capricorn original ideas and policies.

deviation from taking first things first, at a time when you felt that federation was the first thing of the moment ... But from now on, I really hope that you will regard us as your potential agents working in a dimension which would be dangerous for you to work in as a political leader.[3]

Yet, things did not work out as expected for Capricorn. The Federal Government was uncomfortable about associating itself with the Society too much at this stage. Capricorn's support for federation had made it unpopular among Africans. Welensky and other federal leaders were anxious to gain African confidence and did not think continued flirtations with Capricorn would help.

Under these circumstances Capricorn began to rethink its position, ideology and the role it was to play in the federation. During the first period, preceding and including 1953, Capricorn had remained essentially a Southern Rhodesian organization, occasionally sending emissaries to the north to campaign for federation. It had no branches in Northern Rhodesia, even though the Society was already part of the political vocabulary among Africans and non-Africans alike——for Africans in an increasingly pejorative way. Part of Capricorn's response therefore, was to open branches in the north as well as to recruit more members from all races. Capricorn also sought ways of removing the negative image it had acquired during the campaign for the Central African Federation.

On 26 February, 1954 Capricorn placed advertisements in leading newspapers of East and Central Africa explaining its new ideology and its intention to recruit up to 100,000 members.[4] According to Tafataona Mahoso, the 1954 Manifesto was basically a documentation of the general principles and assumptions which had

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[3] CAS Papers. File No. 10, Letter from David Stirling to Roy Welensky, 16 September, 1953.

[4] Rhodesia Herald, 26 February, 1954, p. 5.

guided Capricorn since 1949.[5] Nonetheless, the Manifesto was also a means of guiding and gathering new ideas from those who were provoked into discussion. The aim was to build a platform for the 1956 convention.

The Capricorn Manifesto superseded the Salisbury Declarations[6] as the Society's policy statement. While the Salisbury Declarations had emphasised two things: (a) that the attainment of administrative and economic unity between British Capricorn African territories in some form of political federation could and should precede the achievement of unity and integration between the races within each separate territory; and (b) that the effective support of European political leaders in Africa could precede the widespread backing of the rank and file of all races for the aims of the Society,[7] the Manifesto emphasized striving for multi-racial liberal partnership between the races within each territory as more important than the success of the federation.[8] Now Capricorn wanted to consolidate partnership in the individual territories before striving for a larger political unity. The Society observed that Africa was suffering from deep wounds inflicted by fear and mistrust between races. It therefore saw an urgent need for the development and nurturing of a new

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[5] Tafataona Pasipaipa Mahoso, "Between Two Nationalisms: A Study in Liberal Activism And Western Domination, Zimbabwe, 1920 to 1980," Ph.D. Thesis, Temple University, 1987, p. 191.

[6] See Appendix IV for details of the Salisbury Declarations.

[7] The Capricorn Africa Society Handbook for Speakers, Salisbury, 1955, A 10. Capricorn further stated that the main difference between the Capricorn Declarations published by the Society in December 1952 during the early stages of negotiations for Central African Federation, and the Manifesto published in February 1954, was that the former was an interim statement, whereas the Manifesto laid down the working principles adopted by the Society as the basis of its doctrine.

[8] Rhodesia Herald, 26 February, 1954, p. 5.

spirit in the form of a patriotism stronger than racial or any other loyalty. While Capricorn still believed in the larger federation of East and Central Africa as the ultimate objective, it now proposed to work for the improvement of race relations in the individual territories as the immediate goal.

The Manifesto suggested that Africans and Europeans were members of one body and therefore racial co-operation should have been a natural process. Capricorn now chose as its crest a zebra on the map of Africa and argued that although a zebra had black, brown and white stripes, it was one animal. If the zebra was pierced to the heart it would die irrespective of the stripe through which it was stabbed. Capricorn sought to build the image of the multi-racial society as nevertheless a single organic community in which each race depended on the other for life. In the past Capricorn had been:

> ... content merely to distinguish between an emerging urban elite and the rural peasantry, and to declare themselves for accepting the one and protecting the other, the Manifesto called for positive efforts to encourage and enlist those Africans considered suitable for membership of a multi-racial society.[9]

The idea that Africans and Europeans were members of the same body was not original, at least in the Northern Rhodesian context. As far back as 1946 Moses Mubitana had stated during the first session of the African Representative Council meeting that Africans and Europeans were members of the same body (N.R.) and "that each part of the body, even the simplest, has a little contribution to give for the prosperity of the whole body."[10]

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[9] Ian R. Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia," Rhodesia History, 9 (1978), p. 48.

[10] NAZ, NR/ARC, The Proceedings of the First Session of the Council, November, 1946.

Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika, then president of the Northern Rhodesia

Congress, expressed the same idea of society as an organic whole in 1950:

> The Motto of Congress is now 'Eendrag' (Unity Through Team Work). We not mean unity only amongst the Africans themselves, but also unity with European settlers, Indian settlers, and Euro-Africans for the benefit of Northern Rhodesia. Experience has taught us that Northern Rhodesia will never go forward with other progressive countries if we are divided and suspicious of one another.[11]

Thus, it was not only individual Africans who subscribed to the ideology of multi-

racialism, but the Northern Rhodesia Congress as well. The significance of the

proposals in the Manifesto lie in the fact that they represented a major shift in policy

by the Society, which reflected the ability and flexibility of Capricorn to adapt to the

changing political circumstances, and not "inconsistency of policy."[12] The original

Capricorn philosophy had reflected the colonial social ideology in which the upper

rungs of society were reserved racially for the white community. Now Capricorn was

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[11] NAZ, HM 53/1/63/2 Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika to Reverend E.G. Nightingale, 8 January, 1950. It is interesting to note that the Africa National Congress chose an Afrikaans word—"Eendrag"—for its motto.

[12] Clyde Sanger, Central African Emergency, (London, Heinemann, 1960), p. 100. Sanger added that "in 1950 David Stirling was co-author of the pamphlet 'A Native Policy for Africa' with N.H. Wilson, who later became secretary of the Dominion Party and then resigned even from that reactionary body in protest at what he considered its 'middle-of-the-road' views. The sentiments expressed in the pamphlet could hardly be called liberal: it urged the Southern Rhodesian Government to raise its franchise qualifications, and applauded its 'two-pyramid' policy of separate development. Stirling once favoured a federation of all six territories of East and Central Africa, but later became one of the most energetic advocates of the present federation, exercising particular influence, it is said, on Attlee's thinking. Finally, seeing the strength of African opposition, he switched his views again and came out against compulsory federation for Africans."

prepared to open the upper rungs of the colonial society to "civilized" members of the black race.

The experience of the campaign for the Central African Federation and the fact that Africans were more than ever before determined to fight against federation influenced Capricorn to review and change its philosophical approach to the political problems confronting Central Africa. Now the Society believed that what Capricorn Africa needed most was "not discussion in political terms of any wider federation but closer understanding on human terms between Africa's different races...."[13] That same experience taught Capricorn that there would be no racial harmony in a wider federation founded on "grounds of economic or administrative expediency" alone. The Society was now convinced that its new role would be to arouse an irresistible weight of multi-racial public opinion which would in turn gradually lead to a natural desire for closer union between those territories which would have adopted the new Capricorn order of common citizenship.

The new policy was founded on two closely related assumptions. The first was that to have political stability, priority should be given to the creation of a common patriotism and the establishment of a society in which there was no discrimination on racial grounds, where opportunity was open to all and where human capacity and merit were the only criteria for responsible participation in public affairs. The second assumption was that although in multi-racial territories all development depended on the interaction of an advanced civilization and one that was less advanced, there was nevertheless, need to maintain "civilized" standards in Capricorn

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[13] The CAS Handbook, A 10, Extract from the Manifesto.

Africa.[14] These assumptions formed the basis of the Society's activities for the next five years.

Although the announcement of the new policy was not followed by much positive response from the public, the first Federal Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, gave the new policy a guarded approval in The Times when he said:

> The general idea behind CAS is an ideal that few could object to. It deals however, with subjects that have been a live issue for years in multi-racial countries, and will only be solved by evolutionary development.[15]

Roy Welensky was somewhat more supportive of the new policy because it came close to the partnership policy. He was quoted in the Rhodesia Herald as having said:

> In my opinion the objects of CAS are worthy of the support of all of us who are anxious to find a solution to the racial problem of our Federation. They are in short, the fulfilment of the principles embodied in the preamble of the constitution, the preservation of and advance of western standards of civilization and culture, and the achievement of a common citizenship by those who can bear the attendant responsibilities.[16]

However, the positive attitude adopted by Huggins and Welensky towards the new Capricorn policy was undermined by opposition from within the Society, championed by one of the veteran members, N.H. Wilson.[17] On 27 February Wilson published

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[14] The CAS Handbook, Ibid.. Capricorn defined civilization in terms of European norms and values which Africans were expected to acquire through education.

[15] CAS Papers, File No. 69, cited from The Times, 4 March, 1954.

[16] CAS Papers. File No. 69, cited from The Rhodesia Herald, 12 March, 1954.

[17] CAS Papers File No. 69, David Stirling to F.S. Joelson, 22 March, 1954. Stirling enclosed a summary of extracts from statements made by various political leaders in East and Central Africa, as well as the exchange of letters between N.H. Wilson and Capricorn in the Rhodesia Herald.

a number of charges in the Rhodesia Herald. He alleged that the text of the new Capricorn policy had not been communicated to or approved by the Society. Wilson claimed that the new policy was essentially a one man show by David Stirling. In protest, Wilson resigned from the Society.[18] By the end of March, Stirling was worried by the number of hostile press reports. He wrote to Jack A. Couldry that the Society was running into opposition initiated by Wilson, whom he described as the "old rogue ...doing his utmost to sabotage the Society."[19]

In reality, Wilson's departure from Capricorn was an opportinity for Stirling. On 28 September 1953, he had written to Arthur Stokes that while he did not wish to hurt "the old boy's feelings" in view of his "immense contributions" in the past, he hoped Wilson would leave Capricorn because of his association with the White supremacist Confederate Party.[20]

The Society minimized the negative publicity by deliberately playing down the press. There is no doubt however, that the new policy was launched at an inopportune moment in the history of Central Africa. In Northern Rhodesia especially, nationalists were becoming more militant and anti-European than ever before. The Society therefore now sought to deal with these problems by consolidating itself in the Rhodesias. The process of consolidation was, however, preceded by a two-year period in which a new philosophy enshrined in the Capricorn Contract was developed.

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[18] Rhodesia Herald, 27 February, 1954, p. 4.

[19] CAS Papers, File No. 12/73 David Stirling to Jack A Couldry, 5 April, 1954.

[20] CAS Papers, File No. 51, David Stirling to Arthur Stokes, 28 September, 1953.

This process of consolidation was undermined further by staff resignations from the Society's administrative body, the Executive Council. J.G.M. Bernard, a former secretary of Huggins' United Party, who had joined the Executive of Capricorn's Central African Branch on its formation in 1954, resigned because he saw the new platform as "utterly unrealistic" in its basic assumption that the educated African represented his "primitive brethren."[21] Colonel A.S. Hickman, former Commissioner of the British South Africa Police, who had become Southern Rhodesia chairperson of Capricorn in August 1956 indicated his intention to resign in January 1957. Meanwhile, K. L. Stevens who had taken over as Executive officer for Southern Rhodesia on October 1, 1956 was to end his duties officially on December 31, 1956. Hickman said that while he completely endorsed the principles and ideas of the Society, and would remain a private member, he felt obliged to resign from differences of opinion with the president about administration.[22]

Although these resignations were immediately followed by recruitment of new members who saw a viable role for Capricorn, David Stirling's tour of Northern Rhodesia was affected. Dorothy Lehmann of the International Missionary Council in Kitwe wrote that "quite a few Europeans are attracted to Capricorn."[23] Lehmann pointed out that:

> The African side is rather terrorized by a few Congress leaders who wrote to the press that they were going to blacklist all who attended Capricorn meetings and that threat was published.[24]

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[21] Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society," p. 49.

[22] The Northern News, 1 January, 1957.

[23] Zimbabwe National Archives (Zimb. N. A.), S/EQ 84, Dorothy Lehmann to Gibson, 25 March, 1956.

[24] Zimb. N. A., S/EQ 84 Dorothy Lehmann to Gibson, 25 March, 1956.

These threats, coupled with the image Africans held of Capricorn as not only pro-federation but its association with "Vampire Men" stories, militated against recruitment of any significant numbers of Africans.

The Salima Convention: 1956.

Preparations for the June 1956 convention began soon after the February announcement of the new policy. According to Stirling, the main purpose of the convention was to establish a common ideology for all races of Capricorn Africa. The Society wanted to hold the convention earlier to remove, completely, the slander and "confirm with British public opinion that the settler is a worthy vehicle of responsibility in Africa."[25] This was not a new vision, especially in Northern Rhodesia where, as far back as 1945, settlers had already recognized that their interests and those of the Africans were interlocked.[26] Now Capricorn wanted to demonstrate its own support for racial co-operation publicly, while simultaneously defending European "civilization" in Capricorn Africa.

Initially the convention was scheduled to take place in mid-1954 at Mbeya. Mbeya was chosen for two reasons:

(a)   Capricorn felt that it should create its own atmosphere rather than risk their multi-racial delegates, observers and the World Press representatives being subjected to the racial atmosphere of one of Africa's big towns;

(b)   Mbeya's central position would have enabled some delegates to arrive by car from either Central Africa or East Africa. The centrality of Mbeya

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[25] CAS Papers. File No. 1, "Note on the Capricorn Africa Society", n.d.

[26] NAZ, SEC 5/441 Race Relations: Paramountcy and Partnership, 1949-57.

would also have allowed a fair division of travelling costs which would have been incurred by delegates and observers.[27]

About 100 delegates from all the races in each of the six territories were expected to attend the convention at which the Society was to present its new philosophy. The convention was also expected to draw up specific qualifications for citizenship; make recommendations to the governments concerned about the logistics of common citizenship; propose the adoption of a loyalty code to which all citizens and aspirants to citizenship would subject themselves; and to consider what further active steps were to be taken to achieve its aims and objects.[28]

The preparatory work was done through a network of citizenship committees which were established in 1954 in all the territories where the Society operated. According to The Capricorn Handbook, the programme and organization of the citizenship committees was as follows:

> 1955. Stage 1. Preparation. Examination and discussion of subject. Research into and study of all relevant precedents.
>
> November, 1955. Stage 2. Formulation. Translation of findings during study period into practical documentation form.
>
> Early 1956. Stage 3. Action. Ratification of the citizenship committees' findings at regional congresses. Appointment of delegates to the convention.
>
> June 1956. Stage 4. Dedication. Final fusing of all regional congress conclusions. Dedication of the Capricorn citizenship document at the Mbeya convention.[29]

While each committee was autonomous, the president's office which was "in constant contact with the Society's consultants," was the digestive organ for the various committees' findings. The consultants included J. H. Oldham, who was based in

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[27] The Capricorn Handbook, A. 8.

[28] Sondashi, "The Politics of the Voice," p. 57.

[29] The Capricorn Handbook, C. 2.

London, and Sir R. L. Prain of the Rhodesia Selection Trust. Seven such committees became operational in Central Africa alone.[30]   In Northern Rhodesia the committees were most active on the Copperbelt.   Members of the Copperbelt citizenship committees included R. Banda (African Contractor), Gabriel Musumbulwa (Senior Clerk, Roan Antelope Consolidated Mines (R.A.C.M.)), T. Mzumara (Senior Clerk, R.A.C.M.), C. Mhone (Senior Clerk, R.A.C.M.), S. Mulenga (Teacher), Thomas Mtine (Store Manager) and Mukhalo (Welfare Office).[31]   These Africans were also members of the Urban Advisory Councils and the African National Congress. They represented the politically active class of the time. These African members of the citizenship committees worked side-by-side with their European counterparts. They discussed and drafted versions of the Contract which were submitted to the Salisbury office.

The minutes of the various citizenship committees were sent to Salisbury to be digested and coordinated.[32]   This procedure was designed to ensure a final product which was uniform and one with which every citizenship committee felt associated.   Capricorn envisaged the creation of a Citizenship Document to be enacted as the Capricorn Citizenship Bill by governments in Capricorn Africa. The

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[30] The exact number of these committees is not known. According to Hancock, there were nine citizenship committees in Southern Rhodesia alone.

[31] CAS Papers, File No. 48/39; No. 48/40 I.R. Menzies to David Stirling, 24 November, 1955.

[32] I was unable to examine these documents because of the difficult regulations regarding permission to conduct research in Zimbabwe where these documents are located. It has not been possible to establish the exact numbers of these committees and the ratio of Africans to that of Europeans. However, since there were more European Capricorn members than there were African members, it is plausible to suggest that Europeans were a majority in these committees.

Citizenship Document was meant to provide a statement of the Society's political philosophy applicable to all Capricorn Africa. The Capricorn Citizenship Bill in each territory would have translated the Citizenship Document into a form suitable for legislation. The Bills were expected to conform to the basic tenets of the Document, while meeting the special constitutional circumstances of the individual territories.

The work of the committees extended into a two year period. Differences of opinion were ironed out, leading to ten different drafts produced before the Convention.[33] By the time of the convention the London committee was still working on its draft Citizenship Document.

According to Stirling, both the Secretary of State, Lennox-Boyd, and the Minister of State, John Hare, were supportive of the Society's planned convention. The evidence suggests that Stirling was right. Gorrell Barnes, head of the Africa Division of the Colonial Office, recommended to the Acting Governor of Nyasaland that permission should be given to Capricorn to hold its convention at Salima.[34]

Finally, after a change of venue, the Convention was held at Salima on the shores of Lake Nyasa from 15 to 19 June, 1956. Capricorn received an anonymous donation of £10,000 to help pay the Salima expenses. David Stirling's brother, Bill, provided a clerk of works to help the Society in setting up the camp. Some 138 delegates and 28 observers met to ratify the Contract and endorse the work of the Citizenship Committees. Table IV gives a breakdown of the delegates by race and country of origin.

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[33] CAS Papers, File No. 16, David Stirling, The CAS: A Commentary, (n.d.), p. 7.

[34] CAS Papers, File No. 48/114, David Stirling to Peter Mackay, copied to Michael Wood, Major R. E. Kendall Ward and Dr. J. H. Oldham, 28 March, 1956.

TABLE IV
Delegates to the Salima Convention by race and country.

COUNTRY	NUMBER					TOTAL
	White	Black	Asian	Coloured	Other	
Southern Rhodesia	26	28	4	2	1	61
Northern Rhodesia	8	7	2	-	-	17[35]
Nyasaland	6	3	-	-	-	9
Tanganyika	4	2	-	-	-	6
Kenya	23	11	8	-	-	42
England	3	-	-	-	-	3
TOTAL	70	51	14	2	1	138

Source: Sondashi, "The Politics of the Voice," p.230.

The organization of the convention was described as superb and an achievement in itself. As Reverend Fred Rea observed a few years later:

> Those who took part in the Salima Convention will recall that most of the thinking was already completed beforehand and that much of the significance of the Convention lay in its symbolic significance. The fact that Africans and Europeans could meet and live together and the fact that they could reach agreement on certain basic principles was itself at that time a justification for holding such an event. In spite of subsequent failings, Salima did make a very important contribution towards the political conversation of Central Africa.[36]

Yet, the success of the Convention was seriously undermined by prejudice and suspicion of the Society's intentions. C. W. M. Gell wrote in the Concord that:

> Of course, the delegates to the Convention of CAS *represented no one but themselves.* The Society has at present only some 4,500 members scattered throughout the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Tanganyika and Kenya. *But many of these are influential people in their communities. And in any case, a cohesive pressure group working for*

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[35] The Northern Rhodesian delegation consisted of Dr. Charles Fisher, E. Chitalu (Clerk), A. Fieldman (Mine Captain), H. A. Jones (Farmer), H. T. Kirk (Clerk of Works), D. Lapukeni (Teacher), M. Numa (Clerk), G. Mkechi (Clerk), G. Naik (Businessman), Edina Kirk (Secretary), Major W. J. Donnely (Chairman of Silicosis Compensation Board), S. B. Kayabala (Clerk), Mukhalo (Welfare Officer), A. F. Reid (Resident Engineer), N. Hunt (Architect) and Thomas Mtine (Store Manager). (CAS Papers, File No.98, cited in East Africa and Rhodesia, 12 July, 1956).

[36] CAS Papers, File No. 107, Rev. Fred Rea to Capricorn friends, 23 September, 1960.

certain basic principles and a common plan can achieve surprising results
in a continent as fluid as Africa is today.[37]

Critics argued that delegates to the convention were "hand picked by Stirling and his friends" and that the Contract itself was not really the work of the Citizenship Committees.[38]

Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt felt that unless African nationalist leaders participated "at the Capricorn Convention and agreed to what [was] put in the charter" it would not be acceptable to the majority.[39] Yet the search for "pigmentational self-determination"[40] prevented African nationalists from participating in Capricorn ventures. Since Capricorn was opposed to this racial ideology of Africa for the Africans (black Africans, not white Africans), there was no meeting point between the two. As Jeannine Scott put it, the convention was "certainly not open" to "extremist black racialists any more than to their white counterparts."[41]

Despite the controversy as to who the author(s)[42] of the Contract was (were),

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[37] CAS Papers, File No. 1, Concord, October, 1956 (Italics added).

[38] Sondashi, "The Politics of the Voice," p. 58.

[39] CAS Papers, File No. 77, Letter to the Spectator, 6 April, 1956.

[40] Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p. 14.

[41] CAS Papers, File No. 77, Letter to the Spectator, 20 April, 1956.

[42] Sondashi argues that "most of the work, if not all of the work, was done by Dr. Oldham and his associates at Dunford, not in Africa." Yet minutes of the General Council Meeting held on Sunday 22 January 1961 at Limuru, Kenya indicate very clearly that multi-racial citizenship committees did exist and discussed draft versions of the contract. But

and the controversy over the composition and status of those who ratified it, the Contract was nevertheless regarded as the real achievement of the convention.[43] The signatories, including Africans, pledged themselves to work for racial harmony based on one citizenship and one patriotism. They agreed to work towards a written constitution founded on a common roll, a qualified franchise, the rule of law and the protection of human and individual rights, and they also pledged to work for public and official acceptance of the Contract's principles.

What was the Capricorn Contract? The Nyasaland Times of Tuesday 19 June, 1956 described it as "a moving document that was a mixture of vision and hard headed realism, a document that might rank as the United Nations Charter for Southern Africa or become merely another symbol of frustration in the continent."[44] The Contract invoked passions for its adoption by some and unqualified denunciation from other sections of the community.

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the meeting noted that African participation was not as large as expected. CAS Papers, File No. 19, Minutes of the General Council Meeting held on 22 January, 1961 at Limuru, Kenya, p. 15.

[43] Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society," p. 53. In fact Clyde Sanger pointed out that "the Salima convention received an almost unanimously favourable press and the Contract was frequently compared to the Jefferson's (sic) Bill of Rights." (Clyde Sanger, The Central African Emergency, p. 102.)

[44] Cited from Sondashi, "The Politics of the Voice," p.61. According to Susan Wood, a third generation in her family to live in Africa, and one of the five keynote speakers at the convention, "the Capricorn Contract offered the European the chance to live within his ethic while giving him the opportunity to have the freedom of the individual and responsibility to one's neighbour. The Contract ensured that all enjoyed the security of knowing that the task of preserving the standards of civilization was a combined effort by both the European and the African." (PA, ANC 7/83, Keynote Speech by Susan Wood, 16 June 1956, Salima.) For details of the Contract, see Appendix.

The Contract was divided into two main parts. Part One set out the Society's declarations of faith in a series of basic principles and precepts. Part Two consisted of a series of provisions on subjects which Capricorn considered crucial in the relationship between the races——the electoral system, land reform, labour relations, education and immigration.

The precepts were not as controversial as the provisions. They were nevertheless, criticized for being too formal and old-fashioned because they stressed rights, duties, standards and equality before God and the law. Africans were particularly suspicious of Capricorn's image of a society free from racial discrimination. The whole issue of discrimination was always contentious. In theory Capricorn was opposed to discrimination solely because of colour. In practice, Capricorn favoured a "behaviour and manners bar" in place of the colour bar in all public places.[45] Because the "behaviour and manners bar" was closely linked to "civilized" standards which were in turn closely associated with norms of the white race, especially of the middle class, African nationalists argued that the "behaviour and manners bar" was really colour bar in different clothing. These concerns were not always without foundation. While ostensibly a bar to enforce middle class behaviour, colour rather than class seems to have been the deciding factor defining "civilized behaviour." According to Sondashi, Africans on the Copperbelt had long witnessed cases where a European who was dead drunk and vomiting was admitted into a hotel, while a sober African was turned away.[46] Presumably what Africans

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[45] On the development of colour bar in Northern Rhodesia, see R.L. Prain, "The Problem of African Advancement on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia," African Affairs, 53, 211 (April 1954), pp. 91-103.

[46] Sondashi, "Politics of the Voice," p. 62.

feared was that the code would be enforced rigidly against Africans and not enforced at all against Europeans.

Similarly, Capricorn's suggestion that cinemas should replace the colour bar with a "cost bar," while swimming pools replaced the colour bar with a "hygiene and health bar" was equally criticized. Often, the practical application of these "Capricorn bars" would have confirmed the colour bar. In the end, therefore, such precepts were seen as maintaining disguised racial discrimination in non-racist language.

The most important, and perhaps the most controversial part of the Contract was the electoral system. Above all Capricorn believed that loyalty to the country must be placed before loyalty to race (or tribe) if the country was to reach nationhood without destroying itself through racial (or ethnic) prejudice. For a long time in Central Africa, the franchise had been the stumbling block to the attainment of a multi-racial political system in which all races participated as equals. In Southern Rhodesia, for example, franchise qualifications were continually raised when Africans showed signs of qualifying in any significant numbers. Thus in practice, the Southern Rhodesian common voters roll ensured that the Whites remained in power.

The Northern Rhodesian franchise law since 1924 had been designed virtually to keep out Africans.[47] The settler community had steadily gained political control in the Legco and ensured that no constitutional changes were effected which could lessen their political power. The franchise law for election to the Federal Assembly was modelled on the Southern Rhodesian system. The right to vote was based on property, income and educational qualifications. The special arrangements for

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[47] See Chapter Two for details.

electing Africans from Northern Rhodesia to the Federal Assembly did very little to check the political influence of the settlers.

Capricorn held the view that the ultimate objective was the establishment of an electoral system in which members of all races who had the necessary qualifications as laid down in the law would be entitled to vote on a common electoral roll. Capricorn believed that only such a system could ensure the expression of a common patriotism. According to Capricorn, separate representation, as existed in Northern Rhodesia, implied that one roll would be elevated above the other, and consequently, it would dominate the one below it.[48] Capricorn further argued that separate electoral rolls by race did not leave enough room for a natural shift in power in response to changing circumstances. Under such an arrangement, a community which was in power would refuse to surrender its dominance when circumstances changed.

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[48] In fact, Godwin M. Lewanika had already articulated these views in his letter to the four Legco members representing African interests when he said, "you may be surprised that I view racial representation as a danger. I do not see a happy future in this system, for Africans or the country as a whole. The only sound basis for harmony in the future is the Common Voters' Roll, and all (sic) Africans with the means able to qualify. Racial representation undermines partnership. It perpetuates racial division and so is responsible for disunity. Unintentionally, it gives one race dominance over the others, on account of the ability and experience of its members in addition to its overwhelming majority in the Legco, and on the other hand it creates ill-feeling and bitterness. in the minds of members of the dominated races on account of the constant defeat of their motions in the Legco and the limitations of their political advance as a separate racial group." (NAZ, HM 53/5, Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika to J.S. Moffat, Dauti Yamba, Reverend E.G. Nightingale and Paskale Sokota, 7 September, 1953.

Capricorn therefore worked out an alternative electoral multiple voting system which was a restricted form of qualitative franchise. Members of all races were to be admitted if they possessed certain specified qualifications. The Contract read:

> We affirm our belief in a common voters' roll as the last means of promoting political stability among different races. And we are convinced that if voting is to be fair, it must be by secret ballot. We accept the principle that it shall be possible for more than one vote. In reaching this decision we have been guided by the following considerations:
>
> (a) If the vote is not a right open to everyone but a responsibility of those who have shown themselves fit for it, there must be degrees of fitness among those who have earned the privilege. To recognize these degrees was to give weight to individual accomplishment and sound judgement.
>
> (b) Members of the African community are at different stages in the transition from a static communal society to a state based on an economy and social structure in which the individual is the vital unity.
>
> (c) It was possible by means of the multiple vote to establish the franchise on a basis wider than that of property and education, and to give weight in public life to a variety of qualifications and achievements which were claimed to be of value to the state.[49]

Based on these considerations, the authors of the Contract proceeded to outline a multiple voting system whose qualifications were originally set out as follows:

1. Basic requirements for registration:

   (a) Be a citizen of the territory

   (b) Be aged 21 or over

   (c) Have been resident within the territory for a period of 2 years and within the constituency for 3 months immediately before registration

   (d) Have taken the oath of Allegiance and capable of understanding its obligations.

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[49] CAS Papers, File No. 16, Capricorn Convention, 16-18 June, 1956.

2. Qualifications for votes:

A person qualified under any of two of the categories numbered (i) to (xv) below must be entitled to one vote. For every category beyond two under which he qualified, he was entitled to another vote, up to a maximum of six.

Education.

(i) Have completed Form II of the secondary course or its equivalent;[50]

(ii) The Holder of a University degree or its scheduled equivalent

(iii) The Holder of a diploma or certificate of proficiency in certain scheduled crafts or trades.

Income.

(iv) Have earned an income in the year before registration of at least £240 or own unmovable property valued at £480 (these figures were on the cost of living index current in June 1950).[51]

(v) Have earned a taxable income of £1,500 per annum or over for two or consecutive years.[52]

Public Service.

(vi) Awarded scheduled Civil and Military British decorations

(vii) Chairman or honourary Secretary of a national voluntary organization or recognized national body or past holder of that office for a period of at least 3 years.

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[50] This represented ten years of schooling. Very few Africans reached this level during the colonial period in Northern Rhodesia.

[51] This was a basic European wage level out of the reach of most Africans.

[52] This was taken to mark the stage when the individual started making a considerable personal contribution to the State in direct taxation.

(viii) Member of Parliament, Alderman or City Councillor, Chairman of a Town Management Board, Magistrate or the holder of Magisterial authority including Provincial and District Commissioner, or past holder of any of these offices for a period of at least 3 years.

Other Special Qualifications.

(ix) The mother of two or more children who had passed Form II or its equivalent

(x) Field Rank (Major) or above or equivalent in the Armed Forces, Police, and Voluntary Service, including those who had retired with this rank and who had a good record of service

(xi) African Chief, Headman or elected councillor or retired holder of such office for a minimum period of 3 years

(xii) Master Farmer or its equivalent (African)

(xiii) African Warrant Officer or Sergeant and the equivalent ranks in H.M. Armed Forces and Police or past holder of such rank whose record of service was good

(xiv) Resident farm owner, member of a farmers association, who had cultivated 50 or more acres for 4 or more years previous to registration and who was listed by the National Resources Board or equivalent authority.

Age. (xv) Aged 42 or over.[53]

The multiple voting system was rejected by most Africans and settlers alike, for different reasons. The settlers saw the system as fancy and too risky. It opened the political doors to African domination. Africans on their part felt the system was merely another device by whites to maintain their political domination.

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[53] CAS Papers, File No. 16, 1956.

Despite the flaws of the electoral system, especially the multiple vote recommendation, the Contract was a genuine attempt to develop a true patriotism which cut across the skin colour line in the multi-racial territories of Central Africa. Besides, it did not differ much from the Northern Rhodesia government constitutional proposals of February 1958, which sought to give a political "voice to those——and only those——who have achieved a certain standard" while avoiding "leaving the African race under-represented..."[54]

Worse still, in the case of Central Africa where race was a major political factor, and where the political ideology of African nationalism was based on the search for "pigmentational self-determination" ability and political enlightenment were not considered essential political attributes.[55] Since the political strength of

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[54] PRO, DO 35/4636/333 Draft White Paper, February, 1958, p. 15.

[55] Lewanika effectively expressed this fear when he wrote: "Although I have no doubt that additional members will be men of good education, but I doubt whether they will be men of independent thought. It is a common thing today throughout Africa, that a man with an independent thought and liberal mind does not get the vote. On the contrary a man who gets the vote is the one who is extreme and rude. Everyone who is moderate and liberal is considered as a traitor. In view of this, I am very doubtful, therefore, as to whether the men to be elected will be the right type of men you have in mind. The situation may [in the future] be even more serious than it is now. (NAZ, HM, Godwin M. Lewanika to Reverend E.G. Nightingale, 5 November, 1952, para. 2.

Lack of respect for ability and political enlightenment was further reflected in a letter from Munukayumbu Sipalo to Philimon Chikuni when he said: "There is no particular process through which one has to pass in order to become a politician. You just have got to interest yourself in the affairs of your fatherland and all social problems facing humanity in general——a dynamic interest in these two will lead one to the gateway to political life . . . In fact, . . . just get into Lusaka Town you will graduate in the politics of this country." (PA, ANC 2/3 Vol. 1 Munukayumbu Sipalo, for General Secretary, ANC to Philimon Chikuni, 22 March, 1957.

the more militant African nationalists rested with the masses in the society, they rejected all attempts to have an electoral system based on qualified franchise.

It would be wrong however, to assume that only Capricorn and the settlers preferred a qualified franchise and opposed the principle of one man, one vote. A few Africans saw the limitations of one man, one vote and therefore supported the idea of a qualified franchise, at least until many Africans had become politically enlightened. Lewanika, for example, noted that the principle of one-man, one-vote would be the best where everyone was sufficiently enlightened.[56] He argued that for a while, a qualified franchise was best for Northern Rhodesia. He pointed out that the policy of placing the government in the hands of "civilized" men did not mean that those men would only and always be Europeans. According to Lewanika, the policy had nothing to do with colour, race or nationality.[57] On the contrary, it had to do with the ability to exercise responsibility for the common good since a government in the hands of "civilized" men meant a prosperous, strong and peaceful country. On majority rule, he said:

> No sensible man will question this when the majority is "civilized" and well informed, but it would be fool hardy in a country where most of the inhabitants are still backward and primitive and consist of mostly one racial group. That could lead to dictatorship and a quick switch to tribal wars and raids. No thinking man would dare to invest in such a country, which means the country would revert to semi-barbarism.[58]

Lewanika was particularly opposed to the idea of racial representation in the Legislative Council. He had earlier pointed out that racial representation not only

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[56] CAS Papers, File No. 66, cited from African World, March, 1958.

[57] CAS Papers, File No. 66, cited from African World, March, 1958.

[58] CAS Papers, File No. 66, cited from Africa World, March, 1958.

perpetuated racial division, but tended to encourage false patriotism among Africans.[59] Lewanika's views were naturally disliked by militant nationalists. There were others like Gabriel Musumbulwa and Lawrence Katilungu who shared his views. Generally these people occupied senior positions in their places of work and were part of the small middle class.

The Capricorn Contract and Northern Rhodesian Politics.

The Society regarded the Contract as a "package deal" to be accepted and implemented *in toto*. This was an obstacle for those who wanted to use certain portions of the Contract and leave out the parts they disagreed with. Capricorn spent the next two years campaigning to have the Contract adopted by one of the existing political parties in its entirety. It never succeeded. Only the Federal Party[60] attempted to borrow liberally from the Contract when drafting its charter.[61] In the end, a Capricorn sponsored political party, the Constitution Party, was formed in 1957 to fight the 1958 elections on a Capricorn platform.

Although the Capricorn Africa Society was already "known" in Northern Rhodesia, no effective organization existed there until after the Salima Convention.

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[59] NAZ, HM 53/5 Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika to J.S Moffat, D. Yamba, Reverend E.G. Nightingale and P. Sokota, 7 September, 1953. All four were then Legislative Council Members representing African interests.

[60] The Federal Party was the forerunner of the United Federal Party (U.F.P.) which resulted from a merger of the original Federal Party, formed in 1953, and Garfield Todd's United (Southern) Rhodesia Party in September 1957.

[61] Eileen Haddon Papers, University of Zambia Library. Federal Party, Luanshya Branch, Memorandum to the Proposed Charter (Policy), 1956. See below for more discussion of this.

Delegates to the Convention returned to their home countries with a commitment to find a vehicle through which the Contract could be fought for in the political arena. To meet this challenge the Central Africa branch of the Society was dissolved in August 1956 to pave the way for regional branches which were to be established in both Southern and Northern Rhodesia.

Preparations for the establishment of Northern Rhodesian branches had already started as early as 1955. The first meeting to that effect was held in Luanshya. Dr. Charles Fisher was provisionally elected chairperson and was also given the task of establishing another branch in Lusaka.[62] Few Africans attended the first meeting. It was hoped that more talks would draw more Africans to join Capricorn.[63] Dr. Fisher felt that it would be wrong to identify the Society too specifically with Godwin Lewanika "for the same reason that it would be a mistake to give Savanhu or Hove too prominent a position in the Society in Southern Rhodesia."[64] Lewanika had lost credibility among African nationalist leaders

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[62] CAS Papers, File No. 48/40 I.R. Menzies to David Stirling, 24 November, 1955.

[63] CAS Papers, File No. 48/40, Menzies to Stirling.

[64] CAS Papers, File No. 13, Stirling to Peter MacKay, 28 March, 1955. According to Hardwicke Holderness, "accepting any role in white dominated institutions could imply an acceptance of the status quo and, particularly if there were any elements of patronage in it, turn out to be the kiss of death. Already it looked as if that was what was happening to Jasper Savanhu and Mike Hove, the two who had accepted nomination by the Federal Party for the African seats in the Federal Parliament, and on the fringe of politics, to someone like Chad Chipunza who had become a full time employee of the Capricorn Africa Society. (Hardwicke Holderness, Lost Chance: Southern Rhodesia, 1945-58, Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985, p.170.)

because of his moderate views about Federation. Despite his favourable views about the Society, nothing was done to bring him into it.[65]

Efforts to establish Capricorn branches in Northern Rhodesia were undermined by the formation of the United Northern Rhodesia Association (U.N.R.A.) in 1954. As Capricornists were contemplating the establishment of Capricorn branches in the territory, Harry Franklin, nominated member for African interests in the Legco, was developing another scheme. He organized a meeting on 31 July 1954 to discuss the formation of an inter-racial society to improve race relations in the territory.[66] The U.N.R.A. was finally formed in September.

According to the constitution of the U.N.R.A., Northern Rhodesia's prosperity depended on the "development of such harmonious race relations that its people may go forward in mutual confidence."[67] Like Capricorn, the U.N.R.A. was "non-political" and its membership was open to all races in the country. Its object was to further cooperation and understanding among the races.[68] The U.N.R.A sought to provide a common meeting ground for the free exchange and discussion of ideas. However, unlike Capricorn which always had a political agenda in which members of both black and white communities were expected to participate as equals, the

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[65] See NAZ, SEC 5/185/19/1 Godwin A.M. Lewanika, Address to the Central African Sub-Group of The Conservative Commonwealth Council, 1 August, 1956.

[66] NAZ, HM 53/1 Harry Franklin to E.G. Nightingale, 23 July, 1954.

[67] NAZ, HM 47, Constitution of the United Northern Rhodesia Association, 1954, p. 1.

[68] While it is not clear whether Kaunda joined the Association, evidence suggests that he patronized the association's Kabulonga Club in the 1950s. (See New African, October 1984, p. 63).

U.N.R.A. saw itself as a purely social organization. This image made the U.N.R.A. acceptable to some nationalists.[69]

The formation of the Association was welcomed by the Rhodesia Selection Trust (R.S.T.) which donated a building on a five-acre piece of land in Kabulonga (Lusaka).[70] The Headquarters of the Association was officially opened by Governor Sir Arthur Benson in May 1955.[71] Northern Rhodesian "liberals", especially those in Lusaka, were more favourably disposed to the Association than to Capricorn.

Yet, as Dr. Charles Fisher pointed out with specific reference to the 1950s Club in Luanshya, "the blacks would come because they were glad to have a few whites whom they could harangue about the evils of their ways."[72] Consequently Europeans began to stay away and the 1950s Club died. This was also true of the U.N.R.A. where the admission of Nkumbula and his associates precipitated resignations of some European members from the Association.[73]

Formation of Capricorn branches in Northern Rhodesia and the growth of the Capricorn movement demanded that liberal elements in the country must be won over. The division of liberal elements coupled with the growing intensity of

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[69] Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula then president of the African National Congress joined the U.N.R.A. in 1956.

[70] The Reader may be interested to note that the R.S.T. was also financially supporting Capricorn.

[71] The Northern News, Friday, 30 May, 1955.

[72] Dr. Charles Fisher, Interview with Jane Parpart, 21 August, 1976. I am greatly indebted to Jane Parpart for giving me a copy of the transcript of the interview. The 1950 Club, like the '48 Club of Lusaka, was formed as a meeting place for Europeans and educated Africans. The declared motive was to establish a common ground and better understanding between the races.

[73] Wittington, K. Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, (Lusaka, Neczam, 1979), p. 83.

nationalist politicking made that task particularly difficult. A former Northern Rhodesia Resident Magistrate wrote to Jonathan Lewis, Capricorn's Executive Officer in London, offering to be employed by Capricorn and help in organizing the Society because he wanted to help in the easing of racial tensions in the territory.[74] Northern Rhodesia Capricornists now took practical steps to follow up the Contract and widen the scope of Capricorn political activity in Northern Rhodesia.

First, they arranged for the appointment of an Executive Officer. A sum of £1,000 was found for that purpose. Appointment of an Executive Officer was considered a vital step in the establishment of a Capricorn branch in the region. The Executive Officer, like his counterpart in the south, was to be responsible for running the Society's affairs. P.C. Jackson was subsequently appointed as the Executive Officer for Capricorn's Northern Rhodesia branch.[75] Secondly, Copperbelt Capricornists undertook to build inter-racial clubs at all public centres. This was considered most urgent because the Society had no open meeting places. They felt that it was undesirable that they should always use their private houses for Capricorn meetings. The Society therefore appealed for financial assistance from supporters in the United Kingdom to meet this obligation.

There is no clear documentation indicating when exactly the Northern Rhodesia branches began to operate. It appears however, that there was some operating branch for the period 1 January to 31 December, 1956 according to the following statement of account.

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[74] CAS Papers, File No. 30, Letter to Jonathan Lewis, 19 September, 1956. The author of the letter did not write his name, only identified himself as a former Resident Magistrate in Ndola. It is not at all clear from the records available whether he was offered the job.

[75] Zebra, No. 11 (1956).

Receipts and Expenditure: CAS, Northern Rhodesia Branch:
1 January, 1956 to 31 December, 1956.

Receipts.

Source.	£.	s.	d.
Donations	105	19	0
Membership	4	5	0
Sales	10	0	0
Salisbury contribution	1058	10	0
Undefined	29	14	5
TOTAL	1208	8	5

Payments.			
To Salisbury	36	10	10
Bank Charges		14	9
Refreshments at Meetings		27	0	0
Office Equipment		20	10	0
Stationary	21	12	3
Rentals	82	10	0
Car	325	0	0
Petro and oil	17	5	8
Repairs	28	3	10
Travelling Expenses	4	3	6
Cash on hand	33	12	8
Bank Balance	446	12	5
TOTAL	1208	8	5

Source: CAS Papers, File No. 43, 1957.

It is certain that by the end of 1956 two branches were in operation, one in Lusaka and a second on the Copperbelt at Luanshya. The Lusaka branch was chaired by Reverend Merfyn M. Temple[76] for the period 1956-57. The Copperbelt branch was chaired by Dr. Charles Fisher, who was also chairperson for the whole of Northern Rhodesia.

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[76] Reverend Merfyn M. Temple was secretary of the United Society for Christian Literature, President of the Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia, and Leader of the multi-racial study group appointed by the World Council of Churches to study Christian responsibilities in areas of rapid social change.

Although the Lusaka branch attracted more African sympathy than the Luanshya branch, it was nonetheless less active. Most of the likely supporters were civil servants whose conditions of service precluded them from active involvement in political and quasi-political organizations. Capricorn was affected by this civil service regulation. During a tour of Northern Rhodesia by Capricorn Executive Secretary in mid-1953, John Mwanakatwe[77], W. S. Matsie and Mswoya, then all teachers at Munali Secondary School, indicated their willingness to participate in Capricorn "as soon as their position as civil servants was clarified."[78]   The limitations on political participation by civil servants, coupled with intense ANC propaganda against Capricorn, already equated to *Amunyama* (Vampire men),[79] made recruitment of

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[77] John Mwanakatwe was an education officer and later became the first African secondary school principal in Northern Rhodesia. In June 1961 he was appointed an assistant Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia in London. He was also UNIP's most respected official among Europeans. In 1962 he was appointed Minister of Labour and Mines in the country's first African Government. At independence he became Minister of Education and rose to the post of Minister of Finance until he resigned from the government to go into private business in 1986. Mwanakatwe was an able leader, whose moderate political views were clearly noted even then. He had been a member of the multi-racial '48 Club, which he joined on 16 September, 1952. (NAZ, HM 11, The '48 Club, Minutes of a committee meeting of 16 September, 1952.) The '48 Club was superseded by the United Northern Rhodesia Association. (See The Record of the last General Meeting if The '48 Club, held in Reverend Nightingale's office on 24 November, 1953.)

[78] CAS Papers, File No. 43, Executive Secretary's Report of the Tour of Northern Rhodesia, 24 June to 9 July, 1953.

[79] On Capricorn as an agent of "Vampire men" see Mwelwa C. Musambachime, The Impact of Rumour: The Case of the Banyama (Vampire men) Scare in Northern Rhodesia, 1939-1964," The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 21, 2 (1988), pp. 201-215.

African members extremely difficult. On the Copperbelt, it was largely the fear of ANC which prevented many would-be supporters from joining Capricorn.[80]

Thus, attempts to recruit new African members and influence existing political parties to adopt the Contract as a platform for political change were quite unsuccessful. Though membership figures rose by over one hundred per cent by the end of 1957, judging by the subscription figures, in absolute terms membership remained quite low. In 1956 membership subscription totalled £4 5s, while in 1957 it totalled £8 15s.[81]

Nationalist leaders like Harry Nkumbula chose to join the U.N.R.A.. Nkumbula allegedly told Chad Chipunza that although he himself did not believe in Capricorn, he would not regard Congressmen who joined Capricorn as traitors at all.[82] Nkumbula appears to have kept his word because there is no record of any

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[80] CAS Papers, File No. 43, Executive Secretary's Report of the Tour of Northern Rhodesia, 24 June to 9 July, 1953.

[81] CAS Papers, File No. 119, CAS-N.R. Financial Statement for the Month ending 30 June, 1957. Since the Membership fee was 5s, it meant the numbers of paid up members rose from 17 to 35. These figures are somewhat misleading because there were people who sympathized with Capricorn ideas who did not actually become paid up members. In fact evidence suggests that the Luanshya branch alone had up to 70 active members. (The Northern News, 25 September, 2 October, 1957, and 16 May, 1958.)

[82] CAS Papers, File No. 48/126, Chad Chipunza to David Stirling, 24 March, 1956. Chipunza further informed Stirling that "we should NEVER make it known that we have appealed to Harry. Even his Executive does not know anything about this." A year later Chipunza resigned as the Society's Executive Officer in order to concentrate on politics. He was replaced by Leopold Takawira on 28 August, 1957.

public condemnation of Capricorn after this meeting. Before 1956 Nkumbula had been publicly hostile to Capricorn and those associated with it.[83]

The decision to influence political developments from without was obviously unsuccessful and it was later regretted by the Society. Joseph H. Oldham wrote to Jonathan Lewis in 1960 that the crisis began after Salima when the Society withdrew from the political field and chose to concentrate on non-political activities.[84] Consequently, its philosophy was never integrated into the political institutions of the time.

Capricorn's only impact was made on the Luanshya branch of the Federal Party, which borrowed liberally from the Contract and changed some phraseology to suit the local political scene of Northern Rhodesia.[85] The Federal Party, however, rejected the Society's multiple voting system. It substituted for it an electoral system based on the right of all who had attained the statutory qualifications to elect members of the legislature, registered on one common roll.[86] The Federal Party

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[83] NAZ, SEC 5/112/167, Record of a Meeting between Clement Attlee and African National Congress delegation, Lusaka, 20 August, 1952; PA, ANC 7/83 Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula's letter to various ANC members, 21 November, 1952.

[84] CAS Papers, File No. 12/19, Joseph H. Oldham to Jonathan Lewis, 7 October, 1960.

[85] Eileen Haddon Papers, University of Zambia Library, Special Collections. Federal Party, Luanshya Branch. Memorandum to the Proposed Charter (Policy), 1956. At the time I was given permission to go through the papers, they were not yet catalogued by the Library.

[86] Eileen Haddon Papers, Memorandum to the Proposed Charter, Clause 6.

maintained that the vote was not a natural right but a responsibility to be exercised for the common good by those who had attained the necessary qualifications.[87]

Although the Federal Party's political stand hardly differed from that of the Society, Capricornists decided in mid-1957 to form a multi-racial party——the Constitution Party. Its mandate was to seek a political adoption of the Contract in its entirety. This decision scattered the liberal elements in Northern Rhodesia. In late 1957, a planning meeting was accordingly called in Luanshya. According to Robert Rotberg:

> By mid-1957 ... those among the liberals who had, like Gore-Browne,
> stood apart from Capricorn, as well as those who had joined, began
> rethinking the need for a multi-racial party.[88]

Consequently, "liberals" led by Dr. Alexander Scott,[89] joined by David Stirling, Dr. Fisher, the Reverend Merfyn Temple, the Reverend Colin Morris, Gabriel Musumbulwa, Gore-Browne and Harry Franklin convened a meeting which led to the birth of the Constitution Party.[90] They declared the United Federal Party reactionary and promised to seek a more liberal franchise for Africans. The initial constitution resolved to establish a society "free from racial discrimination with a

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[87] Eileen Haddon Papers, Memorandum to the Proposed Charter.

[88] Robert I. Rotberg, Black Heart: Gore-Browne and the Politics of Multiracial Zambia, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977), p. 303.

[89] Dr. Alexander Scott was initially a railway doctor and had since branched out and became a large shareholder in a Lusaka newspaper and a building society.

[90] According to Clyde Sanger, the genesis of the Constitution Party "was as much a reaction against Congress violence in the boycott of beer halls in Northern Rhodesia as against the unprogressiveness of the Federal Party." (Clyde Sanger, op. cit., p. 104).

system of law based on a solemn contract between our peoples to acknowledge our human unity under God and our unity in one loyalty to the Crown."[91]

In conformity with the new Capricorn policy, the draft policy statement of the new party declared that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were entitled to secede from the Federation if the policy of the Federal Government was not in line with the fundamental principles and the preamble set out in the Federal constitution by the time territorial self-government was achieved.[92] Colin Leys, however, expressed surprise at this declaration, which was not only a tactical move to attract African participation, but a demonstration of realism by the Constitution Party. The Society was genuinely concerned with the futility of insisting on maintaining the federation amidst vociferous African opposition to it. Capricorn now realized that the success of federation depended on the willingness of Africans to participate in it. The argument that the reality of federation would temper African opposition had been proved wrong.

However, in conformity with Capricorn practices and political ideals, the new party's constitution resolved that the vote was not "a natural right, but a responsibility to be exercised for the common good."[93] The Constitution Party therefore advocated a qualitative franchise rather than universal adult suffrage. The Party adopted a "middle of the road" stance and rejected extremism, either on the right or the left. It was assumed that the right represented white supremacy and that the left stood for black supremacy. As Prain put it a few years earlier, they were trying to create something which was different from the rest of Africa. They were "trying to avoid

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[91] Cited from Rotberg, Black Heart, p. 304.

[92] Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, (London, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 124.

[93] The Northern News, 25 September, 1957.

failures of the Union of South Africa with its emphasis on white supremacy, and to avoid the experience of West Africa with its emphasis on black supremacy."[94] Reaching and sustaining that "middle of the road" position was the main preoccupation of both Capricorn and the Constitution Party.

Lawrence C. Katilungu, president of the African Mineworkers' Union, Norman Hunt, a local architect and C.L. Patel, an Asian businessman, took up party positions on the Copperbelt as chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer respectively. Others were Henry Makulu, a Congregational Church minister, Dr. Charles Fisher, Gabriel Musumbulwa,[95] I. R. Menzies, J. C. Mandona, A. J. Adamson and Dean Acheson of the Rhodesian Selection Trust. The Lusaka committee consisted of the Reverend Merfyn Temple, Safeli H. Chileshe, a Capricorn sympathizer and African member of Legco, and Dr. Alexander Scott. According to Robert Rotberg the Reverend Colin Morris of Chingola, Wittington K. Sikalumbi, a member of the African National Congress, and Frank Burton a Lusaka journalist, also gave support to the newly formed party.[96]

The Constitution Party held its first public meeting at the Palace, a multi-racial cinema hall in Lusaka, in the last week of November. Close to 300 people attended the meeting which was described as "a resounding success ... for pathetic

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[94] Prain, "African Advancement in Northern Rhodesia," p. 92. Prain's comparison with the situation in West Africa is absurd because there was no settled white population there at all. West African nationalists never thought of self-rule as "black supremacy" because racial minority safeguards were never an issue there.

[95] Although Musumbulwa participated in the inaugural meeting, he denied having been a member of the Constitution Party. Interview at Luanshya, 15 May, 1989.

[96] Rotberg, Black Heart, p. 304.

Lusaka."[97] The meeting, chaired by Reverend Merfyn Temple, was addressed by Dr.

Scott, Safeli Chileshe and Henry Thorncroft.[98] The new Party announced that it

would fight the United Federal Party in the federal field and in Northern Rhodesia,

but it would not oppose Garfield Todd in Southern Rhodesia.

Katilungu agreed to serve as chairperson of the Copperbelt Regional Interim

Committee, which surprised even veteran Capricorn members. On 28 October Dr.

Fisher wrote:

> To my surprise Katilungu agreed to serve as Chairman of this (the
> Constitution Party's Copperbelt Divisional Executive) Committee; a
> courageous step because he is already under heavy fire from the
> Congress and for him to associate himself with Europeans and Asians
> in a political party is a very big thing....[99]

It required much courage for an African to be associated with white liberals, let

alone to head one of the liberal organizations.[100] Robin Short wrote that "for the

nationalist, it is the liberal that is the danger."[101] The liberal, especially if he was

African, became the perfect target for "a calculated hysterical campaign of

hatred..."[102] However, Katilungu was unable to withstand the barrage which was

poured upon him by the Congress. Consequently, he suddenly resigned from the

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[97] CAS Papers, File No. 4, Weekly Summaries #42/57, 6 December, 1957.

[98] CAS Papers, File No. 4, Weekly Summaries #42/57, 6 December, 1957. Henry Thorncroft was the leader of the Coloured community in Northern Rhodesia.

[99] CAS Papers, File No. 30, Letter from Dr. Fisher cited in a letter from Jonathan Lewis to the Earl of March, 3 December, 1957.

[100] See Chapter Three on the challenges faced by "liberal" Africans in Northern Rhodesia.

[101] Robin Short, African Sunset, (London, Johnson, 1973). p. 193.

[102] Short, African Sunset, p. 193.

Constitution Party early in December 1957.[103] This was obviously a blow to the newly founded multi-racial Party.

Africans had very little choice in joining any of the existing political parties. Some non-Europeans who had voting rights were attracted to the United Federal Party (U.F.P.). Musumbulwa joined the U.F.P. because it supported partnership and quality leadership.[104] The Dominion Party was openly opposed to equality between Africans and Europeans. In the end, the only political party available to Africans was the African National Congress (ANC). ANC never sought European backing and particularly opposed any association with Capricorn. The few Africans who disliked racism in any form turned to Capricorn. Capricorn and ANC therefore competed for the Africans' allegiance.

The Constitution Party therefore mounted a campaign aimed at increasing African membership describing itself as "not just a European Party but ... 'African' in a non-racial sense."[105] Africans were told that the aims of Capricorn and ANC were not very different.[106] The Constitution Party began to emphasize similarities between itself on the one hand, and ANC on the other. When Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, president of ANC, suggested that Europeans were not to rule Northern Rhodesia, the Constitution Party leaders responded that "if by this he means that no race as a race can claim to rule the country, this is our fight too."[107]

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[103] The Northern News, 3 December, 1957.

[104] Interview with Author, 15 May, 1989 at Luanshya.

[105] The Northern News, 28 September, 1957, p. 5.

[106] The Northern News, 28 September, 1957, p. 5.

[107] The Northern News, 28 September, 1957, p. 5.

Similarities did exist. Both ANC and the Constitution Party wanted to see an end to federation, and both were opposed to a rapid move towards independence. Both parties wanted to see an end to racial policies then in existence. Yet, the two groups never joined forces. Why?

The moderate approach adopted by Nkumbula quickly became a minority stand within ANC. Other ANC officials became militant and increasingly opposed any association with liberal Europeans.[108] This cleavage between the moderate Nkumbula and the militant wing of the party not only inhibited co-operation between ANC and the Constitution Party, but also precipitated a split within the ANC itself.[109]

However, the Constitution Party's association with Capricorn proved to be the major obstacle to its success. Despite an early statement that the Constitution Party and Capricorn would be kept apart, the link proved very hard to break and was to haunt the Constitution Party for the rest of its brief life.

The Capricorn stigma prevented the party from making progress in the political arena. Not all "liberals" were attracted into the ranks of the Constitution Party. In spite of his good words about the new party and especially the decision to keep Capricorn out of politics, Lewanika chose to join the United Federal Party. So did Gabriel Musumbulwa.[110] K. S. Chiwama, a known Congress member, wondered whether the Constitution Party was not just a change of name since

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[108] W.K. Sikalumbi, <u>Before UNIP</u>, (Lusaka, Neczam, 1978), p. 59

[109] See Chapter Five for a detailed discussion of the ANC split.

[110] <u>The Northern News</u>, 5 November, 1957.

Capricorn had failed to attract African membership.[111] Another correspondent suggested that the Constitution Party, like Capricorn, was for the middle class and therefore not for ordinary people.[112] These charges prompted David Hamilton, the Capricorn Executive Officer, to respond that the two were independent organizations with different objectives.[113]

In early 1958 the Reverend Colin Morris, who was heading the "Church into Politics" movement and was associated with the Constitution Party, came out in defense of the Party. He felt that "the existence of the racial party of either extreme was coming to a close."[114] He, nevertheless, was concerned that justly or unjustly any suspicion of a tie-up between the two organisations was a "kiss of death" where African opinion was concerned. Morris pointed out that the problem was simply that some of the ablest leaders were very well known Capricorn officials. Both the Constitution Party and Capricorn were faced with the same dilemma: how to remove the stigma without repudiating the people concerned.[115] In fact, Equinox, a Capricorn magazine, had already reported that the formation of the Constitution Party represented a further development of Capricorn.[116] There appeared to be only one solution, the dissolution of Capricorn.[117]

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[111] The Northern News, 9 October, 1957.

[112] Anonymous, The Northern News, 9 October, 1957.

[113] The Rhodesia Herald, 13 December, 1957.

[114] The Northern News, 15 February, 1958.

[115] The Northern News, 15 February, 1958.

[116] "News from Northern Rhodesia", Equinox, November 1957, p. 12.

[117] CAS Papers File No. 6, Equinox, December, 1957. It suggested that the founding of the Constitution Party was a step further in the development of CAS.

The Annual General Meeting of the Lusaka branch of Capricorn held in February 1958 "felt that since the formation of the Constitution Party, much of the work previously undertaken by the group, which was of a quasi-political nature, would now be more correctly handled by the party."[118] It was therefore imperative that Capricorn reexamine its position in Northern Rhodesia. There were several reasons for this turn of events. The intensity of African nationalist activity during the late 1950s contributed a major part. Capricorn as a non-political organization could not cope with the rapid political changes which were taking place in the country.

Then there were the constitutional developments which since 1954 were aimed at establishing and consolidating multi-racial politics. A significant move in this direction was the 1954 Moffat Resolutions.[119] It is plausible to suggest that these resolutions, coupled with Capricorn efforts, contributed to the birth of the multi-racial Constitution Party. Yet by 1958, all indications suggest that multi-racial party politics were unpopular among both Africans and Europeans. Liberalism was interpreted as weakness by both sides.

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[118] "News from Northern Rhodesia," Equinox, June 1958, p. 11.

[119] NAZ, SEC 5/270, The Moffat Resolutions, Legislative Council Debates, 29 July, 1954. Sir John Moffat, the author of the resolutions served in Northern Rhodesia Provincial Administration for 20 years. In 1951 he was appointed to represent African interests on the Legco. In 1955 he was nominated to represent African interests in the federal Assembly and was Chairman of the African Affairs Board, a position he resigned before founding the Central African Party (CAP). On the impact of the Moffat Resolutions on Northern Rhodesia's constitutional changes, see David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-64, (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 56-57.

The Constitution Party participated in only one election——the Federal election of 12 November, 1958——with very unimpressive results.[120] None of its candidates came close to winning a seat. By the end of 1958 both Capricorn and the Constitution Party had accepted the fact that African nationalist activities were too strong to permit any significant numbers of Africans to participate in liberal politics. Meanwhile, racial polarization intensified. A few white Capricornists however, joined African nationalist parties.[121]

There was evidently very little Capricorn or Constitution Party activity in 1959. Meanwhile, liberal leaders of the United Rhodesia Party in Southern Rhodesia with Sir John Moffat from Northern Rhodesia, with leaders of the Constitution Party, held private meetings in February 1959 and later announced the formation of a new party, the Central Africa Party (CAP).[122] The Central Africa Party was a breakaway group which split under Garfield Todd's leadership. It split from the United Federal Party, with which the United Rhodesia Party had just amalgamated. The CAP was a left liberal party with a very weak base. Most members had

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[120] Most Africans boycotted the 1958 Federal elections. It is hard to relate this boycott to the poor performance of the Constitution Party for the simple reason that the boycott was precipitated by African rejection of the electoral system. In a racially polarized political environment it is doubtful if Africans would have supported the multi-racial Constitution Party.

[121] Reverend Merfyn M. Temple joined the United National Independence Party in 1960. He was appointed Deputy Director of National Youth Service in April 1964.

[122] Joan Lorraine Watson, "The Capricorn Africa Society And Its Impact on Rhodesian Politics," Ph.D. Thesis, St John's University, 1981, p. 113. See Chapter five on the CAP's involvement in Northern Rhodesian politics, and its subsequent change of name to the Liberal Party in 1961.

supported Whitehead when he took over the UFP leadership from Todd who was dismissed in 1958.

The General Council acknowledged this decline and admitted that Capricorn had been overtaken by events. Sir John Slessor wrote:

> However true it may be that we detected the *wind of change when it was a faint breeze* and that 90% of whatever we have consistently advocated has now become pretty well the minimum that we can get away with in Africa, the fact is I am afraid that Capricorn in anything like its old form is as dead as the dodo...[123]

Leopold Takawira pointed out in early 1960, after his tour of Northern Rhodesia (from 27 March to 10 April 1960) that the "existence of the Society as such was now impossible."[124] He wondered whether it would not be reasonable for those who shared the Society's principles on racial matters to be persuaded to cling to the idea and implement it through other organisations, new or old, instead of simply insisting on the perpetuation of the name Capricorn, a word which immediately called for shame and spelt political doom in Northern Rhodesia.[125]

In response, the General Council sent Jonathan Lewis, Secretary of the Council, on an assessment tour of the Society's branches in East and Central Africa. His terms of reference were:

> (i) To gain a first hand impression of the situation in East and Central Africa;
>
> (ii) To prepare a report for submission to the Council on the number and quality of the membership and on the activities, future plans and prospects of the branches; and

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[123] CAS Papers, File No. 19, Sir John Slessor to Jonathan Lewis, 7 October, 1959.

[124] CAS Papers, File No. 22, Extract from the Report of the Executive Officer's Tour of Northern Rhodesia, 1960.

[125] CAS Papers, File No. 22, Extract from the Report of the Executive Officer's Tour of Northern rhodesia, 1960.

(iii) To explain to the branches the purpose, function and activities of the London branch.[126]

The Report confirmed Takawira's earlier concerns about the future viability of the Society in Africa. Lewis noted that "membership had fallen away catastrophically since Salima."[127] The Society was no longer regarded as a serious force. Perhaps the most disturbing revelation in the Report was the serious divisions in the Capricorn leadership. Lewis pointed out that members were leaving the Society and joining nationalist parties. Despite efforts to change the image of Capricorn since Federation, the Society continued to suffer from the "handicap of a bad name."[128] Lewis added that there was hardly any evidence that the Society was taken seriously by Africans any more.

The Report suggested, therefore, that there was no point in trying to sell non-racialism to Africans without doing something effective to tackle their basic problem——broadening the franchise. The Report concluded that the Capricorn philosophy was meaningless in the contemporary scene because it was too remote from the day-to-day struggle for existence and for advancement by the ordinary semi-literate Africans.[129]

By 1961 it had dawned on the Capricornists that the Society could not be resurrected in the territory. Dr. Fisher, I.R. Menzies and Father Sillot made it clear

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[126] CAS Papers, File No. 93, Confidential Report to the General Council on the Visit to Society's Branches in Africa. By Jonathan Lewis, Secretary to the Council, October, 1960.

[127] CAS Papers, File No. 93, Confidential Report, October, 1960.

[128] CAS Papers, File No. 93, Confidential Report, October, 1960.

[129] CAS Papers, File No. 93, Confidential Report, October, 1960.

to Reverend Fred Rea, chairperson of the reconstituted Central Africa branch, that "the Society could not provide a meeting point with Northern Rhodesia Africans."[130] In fact, Capricorn kind of work was already being done through the Copperbelt Council of Churches.

Consequently, a circular letter was sent to all known Capricorn members in the territory informing them of the decision to close down the Society in Northern Rhodesia.[131] Since no objection was raised, the Society proceeded to close down formally. First, it obtained permission from the Autolot[132] to dispose of their gift to the Society as the Society wished, and use the money for inter-racial purposes. Then it closed its Bank Account with Barclays Bank in Luanshya, following the distribution of its total asserts of £437 13s 6d as follows:

cheque to London Office (for Zebra House) £128 16s 9d
cheque to Salisbury Office   £128 16s 9d
cheque to Salisbury Office, to assist a
student on scholarship to the USA   £180   0s 0d
TOTAL   £437 13s 6d

Finally, the Society informed the District Commissioner of the Society's wish to be crossed off the list of registered societies in Northern Rhodesia.[133]

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[130] CAS Papers, File No. 43, A Verbatim Report of CAS General Council Meeting Held at St. Julian's Limuru, Kenya, 21-22 January, 1961; also File No. 134, Minutes of the General Council, 22 January, 1961. The General Council acknowledged the decline of the Society in Africa and its pending dissolution, but resolved that the London office should continue its work.

[131] CAS Papers, File No. 131, Memorandum on the closing of Capricorn Africa Society in Northern Rhodesia, 1961.

[132] Autolot was a company which had donated a motor vehicle to Capricorn in Northern Rhodesia.

[133] CAS Papers, File No. 131, Memorandum, 1961.

Impact of Liberal Ideology on Congress.

The Capricorn Africa Society was a genuine agent for the propagation of multi-racial party politics in Northern Rhodesia. In spite of the negative response it received, it influenced some Africans towards liberal activism. As early as August 1954 some Congress supporters had begun to value liberal ideas, but they were not able to advocate them outside the Congress. They therefore sought to advance the liberal cause from within the Congress. While this may explain, to a point, the moderate nature of the Congress, it did not lead to any wider expansion of liberal activism.

On 6 August, 1954 B.L. Zulu wrote to the General Secretary of the African National Congress seeking permission to form a new political party which was to be called the Conventional Peoples Party (C.P.P.). The Congress ignored the letter and others which followed.[134] In October Zulu sent another letter, this time to the President General, informing him that the C.P.P. was formed within the Congress constitution, not to crush ANC but to show difference of policies towards the struggle for independence and that:

> The party is formed by liberal minded Africans of this country who have foreseen that in few years to come we must rule this country on party politics... The party will carry the opposition within the Congress... I think we have reached at the time we should have party politics in this country so that we can abolish ARC and all other government institutions which elect African representatives in this country.[135]

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[134] PA, ANC 5/11, B.L. Zulu, Organizing Secretary, C.P.P. to The General Secretary, ANC, 11 August, 1954. It should be pointed out that it was the same Zulu who in 1952 had vehemently denied any involvement with CAS and had said he did not want to discuss liberalism.

[135] PA, ANC 5/11, B.L. Zulu to President General, ANC, 14 October, 1954.

There is an obvious paradox in Zulu's letter. How ready were they for party politics if they still sought permission from the Congress to form an opposition party? Axon Jasper Soko[136] charged that they were disillusioned with the way the ANC was conducting its affairs, but added that although they had formed a new party they would continue to give Congress their "due respect for its seniority and superiority."[137]

The attitude of Soko and Zulu reflect the notion of the National Leader [Father] or the "fanatical faith in the leader principle."[138] From the days that Harry M. Nkumbula became leader of the Congress he was widely regarded as the "Father" of Northern Rhodesian African nationalism.[139] His leadership was not to be challenged. The leader and the nationalist struggle were viewed as two sides of the

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[136] He was among those who later broke away from ANC in 1958, and was consequently appointed Zambia African National Congress' secretary for Western Province which then included the Copperbelt region.

[137] PA, ANC 5/11, Axon J. Soko to Secretary General, ANC, 24 October, 1954.

[138] Anonymous, The Northern News, Tuesday 27 January, 1953.

[139] He was usually addressed as "Father" by most of the ANC members. Letters to Nkumbula from ANC members usually addressed him as such. See for example Munukayumbu Sipalo's letter to Nkumbula, 11 November, 1957, PA, ANC 7/63. Indeed, even letters between ANC members also referred to Nkumbula as "Father". See for example, J.K. Chivunga's letter to Chiyesu, 18 October, 1957. Chivunga was then Provincial General Secretary of ANC. The same spirit was implied in Sikota Wina's letter to Nkumbula when he said, "summon together the UNIP and ANC and declare that you are moving higher in the African leadership hierarchy and that you are prepared to declare unity of all Africans under one banner - that of ANC of Northern Rhodesia. And that because of your pre-occupation with Legco matters you will take the post of **National Guardian**, leaving the entire administration into the hands of a president to be elected by both organizations." PA, ANC 7/63, 10 December, 1959. (Emphasis added).

same coin by the vast majority of the Africans in the country. To oppose the leader or to form an independent opposition party was taken to be anti-nationalist. Worse still, one risked being called a Capricornist, which to many Africans was a term of abuse. Therefore, it was this wish to appear loyal to the leader and committed to the nationalist struggle which characterized Zulu's and Soko's approach to the ANC on the question of forming an opposition party. Kenneth D. Kaunda put it more vividly in his correspondence with Colin Morris when he said the "person of the leader provides a special intense focus of loyalty."[140] Apparently, in Northern Rhodesian politics, loyalty to the leader was an important factor holding the struggle together.

Most nationalists lacked a sense of true patriotism [love of the country] because their loyalty was to the leader much more than to the country. Many nationalists could not imagine a nationalist struggle which did not have Nkumbula's blessing. There was a general tendency to equate the person of the leader with the country.

Under these circumstances not many Africans were willing to join liberal multi-racial parties and organisations. The Convention Peoples Party suffered a similar fate. Its multi-racial approach was highly resented. Liberalism, rightly or wrongly, was interpreted by Africans as designed to perpetuate the colonial rule and the imperial connections. Because liberal parties and organizations (Capricorn included) were usually directed by Europeans, these fears appeared to confirmed. Furthermore, those Africans who were prepared to discuss liberalism to have a better understanding of its principles were silenced by vocal nationalists.

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[140] Kenneth Kaunda and Colin M. Morris, A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris From Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of Zambia, (London, Longman, 1966), p. 84.

Besides, as Takawira, once Capricorn Executive Secretary, put it when explaining why many Africans did not join the multi-racial Central African Party:

> The CAP caters for the voters and as such cannot speak for the blacks with that natural and native emotion which can only be arrived at from personal suffering and humiliation which Africans encounter day in day out. European friends might be sympathizers, but not physical co-sufferers.[141]

Undoubtedly, Takawira was being propelled by what Mazrui calls the search for "pigmentational self-determination" after his resignation as Executive Secretary of Capricorn. This about-turn in Takawira's political career earned him a place among the nationalist heroes in the ZANU/PF. Terence Ranger writes that "Takawira Day was celebrated inside Mozambique during the war of the 1970s, so that his Capricorn connections were plainly not fatal to him."[142] Ranger believes that normally Capricorn connections would have been fatal in Northern Rhodesia.[143]

Northern Rhodesian Africans were more extreme than Southern Rhodesian Africans in their negative attitude towards liberalism. Most Africans saw no meeting point between themselves and Europeans. As Kaunda said, "the multi-racial bus" was

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[141] Cited in Philip Mason, Year of Decision: Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960, (London, Oxford University Press), 1960, p. 229.

[142] Letter from Terence Ranger to author, 3 January, 1989 (erroneously dated 1988). Ranger writes: "I was briefly a member of Capricorn in Southern Rhodesia at the request of the late Leopold Takawira, who received a salary and travelling expenses as the Secretary of the Society, which he was using to organise for the National Democratic Party. Sceptical though I was about the Society I agreed to join so as to provide him with cover."

[143] This is not quite correct. Known former white Capricornists were appointed to various government positions by the UNIP government. Curiously, however, while UNIP was ready to work with former white Capricornists, it was reluctant to work with former black Capricornists. Ranger's assumption is therefore applicable to Africans but not to Europeans.

not going their way.[144] The multi-racial parties emphasized economic development before political progress and many members from the business class were "obsessed with the maintenance of political stability."[145] Africans on the other hand wanted political power first and then "all else would follow."[146] This was largely because the African political elite in Northern Rhodesia came from the white collar working class and not from the business class. As such, they were more concerned with establishing their hold on the state than on economic development and on exploiting state revenue to propel themselves into a ruling elite.

These conflicting political philosophies made liberalism less attractive to the African nationalists as an ideology for the transfer of political power from European hands to a local multi-racial ruling elite. The prospect of an entirely African government was far more attractive than a multi-racial government. Consequently petit bourgeoisie members of the aspiring middle class polarized. The aspiring bureaucratic bourgeoisie which controlled UNIP clashed with blue collar working class members, especially trade unionists like Lawrence Katilungu.[147]

Nevertheless, there were a few Africans who came to believe that liberalism could and should be the basis for political development in the territory. William Nkanza and L. H. Ng'andu, both independent Members of the Legislative Council, decided to join the Liberal Party in 1961 because it "fought for Northern Rhodesia

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[144] Kaunda and Morris, Black Government?, p. 93.

[145] Mulford, Zambia, p. 49.

[146] Mulford, Zambia, p. 49.

[147] For a detailed analysis of this see, Robert H. Bates, Unions, Parties and Political Development: A Study of Mine Workers in Zambia, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1977).

and was the only party that could ensure unity in the country."[148] Yet these kinds

of political shifts were always short lived. Eventually Africans returned to the

Congress or United National Independence Party (UNIP).[149]

Liberal Ideology and the African Representative Council.

On 24 November, 1945 Governor Sir John Waddington announced the

creation of the African Representative Council (ARC) in the Legislative Council.[150]

The ARC grew out of the Provincial Councils which had been in existence for some

time in the territory. When the Provincial Councils were first established, it was

made clear that they were not to interfere with the Native Authorities. They were

meant to be organizations for the ventilation of public opinion. Their role was that

of advising Provincial Commissioners who were expected to consult them on many

issues relating to "Native" affairs. Finally, they were also to advise the Legislative

Council through the members nominated to represent "Native " interests.[151]

On 19 August, 1946 the ARC constitution was approved. It specified the

function of the Council as that of advising "the governor on matters directly affecting

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[148] The Northern News, 17 August, 1961.

[149] On the birth of the United National Independence Party, see Chapter Five.

[150] On the origins and functions of the African Representative Council, see J. W. Davidson, The Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, (London, 1948), pp. 31-4; and Dot L. Keet, "The African Representative Council, 1946-1958: A Focus on African Political Leadership And the Politics of Northern Rhodesia", M.A. Thesis, University of Zambia, 1975.

[151] NAZ, SEC 5/44, Notes on African Representative Council, 1949-1951.

the African population of the territory."[152] Besides this advisory capacity, the ARC acted as an electoral college for the election of two of its members for appointment by the governor to the Legislative Council. The ARC was not parallel to or in substitution for the Legislative Council or indeed an alternative method of representation open to Africans. It was envisaged as a training ground for future African political leaders in the territory.[153]

The ARC held its first session in November 1946 at which time the acting governor reiterated the role of the ARC in the territory's politics. He emphasized that while the ARC advised the governor, it was not its role to make laws for the land——that was to be done by the Legislative Council. He also pointed out that ARC was not expected to administer the laws of the land, for that was the responsibility of the various government departments through the chiefs and their councils and the "Native" courts.[154]   The agenda for ARC meetings was decided by the government through the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs who also presided over its meetings. Members of the Council were elected by Provincial Councils, except in Barotse Province where they were nominated by the Litunga.[155] Most of the members were initially very moderate in their political views, especially

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[152] NAZ, NR/ARC, Address by Acting Governor, Proceedings of the First Session of the Council, November, 1946. (Emphasis in original).

[153] Interview with Gabriel Musumbulwa at Luanshya, 15 May, 1989.

[154] NAZ, NR/ARC No. 1, The Proceedings of the First Session of the Council, held at the Jeans School, Chalimbana, November, 1946.

[155] Litunga was the Royal title of the Lozi king in Barotseland.

those about race relations. Moses Mubitana's address to the First Session of the ARC is a good example of friendly expression towards whites:

> On behalf of this Council and the Africans of Northern Rhodesia, I wish to take this opportunity of assuring the Europeans in this country that there is no desire on the part of all well-informed Africans to drive the Europeans south across the Zambezi. On the contrary, it is their ardent wish that they stay and continue the good work they have begun. Africans realise that their interests are interdependent with those of Europeans. Today white and black are members of one body (N.R.) and each part of the body, even the simplest, has a little contribution to give for the prosperity of the whole body.[156]

For a while the ARC remained essentially a moderate body. The government put in place a system which kept out those individuals who were perceived to be somewhat radical. In 1953 the government rejected a proposal to elect ARC members from a communal roll because it was felt that Congress would easily take control of such a system and would put its own nominees in the ARC.[157]

Consequently, the ARC was criticized by the Congress as a group of stooges unfit to elect African representatives to the Legislative Council and the Federal Assembly. Nonetheless, the ARC elected Mateyo Kakumbi (10 votes) and Dauti Yamba (9 votes) as Northern Rhodesia's Members of Parliament for African interests in the Federal Assembly. Meanwhile the ARC was planning to form a sub-committee which would have formed the nucleus from which to develop an opposition party on strictly moderate lines to oppose the African National Congress. John Moffat, author of the Moffat Resolutions, and one of the European Legco Members representing African interests, was asked to advise on the formation of this

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[156] NAZ, NR/ARC No. 1, The Proceedings of the First Session of the Council, November 1946.

[157] NAZ, SEC 5/45/275, Extract from Minutes of Executive Council, 10-11 March, 1953.

moderate party.[158] The plan was aborted because it would have antagonized African nationalists.

In the end, the colonial state's intention, in conjunction with the Colonial Office, to train moderate African politicians failed because of Congress activities which pictured moderate Africans as the worst enemy of the nationalist struggle. With time most moderate Africans in the ARC were replaced by militants. The process began at the leadership level. Moderate Godwin M. Lewanika was replaced by Harry M. Nkumbula in 1953 because of his alleged "failure to take a staunch anti-federal stand."[159] In 1951 the ARC had "dropped moderate Legislative Council Members Nelson Nalumango and Reverend Henry Kasokolo and replaced them with 'nationalistic' Congress men Dauti Yamba and Pascale Sokota."[160]

Since the political process in Northern Rhodesia was entangled with the closer association issue, the liberal wing of the settler community approached the problem of effecting the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the problem of African political advancement in Northern Rhodesia not by seeking to suppress the Congress but by trying to influence it in the right direction. As early as 1949 Sir Stewart Gore-Browne began to impress upon the government the need to come to terms with

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[158] NAZ, SEC 5/43, W.F. Stubbs to J.E. Marnharm, 17 December, 1953.

[159] Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 234, fn. 43.

[160] Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 9. Note that two years later Yamba was accused of being a stooge and not fit to represent African interests in the Federal Assembly. According to Mulford, Yamba's position as one of Northern Rhodesia's African Federal M.P.s "fatally damaged his political career." (Mulford, Zambia, p. 22).

the aspirations of "radical" Africans.[161] In 1950 he again urged the government to take heed of the "vocal and influential section of the African population" and criticized the African Representative Council as an ineffective government-sponsored, and controlled organ.[162] This criticism of the ARC by Sir Stewart Gore-Browne fuelled the African National Congress's own apprehension of the Council which increasingly came to be seen as serving the interests of the colonial state and those of the imperial authority. To protect themselves from these insinuations, most liberal minded ARC members shied away from openly embracing liberalism or Capricorn ideas.

From the mid-1950s ARC members were seen by Congress officials as "collaborators, weak-kneed ... yes-men."[163] This criticism did not, however, preclude Congress participation in the political machinery of which the ARC formed but a part. There was always an overlap between ANC and the ARC during much of the life of the latter. Despite ANC's vicious condemnation of the ARC, the two bodies worked in cooperation. Congress officials, including Kenneth Kaunda, Harry Nkumbula and Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe were members of Urban Advisory Councils which elected some of their members to the ARC. Much of the criticism had to do with the fact that Congress wanted more political influence than was possible under the conditions of the time.

Ultimately, on 3 October 1958 the ARC was abolished. Constitutional changes which were being effected had made the ARC irrelevant——particularly the provisions of what became known as the Benson Constitution which, for the first

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[161] Keet, "The African Representative Council," p. 17.

[162] Keet, "The African Representative Council," p. 17.

[163] Munukayumbu Sipalo, cited in Keet, "The African Representative Council," p. 144.

time, made a start towards replacing racial representation with a system under which all members of the Legislative Council were to be elected by a "common machinery providing for direct representation of all qualified voters in a geographical constituency."[164] The ARC held its last meeting on 20 October, marking the end of the official experiment in nurturing liberal politics.

The negative propaganda against Capricorn made it difficult for the Society to gain valuable support from some of the moderate ARC members. Congress "militancy", in the end, proved more influential than the Society's liberal ideology. The presence of Congress elements on the ARC kept Capricorn at a distance. By 1958 when the ARC was dissolved, most its members belonged to Congress and openly criticized Capricorn. The moderate element had been systematically replaced by militants. Capricorn found, not allies, but adversaries in the ARC.

Conclusion.

Assessing Capricorn's impact on Northern Rhodesia's political scene has always been a controversial exercise. Those who emphasize the failure of liberalism in general and that of Capricorn in particular suggest that the Society had no impact on the territory's politics at all. Sondashi, for example, argued that "CAS never actually took off in Northern Rhodesia."[165] It is hard to understand how he arrived at that conclusion when there is irrefutable evidence of Capricorn activities in Northern Rhodesia for the period up to 1959. In contrast, Dr. Charles Fisher argued

[164] Cmd. 530, Northern Rhodesia Proposals for Constitutional Change, September, 1958, p. 20, cited in Mulford, Zambia, p. 57.

[165] Sondashi, "Politics of the Voice," p. 83.

that Capricorn was a useful organization because it made Europeans think realistically about racial matters in the country.[166] The evidence suggests that the influence of Capricorn on Northern Rhodesia's politics, though limited, cannot be overlooked.

A Capricorn Executive Officer noted during his visit to Northern Rhodesia in September 1959 that even though the name Capricorn was "not much used, its ideas and ideals inspire some of the most hopeful thought and action that are going on."[167] In fact, long after Capricorn was officially closed in Northern Rhodesia, Kenneth Kaunda admitted during an interview with Commander Fox-Pitt that Capricorn ideas were essentially useful, while arguing that the Society was being used to the detriment of Africans. According to Fergus MacPherson, "in the eyes of Kaunda and his associates 'Capricorn was dirty because of the people using it'"[168]—not because of its ideas.

However, an assessment of the Society's impact is rendered difficult by the overwhelmingly negative attitude directed towards liberal organisations in general. Former participants are still reluctant to discuss their involvement in the Society.[169] Capricorn's support for federation when it was suspected of being a "Vampire men"

[166] Dr. Charles Fisher, Interview with Jane L. Parpart, 21 August, 1976.

[167] CAS Papers, File No. 128, Secretarial Report on the visit to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, August/September, 1959, p. 13.

[168] Fergus MacPherson, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times And The Man, (Lusaka, 1974), p. 115.

[169] During my field trip in Zambia individuals I had identified as former Capricorn members or sympathizers declined to be interviewed.

movement, was really an albatross around the Capricorn neck, which it could not rid itself of.

The formal closure of the Society in Northern Rhodesia did not mean the end of Capricorn-related programmes. Some of these were implemented well after Capricorn was officially wound up. The multi-racial club in Luanshya was opened in June 1962 with the financial support of the Roan Antelope Consolidated Mines (R.A.C.M.). I.R. Menzies, a former Capricorn member, who was also African Personnel Manager at Roan, informed the 500 guests at the opening ceremony that the "Company hoped the club would contribute towards peaceful co-existence in the townships."[170] Augustine Nkole who was elected club chairperson told the gathering that the club "was a remarkable example of industrial solidarity at Roan." The opening of the club was a reflection of the usefulness of Capricorn social ideology.

Liberalism as an ideology for the transfer of power was not attractive to African nationalists because it was a depolarizing movement. African nationalism, on the other hand was essentially a race conscious phenomenon. As such, it felt threatened by liberalism which emphasized multi-racialism. The UNIP Constitution, for example, did not reflect the multi-racial character of Northern Rhodesia. It was deliberately designed to be "uni-racial". Kenneth Kaunda, President of the party justified this in the following words:

> I believe that one joins a political party because he feels that party would help him solve certain problems. At the same time those people who join that political party must have common problems. Today in Northern Rhodesia the problems that conflict us as a mixed society are so many and varied that I cannot see how a multi-racial party would help, i.e., the major problems are not common problems at all.   Nationalism is one of the greatest forces of the twentieth century. We do not need to find ground for unity as does a multi-racial party ——our unity is already

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[170] Roan Antelope: A Newspaper for Employees, 9 June, 1962, p. 15.

there in the colour of our skin and our common suffering. This is a great emotional force and one which can be harnessed for political progress.[171]

Undoubtedly, Kaunda's conception of the African struggle, though described in the neo-liberal idiom of the struggle "for human rights—the inalienable rights of all men,"[172] never saw multi-racialism as an alternative approach to deal with problems created by the colonial state. African nationalists were always suspicious of white led depolarizing movements like Capricorn.

In Northern Rhodesia, the more militant nationalism became, the more racially exclusive it became, and the more intolerant it became. As Kenneth Kaunda put it in 1960—"Our problem is practical, not ideological. After all, there are 3,000,000 of us and only 72,000 whites."[173] The nation, it seems, was to be defined in terms of skin colour. In such terms the prospects for a liberal ideology stressing individual worth was doomed absolutely.

Capricorn and liberalism in general, also suffered from lack of commitment from a sizeable proportion its African and European members. African Capricornists were easily overwhelmed by nationalist militancy. Takawira met African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia several times. Yet, he never attempted to win them over to the Capricorn cause. Instead, he went over to them. In 1960, while touring Northern Rhodesia in his capacity as the Society's Executive Secretary, he attended a UNIP rally in Ndola. Takawira later reported:

> My presence at that meeting had not been heralded, but to my great surprise, on my arrival there an African newspaper reporter recognized

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[171] Kenneth Kaunda in Kaunda and Morris, _Black Government?_, p. 93.

[172] _Ibid._, loc. cit..

[173] Richard Hall, _Kaunda Founder of Zambia,_ (Longmans, London, 1964), p. 80.

me and in a moment it was known that I had arrived, and there were at once cries of "Freedom" *"Kwacha"* and all sorts of African songs. I was conducted, amidst applause and cheers, to the dais. After many speakers had addressed the rally, I was formally introduced to the 40,000 odd audience as a "fellow Freedom fighter." The sound which rose from the thousands of throats almost frightened me. Here I was an Executive Officer of the hated Capricorn Africa Society received so tumultuously. It did not sound quite correct or true, perhaps to me; the majority of the people there did not know I had any connection with the CAS, although the leaders were aware of this fact.[174]

Takawira's attitude in the presence of African nationalists represented the behaviour of most African Capricornists under similar circumstances.

At a meeting organized by Northern Rhodesia Capricornists in April 1960, Takawira urged them to throw in their lot with UNIP.[175] While a guest of Kaunda, Takawira did not discuss Capricorn. This should not come as a surprise considering that Takawira was himself already more involved with the National Democratic Party (N.D.P.) in Southern Rhodesia. Though he was the Executive Officer of Capricorn, his interests had completely shifted.

At the same time Capricorn's attitude towards former African members who joined nationalist parties was self-defeating. Capricorn abandoned such people. For instance, when Takawira resigned as Capricorn's Executive Secretary in Salisbury to concentrate on nationalist politics, Lewis, who was the Executive Officer in London, wrote that the London office was "not in any way associated with or responsible for his activities as a representative of the National Democratic Party."[176] This attitude

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[174] CAS Papers, File No. 52, Report of Executive Officer's Northern Rhodesia Trip, 27 March to 10 April, 1960.

[175] CAS Papers, File No. 52, Leopold Takawira to David Stirling, 21 April, 1960.

[176] CAS Papers, Files No.34, J. Lewis to Fred Rea, 6 November, 1961.

raised suspicion among Africans. The patronizing behaviour of white Capricornists towards their black counterparts further alienated the latter from Capricorn.[177]

African nationalists continued to see multi-racialism as an obstacle to Northern Rhodesia's political change. Although they acknowledged the participation of European "liberals" in the ending of colonial rule, they believed that only Africans fully understood what they were struggling against.[178]

Nevertheless, Capricorn and liberal activism did have some influence on the decolonization of Northern Rhodesia. Capricorn contributed to moderating militant African nationalist political speeches. Some prominent European Capricornists or those who were clearly sympathetic to Capricorn ideas became trusted friends and advisors of nationalist leaders. It is therefore tenable to argue that these individuals had some influence on these African leaders despite Capricorn's apparent failure.[179]

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[177] CAS Papers, File No. 125, Highly Confidential letter from Henry Crookenden to Whitney Straight, 25 January, 1960. It described Takawira as "a devoted, courageous and effective propagandist for the multi-racial or non-racial approach...but...weak administratively" and that he needed the support of a white man.

[178] Mason, Year of Decision, p. 229 and Kaunda and Morris, Black Government?, p. 93.

[179] Some of the known white Capricorn members who later joined UNIP and exerted obvious influence on Kaunda included Colin Morris and Reverend Merfyn Temple.

CHAPTER FIVE.

TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE: LIBERALISM AND THE TRIUMPH OF AFRICAN POPULIST NATIONALISM, 1958 TO 1964.

Analyses of Northern Rhodesia's "march to political freedom"[1] are far from lacking. These studies range from what Fanuel K.M. Sumaili describes as *confessional* writings[2] to works by professional historians, political scientists and interested political commentators.[3] If there is any point of convergence between these works, it is in their handling of the nationalist movement, which is portrayed as a struggle against the unjust political system then in place.

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[1] The phrase is borrowed from the title of Kapasa Makasa's book, Zambia's March To Political Freedom, (Nairobi, Heinemann, 1985).

[2] Fanuel K. M. Sumaili, "The Self and Biographical Writings in Zambia," Zango, 3, 1 (1988), p. 72.

[3] For works in the first category see, Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free, (London, Heinemann, 1962); Wittington K. Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, (Lusaka, Neczam, 1979); Kapasa Makasa, Zambia's March to Political Freedom,; Sikota Wina, A Night Without A President, (Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, 1985); and Goodwin Mwangilwa, A Biography of the 'Old Lion' of Zambia, (Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, 1982). Sumaili refers to these works as confessional writings "because each one of them is a kind of manifesto of the inner world, a turning away from the mechanical and public to the beauties and dangers of the inner soul; they are an attempt to explore nakedly and without apology the unchartered territory of the man himself." (Sumaili, "The Self," p.72). Works in the second category include, Richard Hall, Zambia, (New York, Praeger, 1965); Andrew Roberts, A History of Zambia, (New York, Africana, 1976); Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, (Harvard University Press, 1966); David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964, London, Oxford University Press, 1967); Fergus MacPherson, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and the Man, (Lusaka, Oxford University Press, 1974); Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds.), The Dynamics of One-Party State in Zambia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984); and William Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1974).

African nationalism began essentially as a reformist movement, which "sought not the overthrow of the system, which appeared secure and permanent, but its liberalization."[4] According to Ibbo D. J. Mandaza, African nationalism developed as a political response to imperialism and its racial ideology of white supremacy.[5] Mandaza added that:

> For all its apparent militancy and anti-colonialist stance, African nationalism is essentially a liberal ideology. This is not surprising since liberalism itself is part of the capitalist ideology and as the capitalist mode of production is dominant in the colonial society, it follows that the capitalist (or bourgeois) ideology is also the dominant ideology—as the ideology of the ruling class—in such a society, and penetrates the entire fabric of the colonial society, through economic, political and social structures, which emerged during colonization. More specifically, liberalism (as part of the capitalist ideology) is imparted into the colonized through the colonialist educational system, the christian religion and various other forms of cultural and ideological expressions of colonial life.[6]

No one can deny that initially African nationalism was essentially a struggle for individual rights by the African emerging elites. They were mainly interested in some limited access to power—both political and economic.

However, settler demands for self-government on the Southern Rhodesia model, before Africans achieved even limited access to power, transformed what was really a reformist movement into a militant organization, which adopted a seemingly populist ideology. This transformation gained currency because of the spectre of

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[4] Richard Hodder-Williams, An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 69.

[5] Ibbo Day Joseph Mandaza, "White Settler Ideology, African Nationalism and the 'Coloured' Question in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Northern Rhodesia/Zambia and Nyasaland/Malawi, 1900-1976," D. Phil., University of York (UK), 1978, p. 813.

[6] Mandaza, "White Settler Ideology," p. 817.

federation which Africans feared and opposed.[7] Nonetheless, there was never a clear break with the past. In spite of its "apparent militancy and the anti-colonialist stance," African nationalism expressed itself through liberal rhetoric as a struggle for the inalienable rights of man. Yet, the extent to which liberal rhetoric by nationalist parties was a reflection of the influence of liberal organizations has so far been ignored. Instead, liberalism has continued to be summarily dismissed as "Africa's lost cause."[8]

This chapter seeks therefore, to depart from this common practice by investigating the relevance and impact of liberalism on the "march to political freedom" in Northern Rhodesia. Secondly, it seeks to explore the extent to which "Africanism"[9] as opposed to nationalism, determined the course of this march.

"Africanism" rejected liberal ideology as an alternative approach to decolonization. The term "Africanism" was first used by Lord Hailey in his monumental *An African Survey*. He suggested that it seemed advisable at the time

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[7] African protests against federation are well documented. For example see, Rotberg, The Rise of African Nationalism, pp. 215-302.

[8] George Keith, The Fading Colour Bar, (London, Robert Hale, 1966), p. 64.

[9] According M. G. de Winton, "To argue that the growth of "nationalism" hastened on political advance has no reality when applied to tropical African territories. The creation of a sense of national identity was one of the problems of nation building. A much more likely source of common motive was the spirit of Africanism, that is an understandable desire to get rid of the control of the white man." (M. G. de Winton, "Decolonization and the Westminster Model," in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), The Transfer of Power: The Colonial Administration in the Age of Decolonization, Kidlington Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 184). De Winton's concept of Africanism is not far from Mazrui's pigmentational self-determination referred to earlier.

"to give prominence to the use of the term 'Africanism' rather than 'nationalism'."[10]

According to Lord Hailey, nationalism as understood in Europe was "a readily recognizable force, ... but as a concept it has associations which make it difficult of application in the conditions of Africa."[11] He suggested that "taking the African peoples at large, the term 'Africanism' seems to describe most nearly the movement which is now so much in evidence in many of the countries dealt with in the survey."[12] He further noted that the spirit of "Africanism" had two characteristic phases. One he considered more definite and in that sense more constructive than the other.

The more constructive phase envisaged the attainment of a government dominated by Africans. Such a government would express in its institutions the characteristic spirit of Africa as interpreted by the modern African.[13] This positive interpretation of "Africanism" contrasted with the Capricorn view, which identified "Africanism" as one of the dangers facing Africa.[14] Capricorn argued that "the African people lacked the numbers, the technical skill, and the maturity to provide

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[10] Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, (London, Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 251.

[11] Hailey, An African Survey, p. 251.

[12] Hailey, An African Survey, p. 252.

[13] Hailey, An African Survey, p. 252.

[14] PRO, DO 35/3603/9, Acting President CAS to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, 2 November 1951, p. 5. According to Capricorn the "unhealthy and dangerous kind of African nationalism has been given additional fillip by the faulty timing of the Gold Coast experiment, the unfortunate behaviour of British politicians towards British settlers in this part of Africa..."

for the timely development of the continent."[15] The Society suggested that this development could be best achieved by combining, on a more extensive scale, western immigration and technology with the latent capacity of the African and other races. It was for this reason that Capricorn sponsored and championed the cause of multi-racialism.

The March to Political Freedom: 1958-1964.

> What is it that we are fighting and sacrificing for? One, we want to get rid of foreign domination. Two, we are determined that the present bogus constitution must go. Three, that the majority must rule. Four, that there never can be any other safe repository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves, which in fact means that you will never be respected unless and until you yourselves control the reins of power.
>   Our problem is practical not ideological. *After all, there are 3,000,000 of us and only 72,000 whites.*[16]

This brief extract from Kenneth Kaunda's speech in 1960 expressed the core of the ideology of African "populist" nationalism——"Africanism"——that is the need of African nationalists to be in control of the political system. The slogan "Seek ye first

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[15] NAZ, NR 8/7/38, The Salisbury Declarations, 1952, para. 3.

[16] Cited from Richard Hall, *Kaunda: Founder of Zambia*, (London, Longman, 1964), p. 80 (Italics added). The last remark confirms de Winton's suggestion that "a much more likely source of common motive was the spirit of 'Africanism', that is an understandable desire to get rid of the control of white men." (M. G. de Winton, "Decolonization," p. 184).

the political Kingdom"[17] found wide appeal amongst Northern Rhodesia's militant nationalists.

From 1924 to 1954 the constitutional arrangements had almost completely consolidated political power in the hands of white settlers. The Colonial Office had meanwhile satisfied itself that political stability would be maintained so long as the political aspirations of the settler community were fulfilled. After all, Africans were yet to prove that they were fit to share in the administration of the country. Although the 1935 and 1940 Copperbelt strikes had sent messages of African discontent, the colonial state in Northern Rhodesia interpreted the strikes as labour, not political problems.[18]

The federation question quickened and intensified African nationalist activism, which began to influence the constitutional process in a different direction. Contrary to pro-federation propaganda, the reality of federation after 1953 did not lead to the end of African opposition. African nationalists (in the north especially) pointed to federation as a clear example of the strengthening of white domination. There is no doubt that federation was an effective propaganda subject for the nationalists. They were not willing to cooperate with the Federal government which represented settler

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[17] The slogan was popularized by Kwame Nkrumah, but was one which Sir Stewert Gore-Browne frequently used to counteract Capricorn "liberal" argument that what Africans needed most was economic advancement first before they began to aspire for political advancement. Gore-Browne was a "liberal" himself, but was opposed to the idea of economic progress as a determinant for political advancement, which formed part of the Capricorn philosophy.

[18] Although political implications of the strikes were beginning to emerge, especially in the 1940 strike, the problem was perceived as largely to do with the Copperbelt and not national. In response therefore, the Forster Commission recommended the setting up of some quasi-political bodies through which Africans in the mining towns could express their political views. The result was the creation of the African Urban Advisory Councils on the Copperbelt in 1938.

triumph and Colonial Office betrayal of African nationalist trust. Meanwhile the Colonial Office was increasingly anxious to secure that cooperation without undermining the authority of the Federal government. How was this to be accomplished?

Colonial authorities in Northern Rhodesia, with the Colonial Office, diagnosed the problem to be the absence of non-racial politics in the territory. Africans and Europeans were constantly divided on racial lines. Having diagnosed the problem, Northern Rhodesia Governor, Sir Arthur E. T. Benson was asked to come up with a solution.[19]

Benson's answer to the problem was that in future all constitutional changes should aim at encouraging the development of non-racial politics. The final objective would be parity in the legislature. There was to be a gradual moving away from the system of racial representation to a constitutional stage when Members of the Legislative Council (M.L.C.s) were elected by, and represented members of a geographical constituency rather than members of a particular racial group.[20] In part, therefore, Benson's approach sought to adjust the representative estates of the colonial state to strengthen it.

Governor Benson's proposals for constitutional changes were inspired by Sir John Moffat's 1954 Resolutions, which he hoped would guide future policy in the country. The four resolutions adopted in the Legislative Council (Legco) on 29 July 1954 read:

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[19] PRO, DO 35/4636/282, Brief for Secretary of State's visit to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, December 1956 to January 1957, p. 1, para. 2.

[20] PRO, DO 35/4636/282, Brief for Secretary of State's visit, para. 4. See also PRO, DO 35/4636/333, Constitutional Change in Northern Rhodesia, p. 8, para. 18.

1. The objective of policy in Northern Rhodesia must be to remove from each race the fear that the other race might dominate for its own racial benefit and to move forward from the present system of racial representation in the territorial legislature towards a franchise with no separate representation for the races.

2. Until that objective can be fully achieved a period of transition will remain during which special arrangements in the Legislative and Executive Councils must continue to be made so as to ensure that no race can use either the preponderance of its numbers or its more advanced stage of development to dominate the other for its own racial benefit.

3. During this period of transition, special legislation must be in force to protect, to the extent that may be necessary, in the interests of either race. Meanwhile this Council notes and agrees with the statement of the Secretary of State that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that on contentious issues the balance is fairly held.

4. Every lawful inhabitant of Northern Rhodesia has the right to progress according to his character, qualification, training, ability, and industry, without distinction of race, colour or creed.[21]

The Resolutions were well received both in Northern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom. On 20 July Sir Thomas Lloyd minuted the Colonial Secretary that the Resolutions should be accepted as a basis for future constitutional development in the country.[22]

However, Governor Benson informed the Colonial Secretary that the Moffat Resolutions introduced no new principle into the policy followed by the United Kingdom Government since 1924. The essence of the Resolutions, he noted, was that they set the principles on which government policy was based and confirmed that the special arrangements and the special legislation already established, were

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[21] NAZ, SEC 5/270, The Moffat Resolutions, Legco Debates, 29 July, 1954.

[22] PRO, CO 1015/1016, Minute by Sir Thomas Lloyd, 20 July, 1954.

essential. The acceptance and adoption of the Resolutions was an "act of confirmation" of government policy, he concluded.[23]

Africans, no less than Europeans initially responded to the Resolutions with excitement. The ANC's "New Look" policy was as much a reflection of the party's acceptance of the Resolutions as it was a reflection of the influence of Harry Franklin on the Congress leader.[24] The "New Look" policy was based on the assumption that what Africans required was not so much a rapid advance in the political field, but a gradual well-grounded political advancement preceded by economic development. These ideas conformed to the Capricorn philosophy which nationalists consistently rejected. Nkumbula insisted that Congress should abandon extremism and adopt moderate policies instead.[25] This position squarely placed Nkumbula outside "populist" political activism favoured by most militant nationalists.

Wittington K. Sikalumbi records that Nkumbula's insistence on the "New Look" policy led to the resignation of Job Mayanda, the Treasurer General and Titus Mukupo, the Clerk of Council, from the Executive Council of the party.[26] Nkumbula was unmoved by these resignations. After the Executive Council meeting Nkumbula, Kaunda, Justin Chimba and Sikalumbi went to the Government Secretariat Building where they met European members of the legislature in the Legislative Council lobby room. During the meeting Nkumbula gave a statement of

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[23] PRO, CO 1015/1016/19, Governor Benson to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 October, 1954.

[24] Wittington K. Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, (Lusaka, Neczam, 1978), p. 88.

[25] Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 88.

[26] Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 88.

the Congress "New Look" policy to John Roberts, leader of the unofficials.[27] The

statement read:

> There are many things that Congress must do which would take a little
> time. We must control our members and our branches better. We
> must control and educate on better lines our extremists. On both
> sides, both Africans and Europeans, there is room for better
> understanding.
>
> By this statement, by bringing the Congress onto constitutional
> practice, and by assuring Africans of this country that the Government
> of Northern Rhodesia is impartial and genuinely interested in
> improving the conditions under which Africans live, I am quite
> confident that race relations will improve to the satisfaction of every
> decent person in this country.
>
> We will do our best to work for the development of Northern
> Rhodesia and all its people, but for this we need the help and
> sympathy of all liberal minded Europeans.[28]

Clearly, the "New Look" policy sought to reform the Congress and prepare it for

participation in the multi-racial politics which were then the subject of proposed

constitutional changes.

Before long, however, nationalists began to despair and question the

significance of the Resolutions. Kaunda, then Secretary General of the Congress,

wrote:

> After the announcement was made about the Moffat Resolutions,
> which support the abolition of the practice of nominated Europeans to
> represent African interests in the Legislative Council and the African
> Representative Council which now operates as the electoral college for
> African candidates to the Legislative Council and Federal Parliament,
> an impression was created upon the people of Northern Rhodesia that
> the Resolutions would form a basis for constitutional talks. The
> people are at a loss as to whether the undefined exotic constitutional
> changes were the same as the Moffat Resolutions.[29]

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[27] John Roberts was at the time leader of Northern
Rhodesia division of the United Federal Party which was headed
by Sir Roy Welensky at the federal level.

[28] Cited in Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 90.

[29] PA, ANC 7/108, Kenneth Kaunda, Secretary General, ANC
to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 March, 1955. The is
no record that this letter was responded to. There are two

There was a genuine concern about what was being done (or not done) to put the Resolutions into effect. A month later, Francis Mwaba, a Congress member stated that if Europeans wanted to avoid "Mau Mau" they should accept the Moffat Resolutions.[30]

Meanwhile, the ANC continued to press the imperial government to enfranchise British Protected Persons and to lower income and property qualifications to £50 and £100 respectively. The Congress asked for a single common roll for blacks and whites and a House of Representatives with a total of thirty seats. Its members were to be entirely elected. The Congress also asked for a cabinet of ten Ministers distributed equally between the two races.[31] The government rejected these demands as they implied an immediate African majority in the Legco. The rejection suggests the extent to which multi-racialism was acceptable. Imperial authorities were not ready to have parity in the Legco yet. Parity in the Legco would eventually have forced a cabinet of equal representation for both races to work together. This did not stop African nationalists from making further demands for constitutional changes.

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possible explanations: (1) records in the Party Archives are not properly kept; (2) Colonial Officials did not respond to all letters from nationalists, even though they sometimes discussed them.

[30] NAZ, SEC 5/270, Francis Mwaba, 6 April, 1955.

[31] PA, ANC 7/108, Kenneth Kaunda to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 March, 1955.

In June 1956 Francis Chembe moved a motion in the African Representative Council (ARC)[32] that the government should give British Protected Persons the right to vote on a common roll based on the following qualifications:

(a) twenty-one years of age;
(b) residential period of three years for immigrants;
(c) ability to read and write in the vernacular;
(d) either property of not less than £50; or
(e) an income of not less than £5 a month.[33]

Although these proposals were not calling for one man, one vote, the government rejected them along with those put forward earlier by the ANC. It argued that lower income and property qualifications would enfranchise thousands of Africans, especially on the Copperbelt and the line of rail. Inevitably, the African vote would have swamped the European vote, making it necessary to transfer political power to a largely "ill-prepared" electorate. This was a political scenario the colonial government and the Colonial Office had been trying to avoid all along. Yet had the education, income and property qualifications been applied rigidly, the outcome would have been parity.

Governor Benson had a four-pronged formula with which to respond to the problem: (1) that there should be qualitative democracy; (2) that Europeans should never be swamped by Africans; (3) that British Protected Persons should be admitted to the franchise; and (4) that the system to be adopted should break away from

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[32] Francis Chembe was also a Federal M.P. The African Representative Council was a government instituted body through which Africans were expected to air their political views. For a detailed discussion refer to Chapter Four.

[33] NAZ African Representative Council Proceedings, 14-16 June, 1956.

racialism.[34] In other words, he wanted politics in Northern Rhodesia to develop along multi-racial party lines and avoid racial confrontation.

Consequently, the White Paper[35] published in September 1958 was based on that principle. It envisaged moving away from racial representation to a system by which all members would be elected to the Council by a common electoral process. The system suggested provided for direct representation of qualified voters in a geographical constituency. Most important, the 1958 constitutional proposals aimed at placing the government "in the hands of responsible men,—men with the understanding and of sufficient education and experience of affairs to be able to reason and to exercise judgement between alternative courses of action."[36]

The Benson Constitution, as the Proposals became known, was heavily influenced by the liberal ideas in favour at the time. The fundamental principle was to establish an electoral machinery designed to encourage the return of moderate politicians from both sections of the community.[37] The Benson Constitution acknowledged that the gap between Africans and Europeans was too wide for multi-racial politics to be achieved within a short period. It was hoped, however, that since only those who positively contributed to the wealth and welfare of the country would

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[34] PRO, DO 35/4636/382, Brief for Secretary of State's visit to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, December 1956 to January 1957, p. 2, para. 4.

[35] Cmd. 530, Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, 1958.

[36] PRO, DO 35/4636/333, Draft White Paper, February, 1958, p. 8, para. 19.

[37] The proposals added that "the electoral system must encourage the return of men and women who were prepared and indeed disposed to consider and balance the interests of all racial groups, and who are prompted primarily by a spirit of public service to the whole community; it must discourage the return of extremists who look to sectional interests alone." (PRO, DO 35/4636/333, Draft White Paper, p. 8 para. 19).

be enfranchised, the problem of one race (African) swamping the other (European) would be minimized.[38]

The need for a liberal political instrument committed to multi-racial politics and the encouragement of multi-racial parties as opposed to racial politics inevitably resulted in the most complicated constitution that was ever introduced by Britain in Northern Rhodesia or perhaps any other colony. The Constitution also brought about a split in the Congress between those who wanted to give the new constitution a chance and those who were adamantly opposed to its adoption.[39]

The 1958 government proposals aimed at broadening the franchise so as "to do justice both to individuals and to the African race as a whole."[40] The proposals were designed to give a political voice only to those who had achieved a certain European standard, while avoiding leaving the African race feeling under-represented and ignored. The Northern Rhodesia Government believed that these considerations could be satisfied by introducing a second lower set of temporary qualifications which would enable some Africans to qualify at once. It gave the vote to all those who were approaching the threshold of European standards while excluding others who had not yet reached that point.[41] Both sets of qualifications were initially to follow those set for the Federal elections——an arrangement which made African nationalists particularly unhappy. The proposed qualifications were as follows:

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[38] PRO, DO 35/4636/333, Draft White Paper, p. 9, para. 20 and 22.

[39] For a detailed discussion of the split of ANC see David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964, (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 73-81.

[40] PRO, DO 35/4636/333, Draft White Paper, p. 15, para. 31.

[41] PRO, DO 35/4636/333, Draft white Paper, p. 15, para. 31.

<u>Ordinary Voters.</u>

(a) £720 p.a. (or ownership, including leasehold, of property valued at £1,500); or
(b) £480 p.a. (or ownership, including leasehold, of property valued at £1,000), plus primary education; or

(c) £300 p.a. (or ownership, including leasehold, of property valued at £500), plus four years secondary education; or

(d) Ministers of Religion who have undergone certain stipulated courses of training and periods of service in the Ministry and who follow no other profession or gainful occupation; or

(e) Paramount Chiefs and other Chiefs recognized by the Governor; or those certified by the Resident Commissioner in the Barotseland Protectorate to be of equivalent status.

<u>Special Voters.</u>

(a) £150 p.a. (or ownership, including leasehold, of property valued at £500); or

(b) £120 p.a. plus two years secondary education; or

(c) In addition persons described in paragraph 33 would also be enfranchised for territorial elections.[42]

The following qualifications were required for <u>all</u> voters:

(i) <u>Simple literacy</u>: applicants must be able to complete in English without assistance the application to be registered as a voter.

(ii) <u>Age</u>: Minimum age 21.

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[42] Paragraph 33 read: "The Government have welcomed the decision of the Federal Government to award the vote to Chiefs in their own right, without regard to the means of qualification, and propose that Chiefs should be similarly enfranchised as ordinary voters on the territorial roll. The Government also propose in the territorial franchise to exempt from the means qualifications, though not of course from the other general qualifications, applicants within the following additional groups for registration as special voters:

(i) persons who are and have been for the past two years Headmen or hereditary Councillors, who are recognized as such by their Chiefs, and who are recommended by their Chiefs, and are performing unpaid service in such office to the community;

(ii) persons who are in receipt of a monthly or annual pension earned after 20 years service with one employer.

(iii) <u>Nationality</u>: British Subjects, citizen of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, or British Protected Persons by virtue of connection with Northern Rhodesia.

(iv) <u>Residence</u>: Two years in the territory and three months in the constituency.[43]

The government proposals also provided for a Legislative Council composed of a speaker and thirty members constituted as follows:

    22 elected members
    6 Official members
    2 nominated members.

The twenty-two directly-elected members were to be secured as follows:

    12 members to be elected in 12 "Ordinary" constituencies;
    6 members to be elected in 6 "special" constituencies;
    2 Europeans to be elected in seats specifically reserved for Europeans; and
    2 Africans elected to be in seats specifically reserved for Africans.

Candidates for the ordinary constituencies were to be elected by voters of every race and each would accordingly represent all racial groups.[44]

For all its short-comings and complicated electoral processes, the Benson constitution of 1959 was the first to break away from past practice. The constitution paved the way for the enfranchisement of approximately 24,648 Africans compared to 13,382 Europeans and 1,254 Asians, and provided for eight African seats in the twenty-six member Legislative Council. This was a significant constitutional development considering there had been only eleven enfranchised Africans on the

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[43] PRO, DO 35/4636/333, PRO DO 35/4636/333, Draft White Paper, p. 15. para. 31.

[44] PRO, DO 35/4636/333, Draft White Paper, p. 19, para. 47.

1957 voters' roll[45] and only four African Legco members, elected through an electoral college system culminating in the African Representative Council.

The Benson constitution initiated a process of change in the composition of the power base of the colonial state. Arguably, it laid (or at least it intended to lay) the foundations of liberal democracy in Northern Rhodesia. Yet, the response it received was reminiscent of Hegel's comment on Spain:

> Napoleon wished to give Spaniards a constitution *a priori* but the project turned out badly enough. A constitution is not just something manufactured; it is the work of centuries, it is the Idea, the consciousness of rationality so far as that consciousness is developed in a particular nation. No constitution therefore, is just the creation of its subjects. What Napoleon gave to the Spaniards was more rational than what they had before, and yet they recoiled from it as from something alien, *because they were not yet educated up to its level.*[46]

This comment has a good deal of bearing on the Northern Rhodesian situation. Although the Benson constitution was more rational for Northern Rhodesia, the people were *"not yet educated up to its level."*

While militant African nationalists felt the constitution did not go far enough to meet their expectations, the European community, for different reasons, believed the pace of change was too fast. Even the most liberal whites believed Africans were not yet ready for democracy. Speaking in the Federal Assembly in June 1961, Sir John Moffat said:

> I would suggest now that the existing system cannot be permitted to continue, but the European population should demand its alteration.

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[45] PRO, DO 35/4636/282, Brief for Secretary of State's visit to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, December 1956-January 1957, p. 1, para. 1 (3). The same voters' roll had 13,382 Europeans and 1,254 Asians. Most Northern Rhodesian Africans were British Protected Persons, and were thereby excluded from the voters' roll.

[46] Cited in Denis Austin, "What Happened To The Colonial State?", The Round Table, 295, (1985), p. 210 (Italics added).

> There is a mathematical certainty that within a period, which can be calculated with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes, the African people, under our present electoral laws, will be in a majority on the voters' roll. Once that happened, it was doubtful whether democracy would be maintained.[47]

It is ironical that Sir John Moffat, author of the 1954 Resolutions, should have made this statement in the Federal Assembly, when the Benson constitution had already given Africans a majority on the Northern Rhodesia's voters' roll. In Northern Rhodesia he saw the role of the Liberal Party as transitory for a period lasting not more than five years.[48] His assessment of the Northern Rhodesian situation was based on the same mathematical formula he was now advising Federal MPs to watch carefully. Nonetheless, his views reflected the thinking of most Europeans, both on the right and on the left, though for different reasons. For Moffat, the African majority needed time to learn the basics of liberal democracy and the art of governance before they took over the government.

The Benson constitution sought to introduce multi-racial party politics in the country.[49] Nkumbula felt that the constitution should be given a fair trial. Yet the party's militants, led by Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, were dissatisfied and became apprehensive about the prospects of nationalist success with such a conciliatory policy. The conflict between moderate Nkumbula and militants like Kapwepwe was over timing and the rate of change. The Benson constitution did not rule out African majority in the Legco but it set a slower pace towards that objective. This was

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[47] Cited in The Northern News, 23 June, 1961.

[48] John Moffat, "The Role of the Liberal in Rhodesian Politics," Central African Examiner, 24 September, 1960, p. 13.

[49] For a detailed discussion of the franchise arrangement it introduced see, David C. Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Election 1962, (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 11-12.

essentially the Capricorn view of the democratization process. Militant nationalists sought an immediate majority in the Legco and therefore, opposed gradualism implied by the Benson constitution.

Attempts to replace Nkumbula as leader of the party failed. Although Kaunda had by 1957 risen to prominence in the Congress, he was not able to replace Nkumbula as leader. Throughout 1957 and part of 1958 the young militants unsuccessfully tried to replace Nkumbula. Finally on the night of 24 October 1958, Kapwepwe, Kamanga and others, followed by Kaunda an hour later, broke away and formed the Zambia Africa National Congress (ZANC).[50] Nkumbula's fall from grace was no doubt assisted by his drinking and self-indulgence, but his moderate political stance was the main cause for complaint among the radical nationalists who deserted him.

Kapasa Makasa also cites ethnic conflicts as contributing to the eventual split of the ANC:

> Nkumbula was a good strategist. Having realized that all was not well with him in the party, he summoned an emergency meeting of the executive committee in October 1958 for the purpose of giving the president general wider powers.... To ensure that there would a majority for him in the committee when it came to voting on the amendments, Nkumbula had brought into the committee a contingent of his supporters from Southern Province, his home area, who were neither members of the central committee nor the party, contrary to

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[50] Sikota Wina, A Night Without A President, (Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, 1985), p. 43. The decision to name the new party Zambia African National Congress was taken deliberately to replace the ANC. According to Makasa, "the people were used to the name 'African National Congress,' which had been in use for eight years, it would be unwise for us to come out with a completely different name which would not be easy for them to pick up quickly. Our task was therefore, to find a name which should be as near as possible but at the same time without creating confusion among our supporters." (Makasa, Zambia's March to Political Freedom, p. 97). This was short of calling the new party ANC2.

the party constitution. This was one of the reasons that led to our walking out of the meeting.[51]

It is therefore, evident that ethnicity was a factor in the split, and may have played an even bigger role than has until now been admitted.

The birth of ZANC signalled both a rejection of the conciliatory policy adopted by the ANC and the development of race conscious nationalism driven by the ideology of "pigmentational self-determination." ZANC also represented the first real attempt to adopt a "populist" philosophy in the nationalist struggle in Northern Rhodesia. Although ZANC was short lived, it tried to appear to be championing the interests of the common people.

ZANC's adoption of the "populist" approach reflected imperial policy which required that before any transfer of power could be sanctioned, the people concerned must prove they were ready to receive power. One requirement was widespread support. This policy encouraged first ZANC and later the United National Independence Party (UNIP) to create the image of "populist" nationalist parties. Yet, it is common knowledge that both ZANC and UNIP, its successor, did not rise out of mass discontent. The elite created the image of UNIP as a mass based party, ready to articulate the aspirations of the common people. As Peter Harries-Jones noted, "UNIP's success involved far more than the creation of a political band-wagon [but] abjured the elitist type of political organization characteristic of the African National Congress...."[52]

However, this does not negate the fact that those who jumped on the UNIP band-wagon had real grievances against the colonial government. Nationalist leaders

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[51] Kapasa Makasa, Zambia's March to Political Freedom, p. 94.

[52] Peter Harries-Jones, Freedom and Labour: Mobilization and Political Control on the Zambian Copperbelt, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell), 1975, p. 117.

hijacked the process and therefore gave the impression that they were leading the struggle.[53] This was not difficult in those days when the villain was identified as the white ruling class. Between 1958 and 1961 there were serious disturbances which affected rural people.[54]

The "populist" ideology, with its search for "pigmentational self-determination," was based on the idea that the black person had suffered enough at the hands of white people and that the only way to redress this situation was to secure the removal of white people from the realm of political power and to replace them with black people. "Populist" ideology particularly opposed liberal ideology with its commitment to multi-racial politics as an alternative process for transferring political power from the white ruling elite to a multi-racial local ruling elite. Kaunda's nationalist "unity ... in the colour of our skin"[55] rejected multi-racialism and he further argued that no multi-racial party in Africa had yet obtained independence for Africans, and that no multi-racial party in Northern Rhodesia was prepared to commit itself to breaking up the federation and fighting for Northern Rhodesia's independence. He concluded that "since the multi-racial bus is not going our direction, we would be foolish to climb on it."[56]

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[53] Thomas Rasmussen has demonstrated that nationalist leaders were not always successful in directing rural protests against the colonial government and that they were at times embarrassed at the extent of rural protest. For details see, Thomas Rasmussen, "The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest," in William Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1974), pp. 40-61.

[54] For details see, Rasmussen, "The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest," pp. 42-43.

[55] Kenneth Kaunda and Colin Morris, Black Government? a Discussion Between Colin Morris and Kenneth Kaunda, (Lusaka, United Society for Christian Literature, 1960), p. 93.

[56] Kaunda and Morris, Black Government?, p. 93.

Nonetheless, Kaunda continued to seek the support of liberal Europeans like Colin Morris. To preserve the dynamism of the populist ideology of his party, however, he outwardly opposed multi-racialism as an alternative approach to the politics of decolonization. Consequently, when the ANC announced that it would participate in the coming elections organized under the new constitution, ZANC decided to boycott the elections and began a vigorous campaign to dissuade Africans from registering as voters. The campaign, which involved haranguing, intimidation and harassment of opponents, resulted in only 6,846 Africans being registered from the potential figure of 24,648.[57] ZANC also hoped to persuade those who had registered to stay away during the voting days.

The violence that followed led to the introduction of *The Safeguard of Elections and Public Safety Regulations, (1959)* and the proscribing of ZANC and the detention of its leaders. Though the elections were held without serious incident, African participation and performance was below expectation. ANC managed only to return its president, Nkumbula in one of the "Special" constituencies. The United Federal Party won 13 of the 22 elected seats, 11 "Ordinary" and both African reserve seats. The multi-racial liberal Central Africa Party (CAP),[58] led by Sir John Moffat, obtained both European reserve seats and one "Special" seat. The Dominion Party, which stood for white supremacy, won one of the "Ordinary" seats. African Independent candidates won two of the four remaining "Special" seats, leaving two seats vacant because no qualified candidates were nominated for them.[59]

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[57] Mulford, <u>The Northern Rhodesia General Election</u>, p. 15.

[58] The Central Africa Party was the successor to the Constitution Party.

[59] Mulford, <u>The Northern Rhodesia General Election</u>, p. 16.

The Impact of Federal Politics on Northern Rhodesia.

The nationalist struggle in Northern Rhodesia was closely connected with the politics of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland—first to prevent its creation and later to secure its dissolution. Thus the decolonization process in Northern Rhodesia had a federal dimension. While neither the imperial government nor the colonial state in Northern Rhodesia was interested in holding back political advancement of the African population permanently, they were continually accused of this. The Benson Constitution was perceived by militant nationalists as a constitution designed to serve the interests of federalists.

Consequently, the British Government responded to the crisis with an announcement in July 1959 that it intended to appoint an Advisory Commission "to advise the five Governments, in preparing for the 1960 (Federal) Review, on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the constitution of 1953, including the Preamble."[60] The result of this commitment was the appointment of the Monckton Commission which was to start gathering evidence by September 1959.

The Commission, however, was surrounded by controversy. There were disagreements over membership, terms of reference, and its impartiality.[61] The Commission was criticised because its terms of reference were too general and it included very few Africans, some of whom were thought to be too moderate to

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[60] Hansard, 21 July, 1959, cited in Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Election, p. 17. The Preamble was significant in this case because it was the only place in the Federal constitution where the partnership principle was mentioned.

[61] For a detailed discussion see, J.R.T. Wood, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983), pp. 661-727.

represent African interests.[62] In Northern Rhodesia, both ANC and UNIP[63] consequently boycotted the proceedings of the Commission because it was not authorised to consider breaking up the Federation. In Britain the Labour Party refused to join the Commission because secession was not explicitly included among its terms of reference.

Despite these objections, the Commission went ahead hearing views, written and oral, from individuals and institutions in the Federation. In Northern Rhodesia, former chairperson of the Lusaka branch of the Capricorn, the Reverend Merfyn M. Temple submitted a written statement to the Commission in which he said:

> I have seen the work of the CAS in Northern Rhodesia founder on the single fact that it failed to obtain any African members because of its support of Federation.
> I have seen the first truly multi-racial political party in Northern Rhodesia, the Constitution Party, break up because it maintained against the opinion of its African members a belief in Federation.
> I do not believe that the Federal Government will ever be able to win the confidence and trust of the African people while it boasts of its material achievements and bullies the under-privileged.[64]

The chairperson of the Northern Rhodesia division of the Central Africa Party, a protégé of Capricorn, also submitted a memorandum to the Monckton Commission in which he pointed out that Federation was failing because both

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[62] The appointment of Lawrence Katilungu is a case in point. He was associated with the much despised Capricorn and the Constitution Party.

[63] United National Independence Party (UNIP) was formed on 1 August 1959 following the merging of the African National Independence Party (A.N.I.P.) and the United National Freedom Party (U.N.F.P.) which had recently been formed after the banning of ZANC by those ZANC elements who had managed to evade detention.

[64] CAS Papers, File No. 128, Memorandum for submission to the Monckton Commission, Prepared by Reverend M. M. Temple, Secretary of the United Society for Christian Literature in Northern Rhodesia, 1 February, 1960. In 1956-57 he was chairman of the Lusaka branch of CAS, in 1957-58 he was Deputy Leader of the Constitution Party.

Africans and Europeans in Northern Rhodesia were disillusioned, particularly over the Kariba Dam issue.[65] Franklin concluded that the Federation was hated and could not remain intact without undergoing serious changes. He also pointed out that "as usual, we have given too little, too late and it may be too late to give even too much." [66]

Almost without exception, the evidence overwhelmingly opposed the continued existence of the Federation. When the Review Commission's Report was finally published in October, it emphasized Africans' dislike of the Federation. One of its recommendations, therefore, was that the territories should have the right to secede. Concerning Northern Rhodesia, the Commission recommended that "there should be an African majority in the Legislative Council and an unofficial majority in the Executive Council so constituted as to reflect the composition of the Legislative Council."[67] The Commission's report, therefore, marked the start of intensive constitutional negotiations which concluded with the granting of the 1962 constitution.

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[65] PA, ANC 1/6 Vo', 1, Memorandum to the Monckton Commission from the Northern Rhodesia Division of the Central Africa Party, 11 February, 1960, pp. 9-12. A copy of the memorandum was confidentially sent Harry Nkumbula with the compliments of Harry Franklin. The dam project was initially supposed to be on the Kafue River in Northern Rhodesia. However, when federation was effected, Federal Officials decided to have the dam on the Zambezi river, on the Southern Rhodesian side. Settlers in Northern Rhodesia were angered by that decision, which was carried out without much consultation with them.

[66] PA, ANC 1/6 Vol. 1, Memorandum to the Monckton Commission, p. 15.

[67] Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, October, 1960, p. 43; cited in Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Election, p. 18; see also Mulford, Zambia, p. 175.

Constitutional Changes, 1960-64.

The 1962 constitution evolved in three stages: the December 1960 London Constitutional conference which ended with the Colonial Secretary's proposals of February 1961; the February-June 1961 phase which included the governor's consultations with the territory's various political groups in Lusaka and resulted in the Colonial Secretary's presentation of the June proposals; and finally, the July 1961-March 1962 phase which followed serious political disturbances in the country. These disturbances led to a reconsideration of the June proposals and the subsequent announcement of further changes on 1 March 1962.

The Northern Rhodesia constitutional conference, which opened on 19 December 1960, ended on 17 February 1961 without reaching an agreement on the future constitutional arrangement for the country. Consequently, Ian Macleod, the Colonial Secretary, followed the example of his predecessors and issued his proposals in a White Paper (Cmd. 1295)[68] whose aim was non-racialism. The Macleod proposals of February 1961 followed previous constitutional changes. According to Mulford:

> Macleod claimed that in seeking a middle course the British Government's chief objective was to secure a substantial increase in African representation in Northern Rhodesia's Legislative Council, while still maintaining the principle of 'non-racial' politics by requiring political parties to seek support from both races.[69]

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[68] Cmd. 1294, Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, 1961. These proposals were also referred to as the Macleod Proposals or Constitution.

[69] Mulford, Zambia, p. 185.

The Macleod proposals therefore rejected the Monckton Commission's recommendations for a clear African majority which was to be based on a purely racial approach to Northern Rhodesia's political development.[70]

Macleod's proposals represented an attempt to reconcile two profoundly opposed racially polarized political groups. Consequently, as Mulford argues, "ambiguities flourished at the expense of both clarity and certainty."[71] Macleod's proposals were based on the following general considerations:

(i)   to provide substantial increase in the number of Africans in the Legislature, to be achieved not by a racial approach, but by means which would maintain the development of a non-racial approach towards politics;

(ii)   Northern Rhodesia was to follow the evolutionary road: relate political advancement to social responsibilities and to proceed to universal suffrage by the gradual road of qualified franchise;

(iii)   emphasize the importance of a transitional period with the Governor retaining ultimate responsibility for public affairs;

(iv)   Governor to retain powers to nominate members of the Legislative Council;

(v)   Conference to consider responsible government in the future; and

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[70] Godwin Lewanika described the Monckton Commission's recommendation that there should be parity of black and white in the Federal Assembly as "illogical and unrealistic, [as] it would mean racial politics and not party politics and would destroy the concept of the multi-racial state." (Godwin Lewanika, "Debate in the Federal Parliament on Monckton Commission's Report", cited in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 13 (1961-62), p. 17921). It is arguable therefore, that to "liberal" minded Africans like Godwin Lewanika, Macleod's proposals were acceptable as they sought to provide an opportunity for the development of multi-racial politics.

[71] Mulford, Zambia, p. 185.

(vi) Chiefs to be given special positions in the central councils of government.[72]

The emphasis on multi-racial politics and gradual advance towards universal suffrage made African nationalists believe that "eventually they would be denied majority rule."[73] On the other hand, Europeans were equally unhappy with the Macleod's proposals because in them they saw a very real possibility of an African majority in Northern Rhodesia. This was going to have broad consequences on federal politics. Thus, as the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, led the attack on the proposals in Salisbury, in Lusaka John Roberts led his ministers in resigning from the Northern Rhodesia Government.[74] Consequently, the February proposals ended in a political stalemate.

Following the deadlock, on 26 June 1961 Ian Macleod issued new constitutional proposals in a second White Paper (Cmd. 1423)[75] which was largely

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[72] Cited in _Keesing's Contemporary Archives_, 13, (1961-61), p. 18585. These considerations conform with Ian Macleod's background as "a pragmatist on the liberal wing of his party." (Richard Hall, _Zambia_, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 192.)

[73] Mulford, _Zambia_, p. 187.

[74] _Rhodesia Herald_, 22 February, 1961. It was this resignation which brought Sir John Moffat's Liberal Party to power in Northern Rhodesia until its defeat in the October 1962 general elections. The Liberal Party was the only one, according to Mulford which had not rejected Macleod's proposals. The search for a formula to bridge the gap between the races had inevitably resulted in a "middle-of-the-road situation which favoured the Liberal Party. The Liberals therefore took over the Executive Council posts vacated by the United Federal Party.(_The Northern News_, 7 March, 1961).

[75] Cmd. 1423, _Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change_, June 1961.

based on the recommendations of the Northern Rhodesia Governor.[76] The June

proposals did not significantly depart from the course already chartered by earlier

constitutional proposals. The principle objective remained the attainment of "non-

racial" political development, but with significantly altered arrangements for electing

national members. To avoid one race dominating national seats, it was decided that:

> ... four of the seven double-member national constituencies proposed were to return one European and one African member. The fifth national seat was to be reserved for Asian and Coloured voters, who would vote together in a special national constituency extending over the whole country.[77]

The proposals also introduced an additional qualification which required national

candidates to secure 20 per cent of the votes cast on one or other of the two rolls.

The arrangement required candidates to have substantial support at least from one

section of the community.

A third and final change concerned the minimum percentage arrangement.

According to Governor Hone, the February proposals required a national candidate

to obtain far more votes from the predominantly African lower roll to be duly

elected. In his view, this placed European candidates at a disadvantage. He thus

devised qualifying arrangements which would not only place candidates of both races

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[76] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 13, (1961-62), p. 18585. During April and May 1961 the governor held several consultative talks with Northern Rhodesia's various political groups separately. The talks involved memoranda which essentially provided a detailed version of Macleod's February proposals. The details covered the delimitation of constituencies, the franchise and arrangements for electing the controversial national members.

[77] Cmd. 1423, Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, June 1961, cols. 33-34, cited in Mulford, Zambia, p. 195.

in a more equal position, but safeguarded the spirit of the constitution.[78] Now the minimum support required by a candidate was expressed as 12% or 400 votes (whichever was the less) of the votes cast by each race in the election.

According to Governor Evelyn Hone, the complicated formula aimed at giving "practical effect to the principle that National members should be obliged to seek support from voters of both races."[79] The June proposals received qualified acceptance from Sir Roy Welensky and the Federal government, but African parties rejected them. In protest, UNIP launched a civil disobedience campaign which led to serious disorder lasting until October. The ANC on the other hand, though opposed to the proposals, issued a statement in September strongly condemning UNIP's campaign of violence.[80] The June proposals were immediately subjected to revision. The revision focused, however, on two technical electoral changes. The first change was about the percentage vote which a candidate was required to obtain to qualify for a national seat. Now a candidate for a national seat was required to obtain 10 per cent of the vote cast by both Africans and Europeans instead of the 12½ per cent as provided in the June White Paper. The second change involved the dropping of the numerical alternative of 400 votes. The changes were introduced by Reginald Maudling the new Colonial Secretary.[81]

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[78] Cmd. 1423, Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, June 1961, p. 6, cited in Mulford, Zambia, p. 195.

[79] Cmd.1423, Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, June 1961, p. 6, cited in Mulford, Zambia, p. 196.

[80] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.13, (1962-62), p. 18594.

[81] For a detailed discussion of Maudling's handling of the Northern Rhodesian constitutional crisis during the period October 1961 to March 1962, see Wood, The Welensky Papers, pp.

Having made these changes, an electoral machinery based on the principle that politics should develop on non-racial lines was set out in the Northern Rhodesia (Electoral Provisions) Order in Council, 1962. The Order in Council provided two separate classes of voters: those qualified and registered under higher franchise; and those qualified and registered under lower franchise. There were, however, four general qualifications which applied to all voters irrespective of their franchise class, namely:

(a) Citizenship of the Federation or of the United Kingdom and the colonies or the status of British Protected Person by virtual of his connection with Northern Rhodesia;

(b) Twenty-one years of age;

(c) Two years continuous residence in the Federation;

(d) Literacy in English (Except those exempted under the additional qualifications for the lower roll voters as described below).

All those who satisfied these universal requirements qualified under one of the "Additional Qualifications" for either upper or lower roll voters contained in the schedule to the Order.

Upper roll voters qualified under the following additional qualifications: either

(a) Income of £720, or

(b) Immovable property worth £1,500, or

(c) Full primary education, and either (i) income of £480; or (ii) immovable property worth £1,000. Or

(d) Four years secondary education, and either (i) income of £300; or (ii) immovable property worth £1,000. Or

(e) Be a member of one of the following categories:
(i) Chiefs;
(ii) Hereditary Councillors;
(iii) Native Authorities or Native Court;
(iv) Member of Municipal Councils, Township Management Boards or Area Housing Boards;

(v) Minister of Religion;
(vi) Members of prescribed religious bodies who have two years' secondary education;
(vii) University education;
(viii) Holders of a letter of exemption issued under the African Exemption Ordinance before 1 July 1961;
(ix) Holders of a Certificate of Honour or a decoration for gallantly or other award from Her Majesty;
(x) Pensioners;
(xi) Persons in receipt of an income of £300 who have been in the service of one employer for a continuous period of ten years. Or

(f) Be the wife of a person qualified in any of the foregoing ways, provided that in the case of polygamous marriages, only the senior wife could rely on her husband's qualifications.

Lower roll voters, on the other hand, qualified under the following additional qualifications: either

(a) Income of £120. Or
(b) Immovable property worth £250. Or
(c) Be the wife of a person qualified under (a) or (b) above, provided that only the senior wife of a polygamous marriage could rely on her husband's qualifications. Or
(d) Be literate in the vernacular and a member of one of the following categories: (i) Tribal Councillors;
(ii) Members of Native Authorities or Native Courts;
(iii) Members of Municipal Councils, Township Management Boards or Area Housing Boards;
(iv) Headmen;
(v) Pensioners;
(vi) Persons registered as Individual or Peasant or Improved Farmers for two years immediately preceding application;
(vii) Members of prescribed religious bodies;
(viii) Holders of Certificate of Honour or decoration for gallantly or other award from Her Majesty;
(ix) Be the wife of a person qualified in any of the foregoing ways, provided that only the senior wife of a polygamous marriage could rely on her husband's qualifications.[82]

With the electoral machinery in place and as the country prepared for the general elections, it was evident that Africans and Europeans were as divided as they had always been. Though the United Federal Party (UFP) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) had emerged as the two dominant political parties, they

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[82] Cited from Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Election, pp. 50-52. Cf The multiple voting system proposed by the Capricorn Africa Society discussed in Chapter Four.

had failed miserably to attract members of the other race. The UFP had remained predominantly white while UNIP had remained predominantly black. Not much was achieved by UFP's Build-a-Nation campaign of mid-October.[83]

The multi-racial Liberal Party, which should have attracted most liberally minded and moderate politicians continued to be marginalized as politics increasingly became racially polarized. The African National Congress, having lost its strong hold on the African people, entered a secret political alliance with the UFP in the hope of defeating UNIP in the coming elections.[84] The ANC-UFP Alliance was merely an alliance of convenience. Apart from the two parties' need to defeat UNIP, they had nothing else in common—their policies and traditions remained diametrically opposed, inevitably weakening the alliance.

Worse still, in the racially polarized political circumstances of Northern Rhodesia at the time, the ANC-UFP Alliance played into the hands of UNIP when it became public. Nkumbula was accused of selling out to Europeans. UNIP exploited the alliance to the maximum, increasingly appearing "populist" and truly concerned with the interests and aspirations of the masses. Within the ANC some leaders opposed any cooperation with Europeans. When it became public knowledge that Nkumbula had entered an alliance with the UFP, they tendered their

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[83] Although the campaign was aimed at winning the "support for non-racial politics by attempting to persuade those Africans who qualified for the vote to claim it," when they claimed the vote they generally supported African nationalist parties. (Quotation taken from Wood, The Welensky Papers, p. 967).

[84] Mulford suggests that the U.F.P. entered into the alliance with a view to maintaining European dominance through a U.F.P.-ANC coalition government. (Mulford, Zambia, p. 240.

resignations.[85] Nkumbula himself began to waver and accused the UFP of cheating and putting unfair pressure on him.[86]

Nevertheless, the two parties observed the alliance quietly. They put up candidates, for both upper and lower roll seats, in such a way as not to undermine each other but to defeat the UNIP candidate. The arrangement was more successful in some constituencies than in others.[87] After the nominations on 9 October a total of 144 candidates were nominated for the 45 seats. UNIP fielded 40 candidates and was committed to support three European independent candidates and one for the Asian seat, while ANC put up 30 candidates and supported one for the Asian seat. The UFP and the Liberal Party fielded 28 and 27 candidates each respectively, while the Rhodesian Republican Party (R.R.P.) had five candidates and the Barotse National Party (B.N.P.) three candidates.[88]

Ironically,[89] the campaign was marked by frequent outbreaks of violence between rival ANC and UNIP supporters. The most serious incidents took place in Ndola and in Fort Jameson on 21-22 April where it was reported that at least eight Africans were beaten to death and more were injured during the ANC-UNIP

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[85] Mulford, Zambia, p. 277. Some supporters wrote angry letters to the press denouncing Nkumbula's secret alliance with the U.F.P. (Letters to the Editor, Central African Post, 16 and 23 October, 1962).

[86] The Northern News, 15 November, 1962.

[87] Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Election, pp. 104-114.

[88] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.13. (1961-62), p. 19109.

[89] It is ironical because during this campaign there were no recorded incidents of violence involving black and white, even though the power struggle was motivated by the spirit of "Africanism". Instead, it was Africans who fought fellow Africans, thus confirming Lord Hailey's observation that "Africanism" was not a cohesive force.

confrontations.[90] There were no reported incidents involving Europeans, at least during this time.

The General Election of 30 October 1962 marked a turning point in the constitutional and political history of Northern Rhodesia. Though the election results almost confirmed the expected, they marked the decline of the colonial state. The UFP won 13 of the 14 upper roll seats[91] while UNIP and ANC split the lower seats between them——12 to 3 respectively. Table V shows both the racial composition of the Legislative Council's elected members and the state of the parties after the general election.

TABLE V
Legislative Council 1962
Racial and Party Composition of Elected Members Following the General Election.

	UNIP	UFP	ANC	TOTAL
Europeans:	-	13	1	14
Africans:	12	2	4	18
EuroAfricans:	1	-	-	1
Asians:	1	-	-	1
State of Parties:	14	15	5	34

Source: Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia, p. 147.

These results show that the racial factor was still important for the Northern Rhodesian electorate despite attempts to develop multi-racial politics. While the constitution required that national candidates should obtain a specified percentage of votes cast by both races, party allegiance remained predominantly racial. Liberalism, with its commitment to multi-racial politics, suffered a crushing defeat. All Liberal Party candidates, including the leader Sir John Moffat, were defeated.[92]

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[90] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 13, p. 19109.

[91] The Livingstone upper roll seat was not contested because there was no qualified candidate.

[92] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 13 (1961-62), p. 19110. Another major setback in the election was the defeat of the right wing Rhodesia Republic Party. All its five European

The election results convincingly proved the dominance of UFP and UNIP among European and African voters respectively.

Consequently, the Liberal Party, which came to power following the resignation of the UFP in February 1961, tendered its resignation on 2 November. Later the same day, the governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, announced that a caretaker government of colonial civil servants had been appointed and would be in office until after the by-elections, since no single party had so far obtained a majority of elected members in the Legislative Assembly.

Following its complete electoral defeat, the Liberal Party announced its disbandment on 5 November and recommended that its followers support UNIP which it said commanded the "support of four out of five African voters."[93] The Liberal Party noted that the aims of both the British Government and the Liberal Party were unattainable as Liberals could no longer control the transfer of power to African nationalists.

Though the ANC had obviously been marginalised as a political force, the election results placed it in an important bargaining position.[94] Both the UFP and UNIP began making approaches to the ANC to form a coalition government because that was the only form of government which could emerge even after the by-election.

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candidates were defeated.

[93] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 13, (1961-62), p. 19109.

[94] Sumaili states that "after the 1962 elections...Nkumbula emerged as the king-maker. He could have chosen to enter into a coalition government with either the white-led U.F.P. and deny the country the birth of black government or he could have chosen to go into partnership with UNIP and be credited with having given birth to the first black government of the country. (Fanuel K.M. Sumaili, "The Self and Bibliographical Writings in Zambia", Zango, 3, 1 (1988), p. 84).

Nkumbula held the balance——he could either move towards multi-racial politics by entering into coalition with the UFP, or join forces with UNIP and close the door on multi-racial politics. Nkumbula refused to commit himself until after the by-election which was set for 10 December 1962.

The by-election results improved ANC's bargaining position. While the UFP candidate J. Macmillan easily won the Livingstone upper roll seat, ANC won two additional seats in the National Constituencies. Table VI summarises the final party and racial composition of the Legislative Council after the December by-election.

TABLE VI

Legislative Council December 1962: Racial and Party Composition of Elected Members.

	UNIP	UFP	ANC	TOTAL
Europeans:	-	14	2	17
Africans:	12	2	5	18
Asians:	1	-	-	1
EuroAfricans:	1	-	-	1
State of Parties:	14	16	7	37

Source: Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia, p. 176.

After the announcement of the election results, the UFP and UNIP increased their pressure on Nkumbula. The Congress called a National Assembly meeting on 12 December to debate the next step to be taken. Delegates from the Copperbelt opposed the idea of cooperating with UNIP. Meanwhile, Africans, including traditional chiefs, called upon Nkumbula to show his "statesmanship" by joining hands with UNIP to end colonialism.

Finally, when Nkumbula went to the Congress meeting accompanied by Kaunda, it was evident that he had been persuaded to enter into coalition with UNIP. In what Mulford described as Nkumbula's "political agility", Nkumbula "posed three questions in rapid succession: how many favour African Government; how

many want African Government now; how many are behind me?" [95] A show of hands decided the fate of the country, and immediately Nkumbula and Kaunda left the meeting for Government House to meet the governor. The search for "pigmentational self-determination" or commitment to "Africanism" had finally prevailed, thereby closing the door on liberalism, and its commitment to multi-racial politics, once and for ever.

According to Nkumbula's biographer:

> Congress agreed to a coalition on several conditions—it demanded three of the six ministerial portfolios, that there should be friendly relations with Katanga government and that a programme of moderate legislation be drawn up giving due regard to Europeans who had confidence in Congress. [96]

Yet, as Sumaili observed, this does not explain Nkumbula's motives for entering into a coalition with UNIP rather than the UFP. The demands were so general that even the UFP could have given Nkumbula "a favourable response." [97] The only plausible explanation seems to be that, despite Nkumbula's moderate political views and consistent association with European liberals, deep down he firmly believed in "Africanism". [98] More importantly, Nkumbula may have believed he would lose any chance as a mass leader if he chose the UFP—he would be labelled as a sell out.

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[95] Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Election, p. 180.

[96] Goodwin Mwangilwa, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, A Biography of the `Old Lion' of Zambia, (Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, 1982), p. 70.

[97] Sumaili, "The Self and Biographical Writings in Zambia," p. 84.

[98] On 25 December 1951 he had said, "White settlers cannot be trusted." Address delivered by the General President of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress at a meeting of the Working Committee held at Kitwe, 25 December, 1951. He made a similar statement in 1958, when he said Europeans were not to rule Northern Rhodesia.

Although Nkumbula and Kaunda had rushed from the meeting to Government House, it soon became apparent that they had not reached agreement between themselves. The governor accordingly advised them to go back and return to government after they reached a settlement regarding the coalition. A long meeting at Nkumbula's house through the night was followed by two meetings with the governor the next day.

In spite of having only seven against the fourteen UNIP's Legco seats, the ANC demanded half the six ministries. The constitutional requirement that at least two members of the Executive Council must be Europeans strengthened ANC's case. Between the two parties, the ANC had the only two Europeans, C.E. Cousins and F. N. Stubbs. However, Nkumbula still had a problem on his hands. Stubbs was reluctant to cooperate with UNIP. He had demonstrated his anti-UNIP stand during the period leading up to the by-election, a stand which had ensured him sufficient UFP European support. After consultations with his electorate in his Mufulira constituency, Stubbs "decided to serve the interests of the country" and agreed to be included in the coalition government. On 15 December Governor Sir Evelyn Hone announced Northern Rhodesia's first African dominated government which was composed of the following:

Ministers.

K.D. Kaunda	(UNIP)	Local Government and Social Welfare
H.M. Nkumbula	(ANC)	African Education
S.M. Kapwepwe	(UNIP)	African Agriculture
R.C. Kamanga	(UNIP)	Labour and Mines
F.N. Stubbs	(ANC)	Transport and Works
C.E. Cousins	(ANC)	Land and Natural Resources

Parliamentary Secretaries.

A.G. Zulu	(UNIP)	Local Government and Social Welfare
C.J.A. Banda	(ANC)	African Education
E.K. Mudenda	(UNIP)	African Agriculture
J.M. Mwanakatwe	(UNIP)	Labour and Mines
F.B. Chembe	(ANC)	Transport and Works

J.E.M. Michello	(ANC)	Land and Natural Resources
A.N.L. Wina	(ANC)	Finance

<u>Chief Whip.</u>

Sikota Wina   (UNIP)

<u>Officials.</u>

Chief Secretary	R.E. Luyt
Finance	T.G. Gardner
Native Affairs	F.M. Thomas
Justice	B.A. Doyle.[99]

The new government took office on 16 December 1962, marking the end of European political dominance, if not quite the end of the colonial state. The birth of "Black Government" took place amid calls by UNIP officials for a new constitution based on universal franchise and the granting of independence to Northern Rhodesia outside the Federation.[100] Although UNIP had participated in the election, it had consistently emphasized its unqualified rejection of both the 1962 constitution and its underlying principles.

Within two months the Northern Rhodesia Legco approved on 13 and 14 February 1963 respectively two motions. The first one, moved by the two African coalition parties, "rejected and condemned the Federation," which had been "imposed against the will of the people" and called on the British Government to grant the territory immediate secession from the Federation.[101] The second motion, moved by Kaunda, condemned the 1962 constitution as "undemocratic and unacceptable." He called on the British Government to secure a new constitution which would provide for a legislature of sixty-five members, a prime minister and fifteen ministers.

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[99] Mulford, <u>The Northern Rhodesia General Election</u>, pp. 181-182.

[100] <u>The Northern News</u>, 6 December, 1962.

[101] <u>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</u>, Vol. 14, (1963-64), p. 19295.

The motion also called for a constitutional provision for general elections every four or five years and the enfranchisement of all adult British Protected Persons or British subjects domiciled in the territory for more than five years preceding registration.[102] Both motions were approved by 21 votes to 14 (UFP).[103]

UFP amendments respectively supporting the continuation of the Federation and accepting a constitution based on a qualitative, other than universal adult suffrage, as serving the best interests of the people were rejected by 21 votes to 14. The six officials took no part in the debate, which lasted six days, nor in the voting that followed. F.M. Thomas, the Acting Chief Secretary, later explained that officials refrained from taking part in the debate because no matter how carefully articulated, their views would have been taken to reflect the view of the British Government.[104] This is curious considering that officials were expected to hold the balance on contentious issues. Why did they choose to be spectators this time?

It is arguable that the various constitutional changes, especially the 1961 and 1962 constitutions, had weakened the influence of officials within the colonial state. They were no longer the mediators because the new African government which came to power in December 1962, for all purposes and intents had changed the power base of the state. Officials were therefore rendered powerless as mediators.

However, the embryo African state which resulted from the "unholy matrimony" of the ANC-UNIP coalition was bedeviled by constant threats of being

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[102] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-64), p. 19295.

[103] The content of the motions had earlier been presented to Butler in form of nationalist demands, see below.

[104] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14 (1963-64), p. 19295.

aborted.[105] Though Nkumbula had formed a coalition with UNIP, he still maintained private contacts with some members of the UFP. A rebel group had been formed by members of the UFP with the intention of befriending and gaining information from ANC's Stubbs, who had been ostracised by whites on the Copperbelt since becoming a minister in the coalition government. The group appointed Norman Coates, MP for Kalulushi, to make the contact.

Nkumbula's continued flirtations with UFP gave UNIP ammunition to declare him a sell-out to the African cause.[106] ANC's position was further weakened by internal dissensions, led by Job Michello and Bellings Lombe who had opposed coalition with UNIP, preferring to cooperate with the UFP instead. It was only a matter of time before the coalition broke up. The Federal question again forced the pace of constitutional change and the fate of the coalition in Northern Rhodesia.

On 19 December 1962, R. A. Butler, minister of the newly formed Ministry of Central African Affairs, announced his intention to visit Central Africa and hold talks with Federal and Territorial leaders. Accordingly, Butler visited the Federation from 16 January to 3 February 1963. He arrived in Northern Rhodesia on 24 January. The next day he held talks with leaders of the coalition government who made three demands: (1) that the British Government should declare Northern Rhodesia's right to secede from the Federation; (2) that a conference should be held in London in March in order to "dig the grave of the Federation" and to draw up a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia; and (3) that a commission should be appointed to study institutions established after the inception of the Federation and

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[105] For a detailed discussion of the problems of the coalition government, see Mulford, _Zambia_, pp. 304-312.

[106] _The Northern News_, 13 March, 1963.

to prepare for territorial services taken over by the Federation in 1953 to revert to

Northern Rhodesia.[107]

The Northern Rhodesian nationalist demand for the territory's right to secede

was strengthened by the British announcement earlier that Nyasaland should be

allowed to secede. Finally, Butler announced Northern Rhodesia's right to secede

on 29 March 1963, and said:

> H.M.G. consider that the objective of any constructive policy in Central
> Africa must be to evolve an effective relationship between the
> Territories which is acceptable to each of them. They recognize that
> the present situation cannot continue unchanged, and they have
> therefore sought in the recent discussions with the governments
> concerned to evolve a basis for a conference at which a new
> relationship could be worked out. These discussions have been very
> helpful in clarifying the broad views of the governments concerned.
>
> In the light of these views, H.M.G. have had to consider what
> is the best course to pursue in the interest of all concerned. They
> accept that none of the Territories can be kept in the Federation
> against its will and they therefore accept the principle that any
> Territory which so wishes must be allowed to secede...[108]

This announcement precipitated another series of talks for a new constitution which

would provide self-government for Northern Rhodesia. The government also

announced on 23 August that elections would be held based on a new constitution

in the second half of January 1964. Preliminary talks to prepare for the new

constitution took place in Lusaka from 11 July to 4 September 1963, and involved

Nkumbula (ANC), Kaunda (UNIP) and John Roberts (N.P.P.)[109] and the governor.

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[107] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14, (1963-64), p. 19295.

[108] Cited in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14, (1963-64), p. 19375.

[109] The National Progress Party (N.P.P.), formerly the Northern Rhodesia branch of the U.F.P. emerged following the reorganization of the U.F.P. on 19 April into four separate political organizations.

The provisions of the new constitution were contained in an Order-in-Council made on 20 December 1963 and laid before parliament on 1 January 1964. The provisions included: the governor and his deputy; a Legislative Assembly of 75 members (65 of whom were to be elected in the main roll constituencies and 10 in reserved constituencies) with an elected speaker who was a minister or parliamentary secretary but was not necessarily a member of the assembly; and an executive consisting of a prime minister with a cabinet of thirteen other ministers who were collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly.[110] The prime minister was expected to be a member of the assembly whom the governor thought was best able to command the support of the majority of the members of the assembly.

Barotseland's Entry Into Nationalist Politics.

Barotseland had always occupied a special position within the Northern Rhodesian political system. It was a protectorate within a protectorate——a status it earned and helped to develop from the days of the BSAC rule through to Colonial Office administration. This special status was explicitly recognized in article 41 of Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1924. Barotseland's special status had been further consolidated in 1936 through the Barotse Native Authority Ordinance and the Barotse Native Courts Ordinance, which granted the Barotse Native Government wider powers and a greater degree of local autonomy than the other native authorities in the territory.

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[110] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14 (1963-64), p. 19889.

As Northern Rhodesia was approaching independence, the *Litunga* of Barotseland began to press for secession. When the British Government intimated that it would abandon the protectorate and let it face the consequences of isolation, the Northern Rhodesia Government proceeded to reform the Barotse National Council. It now included twenty-five elected members. For the first time, the Barotse National Council was open to nationalist politics. UNIP candidates won all the twenty-five seats in the August 1963 Barotse National Council elections. The reform brought Barotseland into the mainstream of Northern Rhodesian politics.

January 1964 Elections.

Registration of voters for the new Legislative Assembly scheduled for 20-21 January 1964 began on September 23, 1963. All persons over the age of 21 who fulfilled certain residential qualifications were entitled to register. More than 1,000,000 Africans registered for the 65 main roll constituencies and 24,000 Europeans registered for the 10 reserved constituencies. Asian and Coloured voters were given the option to vote either in the main roll or reserved roll. The registration methods were criticised by ANC and National Progress Party (N.P.P.).[111] Roberts protested against the absence of postal registration and voting facilities which, he alleged would deprive up to 30 per cent of the Europeans of the

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[111] The N.P.P. was formerly the Northern Rhodesia branch of the United Federal Party (UFP). Although it announced that it would contest all the ten European seats and none of the main roll seats, it made it clear that it did not intend to sit in a formal opposition to government. The N.P.P. declared that its role was not that of a political force in the true sense, and that although it represented the European section of the community, it was in every way dedicated to joining the national effort required to build the country.(Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14 (1963-64), p. 19889).

vote. He also questioned the methods for the registration of African voters. Nkumbula on the other hand, complained of the methods used to identify voters seeking registration alleging that the process was laying the elections "wide open to abuse."[112]

The elections were again preceded by a period of violence, not between white and black, but between rival ANC and UNIP youth movements in which the unemployed were alleged to have played a prominent role.[113] The pre-election clashes placed a great strain on the coalition government. Nkumbula repeatedly threatened to resign as minister and end the coalition. He accused UNIP officials of deliberately encouraging their followers to commit acts of violence against ANC members.

A commission of inquiry instituted later to investigate the cause of the inter-party strife attributed the strife to:

> ... political frustration due to the Nationalist parties' victory and to a sense of anti-climax and loss of direction owing to the virtual attainment of the principal political objectives, thus contributing to a psychological restiveness which in certain cases has exploded into violence.[114]

The report added that a contributory factor was the disappointment felt by many that the coming to power of the nationalists had not resulted in immediate and widespread benefits to the masses of the people. On the contrary, however, this assessment fails to place the ideology of violence between ANC and UNIP youth wingers in its proper perspective during the nationalist era.

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[112] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14 (1963-64), p. 19889.

[113] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14, p. 19890.

[114] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14, p. 19890.

Violence was used by African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia as a political weapon to deal with those who were seen as selling-out to Europeans. Before the split of the ANC in 1958, violence was usually directed at individuals or organizations identified as serving interests other than those of the African nationalists. The Chief Musokotwane case,[115] the Kabalata Affair[116] and the Chizuma-Kaluwa case,[117] all demonstrate the use of violence by nationalists against those believed not to be in the mainstream of the struggle.[118] The use of violence against political opponents has its origins in the Action Group of the ANC.[119] It is therefore doubtful that the ANC-UNIP clashes in the period preceding the January 1964 elections was a reflection of disillusionment with the nationalist government which had come to power following the 1962 elections. For how else would one explain the clashes just before the 1962 elections?

The emphasis on the unemployed youths as the group responsible for the violence is equally misleading. While the urban unemployed could easily be blamed for the violence, the same cannot be said of the clashes in the rural areas. Besides, as Musumbulwa pointed out, some of the most respected nationalists were quite

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[115] PRO, CO 1015/142/1, A. T. Williams to W. L. Gorell Barnes, 3 September, 1952.

[116] NAZ, SEC 5/113, The Kabalata Affair, 1952, see Chapter Three, p. 124.

[117] PA, ANC 7/8, Munenga Congress Branch Chairman and Secretary to District Commissioner, 4 March, 1953. The two Congress officials were summoned to the District Commissioner's office to answer charges of threatening Chizuma and Kaluwa, both of whom were Capricorn members.

[118] See Chapter Three for details.

[119] For a detailed discussion of the origins and functions of the Action Group see, Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 15. Kapasa Makasa refers to the Action Council as the "Crack Unit" of the nationalist movement. (Makasa, Zambia's March to Political Freedom, p. 89.

violent when it came to dealing with people who associated with Europeans.[120] The perpetrators were therefore not always the "unemployed youths" or frustrated masses——they were generally political activists from all walks of life who engaged in violence rather than political debate. Seventy years of colonial rule had not demonstrated the power of political debate. There was no tradition of liberal democracy. Larry Diamond "concluded that——whatever their intentions——even the British and French colonial regimes did more to defeat democracy than to develop it."[121] Instead Africans had grown accustomed to the idea that change came through violence and militancy. For most Zambians politics was like war in which the mightier army carried the day. Musumbulwa pointed out that the saddest aspect of the nationalist era was the reluctance among UNIP leaders to engage in dialogue with moderate Africans.[122] They had no time for ideological debate——besides, many of them had very superficial knowledge of what it was that made the parties different.

Nevertheless, the leaders of the two "warring" parties issued a joint declaration in mid-November appealing to their followers to stop the violence and prepare to "share in the nation's pride in its first free elections" based on the principle of "One-Man One-Vote." The election was important because it would lead to self-government for Northern Rhodesia.

Three parties contested the elections which resulted in an overwhelming victory for UNIP which won 55 of the 65 main roll seats. ANC won the remaining

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[120] Interview with Gabriel Musumbulwa at Luanshya, 15 May, 1989.

[121] Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publications, 1988), p. 10.

[122] Interview with author, 15 May, 1989.

10, while the N.P.P. won all the reserved 10 seats. On 23 January 1964 an all African UNIP cabinet was announced consisting of the following:

Kenneth Kaunda	Prime Minister
Simon Kapwepwe	Home Affairs
Arthur Wina	Finance
Elijah Mudenda	Agriculture
Solomon Kalulu	Land and Works
Mainza Chona	Justice
Alexander Grey Zulu	Commerce and Industry
John M. Mwanakatwe	Education
Reuben C. Kamanga	Transport and Communications
Munukayumbu Sipalo	Natural Resources
Hyden D. Banda	Housing and Social Welfare
Nalumino Mundia	Local Government
Justin Chimba	Labour and Mines
Sikota Wina	Health.

The UNIP government called for immediate constitutional talks. The talks were held in London from 5-19 May 1964 during which time it was agreed to grant independence to Northern Rhodesia on 24 October. The independence constitution agreed upon introducing a republican form of government. It was also agreed that Barotseland would be part of the new independent state.[123] Meanwhile the leader of the National Progress Party, John Roberts, pledged that his party would play its part in trying to mould the best form of government for the new state. He pointed out that the N.P.P. was not going to be an opposition party in the legislature, but would seek to help develop democratic processes in the country.

Conclusion.

The triumph of UNIP following the January 1964 general elections and the subsequent formation of an all UNIP government thereafter, demonstrated a clear rejection of multi-racial politics. It was indeed, the fulfilment of an African dream.

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[123] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14, (1963-64), p. 20169.

More importantly, it presents a paradox of decolonization. Up to this point imperial authorities continued to argue that Africans were not ready to rule themselves and little was being done to make them ready. Yet within months of handing over power to the Africans, independence was granted—telescoping "administrative, economic, educational, political and psychological preparations for independence."[124] However, as Ranger argued, "African leaders were playing not the politics of prosperity but the politics of dignity ..."[125] Kaunda pointed out that the African could not have dignity until he was ruling himself.[126] The election results therefore indicate that in the minds of Africans, leaders and followers alike, nationalism actually meant "Africanism".

Thus, in the terminal stages of colonial rule, the "march to political freedom" was basically a struggle to restore a sense of dignity in the African—dignity allegedly lost during the process of colonization and colonial rule. The liberal ideology was unacceptable because by advocating multi-racialism (or non-racial politics), and by insisting on material and educational progress as the criteria for political advancement, it put itself at odds with the prime motivation of African nationalism—"dignity ... rather than the achievement of economic advancement."[127] For an African nationalist leader, success was determined by how much he articulated the principle of "Africanism". No wonder Kaunda argued that "our

[124] M. G. de Winton, "Decolonization and the Westminster Model," p. 187.

[125] Terence Ranger, "The Politics of the Irrational in Central Africa," The Political Quarterly, 34 (1963), p. 285.

[126] Hall, Kaunda Founder of Zambia, p. 80.

[127] Ranger, "The Politics of the Irrational," p. 286.

problem is practical not ideological. After all, there are 3,000,000 of us and only 72,000 whites."[128]

Kaunda was not the only one who felt that Africans should rule themselves. Even his long time political adversary, Nkumbula, felt the same when he said:

> I must say one thing that I have always avoided, I cannot help thinking and convincing myself that after my experience ... in political life I have come to the conclusion that the best government for black people is a government run by black people of Africa. That is true of any race.[129]

Indeed, as Sumaili speculates, this probably explains Nkumbula's decision to form a coalition government with UNIP rather than with the UFP in 1962.[130]

Interestingly, liberalism as an ideology for the transfer of power in Northern Rhodesia—articulated constitutionally as multi-racial or non-racial politics—was the main objective of both Colonial Office officials in London and Northern Rhodesia Government officials. Constitutional changes, starting with the Benson proposals of 1958 up to the 1962 proposals, all attest to that. It is arguable therefore, that African nationalists objected to these constitutions and the changes they were supposed to bring because they checked the speedy attainment of "Africanism". Nonetheless, contrary to expectation, the electoral machinery put in place after 1958 led rapidly to the eventual triumph of the principle of "Africanism".

Gradualism with its emphasis on economic advance was no match for African nationalist drive for political freedom and the recapture of African dignity. This was largely because there were not many liberals, either white or black, to balance extreme tendencies effectively. The violent attack on African moderates effectively checked the spread of moderate ideas among Africans. In fact, the stronger African

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[128] Hall, _Kaunda Founder of Zambia_, p. 80.

[129] Mwangilwa, _Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula_, p. 72.

[130] Sumaili, "The Self and Biographical Writings," p. 85.

nationalism grew, the more racial it also became, thereby alienating European moderates who were prepared to co-operate with Africans. Calls by some UNIP officials to "hate anything white on two legs," though directed at Europeans, were effectively applied to Africans who associated with liberal Europeans and articulated liberal ideas. Africans were therefore warned to "suspect anybody who says he is a holy or a liberal."[131]

In the end therefore, liberalism as a process through which change could be effected in Northern Rhodesia was swept aside by forces of "Africanism". The nationalist movement which had begun as a reformist movement, seeking only to reform the political system and acquire some limited power sharing and basic rights for the emergent African elite, was completely transformed into a populist movement claiming to champion the cause of the African masses. Power sharing ceased to be the objective. Those nationalists who cherished liberal ideas and were prepared to give gradualism a chance became, in the eyes of militant nationalists, traitors, or sell-outs or worse still, *Acapricorn*. Although liberalism as a political process through which change was initiated and finally brought about has generally been seen as of no consequence, one cannot help but notice that "black government" was born out of constitutions whose principle objectives were inspired by the very ideas African nationalists were constantly attacking. Northern Rhodesia's independence was evolutionary rather than revolutionary because the process was carried out through liberally inspired constitutional discussions. It is arguable therefore, that in Northern Rhodesia, liberalism played an important role in the political process, a role until now unacknowledged because of the general tendency among "nationalist" historians

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[131] PA, ANC 7/31, Week-by-Week, 11 March, 1961. Liberalism was usually associated with religious beliefs, hence the suggestion that people claiming to be holy should be suspected as well.

and other Africanists to attribute the achievement of independence to the power and strength of nationalist parties. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the attainment of independence in 1964 was a combined effort of the various forces then at play in the territory. Liberalism and the triumph of populist African nationalism in the period 1958-1964 were essentially two faces of the same political process. This is why in 1962 the multi-racial Liberal Party recommended that its followers support UNIP and not the white-dominated National Progress Party.

CHAPTER SIX.

THE FIRST REPUBLIC: FROM LIBERAL DEMOCRACY TO ONE-PARTY STATE, 1964 TO 1972.

> African unity is not going to come about just because we are all black
> ... We have to ask ourselves whether it is in our interest now to discuss
> an East African Federation, agree upon it, plan it and determine the
> various steps to implement it, or wait until after independence—when
> people will be too busy with their own domestic problems to pay
> attention to it.[1]

Northern Rhodesian nationalist leaders, particularly Kenneth Kaunda, were attracted to Tom Mboya's vision of East African unity through a federation. He was chairperson of the Pan-African Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in 1963, during which time he considered that the functions of the movement could change to forging economic links by mutual consent.[2] Yet they did not grasp Mboya's perceptive warning that unity would not emerge *ipso facto* "just because we are all black." In a distinctly contrary vein Kenneth Kaunda wrote in 1960 that *"our unity is already there in the colour of our skin and our common suffering."*[3] The generalization, however, vastly oversimplified political reality. Africans had additional loyalties at more intimate levels. "Tribal" affiliation, rooted in the familiar confidences of vernacular languages and pre-colonial cultures and histories, and strengthened by social and regional differentiation during the colonial period, profoundly affected political behaviour.

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[1] Tom Mboya, cited in Richard Cox, _Pan-Africanism in Practice: An East African Study, PAFMECSA 1958-1964_, (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 3.

[2] On PAFMECSA see Cox, _Pan-Africanism in Practice_.

[3] Kenneth D. Kaunda and Colin Morris, _Black Government? A Discussion Between Colin Morris and Kenneth Kaunda_, (Lusaka, United Society for Christian Literature, 1960), p. 93 (Italics added).

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Two issues dominated actions of the UNIP government following independence in October 1964. First, UNIP was preoccupied with the struggle to maintain its political dominance under a constitution designed to guarantee liberal democracy. By liberal democracy is meant "a political system characterized by regular and free elections in which politicians organized into parties compete to form the government, by the right of virtually all adult citizens to vote, and by guarantees of a range of familiar political and civil rights."[4] Since 1959 Northern Rhodesia had a multi-party political system which "for a while maintained competitive pluralistic institutions——a framework for power contests in the polity."[5]

Secondly, the drive for political supremacy was entwined with UNIP's search for national unity, seen as the prerequisite for nation-building. The process culminated in the declaration of the one-party state in 1972, marking the beginning of the Second Republic in Zambia's[6] political history. These two issues can be seen as emerging in the very process of decolonization, which contributed to the failure of liberal democracy and the eventual declaration of a one-party state.

The two issues became ever more closely related as UNIP's search for political dominance was increasingly articulated as a process towards national unity. UNIP leaders noted that while "the spirit of Africanism" had successfully led to independence, a sense of national identity had not simultaneously been developed.

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[4] Richard Sandbrook, "Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist-Revisionist Perspective," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 22, 2 (1988), p. 241.

[5] Ali A. Mazrui, "Pluralism and National Integration," in Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969), p. 333.

[6] Northern Rhodesia was renamed Zambia (from the Zambezi river) at independence on October 24, 1964.

Indeed, as M. G. de Winton[7] argued, "the creation of a sense of national identity was one of the problems of nation-building."[8] De Winton's observation paralleled Kaunda's own concern as first president of Zambia. Kaunda pointed out that although nationalism had successfully led to independence, its future was uncertain, because many Africans in the country lacked any notion of national identity——"their loyalties were more restricted and fragmentary."[9] The intra-party and inter-party factional and ethnic conflict within UNIP and ANC, on the one hand, and between UNIP and ANC on the other, attest to that. Nationalism had to be transformed into national patriotism. There was however a strong feeling within UNIP that the continued existence of an opposition party ran counter to that objective.

UNIP and the Search for Political Dominance.

UNIP's search for political dominance pre-dated independence. When the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), (the forerunner to the United National Independence Party), was formed in 1958 by militant African National Congress (ANC) members who broke away, their decision to name the new party **Zambia**

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[7] He was legal advisor in the service of the Nigerian Government between 1950 and 1960, and legal advisor and constitutional draughtsman in the Colonial Office between 1960 and 1968.

[8] M.G. de Winton, "Decolonization and the Westminster Model," in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), The Transfer of Power: The Colonial Administration in the Age of Decolonization, (Kidlington Oxford, Oxford University, 1979), p. 184.

[9] Kenneth D. Kaunda and Colin M. Morris, A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris From Kenneth D. Kaunda, (London, Longmans, 1966), p. 84.

African National Congress was deliberately taken to replace ANC.[10] According to

Kapasa Makasa:

> Since the people were used to the name "African National Congress,"
> which had been in use for eight years, it would be unwise for us to
> come out with a completely different name which would not be easy
> for them to pick up quickly. Our task was therefore, to find a name
> which should be as near to African National Congress as possible but
> at the same time without creating confusion among our supporters.[11]

The founders of ZANC worked from what Thomas Rasmussen called the "snowball"

and "bandwagon" model which assumes that "as one party gains a clear advantage

over another, it is able to use that advantage to reinforce its dominance."[12] ZANC's

principle objective was to destroy the ANC completely and replace it as the only

nationalist party.

However, the proscribing of ZANC and the consequent detention of its

leaders temporarily left the ANC as the only legal African nationalist party. In

August 1959 ZANC elements who had escaped detention regrouped and formed the

United National Independence Party (UNIP).[13]

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[10] For a detailed discussion of the formation of ZANC and later UNIP, see Chapter five.

[11] Kapasa Makasa, Zambia's March to Political Freedom, (Nairobi, Heinemann, 1985), p. 97.

[12] Thomas Rasmussen, "Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 7, 3 (1963), p. 405.

[13] UNIP was an amalgam of the African National Independence Party (ANIP) and the United Freedom Independence Party (U.N.F.P.), both of which had been registered in July. David C. Mulford pointed out that "little is known about UNIP's actual formation" and speculates that perhaps the "ANIP and U.N.F.P. leaders regarded this as a first step towards African unity..." (David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 119).

UNIP's policy of "independence now" and its apparent populist ideology ensured it a position at the top. Once at the top, UNIP successfully formed the first African government with Kaunda serving first as prime minister in January 1964, and then as the first president in October 1964. Until the legislation of the "one-party participatory democracy" in December 1972 UNIP enjoyed a political dominance "co-existing with competition but without trace of alteration."[14] Its dominance however, continued to dwindle with time. This decline in UNIP's influence precipitated a move away from pluralism to a one-party political system.

The Search For National Unity.

While UNIP easily emerged as the dominant political party from its formation to the attainment of independence, the search for national unity proved elusive. In realistic terms, "the most important single feature of inter-party competition was the allegiance of the political parties' geographical bases of support."[15] This had serious political implications—especially for the question of national unity.

Until the formation of the United Party (UP) in 1966 UNIP was virtually unchallenged in most of the country. Only the rural areas of Southern Province remained outside the domain of the ruling party. The emergence of the UP and the United Progressive Party (UPP) in 1971 posed a serious threat to UNIP's political

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[14] W.H. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and Dissent: their interrelations in the Indian party system," Government and Politics, 1, 4 (July-September, 1966), p. 454.

[15] William Tordoff and Ian Scott, "Political Parties: Structures and Policies," in William Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 141.

dominance. UPP was particularly strong on the Copperbelt. The search for national unity became a major preoccupation for UNIP.

However, lack of national unity was itself reflected in a lack of unity within the ruling party.[16] Since its formation in 1959 UNIP had remained essentially a coalition of various interest groups. It was never a truly coherent political party. UNIP was formed as a platform for the campaign to end colonial rule. It therefore attracted Africans with diverse interests. While this populist approach was attractive during the struggle for independence, it was no longer possible to contain the various interests within UNIP after independence. In the end therefore, UNIP experienced intense, and potentially serious intra-party competition. As Cherry Gertzel and others pointed out: "the most important level of political conflict, however, was not between UNIP and the ANC, but within UNIP itself,"[17] because UNIP's success

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[16] Leadership conflict and crisis was not only confined to UNIP. ANC also experienced internal dissensions. In September 1965, for example, a section of ANC National Council led by Bellings Lombe publicly deposed Harry Nkumbula and asked Edward Mungoni Liso to head the party. But Liso, who was Nkumbula's nephew, refused the invitation and pledged his loyalty to the "deposed" leader. (Times of Zambia, September 27, 1965).

The failure to replace Nkumbula led to the formation of a splinter group led by senior national executive officials and five of the ANC MPs. They formed a new political party called the United Front which comprised the following:

National President	Bellings Lombe
National Secretary	Price S. Chanda
Treasurer	Jack Manzies
Director of Youth	Jairnes Mate
Deputy Director of Youth	Maxwell Sikufweba
Publicity Chief	Patrick Mulandu

(Patrick Wele, Kaunda and Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story, Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, 1987, p. 29.)

[17] Cherry Gertzel, et al The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 7.

contained "the seeds of its own future problems ..."[18] It became more difficult to accommodate rival political interests and the threat of defections increased.

The problem was further compounded by the quick transition of UNIP from a nationalist party formed in 1959 to a ruling party in 1964. UNIP came to power when it was still in its formative stages——the various interests within the party had only began to reach the compromise stage. They were yet to coalesce around various interests.[19] Since the basic materials for a parliamentary system of government remained absent until the terminal stages of colonial rule, and colonialism was essentially "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in which "politics, especially opposition politics, were barely tolerated,"[20] UNIP as a political party was ill-prepared to govern the country. It took over political machinery with which most of its leaders had very little experience. Thus UNIP did not consider political pluralism and conflict as necessary or even desirable aspects of national unity.

Consequently, when disaffection emerged soon after independence, UNIP's response was erratic and sometimes exacerbated the conflict. Sources of conflicts were legion——some individuals who expected rewards for their involvement in the freedom struggle felt left out. UNIP files at the Party Archives contain several letters from UNIP members seeking employment in government on the basis that they had fought for independence. The frequency of such letters prompted the Chief

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[18] Rasmussen, "One-Party Dominance in Zambia," p. 408.

[19] For a detailed discussion on the different stages of political development concerning political integration in a plural society such as that of Zambia see Ali A. Mazrui, "Pluralism and National Integration," p. 335.

[20] J.S. Coleman, "Economic Growth and Political Reorientation", in Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz (eds.), Economic Transition in Africa, (Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 396.

Administrative Secretary at UNIP Headquarters to respond to one such request in

the following manner:

> We have fought and got our independence, but an employment is not
> a reward, we are already awarded with independence and what is left
> over is for us to fight against poverty, disease and ignorance.[21]

Since there were not enough jobs to go round for everyone who believed that they

had spent time fighting for independence, some people inevitably felt frustrated.

Zambia's experience in the first eight years of independence is a typical

example of how most newly independent African countries grappled with the need

to create a sense of national identity. While the colonial geographical entity

Northern Rhodesia provided the frontiers for nation-building, the peoples inhabiting

that unit lacked the ingredients usually required to form "nations" in the classic sense,

such as a common language, culture and religion. "Africanism", which had provided

a temporary unity during the independence struggle, ceased to be a unifying factor

after independence. "Tribal" and regional cleavages within UNIP again brought to

light the reality which nationalist leaders had so far deliberately chosen to

ignore——namely that Zambia was not yet a nation.

In fact, "tribal" and regional cleavages pre-dated independence. It has already

been shown that "tribalism" and regionalism were contributory factors towards the

October 1958 split within the ANC when Nkumbula packed the central committee

with Southern Province candidates.[22]

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[21] PA, UNIP 6/45, Chief Administrative Secretary, UNIP
Headquarters to Alfred Lukonga, January 21, 1967. For more
letters from UNIP supporters seeking employment see File ANC
2/3 Vol. II, Enquiries and Complaints.

[22] See Makasa, Zambia's March to Political Freedom, pp.
88 and 94, and also Chapter Five p. 243.

The process of nation-building was therefore bedeviled by the continued existence of social cleavage coupled with regional economic inequality. UNIP's popularity in the last days of colonial rule was because it shouted the loudest about its commitment to removing social and economic inequalities created by the colonial government. President Kaunda is on recorded as having promised, on January 17, 1964 at a political rally at Chifubu, that there should be "eggs and milk for every child and for every family in Zambia by 1970."[23] Eventually Kaunda and his colleagues in UNIP realized they could not fulfil these promises.

Worse still, the uneven economic development of the pre-independence era increasingly became a major political issue after 1964. UNIP's failure to deal readily with the problem became a major source of conflict within the party.[24] As Bornwell C. Chikulo has argued, UNIP officials viewed "securing positions on the Central Committee ... not only as a necessary means of obtaining political power but also of influencing the allocation of economic resources."[25]

However, side-by-side with the need to unite the black people of Zambia was the more urgent need to "build a non-racial state from the remains of an

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[23] Kenneth Kaunda, Speech at Chifubu (Ndola), January 17, 1964, cited in Fola Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building: Neo-Humanism and Politics in Zambia, 1967-1969," Geneva-Africa, 9, 1 (1970), p. 5.

[24] See Robert Molteno, "Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: a Study in Sectionalism," in William Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1974), pp. 62-106.

[25] Bornwell C. Chikulo, "Elections in a One-Party Participatory Democracy," in Ben Turok (ed.), Development in Zambia: a Reader, (London, Zed Press, 1979), p. 202.

unashamedly racial society ..."[26] The UNIP government had to contend with both sectionalism——a competition for scarce resources between interests which reflected the regional or provincial cleavages——and racial strife. From time to time racial antagonism was used by the UNIP government as a strategy for fostering the ideology of togetherness among black Zambians. This was not always successful. UNIP officials began to propound the ideology of togetherness as a counter measure against an alleged white conspiracy against the Zambian Government. The ideology of togetherness was meant to prevent the imminent coalescing of various interests into contending political parties.

Anyhow, race as a political factor in Zambia had been colonially motivated.[27] Thus, at independence (and beginning with the general elections of 1962), the Zambian National Assembly assumed a unique composition. Although UNIP had fifty-five out of seventy-five elected seats in parliament, the twenty opposition seats were held by politicians some of whom had played long and important roles in earlier councils. Among the ten European members representing the reserved seats,[28] two had been members of the Executive Council in the pre-independence

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[26] John de St. Jorre, "Race Tension on the Copperbelt: Rhodesia Infects Her Northern Neighbour," The Round Table, No. 225 (January 1967), p. 75.

[27] See Chapter Two for details.

[28] Under the Northern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council 1963, which provided for these reserved seats, the United Federal Party reorganized as the National Progress Party, contested the 1964 elections and won all the ten reserved seats. The independence constitution (Cmd. 2365) provided for the continuation of these seats unless the president desired otherwise.

period and five had been members of various councils since 1959.[29] The other ten

seats were held by ANC which represented the parent nationalist party.

However, as Mainza Chona, then Minister of Home Affairs pointed out:

> I am not very worried about the National Progress Party because as I have already said, I do not think that any of them will remain in the House after the next general election, unless they become members of UNIP ... but it is rather from the ANC that a danger would easily come in ... because they are Africans like myself, and more than that they were elected by people for whom we are fully responsible ...
> The imperialists will always believe that they [the ANC] have support and they are quite capable of building up people, even those who have no support.[30]

Indeed, the reserved seats were abolished before the 1968 general elections. In the

end, racial antagonism again brought to the fore the fact that black Zambians were

motivated by the spirit of "Africanism" in their search for nationhood. UNIP

appeared to pay lip service to its declared policy of establishing a non-racial society.

UNIP officials always harboured suspicions against whites who had chosen to remain

in Zambia after independence. These suspicions were further exacerbated by the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by whites in Southern Rhodesia in

November 1965. There was a general belief that whites in Zambia sympathised with

them. Andrew D. Roberts pointed out that while there were "still a large number

of racists in the European community; white Rhodesians and South Africans continue

to be indispensable, and not only in the copper industry."[31]

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[29] Anirudha Gupta, "The Zambian National Assembly: Study of an African Legislature," Parliamentary Affairs, 19, 1 (1965-66), p. 50.

[30] Parliamentary Debates, January 13, 1965, col. 93, cited in Gupta, "The Zambian National Assembly," p. 52.

[31] Andrew D. Roberts, "White Judges under Attack: Growing Pressure for a One-Party State," The Round Table, No. 236 (October, 1966), p. 426.

It was however, the judiciary crisis of 1969 which shattered President Kaunda's claim that he was building a non-racial society through his famous philosophy of humanism. Contrary to his preaching, couched in his philosophy of humanism since 1967, Kaunda remained suspicious of white Zambians. That notwithstanding, at independence some whites who had been sympathetic to UNIP were appointed to senior government posts. One such a person was James John Skinner.[32] He was appointed Minister of Justice at independence and later became Attorney-General and Chief Justice.

The judiciary crisis had its origins in the nullification of fifteen parliamentary seats by judges when ANC successfully petitioned against the election results in 1968.[33] Although for the first five and half years of the country's independence the judiciary had remained independent of the Executive, there was nevertheless an air of uneasiness. This was largely because the Bench was composed only of whites, not all of whom were citizens.[34]

The crisis intensified in 1969 following the arrest and subsequent trial of two Portuguese soldiers who had crossed into Zambia from Angola. On June 16, William Bruce Lyle, a magistrate, convicted the two of illegally entering Zambia from Angola

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[32] James J. Skinner was a Lusaka Lawyer originally from Dublin. He acted as UNIP's legal and campaign advisor. In July 1962 Skinner prepared UNIP's Election Workers' Handbook, (July 30, 1962), an impressive and extensive electioneering guide which was distributed to party officials at all levels. Skinner was also involved in winning over other whites to UNIP.

[33] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building," p. 22. See also Andrew D. Roberts, "White Judges Under Attack," pp. 423-430.

[34] Robert Molteno and William Tordoff, "Conclusion, Independent Zambia: Achievements and Prospects," in Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia, p. 368.

and sentenced each to a fine of K2,000 (£1,166) or in default of payment, to two years imprisonment. The two appealed to the High Court and on July 3, Justice Evans quashed the sentences and commented that the incident was "trivial, and a mere technical breach."[35] On July 14 President Kaunda told a press conference that while he had no quarrel with the quashing of the sentences, he found Justice Evans' comments to have been politically motivated to discredit the government.[36]

President Kaunda further told the press conference that the fact that Justice Evans criticised "Zambian authorities" rather than the police or immigration officials, meant that the criticism was aimed directly at him since he was the "sole authority in Zambia."[37] He therefore asked Chief Justice Skinner to explain whether the judiciary was working for a foreign power.

The following day the Chief Justice totally rejected President Kaunda's complaint and said he did "not accept that the judgement of Justice Evans was in any sense a political one or motivated in any way by political considerations."[38] President Kaunda said for his part, he was dissatisfied with the explanation. On July 16 demonstrations in Lusaka demanded the removal of the Chief Justice and Justice Evans. Some demonstrators carried posters saying that "white men could never be Zambians" and that "the only good white man was a dead one."[39] After the High Court demonstration, the demonstrators marched to State House where they were addressed by President Kaunda who promised that he would Zambianize the

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[35] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1969), p. 23533.

[36] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1969), p. 23533.

[37] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1969), p. 23533.

[38] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1969), p. 23533.

[39] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building", p. 36.

judiciary shortly. What President Kaunda actually meant was that he would "Africanise" the judiciary. The Chief Justice was a Zambian by naturalization and so was Justice Evans. The Times of Zambia editorial of July 18, 1969 pointed out that:

> Let it be clear that Mr. Skinner is a Zambian; he has been a member
> of UNIP from the days when he risked isolation from those whose skin
> is of similar pigmentation to his. To lump him with any other person
> or to condemn every white person smacked of ultra-racialism which,
> apart from cutting across our national philosophy of humanism, stands
> in utter contradiction to our efforts in fighting the racists to the
> south.[40]

The constitution was subsequently amended to enable relatively inexperienced lawyers to be appointed as judges.[41] Thus, President Kaunda was hardly colour-blind on this issue. On July 18, the leader of the opposition African National Congress, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, described the demonstrations by supporters of UNIP against the judiciary as "the end of justice in Zambia."[42]

Indeed, as Soremekun observed, "Kaunda was virtually led by the radical group," a radical wing of the party embodied in the UNIP Youth wing.[43] He chose to reinforce the ideology of togetherness and temporarily appeared to score a victory by siding with the radical wing. He therefore temporarily evaded the real pressing problem of ethnicity and sectionalism within UNIP. In the end, Justice Skinner left the country on July 17 for London and Justice Evans left for Australia on July 25. The two never returned to Zambia despite assurances that they could.

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[40] Africa Research Bulletin, (July 1-31, 1969), p. 1381.

[41] The Constitution (Amendment) (no.5), Act, 1969, S. 12, cited in Molteno and Tordoff, "Conclusion," Politics in Zambia, p. 368.

[42] Africa Research Bulletin, (July 1-31 1969), p. 1481.

[43] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building," p. 37.

The quarrel over the judiciary crystallized wider issues——"a deep-seated problem in Zambian politics: the widespread confusion about where ultimate authority resides, as to the relationship between the law and the executive, and between the executive and the ruling party."[44] The crisis reflected UNIP's discomfort with an independent judiciary. Because it was composed of white judges not all of whom were Zambians provided the excuse. The Constitution Amendment No.5 of 1969 enabled the government to appoint lawyers who were considered loyal to the ruling party as judges. This change began the abolition of the rule of law and its indispensability to democracy in Zambia.

As if this was not enough, a debate on the Copperbelt developed into another racial crisis. This time the issue surrounded the Africanisation of some street names. There was nothing particularly wrong with the process, but the proposed new names were those of four Africans who were hanged for murdering Lilian Burton during the heat of political struggle in May 1960,[45] one of the few cases in which a white person was killed during the independence struggle.

The controversy involved Peter Chanda, Minister of State for the Copperbelt Province, and other radical UNIP members. They openly called the four men national heroes who deserved to be honoured, resurrecting the emotionalism which, at the time of the murder, had led the UNIP journal Voice of UNIP to idolize the murderers of Lilian Burton as courageous freedom fighters.[46] The idea angered Bob Burton, the husband of the murdered woman. He wrote an open letter to Peter

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[44] Roberts, "White Judges Under Attack," p. 428.

[45] The Northern News, 9 May, 1960.

[46] J.R.T. Wood, The Welensky Papers: a History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Durban, Graham Publishing, 1983), p. 1020.

Chanda saying he "was packing his bags and leaving Zambia shortly ... he could no longer associate himself with a country where murder is a laudable accomplishment."[47]

The following day, President Kaunda intervened and courageously wrote an open letter to Bob Burton apologizing for Peter Chanda whom he said he knew

> ... well enough to realize that he is regretting having mixed up this very sad incident ... As humanists we place importance on man as an individual, and I want you to know that I would have written a similar open letter had you by the accident of your birth been yellow, brown or black ... May I end by stating emphatically that Mrs Burton is buried here and I believe that it is here that her family belongs now, and I ask you to stay.[48]

Burton decided to stay, but Peter Chanda was moved from the Copperbelt to Southern Province, then to Eastern Province and then back to the Copperbelt. In 1970 he was moved to the office of the President.[49]

The judiciary crisis, and even to some extent, the Peter Chanda affair, may have helped to create a sense of unity among Africans inside UNIP. The race conflict was used as a strategy to draw the attention of UNIP followers away from

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[47] Bob Burton, "An Open Letter to Minister of State Peter Chanda," _Times of Zambia_, October 22, 196P

[48] K.D. Kaunda, "An Open Letter to Bob Burton from His Excellency The President of the Republic of Zambia," _Times of Zambia_, October 23, 1968.

[49] It is important to point out that Peter Chanda himself never apologized to Bob Burton, neither did he suffer any political setback. His frequent transfers were not unique—they are a common feature in the UNIP government. It is one way in which President Kaunda has kept holders of party and government posts under control by creating uncertainty. Peter Chanda was later appointed Zambia's Ambassador to Ethiopia until his subsequent arrest and detention in February 1972 for supporting the United Progressive Party (UPP). (_Africa Research Bulletin_, 1-29 February, 1972, p. 2377). He was released from detention together with Simon Kapwepwe on 31 December 1972. (_Africa Research Bulletin_, 1-31 December, 1972, p. 2688).

divisions within the party, and among Africans in general. The party, however, was unable to conceive of opposition as anything other than an obstacle to nation-building which must be removed. Initially UNIP leaders believed that this could be done without legally banning the opposition. Rasmussen comments that:

> Until March 1968, UNIP relied heavily upon tactics of persuasion and positive inducements to convince ANC voters that their political and economic interests could be best served through UNIP.[50]

The consensual technique was explicitly emphasized by President Kaunda in his speech to the UNIP General Conference in August 1967, when he restated several principles:

1. That we are in favour of a one-party state;

2. That we do not believe in legislating against the opposition;

3. That by being honest to the cause of the common man we would, through effective party and government organization paralyse and wipe out any opposition thereby bringing about the birth of a one-party state;

4. We go further and declare that even when this comes about we would still not legislate against the formation of opposition parties because we might be bottling the feeling of certain people no matter how few.[51]

UNIP's popularity and parliamentary strength at independence and the corresponding unpopularity and parliamentary weakness (in terms of seats) of ANC gave UNIP the feeling that the ANC would die a "natural death".

However, instead the ANC steadily gained in strength. In the successive elections UNIP did not win the necessary support for its stated goal of establishing a one-party state through the ballot box. Furthermore, factionalism within UNIP aided ANC's political resurrection between August 1967 to December 1972. The

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[50] Rasmussen, "One-Party Dominance in Zambia," p. 407.

[51] Proceedings of the Annual General Conference of UNIP, held at Mulungushi, 14-20 August, 1967. Lusaka, Zambia Information Service, 1967, pp. 10-11, cited in Chikulo, "Elections in a One-Party Participatory Democracy," p. 202.

Southern Province by-elections of March 1968 proved the futility of the strategy of achieving a one-party state through the ballot box. Southern Province remained an ANC stronghold. The by-elections were called because four members of parliament in Southern Province constituencies had changed their party allegiance from ANC to UNIP.[52] The four ANC candidates were elected in the four by-elections in Choma, Kalomo, Magoye and Gwembe constituencies by substantial majorities. UNIP only got fifteen per cent of the total votes cast in the four by-elections.[53] The December 1968 general election further reinforced that point. Contrary to UNIP's "assumption that its position of dominance, and particularly its ability to reward its supporters, would result in the atrophy and eventual political death of ANC," the ANC continued to be a real political threat. The ideology of togetherness was obviously failing.

In the first four years of independence, UNIP's belief in the "snowball" and "bandwagon" model proved to be a fallacy in relation to the ANC-UNIP power struggle. Although UNIP remained in power, after the December 1968 general elections, the ANC continued to be forceful in its role as an opposition party. Nkumbula was always a rallying point for the opposition despite efforts to discredit him. Some ANC MPs, including their leader, proved more experienced than some government ministers. Efforts by the government to discredit ANC, and thus get rid of it immediately, failed.

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[52] According to the Zambian constitution then, an elected member of parliament ceased to be a member of the house if he/she changed party allegiance. A by-election was therefore mandatory in such cases.

[53] Rasmussen, "One-Party Dominance in Zambia," pp. 410-411.

Consequently the UNIP decided to deal with the opposition ruthlessly. Two days before Christmas of 1968, President Kaunda gave what Soremekun described as "one of the most unfortunate speeches in his political career."[54] During the ceremony at which President Kaunda announced the new administration following the December 1968 general election, he promised to implement economic reforms to show that "it pays to belong to UNIP." Issuing a warning to members of the opposition, he said:

> I cannot see how I can continue to pay a police officer or a civil servant who works for Nkumbula ... How dare they bite the hand that feeds them? **They must learn that it pays to belong to UNIP.** Those who want to form a civil service of the opposition must cross the floor and get their pay from Harry Nkumbula.[55]

President Kaunda then announced that he had ordered Justin Chimba, the new Minister of Trade, Industry and Mines "to ensure that none of the eight opposition MPs elected in Barotse Province was granted a new licence to run a business or had his old licence renewed" and warned Chimba that "**if you renew these men's licences you would be sacked yourself.**"[56] The determination to force the ANC out was not the real issue. UNIP was still strong enough to govern. However, as long as the constitution protected and allowed opposition parties to exist legally, and UNIP failed to please the various interests within the party, its dominance would wane. To undercut future defections from UNIP and the emergence of new parties, UNIP decided to legislate against the opposition——not against the ANC *per se*.

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[54] Soremekun, "The Challenge to Nation-Building," p. 24.

[55] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 17 (1968-1969), p. 23321. (Emphasis added).

[56] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building," p. 25 (Emphasis added).

These remarks were immediately followed by some local authorities taking punitive measures against known ANC supporters. The Kitwe City Council decided, on December 31, to grant no further licences to members of ANC. Hyden Dingiswayo Banda, Minister of State for Western Province (now Copperbelt Province) was reported to have banned all ANC meetings in the province "in order to pave the way for the creation of one-party state in Zambia."[57] Banda's announcement was echoed by Fines Bulawayo, one of the district governors in the province on January 14, 1969. Bulawayo said Banda "was ready to expel all opposition party supporters from their jobs and homes."[58]

In the Southern Province "local UNIP leaders turned the Christmas season not into a time to show goodwill toward all men, but into a time to apply 'selective sanctions' against ANC members."[59] Water taps were cut off to ANC areas, and loan applications were cancelled. The current slogan became "It Pays to Belong to UNIP."

President Kaunda's decision to use the economic weapon against ANC was not only a breach of the spirit behind the economic reforms announced in April 1968, but also impeded the process of nation-building. Non-UNIP supporters were alienated from the process of national integration. Because of the regional base of political pluralism, Kaunda's decision to use the economic weapon to marginalize ANC exacerbated ethnic divisions in the country.

Economic Reforms.

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[57] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 23321.

[58] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 23321.

[59] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building," p. 26.

On April 19, 1968 President Kaunda unfolded Zambia's economic reforms which were directed at foreign owned companies. "The Government invited twenty-six key companies to sell 51% of their shares. Second class trading areas where most of the retail trade was conducted by Indians, became proscribed areas to non-Zambians."[60] President Kaunda also announced that from January 1969 no more trade licences would be issued to non-Zambians. According to Soremekun, this part of the reforms affected nearly 8,000 trading places all over the country.[61] Credit facilities were from now on to be restricted to Zambians only. The government also made a clear-cut decision for the development of the rural areas through the promotion of agricultural cooperatives.[62]

The principle behind the economic reforms was to stimulate indigenous entrepreneurship. Party affiliation was not originally part of the equation of the economic reforms. Thus the introduction of party affiliation into the equation on December 23 meant that non-UNIP members were lumped together with non-Zambians, at least as far as President Kaunda's interpretation of how he intended to see the economic reforms implemented. If he believed that this was a short cut to nation-building, he only managed to exacerbate the ANC-UNIP rivalry. More importantly, it made it difficult for ANC members to be patriotic to the nation when they were being treated like foreigners. Kaunda had just worsened his problem of how to transform nationalism into patriotism.[63] He was destroying the nation.

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[60] Soremekun, "The Challenge to Nation-Building," p. 13.

[61] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building," p. 13.

[62] This work does not discuss the failures or successes of the economic reforms as they were unveiled by President Kaunda in 1968.

[63] Kaunda and Morris, A Humanist in Africa, p. 83.

Non-Recognition of the Opposition.

The "economic sanctions" unilaterally imposed on all ANC supporters were soon given a parliamentary twist. On January 22 1969, the new speaker of the National Assembly Robinson N. Nabulyato refused to recognize ANC as the official opposition in the assembly on the grounds that the ANC was too small a minority to constitute an official opposition. He argued that the ANC could "form neither a quorum to execute the business of the House nor a government if UNIP resigned."[64] According to the current constitution, a party needed twenty-seven seats to form a government, but ANC only had twenty-three.

The previous speaker of the House, Wesley Nyirenda, commented that the new speaker was within his constitutional rights. He added however, that while Nkumbula would continue to oppose and lead his party, he would cease to be an important personage in parliament and would neither receive the salary of leader of the opposition nor have an office in the assembly building. Nkumbula was also deprived of an official residence as leader of the opposition.[65] While Nabulyato was exercising his constitutional rights, the fact that his decision followed President Kaunda's speech in which he publicly stated that he intended to show members of the opposition that "it pays to belong to UNIP," the decision was understood as yet another attempt to clamp down on the ANC.

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[64] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 17 (1968-1969), p. 23321.

[65] Africa Research Bulletin, (January 1-31, 1969), p. 1296.

Ultimately, that decision destroyed the democratic principles which were needed for a smooth operation of political pluralism. The crucial element of liberal democracy—the willingness, without even considering the possibility of an alternative, by the government in office to hand over power to the winners of the next election, and to administer political conditions which allow that opposition to work openly to win over a majority of the electorate in the meantime—was no longer acceptable to the UNIP. The "political society" as defined by Somjee[66] began to behave in a peculiar way. According to Somjee:

> A political society occupies a position between social organization and economic structures on the one hand, and legal and political institutions on the other. **It is an arena where people born to certain ethnic, religious and class groupings make efforts to build or join secular collectives of political parties, unions and interests groups, with a cross-section of people to influence and control public institutions.** It is the product of a continuing interaction between social and cultural conditions, goal directions, mobilizational processes and participatory involvements, and above all a constantly emerging pattern of political behaviour which influences and conditions a part of the subsequent political activity.[67]

Instead of being an arena where politically mobilized individuals joined secular collectivities of party organizations, unions or interest groups to pursue their political goals, the Zambia political society became an arena for domination and for awarding political rewards. The "political society" ceased to be in the centre. It became entangled with the legal and political institutions as well as the social and economic structures into which the individuals were born. The political behaviour of the Zambian political society reflected the nature of the social realities and divisions

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[66] A. H. Somjee, <u>The Democratic Process in a Developing Society</u>, (New York, St. Martin's Press 1979), pp. 127-128.

[67] Somjee, <u>The Democratic Process</u>, p. 128 (Emphasis added).

within society. These social realities and divisions were in turn reflected in the behaviour of party leaders.

Thus the lack of unity within UNIP as shown during the August 1967 Mulungushi Conference, served only to prove the falsity of "Africanism" as a unifying force. On the last day of the Conference party elections were held as scheduled——the first and last open and competitive elections for UNIP leadership. Before the elections it was agreed that certain party posts would correspond to certain cabinet posts. For instance, the candidate elected as the president of the party would automatically become the president of the state. The UNIP national vice-president would be the vice-president of the state.[68] When the voting was over, nearly all the candidates from Lozi-speaking Barotseland and Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province were defeated by Tonga-speaking and Bemba-speaking candidates. The party had split along linguistic lines. The Bemba-Tonga Alliance headed by Simon Kapwepwe and the Nyanja-Lozi Alliance headed by Reuben Kamanga, became the key entities in the fight for elections.

The electoral results were shattering for a party which boasted of building a non-tribal and a non-racial nation under the motto of "ONE ZAMBIA ONE NATION." The political aftermath first surfaced on August 20 when President Kaunda appointed a Commission of Inquiry under Chief Justice Jack Blagden to investigate the election results in the light of reports that the number of votes cast had exceeded the total number of people qualified to vote at the conference in four of the seven contests. The Blagden Commission reported on August 24 that there were "substantial errors in the counting of votes at Mulungushi," but never had the

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[68] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building," p. 10.

number of votes cast exceeded the number of voters, nor did the recount suggest any change in the results of the election.[69]

Ethnic tension mounted as it became apparent that the election of Bemba representatives for five of the eleven posts in the Central Committee, and the defeat of long-time Lozi representatives such as Sipalo and Wina, had upset the careful ethnic balance until now maintained in the party hierarchy.President Kaunda expressed concern at the cleavages revealed by the election results:

> What happened in the last elections shows clearly that we have not understood [the dangers of our methods]. We have canvassed so strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial lines, that one wonders whether we really have national or tribal or provincial leadership.... It is very easy to shout "ONE ZAMBIA ONE NATION," but very difficult to think and act in that way honestly and sincerely.[70]

Things came to a head in February 1968 during the UNIP National Council meeting in Chilenje, Lusaka. The National Council met to endorse the party's new Central Committee, but because of dissension from a somewhat large section of the party hierarchy, this was not possible. Incensed by the jubilation of the winning groups, and by the bickering and hostility which resulted from the August 1967 election, President Kaunda resigned his post as UNIP's president and *ipso facto* as Zambia's president on February 4, 1968.[71]

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[69] Africa Report, 12 (October, 1967), p. 35. See Table VII, columns 3 and 4.

[70] President Kaunda, Address to the United National Independence Party Council, August 29, 1967, cited in Africa Report, 12, 9 (December, 1967), p. 33.

[71] Soremekun refers to Kaunda's resignation for a few hours in September 1967. This is an error because all evidence suggests that it was in February 1968, not September 1967, that Kaunda staged his dramatic brief resignation. For a detailed account of these events see Sikota Wina, A Night Without A President, (Lusaka, Multimedia Publications, 1985). The central thesis of Wina's book is that without Kaunda,

Table VII summarises the electoral results of the August 1967 Party elections.

TABLE VII
UNIP PARTY ELECTIONS AUGUST 1967.

Elective Party Office	Candidate	Votes Cast (Mulungushi Count)	Votes Cast (Commission of Inquiry Recount)	Ethnic Background
National President	**Kenneth Kaunda**	Unopposed	————	Bemba
National Vice-President	**Simon Kapwepwe**	2742	2740	Bemba
	Reuben Kamanga	2404	2010	Nyanja
National Secretary	**Mainza Chona**	2404	2740	Tonga
	Munu Sipalo	1911	1210	Lozi
	Aaron Milner	1493	1134	Coloured
Deputy National Secretary	**Justin Chimba**	2953	2450	Bemba
	Humphrey Mulemba	2314	2259	Kaonde
National Treasurer	**Elijah Mudenda**	2964	2962	Tonga
	Arthur Wina	1800	1782	Lozi
Deputy National Treasurer	**Lewis Changufu**	2893	2888	Bemba
	Wesley Nyirenda	1919	1868	Nyanja
Deputy National Chairman	**Grey Zulu**	2522	2674	Nyanja
	Peter Matoka	2390	2083	Tonga
Director of the Women's Brigade	**Maria Nankolongo**	3220	3323	Bemba
	Princess Mukwae Nakatindi	1436	1436	Lozi

Source: Robert I. Rotberg, "Tribalism and Politics in Zambia," Africa Report, 12 (December 1967), p. 32. Fifth column added by author.

Zambia would erupt into violence and all would be lost.

The outcome of President Kaunda's brief resignation is interesting to follow for it provides a focus of his subsequent control of the party. It also accounts for the decline of political pluralism and the consequent declaration of the one-party state in 1972. Alexander Grey Zulu, Chairman of the Chilenje meeting was quoted as having said:

> In the name of the 4,500,000 people of Zambia, in the name of the unborn children and our dead ancestors, I must plead with you to withhold your final decision until tomorrow.[72]

An impression was therefore created that only Kaunda was able to lead Zambia. Kaunda later said he withdrew his resignation when many people, "some of them with tears in their eyes begged him to stay."[73] One Minister of State at the time responded to President Kaunda's brief resignation as follows:

> I left that Hall with one theme in mind——the Republic is finished ... My family was left behind in the Solwezi provincial capital of the North-Western Province. My first thought, following the shock of Ken's resignation, was of the security of my family who were more than six hundred and forty kilometres away from this confusion ... I was therefore going to drive all night to Solwezi, pick up my family, pack a few essential belongings and drive back to Lusaka, and then to Lundazi in the Eastern Province, which is my home. I was going to leave them in the safety of the villagers and return to Lusaka with my shot gun and join in the street fighting.[74]

Nephas Tembo's reaction and thoughts reflect vividly how "tribal" and regionally inspired they were. Although he was a Minister of State, for the northwestern province, his thoughts reflected his belief that he was an Easterner first and Zambian second. Therefore, when President Kaunda briefly resigned his presidency, Tembo was more concerned about the safety of his family in Solwezi among strangers. It is

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[72] Wina, A Night Without A President, p. 45.

[73] Soremekun, "The Challenge of Nation-Building," p. 11.

[74] Nephas Tembo, quoted in Wina, A Night Without A President, p. 46.

therefore, plausible to suggest that the "Zambian nation" as imagined by Tembo and others in UNIP was yet to be consolidated——a process which they imagined untenable without Kaunda whom they visualized as the epitome of unity. Nephas Tembo, like Grey Zulu believed that without Kaunda's leadership Zambia as a nation would be in jeopardy. Both equated the existence of the nation with Kaunda's leadership. Several years later, Mwizenge S. Tembo restated this theme when he wrote:

> It had very grave potential implications for the four million people of Zambia at the time. This was a young and fragile country barely four years old. It was surrounded by White Rhodesia, racist South Africa, and white colonial Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. These regimes would have been more than jubilant to see turmoil and bloodshed in independent black Zambia. That would have been ammunition for these regimes' racist colonial campaigns. Obviously cooler heads among the Zambian political leaders at the time prevailed. During that twelve-hour political crisis, Zambia's future hung in the balance. Fortunately, the leaders restrained their selfish political ambitions for the sake of the unity and safety of Zambia and its citizens.[75]

Mwizenge Tembo's interpretation of the February 1968 crisis reflects "nationalist scholarship" which tends to blame the outside world for most problems of the newly independent countries. Here Mwizenge Tembo gives the impression that Zambia needed Kaunda to remain united as a nation and therefore avoid foreign engineered political instability. This is a refusal to take cognizance of the fact that the Zambian political society was not monolithic and had great potential for political conflict.

However, neither Mwizenge Tembo nor Sikota Wina explain why none of the other candidates who were also returned unopposed at the Mulungushi elections of

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[75] Mwizenge S. Tembo, "Zambia By Zambians," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 22, 1 (1988), p. 151.

Central Committee members in 1967 could effectively lead the party.[76] One could argue that, as in 1958 when Kaunda first emerged as leader of the newly founded Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), and similarly in 1968, Kaunda appeared least motivated by the politics of tribalism. In 1958 Simon Kapwepwe, Reuben Kamanga and others had led the break away, yet Kaunda, who followed them one hour later, became leader of the new party. Why?

In retrospect, it is plausible to suggest that only Kaunda lacked strong tribal inclinations. Although born among the Bemba, Kaunda's Nyasaland (now Malawi) parentage seems to have been at the back of the minds of those who formed ZANC. Events of 1968, and Kaunda's apparent strong anti-tribal sentiments, seem to suggest that only he was capable of playing politics above tribal lines.

The manner in which President Kaunda was persuaded to resume the presidency following his twelve-hour resignation (although he did not hand his letter of resignation to the Chief Justice), created a great psychological impact among UNIP officials. The "Leadership Principle" began to be a reality. President Kaunda emerged stronger than he was before the crisis. It was a political gamble which paid handsome dividends. President Kaunda promised never to resign again. (So far he appears to have kept his word.)

While President Kaunda emerged strong, UNIP as a party was increasingly weakened. Its grip on political power was no longer a *fait accompli*. In response, President Kaunda began moving towards a one-party state—not so much as a process of nation-building, but as a strategy for maintaining UNIP's political dominance and thereby his own in Zambia. To remain an epitome of unity, Kaunda

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[76] The following were also returned unopposed: Chairman, Solomon Kalulu; Publicity Chief, Sikota Wina; and Director of the Youth Brigade, Dingiswayo Banda.

had to remove all existing and potential sources of challenge to his leadership. Conflict within UNIP gave the United Party (UP) a position of political significance which it had never enjoyed since its formation. Because of ethnic polarization in the country, UP's strength grew in Western Province and along the line of rail. The UP was however proscribed in 1968 because of violent clashes with UNIP. After that, UP leaders directed their followers to join ANC. Consequently, between 1968 and 1972 ANC's effectiveness increased substantially and undermined UNIP's hope of achieving a one-party state through the ballot box.

Towards the Second Republic, 1969-1972.

Although Zambia became *de jure* a one-party state in December 1972, the country had been a *de facto* one-party state since 1969 following Robinson Nabulyato's decision as speaker of the National Assembly not to recognize the ANC as an official opposition in parliament.[77] ANC protests could not stop the process towards the creation of a one-party political system in Zambia. Meanwhile, the government continued to deny that it intended to legislate the opposition out of existence. In August 1969 President Kaunda said:

> It is necessary for me to repeat also that if we wanted, we would make Zambia a one-party state today. We have all the necessary instruments including the will of the majority of the people. But we do not want to do so now and we will avoid having to do it by legislation, although I must warn that this is no licence for trouble makers to force our hand in it.[78]

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[77] See above, pp. 312-313.

[78] Africa Confidential, 17 (August 22, 1969), p. 3.

However, the behaviour of UNIP officials in the provinces did not reflect their leader's sentiments. Punitive measures continued to be carried out against ANC supporters.

Meanwhile, cleavages within UNIP continued to grow. In August 1969 President Kaunda issued a party presidential decree which dissolved the Central Committee and abolished the post of party president and vice-president. In their place he created a temporary National Committee to deal with routine party affairs.[79] He began to call himself Secretary-General of the Party. From the point of view of Zambia's constitutional set-up, President Kaunda had emerged as a virtual dictator.

He then appointed two commissions, one to redraft the UNIP constitution (which he blamed for the lack of stability and efficiency), and another to work on the question of discipline in the party. The president also reorganized and changed the relationship between the party and the government. Henceforth the party was supreme over the government.

Simon Kapwepwe tendered his resignation as Vice-President of the party and government the same day saying:

> Some of my colleagues and fellow leaders have never recognized me as a properly elected Vice-President and have engaged in mud-slinging in the press, at public meetings and in dark corners ... The people from the northern part of Zambia—the Bemba-speaking people—have suffered physically ...They have suffered demotions and suspensions because of my being Vice-President. I cannot sacrifice any longer these people.[80]

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[79] Africa Research Bulletin, (August 1-31, 1969), p. 1494.

[80] Africa Research Bulletin, (August 1-31, 1969), p. 1495. Kapwepwe's claims that the Bemba-speaking people suffered physically because he was Zambia's Vice president do not reflect African political realities. In fact the conflict within UNIP centred around the party leadership which reflected Bemba dominance. (See table VI). Because of the

However, on August 27, 1969 Kapwepwe withdrew his resignation from the government and said he would stay on until his term expired in August 1970. Meanwhile factionalism continued to dominate UNIP politics.

In August 1971 Kapwepwe resigned from the government as Minister of Provincial and Local Government and Culture, and became leader of newly formed United Progressive Party (UPP). The UPP epitomised the tendency for intra-party competition in the guise of regional conflict which culminated in the secession from UNIP of some skilled politicians. The defections seriously impaired UNIP's capability for mobilizing votes.[81]

Although UPP was generally a Bemba-dominated party, it attracted those within UNIP who had always emphasized mass participation and popular control as opposed to those who emphasized the importance of unity and control from above as a basis for party organization. The former was usually Bemba dominated while the latter was usually Lozi dominated. This was the ideological basis for the founding of UPP. The new party attracted small businesspeople, middle-level civil servants, local elected councillors and some party militants from UNIP whose services during the anti-colonial struggle had seemingly gone unrewarded after 1964. The UPP was strongest on the Copperbelt. It is in this respect that Gertzel, Szeftel and Baylies argue that UPP was "an expression and consequence of competition for limited resources."[82]

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patronage system, Bemba-speaking people were more secure than is acknowledged.

[81] Cherry Gertzel, et al "Introduction: The Making of the One-Party State," in Cherry Gertzel, et al (eds), The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 14.

[82] Gertzel, et. al "Introduction," p. 14.

Kapwepwe's resignation had a sobering effect on the UNIP leadership. A popular politician outside UNIP represented a real threat. President Kaunda was left with no choice but to go for the one-party state. What he now needed was a justification to make his move. He did not wait very long. Because of the violence that followed which was blamed on the new party, President Kaunda on 4 February 1972 proscribed UPP and detained Kapwepwe and one hundred and twenty-three leading UPP members.[83]

On February 25 President Kaunda announced the cabinet's decision to establish a one-party state in Zambia through constitutional change.[84] A National Commission was set up under the Chairmanship of the Vice-President, Mainza Chona, to recommend necessary changes to the constitution in preparation for the introduction of the one-party state system. The Chona Commission reported in October 1972. Public debate was minimal.

The tenor of the Chona Report "suggested the 'liberal' influence of Zambia's new administrators and entrepreneurs, rather than the populist influence of the party."[85] The government therefore rejected most of the Commission's recommendations, which would have made Zambia's "one-party participatory democracy" a reality. The recommendation that the incumbent president be eligible to stand for a second five-year term, after which he or she would not be eligible to stand for office until yet another five-year period had elapsed, was rejected. The government also rejected the proposal for an electoral competition between three

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[83] _Africa Research Bulletin_, (February 1-29, 1972), p. 2377.

[84] _Africa Research Bulletin_, (February 1-29, 1972), p. 2377.

[85] Cherry Gertzel, et al, _The Dynamics of the One-Party State_, p. 18.

presidential candidates. Instead, the government White Paper[86] provided for one presidential candidate who was to be elected by the party's general conference.

In the end, the constitutional changes which ushered in the Second Republic reinforced party control over the presidency, while simultaneously providing for greater presidential control over the party. Contrary to President Kaunda's suggestion in March 1972 that "one-party participatory democracy" would end the politics of patronage, the reverse was true. On December 4, 1972 the UNIP National Council discussed the Chona Report and accepted the Government White Paper on it. On December 8, by a vote of 78 to none, the National Assembly approved the second and third reading of the Constitutional Amendment Bill prohibiting all opposition parties. It established the ruling UNIP as the country's sole legal party.[87] President Kaunda signed the Bill on December 13 at a ceremony to mark its enactment.[88]

Under this Bill no person was allowed to attempt to form a political party or organization other than UNIP. Further, no one was allowed to "belong to or assemble, associate, express opinion or do anything in sympathy with any such political party or organization."[89] While President Kaunda had in September 1963 openly turned down a proposition that he become Life President of UNIP (and *ipso*

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[86] Summary of Recommendations Accepted by Government, Government Paper No. 1 of 1972 (1972).

[87] Congress MP's walked out in protest and therefore did not participate in the voting.

[88] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 19 (1972), p. 25676.

[89] Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 19 (1973), p. 25676.

facto of Zambia),[90] the constitutional changes which ushered in the one-party state made him a *de facto* Life President. The current slogan was "ONE ZAMBIA ONE NATION; ONE NATION ONE LEADER, THAT LEADER KAUNDA WAMUYAYAYA."[91] President Kaunda never objected to the slogan. In fact he always began his political speeches by starting the slogan and letting his audience carry it to its logical conclusion.

Although Zambia was *de jure* a one-party state from December 13, 1972, the ANC continued to be a major political threat. It became necessary therefore to have the Choma Declaration——a document signed at Choma in the Southern Province between President Kaunda for UNIP and Harry Nkumbula for the ANC in June 1973——to dissolve the ANC formally and ask all ANC members and such structures as branches to identify themselves fully with UNIP.[92] Yet while the Choma Declaration resolved the ANC-UNIP power struggle in the Southern Province, it did not resolve all the problems. Nalumino Mundia and Kapwepwe were still not welcome into UNIP. Many national and local UNIP officials adamantly opposed the readmission of former UPP members into UNIP.[93]

Thus Zambia became officially and constitutionally a one-party state. Throughout the developments leading to this outcome, UNIP had argued that the necessities of nation-building dictated each step in the process. Yet there was little

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[90] Colin Legum (ed.), Zambia: Independence and Beyond, the Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda, (London, Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 154-155.

[91] Wamuyayaya means "for ever and ever" in Chinyanja.

[92] Times of Zambia, 28 June, 1973; Sunday Times, 1 July, 1973.

[93] Times of Zambia, 23 January and 13, 23 and 25 September, 1973.

to suggest that a unified sense of belonging to a single national community was much stronger, in 1972, than it had been during the struggle to avoid absorption in the Central African Federation.

Conclusion.

This chapter has sought to show the inadequacy of the spirit of "Africanism" as a motivating factor in the quest for nation-building. At independence "blackness" ceased to be a unifying factor. Other variables entered the equation. In fact, they were always inherent in the nationalist movements, except that during the struggle against colonial rule these forces were less pronounced and temporarily suppressed.

However, after October 1964, Zambians came to grips with the fact that Zambia as a nation lacked a strong political society capable of sustaining liberal democracy. The UNIP government was intolerant to opposition and was incapable of administering a political system which protected and even allowed that opposition to grow. For UNIP, nationalism, and the national consciousness——a sense of a shared national identity——which it aroused during the struggle for independence, was assumed to be monolithic. Thus intra-party violence and cleavages posed a serious challenge to UNIP's perceived national unity. Because liberal democracy was a new phenomenon with no established tradition, its continued existence was precarious. Political pluralism was viewed negatively and was associated with lack of a strong sense of national identity——which for UNIP meant speaking with one voice.

In the end UNIP officials decided to take the easy way out by establishing a one-party state. Yet the introduction of the one-party state not only put a break on the development and nurturing of liberal democracy, it became an obstacle to the process of nation-building. Evidence suggests that UNIP's decision to declare a one-

party state was motivated more by threats of intra-party leadership conflicts which usually led to defections, than by fear of opposition parties. In fact, it was Kapwepwe's resignation in 1972 and his becoming leader of the newly formed United Progressive Party which gave the movement to a one-party state further impetus.

Finally, the experience of Zambia's First Republic from October 24, 1964 to December 13, 1972 suggests very strongly that the brief transition from colonial rule to independence did not provide any experience whatsoever of liberal democracy. The time between the introduction of party politics in the late 1950s and independence was not long enough to determine that elections would be regular and free or whether the government was willing to foster political conditions which guaranteed political pluralism. Rather Zambian politicians admired the bureaucratic authoritarianism of the colonial era which they believed was essential for nation-building. This helped to focus loyalties on the frontiers of the former colonial state which became symbolised in the UNIP slogan——"One Zambia, One Nation."

Thus the eventual declaration of the one-party state, disguised as "one-party participatory democracy," was in essence a return to the much criticized bureaucratic authoritarianism of the pre-independence days. Zambia's experience in the First Republic and UNIP's search for national unity was essentially a struggle for political control and the financial rewards which accompanied office-holding. Because the political elite did not emerge from the business class, the state, and access to its resources was the best and easiest way to accumulate capital. It was therefore economically and financially disastrous for the ruling elite to relinquish power to an oppositional excluded elite. A successful implementation of political pluralism or liberal democracy——as the antithesis of bureaucratic authoritarianism——would have prevented UNIP from using its political dominance to reward its supporters at the expense of the opposition. UNIP's reluctance to allow the proliferation of opposition

parties between 1964 and 1972, disguised as the search for national unity through the establishment of "one-party participatory democracy," was not only the death-knell of liberal democracy, but a return to an authoritarian political system and an impediment to economic growth.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

CONCLUSION.

Sir John S. Moffat's suggestion that "democracy ... can only flourish in a mature and stable society with a stability established by a long tradition,"[1] summarizes the burden of this study. It has been shown that Northern Rhodesia did not have a long tradition of liberal democracy during the colonial period. In contrast to the white dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, or even the neighbouring colony of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia never experienced a period of responsible government during which different parties took turns forming the government under the tutelage of the Colonial Office. Indeed, until five years before independence, Northern Rhodesia did not even experience party politics. Between 1962 and 1964 three constitutions were written.[2] The 1964 constitution placed power in an executive president. This represented a change from the form of parliamentary government as a dependency to presidential government at independence.

The transition from colonial rule to independence did not provide any experience of liberal democracy. The crucial elements of liberal democracy never developed. Instead, the educated elite who dominated the post-colonial state proceeded to behave exactly as seventy years of colonialism had taught them. Michael Crowder argued that "if the colonial state provided a model for its inheritors

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[1] NAZ, SEC 5/270, Sir John S. Moffat, Text of the speech given during the presentation of the Moffat Resolution in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council on 29 July, 1954.

[2] de Winton, op. cit., p. 189.

it was that government rested not on consent but force."[3] African nationalists had never experienced liberal democracy. They were products of their history and governed much the same as the British before them had. During the decolonization period, the "government-in-waiting"[4] was not an opposition party *per se,* but an African nationalist movement propelled by the search for pigmentational self-determination. Indeed, "democracy, for nationalist forces in the era of decolonization, was a theory of challenge to the colonial order, a vehicle to contest its hegemony and accelerate its departure."[5] A "government-in-waiting" was no longer desirable after independence. Evidently the commitment to liberal democracy was a transitory one.

Because Northern Rhodesia only came into being in 1911 when North-eastern Rhodesia and North-western Rhodesia were amalgamated in response to the financial——not political——concerns of the British South Africa Company (BSAC), it remained politically fragmented. The Colonial Office takeover of the administration of the country in 1924 did not significantly alter the political orientation of the territory. The use of chiefs and their village headmen as units of the colonial state continued the political fragmentation of Northern Rhodesia. It was only after the creation of the African Representative Council in 1946 that colonial officials began to reorient emerging African politicians to think of themselves as Northern Rhodesians. Africans soon took advantage of this process and founded the African

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[3] Michael Crowder, "Whose Dream Was It Anyway?: Twenty-Five Years of African Independence," African Affairs, 86, 342 (1987), p. 13.

[4] Kaunda and Morris, A Humanist in Africa, p. 107.

[5] Crawford Young, "The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, (Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1988), p. 53.

National Congress, which sought to unify Africans in the territory and push for political liberalization.

The absence of political pluralism during the colonial period benefited African nationalists in their struggle for political power. Africans were able to respond, almost in unison to the British desire to see a well-organized nationalist movement which commanded mass support under an undisputed leader. Desiring to make their withdrawal easy and as painless as possible, the British almost demanded unanimity among Africans, a one-party state in waiting, before they handed over power. This encouraged Africans to coalesce around one political movement.[6] Kaunda's exposition that "the mass of the people supported one party and were prepared to trust that party with the task of guiding the new nation,"[7] is reminiscent of Ernest Gellner's perceptive observation that "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they did not exist."[8] However, in the Northern Rhodesian context, as in other former British colonies, the imagined or invented nation reflected the colonial state which the African political elite sought to protect and preserve. As Anderson argued, the magic of colonization and later "of nationalism turn[ed] chance into destiny."[9] Colonialism provided the frontiers which later signified UNIP's "One Zambia One Nation" slogan. Also, as Young

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[6] Kaunda and Morris, A Humanist in Africa, p. 107. This was hardly the case for Northern Rhodesia where the nationalist movement split in 1958. Yet when faced with the choice of forming a coalition government with either the U.F.P. or UNIP in 1963, Nkumbula chose to go with UNIP.

[7] Kaunda and Morris, A Humanist in Africa, p. 107.

[8] Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson), 1964, p. 169, cited in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, (London, Verso, 1984), p. 15.

[9] Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 19.

stated, "the model of the constitutional state utilized as the exemplary vision of the ideal polity to be replicated in the structure of decolonization was the metropolitan state."[10] However the metropolitan parliamentary model lasted only two years (1962-1964), and the liberal democracy model only eight years until the one-party state in 1972. Once independence had been achieved the metropolitan model faded rapidly as clinging to power became the dominant aim and new models became attractive. Over much of the continent the new and fashionable model was the one-party state.

The dream of the metropolitan model was shared by all who believed that Northern Rhodesia was their home. The process of decolonization, however, brought to light several realities of the shared dream. While there was no desire to change the frontiers of the post-colonial state, there was nonetheless, disagreement over its political orientation and who would control it. These issues were reflected in the debate between liberals and African nationalists. Since most liberals were white, they were associated with the colonial state in the minds of most African nationalists. Thus, while the Capricorn Africa Society genuinely sought to preserve and consolidate the crucial elements of liberal democracy, it was heavily suspected of working to preserve white supremacy. Political pluralism and liberal democracy were considered the greatest threat to a unified nationalist movement by radical African nationalists. In the end, liberalism as an alternative approach for the decolonization of Northern Rhodesia was rejected by most Africans.

While the African educated elite initially found common cause with white liberals, the alliance for most elites was short lived. The slow pace of economic and

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[10] Young, "The African Colonial State," p. 53. However, it ought to be pointed out that in reality the actual experience of colonial rule was autocratic, and never functioned in the way that the model state was imagined.

political liberalization, and especially the politics which preceded the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, radicalized African political thought. Liberalism lost ground as most African nationalists took to militant politics as the quickest way of achieving political results. White liberals made a serious political error when they supported federation despite African opposition. For the small settler communities of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland federation was less about economics (the main propaganda in its favour) than it was about saving a substantial degree of white power. Liberals should not have been a part of such a scheme. However given their belief in economic development before political responsibility, particularly by more conservative liberals, they fell easy prey to the propaganda for federation. As a result, they became suspect among most Africans. They were never able to shake the image that they were white first and liberals a long way second.

Yet, nationalism itself was never a monolithic political movement. It represented several interests which were loosely held together by the desire to get rid of white rule. The very fragility of unity of the nationalist movement made it fear and resent liberal democracy. Many Africans were either coerced or persuaded into believing that African unity of expression was essential until white rule was replaced. Only after independence would dissent——liberal democracy——be permitted. However, the independent government felt no more secure than it had as a movement. Since the nationalists had been held together by fear that colonialism might remain should they quarrel, they felt quite uncomfortable when it was gone. They thus invented fears of multi-national companies conspiring or the South Africans plotting to replace colonialism.

Despite the apparent common objective, there had been disagreements on how best to proceed. This had led to the split of the ANC in 1958, after which the

nationalist movement remained divided. While the 1958 split could have formed a base for political pluralism, the brief period of colonial tutelage did not make this possible. More importantly "the ephemeral nature of the graft cuttings of parliamentary democracy upon the robust trunk of autocracy,"[11] during the terminal colonial state proved to serve only as a legitimating myth for the power transfer process. The autocratic and hegemonic impulses of the colonial state which had a more enduring legacy were replicated in the post-colonial state. The dominant political party became intransigent and sought to eliminate the opposition, first through the ballot box, and later when this proved impossible, through legislation. Because the masses had never experienced liberal democracy during the colonial period, they were easy prey for UNIP rhetoric. It was not as if the masses were losing something which they had enjoyed and came to value. In so doing UNIP behaved exactly like the colonial state. By 1969 Zambia was *de facto* a one-party state. Three years later the country was *de jure* a one-party state. This represented a failure of liberal democracy in post-independence Zambia.

In both South Africa and Northern Rhodesia, the failure of "political liberalism" has been attributed to liberal belief in the power of persuasion. It has been suggested that liberals sought to direct the white minority towards a "universal truth, morality or humanity" *vis-à-vis* an alternative which guaranteed the material benefits of their power and privilege.[12] It is true that many liberals had reservations about handing over power to Africans before they were "ready." In fact, many white settlers believed that liberalism provided too many compromises with Africans and

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[11] Young, "The African Colonial State," p. 57.

[12] Heribert Adam, "The Failure of Political Liberalism," in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power, (Cape Town, David Philip, 1979), p. 266.

would eventually lead to lowering standards in government. Yet in the Northern Rhodesian case, liberalism was anathematized by most Africans because of its insistence on gradualism in order to consolidate the crucial elements of liberal democracy.

By the early 1960s it was evident that multi-racialism——the strategic platform of liberal ideology——had almost faded away because of the ability of nationalists to ridicule liberals into silence. In Northern Rhodesia however, liberals managed:

> ... to become the Government and ... [tried], in the desperately short time available to ... ruthlessly ... abolish all distinctions based on colour alone and to start a crash programme to obliterate difference and inequalities between races ...[13]

That brief interlude (February to November, 1961) of liberal government did very little to reassure African nationalists, or for that matter, provide enough experience of liberal democracy. Nonetheless, "liberals had already adjusted to a world where they were no longer 'the Baas'. More importantly, they may have been defeated, but at least they had tried."[14] Thus at independence they resolved to rally behind the triumphant nationalist party——the United National Independence Party.

The triumph of UNIP signalled the rejection of the liberal ideology which advocated multi-racialism. Liberalism in Central Africa recognized that divisions in society were inevitable, but that where and when such divisions were necessary, the

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[13] Sir John Moffat, "The Role of the Liberal in Rhodesian Politics," _Central African Examiner_, (24, September, 1960), p. 12.

[14] Ian Hancock, _White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia 1953-1980_, (London and Sydney, Croom Helm, 1984), p. 216. The term "baas" is a South African (Afrikaans) word for "boss". In Central Africa, as in South Africa it was used by Africans in addressing Europeans. Among Africans in Northern Rhodesia, "baas" became "bwana".

criteria should be material and educational progress. In other words, Central African liberals accepted and encouraged the creation of economic and social classes.

Yet in the circumstances of Northern Rhodesia, liberals were weakened by their ambivalent class position. Because they wanted to give democratic power to everyone gradually while maintaining European values, they were accused of seeking to preserve the status quo. UNIP adopted the convergence theory and thereby neutralized political-class differentiation which liberals were keen to maintain. Furthermore, liberals were weakened by being absorbed into the more radical mobilizational party which secured a dominant electoral position at independence. UNIP used the convergence theory as an ingredient in its campaign for national unity. In the end, through coercion, persuasion and even economic blackmail Zambia became a one-party state in December 1972.

EPILOGUE.

In its day Capricorn propounded three major ideas.[1] It argued for a qualitative and not universal franchise, in opposition to both the white nationalism of settlers influenced by South African ideology and to the "Africanism" of black nationalists influenced by ideas from further north. Its hope was the creation of a racially fluid and expanding ruling middle class elite. From this flowed the idea of a multi-party liberal constitutionalism deemed essential in an open society. Capricorn also looked to the formation of a wider East and Central African Federation and supported the campaign to establish the Central African Federation, abandoning federation only when it appeared to be terminally ill.

Until recently it seemed as if these goals were fleeting illusions, even in the lifetime of Capricorn. Surely they were all swept away irrevocably in the triumph of African nationalism. The qualitative franchise lasted only so long as settlers were able to prevent universal suffrage, and looked increasingly like the last desperate attempts to stop the flow of history. When UNIP came to power it seemed to assume that it was an axiomatic political aim to get rid of all other parties, first by sweeping them away through its electoral support, and when that failed, by making them illegal. Pan-East-Central Africanism was a non-starter. The Central African Federation was swept away as the preliminary, not the climax, of the transfer of power into African hands in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Nothing, it seemed, was left of Capricorn's ideas and concepts.

Recently, however, these same concepts have had a renaissance in new form, spoken through African mouths. The one-party state in Zambia appears bankrupt

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[1] For details see Chapters Three and Four.

and the post-colonial regime has now announced the goal of reintroducing a multi-party system accompanied by freedom of association and the press and a renewed emphasis on the freedom of the individual.[2] The government has scheduled multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections for October 1991 where the main political contender is Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).[3] These recent events are certainly a revival of liberal democracy, without the restrictions suggested by liberals in the 1960s.

The recent geopolitical situation in the region suggests that Capricorn ideas could still be applicable. From the perspective of the 1990s, the study of Capricorn and liberal activism as a response to what John Flint calls the "South African Menace,"[4] suggests that even in the late 1940s and 1950s these fears were soundly based. Although by 1943 the threat had "evaporated, temporarily, into an anticlimax" the "fears left a permanent legacy"[5] which influenced Colonial Office officials and liberals in Central Africa. The South African factor was crucial in the debate leading to the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. Initially, during the war the "South African Menace" arose from the intense fear and suspicion of the British Colonial Office that "South Africa might well become a Nazi country allied to Hitler's Germany..."[6] After the war, the general fear that South Africa was

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[2] *Africa Confidential*, 31, 20 (12 October 1990), p. 6.

[3] Frederick Chiluba was until his election as president of the MMD, Chairman-General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, which championed the cause for multi-party politics. (*Africa Confidential*, 32, 5 (8 March 1991), p. 5).

[4] John E. Flint, " The Colonial Office and the 'South African Menace', 1940-1943," Unpublished Paper.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[6] *Ibid.*.

increasingly becoming a rival imperialist power capable of absorbing British colonies

and protectorates in the north prompted those in favour of amalgamation of the

Rhodesias to suggest federation instead.

The fears intensified following South Africa's adoption of apartheid as its

official policy. The doctrines of racial segregation obviously undermined long-term

British plans for postwar policies. Liberals and non-liberals in Central Africa were

quick to point out that the only way to check South African influence in the region

was to create an equally strong economic and political entity. Some Colonial Office

officials also believed that the threat was already imminent and that a real possibility

existed that imperial interests would be undermined.[7]

The history of British Central Africa has usually been influenced by

developments in South Africa and by the legacy of the South African threat. There

is therefore a case for reassessing Capricorn federation ideas in the light of post-

independence developments in the region. Galvanized by 1 .e fear of South African

domination and intransigence, leaders of nine independent African countries met in

1979 and formed the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

(SADCC).[8] Although SADCC is fundamentally an economic organization, less

politically binding on the part of its members compared to the Federation of

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[7] PRO, DO 35/3603/12, Andrew B. Cohen to G. H. Baxter, 6 November, 1951.

[8] On the origins of SADCC see Christopher R. Hill, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa," African Affairs, 82, 327 (April, 1983), pp. 214-239; Elaine A. Friedland, "The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference and the West: Co-operation or Conflict?," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 23, 2 (1985), pp. 287-314; and Roger Leys and Arne Tostensen, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa: the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference," Review of African Political Economy, 25 (January-April, 1982), pp. 52-71.

This casts doubt on their opposition to Capricorn and federation during the nationalist struggle and suggests concern for their politic 1 career, rather than rejection of Capricorn's liberal ideas, was the primary motivation for their actions.

Thus, Ian Hancock's argument that the Capricorn philosophy and design for a federation of East and Central Africa was illusory[13] can no longer pass unchallenged. Future research should focus on some common strands which run through these organizations, and why regional co-operation continues to excite politicians and scholars alike. Indeed, the current movement for multi-party democracy should be evaluated in the context of regional co-operation, past and present, and useful lessons from the Capricorn experience should be uncovered and utilized to help promote responsible democratic government in the future.

Federation. (Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice, p. 5). Arthur Wina later became the first Zambian Minister of Finance. In the late 1980s he was a founding member and interim chairman of Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).

[13] Ian R. Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia," Rhodesian History, (1978), p. 41.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.
DRAFT STATEMENT ON PARTNERSHIP.

(Prepared by the Government of Northern Rhodesia as a basis for local discussion with reference to paragraph 6 of the Victoria Falls Conference on the Closer Association of the Central African Territories).

PART I: THE POLICY.

1. The ultimate political objective for the people of Northern Rhodesia is self-government within the British Commonwealth; self-government must take full account of the rights and interests of both Europeans and Africans and include proper provisions for both.

2. The only satisfactory basis on which such provision can be secured is economic and political partnership between the races, and this is the approved policy for Northern Rhodesia.

3. The application of such partnership in practice must ensure that Africans are helped forward along the path of economic, social and political progress on which their feet have already been set so that they may take their full part with the rest of the community in the economic and political life of the territory. Africans for their part must be willing to accept the responsibilities as well as the privileges which such advancement entails.

   There can be no question of the Government of Northern Rhodesia subordinating the interests of any section of the community to those of any other section.

   The application of the policy of partnership is not in any way inconsistent with, and does not in any way interfere with, the territory's present status.

   It imposes on each of the two sections (Europeans and Africans) an obligation to recognise the right of the other section to a permanent home in Northern Rhodesia.

4. In the political sphere partnership implies that any constitutional arrangement must include proper provision for both Europeans and Africans and proper safeguards for their rights and interests.

5. Generally, partnership implies that Europeans and Africans will pay due regard to each other's outlook, beliefs, customs and legitimate aspirations and anxieties.

PART II PUTTING THE POLICY INTO PROGRESSIVE OPERATION.

6. In the political sphere Africans will be able to advance until ultimately (so long as representation on racial grounds remains) they have the same number of representatives as Europeans in both Legislative and Executive Councils when they are fit for this. It is hoped to make early progress towards this end and it is

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proposed that there should be an increased number of representatives of African interests in the next Legislative Council.

7. In the economic field every individual must be free to rise to the level that his ability, energy, qualifications, and character permit. In accordance with its declared policy that Africans in Northern Rhodesia should be afforded opportunities for employment in more responsible work as and when they are qualified to undertake it, the Government will continue to provide more and better facilities for training Africans for such work.

8. In the educational field the Government will, in cooperation with Native Authorities and Missions, continue to work steadily towards universal literacy for all African children of school-going age and it will, in accordance with long-term plans already made, provide expanded facilities for both secondary education and vocational training. The question of building in Central Africa a higher college for Africans is being actively pursued in consultation with the other two Governments concerned, and expert advice on the subject is being sought.

9. In the field of Local Government the Government is training Africans to take a larger and more effective part in the administration of rural areas. In the towns African membership of African affairs sub-committees of Municipal Councils and Township Management Boards is extending and it is to be expected that, as Africans gain the necessary knowledge and experience, they will become members of such councils and boards.

10. In the Government service Africans are being trained for and promoted to more responsible positions as they show themselves capable of assuming heavier duties and increased responsibilities.

11. At the present stage of the development of Africans the repeal of all differential legislation would not be in their best interests; much of it is designed to protect them and some of it grants them special privileges. It has been the policy of the Government to remove or relax the differential provisions in legislation according as the advancement of Africans renders such provisions no longer necessary. The Government will keep this matter under close review and propose to the Legislature from time to time such further amendments as it may consider appropriate.

12. Discriminatory practices based on racial distinctions are incompatible with the policy of partnership, and the trend of public opinion in Northern Rhodesia is towards a clearer recognition of this fact. Such practices are diminishing in Northern Rhodesia and will diminish still more rapidly as Europeans and Africans recognise each other's needs as well as their own obligations in this matter. The Government has taken and is taking steps to encourage in both races a sympathetic and helpful approach to this problem.

A.T.WILLIAMS.
ACTING CHIEF SECRETARY.

The Secretariat,
LUSAKA.
April, 1952.

Source: PRO CO 1015/553/47.

APPENDIX II
AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL
DRAFT STATEMENT ON PRINCIPLES OF INTER-RACIAL POLICY.

1. The ultimate objective for the people of Northern Rhodesia is self-government within the British Commonwealth, based on a truly democratic franchise.

2. No one race must ever be in a position to dominate another for its selfish interests. The only way for this to be done is for each to have equal power in the Legislative and Executive Councils.

3. Each individual in Northern Rhodesia shall have the right to advance in every sphere, according to his energy, character, ability and qualifications, without any regard to colour, race or religion.

4. The only satisfactory means by which such provision can be secured is economic, political and social equality between the races, and this is the proposed policy for Northern Rhodesia.

5. The application of such a policy of equality in practice must ensure that Africans are helped forward along the path of economic, social and political progress on which their feet have already been set so that they must take their full part with the rest of the community in the economic and political life of the Territory.

6. In the meanwhile there must be no question of the Government of Northern Rhodesia subordinating the interests of any section of the community to those of any other section and the application of this policy is not in any way inconsistent with, and does not in any way interfere with, the Territory's present protectorate status.

7. In the political sphere equality implies that meanwhile and constitutional arrangement must include proper provision for both Europeans and Africans and proper safeguards for their rights and interests.

Source: PRO CO 1015/554/72 Enc.

APPENDIX III
THE SALISBURY DECLARATIONS: 1952.

We, the sponsors of the Capricorn Declarations, affirm the beliefs which have guided us in their preparation and which will inspire us in their fulfilment.

We hold that all men, despite their varying talents, are born equal in dignity before God, and have a common duty to one another. We hold that the differences between men, whether of creed or colour, are honourable differences. We emphasise this simple precept of Christian teaching because it is fundamental to our beliefs, and also because we wish to dissociate ourselves from the barren philosophy which determines racial legislation in lands beyond our boundaries.

We believe in the destiny of the British East and Central African territories and their peoples. We believe that the colonies of Southern Rhodesia, and Kenya, the protectorates of Uganda, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, the territory of Tanganyika, should be bound in a single self-governing federation under the British Crown, wherein men of all races may live side by side in harmony, sufficiency and freedom.

We believe that to strive towards such a goal will provide a sense of shared purpose and dedication transcending racial differences; and that its attainment will bring untold benefits to Africa and its people, to the British Commonwealth of Nations and to mankind.

Bound by these convictions, we submit that:

1. Africa South of the Sahara is comparable in natural resources with other continents of the world. The extent of mineral, agricultural and industrial potentialities is only being established by research and development.

2. The peoples of Europe have two responsibilities in Africa, and these are complimentary to one another. They have an obligation to mankind to develop that continent jointly with the Africans, so that it shall contribute from its great resources to the wealth of the world. They have an equal obligation to give to the African both incentive and opportunity to archive higher standards of life, and so make possible a true partnership between the races.

3. The African peoples as yet lack the technical skill, the industrial maturity and indeed the numbers to secure by themselves the timely development of the continent. The twofold responsibility of the European cannot be discharged by reserving all Africa's sparsely populated areas for gradual development at a pace determined by the African's birth rate. It can be discharged, and Africa's development quickened, by an increasing combination of western immigration and technology with the latent capacity of the African and other races.

4. British East and Central Africa is divided into many separate territories with separate administrations. The divisions are for the most part arbitrary and are seldom based on considerations of geography, economics or race. They deny the urge, increasingly felt among all races, to become part of a greater communion,

racially and economically. In a larger political and economic unit, problems which are obstinate of solution within individual territories can be more readily resolved.

The consequent economic expansion might well create a nucleus so strong that in time the neighbouring non-British territories would desire to negotiate customs union and other commercial and security arrangements with the Federal Government. The achievement now of Central African Federation should thus be seen as the first step in the unfolding history of a continent's integration.

5. The Federal Government of East and Central Africa proposed in the Declarations must have the legal authority and moral force to weld the six territories into a single economic entity and to become the focus of loyalty for all its citizens. The allocation of powers between the federation and the territories must be made with this end in view.

6. Sustained social and economic progress for any race in the Federation demands sound administration and political stability, which at the outset will call for European leadership and guidance in federal and territorial government. This leadership can be claimed only by right of administrative ability and experience, not of colour. It will not endure, nor deserve to endure, unless it encourages the participation of other races.

7. The successful federation of the six territories will depend essentially upon a policy of race relations which is flexible enough to meet the special requirements of each territory; and broad and liberal enough to face with confidence the scrutiny of enlightened opinion throughout the world. The Federal Government must hold in trust the interest of all Africa's peoples, and its constant duty must be to ensure that the federal structure corresponds to the growing capacities of all sections in the community.

It must promote the spiritual, economic, cultural and political progress of the African. All Africans who have attained the necessary social and educational standard must be accorded the responsibility of franchise and be given no less opportunity than their European fellow citizens to play their part in an expanding, civilised community. At the same time the Federal Government must help those Africans who are unable or unwilling to accommodate themselves to the new economy and way of life to develop in their own ares at a pace consistent with their abilities.

In conclusion, we submit that the leaders of all races in all six territories must be called upon to establish a standing convention to press for the attainment of the objects set out in these Declarations. The Society will convene the first assembly, and place before it the more detailed proposals which follow.

Article 1. The three fundamental aims of policy are to:

(a) Promote the spiritual, economic, educational, cultural and political progress of the African;

(b) Provide full opportunities for those Africans who are unable or unwilling to accommodate themselves to the European way of life, to develop in Reserves and

other Native areas, at a pace consistent with their abilities. In these areas, Native interests would be paramount.

(c) Encourage European immigration on a scale required to meet the needs of the developing, economy, but consistent with the legitimate land requirements of the African population.

Article 2.

To achieve these objectives, each of the three territories should be divided into two main areas——the Native areas, and the European or Open areas. (In the case of Kenya, cognizance must be further taken other areas, such as the coastal belt protectorate).

In the Native area, no non-African would be permitted to own land, reside or carry on any business except in an official capacity, or if that business resulted in the furthering of African interests. (From this provision mining and existing trading rights, subject to proper safeguards, would be excluded).

In the Open areas, the rights of the non-European to own land would be limited to ownership of residential and trading sites in certain urban areas. Apart from this limitation, the paramount interest in this area would be that of civilization and progress, not the interests of any race, colour or creed.

Certain restrictions on the movement of Africans between the areas might be necessary to prevent social evils arising from the growth of "shanty" towns in the Open areas, and likewise to avoid undue pressure on the lands of the Native areas.

Article 3.

In the Open areas, the State Government would be permitted to lay down conditions which would ensure European standards of living and proficiency for any trade or calling. All achieving those standards would have the right to seek employment in those trades.

Political rights would be enjoyed by those Africans who desire them and who had reached the standards of culture and civilization judged to be requisite for the exercise of such rights.

To avoid all risk of lowering the standards of European civilization, it would be necessary to constitute a Federal Authority to lay down the principles which would determine the granting of political rights and also the merits of individual claimants. To ensure justice in this matter, any claimant who considered that his application had been unfairly refused, would have the right of appeal to the courts.

Article 4.

The policy requires that active development of native areas for the benefit of their inhabitants as the first consideration.

The State would encourage industries financed from outside the Native areas; the natural growth of Trade Unions to protect workers' interests; the flow of revenue to the Native Authority, creation, where desired, of co-operative societies; and the steady development of an African middle class.

The Africans in these areas would have communal representation and an increasing degree of self-administration.

8. Certain areas of reasonable or good economic prospect within the six territories, which have a substantial African population and a relatively small European settlement, should be designated "Native States". The electorate of such states would, in due time, have representation on the federal Government and a full measure of state autonomy.

The Federal Government and state and territorial legislatures should accept the principle that the political advance of the African must be kept in line with, and not ahead of, his economic and cultural advance.

9. . . . Unrestricted Asiatic immigration would, however, be damaging to the aim of encouraging the African to achieve European standards and moulding East and central Africa into a modern democratic state. Many Asiatic people would gladly participate in the federation's cultural and political life, provided their attachment to Asia was not encouraged by fresh Asiatic immigration.

10. . . . In order to maintain administrative continuity the Colonial service should be gradually merged into a new federal civil service. The officials should take, as soon as the federal proposals have been carried out, their directive from the Federal Government.

11. Constitutional changes, which are now being considered in any of the six territories, should not be put into effect if they are in any way liable to prejudice the federation of East and Central Africa, or conflict with the spirit of these Declarations.

12. The leaders in all six territories of all races should be called upon to establish a Standing Convention to press for the attainment of the objectives set forth in these Declarations.

We sign these Declarations as individuals in the conviction that we are furthering a movement capable of great benefit to Africa and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The following signed the Declarations:

Sir Godfrey Huggins
Sir Roy Welensky
Ian Wilson (Speaker, S.R.)
J. W. Keller (MP, S.R.)
L. M. Hodson (Deputy Speaker, S.R.)
A. S. Soffe (CAS)
N. H. Wilson (CAS)
G. M. Ellman Brown (CAS)
Bavus A. Baker (United Party, CAS)
C. J. Bowden
Stainley S. Cooke (UCAA)
Hugh Wheeler
Geoffrey Beckett
Hon. Humphrey Gibbs
H. St. L. Green fell (CAS)
Albert Keyser

F. A. P. Schmid
Major General G. R. Smallwood
C. Kenneth Archer
Michael Blunden (Kenya Legco)
Gerald Hopkins (Kenya Legco)
Wilfred B. Havelock (Kenya Legco)
T. C. C. Lewin
Major Kendal Ward
Stainley Ghersie
Clive Salter
R. W. Miller
The Earl of Portsmouth
Lady Sidney Farrar (CAS, Kenya)
R. V. Stone
G. W. Caregie (Tanganyika).

Note: The published version of the Declarations was signed by David Stirling (President) and Arthur Stokes (Secretary).

Source: CAS Papers.

APPENDIX IV
THE CAPRICORN CONTRACT, 1956.

Part One.

We affirm our faith in the greatness of common destiny and resolve to reject the barren doctrine of racial nationalism. We believe that our purpose of uniting the races in one patriotism and one allegiance has the power to provide the stability essential to the orderly development of Africa. We resolve to work for the establishment of a society free from racial discrimination and declare our determination to secure, as a condition of full self-government and the adoption separately in each of the six territories of a written constitution embodying the following Precepts:

Precept One.

All men, despite their varying individual talents and differences of race and colour are born equal in dignity before God and have a common duty to one another.

Precept Two.

Man's fulfilment of his responsibilities to his fellow men is the essential foundation for a community and for the assertion and enjoyment of his rights as an individual. The state has the obligation to secure justice in the case of conflict of interests between individuals.

Precept Three.

The state is under obligation to protect and advance the moral, material and cultural standards of its peoples.

Precept Four.

All who were born in Capricorn Africa or live within their boundaries are entitled to equal standing before the law and, subject to the law, to freedom of movement, speech, religion and association and the right to acquire and enjoy property. They are entitled, without distinction of race or colour, to access to public service and institutions and practice any trade and profession.

Precept Five.

Membership of the state has responsibilities and duties, and the citizen is under obligation to live by the rule of law and to defend the state.

Precept Six.

The right to elect members of the Legislature would be open to all who have attained the statutory qualifications and would be registered on one common roll.

<u>Part Two. Provisions.</u>

1. The Electoral system. See Chapter Four for details on this issue.

2. Land Reform.

(a) The state would allow and encourage the conversion of all land into areas open to purchase by all persons irrespective of race. All existing individual rights in land would be recognized and confirmed by law.

(b) Land would not be reserved in perpetuity for members of one race or tribe to the exclusion of others. Legislation to implement this principles would involve the abrogation of treaties and of solemn pledges to various communities. The state would control any further transfer of land resulting from this legislation. It would also take steps to ensure that transfer of particular lands were made only to experienced farmers.

(c) All land occupied by Europeans would gradually become available for purchase or lease by all races, and land occupied on a communal basis by Africans would be gradually made open for purchase or lease by Africans and would later be made open for transfer to persons of any race.

(d) Where land was to be released from exclusive African reservation, the state would encourage and make provision for land units of a size capable of sustaining a farmer or pastoralist and his family on a reasonable standard of living and would encourage the consolidation of these units into a size which an African farmer could purchase and manage.

(e) Any un allocated land in areas reserved exclusively for members of one race would be allocated in the first instance to members of that race, after which it would be freely transferable to persons of any race.

3. <u>Labour Relations.</u>

(a) Standards of living would be maintained and protected and everything possible would be done to bring all workers up to those standards and to raise standards in respect of output and quality of work, responsibility and rewards.
(b) Individuals holding positions of equal responsibility and producing work equal in quality and quantity would be entitled to equal rates of pay.

(c) Members of a trade organization would not be denied any person on grounds of race.

(d) The opportunity of trade apprenticeship would be open to members of all races on the same terms. To enable all workers to achieve a progressively higher rate and quality of work, the creation of training facilities at every level would be encouraged.

4. <u>Education.</u>

To hasten the fulfilment of this provision, we agree that the following steps be taken:

(a) The establishment of inter-racial teacher training centres.

(b) The extension of out-of-school activities of all kinds on an inter-racial basis.

(c) The extension of inter-racial education at university and technical college level.

(d) The extension of educational facilities of all kinds for women and girls of all races.

(e) The establishment of courses on citizenship and civic responsibilities in all secondary schools and in all forms of adult education.

5. Immigration.

Immigration of Asiatic people would have to be restricted to avoid lowering of European standards.

Source: CAS Papers.

APPENDIX V
MAPS

MAP 1

The Five Countries Where CAS Was Active, 1948-1963.

MAP 2
PABMRCSA Countries, 1958-1964.

Ethiopia Somalia
Uganda Kenya
Rwanda Tanzania
Burundi
Zaire Malawi
Zambia Zimbabwe

MAP 3
SADCC Countries, 1879-1991.

Tanzania

Malawi

Mozambique

Angola

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Swaziland

Namibia

Botswana

Lesotho

MAP 4

Capricorn Africa According to Clause 2 of CAS Constitution, 1950.

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