Illocutionary Autonomy: Moral Responsibility for Disabling Speech Acts

Abstract

This thesis evaluates various consequences of adopting Rae Langton's claims about illocutionary silencing, all through the lens of how they relate to autonomy and moral responsibility. Langton sows the seeds for a theory of illocutionary disablement as a form of oppression, which limits persons' autonomy, specifically women's “illocutionary autonomy” to refuse sex. Alexander Bird draws unwarranted conclusions, which can be defended against with a broader theoretical framework of moral and political responsibility. Overall, I defend the theory of illocutionary disablement set out by Langton as not only plausible, but also consistent with a theory of moral responsibility which holds people accountable for both their actions as individuals and as members of a social community, despite the effect of the silencing as systemic oppression: all of this framed in, and elucidated by, considerations of autonomy. Other main philosophers on whom I draw are Kevin Timpe, Iris Marion Young and Carol Hay.