HALL OF MIRRORS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICS AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE IN THE USE OF HEALTH-RELATED METAPHORS

By

Kaitlin Sibbald

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
May 2024

Dalhousie University is located in Mi'kma'ki,
the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi'kmaq.
We are all Treaty people.

© Copyright by Kaitlin Sibbald, 2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES v

ABSTRACT……… vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 4

1.1.1 Structure of the Dissertation 8

1.1.2 Limitations and Context 9

1.2 CONCLUSION TO THE INTRODUCTION 10

CHAPTER 2 METAPHORS AS INSTIGATORS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 12

2.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 2 12

2.2 ANALOGICAL REASONING 13

2.3 ANALOGICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS 14

2.4 ANALOGICAL REASONING IN WESTERN SCIENCE 16

2.5 ANALOGICAL REASONING: ATTRIBUTES AND STRUCTURE 18

2.6 ANALOGY AND METAPHOR: COMPARABLE CONCEPTS? 20

2.7 FROM ATTRIBUTES TO ANALOGY: CONCEPT SYSTEMS AND EXPERIENCE 24

2.8 METAPHORS, COGNITION, AND DISCOURSE 28

2.9 METAPHORS AS DISCOURSE 32

2.10 A SUMMARY UNDERSTANDING OF STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS THEORIES .. 36

2.11 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 37

2.12 CHAPTER 2 CONCLUSION 40

CHAPTER 3 SHIFTING WEIGHTS AND CONCEPTS: METAPHORS' IMPLICATIONS FOR PRINCIPLED REASONING 42

3.1 CHAPTER 3 OVERVIEW 42

3.2 MANUSCRIPT: MIGRATING METAPHORS: WHY WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT A 'WAR ON MENTAL ILLNESS' IN THE AFTERMATH OF COVID-19 46

3.2.1 Introduction 46

3.2.2 How Metaphors Reflect and Reinforce Power Structures 48

3.2.3 The Military Metaphor 53

3.2.4 The Military Metaphor and COVID-19 54

3.2.5 Justifying Poor Preparation 56

3.2.6 War Metaphors and Biomedical Power – Entrenching Oppression 59

3.2.7 Implications of a War on Mental Illness 64

3.2.8 Considering Difference 65

3.2.9 When Metaphors Shape the Concept of Justice 69

3.2.10 Manuscript Conclusion 70

3.3 CHAPTER 3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 72

3.4 CHAPTER 3 REFLECTION 76

CHAPTER 4 EMBEDDING CONCEPTS IN OPPRESSIVE NARRATIVES: METAPHORS' IMPLICATIONS FOR NARRATIVE REASONING…… 79

4.1 CHAPTER 4 OVERVIEW 79

4.2 MANUSCRIPT: METAPHORICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 2022 MONKEYPOX OUTBREAK IN CANADIAN NEWS MEDIA: CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL NARRATIVE 82

4.2.1 Introduction 82

4.2.2 Methods 90

4.2.3 Results 96

3.2.4 Discussion 113

4.2.5 Conclusion 117

4.3 SUMMARY AND REFLECTION 118

4.3.1 Reflection ... 119

4.3.2 Chapter 4 Conclusion ... 123

CHAPTER 5 METAPHORS AS EPISTEMIC PRACTICE: THE ETHICS OF EPISTEMIC WORK ... 125

5.1 CHAPTER 5 OVERVIEW ... 125

5.2 MANUSCRIPT: ARE METAPHORS ETHICALLY BAD EPISTEMIC PRACTICE?: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AT THE INTERSECTIONS ... 127

5.2.1 Metaphors and Blending Theory ... 128

5.2.2 Metaphors as Ethically Bad Knowledge Practices ... 132

5.2.3 Altering Concepts as Epistemic Harm ... 134

5.2.4 Conceptual Resources and Testimonial Injustice ... 138

5.2.5 Social Structures and Power Dynamics ... 141

5.2.6 Making Judgements – is this metaphor ethically bad epistemic practice? ... 151

5.2.7 Unifying the Conversation – Illness as War ... 158

5.2.8 Negotiating Boundaries ... 159

5.2.9 Metaphors as Epistemic Resources within Inequitable Epistemic Systems ... 160

5.3 CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND REFLECTION ... 163

5.3.1 Reflection ... 164

5.3.2 Conclusion ... 165

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION ... 167

6.1 HOW CAN WE USE METAPHORS TO DO ETHICALLY GOOD EPISTEMIC WORK? ... 167

6.2 OVERALL CONCLUSION: ... 183

6.2.1 Final Thoughts ... 187

BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 189

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Summary of documents included in analysis of metaphors of monkeypox in Canadian news media…………..…96

Table 2 Summary of metaphors of monkeypox in Canadian news media……………………………………………..….97

Table 3 Metaphorical representations of monkeypox in the person and the social body in Canadian news media……….108

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores some of the ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors, with particular attention to those used in health-related communication. Analogical reasoning, including that brought about through metaphor, is an epistemically valuable tool. By drawing comparisons of structural relations across domains, metaphors suggest different things do, and sometimes should, work in the same way. This helps us reason through new problems, ask new questions, and conceptualize new phenomena by allowing existing knowledge to transfer to new domains. However, the knowledge systems within which metaphors do this epistemic work are inequitable, and metaphors help to perpetuate this inequality by building on the biases within these systems, which has further ethical implications. This dissertation suggests some of the ways this occurs is through shaping the specification of principles used in moral deliberation and justification, embedding new phenomena in, and recreating, oppressing discursive narratives, and facilitating the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources.

The three manuscripts contained within this dissertation each explore one of these facets of the ethical implications of metaphors. First, using the example of war metaphors used during the COVID-19 pandemic, I explore how metaphors may shape the prioritization of ethical principles by suggesting an analogical relationship to a paradigm case. Second, using the example of Canadian news media coverage of the first month of the 2022 monkeypox outbreak, I explore how metaphors embed phenomena in dominant discursive narratives and the ethical implications of reinforcing these narratives. Third, I examine the ethical implications of the epistemic work metaphors do by digging deeper into the cognitive and epistemic facets of metaphors. Finally, I conclude by arguing for being critical of metaphors, intentionally critiquing them for their limitations, prompting for disanalogy, and engaging with non-dominant discourse. I suggest this may assist in supporting metaphors to do ethical epistemic work, build critical interpretive skills for recognizing when metaphors may be unethical, and allow them to be creatively used for their ethical potential.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my committee, including Drs. Brenda Beagan, Shanon Phelan, and Kirstin Borgerson for their ongoing support, encouragement and feedback throughout the completion of this dissertation and for their open mindedness in allowing me to use a sometimes-unconventional approach in this process.

I would also like to acknowledge the many peer-reviewers and journal editors who contributed to my thinking and writing in pursuing publication of the manuscripts contained within this dissertation.

I would like to thank my parents for their support and for helping to ensure that I remained fed and nourished throughout this process. And I would like to thank Tilly for helping to inspire many of the ideas and reflections contained in here both during our walks and time sitting together in silence.

Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues, friends, and mentors in the School of Occupational Therapy for challenging me and supporting to see the importance of diverse types of research, multiple ways of knowing, critical reflection, and creativity.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

An exhausted patient accepts another round of chemotherapy as her best chance to win her ‘battle with cancer’. Healthcare providers organize themselves around a patient to form their ‘circle of care’. A widow writes advanced directives asking for assisted death in the case she ‘loses her mind’.

Metaphors like these –cancer as a battle, coordinated care as circular, dementia as losing one’s mind – are ubiquitous in healthcare communication and shape healthcare decisions (Tate, 2020). They are used in the design of healthcare systems (Annas, 1995), in public health communication (Chapman & Miller, 2020; Wallis & Nerlich, 2005), and in individual healthcare encounters (Mould et al., 2010; Tate & Pearlman, 2016). They are used to help explain new medical science (Merriman, 2015; Nelson et al., 2015), and to help communicate the experience of different health conditions (Atanasova, 2018; Coll-Florit et al., 2021; Sakiyama et al., 2010; Shinebourne & Smith, 2010). Metaphors may be used to heal (Turner, 2014), and metaphors have been used to harm (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016).

Metaphors, in their basic form, are composed of two components: a source domain and a target domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). These are sometimes also referred to as the tenor (target) and vehicle (source) domains (Ceccarelli, 2004). A metaphor is, in basic form, structured ‘X is a Y’, where X is the target, or the concept being described, and Y is the source, the descriptor. Thus, in the metaphor ‘the body is a machine’, ‘the body’ is the

target being described as ‘a machine’, which is the source. Metaphors can also be understood as forming metaphor systems, commonly described as conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). The metaphor ‘the body is a machine’ can also be understood as a conceptual metaphor that is composed of many metaphors, such as ‘the heart is a pump’ or ‘the brain is a computer’. By contributing to building conceptual systems, metaphors have epistemic and practical effects. They shape how we understand reality and also how we act within it (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). As I will argue throughout this dissertation, this is what allows metaphors to have both epistemic and ethical consequences. They shape how we understand what things are, how they relate to each other, what actions appear reasonable, and how we understand the effects of actions we take.

As a result of their common use and potential consequences, metaphors in health-related communication have been the subject of significant ethical debate (Fraser, 2018; George et al., 2016; Guta & Newman, 2016; Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016; Nie, Rennie, et al., 2016; Tate, 2020; Tate & Pearlman, 2016). Calls to abandon (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016), adapt (Tate, 2020), and ensure metaphors are evidence based (Trogen, 2017) have arisen in response to these debates. The main arguments underlying these debates are as follows:

1) Metaphors are ethical because they facilitate communication about health-related information by making something unknown, familiar. This can include patients using metaphors to explain their experience, healthcare providers using metaphors to communicate treatment options, and public health communicating community-

level issues and strategies for response. Insofar as these metaphors assist people to receive effective care and enhance their wellbeing, the use of metaphors is ethical.

2) Metaphors are unethical because they limit the ways people can understand and communicate about their experience and the experience of others. They may persuade people to undergo treatments that they otherwise would not and justify actions that might otherwise be considered wrong. They may cause people to ignore or invalidate critical information for understanding and living with health and illness. In these ways, metaphors are unethical.

Each side of this debate reflects what Aristotle identified are the two facets of metaphors: metaphors create, and metaphors persuade (Ricœur, 2003). Metaphors create opportunities for communicating and new ideas to be communicated, and yet metaphors persuade people to accept certain beliefs that may not be entirely accurate: "Metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality" (Ricœur, 2003, p. 16). Because metaphors both create and persuade, they have both epistemic and ethical implications. I argue that it is this duality that underscores debates around the ethics of metaphors.

In addition, these debates around the ethics of metaphors in healthcare occur in the context of inequitable social conditions, conditions in which relationships of power systematically oppress some groups of people while systematically privileging others. Oppressing systems are intertwining, overlapping, compounding, and conjunctive. As Sally Haslanger (2020) describes, by way of analogy, they are 'cooked together', where oppressing systems are made of "a set of ingredients, resulting in a *capitalist white*

supremacist nationalist ableist ageist heteronormative…etc…patriarchal order” (p. 226). While each ingredient can be examined in relation to its effect on the whole, this involves considering how each interacts with other ingredients within the recipe. Although one ingredient cannot be fully separated from the others in its ‘cooked’ state, examining it may still provide an important, although partial, contribution to understanding the system as a whole. Healthcare, with professions grounded in these oppressing ‘cooked’ values (Grenier, 2020), is both a baker and a consumer of these oppressing systems. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the metaphors that pepper the language, models, and analogies that guide healthcare practice have an oppressing flavour. Like different spices may bring out different flavours, different metaphors may be more or less implicated in enhancing the role of some ingredients in oppressing systems over others. Metaphors create and persuade within this already complex network of power relations.

How then, may we understand the ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors within highly inequitable social systems? The intent of this dissertation is to examine epistemic facets of metaphors and interrogate the ethics of the epistemic work that metaphors do within inequitable social systems. If we understand metaphors as creating and persuading in favour of a particular conceptual reality, one that tends towards systematic oppression, when may this help, and when may this hinder efforts towards social and epistemic justice?

1.1 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation is composed of six chapters which each take a different perspective on examining the ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors within inequitable social systems. It takes an interdisciplinary approach drawing on and bringing together concepts traditionally found in philosophy such as epistemology, logic, and argumentation, concepts and methodologies traditionally found in the social sciences, such as discourse analysis, critical theory, and qualitative analysis, and blending in elements of linguistics, rhetoric, and cognitive sciences. It cannot be distilled as belonging squarely within one body of knowledge, discipline, or school of thought, but rather challenges the hermeneutical injustice that arises from the separation of knowledges and knowers (Pohlhaus Jr., 2017) by bringing them together to produce productive epistemic friction (Medina, 2013). I explore experience of working within and feeling the heat of this friction throughout reflections at the end of each chapter.

Chapter 2 provides a conceptual overview of the epistemic work that metaphors do. Drawing on diverse literature about the definition and function of metaphors, I argue that metaphors prompt analogical reasoning allowing for structural relationships between ideas to emerge. Metaphors, however, are more than cognitive tools; they are highly social and are used to co-create a shared social reality. They therefore are also discursive, building on the social/conceptual resources available to sustain a power-laden reality. It is here, at the intersection of cognition and discourse, that the ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors emerge.

With this understanding of the epistemic facets of metaphors, I then examine two ways metaphors do ethical and epistemic work on a social level. In Chapter 3, using the example of war metaphors used during the COVID-19 pandemic, I explore how metaphors may shape the prioritization of ethical principles when they conflict by suggesting an analogical relationship to a paradigm case. I argue that given the doctrine of universalizability, “the widely recognized moral requirement to treat similar cases in a similar way” (Childress, 1997), metaphors suggest that the prioritization and specification of principles in one case (in this example war) ought to be parallel to what they are in case in question (the COVID-19 pandemic). I suggest that this reasoning may be used to justify actions and policies that would otherwise be considered unethical. When this analogical relationship reflects the realities and values of those in positions of power, as metaphors that become embedded in discourse tend to do (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), this reasoning may erase, or neglect consideration of alternate perspectives and harm those who are in marginalized positions. When metaphors reproduce discourse that excludes the realities of those who are marginalized, decisions and actions grounded in and legitimated by these metaphors are likely to reproduce oppressing power relationships.

In Chapter 4, using the example of Canadian news media coverage of the first month of the 2022 monkeypox outbreak, I next explore how metaphors embed phenomena in dominant discursive narratives and the ethical implications of reinforcing these narratives. I argue that within the dominant discourse, narrative structures and characterizations are evoked through metaphors. When metaphors that draw on these conceptualizations are used in relation to novel phenomena, I argue they provide a

framework that suggests how the narrative ought to unfold and how we therefore ought to understand and interact with the phenomenon in question. Because narratives within the dominant discourse on which metaphors draw to make sense of new phenomena reflect the ideologies of that discourse, these narratives tend to perpetuate the ideologies on which they are grounded. When used to justify decisions and actions, they may then justify perpetuating oppressing ideologies.

Together, these examples suggest two ways that metaphors, when used within inequitable social systems, may justify perpetuating inequality. The analogical reasoning which they evoke, grounded in dominant discourse, works to perpetuate the values of this discourse and justify actions that support it. This may occur by rendering invisible non-dominant experiences and/or reinforcing oppressing narratives. When metaphors that use these strategies guide understanding, policy development, and action, they may unethically perpetuate inequitable social and epistemic systems.

The fifth chapter digs deeper into the cognitive and epistemic facets of metaphors and examines the ethical implication of the epistemic work of metaphors in itself. I argue that metaphors influence who is considered a knower and what concepts are available for understanding and communicating experience. Because metaphors shape the conceptual resources we have available for understanding and communicating, including who we understand to be a legitimate knower, the way metaphors shape concepts has ethical implications.

The concluding chapter considers what has been presented thus far and based on these arguments, addresses the question: “if metaphors have ethical and epistemic implications, how can we use metaphors to do ethically good epistemic work within inequitable social systems?” Harnessing the creative and generative potential of metaphors and drawing on non-dominant discourses to suggest alternative ways of knowing and understanding an inequitable reality, I explore ways that metaphors may be used to instigate discursive and subsequently social transformation.

1.1.1 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is written using a manuscript style framework. The central three chapters (chapters 3, 4, and 5) all contain manuscripts that have been submitted for publication. They thus each contain a central argument in themselves, and are structured to reflect the requirements of the respective journal in which they were published/submitted. The central manuscripts are organized to progress in conceptual complexity and depth, while also progressing in the order events unfolded over time. Each of these manuscripts is bracketed by an overview introduction, and a reflective summary conclusion. These components tie the manuscripts back to the central theme of the dissertation, arguing how each illustrates ways in which metaphors have ethical and epistemic implications within inequitable social systems. In addition, the reflections are intended to be both reflections on the manuscripts’ role in providing argumentation towards the central thesis, but also reflection on the process of writing each manuscript. As such, they are written using a variety of flavours, spanning a range of formality, as was suited to the topic of reflection.

1.1.2 Limitations and Context

While the arguments in this dissertation aim to identify some of the epistemic and ethical implications of metaphors, I do not claim that what is presented here is an exhaustive summary of all, or the only implications. This dissertation was written with the intent of avoiding unnecessary conceptual foreclosure, the limiting of additional or alternative theoretical interpretations of concepts (Dotson, 2012). For example, when I present 'some ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors', I do not claim that these are 'all of' or 'the only' possible implications. These are some. There may very well be others. They are intended to be "open conceptual structures" (Dotson, 2012, p. 42) and I hope for them to be read that way.

By examining metaphors from the perspective of their role in promoting epistemic in/justice, this dissertation aims to unify – but not solve – debates about how metaphors are harmful and helpful and to generate avenues for reasoning that bring both sides into a productive dialogue with, rather than against each other. Importantly, it also facilitates reasoning about why and how metaphors may unconsciously supress knowledge production in ways that further instantiate inequality and how, with an intentionally critical approach, they may be used to challenge epistemic inequity.

This dissertation was written between 2020 and 2024. During this time, the topics addressed in this dissertation – COVID-19, monkeypox, and mental illness – were salient globally for their emergence and resurgence. Parts of this dissertation were written during COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns, and while recovering from COVID-19 infection.

Articles about monkeypox were collected as they were being published by news media and monkeypox transitioned to be named “mpox” as the chapter on this topic was being written. During the creation of this dissertation, Nova Scotia experienced the worst mass shooting and the most destructive hurricanes, floods, and fires on record. Ottawa was under blockade with convoy protests spread across Canada. In the United States, Roe v Wade was overturned, the Whitehouse was stormed, Black Lives Matter became a global movement, and ex-American President Donald Trump was indicted. Russia invaded Ukraine. Israel and Palestine were at war. In the context of these events, mental illness reached crisis levels. This dissertation cannot be separated from the context in which it was written and that in this context these events were not history, but presence, with the uncertainty and obscurity that exists without the privilege of hindsight. This context undoubtedly influenced the thinking process that developed the concepts herein, and the language with which they are expressed.

1.2 CONCLUSION TO THE INTRODUCTION

I have called this dissertation ‘Hall of Mirrors’ as it is a metaphor for the reality metaphors create within systems of power. It is also a metaphor of how each component of this thesis sits in relation to the others. Mirrors reflect the world, framed in a particular way; some things are framed in, others are framed out. Mirrors can be strategically placed and tilted, as they are by magicians, to direct our attention towards certain things, and away from others. They can create an illusion of a reality meant to draw people in by capturing their imagination, emotions, and sense of wonder – a reality that is a spectre of power. Mirrors can also be tilted to direct power in ways that blind, and ways that burn,

and that therefore can systematically erase certain ways of seeing and objects to be seen. Mirrors can be tilted in ways that are playful, ways that are useful, ways that distort, and ways that are harmful. So too can metaphors. This dissertation aims to challenge the taken-for-granted-ness of some of the ways metaphors are used in healthcare, looking through these mirrors from different angles, so that we can consciously consider where to place and how to tilt these mirrors to re-envision and recreate a more just world.

CHAPTER 2 METAPHORS AS INSTIGATORS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 2

The objective of this dissertation is to explore ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors within oppressive social systems. In this theoretical overview, I will examine epistemic facets of metaphors, drawing on their use in bioethics, science, and critical discourse analysis. Based on this understanding of the epistemic work that metaphors do, I will then proceed in the following chapters to examine the ethical implications of this work, as well as the ethics of this epistemic work in itself. I then conclude by considering if metaphors do the type of work outlined here within inequitable epistemic systems, and this work has ethical implications, how then can we be ethically responsible in our use of metaphors?

To examine the epistemic work that metaphors do, I will first discuss how metaphors are used in different disciplines and the shared functional elements among them. I begin by examining analogical reasoning in both bioethics and science and the shared structure both disciplines suggest underlies this reasoning. While these are not the only disciplines that use analogical reasoning, nor do they use this form of reasoning exclusively, they provide examples that help to illustrate what analogical reasoning is and how it can be used.

I then introduce the idea of metaphor and its relationship to analogical reasoning, suggesting, in line with Max Black's (1977) Interaction Theory, that metaphors prompt analogical reasoning. Next I challenge Gentner and Markman's (1997) model of the relationship between metaphors and analogy to explain how this can be the case. Finally, I use Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998) to support a discursive orientation to metaphors that acknowledges their role in creating and sustaining social cognitions. Based on these epistemic facets of metaphors, I then outline how I will examine ethical considerations of this epistemic work within inequitable social systems.

2.2 ANALOGICAL REASONING

Analogical reasoning is a common method for deliberation and argumentation used across disciplines. The word 'analogy' has roots in Greek, meaning 'proportion' (Bailer-Jones, 2002). It suggests a proportional relationship between two things, for example, 3:6 : 6:12, where the relationships within the two ratios are the same for both (Bailer-Jones, 2002); three is related to six in the same way that six is related to twelve. In its basic form, analogical reasoning takes the structure A is to B as C is to D (Bailer-Jones, 2002). While the attributes of each domain may be different, analogical reasoning directs our attention to shared or comparable relationships between attributes or shared structural relationships (Bailer-Jones, 2002; Gentner, 1981). I argue that metaphors rely on similarities in the same way analogies do, and that although there are of course differences in the two concepts that metaphors bring together, it is the analogous similarities that are brought to light through their use.

2.3 ANALOGICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS

In bioethics, analogical reasoning draws on "the widely recognized moral requirement to treat similar cases in a similar way" (Childress, 1997): the doctrine of universalizability or of formal justice. As Jame Childress (1997) describes:

> In general, analogical reasoning illuminates features of morally or legally problematic cases by appealing to relevantly similar cases that reflect moral or legal consensus (precedent). Of course, much of the moral (or legal) debate hinges on determining which similarities and differences are both relevant and significant. (p.18)

Analogical reasoning is particularly significant when using casuistry as a method of ethical reasoning. In this method, a case is compared to a paradigm case from which one triangulates morally significant elements and their weights: "The essence of the casuistical method is to start with paradigm cases whose conclusions are settled, and then to compare and contrast the central features in these settled cases with the features of cases to be decided" (Arras, 1994, p. 962). Versions of principlism, where morally relevant principles are explicated in a case and compared across cases (Beauchamp, 1994, 2003), also draw on analogical reasoning (Childress, 1997). While their perspective on the role of principles in reasoning is different, in both types of ethical deliberation, the case in question is compared to another, more established case to draw similarity in ethically-relevant content.

Two important points about analogical reasoning emerge from Childress' (1997) description. First, Childress (1997) notes the importance of drawing analogy to a case that reflects moral or legal consensus. This point is echoed by others who argue that

effective analogical reasoning must bring the case in question into conversation with another that already has a solution, building on knowledge gained from previous challenges (Johnson & Burger, 2006; Mertes & Pennings, 2011). Second, Childress (1997) notes that in order to highlight the similarity between cases, one must determine which similarities and differences are relevant and significant in order to select a case that is a suitable comparator. This is what some suggest is the relationship between principles and casuistry in bioethics: it is the principles that provide the analogical link between cases (Beauchamp, 1994, 2003; Childress, 1997; Mertes & Pennings, 2011). Others suggest these analogous relations are properties such as rights, values, and norms (Spielthenner, 2014), central features of the case that may have moral significance (Arras, 1994). Analogical reasoning in bioethics therefore occurs between a novel case and a case with consensus that has similar (although often debated) morally-relevant features. This comparability of key features allows conclusions to be drawn across cases, in line with the principle of formal justice (Childress, 1997). While different perspectives exist on exactly what is under comparison between the cases, the general framework of moving from what is known to what is unknown through comparison of morally-relevant elements is essential.

Importantly, however, analogical reasoning does not necessarily end with finding sufficient similarities between cases. It may be equally important to attend to dissimilarities. Mertes and Pennings (2011) argue that practically, it is very rare to find bioethics cases with morally relevant similarities that also lack morally relevant differences, and that rather than being automatically problematic, morally relevant

differences can undermine and/or support argumentation (Mertes & Pennings, 2011). Arras (1994) argues similarly in highlighting the importance of attending to particularities in cases. A key feature then, is that analogical reasoning *done well* not only draws on the similarities between cases to stimulate knowledge transfer but also on what makes them distinct. Effective analogical reasoning is thus both a comparison *and contrast* of morally-relevant structural relationships.

2.4 ANALOGICAL REASONING IN WESTERN SCIENCE

Similar arguments have been made about the use of analogical reasoning in Western science: "The central idea is that an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain [onto another] such that a system or relations that holds true among the base objects also holds among the target objects" (Gentner & Jeziorski, 1993, pp. 448–449). In science, analogical reasoning often emerges in models, such as scaled models which may be analogous in a literal sense as they aim to proportionally represent relationships between features (Bailer-Jones, 2002; Black, 1960). It may also appear in reasoning about relational structure between different phenomena, such as between a cell and a factory (Gentner & Jeziorski, 1993), or between the solar system and an atom:

> The analogy conveys that the relationships that hold between the nodes in the solar system also hold between the nodes of the atom: for example, that there is a force attracting the peripheral objects to the central object; that the peripheral objects revolve around the central object; that the central object is more massive than the peripheral objects; and so on. (Gentner, 1981, pp. 9–11)

Analogical reasoning is a method of providing explanation, "because the use of more familiar and already accepted models (models that have led to understanding in different, but comparable situations) appears as a promising strategy in a new context" (Bailer-

Jones, 2002, p. 112). As with the use of analogy in bioethics, it allows for knowledge transfer between the known and unknown by drawing on similarity.

Particular emphasis in analogical reasoning in science is placed on the importance of comparability of relationship structure, rather than comparability of attributes (Gentner, 1981). Gentner and Jeziorski (1993) go so far as to say comparability of attributes amounts to extraneous relations and do not contribute to the strength of the analogy: "For example, the fact that the sun and plants are made up of atoms does not strengthen the atom/solar analogy" (p. 450). This feature is particularly salient in the analogical comparison of a cell to a factory – their actual attributes are distinct, while the structural relationship between components in how they function is what is comparable.

In the scientific context too, as in ethical deliberation, the importance of dissimilarity, or 'disanalogy' is also highlighted.

> Proclaiming one thing to be analogous to another is not simply a statement about what the two subjects have in common. Rather, in the interesting cases of analogy, there are differences between the relations and attributes present in both domains; these are called "disanalogies" or "negative analogies." Electrons and planets are attracted by the atomic nucleus and the sun respectively, but not through the same kind of force. (Bailer-Jones, 2002, p. 112)

Similarly, the limitations of analogy (and with it models) are also acknowledged. An important component of using an analogy effectively is knowing where the analogous components end: "Knowing what the model is not a model of is part of the model"(Bailer-Jones, 2002, p. 131). In addition, because analogies and models are typically constructed for a particular purpose and therefore obscure components not relevant to their purposed use, using a model for a purpose other than it was intended can

lead to flawed reasoning (Wardrope, 2015). For example, a two-dimensional scale model of the solar system may illustrate relative proportional size of planets and may do that quite well, but that model cannot also be used to explain planetary rotation, or a solar eclipse. Given that reasoning is often creative, with hypotheses built around the idea that if one relationship is comparable others should be as well, testing these hypotheses and acknowledging the limitations of comparable relationships is crucial (Brown, 2003).

2.5 ANALOGICAL REASONING: ATTRIBUTES AND STRUCTURE

The similarities between analogical reasoning in both ethics and science are apparent. Both seek to facilitate knowledge transfer from one domain to another domain, where more is known about the first domain than the second. Both rely on similarities between the two domains to allow this knowledge transfer to take place: in ethics the reliance is on similarity of morally-relevant features, and in science on structural relationships between attributes. Both also acknowledge the importance of dissimilarity for good reasoning, to know what knowledge should not be transferred and provide caution about transfer of knowledge when features are dissimilar.

One apparent difference is the role of comparable attributes across cases. It appears that while analogy in science differentiates between comparable attributes and structural relationships (Gentner, 1981), in ethics, it is morally-relevant attributes that are being compared. Different arguments have been put forth about whether, and if there is a distinction between the two. In discussing analogies in science, Dedre Gentner (1981) specifically differentiates between comparing attributes and structural relationships –

calling the former metaphor and the latter analogy. Similarly, Mary Hesse and Paul Bartha both distinguish between horizontal and vertical analogies, and while both are analogies, horizontal analogies are comparisons of attributes whereas vertical analogies are comparisons of relations (Weber & Wang, 2023). While there has been less discussion of this distinction in ethics, it appears that this distinction is what Beauchamp and Childress (1994; 2019) allude to in their discussion about the importance of principles in casuistry:

> That is, all analogical reasoning in ethics requires a connecting norm in order to show that one object or event is like or unlike another in the relevant respects. The creation or discovery of these circumstance linking norms cannot be achieved purely by analogy. At least rough and ready principles, rules, or maxims are required. (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 269)

This suggests that morally-relevant factors are morally relevant because they show relationships between attributes in the case. A norm, therefore, is a structural relationship that joins the cases together. This 'norm' may be a principle or morally relevant relationship between attributes within the case, and therefore can be mapped across cases. These mappings are therefore also mappings of structure, shared relationships between attributes, rather than solely attributes themselves. This guides both the selection of a paradigm case for comparability and highlights features for comparison (Arras, 1994; Beauchamp, 2003). As such, it appears that in bioethics, as in science, what is brought into comparison is structural relationships, rather than attributes.

For example, two cases could involve a parent and their child. One may involve substitute decision making where a parent is making a decision on behalf of their child with developing autonomy. Another case may involve a child making a decision on

behalf of their parent who is experiencing a cognitive impairment. These cases may share similar attributes in that they involve a parent and a child, but it is not immediately clear that this attribute is a shared morally-relevant factor between the two cases that would make the conclusion drawn from one transferrable to the other. Instead, we may say the comparison is in the question of autonomy and how it is specified, a structural component that allows for deliberation on when and how a decision can be made on behalf of someone else. In addition, the relationship between parent and child, a relationship between these case attributes, may also be morally relevant. What makes the cases suitable for analogical reasoning is thus comparability of relational structure between a person, and another making a decision on their behalf, or the familial relationship, rather than comparability of case attributes of both involving a parent and their child.

Analogical reasoning in both science and ethics, therefore, relies on similarity and difference of structural relationships rather than solely attributes. The similarity between analogical reasoning in science and ethics is also apparent in the use of explanatory logic models to explain reasoning in both contexts and the common theorists they draw on to support the use of analogical reasoning (Weber & Wang, 2023). While the content of what is brought into comparison is different in the different disciplines, the qualities of these comparisons, that they are comparisons of structural relations where comparison is used to bring knowledge from a known domain to one of relatively unknown, is shared.

2.6 ANALOGY AND METAPHOR: COMPARABLE CONCEPTS?

Thus far, I have outlined features of analogical reasoning in both ethics and science. Both suggest the importance of knowledge transfer from the more to the less familiar; both intentionally highlight the importance of both comparison and contrast for sound analogical reasoning; both suggest the importance of comparable structural relationships between two cases; and both distinguish between relationships of attributes and relationships of structure. While I have introduced different sets of terms for conceptualizing this last point, for the remainder of this section I will adopt Gentner's (1981) vocabulary and use the terms 'attributes' and 'structural relationships' to describe these features.

In what follows, I explore the relationship between metaphors and analogies. It is not my aim to take on the vast multidisciplinary question of whether or not metaphors and analogies are different, how, and why. What I aim to do here is explore how metaphors can prompt analogical reasoning. To do this, I sketch out some of the differing perspectives on the subject before adopting Gentner and Markman's (1997) explanation of the relationship between metaphors and analogies. This perspective suggests that all analogies are metaphors, but not all metaphors are analogies. While Gentner and Markman (1997) posit that metaphors that compare only attributes do not qualify as analogies because they are not comparisons of structural relations, I argue that because attributes are always and already positioned in structural relation to our experience of them and discursively to other attributes, a metaphor comparing attributes can prompt analogical reasoning. As such, I argue that metaphors prompt analogical reasoning.

There are differing perspectives about the relationship between metaphors and analogy. Max Black suggests that metaphors prompt and mediate the recognition of analogy (Black, 1977). In this way, analogous relationships are both recognized as possibly pre-existing, but also created through the use of the metaphor. In other cases, metaphor is thought to emerge as a result of underlying analogy, drawing on this analogy to create terms for novel ideas (Bailer-Jones, 2002). Current cognitive research suggests that verb metaphors (such as 'the wagon limped') are processed as analogies, indicating little definite distinction between the two (King & Gentner, 2023). Some scholars do not differentiate between the two, talking rather of metaphors and conceptual metaphors, where metaphors are individual instances of non-literal linguistic comparison and conceptual metaphors are broader systems of metaphors that illustrate a deeper relationship from which metaphors stem (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). In ethics, while some note there is a distinction between analogy and metaphor, many suggest this distinction is out of the relevant domain for discussion, or that they are effectively the same (Childress, 1997; López, 2006). Across perspectives, what is shared is that metaphor and analogy are likely related and metaphors may link somehow to analogical reasoning. What differs is the underlying ontological assumption of whether analogous structural relations are created, conceptual, pre-existing, pre-linguistic, or socially constructed.

I take Max Black's (1977) interaction view of metaphor as the most useful and the most versatile. In this view, metaphors prompt the recognition of underlying analogical structural relationships between the two domains, and this results in an alteration in the view of both domains involved in the metaphor as well as a new idea based on the two.

Depending on what one's view of objectivity is, these relationships could be existing underlying properties, however from a social constructionist perspective, these relationships are brought into existence or affirmed through metaphor (Black, 1977). While a metaphor may prompt the recognition of an underlying analogy that has previously been identified, it is also possible that it creates the recognition of new patterns of structural relations, shaping both the inputs and outputs of the metaphor in process.

However, while metaphors may prompt the recognition of analogical structure, an explanation of how this occurs is required. Gentner and Markman (1997) developed a model that suggests a gradient relationship between metaphor and analogy, moving from mappings of attribute to mappings of structure, with analogy referring to mappings of structure only, and metaphor encompassing the spectrum including mappings of structure and/or attributes (Gentner & Markman, 1997). From this perspective, all analogies are metaphors, but not all metaphors are analogies. This model suggests that some metaphors that compare only attributes do not prompt analogical reasoning because they do not meet the criteria of drawing comparisons between structural relationships. If, however, we can show that comparisons of attributes do prompt the recognition of comparable structural relations, then it would follow that metaphors prompt analogical reasoning.

I argue that the notion of attributes as 'properties of things' presupposes an objectivist, positivist paradigm and that even if attributes of things exist, our ascription of them to things is subject to our interpretation of them. Stepping outside of this paradigm

acknowledges that attributes always exist in relation to our understanding and experience of them, which is mediated by social, cultural, embodied experience. In what follows, I argue that 'attributes' also and already exist in structural relation to our experiential and social conceptual system, allowing comparison of attributes to evoke structural relationships. For example, take Gentner's (1981) metaphor that compares attributes: "the sun is an orange". While attributes of 'round' and 'orange' are being compared, as Gentner suggests, my social relationship to the sun rising in the morning and drinking orange juice in the morning, an experience highly mediated by culture, is also brought into my understanding and interpretation of this metaphor. What may appear or be intended to evoke a comparison of attributes still prompts the recognition of structural relationships. I suggest that Conceptual Metaphor Theory and metaphor as a form of critical discourse analysis allow us to acknowledge the structural relationships attributional metaphors evoke prompting analogical reasoning. If we understand attributes as always and already embedded in systems of conceptual, experiential, and discursive relationships, the distinction between metaphor and analogy dissolves, and all metaphors can then, to some extent, be understood as prompting analogical reasoning, as Black (1977) suggests.

2.7 FROM ATTRIBUTES TO ANALOGY: CONCEPT SYSTEMS AND EXPERIENCE

In this section, I explore how attributes can be understood as always already embedded within structural relationship to our experience, concepts, and discourse. In doing so, I provide justification for how metaphors can prompt analogical reasoning even if they appear to only draw comparisons of attribution. I will first provide a brief overview of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. I then follow by suggesting attributes exist in conceptual

relationship to each other, and therefore one way that comparisons of attributes may prompt analogical reasoning is through a plurality of attributional comparisons that are already understood as conceptually related to each other. A second way I suggest attributional comparisons may evoke analogical reasoning is because attributes exist in structural relationship to the self and self-experience, which is necessarily brought into the metaphor in the process of interpretation. Because attributes are part of conceptual and experiential structures, existing in relationship to other attributes, they are inherently structural and can prompt analogical reasoning.

In their work on Conceptual Metaphor Theory, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson focus not on the distinction between analogy and metaphor but on linguistic and conceptual metaphors:

> Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 456)

They argue metaphors in language suggest an underlying conceptual organization that is metaphorical. For example, they suggest the linguistic metaphors ‘saving time’, ‘spending time’, ‘wasting time’, and ‘budgeting time’ indicate the likelihood of an underlying conceptual metaphor where TIME IS MONEY that emerges through language (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). While I am not convinced this metaphor is ‘underlying’ and pre-linguistic, it does highlight interesting relationships between metaphors and the concepts they evoke.

In this example, the metaphors highlight shared attributes of time and money, suggesting both share attributes of save-ability, spend-ability, waste-ability, and budget-ability. These attributes, however, exist in relation to each other. While each individually may only highlight one attribute, these attributes are tied to a broader conceptualization of how money works. Save-ability is understood in relation to the possibility of being used or spent. Budget-ability is understood only and already in relation to the concepts of 'save' and 'spend'. These attributes are therefore structural because they gain meaning only in relation to other aspects of concepts to which they are related, which are then assumed to be other attributes of the phenomenon in question. The possibility of 'spending' evokes the possibility of 'saving' and the structural relationship between the two. As Lakoff and Johnson describe, a metaphor causes a "reverberation down through the network of entailments" (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 140), where evoking a comparable attribute brings to awareness other attributes to which it is related. Attributes are therefore not necessarily isolated, but exist in conceptual relation to other attributes, evoking structural relations which can then be compared.

A second way comparisons of corresponding attributes could prompt analogical reasoning is if they evoke attributes which exist in structural relation to our experience of these attributes. Our experience forms a conceptual reference point to which attributes are connected. The above example of my relationship to the sun and to oranges is an example of this. An attribute therefore evokes a structural relationship between aspects of our experience to which the attribute is related (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). This may include linking novel experiences to past experiences in order to make sense of them.

In their description of conceptual metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (2003) draw attention to the importance of the self and experience in developing conceptual systems within which metaphors are organized: "Which metaphors we have and what they mean depend on the nature of our bodies, our interactions in the physical environment, our social and cultural practices" (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 247). They suggest that, "Primary metaphors are motivated by embodied experiences coming together regularly. For example, when children are held affectionately by their parents, the experiences of affection and warmth correlate, yielding Affection Is Warmth (Lakoff, 2012, p. 777)". What this description highlights is that attributes do not exist in isolation, outside of structural relations, but rather attributes exist in structural relation to one's experience of them. In the example above, warmth is an attribute, but it is made sense of in relation to my experience of it, as is affection, and it is the structural relations between attributes and my experience of those things as 'nice', and co-occurring that draw them into analogy. Metaphors may therefore instigate analogical reasoning not just because multiple attributes with relationships to each other evoke structural relationships between domains; they may also prompt analogical reasoning because attributes exist in structural relationship to experience of them and the meaning of this experience.

What this analysis begins to suggest is that attributes exist already in structural relation to our experience of them and our conceptual systems. They are therefore not isolated properties outside of conceptual and experiential systems but embedded in systems with relational structure. A metaphor may therefore evoke analogical reasoning about

structural relationships even if it highlights only a comparable attribute. These may be at least two of the ways metaphors can lead to analogical reasoning.

2.8 METAPHORS, COGNITION, AND DISCOURSE

Suggesting that attributes exist in structural relation to each other based on conceptual understanding and experience acknowledges metaphors have a distinctly social element. Both experience and understanding emerge within social contexts and are dependent on social interactions, norms, and relationships. Yet, because of the disciplines in which metaphor theory emerged, this aspect of metaphors has been largely neglected in much of the theoretical literature. As a result, many theories of metaphors are of limited value for explaining their epistemic properties in social contexts.

While both Black (1977) and Lakoff and Johnson (2003) in their early work acknowledge the importance of social influences on metaphor, neither take this as their focus. Black, writing between 1955 and 1979, appears to have been primarily concerned with metaphor's role in creating a conceptual reality, and explaining how this could be so against a dominant paradigm of objectivism. This topic was of primary concern in his two primary works on metaphor (Black, 1955, 1977). Gentner (1981) was concerned with understanding the difference between metaphor in literature and science, and what it was about good metaphors in science that allowed them to make accurate scientific predictions, again working in an objectivist paradigm. While both allude to social elements, metaphor was largely extracted from its social context and explored in or against a largely objectivist paradigm. Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson, in their early work

in the 1980's were focused on explaining metaphors in terms of cognition (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). While their early work alludes to social facets of metaphors, such as the role of power in influencing metaphors' uptake and the importance of experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 2003), in Conceptual Metaphor Theory and their later work focusing on neural mapping of metaphors, this dimension is largely absent (Hart, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Their work develops a unidirectional relationship between cognition and language, where metaphors reflect cognition, but cognition is not examined as influenced by social experience (Hart, 2008).

What these theories leave out are the social and discursive aspects of metaphor that occur in conjunction with cognitive elements. While these theories lend valuable insight into how metaphors work, what they are, and how we use them to understand the world, they fall short of providing insight into how metaphors are used socially, for social purposes, and shape our thinking about the social world. They do not explain how metaphors are related to discourse. "From a sociological standpoint, *discourse* is defined as any practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning" (Ruiz, 2009, p. 3). Metaphors pragmatically are a way that people make meaning and persuade others of meaning (Charteris-Black, 2004b; Hart, 2008). Metaphors therefore should be considered a form of discourse. Yet, Conceptual Metaphor Theory is insufficient to explain how this could be (Hart, 2008). By arguing metaphors are grounded in embodied experience, these theories neglect that metaphors can be chosen based on communication goals, rather than being pre-determined by experience (Hart, 2008). As Jonathan Charteris-Black describes:

> One of the limitations of metaphor analysis when the cognitive approach is isolated from the pragmatic one is that the only explanation of metaphor

> motivation is with reference to an underlying experiential basis. This assumes that metaphor use is an unconscious reflex, whereas a pragmatic view argues that speakers use metaphor to persuade by combining the cognitive and linguistic resources at their disposal. (Charteris-Black, 2004b, p. 11)

What Charteris-Black (2004) and Hart (2008) argue, therefore, is that focusing solely on the cognitive components of metaphor neglects consideration of discursive aspects: "A theory is required in which the root of metaphor…may be treated as grounded in discourse" (Hart, 2008, p. 94).

Failing to acknowledge the social aspects of metaphors not only is in conflict with thousands of years of philosophical thought on the subject, but is at odds with an intuitive sense of how we use metaphors during different language acts. Historically, Aristotle's exploration of metaphors in *The Rhetoric* highlights metaphors' persuasive power (Ricœur, 2003). Persuasion is a social and meaning making act. Intuitively, metaphors are consciously chosen to convey a particular meaning; I can consciously choose when writing to describe teaching as 'cultivating a garden', 'preparing travellers for a journey', or 'fulfilling a factory quota', each of which conveys a different meaning (Ahmady et al., 2016). Failing to acknowledge the social dimensions of metaphors and the importance of choice in making and conveying meaning naturalizes the version of reality that a metaphor invokes (Sherwin, 2001). If we understand the social world as innate, we fail to recognize how it is made and remade through our actions, including metaphors, and we fail to acknowledge the possibility that it could be otherwise. From an ethical perspective, relegating metaphor use to the realm of unconscious reflex also absolves moral responsibility for the use of a metaphor and its implications. This is not to say that linguistic and cognitive elements of metaphor are not important in their own right, but

that they are insufficient for capturing the breadth of the social aspects that also require attention.

To understand the discursive aspects of metaphor, Hart (2008) suggests that Blending Theory, a theory of meaning construction, is useful for supporting this type of analysis. Within this theory, words do not refer directly to entities in the world but prompt the construction of mental spaces, or conceptual packets of understanding and action (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Hart, 2008). Hart (2008), drawing on Fauconnier and Turner, explains that these conceptual packets consist of “vital relations including identity, role, intentionality, time, space, and category” (Hart, 2008). These are based on social meaning and selectively recruited into the blend based on context. This theory therefore acknowledges that terms used in the metaphor are embedded within social conceptual systems of relationships from which they draw to produce their meaning.

For example, if we consider the metaphor ‘the video went viral’ in its contemporary use, this metaphor is used to draw structural relation between how videos work and how a virus works. It brings ‘video’ and concepts associated with it, likely including YouTube, TikTok and other social media feeds, as well as likely properties of the video, such as its length, type of device used to record it, and likely content (e.g., political or comedic) to the metaphor. In addition, ‘virus’ and concepts associated with it, such as person-to-person spread in an escalating manner over a short time, are also brought into the blend. The context in which this metaphor occurs shapes what relationships are highlighted – the same metaphor used in 1920 when videos were constrained to being shared in theatres

would likely mean a different thing (and existing outside of that context, I can't even begin to posit what it might mean). Together this creates a new meaning that shapes how we understand 'how videos work' and 'what viral means' as well as what is going on with the particular video that is being referenced. A metaphor brings these structural relations into play, allowing for analogical reasoning to occur, in this case between how media is shared and how viruses spread. These discourse packages blend to create new meaning, and in doing so influence conceptualizations of the phenomena being blended as well. In effect, Blending Theory dissolves the distinction between attribute and structural relation, acknowledging the structural relations inherent in our discursive, conceptual, and experiential understanding of the ideas brought together and produced by the metaphor.

2.9 METAPHORS AS DISCOURSE

Metaphors, therefore, can be understood as discourse by using Blending Theory to support an understanding of how metaphors work. Blending Theory, in many ways, fleshes out Black's Interaction Theory, suggesting that both domains are altered in the production of a metaphor, as well as the creation a new conceptual space that involves elements of both; this new space can then be generative of additional meaning (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998). This is not separate or in conflict with cognitive and embodied perspectives of metaphor. And as Lakoff and Fauconnier (2009) describe, their work does not conflict, but rather builds on a similar foundation and dovetails into different focuses that complement each other. While Lakoff and colleagues went on to focus more so on neural linguistics (Fauconnier & Lakoff, 2009), and Fauconnier and colleagues focused on cognitive processing (Fauconnier & Lakoff, 2009; Fauconnier &

Turner, 2008a), Blending Theory became adopted as the explanatory model for how metaphor is related to discourse and why it can be studied as discourse (Charteris-Black, 2004b; Hart, 2008). Because it acknowledges that the domains pulled into the metaphor are always and already embedded in conceptual and discursive systems of meaning, and the result draws on these to produce new meaning, what is produced is both conceptual and discursive.

Understanding metaphors using Blending Theory supports a conceptual orientation to discourse and discourse analysis. Within this perspective, "conceptualisation is the construction of world knowledge, including 'social knowledge' of people, objects, events, processes and states of affairs in the world" (Hart, 2007, p. 106). Discourse reflects and reproduces conceptualizations. While meaning making may occur on an individual level in one's mind, it is also inherently social. Conceptualizations are not individual, but are communicated and shared through systems of concepts among a social group – they are social cognitions: "Social cognitions may be defined more abstractly as 'attitudes', 'ideologies', 'beliefs' or -isms'" (Hart, 2007, p. 125). If metaphors shape our conceptualizations, how we understand things in the social world, communicate this understanding, and reinforce and reproduce social cognitions, they help form a collective understanding. They also influence social actions and interactions.

I argue this means metaphors have ethical implications. This is at least in part because social cognitions are not reinforced and reproduced from a position of equality; some people are in positions of power which allow them to shape social cognitions more

effectively than others and the social cognitions which emerge uphold and justify their position of power (van Dijk, 1995). Metaphors, as a form of discourse, are one way self-perpetuating social cognitions that uphold power structures are reproduced. As van Dijk (1995) describes, some of the ways “discursive mind control” (p. 23) occurs is by emphasizing some ideas at the expense of others, influencing the models with which discourse can be comprehended, and preventing alternative representations. This is strikingly similar to key features of metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Metaphors therefore may contribute to these types of ‘discursive mind control’ because what they do is “highlight some features of reality and hide others” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 484), they form the models within which we understand reality (Black, 1960; Lakoff, 2003), and they delegitimate alternative conceptualisations (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Insofar then, as the dominant discourse reinforces social cognitions that uphold systems of power, metaphors that draw on and reflect this dominant discourse are likely to uphold and reproduce these systems of power.

Because metaphors can be understood as discourse, reflecting and reinforcing power structures, the tools appropriate for critical discourse analysis are likely to be applicable for studying metaphors as well. This perspective has been taken up by many who analyze metaphors as a form of critical discourse analysis, often referring to it as critical metaphor analysis (Charteris-Black, 2004a; Fallah & Raouf Moini, 2016; Hart, 2008; Nguyen & McCallum, 2016). Critical discourse analysis, as it pertains to metaphors, is interested in increasing awareness of how social relations are reproduced through language, bringing ideologies inherent in metaphors to attention for examination

(Charteris-Black, 2004b). It understands metaphors to be a concealer of underlying social processes that can be interrogated (Charteris-Black, 2004b). However, I argue that critical discourse analysis has a broader scope, part of which is being neglected in examining only how metaphors are used and the social processes they reflect. Teun van Dijk (1995) suggests: “CDA [critical discourse analysis] studies the way in which such influence and control of the mind is socially or morally illegitimate” (p.22). I argue that while the socially illegitimate aspects of metaphor have been acknowledged, the *morally illegitimate* facets have yet to be sufficiently examined. Given that metaphors have the epistemic effect of prompting analogical reasoning and shaping how we individually and collectively conceptualize, act in, and sustain a world riddled with inequality, this likely has moral implications. This will be explored in the chapters to come.

In the realm of social epistemology, it has been widely acknowledged that how we individually and collectively conceptualize and communicate ideas has moral implications. This is particularly salient in discussions of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) and of ignorance (Mills, 2007). What ideas and beliefs are socially acknowledged (or not), what concepts are available for making sense of experience (or not), who is believed and trusted to share knowledge (or not), have moral implications (Fricker, 2007; Mills, 2007). Given the epistemic facets of metaphors, it is likely that metaphors share at least some of these morally relevant elements. However, metaphors have yet to be examined for how and why they may have ethical implications for creating ignorance and perpetuating epistemic injustice. Exploring some of these moral issues is the intent of this dissertation.

2.10 A SUMMARY UNDERSTANDING OF STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS THEORIES

Metaphors prompt analogical reasoning by highlighting structural relations across domains. The structural relations compared across domains take different forms in different theories, but they remain relationships that support 'how things are' in a broad sense. For Lakoff and Johnson, these structural relations are apparent in embodied and experiential relationships with phenomena (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). For Hart (2008) and Charteris-Black (2004) structural relationships are discursive, elements of "thematic roles, categories which structure the linguistic representation in discourse of a given scenario – for example, with regard to who did what to whom, where, and how" (Hart, 2008, p. 96). In analogical reasoning from a principlist perspective, these structural relationships are moral principles within the case (Beauchamp, 2003; Beauchamp & Childress, 2019). In casuistry, structural relations emerge in the morally-relevant case elements (Arras, 1994). In science, structural relations may be those between attributes that are mathematically specifiable, functional, or explanatory (Bailer-Jones, 2002; Gentner, 1981; Gentner & Jeziorski, 1993). All are structural relations from different disciplinary orientations to functional/structural significance.

The variety of possible structural relationships that metaphors can draw is apparent. While one may be able to intentionally highlight particular types of relationships through the context in which they use a metaphor, there remains an element of unpredictability about exactly which relationships will emerge when a metaphor is used (Fauconnier &

Turner, 2008b). Herein lies the creative potential of metaphors (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008b). They have the ability to bring about new ideas and shape concepts through drawing relationships that may not otherwise have been considered (Brown, 2003). As metaphors also contribute to shaping how we understand and act in the social world, this creative potential may be instrumental in re-shaping how we understand and act in the world to bring about greater epistemic equity.

2.11 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2

Thus far, I have argued that metaphors, regardless of whether they draw explicit comparison of attributes or structural relationships, prompt analogical reasoning about the structural relationships between two domains. These relationships may be functional, measurable, moral, categorical, narrative, and/or discursive, but are selectively evoked based on the comparison and the context (Fauconnier & Turner, 2008a). Even comparisons that appear to be purely attributional may prompt analogical reasoning because these attributes are always already embedded within systems of relationship to each other, our experiences, and broadly our cultural discourse.

Based on Black's (1977) Interaction Theory, bringing domains together not only creates a new metaphorical frame involving both domains, but shapes how each domain is conceptualized on its own. It prompts us to reason about analogous processes between the two, highlighting structural relationships that suggest 'things work the same way'. The occurrence of comparable structural relationships may also prompt projection of potential analogy between the two domains, the idea that things 'should work the same way'. This

is part of the creative divergent reasoning metaphors can initiate. In addition, metaphors can be used to convince us that a certain version of reality is true when they are chosen with the intent of recruiting particular discursive packages to produce blended meaning that supports an ideological reality.

These are some of the cognitive and epistemic facets of metaphors. However, these facets emerge within a highly inequitable social system. If this is how metaphors do epistemic work, what are the implications of this work within inequitable social systems? If the discourse upon which metaphors draw and build, the experiences which they make salient and hide, the reasoning they provide, the questions they prompt, and the creativity they promote all occur within an epistemic system that privileges some and oppresses others in very systematic and coordinated ways, what are the ethical implications? Whose metaphors, and what analogical reasoning is taken as 'true', representing 'how things really are'? How do metaphors influence what we see as morally justified, and 'right'? Can metaphors only reproduce discourse that already exists, or can their creative aspect challenge problematic discursive norms?

The following three chapters address these questions through case analyses. Chapter Three examines the implications of war metaphors used to conceptualize the COVID-19 pandemic on analogical ethical reasoning from a principlist perspective. As Arras (Arras, 1994) describes, one of the key elements left open in reasoning based on principles is the weighting of ethical principles in relation to each other and their prioritization within a case when they conflict. I argue that metaphors, such as war metaphors, evoked in

framing a situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic, suggest a particular interpretation and weighting of moral principles. This in turn influences how principles are specified, and what becomes justifiable based on these principles. In addition, because discourse has a tendency to travel between situations, reasoning based on this discourse may appear justified in other situations as well. In examining the potential transfer of pandemic rhetoric to describe a 'mental illness pandemic', I argue metaphors may therefore not only skew how we interpret cases, but may also problematically suggest a structural relationship to an inappropriate paradigm case promoting flawed reasoning.

The following chapter, Chapter Four, explores the use of metaphors in Canadian news media to conceptualize monkeypox during the first month of the 2022 outbreak. Examining the pattern of metaphors and how these relate to explanations of cause, effect, and response allows for examination of how metaphors both draw from discourse to help make something new make sense and build new phenomenon into discursive narratives. Yet, because these discursive narratives reflect and support dominant ideologies that support systems of oppression, they may be used to justify action that continues to perpetuate oppression. By examining how metaphors draw analogies between new phenomena and existing discourse rooted in inequitable power relationships, we can see ways metaphors can support and reproduce oppressing discourses.

While Chapters Three and Four examine the ethical implications of the epistemic work metaphors do within inequitable epistemic systems on a social level, Chapter Five looks at the ethical elements of the epistemic work metaphors do on an epistemic level. This

chapter looks at how the work metaphors do can promote injustices (and justices) that are epistemic and the limitations and possibilities of this work within epistemic systems that are always and already inequitable. It suggests metaphors shape the resources available for knowing, who is considered a knower, and whose knowledge is considered credible. These are ethics of the epistemic work that metaphors do within inequitable epistemic systems. I argue that within a social system with an inequitable distribution of epistemic resources, metaphors can contribute to and perpetuate this inequitable distribution of resources, making them unethical.

This dissertation then concludes by asking what we can learn from methodologically-sound analogical reasoning about how to make the work metaphors do within inequitable social systems more ethical. It builds on a component acknowledged as important in analogical reasoning used in both science and ethics as described in this chapter – the importance of limitation and disanalogy, as well as the creative potential of metaphors for generating recognition of new structural relationships. I argue that acknowledging limitations and prompting for disanalogy are not in themselves metaphorical (or analogical) reasoning, but a critical reflection on this process. With this in mind, we can embrace the creative potential of metaphors, and understand when this may and may not be both an epistemically productive and ethical approach.

2.12 CHAPTER 2 CONCLUSION

Analogical reasoning, including that brought about through metaphor, is an epistemically valuable tool. This has been acknowledged by many disciplines and emerges directly in scientific and ethical reasoning. By drawing comparisons of structural relations across

domains, metaphors suggest different things do, and sometimes should, work in the same way. This helps us reason through new problems, ask new questions, and conceptualize new phenomena by allowing existing knowledge to transfer to new domains. However, the knowledge systems within which metaphors do this epistemic work are inequitable, and metaphors help to perpetuate this inequality by building on the biases within these systems, which has further ethical implications. This dissertation suggests some of the ways this occurs is through shaping the specification of principles within moral deliberation and justification, embedding new phenomena in and recreating oppressing discursive narratives, and facilitating the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources. However, as I intend to suggest in the conclusion of this dissertation, being critical of metaphors, intentionally critiquing them for their limitations, prompting for disanalogy, and engaging with non-dominant discourse may assist in supporting metaphors to do ethical epistemic work and build critical interpretive skills for recognizing when metaphors may be unethical and creatively using them for their ethical potential.

CHAPTER 3 SHIFTING WEIGHTS AND CONCEPTS: METAPHORS' IMPLICATIONS FOR PRINCIPLED REASONING

3.1 CHAPTER 3 OVERVIEW

This chapter examines implications of using metaphors to support ethical reasoning within systems of complex power relationships. In this case, I consider ethical reasoning to be reasoning that supports deliberation of morally relevant problems or issues, with the intent of arriving at a morally good, or right outcome. This chapter addresses this aspect of the ethical implications of the work metaphors do by exploring how metaphors influence ethical reasoning by shaping how we conceptualize and specify the principles with which we reason. Because how we understand and apply ethical principles shapes ethical decision making, and metaphors influence these factors, metaphors have ethical implications.

According to a principlist perspective:

> Moral principles are simply relatively general norms of conduct that describe obligations, permissible actions, and ideals of action. A principle is a regulative guideline stating conditions of the permissibility, obligatoriness, rightness, or aspirational quality of actions falling within the scope of the principle. (Beauchamp, 1994, pp. 955–956)

Principles emerge from a common morality, norms based on history and social convention, and are moral convictions where we have high confidence in their moral quality and low levels of bias (Beauchamp, 1994). In bioethics, these emerge from both norms of the traditional healthcare context and role expectations, obligations, and virtues for professional practice (Beauchamp, 1994).They were selected for their uncontroversial

nature, with the thought that any moral theory or religious view would endorse these mid-level principles practice (Beauchamp, 1994). Commonly referred to as the ‘four pillars of bioethics’, the most common manifestation of these principles in a bioethical context is respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2019; Beauchamp, 1994, 2003).

Principlism is a method of ethical reasoning where principles are held to be obligations of behaviour. Within a specific case, reasoning pursues a state of ‘reflective equilibrium’ where principles become specified to achieve coherence in ways that support the mutually accepted norm (Beauchamp, 1994). For example the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’, which is “respect for the decision making capacities of autonomous persons” (Beauchamp, 1994, p. 956), may be further specified to the precise obligation in a case to ‘respect people’s decisions to engage in occupations of their choice except in cases where this occupation is likely to put others at a high likelihood of significant harm’. Specification moves thinking from what is generally required to consider when it may be reasonable to modify or override an obligation in a specific set of circumstances (Beauchamp, 2003).

One of the primary critiques of principlism is that it includes no theoretical basis on which to weigh or balance the relative value of principles against each other when they conflict (Arras, 1994). As Tom Beauchamp (1994) describes:

> They are firm obligations that can be set aside only if they come into conflict with and do not override another obligation. In cases of a conflict of obligations, either obligation then has the potential to release the person from the other obligation.

> Often some balance between two or more norms must be found that requires some part of each obligation to be discharged, but in many cases one simply overrides the other. (p. 956)

While principles may come into conflict, and override each other (as the commitment to non-maleficence overrode the principle of autonomy in how it was specified in the previous example), a lack of cohesive underlying theory means there is little guidance on how/when this should occur (Arras, 1994).

Reasoning based on principles also occurs in some forms of casuistry (or case-based reasoning), which uses both principles and analogy to draw resolutions to a case (Beauchamp, 1994). As Beauchamp (1994) argues, one way to determine similarities between cases is based on principles: cases may be similar because they evoke the same principles and if cases specify principles in similar ways, they may prove useful for analogical reasoning. However this may not be all of, or always, what draws analogy between cases required for casuist deliberation; other morally relevant elements such as rights, values and norms (Spielthenner, 2014), or central features of the case that may have moral significance (Arras, 1994) may also be bases for connections between cases.

What I argue in this chapter is that metaphors can influence the specification of principles and the choice of analogical case comparison and therefore influence ethical decision making. Because principles often require specification for ethical deliberation and also provide guidance on analogical cases for comparison, metaphors that draw analogy suggest principles ought to be specified the same way across these analogical cases and therefore influence ethical reasoning. Using the example of war metaphors used to

conceptualize COVID-19, I argue that discourse that framed the COVID-19 pandemic as a war seemed to justify specification of principles, particularly the principle of justice, in ways that are permissible during war but that may otherwise not be permissible in a health care context. In addition, the analogical reasoning evoked by transferring pandemic discourse into the domain of mental health may transfer conclusions drawn within a military framing to the context of mental illness. While there may be instances where this type of specification and analogical reasoning is appropriate, it may not always be; and because metaphors may obscure important differences, it may inappropriately hide alternative options and important considerations because of its rhetorical and cognitive influence.

What follows is a manuscript I wrote between November of 2021 and February of 2022 that was published by the *Canadian Journal of Bioethics*, under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License in April of 2023, after two rounds of peer revisions. Following the conclusion of the manuscript, I provide a summary argument in relation to the thesis of this chapter, address possible counter arguments, and provide a reflection on the process.

Citation:

Sibbald, K.R. (2023). Migrating metaphors: Why we should be concerned about a 'War on Mental Illness' in the aftermath of COVID-19. *Canadian Journal of Bioethics.* DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1098554ar

3.2 MANUSCRIPT: MIGRATING METAPHORS: WHY WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT A 'WAR ON MENTAL ILLNESS' IN THE AFTERMATH OF COVID-19

3.2.1 Introduction

Since COVID-19's initial identification in late 2019, metaphors of COVID-19 have permeated contemporary discourse. While a variety of metaphors have been used (Vlastou, 2021), the military metaphor commonly occurs in a variety of contexts (Adam, 2020; Gök & Kara, 2021; MacLeod, 2020; Vlastou, 2021; Walker, 2020). The military metaphor is present in rhetoric such as "the war on COVID-19", "frontline healthcare workers", "tightened borders", and vaccines and masks as "the best defence". War metaphors justify certain actions and condemn others (Bailey et al., 2021). This justification has implications for how we conceptualize the pandemic and the ethics of certain actions, which in turn influences where we direct resources, what policies we put in place, and what actions we take on a daily basis (Bailey et al., 2021; Grubbs & Geller, 2021; Wilkinson, 2020).

Concerns about the increase in mental illness resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic have led the predicted rise in cases of mental illness to be described as the "next pandemic". This rhetoric permeates both public media and scientific discourse with article headlines such as "Indigenous communities facing dual pandemic" (Wright, 2021), "Mental health is the next pandemic" (Barthelemy, 2020), and "The next pandemic: impact of COVID-19 in mental healthcare…" (Ornell et al., 2021). This transfer of pandemic rhetoric into discussions of mental illness has the potential to shift how we conceptualize mental illness and subsequently how we respond to it. Given that

military metaphors have shaped the conceptualization of a ‘pandemic’ in COVID-19, and this conceptualization of ‘pandemic’ is now being mapped on to mental illness, we may expect to see military metaphors mapped onto mental illness in the same way they were used during the COVID-19 pandemic. This transfer of metaphors from one disease to the next can be seen throughout the 19th and 20th centuries from tuberculosis to cancer (Sontag, 1990b); the diseases that are more likely to be ‘metaphorized’ are those that were, at that time, least likely to be understood.

I argue that given the implications and concerns surrounding military metaphors in COVID-19 and healthcare ethics in general, if this rhetoric is adopted to describe mental illness in a post-COVID context, we risk continuing to dismiss the societal structural components of mental illness and put those who are already the most marginalized at the greatest risk of injustice and exploitation. These metaphors lead to questioning the ethics of using language that may shape our conceptualization of justice as well as its relationship to beneficence, autonomy, and non-maleficence, in a way that disproportionately negatively effects marginalized groups.

To make this argument, I first outline how metaphors reflect and reinforce the power structures within the society where they are produced, and how this shapes not only language and knowledge, but also actions at individual and collective levels. Next, I explore how the military metaphor has been used in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effect this has on justifying and legitimating existing power structures and the exploitation of those already left vulnerable by such structures. Given these

effects, I identify some likely consequences of adopting military metaphors to conceptualize mental illness post-COVID, with particular attention to how these metaphors reinforce a biomedical understanding of mental illness to the exclusion of other possible conceptualizations. I discuss who this is likely to benefit and harm, and argue that we have a moral obligation to interrogate what appears 'natural' within metaphorical systems that promote particular conceptualizations of moral values. This may be particularly true when metaphors are legitimated by and legitimate systems of domination and oppression.

3.2.2 How Metaphors Reflect and Reinforce Power Structures

The relationship to power has been a central concern to those studying metaphors since at least the time of Aristotle (Ricœur, 2003). This concern stems from metaphors' function as not just describing, but also creating the world by influencing actions and decision making, while rendering other options inconsequential (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Ricœur, 2003). "Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight" (Davidson, 1978, p. 47). Metaphors are composed of two domains: the target domain and the source domain; they take the expressive form of 'target domain' is 'source domain' (Davidson, 1978; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For example, in the metaphor "the body is a machine", the body is the target domain, and a machine is the source domain. Metaphors work by mapping the concepts associated with the source domain onto the target domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In doing so, certain shared concepts are highlighted, while others are obscured (Davidson, 1978; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Ricœur, 2003). For example, concepts highlighted in "the body is a machine" metaphor are the mechanical or electrical components of body systems.

Cognitive and emotional components may become less obvious. In this way, metaphors validate certain components of reality while rendering others unintelligible.

Metaphors also exist in relation to each other, forming larger metaphorical systems (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For example, the "body is machine" metaphor is part of the system that conceptualizes the heart as a pump, veins and arteries as pipes, and the brain as a computer. This allows the idea of "clogged arteries" or a "short-circuited brain" to make sense because they align with the broader metaphorical system that has entrenched these conceptual relationships. However, because these relationships are so deeply entrenched, it becomes difficult to understand something that contradicts this conceptual system. For example, with the "body is machine" metaphor forming the foundation of the conceptual system, it becomes easy to dismiss concepts such as spirituality, humors, and chi not because they are inherently false, but because they cannot be made sense of within the conceptual system, reflected in our metaphors, that we use to define reality.

However, it is not just any reality that common metaphors define as 'true', but specifically the realities of those in power. Those in positions of power (e.g., policymakers) develop metaphors that stick and become embedded in how reality is conceptualized in a given social context (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) – these metaphors become part of the dominant discourse. The dominant discourse can be understood as the socially acceptable story or explanation in the context where it is dominant. This dominant discourse has the power and function of truth. Discourse is conceptualization textualized, and in its textual state, it is embedded in everyday life in art, media, policies

and procedures, stories, clothing, and other media used to convey meaning (Foucault, 1980). Many artefacts telling the same story form the dominant discourse. For example, artefacts that may suggest the "body is a machine" include medical textbooks that may use these metaphors in anatomical descriptions, exercise equipment, production line manufacturing systems, and office furniture design. The ideas of working particular muscle groups, using bodies as a step in the manufacturing process, and ensuring alignment of the skeletal system for optimal functioning are all supported by this metaphor system.

Importantly, the people who determine the dominant story are those who hold power within the society where the discourse is dominant (Mills, 2007). Those in power have a particular investment in the proliferation of discourse that maintains their status and therefore continue to entrench conceptual systems that makes this reality possible (Foucault, 1980; Mills, 2007). They are also likely to create metaphors that reflect their lived experience, and in so doing, render invisible experiences that conflict (Mills, 2007). For example, it may lead to a medical system that produces and endorses artefacts that align with this conceptual reality – such as surgical robots, prosthetic limbs, or electrical nerve stimulators – because medical professionals maintain power and status as the "fixers of broken bodies". It may also lead to a medical system that rejects evidence that contradicts this conceptual system, such as conditions without an identifiable physical cause, or that cannot yet be 'fixed' through technological means because it would challenge the reality that medical professionals rely on to maintain their power (Dusenbery, 2018). "The acceptance of the metaphor, which forces us to focus only on

those aspects of reality which it highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true. Such ‘truths’ are true, of course, only relative to the reality defined by the metaphor” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 484).

There is growing recognition that, because of the way metaphors help to re-establish and entrench systems of power, that they deserve ethical consideration (Chambers, 2016; Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016; Sherwin, 2001). Concerns about how metaphors are used in communication with patients (George et al., 2016; Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016; Tate & Pearlman, 2016), how they influence informed consent in research (Brody & Childress, 2009; Gordon et al., 2006; Jepson et al., 2018), and how they influence policy decisions (Bailey et al., 2021; Chapman & Miller, 2020; Sherwin, 2001) have been raised. While their naturalized appearance may make metaphors seem to be innocuous sites for interrogation, it is specifically this feature that allows them to support systems of power in the way that they do.

> The fact that metaphors appear to be settled in many areas of health care does not remove the moral and political value of examining their implications; rather, it may make it even more important to review and challenge the established metaphors that govern the various practices in each area of medicine. (Sherwin, 2001, p. 345)

The systemic and political implications of metaphors have, until recently, been explored predominantly in the context of HIV/AIDS. However, “AIDS provides a useful model of how an effective and explicitly political intervention into the representation of a medical condition can transform or even set the agenda surrounding a matter of medical concern” (Sherwin, 2001, p. 362). When conceived of as a viral agent, which invokes war metaphors of invasion and destruction (Sherwin, 2001; Sontag, 1990a), HIV/AIDS

requires a biomedical response that fights against the virus. This significantly lessens the impact of concurrently relevant factors, such as poverty and vulnerability to rape, which also play a large role in the transmission and acquisition of the infection, particularly in marginalized communities and outside North America and Europe (Sherwin, 2001). Furthermore, the metaphor of AIDS as a “gay cancer” obscured the impact and experience of the disease in women, which sidelined research on HIV/AIDS in female bodies, other than the risk of fetal transmission (Sherwin, 2001). The military notions of ‘annihilation’, ‘eradication’, and ‘victory’, which were so deeply rooted in HIV/AIDS rhetoric for the first decades of its known existence, conflict with the experience of HIV/AIDS as a chronic condition, which is now more commonly discussed (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016; Sherwin, 2001; Sontag, 1990a). This has led to questioning the helpfulness of military metaphors in this context, and in the context of other immunological conditions (Ferri, 2018; Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016).

While much of the interrogation into the ethics of metaphors has occurred in the context of HIV/AIDS, many health experiences are conceptualized and described metaphorically. This may be particularly true for illnesses that lack a definitive biological cause or explanation, or those whose experiences are difficult to explain, such as dementia (Johnstone, 2013), endometriosis (Bullo, 2020), cancer (Sontag, 1990a), and a variety of different mental illnesses (Mould et al., 2010; Probst, 2015). Health conditions that receive widespread media coverage during increases in their occurrence are also frequently metamorphosized creating a collective understanding of an emerging phenomenon, such as Ebola (Abeysinghe, 2016; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002), avian flu

(Koteyko et al., 2008), and foot and mouth disease (Nerlich et al., 2002). New health conditions may adopt metaphors of previous, no longer socially significant health conditions, such as metaphors for tuberculosis migrating to conceptualize cancer (Sontag, 1990b). These are also health conditions that are frequently stigmatized (Sontag, 1990b). As mental illness continues to illude definitive biological explanation in many cases, involves an experience that is difficult to communicate (Steslow, 2010), draws media attention, and carries social stigma (Grinker, 2021), it is well positioned to be socially constructed metaphorically.

3.2.3 The Military Metaphor

It is the framing effect, where solutions to problems are judged to be more viable when they share a metaphorical system (Thibodeau, 2016), that underscores the debate around the ethical use of the military metaphor in medicine, both in individual patient/–healthcare provider communication and on a broader social political scale. At the level of interpersonal communication with patients, on one side of the debate sits the argument that military metaphors are harmful because they reinforce the biomedical model (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016), preclude an appropriate understanding of certain conditions (Ferri, 2018; George et al., 2016), and may leave patients feeling like the only option in their care is to fight (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016). On the other side, there are the arguments that military metaphors may be the best way of communicating that patients have at their disposal (Tate & Pearlman, 2016). They may also instill a sense of agency in patients (Tate & Pearlman, 2016). In the middle lie the arguments that metaphors need to be flexible to patient needs, which may involve the use of military metaphors (Tate & Pearlman, 2016) and that the area of healthcare in which military metaphors are used

matters, because they are more harmful in some areas than others (Childress, 1983; Nie, Rennie, et al., 2016). Others have argued that caution is needed in the use of dominant metaphors that silence other ways of understanding (Steslow, 2010) and that what is problematic is the Western conception of war rather than the use of military metaphors (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016).

On a broader scale, arguments against the use of military metaphors suggest that they lead to the justified over-mobilization of resources (Annas, 1995), glorify war and violence (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016), erase the contributions of social factors to illness and disease (George et al., 2016), and justify casualties and collateral damage (Bailey et al., 2021; Chapman & Miller, 2020). However, because of their persuasive nature, they can also quickly and convincingly communicate the need for a large-scale response (Chapman & Miller, 2020). It is these central concerns that have emerged in debates around military metaphors used in the context of COVID-19.

3.2.4 The Military Metaphor and COVID-19

Military metaphors were ubiquitous in public communication surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. From Queen Elizabeth II's coronavirus speech thanking those on the 'frontlines', which was watched by over 24 million people (BBC, 2020), to then-President Donald Trump's comparison of the race to find a vaccine with the Manhattan Project's race to create an atomic bomb (Bailey et al., 2021), military metaphors dominated media coverage and political messaging (Vlastou, 2021). The military metaphor allows for an enemy to be identified, which can help create a sense of calm during social upheaval as people focus on an identifiable threat (Chapman & Miller,

2020). One of the benefits of military metaphors is that at “the communal level, they may help whole societies to mobilize human, economic, and social resources for healthcare and medical research” (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016, p. 5). As such, “By choosing to frame the pandemic in military terms, governments are clearly trying to communicate the gravity of this public health crisis, one that requires the type of state intervention and personal sacrifice most nations have not experienced in peacetime” (Naudin, 2020, p. 63).

Military metaphors not only influenced individuals’ conceptualizations of the coronavirus as an enemy in a war (Gök & Kara, 2021), but also influenced behaviour and led to responses on individual and social levels that resembled those expected during war. Like during war time, the media focused on infection and death rates (Bailey et al., 2021), which, at the time of writing, were still being reported daily. Women hand-stitched masks for frontline healthcare workers (Grubbs & Geller, 2021), invoking images of women manufacturing protective equipment and clothing for soldiers during World War II. Tributes to those on the front-lines from urban balconies (Craig, 2020) invoked images of veteran’s homecoming parades. The actual Canadian Military, in “defense teams”, were deployed to areas overwhelmed by the virus (Government of Canada, 2021). These actions make sense within the conceptualization of the pandemic as a war and align with the previous responses expected during wartime in Canada.

War, therefore, provided a conceptual structure within which the pandemic and its expected response could be conceptualized and enacted. While this had benefits –of convincing the public to use masks as “battle armour” and to “shelter in place” (Craig,

2020), and arguably saved lives – it is important to also interrogate at what cost these benefits came and *to whom*. Furthermore, it is important to question, given the implications of this metaphorical system, if we are willing to accept this cost of waging war on “the next pandemic”, notably “the war on mental illness”, in the same way as we did for COVID-19.

> War-making is one of the few activities that people are not supposed to view “realistically”, that is, with an eye to expense and practical outcome. In all-out war, expenditure is all-out, imprudent – war is by definition an emergency in which no sacrifice is excessive. (Sontag, 1990b, p. 99)

I argue that the war metaphor for COVID-19 justified making sacrifices such as leaving healthcare providers unprepared and adopting health policy decisions that disproportionately affected women, Indigenous, Black, and lower-class peoples, and yet advanced the agendas of those in political power. If the war metaphor is therefore applied in the same way to a “mental illness pandemic”, I argue that this discourse will continue to entrench existing systems of power in similar ways to those evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic, and that this undermines medicine’s commitment to justice.

3.2.5 Justifying Poor Preparation

Describing COVID-19 in military terms justified leaving healthcare providers unprepared by framing the response as a kind of “tactical improvisation” (Finley & Felepchuk, 2021). This absolved government and health administrators from the responsibility to have been prepared for a pandemic prior to its occurrence (Finley & Felepchuk, 2021): “Improvisation has been discursively situated as a defensive tactic within the metaphorical framing of *illness as war,* which is a result of its association to the military through mottos such as ‘improvise, adapt, and overcome’” (Finley & Felepchuk, 2021, p.

1). The need to improvise also emerges in portrayals of the virus as changing, mutating, developing variants, and the change in strategy that is required to continually defend against an ever-changing offense.

What is left out of the need to improvise in the war on COVID-19 is that there were things which could have been planned and prepared for that would have decreased the amount of improvisation needed. For example, there could have been enough ventilators available ahead of time to support a pandemic-level response and there could have been enough personal protective equipment available for healthcare workers to be protected while caring for patients (Chung, 2020). This could have alleviated the need to improvise decision making protocols for who does and who does not receive resources that can have life-or-death implications when resources are limited. There could have been research into the transmission and treatment of highly contagious coronaviruses, and work towards the development of a vaccine prior to requiring global lockdowns. In fact, there were attempts to do this, however they were not funded because it was not a research priority. Hungarian biochemist Katalin Karikó, whose work on messenger RNA led to the development of the COVID-19 vaccine, was repeatedly denied grants that would have allowed her to pursue this work as early as the 1990's (Garde & Saltzman, 2020; Kolata, 2021). We can only postulate whether, had research funding in this area been considered a priority and allocated to researchers like Karikó, the infection rate would even have reached pandemic proportions. Framing the COVID-19 pandemic as a war that needs to be responded to as it unfolds obscures the fact that there could have been protective

equipment, treatment resources, and preventative vaccines, that might have prevented COVID-19 from reaching pandemic proportions in the first place.

If we next are facing a war on mental illness, we risk also adopting the motto to "improvise, adapt, and overcome" in this context, which absolves those who hold power from having put systems and services in place that could have prevented a mental illness pandemic in the first place (Finley & Felepchuk, 2021). We risk requiring healthcare providers, who already felt unprepared to deal with the experiences their patients were facing prior to COVID (Isobel et al., 2020), to continue to work in circumstances where they may be unprepared, or untrained, as they did during World Wars I and II (Grinker, 2021). If we deploy new recruits or members of our healthcare 'militia' to wage a war on mental illness, a system of military metaphors may allow us to do this without ensuring sufficient training, which puts both patients and providers at risk.

In addition, by using military metaphors that justify improvisation, we risk forgetting that, had we funded more housing-first projects, done more to prevent adverse childhood experiences, implemented guaranteed basic income, and decreased domestic violence, it is possible that we may not have been in a position of mental health crisis in the first place. We risk erasing from public consciousness that, prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, our mental healthcare system was already overwhelmed, and many were denied or unable to access effective care (Ayers, 2018; Children's Mental Health Ontario, 2020). For example, in 2018, when the provincial standard in Nova Scotia for access to mental healthcare was 28 days, the average wait time for non-urgent services in Cape

Breton – several hours from the provincial capital – was 210 days for adults and 80 days for children and adolescents, an improvement over 363 and 157 days respectively in 2017 (Ayers, 22 Dec 2018). A report on mental health service access in Ontario, released just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, indicated that youth in York Region, on the outskirts of Toronto, Canada's largest city, faced wait times of up to 919 days, and that approximately 200,000 youth in Ontario with mental illness went without services each year (Children's Mental Health Ontario, 2020). Real time funding towards youth mental health services in Ontario decreased 50% over the past 25 years (Children's Mental Health Ontario, 2020). The urgency and unexpectedness encoded in military metaphors of improvisation means we risk forgetting there were other things we could have done – and could have done better. Evidence therefore suggests that we are not improvising a newly emerging war on mental illness, as the metaphor may suggest.

3.2.6 War Metaphors and Biomedical Power – Entrenching Oppression

Employing military metaphors in COVID-19 rhetoric justified adopting and implementing policies that disproportionately negatively affected women, two-spirit, transgender, and non-binary people. "Just as in wartime, American society during the current pandemic has deemed the critical women's healthcare needs of today as the problems of tomorrow" (Bailey et al., 2021, p. 3). Intimate partner violence towards women increased, and in at least 11 states in the United States, abortion was deemed a non-essential service to promote public safety (Bailey et al., 2021). Women's healthcare clinics were closed and may not reopen due to the lost income (Bailey et al., 2021). More women than men worked in jobs deemed 'essential', and therefore faced increased risk of

contracting the virus (Carli, 2020)[1]. More women than men lost their jobs (Carli, 2020). Women had more work disruption than men due to childcare responsibilities and more women worked from home while also doing full-time childcare (Carli, 2020). These factors all affect women's health. In many places, gender affirming treatment was delayed or put on hold, which can have significant health effects for transgender and gender non-binary individuals (van der Miesen et al., 2020). In Canada, some gender affirming surgeries were cancelled and postponed indefinitely (Brennan et al., 2020), highlighting how 'non-essential' they are considered within the healthcare system. Because of "war being defined as an emergency in which no sacrifice is excessive" (Sontag, 1990b, p. 99), ignoring the disproportionate effects "acceptable sacrifices" have on the health of women, transgender, two-spirit, and gender non-binary people could be justified. Coincidently, all of these factors may also increase rates of mental illness (Brennan et al., 2020; van der Miesen et al., 2020).

Similarly, war rhetoric may also serve to disproportionately negatively affect other marginalized groups. Military metaphors are deeply linked with the biomedical model (Nie, Rennie, et al., 2016; Sherwin, 2001; Sontag, 1990a), which tends to lead to technological means of 'annihilating' the threat (Annas, 1995; Nie, Rennie, et al., 2016; Sherwin, 2001; Sontag, 1990a)(25,32,46,47). As framing the 'problem' in biomedical terms leads people to more likely endorse a biomedical 'solution' (Kemp et al., 2014; Thibodeau, 2016), transplanting pandemic military metaphors onto mental illness may

[1] Women and men were the only genders included in this study.

therefore increase the perception of the need for biomedical, technological treatment. In mental health, the technological means most often employed is pharmaceutical treatment (Elliott, 2003). As with HIV, the social factors contributing to the emergence of illness become obscured when the focus is on fighting through technological means (Sherwin, 2001). And this may be problematic for several reasons.

First, biomedical problems and pharmaceutical solutions individualize and simplify largely social issues (Elliott, 2003), as we saw in the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Sherwin, 2001; Sontag, 1990a). When an individualized perspective is taken on illness or disability, this largely absolves the need to respond at a social level (Morrow, 2013). This has been widely voiced in arguments against a biomedical conceptualization of disability (Thomas, 2004; Withers, 2012). On a social level, when policies are made based on an individualized, and therefore often simplified, understanding of social problems, they tend to continue to marginalize those who are most affected (Chapman & Miller, 2020). For example, the "War on Drugs" in the United States, in which the systemic issue of drug use was responded to with the incarceration and criminalization of individuals who used drugs, led to Black people being incarcerated at extremely high rates, which destroyed family networks and led to increased poverty (Chapman & Miller, 2020). When the intergenerational trauma resulting from the social and political move to forcefully place Indigenous people in residential schools is framed as individualized mental illness, it increases the pathologizing of Indigenous people as sick and deviant (Linklater, 2014). This justifies the continued denial of cultural considerations in mental healthcare (Linklater, 2014). When the increased stress that women face as a result of

more frequent job losses and increased caring responsibilities is ignored in favour of a biomedical explanation of mental illness, so are the many ways that misogyny contributes to these larger social problems (Manne, 2018). In the context of mental illness, taking illness to be rooted in the individual, rather than the product of social relations, it is called 'psychocentrism' (LeBlanc & Kinsella, 2016; Rimke, 2003), and threatens to further entrench both a Western biomedical perspective and the Western value of individualism (Elliott, 2003; LeBlanc & Kinsella, 2016). As such, adopting war metaphors that support the conceptualization of mental illness as biological and treatable by technological means is likely to not only further entrench social marginalization, but also deny the social complexity of mental illness and the variety of ways it is experienced.

Secondly, biomedicine has done a particularly poor job of recognizing the experiences of people who are not white men (Bailey et al., 2021; Blease et al., 2017; Dusenbery, 2018; Manne, 2020; Mercer, 2018) and/or the experiences of people with mental illness (Crichton et al., 2017; Daley et al., 2012; de Bie, 2019; Liegghio, 2013; Meerai et al., 2016). Psychiatric classifications are racially and culturally based, which reinforces racial and cultural stereotypes (Daley et al., 2012; Linklater, 2014; Meerai et al., 2016). The long history of the conceptual relationship between female bodies and hysteria (Mercer, 2018) continues to lead to the dismissal of non-male needs in health research and treatment (Dusenbery, 2018). Those experiencing mental illness have repeatedly had their knowledge and experience ignored, erased, and invalidated (LeBlanc & Kinsella, 2016; Liegghio, 2013; Linklater, 2014; Stark, 2019; Steslow, 2010). It is not difficult to imagine a post-COVID mental health system that continues to use the DSM-5 as its primary

reference text and uses pharmaceuticals as its primary method of treatment to the exclusion of other socially and culturally oriented approaches. I argue, therefore, that it is unlikely that using war metaphors – which further validate biomedicine and with it the patriarchy, White Supremacy, and Sanism – will produce a transformative system capable of effectively challenging these ideologies. If anything, it risks adding urgency and expanding notions of acceptable sacrifices to an already existing problematic system.

Furthermore, the war metaphor was used in the COVID-19 pandemic to justify increased monitoring and surveillance (Chapman & Miller, 2020). Living through the pandemic in Nova Scotia, I observed borders, both provincial and national, became tighter to prevent the "external threat" of increased cases and variants from further burdening our healthcare system. The population was screened and tested prior to being allowed to enter countries, provinces, workplaces, schools, and stores, which then progressed to requiring proof of vaccination. Mask requirements were put in place for both indoor and outdoor public spaces. People downloaded phone apps that allowed them to be traced through GPS. These measures were widely accepted to increase public safety and were advertised as "caring for your neighbours". Living through this transition, allowing the government this increased level of power, control, and surveillance that prior to the pandemic would have been almost unimaginable, but the war metaphor contributed to making it acceptable (Chapman & Miller, 2020).

It is important to clarify that I support public health measures to address the pandemic (e.g., promoting vaccination and the use of masks). However, I am critical of the adoption

of such practices without interrogating who they are empowering or disempowering and considering *who* is being asked to sacrifice *what*. We need to consider that anti-Black Racism constructs Black men as always and already a threat, and that wearing a mask increases the perception of that threat and the likelihood that a Black man wearing a mask will be killed for being Black (Grubbs & Geller, 2021). We need to consider that those who rely on lip reading, and those who face challenges being understood now have an additional communication barrier to overcome that may effectively exclude them from participation in public spaces (Grubbs & Geller, 2021). And we need to consider that white men who refuse to wear masks because their white male privilege makes them feel entitled to being comfortable at all times and in all places (Manne, 2018) puts those who are immunocompromised, those who cannot be vaccinated, those with underlying health conditions, and those who are elderly (who are also disproportionately non-white women) at increased risk of contracting and dying from the virus. The rhetoric of sacrifice that accompanies metaphors of war tends to demand and justify the greatest sacrifice from those who are marginalized, which serves to both support and hide oppressive systems (Chapman & Miller, 2020; Sibbald & Beagan, 2022). It also leaves those with the greatest privilege arguing that the requirement of sacrifice should not apply to them (Manne, 2020).

3.2.7 Implications of a War on Mental Illness

With this in mind, we may postulate what mental healthcare might look like with war metaphors that justify increased control of movement and migration, and increased surveillance. We can predict a “war on mental illness” that justifies tightening our borders and denies entry to those seeking to immigrate to or claim refugee status in Canada to

prevent increasing the burden on an already overloaded mental healthcare system. We can predict that this may disproportionately affect those experiencing forced migration due to war and/or persecution, who would be more likely to have experienced trauma that may lead to, or present as, mental illness. We can predict increased surveillance on racialized and impoverished communities, because social factors put them at increased risk of mental illness. We can predict that these communities will face increased stigma due to greater identification of mental illness that results from increased surveillance. We can also predict that the government may remove people from these communities out of fear of the spread of violence and parental unsuitability that is associated with mental illness through stigma (Schnittker, 2013).

We may predict this type of mental healthcare system because when war metaphors were used in the American "War on Drugs" and the American "War on Poverty", this was what happened (Chapman & Miller, 2020); and we may easily imagine this world because it reflects the one in which we are living, a world in which living with mental illness is "about trying to get by in a world that fears you, that believes you are unfit for your job, that wants to take your children away. A world whose police will kill you because you can't understand instructions" (Pryal, 2017, p. XV).

3.2.8 Considering Difference

It is also important to consider in what ways mental illness is different from COVID-19 and the impact this could have on what may become justified if military metaphors become embedded in conceptualizations of mental illness. There is a pervasive conceptualization in which those with mental illness are perceived as violent (Meerai et

al., 2016; Scheff, 1966; Schnittker, 2013), and a history of entanglement with behaviour labelled deviant (Conrad & Schneider, 1992; Hacking, 1998; Laing, 1967; Szasz, 1973). Given the conceptual overlap between 'person with a mental illness', 'violence', 'deviance' and 'war', 'violence', and 'enemy', military metaphors may carry the potential to justify increased violence towards those with mental illness in a way they did not towards those with COVID-19. It is possible that the use of military rhetoric may help build a bridge wherein the notion of needing to fight back against mental illness is conceptually extended to needing to fight back against people with mental illness (Khan et al., 2021). While this has the potential to be used to justify greater violence towards people with mental illness in general, it may particularly affect those with Black bodies who already experience greater violence due to entrenched stereotypes of violence (Meerai et al., 2016).

It would be unfair, however, to not also recognize the potential benefits that employing war rhetoric may have on improving the lives of those with mental illness; after all, there were benefits to using military rhetoric to conceptualize COVID-19. War metaphors gave the public a way to conceptualize something that was new, and to which they needed to respond with some urgency (Bailey et al., 2021). It convinced people to follow government requests and unite against a common enemy (Chapman & Miller, 2020). In America, given the narrative of undeniable victory that surrounds World War II in public discourse, using this rhetoric in the context of COVID-19 instilled a sense of optimism (Bailey et al., 2021). And, unlike during the AIDS epidemic, it decreased the use of

‘plague’ and ‘pollution’ metaphors, which were then weaponized against those who contracted, and were perceived at greater risk of contracting, HIV (Craig, 2020).

It is possible that these benefits may migrate to mental illness, justifying increased funding to combat a common enemy, decreasing the stigma of mental illness through the recognition that we are all at risk, and instilling a sense of optimism that victory is possible in the context of mental illness. Indeed, some of the greatest advances in understanding and treating mental illness occurred in the context of war (Grinker, 2021). It is also possible that, given that war justifies the mobilization of significant resources (Annas, 1995), using this metaphor could support efforts to address the social determinants of mental illness. As these occur at a social level, these endeavours may need the public buy-in and support that the war metaphor helps to bolster (Chapman & Miller, 2020).

There may be benefits at the individual level as well. War metaphors are one of the main ways that people with depression (Coll-Florit et al., 2021) or addiction (Shinebourne & Smith, 2010) may conceptualize their experiences. Given the ongoing history of ignoring and invalidating the perspectives of those with mental illness (Carel & Kidd, 2017; Carver et al., 2017; Liegghio, 2013; Steslow, 2010), adopting metaphors that align with those put forth by people with lived experience may help to validate their knowledge.

I am not denying that there could be benefits to adopting military metaphors to conceptualize mental illness; what I want to interrogate is who is likely to receive those

benefits and *who is likely to not*. Yes, war metaphors may validate *some* people's lived experience of mental illness, however if war becomes the dominant metaphor for conceptualizing mental illness, it will also render many people's experiences invalid. Even in the studies cited above, war metaphors were only *one of many* metaphorical systems people used to conceptualize mental illness (Coll-Florit et al., 2021; Shinebourne & Smith, 2010). Some metaphors that reflect lived experience and intentionally challenge the applicability of common metaphors used to conceptualize mental illness (Steslow, 2010; Venkatesan, 2017) would continue to be invalidated. Given the conceptual alignment of war metaphors and biomedicine, it is likely that those who conceptualize mental illness in war terms are invested in a biomedical healthcare system to some extent. Those whose experiences become unintelligible are likely to be the people who are worst served by the prevailing biomedical system, who are therefore already vulnerable to systemic harm and silencing (Linklater, 2014).

In addition, I am not insinuating that justifying increased funding towards mental health is inherently bad. I am questioning where, using a military conceptualization of mental illness, this funding is likely to go. Will it go to increased access to individual biomedical treatment, research, and development of new psychiatric drugs? Or, will it go to housing-first initiatives, addressing domestic violence, increasing newcomer community integration, supporting a guaranteed basic income, and culturally-restorative Indigenous practices? I argue that the former is likely to support white, middle- and upper-class individuals for whom individual treatment is conceptualized as safe, legitimate, and socially acceptable. I also argue that the latter is likely to support those who are

Indigenous, newcomers, women, insecurely housed, racialized, and the working poor. The military metaphor tends to support technological over social initiatives (Annas, 1995), and these are more likely to exclude those identifying with marginalized groups (Sherwin, 2001). Choosing the latter option requires a social orientation towards mental illness, one that is more difficult to conceptualize using a military metaphor system.

3.2.9 When Metaphors Shape the Concept of Justice

Healthcare may be constructed on the ethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice, but how we conceptualize and balance these principles depends, in part, on the metaphorical system within which we are working (Childress, 1982). War metaphors are likely to promote a conceptualization of justice that involves "doing what it takes to win the war" (Childress, 2012). When war metaphors suggest we are on the 'good side', fighting the 'enemy' who is 'bad', actions that may not be considered just within other frames of reference may appear just because of their appeal to the overall just cause of winning the war against evil (Lakoff, 2009).

In the context of war, when what is framed as the just cause of winning the war is given the highest priority, non-maleficence is given less priority. The justice of victory may even hide the maleficence needed to achieve it, particularly when it disproportionately affects those in oppressed groups and benefits those in power. Bioethics in the context of war may not reflect the values of medicine in non-war contexts (Rochon, 2016) and calling something a war when it is not may shift the ethical reasoning in ways that would otherwise be incongruous with medical values. "Whether any particular metaphor is adequate or not will depend in part on the principles and values it highlights or hides"

(Childress, 1997, p. 9), and while the war metaphor may have had some beneficial use in the COVID-19 pandemic, the principles and values it highlights are likely not a useful framework for making ethical decisions in the context of mental illness.

3.2.10 Manuscript Conclusion

Given how embedded military metaphors are in both medical discourse in general, and COVID-19 pandemic discourse specifically, I argue that it is likely that as we transfer pandemic discourse into the context of a subsequent "pandemic of mental illness", that these metaphors are likely to transfer as well. While there may be some benefits to using military metaphors to gain widespread public support for mental illness initiatives, there may also be many harms. And those benefits and harms may not accrue to the same people.

Metaphors have not only the power to describe, but also to create shared and legitimized conceptualizations of reality, and this reality is biased towards the experiences of those in power. Metaphors therefore entrench a reality in which those in power maintain their power and create systemic ignorance by rendering alternatives inconceivable. Military metaphors used in healthcare shape what is considered ethical, what research is conducted, what treatments are available, what improvisations and sacrifices are deemed acceptable, and what and whose conditions are considered valid by reinforcing the idea of a biomedical problem that is individual and fixable through an arms race of technology. By examining how this metaphor system has been used to justify particular courses of action during the COVID-19 pandemic, it becomes clear that it contributes to justifying putting those who are already vulnerable at the greatest risk. This may include those who

are predominantly racialized and/or of a lower class, and those with disabilities who may be immunocompromised, unable to get vaccinated, or silenced or endangered by mask use. These are not-so-coincidentally many of the same people who are least well served by the dominant conceptualization of mental illness and the current medical system. If we adopt a concept of justice reflective of military rhetoric, we risk adopting and acting on a conceptualization of justice that ignores these harms.

Using these experiences as the basis of analysis, we may predict that if military metaphors were to be adopted in the same way to conceptualize a “mental illness pandemic”, these same groups would continue to bear the brunt of the sacrifice this metaphor system legitimates. This may continue to augment the power of those in positions of privilege in the name of war, and perpetuate a system that pushes for technological and pharmaceutical advances at the exclusion of other possibilities for care. It would create a reality where mental illness becomes a weapon used against those most vulnerable to it. And~~,~~ we can imagine this reality largely because it had already taken hold prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The alignment of this reality with the reality that military metaphors work to both describe and recreate may make military metaphor use in this context seem natural. But metaphors are not natural: they naturalize. We need to acknowledge what values and ethical concepts are naturalized by the reality that metaphors validate. We thus have a moral obligation to interrogate what is constructed as ‘natural’ when this involves evoking a kind of justice where some people experience greater harm than others, and to actively seek out alternatives when this is unjust.

End of Manuscript

3.3 CHAPTER 3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

What I argue in the above manuscript is that metaphors used to frame COVID-19 as a war justified a war-like response to the pandemic. Metaphorically framing COVID-19 as a war, I argue, evoked a particular conceptualization of justice to be upheld, suggesting the principle applied in the same way in COVID-19 as it would in the context of war. This metaphor suggested an analogical comparison between COVID-19 and war, in which the principle of justice ought to be similarly specified. In this way, metaphors influenced ethical reasoning by drawing comparison to a particular case and shaping what principles were prioritized and how they were specified.

This argument rests on the premise that metaphors that frame our understanding of a phenomenon influence how we ethically reason about it and what we consider 'right' as a benchmark during this reasoning. It rests, in some respect, on disintegrating the distinction between descriptive (metaphors that describe) and normative (metaphors suggest what ought to be) metaphors. I argue that how one describes what is going on using a metaphor is entwined with implication of what ought to go on. Some suggest this is not the case.

For example, in his discussion of metaphor and analogy in bioethics, James Childress (1997) distinguishes between descriptive and normative metaphors, arguing that descriptive metaphors describe "what is going on", whereas normative metaphors suggest "what should go on" (p.5). With this distinction, we may suggest that war metaphors in

the COVID-19 context may be descriptively accurate, but normatively problematic. That is, one could argue that war metaphors provide accurate descriptors of the experience of the pandemic, but are problematic when used to guide actions and decision making. Through this lens, it would appear coincidental that descriptive metaphors framing COVID-19 as a war occurred alongside policies and political decisions that were 'war-like'. A more moderate version would suggest it was problematic to make normative decisions based on a descriptive metaphor, but that the descriptive metaphor carries no moral weight.

I argue that this distinction is useful reflectively, but inaccurately captures how metaphors are used pragmatically in-the-moment as persuasive and social discourse. First, research suggests that people, when presented with a metaphor, do not separate the metaphor as a descriptor of 'what is' separate from normative implications of 'what ought to be'. Research investigating decision making based on metaphorical framing demonstrates this; people are more likely to choose the response that fits the metaphor – they choose 'what ought be' based on descriptions of 'what is' (Kemp et al., 2014; Thibodeau, 2016). If people separated descriptions of 'what is', from what the response 'ought to be', responses of participants likely would not have differed based on metaphorical framing. Second, this distinction would contradict the doctrine of universalizability, or formal justice, "the widely recognized moral requirement to treat similar cases in a similar way" (Childress, 1997). If metaphors suggest two things are the same, and the doctrine of universalizability suggests things that are the same should be treated the same way, then descriptions of similarity have normative implications. This suggests that reasoning based

on metaphor is not only what people do, as research suggests, but what they ought to do, as the doctrine of universalizability suggests. Insofar as description evokes similarity, and with it implies the need to treat similar cases the same way, descriptive metaphors have normative implications.

Methodologically, bioethical inquiry has safeguards to prevent uncritical application of the doctrine of universalizability to things that appear to be similar. This includes specification of principles and how they are applied in this case, and questioning of whether this is also consistent with other cases in which principles were specified in the same way (Beauchamp, 1994). It includes prompting for disanalogy and noting differences that could, or could not affect whether the cases are truly comparable in a way that we can generalize from one to the other (Mertes & Pennings, 2011). This systematic deliberation allows us to differentiate between when a descriptive metaphor should or should not be used for normative guidance. This was the strategy adopted in the above analysis.

What I intend to suggest is the metaphor itself, whether intentionally used descriptively or normatively, when used without systematic critical analysis, carries normative implications. This occurs because epistemically, metaphors prompt us to create and attend to systems of relations that build a conceptualization of two different things working the same way. They make invisible the way things work differently. Metaphors are embedded in arguments of the following structure:

P1. Principle X outweighs Principle Y in the context of war.

P2. If two things are the same, ethical principles should be weighted in the same way. (doctrine of universalizability)
P3. The COVID-19 pandemic is a war. (metaphor)
C. Principle X should outweigh Principle Y in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The same flaw can be seen in the following argument:

P1. X is permissible in the context of a pandemic.
P2. If two things are the same, then what is permissible in one is permissible in the other. (doctrine of universalizability)
P3. The increase in mental illness is a pandemic. (metaphor)
C. X is permissible in the context of the increase in mental illness.

If, rather than stating a factual premise, metaphors are understood as conveying a representation of reality (Black, 1977), and a representation of reality that, if dominant, is likely supporting and hiding systemic power relationships to the advantage of those in positions of power (Charteris-Black, 2004b; van Dijk, 1995), the validity of this premise on which to base a reasoned argument becomes shaky.

When metaphors are used as the premise to justify universalizability between contexts, it then becomes crucial to substantiate the validity of this metaphor. We must ague for why this representation of reality is the best one. This involves explicitly acknowledging what is meant by this metaphor given the discourse in which it is embedded – what similarities are being highlighted? It involves acknowledging the particularities of the two domains in context and prompting for disanalogy – what makes these two things different? It involves considering alternative framings, particularly from non-dominant discourses that may otherwise not have been considered because they do not support the taken-for-granted inequitable social-epistemic system – is there a metaphor that more accurately captures the reality of diverse experiences, or is at least less biased towards only

representing the reality of those in power? If a metaphor can stand up to this scrutiny, then I suggest it may be a valid premise on which to base an argument. However, in the case examined here, I argue that this is unlikely to be so for the metaphors "the COVID-19 pandemic is a war" and "mental illness is the next pandemic".

3.4 CHAPTER 3 REFLECTION

This chapter was written between November 2021 and February 2022, during the most significant wave of COVID-19 in Nova Scotia. In the years following the writing of this chapter, much of the military language that was being to be used to describe the increase in mental illness during and as a result of the pandemic ceased. While occurrences of military rhetoric in the mental health context still emerge, this framing did not dominate discussions of mental illness in the way that appeared to be taking shape in the earlier days of the pandemic. I suggest there are at least two possible reasons why this is the case.

First, in February 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine, starting what would come to be referred to as 'the war in Ukraine'. It is possible that the media's focus on this literal war made using the same language to describe a metaphorical war in the context of mental illness less appealing. A similar phenomenon happened during the 2001 SARS outbreak in Britain. Occurring concurrently with the beginning of the 2001 Iraq War, very few war metaphors were used to describe this outbreak (Larson et al., 2005). Analysis of the news coverage focusing on metaphor use suggests that the lack of war metaphors allowed for two different discourses to unfold with the two different stories; this in turn prevented the

highly politicized divisions surrounding the literal war from influencing the framing of the outbreak (Larson et al., 2005). It is possible that the war in Ukraine had a similar impact on the choice to use war metaphors to describe mental illness. This suggests that metaphor choice is highly contingent on the social meaning of the concept being used metaphorically, which is influenced by social events and actions.

Second, it is possible that the discursive shift away from 'fighting COVID-19' to 'living with COVID-19' worked to neutralize the significance of increases in mental illness. During the months following March 2022, many of the public health restrictions that had been in place to prevent the spread of COVID-19, including gathering limitations, masking requirements, and physical distancing, were being repealed, with the widespread messaging that we need to learn to live with this virus that had so significantly affected daily life for over two years. This promoted expectation to 'live with' increased risk of contracting the virus, along with 'living with' the lasting impacts of the pandemic on social and economic systems, developmental trajectories, and health status and may have functioned to normalize the increased distress from the pandemic. While just conjecture, as someone living through the rhetorical transition, I wonder if ceasing to frame the increase in mental illness as a war, while concurrently ceasing to frame COVID-19 as a war, sought to erase the effects of the pandemic on people's mental health and normalize the social conditions under which increased distress emerged, invalidating the experience. Choosing to stop using a metaphor may also influence which parts of experience are validated and shapes the shared narrative of experience.

3.4.1 Ethical Implications of Metaphors in Inequitable Social Systems

In this chapter, I argue that one of the ways that metaphors have ethical implications within inequitable social systems is that they bias ethical deliberation by creating a potentially false (or at least partially inaccurate) premise on which to base arguments. By suggesting two things are the same (and obscuring the ways in which they are different), metaphors may suggest that what is permissible in one case is permissible in another, or that how principles are specified in one case is how they should be specified in another. When a metaphor is biased in representing the reality of those who have the power to control discourse, it embeds that bias in ethical reasoning, leading to conclusions that substantiate actions that perpetuate the social harms on which the metaphor is based. Because of the doctrine of universalizability, even metaphors that are 'purely descriptive' may carry normative implications because they suggest that things 'work the same way' which allows them to be used as premises for the applicability of the doctrine of universalizability. We therefore have a moral obligation to be critical of our metaphors and ensure that if they are being used to support arguments for the transfer of beliefs, decisions, and permissible actions between contexts that the withstand critical scrutiny.

CHAPTER 4 EMBEDDING CONCEPTS IN OPPRESSIVE NARRATIVES: METAPHORS' IMPLICATIONS FOR NARRATIVE REASONING

4.1 CHAPTER 4 OVERVIEW

In the previous chapter, I explored how metaphors can shape ethical reasoning by influencing how we conceptualize moral principles and their relevance in the context of a specific case. I argued that metaphors imply an analogical relationship to a comparison case, suggesting that the relative valuing of moral principles should apply similarly across relevantly similar cases and what is permissible in one case should also be permissible in another. Using the example of war metaphors in the context of COVID-19, I also suggested that this occurs to the systematic disadvantage of marginalized groups, those whose reality is least likely to be reflected in the metaphors that dominate a social discourse within an inequitable social and epistemic system. In the previous chapter, I focused on reasoning based on moral principles. While this type of reasoning is one way we make decisions in situations of moral conflict, it is by no means the only way that we work to understand, reason through, and justify actions.

This chapter focuses on a second way metaphors influence reasoning and actions within inequitable social systems in ways that have moral implications. In this chapter, I argue that metaphors situate new phenomena within pre-existing discursive narratives and that decisions and actions can be justified because they align with, or progress, the story in which the metaphor embeds a phenomenon. However, because often the narratives that

are dominant and available align with discourses that support inequitable power relationships (Mills, 2007), metaphors help to assist with bringing new phenomenon into knowledge systems in ways that support and reinforce oppressive social systems. As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) describe, “we are constantly functioning under the expectation of being able to fit our lives into some coherent life story” (p.175) and metaphors, by highlighting discursive relationships between concepts, evoke a story for phenomena so they can be understood. I argue that narratives invoke a discursive ‘ought’, implying what ‘should’ happen based on taken for granted norms within a discourse, of which the narrative is part. For example, in Thibodeau’s (2016) oft-cited experiment, in which participants were asked to choose an appropriate solution to a metaphorically framed problem, participants were more likely to respond to crime by ‘fighting’ it when it was metaphorically framed as a beast. Fighting aligns with the dominant discursive narrative of ‘how one ought to respond to a beast’. The response of fighting is justified because it fits the discursive narrative, without necessarily being subject to scrutiny of whether it is morally right. It evokes a discursive ‘ought’, rather than an ‘ought’ that has been subjected to moral scrutiny. Because dominant discourse holds the social status of ‘truth’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), it can appear that actions that move the story in the ‘right’ direction are morally ‘right’. By situating new phenomena in accepted discursive narratives, metaphors conflate the distinction between descriptive and normative, being at the same time both descriptive (of how a phenomenon is understood within a particular power laden reality) and normative (how it ought to be understood and responded to in that reality). As such, they function to normalize and naturalize phenomena as morally right.

This manuscript advances this argument using the example of Canadian news media coverage of the monkeypox outbreak between May and June 2022. By analyzing the metaphors used to frame monkeypox as it emerged, previously largely unknown in Canada, I examine what narratives were evoked during this process to help explain and communicate about the virus. Furthermore, I suggest responses that could therefore be justified based on these narratives – in other words, what the metaphorical framings suggested might be the 'right' course of action.

Unlike the previous chapter, this manuscript uses empirical methods to collect, identify, and analyze metaphors from news media. It uses qualitative document analysis (QDA) (Altheide et al., 2008) and critical metaphor analysis (Charteris-Black, 2004) to interrogate what metaphors were used to support the conceptualization of monkeypox in the media during the first month of the outbreak in Canada and what social narratives support and are supported by these conceptualizations. I argue that in this context, metaphors have the epistemic effect of integrating conceptualizations of monkeypox into dominant social narratives that reinforce oppressive power structures. The expectations and assumptions involved in these broader social narratives are then used to justify responses to emerging phenomena. This adds an ethical dimension to analysis; it acknowledges the productive effect of metaphors to create and sustain oppressing social narratives and subsequent actions.

A version of this chapter is currently under review for publication in *Social Science and Medicine – Qualitative Research* (*SSM-QR*).

4.2 MANUSCRIPT: METAPHORICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 2022 MONKEYPOX OUTBREAK IN CANADIAN NEWS MEDIA: CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL NARRATIVE

4.2.1 Introduction

On May 7, 2022, the first monkeypox case of what would become a global outbreak was identified in the United Kingdom (WHO, 16 May 2022). This outbreak was announced on May 13, 2022 (WHO May 18, 2022-2), and in the month that followed, cases were identified in over 28 countries (WHO, 10 June 2022). The monkeypox virus, considered endemic to some African regions, had, until this outbreak, very rarely been identified outside of those geographical locations. Reports of the outbreak began to be publicized in Canada on May 13, 2022, with the first case identified in Canada on May 19, 2022 (Aziz, 19 May 2022). While not a new virus, during the first month of the outbreak much remained unknown about the transmission of the virus, complicated by varying, and atypical presentations (WHO, 10 June 2022). Arriving two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, the sentiment evoked by the outbreak was captured in the news headline: "Monkeypox? Please, not another virus" (Sears, 29 May 2022).

As Aristotle explained: "ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh" (*Rhetoric,* 1410b). Taking the typical form 'X is a Y', for example, 'climate change is a virus', metaphors help to

integrate new ideas into social understanding by bringing something unknown into epistemic relationship with what is already understood, thereby conceptually shaping it to have meaning. In this example, if 'climate change' is a new concept, it becomes integrated into social knowledge in relation to what is already known and understood about a 'virus'. Metaphors therefore help to make what is unknown knowable by relating it to concepts that are already familiar.

In the context of the 2022 monkeypox outbreak, while having existed as a known virus for over 60 years, monkeypox had never before been observed in Canada. It was therefore widely unknown in the Canadian context at the time of the outbreak. When new issues emerge, news media play a large role in providing accessible information about the issue to the public; one way this is accomplished is through metaphors. In news media, where attempting to convey what is 'new' requires reference to ideas that are already known to make sense, metaphors play an important role. It is therefore likely that metaphors used to communicate about monkeypox as a 'new' virus in the Canadian context played a role in helping to shape how the virus was socially understood in the Canadian context.

Because of metaphors' role in shaping understanding and action, many have been curious and critical about how they are used in communicating about emerging and changing viruses and how this relates to the justification of the response to these viruses. Metaphorical framings guide decision making and actions (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Thibodeau, 2016). For example, when a social issue is metaphorically framed as a virus,

social reform that is framed as 'treatment' is more likely to be endorsed as an appropriate response than 'attacking' the issue, which is more likely endorsed if the issue is framed as a beast (Thibodeau, 2016). Similarly, when mental illness is metaphorically framed as a chemical imbalance, people are more likely to choose psychopharmaceuticals described as 'restoring balance' for treatment than other options (Kemp et al., 2014). People tend to choose the response that fits with the story conjured by the metaphor.

Previous case studies on the social construction of viruses have shown that how a virus is conceptualized can have implications for research, policy decisions, and public response. For example, researchers have been critical of the metaphorical representation of HIV/AIDS and the influence this had on how the virus and associated conditions were understood, researched, and treated. In an early discussion of the metaphorical construction of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Susan Sontag (1990) was critical of the framing of AIDS as a botanical or zoological entity, arguing that it created the conception that the maturing virus would inevitably cause AIDS. Reasoning with this expected narrative trajectory shaped how clinical evidence was interpreted, and subsequently influenced how individuals were treated (Sontag, 1990a). Susan Sherwin (2001) also raised critique of the pollution metaphors used around HIV/AIDS, arguing that attributing contamination to already at-risk groups provided scientific support for prejudice and shaped research and treatment in ways that left out the importance of social influences on viral infections. The use of war metaphors to frame HIV/AIDS has also been critiqued for how it constructs enemies, influences clinical communication, promotes discrimination, and supports particular research and resource use that may disadvantage already

marginalized groups (Craig, 2020; Guta & Newman, 2016; Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016; Sherwin, 2001; Sontag, 1990a).

Similarly, during an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in Britain in 2001, invasion metaphors were commonly used to frame the virus (Larson et al., 2005). Described as a "foreign invasion", subsequent policy decisions surrounding FMD were enacted within this same frame of reference, including an animal 'slaughter policy', rural movement restrictions, and airport food checks (Larson et al., 2005). Suggesting FMD was a 'foreign invader' evoked a national level response because it was perceived as a national threat (Larson et al., 2005). In the context of British history and national identity, alongside scientific uncertainty around vaccination, an 'invasion' evoked notions of old-style warfare; responses such as 'fortress farming' and medieval-like responses of large scale slaughtering that "eventually came to [be seen] as needless killing" were perceived justified (Larson et al., 2005, p. 255). In this case, how the virus was framed influenced what policies could be justified in response: the response fit the narrative of medieval warfare. Similarly, investigations into metaphors used to communicate about the international outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003-2004 (Chiang & Duann, 2007; Wallis & Nerlich, 2005), and the 2005-2006 United Kingdom avian flu epidemic (Koteyko et al., 2008), found that metaphors used to explain the viruses aligned with policies and responses to them.

Rhetoric, such as metaphors, unconsciously communicates particular ideologies and evaluations of viruses, and can be used to justify policies that align with them (Charteris-

Black, 2004b; Deignan, 2010). In the 2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa and the US, for example, analyses of Western newspapers found that the spread of the virus was linked to "uncivilised practices" of a monolithic African culture (Abeysinghe, 2016, p. 463), supporting a metaphorical framing of 'Africa is a Jungle'. 'Uncivilized practices' included living in the jungle, eating bush meat, using traditional healers, lack of modern medicine, and contact with bodies for burial (Abeysinghe, 2016; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002). This depiction was used alongside discussion of domestic political concerns supporting representations of the virus through frames of immigration security, bioterrorism, and racism (Abeysinghe, 2016). The 'othering' resulting from linking the virus to 'the uncivilized' and to perceived domestic political threats, was used by political powers in the West to argue for racist policies of surveillance, border control, and quarantine (Abeysinghe, 2016; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002). This functioned to further Western political agendas (Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002) while ignoring the Ebola crisis occurring outside the West (Abeysinghe, 2016), supporting a colonial and racist ideology. The story crafted through the use of metaphors linking cause, effect, and response reinforced oppressing ideologies and actions that support them.

More recently, the use of metaphors to frame the global COVID-19 pandemic has been widely explored and critically analyzed for shaping pandemic response. The frequent use of war metaphors and rhetoric in reference to the COVID-19 pandemic has been criticized for justifying the continued devaluation of women's health (Bailey et al., 2021), politically weaponizing the disease (Craig, 2020), legitimizing increased burdens on those already marginalized (Chapman & Miller, 2020; Sibbald, 2023), justifying unsafe

working conditions (Khan et al., 2021), and bolstering political support, nationalism, and patriotism (Chapman & Miller, 2020; Efeoğlu Özcan, 2022). Within the narrative of a just war, where no sacrifice is excessive, these consequences can appear justified (Sibbald, 2023). Given how they influence the response to viral outbreaks, it is important to understand how the metaphors used to describe monkeypox may be similar to, or different from, how spreading viruses have been constructed in the past and how this relates to broader social discourses with particular power relations.

In written news media, the language used is an intentional linguistic choice; another framing could have been chosen to convey the message in a different way, but was not (Charteris-Black, 2004b)*:* "A written medium allows an author to plan her or his choice of words carefully and select the most striking quotations to include in a news article, thereby incorporating the most potent metaphors in the text" (Johnson, 2005, p. 80). This element of conscious language selection, whether one is necessarily aware of the particular metaphorical and ideological frame they are evoking or not, is what allows metaphors to be analyzed as a form of critical discourse analysis that "attempts to demonstrate how particular discursive practices reflect socio-political power structures and, by implication, to modify practices to the benefit of those whom they currently disadvantage" (Charteris-Black, 2004b, p. 29). In shaping the way knowledge and ideas are understood and evaluated, metaphors in news media stand "at a junction, as it were, between the society and cognition [that] generates, mediates and sustains knowledge among discourse participants in a society" (Čičin-Šain, 2019, p. 6).

While metaphors can be valuable communication tools (Tate, 2020), they are also more than that. The ideas produced and/or evoked through metaphor not only communicate an idea but also communicate a particular evaluation of that idea (Deignan, 2010). These evaluations can occur through the use of individual words that carry positive or negative connotations and entailments (Charteris-Black, 2004b). Metaphors can also convey an evaluation by evoking a socially-known narrative that conveys a particular evaluation of the situation (Deignan, 2010):

> As a means of presenting a judgment about a situation, using a metaphor to generate entailments in this way may be particularly effective because it is off-record. The reader or hearer does not need to be told explicitly what conclusions to draw; knowing the story of the metaphor, he or she can supply them unaided. (Deignan, 2010, p. 359)

As such, understanding metaphors as placing concepts within certain narratives has implications for analyzing how metaphors are presented in news media. Metaphors can be understood as a form of discourse, which "is defined as any practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning" (Ruiz, 2009, p. 3). Metaphors not only create a frame of reference in which certain policy decisions or responses are possible (as may be indicated by the increased likelihood of choosing to 'attack' a phenomenon framed as a beast) but also evoke a story that forms the backdrop of those decisions and responses (such as a beast that is invading is a threat to those most vulnerable, is ugly, cursed, fanged, does not belong, is inhuman, irrational, can be morally sacrificed, needs to be forcibly chased out with pitchforks and flaming torches). This off-record evoked story locates the decision for action, giving it reason and intended consequence (Deignan, 2010).

Importantly, metaphors that dominate the framing of a phenomenon are likely to be those that reinforce the dominant discourses that shape the context. Because metaphors draw on current understanding to frame something new, they are likely to embed new concepts into already dominant ideologies that are reflected in the conceptualization of previously understood phenomena (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). The dominant discourses, underscored by dominant ideologies, is an apparatus of power that upholds systems of power and oppression (Foucault, 1980). It is therefore likely that the overarching narrative evoked by the metaphor is one that reflects dominant ideologies and builds new ideas into existing discourse that supports systems of power and oppression.

In the context of monkeypox, the metaphors used in news media are likely to have had a significant impact on how the outbreak was understood and addressed, as metaphors have in viral outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics in the past (Chapman & Miller, 2020; Chiang & Duann, 2007; Koteyko et al., 2008; Okanume, 2018; Toochukwu et al., 2018). In addition, it is likely that these metaphors work alongside other social narratives to sustain and reinforce privilege and oppression (Chapman & Miller, 2020; Charteris-Black, 2004b; Deignan, 2010; Foucault, 1980; E. Johnson, 2005):

> The value of Critical Metaphor Analysis is that by making us more aware of the subliminal role of metaphor in situations where we are not aware that a speech act of persuasion is taking place we are in a better position to identify its discourse role in forming evaluations. (Charteris-Black, 2004b, p. 250)

The purpose of this research is to explore what metaphors were used to frame monkeypox during the first month of the 2022-2023 monkeypox outbreak in Canada and what larger narratives these metaphors evoke to understand if and how these metaphors support oppressive ideologies.

4.2.2 Methods

A case study methodology (Merriam, 1998) using qualitative document analysis (Altheide et al., 2008) was used to explore how monkeypox was framed in Canadian news media during the first known month of the 2022 outbreak. This case study drew on Merriam's (1998) interpretation of a case study, which focuses on wholistic description of the complexities of the situation from a variety of different viewpoints (Brown, 2008; Merriam, 1998). In this study, these viewpoints include a variety of different news sources and the different metaphors they used. This case study methodology is interpretive, acknowledging the multiple perspectives and interpretations present in a case and that these interpretations are then interpreted by the researcher, filtered through their lens. This interpretation is essential in the context of metaphors as interpretation is necessary to move from individual linguistic metaphors to conceptual metaphors working together to form a concepts and narratives. These viewpoints are incorporated as a variety of different narratives that are evoked and constructed in different ways and do not necessarily collapse into a single, logically coherent narrative.

In line with Merriam's initial stage of the research process involving a literature review, case study examples of metaphor analyses of other viruses including SARS (Chiang & Duann, 2007; Wallis & Nerlich, 2005), Ebola (Abeysinghe, 2016; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002), Foot and Mouth Disease (Nerlich et al., 2002), and HIV/AIDS (Sherwin, 2001; Sontag, 1990a) were sought. While each of these studies may be considered a case study for their examination of metaphors particular to a specific virus in a particular context,

none self-identify as case studies, but rather as qualitative research and outline methods rather than methodologies for their approach.

A primary component of a case study is 'fencing in' the object of study, a choice made by the researcher that contributes to the definition of the phenomenon of study (Merriam, 1998). In this case, the study is bounded by phenomena (monkeypox), geographic region (Canada), data source (written news media), language (English), and date (May 13, 2022, to June 13, 2022). Within these boundaries, the object of study is further defined as metaphorical and discursive framings of the virus and the narratives they evoke. Case studies are particularly useful when the context plays an important role in understanding the phenomenon (Yin, 1999). Given the importance of contextual components such as region, date, the occurrence of the outbreak just over two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, and the emergence of this phenomenon in news media simultaneously reporting on other emerging events, a case study that acknowledges and situates the phenomenon within this context is appropriate.

The lens I bring to this research is critical and contemporary to the phenomenon in question. This data was collected and this analysis constructed as the outbreak was emerging in the context of the unknowns that accompanied it. Although I do not have lived experience with all identity groups discussed throughout this analysis, my lens was shaped by informal conversations with members of these groups as this research and analysis unfolded, which occurred because the outbreak occurred during my lived time and space.

Qualitative document analysis (QDA) (Altheide et al., 2008), also referred to as ethnographic content analysis (Altheide, 1987), provided guidance on methods for conducting this research. Unlike content analysis, which takes a quantitative approach to qualitative data, QDA takes an ethnographic approach that seeks to track discourse and framings across contexts (Altheide, 1987; Altheide et al., 2008). In line with the process outlined by Altheide et al. (2008), documents were selected using purposeful and emergent sampling. Initial inclusion criteria were online written news documents available through my university's media database, Factiva, that were published online in English by eight Canadian news sources between May 13, 2022 and June 13, 2022. News sources included: the Chronicle Herald, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Montreal Gazette, the Toronto Star, and the Globe and Mail. Articles from the Vancouver Sun, Edmonton Journal and Calgary Herald were later included to ensure representation from where the virus was detected during this timeframe. These sources represent major news outlets in Canada that capture local, national, and international news, in provinces that span the country. As information from the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) was frequently referenced and cited in these articles, updates published by PHAC during this window were also included.

Analysis followed the process outlined by Altheide et al. (2008), including initial engagement with approximately 6-10 sources, outlining categories to guide data collection, testing collection protocol on several documents, and revising the protocol by

adding additional documents or data collection categories (Altheide, 2008). Categories guiding data collection included:

- Headline, subheadings, date, and news source
- Metaphors used to frame the virus and associated language
- Explanation of virus/outbreak origin
- Experts cited and/or referenced
- Images portrayed
- Comparison and contrast with other viruses (COVID-19, smallpox, influenza, Ebola etc.)
- Suggested responses/next steps

Data were extracted into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to allow for analysis across categories and within a single source. Metaphors were identified using the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) (Group, 2007). The MIP involves identifying words that are used in a non-literal way in reference to the phenomenon in question. When a question arose as to whether a meaning was literal or not, the online Merriam Webster dictionary (merriam-webster.com) was used to check the literal meaning of the word.

This research takes a critical approach, which guided the selection of categories for data extraction, the questions asked of the data, and the interpretation of the results (Collins & Stockton, 2018). In line with these perspectives, the following questions guided analysis:

- What metaphors are used to frame monkeypox and what features do these metaphors make salient?

- In what narratives are these metaphors embedded and how does this influence the frame of reference they produce? (e.g. How are comparative metaphors used to allude to similarity to, or difference from, other viruses and their narrative representation?)
- What lines of reasoning logically follow from the frames of reference conjured by the metaphor? (e.g. How does the metaphorical framing relate to the proposed public health response?)
- How do these lines of reasoning support certain discourses, particular types of knowledge production, and systems of power and oppression?

Narrative methods informed the analysis and presentation of results by providing a framework to thematically organize perceived origin, explanation, conceptualization, and response to the virus. 'Narrative-type' narrative inquiry, where data gathered is collated to produce explanatory stories (Polkinghorne, 1995) was used to connect metaphors to the broader social narratives in which they are embedded.

Ethical consideration was given to how quotations and metaphors would be presented throughout the analysis. As the focus of the analysis is on systemic and political implications of metaphors, titles as disclosed in the news reporting, rather than names, are used in quotations to maintain this focus. For example, rather than naming the person who is the 'Chief Public Health Officer' or a 'World Health Organization Official', they are described *only* as the 'Chief Public Health Officer' or 'a World Health Organization Official'. This decision was made to draw attention to the social markers of credibility that are textually represented to validate the credibility of a person's statement. The

purpose of analyzing what 'experts' are represented in news media and the metaphorical framings which their testimony supports is not to call out particular experts or authors for their understanding or representation of events, but rather to more broadly understand what types of expertise are valued and considered credible and how this relates to and is supported by (or not) the narratives evoked and constructed through metaphor. In this analysis, the intention is to draw attention to the systemic implications of metaphorical framings, rather than enforce personal accountability. As such, the focus is put on the systemic structures that validate expertise and language choice, rather than on any particular individual. Similarly, newspaper names along with the date of publication, rather than individual authors, are given to contextualize quotations, as is often done for critical approaches to news media (Abeysinghe, 2016; Joffe & Haarhoff, 2002; Toochukwu et al., 2018; Wallis & Nerlich, 2005).

In addition, throughout this paper, the name 'monkeypox' is used to refer to the particular virus contributing to this outbreak. While the name of the virus changed to mpox in November of 2022, all of the documents included in this analysis were written prior to this change and referred to the virus solely as 'monkeypox'. As the name 'monkeypox' carries with it particular connotations and evokes social narratives relevant to this analysis, it is integral that representation is accurate to how it was at the time the outbreak occurred and the data used here emerged. It is likely reasons relevant to this analysis and the social narratives invoked by the name 'monkeypox' contributed to the decision for the name to change, hence the importance of using the name as it was used at the time of the research for analysis.

4.2.3 Results

After emergent sampling, and the exclusion of duplicates, 88 documents were used in this case study. Of these, 85 were news media articles and three were PHAC updates (Table 1). Often duplicates occurred in news sources owned by the same corporation, so the number of articles included represents the number of unique articles from sources with the same corporate owner.

Table 1:Summary of Documents Included

Corporate Owner	News Source	Articles
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (34)	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation	34
NordStar Capital LP (22)	The Toronto Star	22
Saltwire Network (11)	Chronicle Herald	11
The Woodbridge Company (6)	Globe and Mail	6
Postmedia (12)	Montreal Gazette	7
	Vancouver Sun	3
	Edmonton Journal	1
	Calgary Herald	1
Government of Canada (3)	Public Health Agency of Canada	3

Metaphors and Narratives of Monkeypox

Six conceptual metaphors (CM) were commonly used to frame monkeypox. Drawing on work by Jonathan Charteris-Black (2004) a conceptual metaphor is the underlying metaphor that connects surface linguistic metaphors into an organized conceptual framework. Conceptual metaphors used to frame monkeypox included: *MONKEYPOX IS A CRIMINAL, MONKEYPOX IS AN OVERFLOWING LIQUID, MONKEYPOX IS AN ENEMY OF WAR, MONKEYPOX IS A MEMBER OF THE ORTHOPOX FAMILY,*

MONKEYPOX IS A THREAT TO OUR GLOBAL COMMUNITY and MONKEYPOX IS A NATURAL DISASTER.

Table 2: Summary of Monkeypox Metaphors in Canadian News Media

Narrative/Metaphor System	Example Metaphors
Detective/Policing *CM: MONKEYPOX IS A CRIMINAL*	Active investigation; suspected cases; strange and intriguing; detected/undetected cases and spread; suspected cases under investigation; masquerading as other illnesses; be on the lookout; detected in local resident.
Outbreak and Containment *CM: MONKEYPOX IS AN OVERFLOWING LIQUID*	Usually confined to central and western Africa; virus outbreak, spreading very fast; capacity for containment; spilling out; confined to certain individuals; contained within a community; spread further afield/beyond typical territory.
War *CM: MONKEYPOX IS AN ENEMY OF WAR*	Deploying shots of the vaccine; targeting testing at distinctive lesions; drugs can be deployed; vaccines used to combat monkeypox; strategically positioning vaccines; targeted approach to vaccination and treatment; our enemy is the virus; mobilizing resources; imperil wealthy countries; targeted solutions for the gay community.
Orthopox Family *CM: MONKEYPOX IS A MEMBER OF THE ORTHOPOX FAMILY.*	Related viruses spread via sex; lesions resemble those caused by smallpox; two main clades of monkeypox; monkeypox belongs to the same family of viruses as smallpox; smallpox is monkeypox's cousin; a lineage has evolved the ability for human-to-human transmission; same family of viruses as variola, the virus that causes smallpox; smallpox is a related disease.
Global Community/Neglect of Africa narrative *CM: MONKEYPOX IS A THREAT TO OUR GLOBAL COMMUNITY*	World's attention was elsewhere; spread to person to person unnoticed; when they started looking for it, they found it; public health authorities haven't been paying it very much mind; can't take our eye off the ball with what's happening in Africa; stark reminder of the need to invest in central and western Africa.
Natural Disaster *CM: MONKEYPOX IS A NATURAL DISASTER*	Spate of cases; spread under the surface; random event; perfect storm; seeing the tip of the iceberg; flurry of cases; sweeping through the population; ripple effect; echoes of past catastrophes; cropping up; propagating in this group of people; continues to grow; astonishing, rapid propagation.

These conceptual metaphors draw on and are embedded in social narratives and their use evokes these narratives. Each draws on an explanation of the origin of monkeypox and suggests what would be a reasonable resolution to the challenges monkeypox poses. Each also evokes broader social narratives which reflect underlying ideological assumptions and provide justification for different social actions and inactions.

Detectives, Policing, and Biopolitics

The most common metaphor used to frame the monkeypox virus was the 'detective/policing' metaphor. This language evokes the conceptual metaphor *MONKEYPOX IS A CRIMINAL*. Language describing the 'investigation' into 'suspected cases', leading to the 'detection' of new cases was included in almost every news article and common in headlines such as: "Canada investigating a couple dozen suspected monkeypox cases…"(CBC, 20 May 2022). Occasionally the metaphor was also supported by the deviousness of the monkeypox virus; its potential to mutate, masquerade, hide, and suddenly appear contributed to the need for keen detective work to police the virus into containment: "Monkeypox can 'masquerade' as other conditions, with wide range of symptom severity" (CBC, 10 June 2022). This frames the virus using human characteristics such as a deviant 'cheeky monkey' unpredictably wreaking havoc and requiring the imposition of behavioural enforcement to establish order. Within this context emerged "the 'big mystery' [of] is it a more contagious strain, or did it just infect somebody 'where conditions were just right to establish all these different transmission chains?'" (Virologist at the University of Saskatchewan's Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization cited in The Toronto Star, 19 May 2022). The language used to describe public health officials, who are 'chief officers' and 'deputies' further contributes to this

metaphorical framing of policing and detective work as these terms are also common terms used in policing.

From a biopolitical perspective, this framing of policing deviance can be used to support apparatuses of biopower, using political forces to regulate individual bodies, particularly through surveillance (Foucault, 2008). This helps to justify some of the responses that public health employed to control the virus (Gislason, 2013; Moodley & Lesage, 2020), including making monkeypox a reportable disease, asking the public to practice self-surveillance for symptoms, and developing a virtual tracker to track the number of cases in different areas. Many of the articles' main purpose was to convey the number of cases identified and suspected resulting from the success of public health surveillance.

This metaphorical framing also supported the narrative that the outbreak originated from deviance; there were multiple reports that the origin of the outbreak was the result of gay men having sex with multiple partners at large raves and Pride events in Europe:

> Germany has confirmed cases linked to exposure at 'party evening…where sexual activity took place' in Spain's Canary Islands and Berlin…authorities are investigating possible links between a recent Gay Pride event in the Canary Islands, which drew some 80,000 people, and cases at a Madrid sauna. (The Globe and Mail, 24 May 2022)

Importantly, the months in which the outbreaks became salient aligned with those in which Pride celebrations for those in the 2SLGBTQ+ community take place and were re-emerging after two years of cancellation and postponement due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, others described how: "a leading advisor to WHO said the outbreak in Europe and beyond was likely spread by sex at two recent raves in Spain and Belguim"

(CBC, 6 June 2022). A common strategy of public health (Gislason, 2013), the public could then be reassured that practicing 'normative' behaviours would protect them from the virus: “It’s not something you can acquire if you go to the grocery store or go on public transportation” (Montreal Public Health Director cited in Montreal Gazette, 20 May 2022). In contrast, those who participated in non-normative behaviours, such as having same-sex sex, multiple partners, or going to bath houses, were labeled as those at highest risk, and expected to be subject to the highest amounts of government, interpersonal, and personal surveillance: “Several clinics will be held in the coming weeks…to vaccinate those at higher risk of being exposed to the virus. Sunday’s clinic is for employees of bath houses” (CBC, 11 June 2022). Compounding with metaphors of containment, where the aim of public health intervention is to confine the virus to particular groups or geographic regions, these metaphors have the potential to lead to lines of reasoning that suggest state confinement and surveillance of deviant groups is warranted – imposed behavioural modification for the deviant, even criminal monkey. This does not mean the decision to focus vaccination and surveillance on the 2SLGBTQ+ population who was being affected was ill-intentioned, or ineffective; rather, as elaborated below, it highlights that the ability to draw boundaries around a group and define them as ‘others’ contributes to the ability to also define them as deviant and justify increased surveillance that might not otherwise be tolerated at the population level (Abeysinghe, 2016; Gislason, 2013).

Containment and Break Out

The containment metaphor was also frequently used. Descriptions of an 'outbreak', monkeypox 'spreading', and the zoonotic virus 'spilling over' into humans, reflect this framing: “[contact with animals] makes it easier for viruses such as monkeypox to spill over from wildlife into human populations” (Scientist from Emory University, originally from Cameroon cited in CBC, 1 June 2022). This language is part of the conceptual metaphor *MONKEYPOX IS AN OVERFLOWING LIQUID.*

In their analysis of the media's framing of the Ebola virus, Ungar (1998) theorised that the media use the 'mutation-containment' information package (discourse that includes metaphors, examples, stories, images, etc.) to frame 'hot crises'. In this package, initial reports may incite panic, by conveying ideas that the virus has changed, knows no boundaries, and is on a rampage (Ungar, 1998). This is followed by messaging of containment, which aims to tame and redirect the threat (Ungar, 1998). The media reports during the first month of the monkeypox outbreak in Canada reflect this theory, with the media initially framing the virus as having changed, spread out of its typical geographical space, and fears of mutation increasing transmissibility: “The recent cases suggest a potentially novel means of spread” (Disease expert at the University of Edinburgh cited in CBC, 18 May 2022). Framing suggested that although it had previously been contained, it had now “spilled across borders” (Globe and Mail, 24 May 2022). This was followed by reports that predominantly specified case numbers and included discussions of 'containing' the virus within specific communities: “Public health officials believe it’s still possible the virus can be contained to the gay community” – Spokesperson for the Montreal Health Authority (Montreal Gazette, 8 June 2022).

As Ungar (1998) describes, this idea of 'containment' is counter to the narrative of globalization and interconnection between people and groups, in which community and state boundaries are porous rather than impermeable. If boundaries are porous, containment does not make sense. In suggesting the virus can be ‘contained within the gay community’, it implies the boundaries of this community are clearly defined and can be made impermeable for containment, furthering a narrative of ‘Us and Them’, and framing the gay community as ‘other’. While this was repeatedly challenged with reassurance that monkeypox is not a “gay disease” (The Globe and Mail, 31 May 2022), and that “anyone can catch the virus” (Montreal Gazette, 20 May 2022), the use of a containment framing that makes salient fictitious community boundaries contradicts these statements. It is possible therefore that the overall framing of the virus using a metaphor of containment may counter the intent to decrease discrimination against the gay community. While “the virus does not discriminate” (Calgary Herald, 3 June 2022), and experts urge the public not to discriminate either, how the virus is metaphorically framed may still support a logic of discrimination through implying difference and separation.

Similarly, metaphors of containment often emerged in relation to the typical status of the virus as ‘contained’ within Africa and the atypicality of it breaking out of this geographic containment. While media did not go so far as to explicitly suggest the solution to the outbreak was to re-contain the virus specifically in African regions, the generalized framing of an outbreak from Africa and the need for containment may be interpreted to imply this solution. This too may imply that continental boundaries are impermeable,

reinforcing a narrative of ‘us and them’ between the African continent and the rest of the world. It also suggests the virus is not a problem when it is contained and only affecting those in African regions, which may support the narrative of neglect discussed in more depth below.

However contrary to Ungar’s theory, while possible mutation was discussed early on in the outbreak, there was also concurrent, repeated reassurance that this virus was ‘not like COVID-19’: “The situation is different from what Canada saw with the emergence of COVID-19” – Minister of Health (The Toronto Star, May 24, 2022). Others noted: “Is this the new COVID-19? No.” – Infectious Disease Physician (The Toronto Star, 18 May 2022). While some elements of Ungar’s mutation-containment package theory were reflected in this media coverage, the quick jump to containment may be reflective of the proximity of the outbreak to coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, which frequently covered ‘mutation’ in relation to numerous new variants of the virus over more than two years. At the time of the beginning of the outbreak, at least five major variants of concern of COVID-19 had been identified (NCCID, 2023). It is possible, therefore, that the mutation-containment package reflects the coverage of COVID-19 and monkeypox when examined together – with the focus for COVID-19 more on mutation once containment was impossible, and the subsequent focus for monkeypox more on containment, distancing it from the COVID-19 pandemic and the fears repeatedly evoked in that context. In addition, it is possible that using the mutation-containment package with a focus on containment for monkeypox provided some closure to the COVID-19 pandemic,

allowing a narrative of containment to emerge in a way that was not possible for COVID-19. It may have provided the ending to a different story.

War, Combat, and Vaccines

While war metaphors were consistently used across articles, they were primarily used when discussing ways to 'combat' the virus, most commonly in reference to vaccines: “smallpox vaccines have proven effective in combatting the related virus” (CBC, 11 June 2022). War metaphors were the only metaphors used to frame vaccines and used almost exclusively for this purpose. They were also used in articles discussing the occurrence of the virus in the 2SLGBTQ+ community, reaffirming that, “Our enemy is the virus, not the people who are affected” (Montreal Gazette, 27 May 2022), and using parallel metaphors of 'fighting monkeypox' with 'fighting stigma'. The language of “targeted solutions for the gay community” (CBC, 3 June 2022), where vaccines would be ‘deployed’, further supports this metaphorical framing. Typically, when using war metaphors to conceptualize the need to combat the virus, no explanation of the origin of the virus was described. This language evokes the conceptual metaphor *MONKEYPOX IS AN ENEMY OF WAR*.

The use of war metaphors to describe vaccines was frequent during COVID-19, and particularly salient in the then-American President’s comparison of creating COVID vaccines to creating the atom bomb (Bailey et al., 2021). However, monkeypox generally was not framed as a war in the media, particularly in comparison to the saliency of this metaphor during the recent COVID pandemic (Bailey et al., 2021; Chapman & Miller,

2020; Kahn et al., 2021). Research on metaphors for framing SARS found similar results; occurring immediately after an outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in Britain, in which the media frequently employed war metaphors, the 2003 SARS epidemic in Britain, in comparison, used relatively few (Larson et al., 2005). This was attributed both to the fatigue of war metaphors in the news, and the concurrent American invasion of Iraq, which required literal use of war language (Larson et al., 2005).

A comparable situation occurred with monkeypox in Canada, where the outbreak occurred concurrently with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and immediately following the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada. While this may explain the relative lack of war metaphors, it is interesting that vaccines are still framed as weaponry to combat the virus despite the rare framing of the outbreak as a ‘war’. This may be due to the colloquial understanding of the immune systems as 'fending off invaders' (Ferri, 2018), which vaccines are used support.

However, when a virus is not socially framed as the target of war, it becomes a stretch to reason that vaccines, as deployable weapons, are the most reasonable solution for national defence. People are more likely to endorse solutions that metaphorically align with how the problem is framed, rather than those that draw on a different framing (Thibodeau, 2016). Given that the media repeatedly also reported that widespread vaccination was not likely to be how public health chose to respond to monkeypox, not constructing monkeypox metaphorically as a war aligned with the choice not to pursue a national vaccination strategy in Canada as a solution, and may have garnered public

support for this decision. Not everyone needs to be armed with weaponry if we are not fighting a war. Vaccines were framed more so as individual protection against a threat breaching one's personal circle or 'ring', rather than as a national defence.

The Orthopox Family and the Power of Public Health

Another dominant framing evokes the conceptual metaphor *MONKEYPOX IS A MEMBER OF THE ORTHOPOX FAMILY.* It is represented in the 'familial relationship' metaphor connecting smallpox and monkeypox. Over half the articles reviewed use a phrase that describes those viruses as 'family', 'cousins', 'siblings' or 'relatives'. The majority of the time, this is followed by a statement such as 'the World Health Organization (WHO) eradicated smallpox in 1980': "Monkeypox is a rare disease that comes from the same family of viruses that causes smallpox and was declared eradicated by the World Health Organization in 1980" (CBC, 25 May 2022). Others noted that, "Smallpox was declared eradicated by the WHO in 1980, one of the greatest public health achievements in history" (The Globe and Mail, 31 May 2022). This implies that a familial relationship to what has been conquered by science and public health makes monkeypox conquerable as well. This contributes to the 'mutation-containment' package (Ungar, 1998), by suggesting that monkeypox could be a threat like smallpox "bring[ing] back memories of all the terrifying pox viruses that have plagued humanity" (The Toronto Star, 29 May 2022), but that it is likely to be stopped because the WHO already got rid of its sibling. Moreover, the same vaccine that the WHO used to eradicate smallpox was effective against monkeypox, so their resemblance is likely to support successful containment.

This familial relationship, in which monkeypox is framed as both similar to and distinct from smallpox, allows different frames of reference to be evoked by their comparison, which can be strategically manipulated to convey both scientific information, and an evaluation of that information, in a way that supports dominant ideologies (Deigan, 2010). By comparing monkeypox to smallpox and following with a description of the success of the WHO's campaign to eradicate smallpox, the narrative is guided to suggest the WHO will be successful in this case, too. Similarly, by following this comparison with statements that the same vaccine can be used to protect against both viruses, their similarity suggests preparedness and strong defences. However, this familial metaphor was also used to create distance between smallpox and monkeypox, describing smallpox as the 'nastier' cousin for its increased transmissibility and increased severity, implying the relative banality of monkeypox. Both the similarities and differences that contextualize the 'familial relationship' metaphor between smallpox and monkeypox contribute to supporting the containment of the virus, and a positive view of public health: a positive view of an organization that effectively polices its citizens through surveillance, reinforces and normalizes its power, supported by institutions of science.

Metaphors of Industrialization, Colonialism, and the Narratives of the Neglect of Africa

The conceptual metaphor *MONKEYPOX IS A THREAT TO THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY* was also used. This framing draws on the larger metaphor system of a global community in which countries are framed as people: "A state is conceptualized as a person, engaging in social relations within a world community" (Lakoff, 2009). Comments that: "we are a

global community and that we need to coordinate and cooperate" (Vancouver Sun, 28 May 2022) support this metaphor system. Within this metaphorical system, maturity is parallel to industrialization, and considered a natural state to reach; those nations who have not reached this state are akin to children, who need to be helped along to develop appropriately (Lakoff, 2009). Descriptions of the origin of the outbreak in interacting with dead animals and consuming poorly cooked bush meat reinforce and contribute to this perception. The parallel rhetoric to describe the effect of the virus on the individual body and social body (Table 3) also support this larger metaphor system.

Table 3: Monkeypox in the Person and Social Body

Language of Virus Actions in Person	Language of Virus actions in community
"Scabs break out"	"Global outbreak"
"Spreads down the arms"	"global spread" "very occasionally spreads elsewhere"
"The rash appears, surfaces as red spots"	"rash of cases" "Spreading under the surface for months"
"typically starting on the face and spreading from there"	"Pattern of spread"
"Lesions popping up across the entire body"	"Cases popping up"
"Emergence of a rash"	"Emerged in western countries"
"Lesions like mini volcanos"	"Explosion of cases"

The explanation that was least commonly used to frame the origin of the monkeypox outbreak was the globalization/ industrialization narrative. This framing attributed the outbreak to industrialization and climate change bringing people into more contact with animals, causing poverty, civil unrest, and deforestation. Experts who put forth this

explanation were often those living and/or working in and near areas where monkeypox is considered endemic, like Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These experts were the least commonly referenced or cited in the news media accounts reviewed.

Often accompanying this explanation, was the compounding narrative representation of the neglect of Africa, where the West only pays attention to viruses once they are present in Western countries: “Almost all the attention is on cases in wealthy countries. The tragic deaths and increasing burden of the disease in impoverished regions of the world continue to be largely neglected” (Vancouver Sun, 28 May 2022). Arguments supporting this narrative included that Western countries ignored warnings for years, did not respond to monkeypox because it did not affect them and did not offer lucrative pharmaceutical prospects, and that policies to curb the spread were ‘left on a shelf’ and not prepared for implementation when needed (Globe and Mail, 31 May 2022). Calls for the West to “pay attention” (Globe and Mail, 1 June 2022) implies a narrative of blame in which Western countries did not do enough to support African countries when it was not in their self-interest.

The implication of this framing then, is a narrative that Western countries have an obligation to interfere in and assist with challenges faced by those in African countries, who, like children are not capable of handling these issues by themselves and without guidance are a threat to civilized human society. This lack of capability is presumed to be inherent as not one article described how many of the issues to which the outbreak was

attributed – poverty, civil unrest, deforestation – are not the result of *inaction and neglect of Africa* from Western countries, but *centuries of colonial action, imperialism, and interference in Africa* from these same countries. A narrative of 'neglect' erases this history. The call to 'pay attention' may justify increased Western surveillance, and subsequent action.

This narrative also occurs alongside an ongoing history of dehumanization through discourses of simianism (Jardina & Spencer, 2021), in which Black people are compared to monkeys, which is evoked by the name 'monkeypox'. Alongside the narrative of the global community, this suggests not only are African countries (and their people) less developed, but less evolved. Not only do the concurrence of these narratives infantilize and dehumanize African peoples, they support an ideology of white supremacist capitalism, normalizing industrialization as social 'progress', denying other worldviews and epistemologies. This serves to erase the impacts of colonialism and justify the ongoing use of Western power to surveil, and politically influence African countries, while making invisible the expertise of those in that area. That virus experts identified as from African countries were only referenced twice in 88 articles, further supports the dominance of Western knowledge, erasing and delegitimizing local expertise.

While the intent of these narratives is likely to foster feelings of community, highlight global responsibility, and justify sharing resources across a global community, this framing may simultaneously contribute to justifying continued neo-colonialism, subordination, and erasure of the expertise of those who are most affected by the virus. It

supports the ideology of the ‘White Man’s Burden’ (Kipling, 1899) to exert colonial control.

Uncontrolled Natural World and The Perfect Storm

Another metaphorical frame of reference frequently conjured through metaphor conceptualizes monkeypox as a natural disaster, or weather event. Language describing it as a ‘flurry’, ‘iceberg’, ‘eruption’, or ‘wave’ supported this framing. Similarly, metaphors of plant growth, including descriptions of the virus ‘cropping up’, having ‘astonishingly rapid propagation’, and ‘continuing to grow’ evoke themes of apocalypse and a narrative of the uncontrollability of the natural world.

This metaphor brought forth different social narratives depending on the context in which it was used. In some cases, framing the virus as a ‘perfect storm’ highlighted the numerous contributing factors that allowed the outbreak to occur:

> The clear spike in infections occurred as globalization increased, humans continued encroaching on animal habitats and cross-protection offered from decades-old smallpox immunization began to wane. Given that perfect storm, many scientists weren’t shocked by the recent emergence of monkeypox in other countries around the world. (CBC, 1 June 2022)

In other cases, this metaphor seemed to imply a lack of causal responsibility – after all, we can’t control the weather: “The [WHO] is considering whether the flurry of cases should be assessed as a ‘potential public health emergency’” (Montreal Gazette, 1 June 2022). Similarly, it was reported that “the unprecedented outbreak of monkeypox in Europe and North America was a ‘random event’” – Leading advisor to the WHO (The Chronicle Herald, 23 May 2022), and “the priority is limiting the outbreak rather than

finding its origin" – Spokesperson for Montreal Public Health (Montreal Gazette, 1 June 2022). When framed as 'random', and understanding the cause deprioritized, the responsibility to have prepared for the outbreak is erased.

When used in conjunction with the narrative of 'neglect of Africa', however, metaphors of flood conveyed undertones of divine retribution, with the West needing a 'wake-up call' and facing the consequences of greed and selfishness, the result of "little to no investment in new diagnostic testing, vaccines, and treatments" because "innovation only comes when rich countries perceive a threat" (The Globe and Mail, 1 June 2022).

Supporting the framing of the perfect storm is the narrative of the virus' origin in climate change and the similarly numerous factors contributing to this global issue: "global and local changes to the Earth's climate and environment are driving new opportunities for virus sharing between animal species" (The Globe and Mail, 1 June 2022). Others noted: "Infectious disease threats will grow steadily in the years to come, for a variety of reasons, chief among them climate change" (The Globe and Mail, 31 May 2022). Like with the 'global community' narrative, this narrative suggests shared responsibility for the virus – and the threat of shared consequences. However, despite shared responsibility, there is no challenge to the normative behaviours and values that contribute to climate change, such as heavy reliance on mined minerals and fossil fuels, monocultural farming, consumerism and waste production. A 'perfect storm' metaphor, embeds monkeypox in narratives of climate change, connecting the origin of the virus to human behaviour

causing the destruction and disruption of the natural world and the inevitability of the threat to life as a consequence.

3.2.4 Discussion

This paper examined the different metaphors used to frame monkeypox in Canadian news media during the first month of the 2022 outbreak, and how these metaphors may evoke narratives that reproduce oppressive ideologies. While many different metaphors and narratives were used, examining how they relate to and support each other within dominant discourses gives insight into how they contribute to supporting oppressing ideologies.

One important reason to examine metaphors used in conveying scientific information is that these metaphors tend to shape what type of response and regulation are subsequently expected and tolerated (Merriman, 2015; O'Keefe et al., 2015). In this case, metaphors of policing and detection dominated, as they were present in almost every article included in the analysis. The response to the virus that was most commonly described was increasing surveillance, both on a social and individual level, particularly for the 2SLGBTQ+ community. While a 'ring vaccination' strategy – vaccinating the social circle of those exposed to the virus – was occasionally described, vaccination was only available to those who had undergone sufficient social or personal surveillance to be considered 'high risk'. The lack of immediate congruence between war metaphors, used in reference to the vaccine, and policing metaphors used in reference to the virus, may have helped to rationalise a response of surveillance over mass vaccination. Similarly, metaphorical

congruence between containment, and a distinct 'ring' of contacts that could be vaccinated may have supported this use of vaccines as a response.

One of the downfalls of metaphors is that in drawing comparisons, they can only ever convey a partial story, screening out other elements (Charteris-Black, 2004). This can be dangerous when it reinforces and naturalizes a particular, often dominant, worldview, to the exclusion of other possibilities (Sherwin, 2001). In the case of monkeypox, multiple metaphors were used locating the virus within multiple social narratives. While it has been hypothesized that using multiple metaphors may counter the effect of naturalizing a dominant discourse by opening up a variety of perspectives from which to view an idea, what often occurs is that these metaphors compound each other, still resulting in a limited frame of reference (Ceccarelli, 2004).

In the case presented here, many mixed metaphors compounded each other to still reinforce dominant ideologies. Metaphors of outbreak and containment may compound with metaphors of policing to allow for the rationalization of surveillance and forced confinement of those who deviate from the normative behaviour constructed by public health messaging, for example for gay men. Metaphors of attention and neglect support a system of metaphors implying a global community, which alongside the name 'monkeypox' fuels the infantilization and dehumanization of African peoples, and also justifies increased public health surveillance and intervention. It may also be possible to take these metaphor systems together and further rationalize the containment and surveillance of 'underdeveloped' African peoples for their deviant behaviour – for their

own good. While each of these metaphor systems on their own support components of oppressive ideologies, together they support a neo-colonial, capitalist, racist, heteronormative ideology. The ease with which some of the metaphorical language may support multiple metaphor systems, for example language of ‘spilling over’ metaphorically supporting both narratives of containment and flood as a natural disaster, or metaphors of family supporting both narratives of a global community and viral relationships, may further support the entanglement of these ideologies.

This analysis suggests multiple metaphors may each contribute a different partial story reflecting a different facet of normative, oppressive discourse. Importantly, this may occur despite direct messaging to the contrary. These oppressing ideologies are supported because each metaphor analysed here was not only present as part of an individual metaphor system of related metaphors, but was also linked to broader social narratives that exist as the backdrop upon which these metaphors are interpreted. For example, metaphors of nature may form a metaphor system of natural disaster, but they also invoke social narratives of climate change, apocalypse, and retribution which contribute to how these metaphors are interpreted and the frame of reference they create. These social narratives are not unique to metaphors of monkeypox, but connect monkeypox to existing ideas, constructing it in relation to them. These relationships help weave an understanding of monkeypox into social understanding by making it part of familiar stories (Deignan, 2010).

The implications of the metaphors used here are similar to those described in other case studies of viral outbreaks. In their exploration of how American newspapers represented the Ebola virus, Abeysinghe (2016) found the origin narrative of that outbreak "dwelt upon 'traditional' cultural features, referred to the population as inhabiting a homogeneous monolithic 'culture' and provided descriptions of the African 'jungle' rather than the contemporary urban space." (Abeysinghe, 2016, p. 463). In addition:

> The disease was transformed from a problem of the 'distant' area of West Africa to a domestic concern. Issues in the core impact zone were erased and underemphasised, with only general discussions of 'Africa' (and Africans)…contrasted with specific and prolonged examination of cases in the West. (Abeysinghe, 2016, p. 457)

A similar story, where the outbreak emerged as a result of 'uncivilized' contact with animals, followed by the erasure of the impacts of the virus and expertise of those in its endemic territory, occurred in this case pertaining to monkeypox. Interestingly, despite the frequent criticism that the virus and its impact in African countries was neglected until now, information that may serve to address this neglect was rarely included. Only one article included here had the specific intent of capturing the effect of monkeypox in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria (Asadu & JeanCP, 30 May 2022). This narrative was largely invisible.

In addition, consideration of multiple metaphors in relation to each other helps to illuminate how ideologies work together to uphold sociopolitical power structures, supporting an intersectional approach to analysis (Crenshaw, 1989). As Sally Haslinger (2020) describes, the social order is made up of many 'cooked together' ingredients, that include capitalism, white supremacy, sexism, ableism, etc, that once cooked, are

impossible to fully separate. Each of these 'ism' has their own logic (Manne, 2017) that allows oppressive actions to be justified. Metaphors help 'cook' new ideas, in this case monkeypox, in preparation for social consumption. Each narrative in combination with others, brings out a slightly different taste, but the recipe is incomplete without consideration of how each contributes to the overall flavour. Considering the narratives metaphors evoke and how these relate to multiple co-occurring and inseparable ideologies acknowledges the inseparable nature of these ingredients that together sustain a problematic social milieu.

An important limitation of this work is that the timeframe selected for this case study (the first month after the beginning of the outbreak in 2022) does not permit analysis of how metaphors may have 'settled in' over time leading to a socially dominant metaphor. Rather, it seeks to illuminate the initial possible conceptualizations made available within the media as the phenomenon made its way into the Canadian public's consciousness. A wider time frame of data collection may have allowed for comparison and contrast of metaphors used over time as more information about the virus became more widely known. In addition, the choice to include news media, rather than social media, likely meant that the metaphors used were more curated and intentional than they otherwise would have been. In the Canadian context, major news production corporations tend to strive for perceived political neutrality, rather than politically polarized as may more often occur in American news.

4.2.5 Conclusion

Monkeypox was represented in Canadian news media using a variety of metaphors during the first month of the 2022 outbreak. These metaphors, in the context of multiple narratives describing origins of the outbreak, and broader social narratives underlying oppressive ideologies, served to not only reflect systems of power and oppression, but provide frameworks within which they could be actively legitimated through a response within the same frame. As shown by critical analyses of other viruses such as Ebola, the combination of narrative, metaphor, and framing of monkeypox commonly supported colonial, white supremacist ideologies (Abeysinghe, 2016; Mabhala et al., 2020; Moodley & Lesage, 2020; Shahvisi, 2019; Ungar 1998). Particularly salient were policing and detective metaphors that exercised biopolitical power by justifying multiple levels of surveillance of, exerting control over, and 'othering' 2SLGBTQ+ people and communities (Gislason, 2013). While these ideologies are distinct, they share features of reinforcing oppressing systems. In addition, they contribute to reinforcing a normative ideal by casting certain groups as deviant, other, sub-human, and unnatural, which may be used to provide justification for continued oppression. Being critical of metaphors for not only the systems of power they reflect, but also the oppressing actions they can legitimate, is an important consideration for critical metaphor analysis.

End of Manuscript

4.3 SUMMARY AND REFLECTION

This manuscript explored how metaphors helped to embed the monkeypox virus into existing social narratives and how these narratives reinforced and justified oppressive ideologies. A novel phenomenon for most in Canada, a collective conceptualization or

social cognition of the monkeypox virus was constructed to give the virus social meaning. This has ethical implications because how it is constructed influences what we do to, with, and about the virus, and simultaneously what we do to, with, and about individuals and groups with whom it is socially connected. Analogical reasoning suggests the 'story of monkeypox' has the same structural features as narratives that support oppressing discourses: stories of policing and surveillance, stories of scientific imperialism, stories of colonial control, stories of white saviourism, stories of divine retribution. In this case, the social cognitions about the virus that metaphors helped to construct are those that restrict individual and collective freedoms, justify the disclosure of personal information, shape how we distribute limited resources, and influence collective identity perceptions and characteristics. These are ethically loaded actions and decisions.

That these stories happen to be ones that align with and perpetuate oppressive ideologies I argue is not an accident – it is part of a coordinated epistemic system that perpetuates the inequities that uphold it. In the following chapter, I explore the role of metaphors in this system and ways that they contribute to the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources in ways that perpetuate systems of privilege and oppression. That it is these stories that are available within the dominant discourse to form the building blocks of the social construction of monkeypox reflects how metaphors perpetuate inequalities within inequitable epistemic systems.

4.3.1 Reflection

One of the most difficult pieces of writing this chapter was that it forced me to put into words 'things you aren't supposed to say', and 'beliefs you aren't supposed to have' because whether explicitly acknowledged or not, these are the ideas and ideologies that make up the dominant discourse in which I am embedded. Many of the underlying narratives and discourses evoked through these metaphors – simianism, sexual deviance, neo-colonialism – are ones that I think, in general, we would prefer didn't exist. I would prefer they didn't exist. And it is therefore easier to pretend they don't exist and to not engage with them. In my current society in which 'cancelling' emerges as the strategy for engaging with (or rather avoiding) ideas and behaviours that are socially problematic, putting these words and ideas on a page, even in disagreement with them, feels like it carries a big risk. It feels wrong. It is almost like writing it down is somehow making it true, or making it right.

But I also think that is the point. That is likely one of the reasons these ideologies and ideas are 'concealed' in metaphors, where they can be evoked without actually having to say them, and perpetuated without having to explicitly acknowledge agreement with them while implying commitment to an oppressive system. Because actually saying them is uncomfortable, implying them without having to say them is easier and works to facilitate the same end. Metaphors can make things we may agree are socially wrong palatable for communication and perpetuation.

In addition, because metaphors require such interpretation, if called out, one can just say 'that's not what I meant'. With this, while writing this chapter, came the consistent fear of

over interpretation, the fear of ‘am I going too far if I connect this little thing, these few little words, to this big social problem? Can’t someone just come along and say I’ve overstretched this meaning? That I’m making something little into something big? That I am seeing harms that aren’t really there? That maybe that’s what they *said* but it isn’t what they *meant*?’

And again, I think that is the point, or at least illustrates the point. I *hope* that those using the above metaphors *were not* intentionally trying to promote the underlying ideologies and narratives to which the metaphors connected. I *hope* that if they were to read this analysis that they would argue that it is not the interpretation that they were going for. A hopeful reading of the fact that people went to great lengths at times to specify ‘monkeypox does not discriminate’ and to not blame any one group, and yet at the same time used metaphors that suggest those who are gay are ‘Other’, deviant, criminal, and targets, may suggest that we don’t have the narrative resources to communicate, and make understood, the story we would prefer to tell. It may be that it is not necessarily the intention of the communicator that is problematic, but that it is the resources at their disposal, which have been developed over time within an inequitable epistemic system, that constrain the meaning they are able to convey, and that simultaneously unintentionally also continue to support the inequitable epistemic system within which they are developed. This is explored further in the following chapter.

I also wonder about how the fear of over interpretation, the fear of going too far, the fear of making something little into something big, is a reflection of structural gaslighting

embedded in the norms of academic research and writing. As Nora Berenstain describes, gaslighting, "knowingly, intentionally, and consistently undermines the perceptions of another with the goals of making them appear 'crazy' to others, feel like they are losing their mind, and genuinely doubt their own grasp on reality" (Berenstain, 2020, p. 373-374). Following from this, "Structural gaslighting describes any conceptual work that functions to obscure the nonaccidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm that they produce and license" (Berenstain, 2020, p. 374). In this case, it is likely, given that systems of oppression function in coordinated ways, that the connections between metaphors and systemic narratives of oppression are nonaccidental. That is how oppression works.

Obscuring these connections by de-valuing and delegitimating the type of interpretation needed to make them structurally gaslights the experience of this reality and perpetuates these structures, denying their existence. It does this by enforcing a conceptual paradigm and the associated standards of objectivity. To make these connections may be to go beyond a level of interpretation fit for academic standards. And therefore these standards may obscure the reality of these connections by labeling them invalid. This not only gaslights the reality which I perceive during my interpretation, but I would argue contributes to the academic tendency to structurally gaslight the validity of research that strays from promoting objectivist norms. So even if what some may consider 'over' interpretation is needed to make the connections between these individual linguistic acts and the oppressing narratives that they support, I would rather err on the side of 'over' interpretation, the side of acknowledging oppression and validating the experience of 'the

patterns of harm they license and produce' than the side of obscuring it. Acknowledging that research is not done in a vacuum, and given that the reaction of those with whom this research was discussed in the process of wrestling with these ideas (who also happen to be members of the communities who are harmed by the ideologies that these metaphors promote) was: 'finally someone is talking about the things that are actually important here', I am willing to accept this risk.

4.3.2 Chapter 4 Conclusion

What I have argued so far is that metaphors within inequitable social systems have ethical implications for at least two reasons. First, when reasoning based on ethical principles, they may shape what principle takes priority, and shape how that principle becomes specified within the case in question. In the case of using war metaphors to frame COVID-19, metaphors implied that the principle of justice should be prioritized and specified using characteristics of military justice, legitimating actions that supported this interpretation. Second, metaphors shape in what narrative new phenomenon are embedded; analogical reasoning based on this narrative implies how the story is supposed to unfold suggesting what is 'right' aligns with moving the narrative in the direction of its discursive norm. Yet, as demonstrated with the example of monkeypox, narratives that are part of dominant discourses tend to have plots that, when reproduced analogically, re-create and legitimate the foundational ideologies of dominant, oppressive discourses. These two functions of metaphors are not necessarily distinct in practice. Pragmatically, ethical principles and values cannot be untangled from their history and the stories in which they emerge, and the stories and examples that make them 'right'. Stories as well have moral implications, often forming the foundation of moral principles on which we

can agree. Both are necessarily entangled with each other and emerge because there is some aspect of 'truth' to them. They both form part of the discursive packages on which metaphors draw in creating a social reality and legitimating actions within that reality. This is some of the work that metaphors do in inequitable social systems that has ethical implications.

Yet, as I have alluded, ethical implications emerge not just with what metaphors can legitimate and how they can guide our actions. There is something in the process of how metaphors work, of how they use analogical reasoning to reach a conclusion, that is worthy of ethical interrogation. How is it that they can do this work of legitimating actions and beliefs that with interrogation we would otherwise find ethically problematic, and do it in a way that appears natural? How do they take 'some truth' and make it 'the whole truth'? Why is it that *dominant ideologies* emerge in their use, justifying the field of critical metaphor analysis in the first place? How is the epistemic system coordinated to make that happen? That is the topic of the following chapter which looks at the ethical implications of the epistemic work that metaphors do within inequitable epistemic systems.

CHAPTER 5 METAPHORS AS EPISTEMIC PRACTICE: THE ETHICS OF EPISTEMIC WORK

5.1 CHAPTER 5 OVERVIEW

In the previous two chapters, I examined some of the ethical implications of metaphors, including shaping what ethical principles are prioritized when they conflict in decision making and what actions metaphors may justify by implying the 'right' narrative plot phenomena are supposed to take. While these are some of the ethical implications of metaphors, how is it that they can have these ethically problematic effects? What is it about how metaphors work when they are used in inequitable social systems that allows this to happen? That is the topic of this chapter.

In this chapter, rather than exploring the ethical implication of the work metaphors do by interrogating the types of conclusions they lead us to draw, here I examine ethical aspects of the work that metaphors do on an epistemic level, asking how they influence the epistemic system within which we find ourselves.

This manuscript is framed broadly in the context of the use of war metaphors, as this is a significant discussion in the ethics of metaphors and one that has drawn a lot of debate and criticism in recent years. This aligns with the level of analysis present in the previous two manuscripts – analysis of the effects of metaphors on decision making and actions. However, this manuscript invites a deeper discussion looking not at the ethical

implications of this epistemic work, but rather at the ethics of this work in itself and the ways metaphors shape our understanding of persons as knowers and the information and beliefs available for knowing. Based on the ethics of this work in itself, I then proceed in the final concluding chapter to explore how we can use metaphors to do ethically good epistemic work.

The following manuscript has undergone multiple rounds of review and was published in *Hypatia* in January, 2024 under creative commons license that allows it to be freely reproduced here in full. Using Blending Theory as a foundation for how metaphors shape and are shaped by conceptualizations, this manuscript looks at the ethical implications of this epistemic process within inequitable epistemic systems. It concludes by outlining considerations for reflection and analysis that one can use to determine the likelihood of epistemic harm arising from a metaphor's use. This manuscript is theoretically grounded in philosophical work on epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) and the social production of ignorance (Mills, 2007). This considers the ethics of both the distribution of the epistemic resources that are available, and the ethics of the resources that are socially made to be absent. I argue that the presence of resources in inequitable distribution and the systematic absence of particular resources both have ethical implications and that metaphors contribute to both injustices.

Sibbald, K.R. (2024). Are metaphors ethically bad epistemic practice?: Epistemic injustice at the intersections. *Hypatia.* Published online 2024:1-21. doi:10.1017/hyp.2023.90

5.2 MANUSCRIPT: ARE METAPHORS ETHICALLY BAD EPISTEMIC PRACTICE?: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AT THE INTERSECTIONS

In 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the #ReframeCovid initiative sought contributions of non-war-related figurative language to promote alternative ways to understand the global pandemic ("The Initiative," 2020). The call went out for people all over the world to contribute to an open-source collection of visual and linguistic metaphors to provide alternatives to the war metaphors that dominated how people around the world framed, and therefore responded to, the pandemic (Gök & Kara, 2021; Vlastou, 2021). Criticism arose about how war metaphors justified the continued marginalization of women's health (Bailey et al., 2021), supported the agenda of those with political power (Chapman & Miller, 2020), and fuelled xenophobia (Khan et al., 2021). If metaphors are to be blamed for playing a role in perpetuating these social problems, to the extent that a global movement arose to change them, it is probable that metaphors have both epistemic and ethical consequences. At present, however, we lack a framework to explain how and why this is the case.

In this paper, I draw on Blending Theory, a theory of cognition, and theories of epistemic injustice, to map an explanatory framework that reveals both the epistemic and ethical implications of metaphors. First, I outline Blending Theory and the relationship between metaphors and their potential epistemic consequences. Second, I explain two ways that metaphors shape our hermeneutical resources and how these have the potential to contribute to epistemic injustice. For each, I outline how metaphors that lead to epistemic

injustice by contributing to the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources and thereby supporting an inequitable status quo, may constitute ethically bad epistemic practices.

In the following section, I examine the conceptual impacts of metaphors in the context of the multidirectional power relationships and diverse identities characteristic of lived experience. I consider how metaphors used to support social change create ethical tensions that distribute epistemic resources in ways that can both support and undermine efforts towards epistemic justice. What distinguishes those that are ethical from those that are not is their relationship to the dominant discourse and their impact on concepts that capture group experience and influence credibility judgements. These considerations ought to be contextualized within an inequitable epistemic system. Following, I address the debate around the use of the war metaphor in healthcare contexts. As such, I suggest that the considerations I present provide resources to help determine whether a metaphor may constitute ethically bad knowledge practice, particularly considering the complexity of intersectional power relations within inequitable epistemic systems.

5.2.1 Metaphors and Blending Theory

'Blending Theory' emerged from the cognitive sciences and began to receive attention for systematic study by Giles Fauconnier and Mark Turner in 1993 (Fauconnier & Turner 2003). It has since influenced research in mathematics, social science, literature and linguistics (Fauconnier & Turner 2003). Blending Theory is a theory of mental operation that explains the construction of meaning (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003). In this theory, mental spaces are "small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action" (Fauconnier & Turner 2002, 40). These

spaces are dynamic and can be modified as discourse unfolds (Fauconnier &Turner 2003). Within this theory, there are multiple types of conceptual integration. The type of integration relevant to understanding metaphors is Double-Scope (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003). Double-Scopes create a frame of reference between two fundamentally different, clashing inputs (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003), such as the two concepts that are brought together to make meaning with a metaphor. Metaphors, according to Blending Theory, fuse concepts in a way that prompts the construction of mental spaces that generate meaning (Fauconnier & Turner 1998). Metaphors do this by blending what is known about each concept used in the metaphor – for example the input concepts of 'men' and 'wolves' in the metaphor 'men are wolves' – in the context of generic background knowledge, to generate new meaning (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Hart, 2008). This emergent meaning is the product of three steps: 1) composition: the fusion of the domains – the input spaces – and the ideas associated with them, 2) completion – the integration of select background information with the fused ideas, and 3) elaboration – the cognitive work that emerges from the generated frame of reference, such as reasoning and drawing inferences along the lines of the metaphor (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Hart, 2008). For example in the metaphor 'men are wolves' we may consider the steps: 1) composition: fusing the ideas of men and wolves; 2) completion: integrating select background information, such as narratives involving anthropomorphized wolves from the fable 'Little Red Riding Hood', or a wolf in sheep's clothing, and the context of the metaphor to create a framework for understanding what is being expressed; and 3) elaboration: reasoning about how to act as a man if men are conceptualized as wolves, such as acting

with cunning or violence, or how to interact with men conceptualized as a wolves, such as being suspicious or guarded against hidden violent intentions.

The relationship between the ideas fused makes some background information more likely to be recruited than other. In the example above, not all information known about wolves or men is likely to be recruited through the metaphor comparing men to wolves, such as wolves travelling in packs, howling at the moon, or running fast, because these are less salient in the fusion of the ideas ‘men’ and ‘wolves,’ given background context. This partial recruitment contributes to metaphors’ ability to both create and persuade, something that has made them “philosophy’s greatest enemy and also its greatest ally” (Ricœur 2003, 10). The result is that metaphors evoke a frame of reference that influences reasoning in a way that is both partial, and evaluative (Deignan, 2010). When only select generic background information is recruited: “speakers may choose to recruit [a] particular structure in order to promote a certain perceived reality” (Hart 2008, 97). This select information reinforces a particular ideology (Hart, 2008). One ideology reinforced by the above example metaphor may be heteronormative masculinity, emphasizing strength, power, cunning, and violence (Manne, 2018).

In the elaboration stage, the metaphor ‘becomes reality’ as it is entrenched in patterns of thought and action that convey and reinforce particular ideologies (Hart, 2008). When the relationship between ‘men’ and ‘wolves’ becomes the framework within which one reasons about what ‘men’ are, one is then likely to act based on this reasoning (Lakoff & Johnson 2003). Studies examining the implications of metaphors have found that people

are more likely to endorse actions that align with the metaphorical framing of a problem than ones that conflict, such as responding with force when crime is metaphorically described as a beast (Thibodeau, 2016), or using antidepressants if mental illness is framed as a chemical imbalance (Kemp et al., 2014). Through metaphors, “the audience is persuaded to adopt specific opinions which reflect the ideology of those who have the power to create that discourse and disseminate their metaphors” (Efeoğlu Özcan 2022, 171). In addition, because “people in power get to impose their metaphors” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), the reality conveyed through dominant metaphors reflects the experience of those in positions of social power and the ideologies that support their status. Used frequently enough, the knowledge produced through elaboration may shape the background knowledge recruited for future understanding (Fraser, 2018). For example, frequent use of the ‘men are wolves’ metaphor may contribute to what background information is recruited when the ideas of ‘men’ and ‘wolves’ are used in future discourse. When the reality the metaphor conveys reflects the experience of those empowered by the dominant discourse, these experiences are validated, such as displaying or accepting heteronormative masculinity; experiences of reality that contradict or are excluded by the metaphor are obscured.

While metaphors are traditionally defined as “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing or experience in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 455), when viewed in the context of Blending Theory (Hart 2008; Fauconnier & Turner 1998), I argue it is more appropriate to define a metaphor as evoking a frame of reference within which one understands and experiences one or both things in relation to a partial understanding of

the other. What this definition adds is the recruitment of select, partial background information for generating new meaning (the completion stage described above) and the production of not only an idea or experience, but one that may then be generative of additional reasoning (the elaboration stage described above). It also allows for non-traditional metaphors, such as models (Black, 1960; Brown, 2003), archetypes (Black, 1960), and analogy (Childress, 2012), to be included within this definition, and thus be analyzed through this lens. In addition, by acknowledging metaphors' conceptual generative potential, it acknowledges that ideas contributing to the metaphor may be altered by its composition. This alteration of conceptual space, I argue, has both epistemic and ethical consequences as it influences both understanding and subsequent behaviour. Defining metaphors in this way shifts the conversation from what metaphors 'are', to what metaphors 'do'. These components acknowledge the possibility that metaphors may do diverse epistemic work within dynamic knowledge systems.

5.2.2 Metaphors as Ethically Bad Knowledge Practices

Using this model to understand how metaphors work highlights the inherent partiality of the frameworks for reasoning that they produce. Partial recruitment of the ideas associated with each concept in the context of relevant background information blend to produce a framework that leaves out some conceptual elements of each concept. The elaboration that subsequently occurs neglects consideration of these left-out conceptual elements. I argue this feature gives metaphors the potential to do at least the two following types of potentially harmful epistemic work:

1. Metaphors can direct us away from, and distort, our understanding of the concepts the metaphors are otherwise illuminating.

2. Metaphors can exploit the terms they use to elucidate a concept or experience in ways that distort one or both terms, so they are no longer useful for their main purpose.

In both cases, metaphors may affect the epistemic resources available in ways that can make them less useful for understanding or conveying experience, causing epistemic harm.

For example, a metaphor that causes epistemic harm by altering the concept it intends to illuminate may be found in the metaphor 'the body attacks itself' to describe the experience of autoimmune disease. Beth Ferri (2018) discusses her experience with autoimmune disease, arguing that while the concept this metaphor evokes does capture some aspects of her experience, this metaphor casts her as both the enemy and the hero, which does not acknowledge important parts of her experience, including the interconnection between the immune system and other aspects of her body and everyday life (Ferri, 2018). The metaphor 'the body attacks itself' excludes these elements from the concept of 'experiencing autoimmune disease', reducing the concept and making it more challenging for Ferri (2018) to convey her experience. By altering a concept so that it no longer captures important components of experience that 'experiencing autoimmune disease' otherwise may have, the epistemic resources to understand and communicate this experience are obscured.

In this case, the frame of reference produced through the metaphor excludes elements of the concept it seeks to elucidate, altering the epistemic resources available for conveying

experience. However, metaphors may also cause epistemic harm by exploiting the *terms they use* to convey an experience so that they are no longer useful for their main purpose. For example, there are some concepts that accurately capture experiences because of their strength, such as misogyny (Manne, 2018), and rape (Fraser, 2018). When these words are used as the input domain in metaphors that draw comparisons between this domain and others that weaken the concept's ability to capture the significance of the experience, it results in epistemic harm because members of particular groups are no longer able to accurately communicate their experience when it is in their interest to do so (Fraser, 2018). As such, using the metaphor "rape the fields" when talking about crops, or comparing winning a sporting event to 'raping' the other team, trivializes the language concept of rape in a way that takes away the power of the language to communicate the actual experience of rape (Fraser, 2018). The metaphor diminishes the epistemic resources of those who have an interest in communicating their experience. Although the experience may still be understood, the epistemic resources to communicate it are rendered insufficient. They are distorted because they are altered by their involvement in metaphorically conveying a different experience.

5.2.3 Altering Concepts as Epistemic Harm

Metaphors can therefore cause epistemic harm by either altering the concept they wish to illuminate or altering the concepts they use in ways that negatively affect the ability of certain groups of people to convey their experience. I argue this constitutes epistemic injustice, "a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower" (Fricker, 2007, p. 1), because it deprives groups of people of the existing epistemic resources to understand and convey their experience.

I argue these conceptual alterations that metaphors may produce can take two related forms: exclusion (leading to reduction), and dilution. In the case of exclusion, elements of a concept are 'pushed out' of the conceptualization so that they are not captured by the frame of reference produced. The 'body attacking itself' metaphor is an example of this. Elements of experience that may otherwise have been associated with autoimmune disease, such as a lack of dichotomy between the 'body' and the 'self', cannot make sense within this framing (Ferri 2018). What otherwise may have received conceptual space is excluded. This exclusion may result in a type of conceptual foreclosure by prematurely limiting alternative conceptualization, leading to epistemic oppression (Dotson, 2012).

In contrast, a metaphor may distort a concept by bringing in additional conceptual elements, directing attention away from those that are key components of experience. The above metaphors using 'rape' are examples. In these cases, additional elements are being added to the concept – that of losing a sports game, or farming – that distort the concept so that it no longer has the same power to convey the experience for which it was originally intended. These metaphors still leave space for the original meaning of the concept but dilute it by focusing attention away from this meaning.

While these two conceptual alterations are distinct, they are related in that they both result in the distortion of concepts in ways that prevent the use of these concepts from adequately conveying experiences. However, distortion by dilution still leaves room for the experience to be captured within the frame of references (albeit less saliently than it

otherwise would), whereas distortion by exclusion prevents the concept from capturing experiences for which it was otherwise intended.

I argue that the epistemic injustices produced through metaphors in these ways are a type of hermeneutical injustice distinct from the lacunae in resources that Fricker (2007) describes as contributing to hermeneutical injustice. Fricker (2007) argues that hermeneutical injustice occurs when someone "has a significant area of their social experience obscured from understanding owing to prejudicial flaws in shared resources for social interpretation" (147). This is arguably what occurs in the above-described cases; the alterations to either the concepts used or illuminated by the metaphors dilute or exclude conceptual elements in ways that distort these concepts, creating flaws in these shared conceptual resources for social interpretation. When metaphors work in this way, we may therefore say that they result in hermeneutical injustice. However, this injustice is not the result of a "a collective hermeneutical lacuna" (Fricker, 2007, p. 157) where prejudicial flaws in shared epistemic resources have left a yet-to-be-filled gap that prevents one from rendering their experience intelligible. In this case, there is no negative space or gap in concept. Elements have either been pushed out, leaving no space for those needed to convey experience, or are there, but diluted beyond utility. This 'hermeneutical pruning' cuts back conceptual resources, shaping and limiting the direction within which future hermeneutical growth is possible, while 'hermeneutical dilution' decreases the conceptual saliency and therefore the utility of the concept.

Instead, I argue that these types of injustice are similar to the second type of unknowing described by Rebecca Mason (2011) in her critique of Fricker's (2007) explanation of hermeneutical injustice. Mason (2011) argues that the 'gap' Fricker describes:

> is ambiguous between two kinds of unknowing: an unknowing to which members of non-dominant social groups are subject by virtue of their systematic hermeneutical marginalization and an unknowing to which members of dominant groups are subject by virtue of their ethically bad knowledge practices. (295)

Mason (2011) suggests that ethically bad knowledge practices are those that "maintain gaps in dominant hermeneutical resources even while alternative interpretations are in fact offered by non-dominant discourses" (p.301). They contribute to miscognition, an epistemic agreement to see the world wrongly, sustaining false beliefs (Mason, 2011; Mills, 2007). Drawing on Mills (2007), Mason (2011) argues that the ignorance produced is "a kind of epistemically culpable and morally noxious *mis*cognition that facilitates the maintenance of the status quo" (Mason, 2011, p. 302). I argue that both types of conceptual alterations resulting from the work that metaphors do may contribute to the type of miscognition that Mason (2011) describes. However, like with Fricker's (2007) definition on which Mason (2011) draws, I argue that 'maintaining a gap' is insufficient to capture the type of miscognition that metaphors may facilitate. I therefore argue that epistemically bad knowledge practices also include those that prune or dilute conceptual elements from dominant hermeneutical resources when the available dominant hermeneutical resources would otherwise have been sufficient to convey experiences of those who are epistemically marginalized. Metaphors may therefore produce ignorance through promoting hermeneutical injustice by taking away hermeneutical resources useful for conveying experience. Through these means, metaphors can facilitate

miscognition that maintains *or exacerbates* the status quo, which can be considered ethically bad epistemic practice.

5.2.4 Conceptual Resources and Testimonial Injustice

I have argued thus far that the conceptual alterations that result from metaphors may decrease the utility of the concepts they use and evoke, impairing one's ability to adequately understand and communicate experience, and that this constitutes a type of hermeneutical injustice. However, due to the relationship between the available hermeneutical resources and testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007), alterations in concepts that result in dilution and exclusion, when those concepts are meant to capture qualities that impact credibility judgements, may be particularly problematic.

Metaphors may entrench group-based credibility errors by reinforcing stereotypes. Stereotypes can emerge or be reinforced through metaphors (Young et al., 2019). For example, repeated use of metaphors that compare 'experiencing dementia' to 'being a zombie' create and reinforce a stereotype of dementia that renders those who experience it as inhuman and incompetent (Young et al., 2019). The fusion of ideas associated with zombies, such as 'emptiness', 'brainless', 'contagion', 'inhuman', and 'living dead' with ideas associated with 'dementia' produces a frame of reference within which reasoning that a person with dementia lacks credibility makes sense because markers of credibility are pushed out of the concept. The result may be that those with dementia self-silence their experience out of fear they are unreliable (Young et al., 2019), what Kristie Dotson refers to as 'testimonial smothering' (Dotson, 2011). It may also result in those with dementia not being considered knowers and therefore not identified as valuable

knowledge contributors in decisions that are in their interest (Young et al., 2019), what Dotson refers to as 'testimonial quieting' (Dotson, 2011). The frame of reference this metaphor supports justifies reasoning that a person is:

> cognitively unreliable, emotionally compromised, existentially unstable or otherwise epistemically unreliable in a way that renders their testimonies and interpretations suspect simply by virtue of their status as an ill person with little sensitivity to their factual condition and state of mind. (Carel & Kidd 2014, p.5-6)

This would constitute ethically bad epistemic practice as the miscognition it produces denies one the credibility resources they are due and prevents potentially valuable testimony from being included in the knowledge production process. This occurs when the concept 'dementia' is pruned through the use of metaphor to exclude markers of credibility. This entrenches ageist and ableist ideologies.

In addition, testimonial injustice may occur when a metaphor produces or reinforces a stereotype that encourages a group-based credibility error that is a credibility excess, rather than a credibility deficit. For example, the metaphor 'just what the doctor ordered', or 'doctor's orders' may evoke a frame for reasoning in which a physician is given more credit than they are due based on their status as a physician, rather than their actual credibility on a particular subject. This metaphor, in the Western context, which uses 'the military general' as the input domain to which the physician is compared, conceptually reinforces a paternalistic and authoritarian relationship between a doctor and patient (Nie et al. 2016). This, I argue, may bolster physician testimony with a credibility excess because of their status as physician, rather than their epistemic credentials. Additional credibility resources become included in the concept of 'physician' when they otherwise may not have been, detracting attention from the fallibility of physicians and the

limitations of their knowledge. Because of this excess credibility, those not members of this group may also self-silence or not be consulted when their testimony could contribute to knowledge production, thereby producing testimonial smothering and quieting (Dotson, 2011). Those who do contribute may be ignored because of their comparably-lower group-based credibility to the physician, thereby producing testimonial injustice (Medina 2011).

In both cases, alterations to the conceptual categories within which people are viewed influence the perceived credibility they are due. Because what is being diluted or excluded are credibility resources that influence credibility judgements, making an accurate judgement less likely, these metaphors facilitate testimonial injustice. When these credibility resources are distributed to grant those in privileged positions excess credibility or create a credibility deficit for those in marginalized positions, the unequal distribution of epistemic resources maintains the status quo and the metaphor may constitute ethically bad epistemic practice.

Thus far, I have argued that metaphors may facilitate epistemic injustice by producing alterations in either the concepts on which they draw, or those they seek to illuminate. These alterations may be exclusions, whereby the concept is pruned to exclude important conceptual elements for capturing experience, or dilutions, whereby the concept is altered to include additional conceptual elements in ways that detract attention from important conceptual elements for capturing experience. When this occurs through metaphors that aim to capture experience, hermeneutical injustice may occur as conceptual resources for

conveying an experience are made insufficient. When metaphors alter conceptual categories by diluting or excluding information that is used to make credibility judgements in ways that make them inaccurate, testimonial injustice may occur.

5.2.5 Social Structures and Power Dynamics

What has so far received insufficient attention in this analysis is the role of social structures and power dynamics in this account. As noted in the introduction, not all metaphors have the same status within inequitable social epistemic conditions where the dominant discourse is the reality against which 'truth' is judged (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980): "the people who get to impose their metaphors on a culture get to define what we consider true – absolutely and objectively true" (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 160). As Mason (2011) describes, failure of the dominant hermeneutical resources to adequately convey experience does not preclude the possibility that there are other non-dominant hermeneutical resources one can use to convey their experience. As such, altering a concept within the dominant hermeneutical resources does not necessarily mean an alternative conceptualization cannot exist. Rather, I argue, injustice may occur because the inequitable epistemic status quo is maintained and/or reinforced through the conceptual distortions that metaphors produce in the dominant hermeneutical resources, where these resources hold the social status of 'truth'.

Considering the status quo of the dominant hermeneutical resources is unjust, maintenance or proliferation of this status quo furthers its injustice (Mason, 2011). However, because metaphors can distort conceptual resources, they also have the

potential to distort concepts as they exist within the dominant hermeneutical resources in ways that make clear experiences that may otherwise be obscured. In this way distortion caused by metaphors has the potential to facilitate epistemic justice. Take for example the metaphor in which a wheelchair is referred to as a 'corvette'. In this case, the metaphor pushes the concept of using a wheelchair to better reflect more aspects of the experience of using a wheelchair; the experience of gaining mobility, freedom, and independence through using a wheelchair may feel similar to getting a car. This 'freedom' is counter to a dominant discourse in which a person using a wheelchair is described as 'confined' or 'trapped'. The metaphor dilutes the concept of 'the experience of using a wheelchair' to also include elements of freedom, expanding the concept to reflect a wider variety of experiences, when those experiences have been historically problematically excluded from the dominant discourse. In cases like this, the dilution expands conceptual resources in ways that include realities that may otherwise be excluded, challenging the problematic status quo that the dominant hermeneutical resources proliferate.

However, because contradicting or challenging the dominant discourse may be considered a mark of incredibility, using metaphors such as this may result in a person receiving an undue credibility deficit. If those who impose their biased metaphors consider the metaphors and the ideologies they support to be absolute truth (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), distorting these metaphors to include hermeneutical resources that are excluded from those that are dominant may be perceived as conveying an untruth. This may result in a credibility deficit that increases the likelihood that one will experience testimonial injustice. Building on the example above, someone who metaphorically

frames a wheelchair as a corvette may be dismissed as childlike or delusional for conveying an inaccurate representation of reality, when reality is measured against the dominant discourse. Insofar as markers of credibility within the dominant discourse include communicating using hermeneutical resources that maintain and proliferate the inequitable status quo, distorting concepts in ways that challenge the status quo, while promoting hermeneutical justice, may result in experiencing testimonial injustice. Checks and balances within the epistemic system work to sustain an inequitable status quo by invalidating the testimony of those who challenge it. This testimonial injustice, however, is the possible result of using the metaphor in a social context, it is not inherent to the work that the metaphor does on a conceptual level. Yet, this result has very real impacts when metaphors are used by people within inequitable social systems – impacts with epistemic consequences. This complicates the judgement of whether or not a metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice.

Concurrently, because metaphors that support the dominant discourse may be considered a mark of credibility, they may be used to bolster the credibility of someone who may otherwise be attributed an undue credibility deficit. They may therefore result in apparent testimonial justice, even if injustice may occur through the distortion of conceptual resources in ways that support an inequitable status quo. The specific power dynamics at play in the situation in which the metaphor is used, as well as the metaphor's relationship to the dominant conceptual resources must therefore be considered.

For example, consider the ‘doctor is a military general’ metaphor described above. There, I argued that this metaphor, by including a concept in ‘the physician’s role’ of someone who holds absolute authority, may be unethical because it reinforces a credibility excess attributed to the physician. Insofar as the conceptual category ‘physician’, which is used as a marker of credibility, becomes distorted, it increases the credibility of the physician in ways that support the status quo. In general, it may be accurate that physicians enjoy a privileged social position with significant credibility (Parsons, 1939) and that this metaphor bolsters this credibility by drawing on the paternalistic conceptualization of the military general (Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016). This metaphor, *in general*, may therefore sustain false beliefs in excess physician credibility. (For example, a physician may not possess the knowledge needed to be credible on a condition because it is under-researched and under-taught in medical school, and those with lived experience of the condition may have more knowledge about it than physicians, as has been shown to be the case with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (Blease et al., 2017)). When used in the social context in which this is the case, this metaphor may unduly bolster physician testimony, granting them more credibility than is warranted. As the physician enjoys greater privilege in a medical encounter than a patient (Blease et al., 2017; Parsons, 1939), this metaphor may sustain the status quo of medical paternalism by unfairly distributing epistemic resources in a way that is ethically bad epistemic practice. This injustice can in turn lead to harm through misdiagnosis, and failure to provide appropriate, timely treatment (Manne, 2021). This analysis only includes the power relationship between the physician and patient roles.

However, this same metaphor used in the case of a physician experiencing an undue credibility deficit because of their membership in a marginalized group, such as a physician who is racialized, a woman, disabled, LGBTQ+, Indigenous, working-class, and/or an ethnic minority (Kaye 2021; Sibbald 2021; Sibbald and Beagan 2022) may neutralize an existing unjust credibility deficit. Therefore, while the 'physician is a military general' metaphor may be ethically bad epistemic practice because it bolsters a physician's testimony to the point of credibility excess, thereby reinforcing a paternalistic ideology, it may also neutralize an undue credibility deficit by challenging racist, ableist, sexist, heteronormative, colonial, and classist ideologies by bolstering testimony to give someone the credibility they are due.

Relatedly, the 'born in the wrong body' metaphor may function similarly for those seeking gender-affirming healthcare treatment when the power dynamic between the healthcare provider and person seeking healthcare is biased towards the healthcare provider. This metaphor is the socially dominant metaphor for the transgender experience (Putzi, 2017), and one that may need to be employed to achieve credibility in clinical encounters and facilitate gender-affirming medical treatment because of its alignment with the dominant medical discourse (Johnson, 2015). When a person is already at a power disadvantage because of their status as patient, using dominant narratives to convey experience may allow for the person to be considered credible (Carel & Kidd 2014). However, on a structural level, it reinforces the idea that gender is binary (Bettcher, 2014; Putzi, 2017). Not only may this inaccurately reflect the range of experiences of being transgender (Kobabe, 2019), it validates and engrains the

hermeneutical resources that underscore gender-oppressive power structures within the dominant discourse. When considering the multiple relationships between the physician and the patient within the dominant cis-heteronormative ideology, the metaphor may be ethically bad epistemic practice as it could be considered testimonial smothering, a coerced silencing involving "the truncating of one's own testimony in order to ensure that the testimony contains only content for which one's audience demonstrates testimonial competence" (Dotson, 2011, p. 244); yet it simultaneously allows the person to receive the credibility they are due and access the resources they require.

Similarly, feeling ‘down’ is a common metaphor for depression (Coll-Florit et al., 2021). If this metaphor is being used by a patient to communicate her experience to a health professional in a way that bridges the epistemic gap between patient and healthcare provider, it may facilitate testimonial justice. The patient may be drawing on the hermeneutical resources at her disposal to communicate across an epistemic divide what a healthcare provider may conceptualize as ‘negative affect’. This may be the best epistemic tool at her disposal and capture her understanding of her experience, resulting in her being received as credible. This is characteristic of testimonial justice (Fricker, 2007).

Now, this may be the best epistemic tool at her disposal because of a history of Western, colonial medicine, popular culture, and pharmaceutical promotion has entrenched the metaphor ‘depression is down’ and ‘down is bad’ in dominant discourse to the exclusion of others (Delbaere, 2013; Elliott, 2003; Linklater, 2014). And it may also limit other

possible expressions and conceptually neglect important experiential components, such as loss of appetite, which are in her interest to have attended. In addition, as feminist critiques of psychiatry have argued, it may also circumvent attention to situational components that may justifiably contribute to experiencing 'downness', such as gendered poverty, maternal role expectations, sexual objectification, and trauma (Tobia et al., 2013). By reinforcing this metaphor through its use in this context, it may entrench a conceptualization of depression that makes those who express alternatives unintelligible and in-credible, and therefore be considered an ethically bad epistemic practice at the same time as it facilitates testimonial justice by rendering the testifier credible, which is ethically good practice.

These examples illustrate the complex interaction between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. In all three of these examples, metaphors were used to ensure the testifier received the credit they were due in situations where an unfair credibility deficit was otherwise present or highly likely to be present. They therefore to appear to be examples of transactional testimonial justice (Anderson, 2012); the testifier is drawing on the dominant hermeneutical resources available to capture their experience and is given the reception they are due in the testimonial exchange because this testimony bears the appropriate markers of credibility (Carel & Kidd, 2014).

Yet in each of the three cases, the testimony that was provided using metaphor may not have been reflective of the experience the testifier was attempting to communicate. In the example of the physician identifying with a marginalized group, the metaphor may be

challenging testimonial quieting, the failure to identify a person as a knower due to their lack of credibility resources (Dotson, 2011), by increasing credibility resources at the expense of testimony reflecting experience. In the example of the person seeking gender affirming care, this may be testimonial smothering: "the truncating of one's own testimony in order to ensure that the testimony contains only content for which one's audience demonstrates testimonial competence" (Dotson, 2011, p. 244). In both cases, while credibility was bolstered, it was bolstered by truncated testimony: testimony only partially reflective of experience. This truncated testimonial justice, whereby a person is given the credit they are due for their testimony, when this testimony insufficiently reflects the experience they are trying to understand and communicate, may be particularly salient with the use of metaphors. Given that metaphors may distort conceptual resources by diluting and pruning resources available within the dominant discourse and that they tend to reflect and reproduce a dominant discourse, their use by those already in a position of social and epistemic disadvantage may increase the likelihood of experiencing truncated testimonial justice. Yet, one may not have a choice but to pursue this truncated testimonial injustice along with the material resources it affords as the already-inequitable epistemic system would otherwise put them at risk of more severe forms of epistemic injustice. Truncated testimonial justice, although not epistemic *justice,* may be better than testimonial injustice; it may be a means of survival and a strategy for avoiding further epistemic exploitation in some circumstances (Berenstain, 2016).

In the third example, the person with depression gave testimony using metaphor that was not necessarily inaccurate, but may have been insufficient to capture the experience of depression. This is likely a case of contributory injustice because the resources that would have been useful have been excluded from the dominant discourse because of the exclusion of their originators (Dotson, 2011). While the person may have been doing their best with the resources available to them, these resources are insufficient. Testimonial justice is therefore truncated by the availability of resources with which to testify and maintain credibility.

What these three examples illustrate is transactional testimonial justice (which I argue is truncated transactional testimonial justice) with simultaneous structural hermeneutical injustice (Anderson, 2012). Apparent testimonial justice is achieved in the transaction as the testifier receives the credibility they are due and the material effects this affords, yet the testimony used to achieve this state is not reflective of their experience due to the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources within the epistemic system. Their testimony may continue to entrench the credibility of dominant discourses and the incredibility of alternatives, and yet, may be more ethical than the injustice that would otherwise result. It may be the better of two unjust options. Examples like these require a case-by-case assessment with close attention paid to all effects, particularly if epistemic justice in its fully realized form is unavailable due to the inequitable epistemic system within which testifiers find themselves.

In addition, the inverse is also possible: hermeneutical justice may be achieved at the expense of transactional testimonial justice. Although those who use novel metaphors may help to create and sustain the hermeneutical resources needed to challenge oppressive systems, the cost is the potential for transactional testimonial injustice – these metaphors may render one in-credible. K. Steslow (2010) describes this type of experience when discussing her use of the metaphor 'experiencing mental illness is being a migratory bird experiencing avian flu'. This metaphorical description is at odds with how those with whom she interacts in the medical system conceptualize and understand mental illness – it does not have the markers of credibility in the medical context because it challenges the dominant discourse (Carel & Kidd, 2014). By using this metaphor, she risks that it will contribute to the perception that she is in-credible, which is reinforced by the stereotypes of those experiencing mental illness (Crichton et al., 2017). The result for Steslow is very real, material harm, such as continued hospitalization and dehumanization, as this in-credibility serves as a marker of lack of rehabilitative progress (Steslow, 2010). Although her description may be creating a hermeneutical resource that reflects her experience of mental illness and thereby facilitate hermeneutical justice, its use renders her in-credible, creating transactional testimonial injustice, and exposing her to material threat.

I have argued thus far that metaphors may have epistemic consequences for both the terms they employ and the concepts they wish to illuminate. These consequences result from possible dilution, where concepts are expanded to contain ideas that they otherwise would not, and exclusion, where elements of concepts are pruned, or 'pushed out' of a

conceptual space. The result is the potential for metaphors to lead to hermeneutical injustice if they shape concepts in the dominant discourse, either by dilution or exclusion, so that they are no longer sufficient for those who have been epistemically marginalized to convey their experience. However, metaphors also have the potential to facilitate hermeneutical justice by diluting problematically reduced concepts in the dominant discourse to make them more useful for those who have been epistemically marginalized to convey their experience. In addition, because metaphors can shape concepts of credibility, metaphors also have the potential to lead to testimonial injustice. If metaphors distort concepts in the dominant discourse in ways that make it more difficult for accurate credibility judgements to occur, they may lead to testimonial injustice. They may also, however, distort already problematic concepts in the dominant discourse to facilitate accurate credibility judgements. This testimonial in/justice is the result of the hermeneutic effects of metaphors on a conceptual level. In addition, testimonial injustice may occur if the act of distorting the hermeneutical resources available through metaphor is perceived as a marker of in-credibility. This perception may lead to testimonial injustice regardless of the hermeneutical benefits or harms on a conceptual level. Both the social and conceptual work metaphors do have ethical and epistemic consequences.

5.2.6 Making Judgements – is this metaphor ethically bad epistemic practice?

Based on this analysis, it is clear that there are many factors that are involved in considering whether a metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice. To assess these factors, I propose asking the following questions:

1. **Is the person using the metaphor, who exists within an inequitable epistemic system, using the best epistemic resources at their disposal to communicate *their* experience?**

   If yes, then it is unlikely that the metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice.

   1.1 If the person is not using the best resources at their disposal to communicate their experience, would using the 'best' resources increase their likelihood of experiencing epistemic or material harm?

   If yes, then it is unlikely the metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice.

2. **Is the metaphor altering a concept that acts as a marker of credibility within the social context in which it is being used?**

   If yes, the metaphor has the potential to be ethically bad epistemic practice.

   2.1 Is the metaphor altering a concept that acts as a marker of credibility in a way that results in an increased likelihood of someone experiencing a credibility error?

   If yes, it is likely the metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice.

   2.2 Is the metaphor altering a concept that acts as a marker of credibility in a way that moves towards correcting an existing credibility error?

   If yes, it is unlikely the metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice.

3. **Is the metaphor altering one of the concepts it uses when this concept is used to capture a group's lived experience within the dominant discourse?**

   If yes, it is likely that the metaphor has epistemic and ethical consequences.

3.1 Is the metaphor diluting a concept in the dominant hermeneutical resources so that it detracts attention from key components that capture the experience for some or all members of an epistemically marginalized group?

If yes, it is likely the metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice.

3.2 Is the metaphor excluding from a concept in the dominant hermeneutical resources components that capture the experience of some or all members of an epistemically marginalized group?

If yes, it is likely the metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice.

4. **How likely is it that this metaphor will be taken up within the dominant discourse, or to reflect the ideologies of the dominant discourse?**

   Metaphors likely to be taken up by, and that support, the ideologies of the dominant discourse in an inequitable epistemic system likely constitute ethically bad epistemic practice. Metaphors that likely will be taken up by the dominant discourse, but challenge its ideologies are unlikely to constitute ethically bad epistemic practice.

The first question draws attention to two elements of metaphors in context. First, it accounts for the inequitable epistemic system in which conveyers of information find themselves. Insofar as this system has an ongoing history of perpetuating structural hermeneutical injustice, individuals are not at fault for the absence of epistemic resources available to convey their experience within the dominant discourse. In the example above, Steslow (2010) is not at fault for using a metaphor (mental illness as avian flu) that is not understood when the dominant discourse, due to an ongoing history of sanism, has systematically excluded the resources needed to do so, characteristic of contributory

injustice (Dotson, 2012). Similar to Mills (2007) 'White Ignorance', the absence of adequate knowledge of a group's experience from the dominant discourse is not the fault of those who fail to be understood within an inequitable system. Similarly, it is not necessarily the fault of a receiver for failing to understand the metaphor when the reason for this is structural hermeneutical injustice (Anderson, 2012). While structural hermeneutical injustice may be operating in the background, and become obvious during the use of the metaphor, it is not the metaphor itself but the social epistemic structures that are causing the injustice.

Second, this criterion highlights a distinction between using a metaphor to convey one's personal experience and using a metaphor in a way that shapes the concept of a group's experience *in general*. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive because repeated use of a metaphor will shape the concept as it is used by many people (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). However, the possibility remains that the best resources at one's disposal to convey their experience may be problematic for any or all of the other reasons listed, and calling the use of these resources for this purpose unjust is inherently counter to epistemic justice. In addition, this is disproportionately likely to affect those who are epistemically marginalized, who are less likely to have effective resources in the dominant discourse to convey their experience (Mills, 2007). Expression of one's experience through the best resources at one's disposal cannot be unjust. Injustice is likely to emerge however, when one is using metaphors to convey an experience that is not theirs, or that generalizes the experience of a group with diverse experiences. This occurs because metaphors can shape

concepts in ways that may then deny others the hermeneutical resources they need to convey their own experience.

Question 1 continues by taking into account the harm that can arise from using the best epistemic resources available within an unjust epistemic system. This may be particularly salient when one is in a position of marginalization such that the best epistemic resources one has at their disposal are counter to, or alter, the dominant conceptual resources in contexts where this is unsafe. Not accounting for this circumstance opens those in positions of marginality up to epistemic exploitation by compelling them to educate members of the dominant group on the experience of marginality (Berenstain, 2016). Protecting oneself from exploitation is not unethical. In addition, this question allows for consideration of the credibility errors that can result from challenging and altering the dominant discourse. As in Steslow's (2010) case described above, using the best epistemic resources at her disposal to describe her experience, that of a bird with avian flu, in the context of psychiatric hospitalization, increased the likelihood that she would be judged incredible for speaking outside the dominant recovery metaphor. This not only increased the likelihood of not only the epistemic harm of experiencing testimonial injustice but also increased the likelihood of a variety of material harms. Choosing to use the dominant metaphor in this context to decrease the likelihood of experiencing a credibility error and the injustices and harms that result, would not be unethical. Within epistemic systems that perpetuate harm as their status quo, protecting oneself from this harm and experiences of epistemic injustice is not unethical.

Importantly, this question does not necessarily provide criteria by which we can judge the ethics of others' metaphors. Particularly with question 1, without significant additional information, one cannot know if another person is using the best epistemic resources at their disposal to convey their experience. However, one can self-reflect on whether they themselves are using the best epistemic resources at their disposal, or uncritically repeating metaphors of the dominant discourse as their experience.

Question 2 interrogates the metaphor's effect on markers of credibility, distinguishing between metaphors that shape concepts to create or exacerbate existing credibility errors in the dominant discourse, and those that correct for errors that exist because of structural group-based credibility errors. Given that credibility errors are part of the dominant discourse, shaping this discourse to correct for these errors promotes epistemic justice. Contrarily, perpetuating the miscognition of credibility errors embedded in the dominant discourse, such as by comparing those with dementia to zombies, perpetuates the status quo in a way that is likely to constitute ethically bad epistemic practice.

Question 3 interrogates metaphors' effects on the concepts for capturing experience, differentiating between those that shape the dominant hermeneutical resources in ways that are more or less useful for supporting those who have been epistemically marginalized to convey their experience. Making concepts less reflective of experience and less useful facilitates miscognition in ways that support an inequitable status quo, as occurs with rape metaphors, thereby constituting ethically bad epistemic practice.

Question 4 interrogates the metaphor in relation to the dominant discourse and ideologies that support it. It does not act, in itself, as a qualifier on which to judge a metaphor, but rather, in conjunction with what is illuminated by interrogating the metaphor using questions 1 through 3, allows one to interrogate the likely magnitude of possible harm. Those in positions of power or privilege are more likely to have the metaphors they use taken up by the dominant discourse (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). For example, a white, heterosexual, cisgender, upper-class, male, political leader who uses a metaphor that is then repeated by numerous media sources is likely to have more impact on shaping the conceptual resources in the dominant discourse than a person using the same metaphor in a casual conversation with one other person. The likelihood of this conceptual alteration becoming dominant discourse as a result of the user's social and epistemic positionality is an important consideration. Those in positions of power and privilege therefore have more responsibility to interrogate the epistemic effects of the metaphors they use because the likely epistemic impact resulting from their influence on the dominant discourse is greater. As well, metaphors that support dominant ideologies are also more likely to become dominant within a discourse (Efeoğlu Özcan, 2022). They are therefore more likely to shape conceptual categories in ways that may promote epistemic injustice. Considering what ideology is facilitated by the alterations in concepts metaphors promote – such as the ageist and ableist ideology of the 'people with dementia are zombies' metaphor, and the misogynist ideology of the 'men are wolves' metaphor – is an important ethical consideration. The risk of harm is greater when the metaphor supports an ideology that underlies the dominant discourse because of the inequitable epistemic

system in which it is grounded. Metaphors that challenge these ideologies are likely those working towards epistemic justice.

5.2.7 Unifying the Conversation – Illness as War

While in these cases, a definitive conclusion as to whether a metaphor constitutes ethically bad epistemic practice is complicated, these questions guide reasoning about the ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors and the various ways epistemic injustice is reproduced and challenged by them. I argue that this process helps to unify ongoing discussion about the ethics of a highly debated metaphor: the 'illness is war' metaphor that is commonly employed in healthcare (Chapman & Miller, 2020; George et al., 2016; Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016; Sontag, 1990b, 1990a; Tate, 2020; Tate & Pearlman, 2016).

The tension arising between transactional testimonial injustice and structural hermeneutical injustice is the tension that, in different words, underscores the primary ethical debate around metaphor use in healthcare. On the one side are those arguing that war metaphors reinforce oppressive systems at odds with the values medicine seeks to promote and that such metaphors also limit the possibilities for understanding, communicating about, and responding to, illness (George et al., 2016; Nie, Gilbertson, et al., 2016; Sontag, 1990b). This is effectively an argument that metaphors promote hermeneutical injustice. On the other are those who argue metaphors can be empowering, and facilitate communication, particularly when the patient and healthcare provider do not have a shared language (Tate, 2020; Tate & Pearlman, 2016). This is effectively an argument that they promote testimonial justice. While the questions outlined here do not solve this debate, they bring to light the importance of considering the inequitable

epistemic system and the intersectional power relationships that shape the context in which the metaphors are used. Both sides are correct, but both fail to acknowledge the work this metaphor does within a broader, epistemically unjust system, and how this work changes based on those using this metaphor and their relationship to the dominant discourse. I therefore aim to shift the conversation from whether or not the metaphor is inherently ethically bad epistemic practice to how one may negotiate epistemic justice given the metaphor's potential to promote both epistemic injustice and justice in different contexts. Given that metaphors do epistemic work, how can we use them to do ethical epistemic work?

5.2.8 Negotiating Boundaries

An important caution though is that even if a metaphor may be considered ethically bad epistemic practice for reasons outlined above, this does not mean the use of this metaphor should necessarily be stopped, or the metaphor abandoned. Based on the analysis provided here, it is possible for metaphors that constitute 'ethically bad epistemic practice' because they facilitate miscognition, supress non-dominant discourse, and reinforce the status quo, to also help to challenge these same things. If any metaphor that has unjust consequences is abandoned, regardless of whatever other justice it may facilitate, this may result in disproportionate harm to those in already epistemically disadvantaged groups, and itself be considered ethically bad epistemic practice. An argument to abandon metaphors because they result in epistemic injustice could be used to justify constraining language that has the potential to be used for resistance because it supports the status quo in some ways, although it challenges it in others, depending on the context. It could be used to silence voices who are attempting to communicate their

experience in the only way they know how to or the only way in which others will listen. It has the potential to erase the consideration of intersectional experiences and multidirectional power relationships that is in the interest of (at least) disadvantaged groups to have understood. Caution must be taken to ensure this is not the case.

As such, while facilitating miscognition, distorting concepts, and reinforcing the status quo may be considerations in determining whether a metaphor is ethically bad epistemic practice, taking an intersectional lens, they may not be sufficient justification for *abandoning* a metaphor. Given the multiple ways cognition and epistemic injustice are related, as well as the multidirectional power relationships involved in intersectional experience, if we do not have a frame of reference in which these can be considered during reasoning, we risk committing the same injustice we seek to identify: we risk perpetuating ethically bad epistemic practice. I argue that this analysis provides epistemic resources to reason through these debates in ways that foreground the experience of those epistemically marginalized.

5.2.9 Metaphors as Epistemic Resources within Inequitable Epistemic Systems

As Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (2012) describes:

> Good epistemic resources put us in particular relation to our experiences (for example, noticing more or certain kinds of details about the experience or anticipating what will follow from the experience). If our language, concepts, or standards don't do that, then we need to develop new resources that do. (718)

Metaphors have the potential to be good epistemic resources. They direct us to notice more or certain kinds of details, but at the same time, they obscure others. Within an unjust epistemic system, metaphors that support the dominant discourse and subsequently

the ideologies that underly it, are also those that are likely to shape the concepts they use in ways that make them less useful for those in marginalized groups to convey their experience. This is because, as Lakoff and Johnson (2003) describe, “The canonical person forms a conceptual reference point, and an enormous number of concepts in our conceptual system are oriented with respect to whether or not they are similar to the properties of the prototypical person" (132). Those who deviate from what the dominant discourse considers ‘prototypical’ are already epistemically disadvantaged because the hermeneutical resources available through these concepts are less likely to capture their experience. Altering the resources that do, so they are no longer useful for this purpose, constitutes ethically bad epistemic practice by promoting miscognition that supports and exacerbates an inequitable status quo.

Within this inequitable epistemic system, metaphors that perpetuate the status quo by altering concepts that can be used to convey the experience of those marginalized by this system may be unethical. Metaphors can do this by excluding from the conceptual frame of reference components of experience relevant to those who are epistemically marginalized by the dominant discourse. They can also do this by diluting concepts so that they no longer make salient important components of experience that are in someone’s interest to convey. Both the concepts used, and those produced by a metaphor are vulnerable to these alterations. In addition, because concepts are used as markers of credibility, metaphors can shape concepts to perpetuate credibility errors by excluding or diluting conceptual components.

These effects highlight two important theoretical considerations for epistemic injustice. First, hermeneutical injustice does not necessarily constitute a gap in hermeneutical resources. It can also occur when existing hermeneutical resources are altered, through dilution and exclusion so that they no longer become useful concepts for conveying experience. In these circumstances, rather than leaving a gap in resources, resources become pruned or washed out of the dominant discourse. It is, in effect, the removal of available epistemic resources to convey experience, which can be just as harmful. Second, because the removal of resources is highlighted, I argue it is not only important to add conceptual resources to the dominant discourse to capture the experience of those who are experiencing ongoing epistemic injustice, but also preserve those that are already there and useful and at risk of distortion in ways that may constitute ethically bad epistemic practice.

While metaphors have the potential to cause epistemic harm, they also have the potential to work towards epistemic justice by altering existing concepts in ways that better convey experience, particularly the experiences of those who are epistemically marginalized. A metaphor's relationship to the dominant discourse, to the experience of the person conveying it, as well as how it shapes conceptual resources are all important considerations in determining when a particular metaphor is unethical. Importantly, because of structural hermeneutical injustice inherent in the epistemic system, in defining a metaphor as inherently unethical, we risk blaming or silencing those already disadvantaged by the epistemic system within which they survive. Structural hermeneutical injustice, and the experiences it promotes, such as testimonial injustice,

hermeneutical injustice, epistemic exploitation, and ignorance, must therefore be central considerations in the discussion of the ethics of metaphors to decrease the likelihood of these harms.

By influencing our conceptual systems, metaphors not only shape our epistemic resources, but influence how we act in the world and the reality against which we measure 'truth' (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). When metaphors distort concepts in dominant discourses in ways that promote epistemic injustice, they risk not only perpetrating epistemic and material harm, but legitimating this harm within the framework for reasoning they evoke. Because our conceptual system is both inequitable and in constant flux, interrogating how we engage with and shape this system, and the consequences, is an ethical task.

End of Manuscript

5.3 CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND REFLECTION

Thus far, I have examined the ethical and epistemic implications of metaphors at different levels of analysis. First, highlighting the function of metaphors to instigate analogical reasoning, I examined how metaphors may influence ethical reasoning. Because metaphors are discursive, and therefore simultaneously both descriptive and normative, they influence ethical reasoning by evoking the doctrine of universalizability, suggesting that ethical principles ought to be specified in the same way in different cases, and that what is permissible in one case ought to be permissible in another. Metaphors that highlight similarity, while obscuring difference and without critical attention to whether

differences are relevant to ethical decision making, may bias us into misapplying the doctrine of universalizability. Similarly, because metaphors draw on discursive packages to convey meaning, and part of what is contained in these discursive packages is the narrative structure of a phenomenon, metaphors evoke a narrative plot for phenomenon, suggesting what actions may be reasonable to move the plot along in ways that align with discursive expectations. Metaphors may therefore guide actions in ways that perpetuate the norms espoused by the discourses on which they draw. While these arguments look at the epistemic effects of metaphors as products of the epistemic system within which they are embedded, they do not examine metaphors as contributors to and substantiators of the epistemic system in which they are used.

This manuscript explored metaphors at this level of analysis. I examined the work that metaphors do within inequitable epistemic systems and how they influence these systems. The above manuscript highlighted how metaphors may contribute to the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources in ways that affect the pursuit of both hermeneutical and testimonial justice. It also introduced the ideas of pruning and diluting epistemic resources and how these shape the conceptual epistemic resources available and how particularly diluting epistemic resources has the potential to either facilitate or impair the equitable distribution of resources. This manuscript concluded by posing the question, ‘if metaphors do ethically loaded epistemic work, how can we use them to do ethically good epistemic work?’ That is the topic of the final, concluding chapter.

5.3.1 Reflection

This paper did not end up where it started. It underwent four rounds of major revisions, each time emerging with many of the same examples, drawing on many of the same texts, and yet with a very different purpose or thesis. In the second round of review, one reviewer requested ‘definitive criteria they could use to judge whether a metaphor was unethical’. It took another two rounds to even feel like I could remotely make an attempt at what that could be. During the third round, the editor filtered particularly unpleasant comments from one reviewer who had misinterpreted the intent of the manuscript, and highlighted the novelty of the concepts of dilution and pruning which deserved explicit recognition in themselves as key ideas in social epistemology. Ironically, the concept of ‘pruning’ was one I originally started with at the beginning conceptual stages of the dissertation, that then got lost (or pruned out) until it was recovered by someone else as something of value. These parts of the process – gaining confidence to say something about the world, challenging misinterpretation, uncovering ideas that were ‘pushed out’ because they didn’t have conceptual space, making ideas palatable for a body of knowledge with its own norms, these are the things that allowed the ideas captured here to come into existence. If this is what generative epistemic work looks like, can metaphors do that?

5.3.2 Conclusion

Thus far, I have suggested that metaphors are both products and producers of discourse, and that ethical implications emerge in both roles. Yet, it may appear as if metaphors are doing this work within and to a social epistemic system by themselves, rather than through conscious choice of humans performing language acts. While acknowledging that people may be constrained by their epistemic system in ways described above, they

are not completely devoid of agency, at the mercy of the discourse they breathe in and out. In the final chapter, and conclusion, I examine how people can assert critical agency on metaphors, using them to do ethically good epistemic work, and challenge the epistemic systems and discursive assumptions from which metaphors emerge and do ethical and epistemic work.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

6.1 HOW CAN WE USE METAPHORS TO DO ETHICALLY GOOD EPISTEMIC WORK?

Browsing through blogs about metaphors (no, there are not a lot of them) I came across a few talking about metaphors you shouldn't use, or things you shouldn't say metaphorically. These also often pop up on my social media, captured in posts or one-minute videos. Often criticisms of metaphors are written by members of the disability community, they argue that metaphors that use words like 'stutter' (Schick, 15 Nov 2015), 'blind' and 'deaf' (Liebowitz, 2014) or 'stand up' (Leduc, 27 Nov 2021) are ableist and shouldn't be used. Similarly, the Harvard Business review published an article entitled, 'Why you need to stop using these words and phrases' (Ravishanker, 15 Dec 2020), calling for the abandonment of ableist metaphors. The American Psychological Association blog calls for "An End to Blind Review" (Andes, 20 Feb 2020) because it uses the word 'blind'. The Toronto Star even went so far as to call English "a linguistic prison for disabled people" (Leduc 27 Nov 2021). Metaphors that draw on disability, they suggest, promote ableism, stigma, and negatively impact or erase people's experience.

What these authors argue for is an abandonment of ableist metaphorical language, and they provide good reasons for why this language is problematic. However, while I agree with the premises for their argument, and suggest that the conclusion that they draw is justified in some cases, I am cautious about arguing for an absolute prohibition on certain

metaphors. In what follows, I articulate the premises put forward by those who argue for the abandonment of metaphors. I examine these in relation to arguments that have been put forth so far in this dissertation. However, given the creative and generative potential of metaphors, I argue that in some cases, these premises may not be valid, or may require qualification in ways that hinder the validity of these arguments. Rather, it may be that by challenging and questioning the premises on which these arguments rest, something that requires an active choice to critically engage with the metaphor, we undermine the structures that allow metaphors to reproduce harmful discourse, and in doing so, open space for social transformation.

First, let's examine the premise upon which abandoning these metaphors rests. The premise of these arguments is that what is brought into the metaphor when disability language is used is an implied negative evaluation of disability or disability experience (Liebowitz, 2014). As Amanda Leduc describes, "They hint at a hierarchy that places some people above others, that says *these people* and *these bodies* are worth less than these ones" (Leduc, 27 Nov 2021). Metaphors that use 'deaf' perpetuate the perception that those who cannot hear have an inability to communicate (Liebowitz, 2014); for example metaphors like "she remained deaf to their protests" may imply an intentional, and therefore blame-worthy choice to fail to respect the communication attempts of others. Metaphors using terms like 'stand up,' such as 'standing up to bullies' convey how one is supposed to move through the world, devaluing other possibilities (Leduc, 27 Nov 2021). The negativity and otherness implied by metaphors like these highlights

unconscious bias, makes us internalize negative biases about disability, and perpetuates stigma (Ravishanker, 2020).

These harms rest on the assumption that what is communicated when using disability in metaphor is a negative evaluation of disability or the experience of being disabled. It assumes this will *always* be brought into the metaphor in the discourse package associated with disability. This negative evaluation is what allows for stigma and (negative) stereotypes to be conveyed using the metaphor. Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that metaphors tend to reflect the dominant discourse. Given that the dominant discourse around disability evaluates it negatively, it is likely that metaphors, in reflecting this discourse, perpetuate this same evaluation.

The dominant discourse is, in part, what allows metaphors to have shared meaning when used to communicate. In Chapter Two, I outlined some of the epistemic elements of metaphors. These included that metaphors draw on analogical reasoning to highlight structural relationships between the domains (Gentner, 1981; Gentner & Markman, 1997). These are relationships of how properties relate to each other, rather than similarity of properties in themselves (Gentner, 1981). Drawing on Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003), an analogy is drawn from blending together discursive elements of vital relations within each of the domains, which can include narrative structure, morally relevant features, characterization, time space, and category (Hart, 2008). In the context of disability, there is an assumed vital relationship that disability is value negative.

In order to be understood, the conveyer of the metaphor must be reasonably sure that approximately the same discourse packages leading to the recognition of approximately the same structural relationship that they intend will be interpreted by the receiver (Čičin-Šain, 2019). These tend to be the 'default' meaning of concepts, that which is supported by the dominant discourse (Čičin-Šain, 2019). Metaphors, as a form of "discursive mind control" (van Dijk, 1995, p. 23), suggest the worldview, narrative, and values that ought to be held about the phenomenon in question in ways that align with the dominant discourse (Čičin-Šain, 2019; Efeoğlu Özcan, 2022). Put simply, when I use a metaphor, I can be reasonably sure that you will draw the analogy between the domains that I intend to convey because I assume we are both working from relatively similar discourse packages – the dominant ones. This language act of evoking these discourse packages through metaphor serves to reproduce and therefore reinforce these packages of meanings and the ideologies they reflect. Because the discourse package associated with disability in the dominant discourse contains a negative evaluation of the disabled trait, this is likely to be brought into the metaphor and reinforced by it.

But what if it wasn't.

Importantly, metaphors also have creative potential. This is at least part of the reason why they have been able to lead to scientific innovation. There is an element of unpredictability of exactly which structural relations will be recognized and there is the possibility that additional structural relationships that have not yet been acknowledged or

identified may be evoked (Black, 1977; Brown, 2003). This means that I can only guess which discursive packages you will use to interpret my metaphor. I can guess about the dominant discourse you will likely use to interpret it, but I can never be certain. The meaning could come across as more or different than I predict or intend.

In the case of metaphors that use disability terms and experience as domains from which to draw structural relations, those arguing against the use of these metaphors do so on the grounds that using disability concepts implies a negative evaluation of the disability concept, perpetuating negative views and stereotypes of disability. Given that disability carries negative connotations within the dominant discourse (Withers, 2012), and metaphors rely on dominant discursive meaning of concepts to communicate ideas (Čičin-Šain, 2019), this makes sense. For example, the metaphorical statement "she was blind to the opportunity", draws structural relationship between being unable to see and therefore being ignorant of, and a person's lack of knowledge of an opportunity as ignorance, to imply being unable to see is being ignorant, and lack of knowledge is being ignorant. This relies on an equation of being blind to being ignorant, the meaning of blindness as ignorance, within the dominant discourse of disability. For this metaphor to make sense, I need to assume that you will recruit a discursive package that equates blindness with ignorance to interpret the metaphor. Given this is the dominant discourse, this is a reasonable assumption to make.

But what if it wasn't.

If I were to provide you with a different discursive package for blindness from which to draw analogy, one that did not include a negative evaluation, then I may shift your interpretation of the metaphor away from a baseline-negative state. Logic would then suggest that if a metaphor was to not convey a negative evaluation and not suggest a negative structural relationship, it would not perpetuate negative biases and stereotypes, it would not cause these harms, and it would not have grounds to be abandoned.

Is that even possible? If metaphors can be used as mind control, and they are also creative, how can we use this to help change people's minds? As Aristotle noted both the creative and persuasive potential of metaphors (Ricœur, 2003), can we use metaphors creatively to persuade people to adopt alternative worldviews towards greater social and epistemic justice?

First, let's remember some of the ways that metaphors can convey a negative evaluation and ways that they may have negative epistemic consequences. As explored in Chapter Five, metaphors may distribute epistemic resources in inequitable and unethical ways by shaping identity categories so that people who are members of those categories experience increased testimonial injustice. For example, metaphors that suggest blindness is ignorance shape the identity category of 'blind' in ways that increase the likelihood of experiencing testimonial injustice because it suggests those who are members of this category are not knowers. Belief that someone is ignorant is a credibility marker (a negative credibility marker, making it likely that someone will receive less credibility than they are otherwise due). Perpetuating this perception and stereotype of blind people

as ignorant may make them less likely to be perceived as knowers, sought out for their knowledge, and to have their testimony granted credibility (Dotson, 2011). This perpetuates the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources and may therefore be considered unethical (Mason, 2011).

However, as also discussed in Chapter Five, metaphors can shape conceptualizations in different ways, including by diluting, or pruning them. Shaping conceptualizations in itself is not inherently problematic; shaping them in ways that perpetuate the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources is. Shaping them to re-distribute resources towards justice may be ethical. Therefore, shaping the conceptualization of 'blind' to not be reduced to equate with ignorance, but diluting this category to also suggest creativity, resilience, heightened non-visual sensory awareness, resistance, typicality, confidence, bravery, ingenuity, independence, cooperation, collaboration, trust, agency, and intelligence, redistributes epistemic resources by acknowledging and validating markers of credibility that, within the dominant discourse, are often ignored for members of this group. If a metaphor were to prompt this conceptual distortion, it would likely not be unethical and would suggest that abandoning metaphors that use disability terms in their entirety may not necessarily lead to a more equitable social and epistemic system. We may need to distort our metaphors to distribute resources differently.

And yet, based on how metaphors work, is it even possible for a metaphor to challenge the conceptualizations of the dominant discourse? If, in order to be understood, metaphors require a common denominator or meaning, and that common denominator is

the dominant discourse, then for a metaphor to make sense, it must necessarily reproduce and reinforce this meaning. This is, in part, what was described in Chapter Four, examining the metaphors Canadian news media used to conceptualize monkeypox during the first month of the outbreak. Despite trying to spread messages that did not discriminate against gay men, the metaphors used evoked narratives that did. Metaphors also perpetuated racist and colonial ideologies, despite attempts to foster a 'global community' of equity and justice. Because the dominant discourse is infused with these ideologies and is what the public has in common as an epistemic resource to understand new phenomena, whether intentional or not, it is perpetuated by the resources we have to make and share meaning. This may be even more common given the discursive role of media (Čičin-Šain, 2019; van Dijk, 1995).

So it seems, then, if the default meaning evoked and produced by a metaphor draws on and supports the dominant discourse and underlying ideological values, additional effort is needed to alter this default position. It is possible to evoke alternative structural relationships, but there is a high possibility that if they conflict with the dominant discourse, they will appear to not make sense. So, we need to make the sense for them. One way to do this may be to explicitly draw the structural relationships that contradict the default meaning presupposed by the dominant discourse. As mentioned above, I may need to provide you with an alternative discourse package with which to interpret the metaphor, or explicitly draw the analogies I intend to convey grounded in alternative meanings. While the dominant discourse makes some meanings more likely, the

generative potential of metaphors means that the possibilities for relationships are not confined by this discourse.

I suggest that, because of this generative potential, there are at least two ways to challenge the assumed discourse package evoked by metaphor that perpetuates the dominant discourse. Using the concepts of epistemic pruning and dilution, I propose that one can use metaphors to flood or to swale concepts to redistribute epistemic resources in ways that promote greater epistemic justice. (I'm repurposing these terms - more on swale later!)

First, let's examine how we would flood a metaphor and what effect this might have. What I mean by flooding is to draw in additional analogical comparisons between the two domains using the dominant discourse to the point where the analogy ceases to hold. Similar to a 'slippery slope' argument, it attempts to dissolve the metaphor by including additional comparisons to the point where difference, rather than similarity, becomes evident.

This is, in part, what the analysis of war metaphors used to frame COVID-19, and the possibility of pandemic metaphors being used to conceptualize mental illness illustrated in Chapter Three. By drawing additional structural relationship between war and the COVID-19 virus, and being critical of the validity of these relationships, we call the validity and ethics of the metaphor into question. War implies acceptable sacrifice, improvisation, technological solutions, imprudent resource use, nationalism, xenophobia,

and political power. Some of these were integral in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, pushing this metaphor further, the intent was to draw comparisons to the point where we no longer agreed that the similarities hold, for example, in the level of acceptable sacrifice, the responsibility for preparedness, and the type of justice used to justify actions. Similarly, comparisons were drawn between the COVID-19 pandemic and a 'pandemic' of mental illness for the purposes of illustrating difference, upon which the metaphor falls apart. Intentionally pushing the metaphor for additional structural relations may also function to illustrate the absurdity or problematize the assumed relationship between the two domains. This draws on the concept of dilution introduced in Chapter Five. By drawing relationship to and therefore bringing in additional concepts, flooding the concept and the analogical relationship, the metaphor is diluted to the point of dissolving, either in part, or in its entirety, as the primary way to understand a concept.

In analogical reasoning, this strategy is similar to hypothesis testing of analogies, as is used in scientific reasoning (Brown, 2003), and prompting for dis-analogy, as is used to promote strong analogical reasoning in bioethics (Mertes & Pennings, 2011). Explicating structural relationships to the point of finding where they no longer hold, or where the analogy breaks down, allows us to acknowledge the limitations of the metaphor. These limitations expose it as a construction of reality, and one that is partial. One that makes visible some things, and obscures others. Where structural relationships are not evident, it may prompt for consideration of alternative metaphors. During COVID-19, this emerged with proposals of a fire-fighting metaphor, and eventually the neighbourly metaphor of 'living with COVID'. Flooding the metaphor may therefore give us pause to

acknowledge its limitations and be creative with finding alternative ways to represent reality.

In flooding the metaphor, we may ask of it the following questions:

1. What structural relationships hold between the domains of this metaphor?
2. What structural relationships do not hold between the domains of this metaphor? In other words, how are they different?
3. What are the limitations of the use of this metaphor? What can reasonably understood from its use, and what cannot?

We can then be critical of the conceptual reality that the metaphor fortifies and ask:

4. Who does this benefit, and who does this harm?

Flooding is used to examine at what point the structural relationships break down, and what is excluded from conceptualization in using a particular metaphor. These strategies reflect those that promote sound analogical reasoning and hypothesis testing used in bioethics and scientific reasoning (Brown, 2003; Mertes & Pennings, 2011).

A second way that we might redistribute epistemic resources through metaphors is to swale the metaphor. A swale (which is a noun, not a verb, although for my purposes I am choosing to use it as a verb) is a shallow trough in the land used to prevent water runoff, erosion, and flooding. Similar to a ditch, it can collect and redistribute water runoff. I use 'to swale' to describe carving an alternative path for epistemic resources, branching from the dominant discourse to draw connections to and with other ideas, to force concepts to flow in a different direction. So, for example, we may swale a metaphor by making and strengthening analogical relationships outside of those likely acknowledged by the

dominant discourse. This is not categorically different than dilution, but rather is a specific kind of concept dilution effected by diluting with non-dominant, particularly counter-hegemonic epistemic resources to change paths of thought.

Take for example the argument mentioned above that we need “An End to Blind Review” (Andes, 20 Feb 2020). This argument rests on the premise outlined above equating blindness with ignorance. So let’s flip the script. Let’s say this is a good metaphor, suggesting the strengths of being unable to see. Instead of seeing blindness as ignorance of authorship, what if we say blindness allows for stronger critical reflection on the content of a manuscript. It requires additional creativity and ingenuity to imagine the author’s perspective. It allows for a more pointed focus on what is important. It attends to multiple means of knowing. It is valued in the pursuit of knowledge. And yet this blindness is produced by an unjust epistemic system, where information contained within the document being reviewed may be judged incredible based not on its quality, but on the assumptions of credibility due to gender, race, ability, author reputation, or institution if these were available to the reviewer. This suggests that rather than someone who is blind being ignorant and ‘unknowing’ or an ‘unknower’, blindness is a strength that allows for a different, better, and stronger understanding of what is being presented. There is the possibility that rather than being negative, it is a strength, accompanied by wisdom and clear judgement. It is also created by and reflects an inequitable epistemic system marred by issues of power and unjustly applied credibility deficits. In addition, by pointing out how ‘blindness’ is valued in peer review, we can point out the hypocrisy in the systematic ways those who experience blindness are excluded from academic pursuit

and access to academic knowledge. This only appears as hypocrisy if first we have a way to acknowledge the value blindness brings. We might even consider 'doing away with blind review' to be ableist as it reinforces that blindness is undesirable.

Does this capture everything that it means to be blind? No. Does it challenge a dominant, hegemonic discourse of blindness as ignorance, incapacity, and individual? It begins to. Does it completely erase the possibility of a dominant interpretation, equating blindness with ignorance? No. Does it help to shape our thinking in a different way, one that allows us to understand elements of experience and see value in things the dominant discourse tends to exclude? Yes. How did we get there? By intentionally, and explicitly, pushing for acknowledgement of structural relationships beyond, or instead of, those that are assumed in the dominant discourse. By intentionally choosing an alternative to the dominant discourse assumed to form the basis for meaning, new meaning was able to emerge. It denaturalized the taken for granted assumptions of the dominant discourse. We carved a new path within which we can identify structural relationships between ideas, building resources with which to understand reality.

In effect, swaling chooses to interpret the metaphor using an alternative discourse package. It involves asking the following questions:

1. What discourse package (likely the dominant or hegemonic one) am I intended to use to interpret this metaphor?

2. If I substitute an alternative discourse package, one that does not share the same ideological assumptions, what structural relationships emerge between domains?
3. Does this alternative interpretation provide a framework within which epistemic resources are more equitably distributed?

These questions may require a different level of critical thinking than flooding. They require at least an understanding that there are different discourse packages on offer that have different underlying ideological assumptions. They require that one can suspend the discursive reality in which they are steeped enough to imagine and elaborate a possible alternative. I can still use the questions that flood the metaphor to critically analyze the limitations of this new metaphorical interpretation. However, swaling invites alternative pathways into the conversation, rather than just pushing for the limitations of what already exists.

I have distinguished between these two strategies for challenging metaphors for the purpose of explanation, when pragmatically, they may not always be distinct. For example, when I am in a meeting and we talk about education as cultivating a garden, and I ask, “If education is a garden, who and what are we weeding out?”, this could be considered flooding the metaphor by highlighting additional structural relationships that challenge the intent or applicability of the metaphor. It could also be considered swaling because it introduces into the conversation counter-discourse, that of education as epistemic violence. It’s not necessarily one or the other. It could possibly even be that flooding instigates the opportunity for swaling. It could be that in the case of a flood, the

need for swales becomes even more imperative. The point is it dilutes the metaphor in a way that denaturalizes the underlying assumptions of the discourse in which the metaphor is used. It allows us to be critical of what would otherwise be taken for granted as natural.

Now neither of these strategies is without critiques. One could argue that flooding is epistemically harmful because it ceases to allow for meaning making. One could also argue that the point of metaphors is to highlight *some* structural relations and that flooding suggests that *all* structural relations should hold, making it a literal statement, undermining the epistemic role of metaphor in the first place. One could argue that swaling a metaphor doesn't necessary undermine the harmful epistemic effects, it could just make them different. Swaling could allow us to metaphorically dig a trough that feeds water to the same pool, just on an alternative path. Or, it could be that using any metaphor that draws on an identity category uses the persons in that category as means to another meaning-making end, which is, in itself, a problematic form of objectification and/or exploitation.

Yes. Those are all valid criticisms. And if we had to flood or swale every metaphor we encountered, that would probably be problematic and likely cause ethical and epistemic harms. (Not to mention impossibly complexify communication.) But I am not arguing that flooding and/or swaling are ethical imperatives, things we ought to always do. I am arguing that they are tools we can use to try to challenge the naturalized and assumed neutral dominant epistemic resources. If doing nothing allows harmful ideologies to flow unchecked in ways that are harmful, it is a way to try something, to think something new,

and maybe even say something. This may be particularly important when metaphors are used to devalue, or justify harm to, already epistemically disadvantaged groups. It allows us to be critical of that. Not all metaphors may carry this social weight.

And sometimes these strategies may fail. Sometimes they won't make sense (used literally as *making sense*). And there may be some identity categories for whom it may only very, very rarely, or never be justified to use them in metaphors as means to other epistemic ends. There may be some words whose history and use for systematic abuse are so strong, and socially significant, that it is unjust to reinterpret their meaning using metaphor and negate the significance that has for those who experience them within the dominant discourse. Some words in some contexts may be best left out of metaphors, especially by those to whom they do not belong.

But excluding topics from metaphorical involvement, such as excluding disability- and ability-related concepts in general from being used metaphorically, also excludes the possibility that these concepts can be altered or challenged using metaphors towards greater epistemic equity. Excluding disability concepts from being used metaphorically because the dominant discourse evaluates these concepts negatively and metaphors perpetuate this negativity assumes that one must draw on the dominant discourse and/or that disability inherently has a negative evaluation. I prefer to leave open the possibility that this need not, or need not always be the case. I prefer to have the hopeful interpretation that with the creative potential metaphors promote, the variety of discourses that are possible, the multitude of ideologies by which concepts can be

organized, the plethora of worldviews that people bring, the ingenuity and drive humans have to understand and communicate about experience, there is the potential for something more, and something different. And that choosing to be critical may help us towards a more equitable world. These are some tools that may help us do that epistemic work. And all tools require intentional and critical use to productively build reality.

So what might this look like in practice? Well, when my colleague asks me to ‘pow wow’ after class to talk about next steps, I can respond with: “So you would like me to join you in an Indigenous cultural event after class”? Even when I know full well that is not what they meant. By flooding the metaphor, they might also realize it is not what they meant either. When I examine the premise of an argument, I can question on what the conclusion ‘stands’, ‘sits’, ‘rests’, or ‘balances’, and use any of these to the same end. When I hear the pendulum has swung in the ‘opposite direction’ on issues of injustice, I can ask ‘but who built the clock, and who benefits from this particular way of representing time?’ So rather than abandoning metaphors we can use them as indicators of where to probe for the limits and opportunities of our epistemic resources and as opportunities to understand the world differently.

6.2 OVERALL CONCLUSION:

Communication is steeped in metaphors, and communication about health, disease, and disability is no exception. This is in part because metaphors help us understand new things by suggesting analogical links to things that are already familiar, such as between COVID-19 and war, mental illness and COVID-19, monkeypox and detective work, and

ignorance and blindness. Sometimes this is helpful because it gives us a frame of reference to reason about how to understand and act in the world; it suggests what actions are ethical, what might happen next to move the story in the right direction, and who we can trust. But they also can be harmful because in doing so, metaphors may limit the possibility for other interpretations, and may bias our understanding and actions in ways that cause harm unfairly.

Throughout this dissertation, I have explored different ethical and epistemic effects of metaphors. First, I explored how metaphors can shape ethical reasoning by influencing how ethical principles are prioritized in relation to each other regarding a particular issue and by shaping to what case the issue is compared. Using the example of war metaphors to frame COVID-19, I argued that war metaphors justified the prioritization of justice above other ethical principles, and that justice was then specified to take on militarized characteristics that otherwise may have been considered inappropriate. I further argued that subsequent use of pandemic metaphors to conceptualize increasing incidents of mental illness may justify responses to this increase to reflect those justified by military rhetoric during COVID-19. When metaphors draw structural relationships between two concepts, and those include structural relations that guide the prioritization and specification of ethical principles, metaphors can influence ethical reasoning. The epistemic effect of evoking analogy allows for ethical reasoning by analogy. This is an ethical epistemic implication.

Second, I examined how metaphors evoke dominant discursive narratives that influence our reasoning. I explored how monkeypox was metaphorically framed in Canadian news media during the first month of the 2022 monkeypox outbreak. Similarly to ethical reasoning, I argued that metaphors support analogous reasoning between new and familiar concepts in ways that suggest the structural narrative and characterization in one also holds in the other. Metaphors place new phenomena within familiar stories allowing us to reason through the challenges they pose using the plot and characterizations of that story. Actions can then be justified because they move the story in the 'right' direction and treat the 'characters' in the story as they are due. However, because these familiar stories are part of and reflect the dominant discourse, they also function to bring new phenomena into this discourse in ways that support its perpetuation. Using these discursive narratives to explain and justify actions of continued oppression in the context of new phenomena then appears natural. This is a second way the epistemic elements of metaphors have ethical implications.

Third, I explored some of the ethical implications of the epistemic qualities of metaphors from the perspective of epistemic (in)justice. Taking the premise that ethically bad epistemic practices are those that contribute to and perpetuate the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources (Mason, 2011), I explored how metaphors influence the distribution of epistemic resources. I argued that metaphors can impact epistemic resources because they can prune and dilute the epistemic resources available for knowing and communicating experience, with a particular focus on the resources available within the dominant discourse. I argued that pruning and diluting epistemic

resources has ethical implications because these resources influence who is perceived to be a knower and what concepts are available for understanding and communicating experience. I argued that when metaphors prune and dilute epistemic resources in ways that perpetuate the inequitable distribution of epistemic resources, this is unethical because it promotes epistemic injustice. However, metaphors that work to redistribute, or create epistemic resources towards equalization of epistemic resources may be ethical.

Building on the premise that metaphors may create or redistribute resources within the dominant discourse towards epistemic equity, in this final chapter I explored strategies for using metaphors to do this task. Taking the specific example of disability metaphors, I proposed that flooding and swaling may be two ways to critically challenge metaphors in ways that promote the redistribution of epistemic resources. These build on the generative and creative epistemic properties of metaphors – that they spur additional analogical reasoning – to dilute the metaphor with analogies that either point to its limitations (flooding) or with additional analogies that challenge the assumed discursive package the metaphor evokes within the dominant discourse (swaling). While not categorically different – after all, swales become most useful for redistributing resources in times of flood – they allow metaphors to bring additional discourses into the conversation and challenge the apparent neutrality and naturality of metaphors in the dominant discourse. These may not always be useful or appropriate tools to use on all metaphors in all circumstances, but insofar as they are used to challenge dominant oppressive discourse and bring out the potential for alternative ways for knowing, understanding, and acting in the world, they can be used to do good epistemic work.

6.2.1 Final Thoughts

In her essay, *On Reflection*, Ellen Rose (2013) describes reflection as: "this ability to draw deep connections between often disparate fields and sources" (p.25). Thinking with and through metaphor, drawing connections between disparate packages of discourse, imagining new framings and perspectives, is a type of deep thinking that constitutes reflection. It is probative and creative. Flooding and swaling assist with this reflective work. What flooding and swaling do is distort the metaphor in a way that redirects patterns of thinking – patterns that may have become so engrained, they are thoughts we didn't even notice we were thinking. They distort our understanding of reality creating new pools that reflect it back to us, force us to confront it, look it in the face, and say "is that the world I want to reflect with my words?"

Flooding and swaling create new mirrored surfaces that reflect an extraordinary face, an unexpected reflection that makes us stare. These are the distortions that accentuate what is hidden by structures of power: "So while the ordinary face pleases with its symmetry, proportions, and familiarity, the extraordinary face throws down a visual hermeneutic challenge to its discomforted viewer" (Garland-Thomson, 2006, p. 178). It may allow us to view our reality as something freakish, or monstrous, pulling into view what may be intentionally hidden by power systems and pushing the boundaries of the hermeneutical constructs used to make sense of the world, expanding the accessible epistemic resources (Garland-Thomson, 2006; Medina, 2013). It makes our imagination stare, and, "Unpredictable things happen when people stare…" (Garland-Thomson, 2006, p.175),

because “[n]ot only does staring bespeak involvement, but being stared at demands a response as well” (Garland-Thomson, 2006, p.174).

It can be tempting to understand a metaphor as a perfect mirror, as a discursive reflection of a particular reality, one so natural it may cease to capture our attention. A mirror on a wall that blends into the background décor. One you may move past without acknowledgement. Instead, I invite you to move through a metaphor like a hall of mirrors, experiencing reality reflected and distorted in ways that are helpful, harmful, playful, and intriguing. I challenge you to notice what features each may enlarge, and which ones shrink to invisibility, where the reflection may twist and spiral beyond recognition. I invite you to experience the distorted symmetry, the discomfort, and the hermeneutical challenge of staring in different mirrors and being critical of what and who stares back.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abeysinghe, S. (2016). Ebola at the borders: Newspaper representations and the politics of border control. *Third World Quarterly*, *37*(3), 452–467. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1111753

Adam, M. (2020). An enemy to fight or someone to live with, how COVID-19 is described in Indonesian media discourse. *National Seminar of English Linguistics and Literature*, 12.

Ahmady, S., Yaghmaei, M., Arab, M., & Monajemi, A. (2016). Metaphor in Education: Hidden but Effective. *Journal of Medical Education*, *15*(1), 52–57.

Altheide, D. L. (1987). Reflections: Ethnographic content analysis. *Qualitative Sociology,* 10(1), 65–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00988269

Altheide, D., Coyle, M., DeVriese, K., & Schneider, C. (2008). Emergent Qualitative Document Analysis. *In Handbook of Emergent Methods* (pp. 127–154).

Anderson, E. (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. *Social Epistemology*, *26*(2), 163–173. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211

Andes, R. (20 Feb 2020). An end to "bling review". *Blog of the American Psychological Association.* https://blog.apaonline.org/2020/02/20/an-end-to-blind-review/

Annas, G. (1995). Reframing the debate on health care reform by replacing our metaphors. *New England Journal of Medicine*, *332*(11), 744–747. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM199503163321109

Arras, J. D. (1994). Principles and particularity: The roles of cases in bioethics,. *Indiana Law Journal*, *69*, 983–1014.

Atanasova, D. (2018). “Keep moving forward. LEFT RIGHT LEFT”: A critical metaphor analysis and addressivity analysis of personal and professional obesity blogs. *Discourse, Context & Media*, *25*, 5–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcm.2017.09.012

Ayers, T. (22 Dec 2018). Website for mental health wait times in N.S. gets 1st update since 2017. *CBC News*, 1.

Aziz, S. (19 May 2022). Canada confirms first two cases of monkeypox in Quebec. *The Globe and Mail.* Retrieved from: https://globalnews.ca/news/8850295/canada-first-monkeypox-cases-confirmed/

Bailer-Jones, D. (2002). Models, metaphors and analogies. In P. K. Machamer & M. Silberstein (Eds.), *The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science*. Blackwell.

Bailey, Y., Shankar, M., & Phillips, P. (2021). Casualties of the World War II metaphor: Women's reproductive health fighting for narrative inclusion in COVID-19. *Medical Humanities*, *(48)*3, 261-264 https://doi.org/10.1136/medhum-2021-012152

Barthelemy, J. E. (2020, May 5). Mental health is the next pandemic. *Global Med*, 1.

BBC. (2020, April 6). Coronavirus: The Queen's message seen by 24 million. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-52183327

Beauchamp, T., & Childress, J. (2019). *Principles of biomedical ethics*: Marking its fortieth anniversary. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *19*(11), 9–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2019.1665402

Beauchamp, T. L. (1994). Principles and other emerging paradigms in bioethics. *Indiana Law Journal*, *69*(4), 955-971.

Beauchamp, T. L. (2003). Methods and principles in biomedical ethics. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, *29*(5), 269–274. https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.29.5.269

Berenstain, N. (2016). Epistemic exploitation. *Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy*, *3*(22) 569-590. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.022

Berenstain, N. (2020). White Feminist Gaslighting. *Hypatia*, *35*(4), 733–758. https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2020.31

Bettcher, T. M. (2014). Trapped in the wrong theory: Rethinking trans oppression and resistance. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, *39*(2), 383–406. https://doi.org/10.1086/673088

Black, M. (1955). Metaphor. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series*, *5*, 273–294.

Black, M. (1960). Models and archetypes. In C. E. Boewe & R. F. Nichols (Eds.), *Both human and humane: The humanities and social sciences in graduate education*. University of Pensylvania.

Black, M. (1977). More about metaphor. *Dialectica*, *31*(3), 431–457. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42969757

Blease, C., Carel, H., & Geraghty, K. (2017). Epistemic injustice in healthcare encounters: Evidence from chronic fatigue syndrome. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, *43*(8), 549–557. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103691

Brennan, D. J., Card, K. G., Collict, D., Jollimore, J., & Lachowsky, N. J. (2020). How might social distancing impact gay, bisexual, Queer, trans and two-spirit Men in

Canada? *AIDS and Behavior*, *24*(9), 2480–2482. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10461-020-02891-5

Brody, H., & Childress, A. M. (2009). Understanding randomization: Helpful Strategies. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *9*(2), 14–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160802663245

Brown, T. L. (2003). *Making truth: Metaphor in science*. University of Illonois Press.

Bullo, S. (2020). "I feel like I'm being stabbed by a thousand tiny men": The challenges of communicating endometriosis pain. *Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine*, *24*(5), 476–492. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363459318817943

Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2014). Epistemic injustice in healthcare: A philosophial analysis. *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, *17*(4), 529–540. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2

Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2017). Epistemic injustice in medicine and healthcare. In I. J. Kidd, J. Medina, & G. Pohlhaus (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of epistemic injustice* (1st ed., pp. 336–346). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043-33

Carli, L. L. (2020). Women, gender equality and COVID-19. *Gender in Management: An International Journal*, *35*(7/8), 647–655. https://doi.org/10.1108/GM-07-2020-0236

Carver, L., Morley, S., & Taylor, P. (2017). Voices of deficit: Mental health, criminal victimization, and epistemic injustice. *Illness, Crisis & Loss*, *25*(1), 43–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/1054137316675715

Ceccarelli, L. (2004). Neither confusing cacophony nor culinary complements: A case study of mixed metaphors for genomic science. *Written Communication*, *21*(1), 92–105. https://doi.org/10.1177/0741088303261651

Chambers, T. (2016). Root metaphor and bioethics. *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, *59*(3), 311–325. https://doi.org/10.1353/pbm.2016.0027

Chapman, C. M., & Miller, D. S. (2020). From metaphor to militarized response: The social implications of "we are at war with COVID-19" – crisis, disasters, and pandemics yet to come. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, *40*(9/10), 1107–1124. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-05-2020-0163

Charteris-Black, J. (2004a). Critical approaches to metaphor. In J. Charteris-Black, *Corpus approaches to critical metaphor analysis* (pp. 25–43). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230000612_3

Charteris-Black, J. (2004b). Critical metaphor analysis. In *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis*. Palgrave MacMillan.

Chiang, W.-Y., & Duann, R.-F. (2007). Conceptual metaphors for SARS: "war" between whom? *Discourse & Society*, *18*(5), 579–602. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926507079631

Children's Mental Health Ontario. (2020). *Kid's can't wait: 2020 Report*.

Childress, J. (1997). *Practical reasoning in bioethics*. Indiana University Press.

Childress, J. F. (1982). Metaphors and models of medical relationships. *Social Responsibility*, 47–70.

Childress, J. F. (1983). Triage in neonatal intensive care: The limitations of a metaphor. *Virginia Law Review*, *69*, 17.

Childress, J. F. (2012). Metaphor and analogy in bioethics. In F. Baylis, B. Hoffmaster, S. Sherwin, & K. Borgerson (Eds.), *Health Care Ethics in Canada* (3rd ed.). Nelson Education Ltd.

Chung, E. (2020, March 19). Hospitals scramble to secure more ventilators amid coronavirus outbreak. *CBC News*.

Čičin-Šain, V. (2019). Metaphors for language contact and change: Croatian language and national identity. In L. Šarić & M.-M. Stanojević (Eds.), *Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture* (Vol. 82, pp. 127–153). John Benjamins Publishing Company. https://doi.org/10.1075/dapsac.82.06cic

Coll-Florit, M., Climent, S., Sanfilippo, M., & Hernández-Encuentra, E. (2021). Metaphors of depression: Studying first person accounts of life with depression published in blogs. *Metaphor and Symbol*, *36*(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10926488.2020.1845096

Conrad, P., & Schneider, J. W. (1992). *Deviance and medicalization: From badness to sickness: with a new afterword by the authors* (Expanded ed). Temple University Press.

Craig, D. (2020). Pandemic and its metaphors: Sontag revisited in the COVID-19 era. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, *23*(6), 1025–1032. https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549420938403

Crichton, P., Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2017). Epistemic injustice in psychiatry. *BJPsych Bulletin*, *41*(2), 65–70. https://doi.org/10.1192/pb.bp.115.050682

Daley, A., Costa, L., & Ross, L. (2012). (W)righting women: Constructions of gender, sexuality and race in the psychiatric chart. *Culture, Health & Sexuality*, *14*(8), 955–969. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691058.2012.712718

Davidson, D. (1978). What metaphors mean. *Critical Inquiry*, *Autumn*, 31–47.

de Bie, A. (2019). Finding ways (and words) to move: Mad student politics and practices of loneliness. *Disability & Society*, *34*(7–8), 1154–1179. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2019.1609910

Deignan, A. (2010). 18. The evaluative properties of metaphors. In G. Low, Z. Todd, A. Deignan, & L. Cameron (Eds.), *Researching and applying metaphor in the real world.* John Benjamins Publishing Company. https://doi.org/10.1075/hcp.26.21dei

Delbaere, M. (2013). Metaphors and myths in pharmaceutical advertising. *Social Science & Medicine*, *82*, 21–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.020

Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing. *Hypatia*, *26*(2), 236–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x

Dotson, K. (2012). A cautionary tale: On limiting epistemic oppression. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*, *33*(1), 24. https://doi.org/10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024

Dusenbery, M. (2018). *Doing harm: The truth about how bad medicine and lazy Science leave women dismissed, misdiagnosed, and sick*. HarperCollins.

Efeoğlu Özcan, E. (2022). Pull the weeds out or perish: Using pandemic metaphors to strengthen in-group solidarity in Turkish political discourse. *Metaphor and Symbol*, *37*(2), 171–184. https://doi.org/10.1080/10926488.2021.1994840

Elliott, C. (2003). *Better than well: American medicine meets the american dream*. W.W. Norton & Company.

Fallah, N., & Raouf Moini, M. (2016). A critical metaphor analysis of Arab uprisings in “The Washington Post” and “Keyhan” editorials. *Metaphor and the Social World*, *6*(1), 79–102. https://doi.org/10.1075/msw.6.1.04fal

Fauconnier, G., & Lakoff, G. (2009). On metaphor and blending. *Cognitive Semiotics*, *5*(1–2), 393–399. https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem.2013.5.12.393

Fauconnier, G., & Turner, M. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. *Cognitive Science*, *22*(2), 133–187. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2202_1

Fauconnier, G., & Turner, M. (2003). Conceptual blending, form, and meaning. *Recherches En Communication*, *19*, 57–86.

Fauconnier, G., & Turner, M. (2008a). Rethinking metaphor. In R. W. Gibbs, Jr. (Ed.), *The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought* (1st ed., pp. 53–66). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816802.005

Fauconnier, G., & Turner, M. B. (2008b). Conceptual projection and middle spaces. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1290862

Ferri, B. A. (2018). Metaphors of contagion and the autoimmune body. *Feminist Formations*, *30*(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1353/ff.2018.0001

Finley, B., & Felepchuk, E. (2021). Playing the changes. *Critical Studies in Improvisation / Études Critiques En Improvisation*, *14*(1). https://doi.org/10.21083/csieci.v14i1.6510

Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. Pantheon Books.

Fraser, R. E. (2018). The ethics of metaphor. *Ethics*, *128*(4), 728–755. https://doi.org/10.1086/697448

Fricker, M. (2007). *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*. Oxford Scholarship Online. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001

Garde, D., & Saltzman, J. (2020). The story of mRNA: How a once- dismissed idea became a leading technology in the Covid vaccine race. *Stat News*, 2.

Garland-Thomson, R. (2006). Ways of staring. *Journal of Visual Culture*, *5*(2), 173–192. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470412906066907

Gentner, D. (1981). *Are scientific analogies metaphors?* (N00014-79C-0338). Office of Naval Research Psychological Sciences Division.

Gentner, D., & Jeziorski, M. (1993). The shift from metaphor to analogy in Western science. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and thought* (2nd ed). Cambridge University Press.

Gentner, D., & Markman, A. B. (1997). Structure mapping in analogy and similarity. *American Psychologist*, *52*(1), 45-56.

George, D. R., Whitehouse, E. R., & Whitehouse, P. J. (2016). Asking more of our metaphors: Narrative strategies to end the “War on Alzheimer’s” and humanize cognitive aging. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *16*(10), 22–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2016.1214307

Gislason, M. K. (2013). West Nile virus: The production of a public health pandemic: West Nile virus: a public health pandemic. *Sociology of Health & Illness*, 35(2), 188–199. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01535.x

Gök, A., & Kara, A. (2021). Individuals' conceptions of COVID-19 pandemic through metaphor analysis. *Current Psychology*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-021-01506-z

Gordon, E. J., Harris Yamokoski, A., & Kodash, E. (2006). Children, research, and guinea pigs: Reflections on a metaphor. *Hastings Center Report*, 9.

Government of Canada. (2021). *Military response to COVID-19*. Government of Canada. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/covid-19-military-response.html#vac

Grenier, M.-L. (2020). Cultural competency and the reproduction of White supremacy in occupational therapy education. *Health Education Journal*, *79*(6), 633–644. https://doi.org/10.1177/0017896920902515

Grinker, R. R. (2021). *Nobody's normal: How culture created the stigma of mental illness*. W.W. Norton & Company.

Group, P. (2007). MIP: A Method for identifying metaphorically used words in discourse. *Metaphor and Symbol*, *22*(1), 1–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/10926480709336752

Grubbs, L., & Geller, G. (2021). Masks in medicine: Metaphors and morality. *Journal of Medical Humanities*, *42*(1), 103–107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10912-020-09676-w

Guta, A., & Newman, P. A. (2016). Of HIV, kings, and cures: Troubling the apocryphal apothecary. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *16*(10), 25–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2016.1214313

Hacking, I. (1998). *Mad travelers: Reflections on the reality of transient mental illnesses*. Harvard University Press.

Hart, C. (2007). Critical discourse analysis and conceptualisation: Mental spaces, belnded spaces, and discourse spaces in the British national party. In C. Hart & D. Lukes (Eds.), *Cognitive Linguistics in Critical Discourse Analysis: Application and Theory.* (p. 25). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Hart, C. (2008). Critical discourse analysis and metaphor: Toward a theoretical framework. *Critical Discourse Studies*, *5*(2), 91–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/17405900801990058

Haslanger, S. (2020). Why I don't believe in patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne's *Down Girl*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *101*(1), 220–229. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12697

Isobel, S., McCloughen, A., & Foster, K. (2020). A frog in boiling water? A qualitative analysis of psychiatrists' use of metaphor in relation to psychological trauma. *Australasian Psychiatry*, *28*(6), 656–659. https://doi.org/10.1177/1039856220946596

Jardina, A., & Piston, S. (2021). Hiding in plain sight: Dehumanization as a foundation of white racial prejudice. *Sociology Compass*, 15(9). https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12913

Jepson, M., Elliott, D., Conefrey, C., Wade, J., Rooshenas, L., Wilson, C., Beard, D., Blazeby, J. M., Birtle, A., Halliday, A., Stein, R., Donovan, J. L., Beard, D., Carr, A., Cook, J., Cooper, C., Dean, B., Donovan, J. L., Gray, A., … Stallard, N. (2018). An observational study showed that explaining randomization using gambling-related metaphors and computer-agency descriptions impeded randomized clinical trial recruitment. *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology*, *99*, 75–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2018.02.018

Joffe, H., & Haarhoff, G. (2002). Representations of far-flung illnesses: The case of Ebola in Britain. *Social Science & Medicine*, *54*(6), 955–969. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(01)00068-5

Johnson, A. H. (2015). Normative accountability: How the medical model influences transgender identities and experiences. *Sociology Compass*, *9*(9), 803–813. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12297

Johnson, E. (2005). Proposition 203: A critical metaphor analysis. *Bilingual Research Journal*, *29*(1), 69–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/15235882.2005.10162824

Johnson, S., & Burger, I. (2006). Limitations and justifications for analogical reasoning. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *6*(6), 59–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160600939011

Johnstone, M.-J. (2013). Metaphors, stigma and the 'Alzheimerization' of the euthanasia debate. *Dementia*, *12*(4), 377–393. https://doi.org/10.1177/1471301211429168

Kaye, E. C. (2021). Misogyny in medicine. *New England Journal of Medicine*, *384*(24), 2267–2269. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2103616

Kemp, J. J., Lickel, J. J., & Deacon, B. J. (2014). Effects of a chemical imbalance causal explanation on individuals' perceptions of their depressive symptoms. *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, *56*, 47–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2014.02.009

Khan, Z., Iwai, Y., & DasGupta, S. (2021). Military metaphors and pandemic propaganda: Unmasking the betrayal of 'Healthcare Heroes.' *Journal of Medical Ethics*, *47*(9), 643–644. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2020-106753

King, D., & Gentner, D. (2023). Verb metaphors are processed as analogies. *Proceedings of the 45th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*.

Kobabe, M. (2019). *Gender Queer: A memoir*. The Lion Forge.

Kolata, G. (2021, September 24). Kati Kariko helped shield the world from the coronavirus. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/health/coronavirus-mrna-kariko.html

Koteyko, N., Brown, B., & Crawford, P. (2008). The dead parrot and the dying swan: The role of metaphor scenarios in UK press coverage of avian flu in the UK in 2005–2006. *Metaphor and Symbol*, *23*(4), 242–261. https://doi.org/10.1080/10926480802426787

Laing, R. D. (1967). *The politics of experience and the bird of paradise*. Penguin Books.

Lakoff, G. (2003). Metaphor and war, again. *UC Berlkey Previously Published Works*.

Lakoff, G. (2009). Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify War in the Gulf. *Cognitive Semiotics*, *4*(2). https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem.2009.4.2.5

Lakoff, G. (2012). Explaining embodied cognition results. *Topics in Cognitive Science*, *4*(4), 773–785. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01222.x

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). *Conceptual metaphor in everyday language*. *77*(8), 453–486. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025464

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2003). *Metaphors we live by*. University of Chicago Press.

Larson, B. M. H., Nerlich, B., & Wallis, P. (2005). Metaphors and biorisks: The war on infectious diseases and invasive species. *Science Communication*, *26*(3), 243–268. https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547004273019

LeBlanc, S., & Kinsella, E. A. (2016). Toward epistemic justice: A critically reflexive examination of 'Sanism' and implications for knowledge generation. *Studies in Social Justice*, *10*(1), 59–78. https://doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v10i1.1324

Leduc, A. (27 Nov 2021). How common, and uncommon, terms in English set up a linguistic prison for disabled people. *The Toronto Star.* https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/how-common-and-uncommon-terms-in-english-set-up-a-linguistic-prison-for-disabled-people/article_919f6ab2-ea3a-5c56-b62a-2b9009203f9f.html

Liebowitz, C. (2014). The trouble with ableist metaphors. http://thatcrazycrippledchick.blogspot.com/2014/07/the-trouble-with-ableist-metaphors.html?m=0

Liegghio, M. (2013). A denial of being: Psychiatrization as epistemic violence. In B. A. LeFrançois, R. Menzies, & G. Reaume (Eds.), *Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies*. Canadian Scholars' Press.

Linklater, R. (2014). Psychiatry and Indigenous Peoples. In *Decolonizing Trauma Work: Indigenous Stories and Strategies*. Fernwood Publishing.

López, J. J. (2006). Mapping metaphors and analogies. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *6*(6), 61–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160600939037

MacLeod, N. (2020). COVID-19 metaphors. *Critical Inquiry*, *47*, S49–S51.

Manne, K. (2018). *Down girl: The logic of misogyny*. Oxford University Press.

Manne, K. (2020). Incompetent—On the entitlement to medical care. In *Entitled: How Male Privilege Hurts Women* (pp. 75–96). Crown.

Manne, K. (2021). *Entitled: How Male Privilege Hurts Women*. Penguin Random House.

Mason, R. (2011). Two kinds of unknowing. *Hypatia*, *26*(2), 294–307. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01175.x

Medina, J. (2011). The relevance of credibility excess in a proportional view of epistemic injustice: Differential epistemic authority and the social imaginary. *Social Epistemology*, *25*(1), 15–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2010.534568

Medina, J. (2013). *The epistemology of resistance: Gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and resistant imaginations*. Oxford University Press.

Meerai, S., Abdillahi, I., & Poole, J. (2016). An introduction to anti-Black sanism. *Social Work*, *5*(3), 18.

Mercer, C. (2018). The philosophical roots of Western misogyny. *Philosophical Topics*, *46*(2), 183–208. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201846218

Merriman, B. (2015). "Editing": A productive metaphor for regulating CRISPR. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *15*(12), 62–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2015.1103806

Mertes, H., & Pennings, G. (2011). The force of dissimilar analogies in bioethics. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*, *32*(2), 117–128. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9165-6

Mills, C. (2007). White ignorance. In S. Sullivan & N. Tuana (Eds.), *Race and epistemologies of ignorance*. SUNY Press.

Morrow, M. (2013). Recovery: Progressive paradigm or neoliberal smokescreen? In B. A. LeFrançois, R. Menzies, & G. Reaume (Eds.), *Mad matters: A critical reader in Canadian mad studies*. Canadian Scholars' Press.

Moodley, P., & Lesage, S. S. (2020). A discourse analysis of Ebola in South African newspapers (2014–2015). *South African Journal of Psychology,* 50(2), 158–169. https://doi.org/10.1177/0081246319868656

Mould, T. J., Oades, L. G., & Crowe, T. P. (2010). The use of metaphor for understanding and managing psychotic experiences: A systematic review. *Journal of Mental Health*, *19*(3), 282–293. https://doi.org/10.3109/09638231003728091

Naudin, J. (2020). Opinião dos Especialistas–O mundo e a Covid -19. *Revista Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea*, *9*(1), 108–116. https://doi.org/10.37067/rpfc.v9i1.1069

Nelson, S. C., Yu, J.-H., & Ceccarelli, L. (2015). How metaphors about the genome constrain CRISPR metaphors: Separating the "text" from its "editor." *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *15*(12), 60–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2015.1103815

Nerlich, B., Hamilton, C. A., & Rowe, V. (2002). Conceptualising Foot and Mouth Disease: The socio-cultural role of metaphors, frames and narratives. *Metaphorik, 2*, 90-108

Nguyen, L., & McCallum, K. (2016). Critical metaphor analysis from a communication perspective: A case study of Australian news media discourse on immigration and asylum seekers. *ANZCA,* 1-11.

Nie, J.-B., Gilbertson, A., de Roubaix, M., Staunton, C., van Niekerk, A., Tucker, J. D., & Rennie, S. (2016). Healing without waging war: Beyond military metaphors in medicine and HIV cure research. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *16*(10), 3–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2016.1214305

Nie, J.-B., Rennie, S., Gilbertson, A., & Tucker, J. D. (2016). No more militaristic and violent language in medicine: Response to open peer commentaries on "Healing without waging war: Beyond military metaphors in medicine and HIV cure research." *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *16*(12), W9–W11. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2016.1226988

Okanume, O. B. (2018). Perception of Warri metropolitan residents on online newspaper reportage of the monkey pox virus vaccination hoax. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Publications*, *1*(5), 8.

Ornell, F., Borelli, W. V., Benzano, D., Schuch, J. B., Moura, H. F., Sordi, A. O., Kessler, F. H. P., Scherer, J. N., & von Diemen, L. (2021). The next pandemic: Impact of COVID-19 in mental healthcare assistance in a nationwide epidemiological study. *The Lancet Regional Health - Americas*, 100061. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lana.2021.100061

Parsons, T. (1939). The professions and social structure. *Social Forces*, *17*(4), 457–467. https://doi.org/10.2307/2570695

Pohlhaus Jr, G. (2012). Relational knowing and epistemic injustice: Toward a theory of willful hermeneutical ignorance. *Hypatia*, *27*(4), 715–735. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01222.x

Pohlhaus Jr., G. (2017). Varieties of epistemic injustice. In *The Routledge handbook of epistemic injustice*. Routledge.

Probst, B. (2015). Queen of the owls: Metaphor and identity in psychiatric diagnosis. *Social Work in Mental Health*, *13*(3), 235–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/15332985.2014.893946

Pryal, K. R. G. (2017). *Life of the mind interrupted: Essays on mental health and disability in higher education*. Raven Books.

Putzi, J. (2017). “None of this ‘trapped-in-a-man’s-body’ bullshit”: Transgender girls and wrong-body discourse in young adult fiction. *Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature*, *36*(2), 423–448. https://doi.org/10.1353/tsw.2017.0029

Ravishankar, R.A. (15 Dec 2020). Why you need to stop using these words and phrases. *Harvard Business Review.* https://hbr.org/2020/12/why-you-need-to-stop-using-these-words-and-phrases

Ricœur, P. (2003). *The rule of metaphor the creation of meaning in language*. Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ulaval/detail.action?milDocID=7295

Rimke, H. (2003). Constituting transgressive interiorities: 19th century psychiatric readings of morally mad bodies. In A. Arturo (Ed.), *Violence and the body: Race, gender and the state* (pp. 403–428). Indiana University Press.

Rochon, C. (2016). Dilemmas in military medical ethics: A call for conceptual clarity. *BioéthiqueOnline*, *4*. https://doi.org/10.7202/1035513ar

Ruiz, J. R. (2009). Sociological discourse analysis: Methods and logic. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung*, *10*(2). http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0902263

Sakiyama, M., Josephsson, S., & Asaba, E. (2010). What is participation? A story of mental illness, metaphor, & everyday occupation. *Journal of Occupational Science*, *17*(4), 224–230. https://doi.org/10.1080/14427591.2010.9686699

Scheff, T. (1966). *Being mentally ill: A sociological theory*. Aldine Publishing C*ompany.*

Schick, E. (15 Nov 2015). Ableism in metaphor. *Did I Stutter?*. https://www.didistutter.org/blog/ableism-in-metaphor

Schnittker, J. (2013). Public beliefs about mental illness. In C. S. Aneshensel, J. C. Phelan, & A. Bierman (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of mental health*. Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4276-5

Sears, R. (29 May 2022). Monkeypox? Please, not another virus. Winnipeg Free Press. Retrieved from: https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/analysis/2022/05/29/monkeypox-please-not-another-virus

Sherwin, S. (2001). Feminist ethics and the metaphor of AIDS. *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, *26*(4), 343–364. https://doi.org/10.1076/jmep.26.4.343.3011

Shinebourne, P., & Smith, J. A. (2010). The communicative power of metaphors: An analysis and interpretation of metaphors in accounts of the experience of addiction. *Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice*, *83*(1), 59–73. https://doi.org/10.1348/147608309X468077

Sibbald, K. R. (2021). Epistemic injustice and clinician mental health: The ethical implications of clinician disclosure. *Journal of Ethics in Mental Health*, *11*.

Sibbald, K.R. (2023). Migrating metaphors: Why we should be concerned about a 'War on Mental Illness' in the aftermath of COVID-19. *Canadian Journal of Bioethics.* DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1098554ar

Sibbald, K.R. (2024). Are metaphors ethically bad epistemic practice?: Epistemic injustice at the intersections. Hypatia. Published online 2024:1-21. doi:10.1017/hyp.2023.90

Sibbald, K. R., & Beagan, B. L. (2022). Disabled healthcare professionals experiences of altruism: Identity, professionalism, competence, and disclosure. *Disability and Society*, 1–18.

Sontag, S. (1990a). *AIDS and its metaphors*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Sontag, S. (1990b). *Illness as metaphor*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Spielthenner, G. (2014). Analogical reasoning in ethics. *Ethical theory and moral practice*, *17*(5), 861–874. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9484-6

Stark, C. A. (2019). Gaslighting, misogyny, and psychological oppression. *The Monist*, *102*(2), 221–235. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onz007

Steslow, K. (2010). Metaphors in our mouths: The silencing of the psychiatric patient. *Hastings Center Report*, *40*(4), 30–33. https://doi.org/10.1353/hcr.0.0279

Szasz, T. S. (1973). *Mental illness as a metaphor*. *242*, 3.

Tate, T. P. (2020). Your father's a fighter; Your daughter's a vegetable: A critical analysis of the use of metaphor in clinical practice. *Hastings Center Report*, *50*(5), 20–29. https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1182

Tate, T. P., & Pearlman, R. A. (2016). Military metaphors in health care: who are we actually trying to help? *The American Journal of Bioethics*, *16*(10), 15–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2016.1214320

The Initiative. (2020). *#ReframeCovid*. https://sites.google.com/view/reframecovid/initiative

Thibodeau, P. H. (2016). Extended metaphors are the home runs of persuasion: Don't fumble the phrase. *Metaphor and Symbol*, *31*(2), 53–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/10926488.2016.1150756

Thomas, C. (2004). How is disability understood? An examination of sociological approaches. *Disability & Society*, *19*(6), 569–583. https://doi.org/10.1080/0968759042000252506

Tobia, A., Draschil, T., Sportelli, D., Katsamanis, M., Rosenberg, S., & Williams, J. M. (2013). The horror!: A creative framework for teaching psychopathology via metaphorical analyses of horror films. *Academic Psychiatry*, *37*(2), 131. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ap.12070134

Toochukwu, D., Patience, N., & Obianuju, S. (2018). Newspaper framing of monkey pox outbreak and its influence on media audience perception in South East region of Nigeria. *Ezegwu, Ezeonyejiak & Asodike*, *2*(2), 21–38.

Trogen, B. (2017). The evidence-based metaphor. *JAMA*, *317*(14), 1411. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2016.17219

Turner, J. (2014). Metaphors and therapeutic encounters in mental health nursing. *Mental Health Nursing*, 6.

Ungar, S. (1998). Hot crises and media reassurance: A comparison of emerging diseases and Ebola Zaire. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *49*(1), 36. https://doi.org/10.2307/591262

van der Miesen, A. I. R., Raaijmakers, D., & van de Grift, T. C. (2020). “You have to wait a little longer”: Transgender (mental) health at risk as a consequence of deferring gender-affirming treatments during COVID-19. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, *49*(5), 1395–1399. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-020-01754-3

van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Aims of critical discourse analysis. *Japanese Discourse*, *1*, 17–27.

Venkatesan, S. (2017). The bad doctor: The troubled life and times of Dr. Iwan James, by Ian Williams. *Journal of Graphic Novels and Comics*, *8*(1), 110–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/21504857.2016.1149082

Vlastou, L. (2021). *Figurative manifestations of COVID-19* [Aristotle University of Thessaloniki]. https://ikee.lib.auth.gr/record/333037/files/GRI-2021-31518.pdf

Walker, I. F. (2020). Beyond the military metaphor. *Medicine Anthropology Theory*, *7*(2), 261–272. https://doi.org/10.17157/mat.7.2.806

Wallis, P., & Nerlich, B. (2005). Disease metaphors in new epidemics: The UK media framing of the 2003 SARS epidemic. *Social Science & Medicine*, *60*(11), 2629–2639. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.11.031

Wardrope, A. (2015). *Medicalization and epistemic injustice*. *18*, 341–352.

Weber, E., & Wang, Q. (2023). The structure of analogical reasoning in bioethics. *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, *26*(1), 69–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-022-10123-x

Wilkinson, A. (2020, April 15). Pandemics are not wars: There are better metaphors to describe what’s happening right now. *VOX*. https://www.vox.com/culture/2020/4/15/21193679/coronavirus-pandemic-war-metaphor-ecology-microbiome

Withers, A. J. (2012). *Disability, Politics & Theory*. Fernwood Publishing.

World Health Organization (WHO). (16 May 2022). Monkeypox – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2022-DON381

World Health Organization (WHO). (18 May 2022). Monkeypox – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2022-DON383

World Health Organization (WHO). (10 June 2022). Multi-country monkeypox outbreak: situation update. https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2022-DON392

Wright, T. (2021). Indigenous communities facing ‘dual pandemic’ due to the impact of COVID-19 on mental illness and addiction, report says. *The Globe and Mail*, 1.

Young, J. A., Lind, C., Orange, J. B., & Savundranayagam, M. Y. (2019). Expanding current understandings of epistemic injustice and dementia: Learning from stigma theory. *Journal of Aging Studies*, *48*, 76–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaging.2019.01.003