

# Labour and Rearmament

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**L**ABOUR'S part in a period of rearmament can be stated in one word: work. Everything else that can be said on the subject is just an elaborate footnote, a statement of the conditions on which the most work and the best work will be forthcoming.

One condition is already present: an almost unanimous belief in the necessity of rearmament. On February 20, in a joint brief to the Government, the four central Labour organizations (the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, the Canadian Congress of Labour, the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, and the Dominion Joint Legislative Committee of the Railway Transportation Brotherhoods) said: "The free world now faces the most ruthless and powerful aggressor in history. The best it can hope for is long years of heavy defence expenditures, a large proportion of its manpower and resources diverted from productive work to a great effort for sheer survival. In this effort Canada must play a major part. We have no choice. The enemy is no longer at a safe distance. He is on our northern doorstep. Our share of the free world's industrial potential is large and important, far larger and more important than at the outbreak of war in 1939. If we fail or falter, our allies may be critically weakened, and disaster may overwhelm us all.

"Labour knows this as well as any section of the Canadian people, perhaps better. Both the Trades and Labor Congress and the Canadian Congress of La-

bour have been engaged in a long battle with the Communists in their own ranks. Labour knows from bitter experience just how tough, how clever, how elusive, how relentless, even a handful of Communists can be. It has probably fewer illusions about the size of the job ahead than any other class. It certainly knows better than any other class just what Communist domination would mean."

That statement represents the thinking of practically the whole Canadian Labour movement. There are, of course, still a few Communist-dominated unions. The most important are the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America ("U.E."), in the electrical apparatus industry, and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, in gold and base metals. But both of these have been expelled from the Canadian Congress of Labour, and two CCL affiliates, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America ("I.U.E."), and the United Steelworkers of America, are now organizing the workers in these industries in unions free of Communist control. This effort deserves, but has not always received, all the help which employers and public authority can properly give to it. For both these industries are vital to our defence.

Overwhelmingly, then, Canadian Labour supports rearmament. Overwhelmingly, it believes that Communist aggression must be resisted. Overwhelmingly, it stands ready to do its part in a common effort to preserve a free society. But the effort

must be genuinely common, and the society really free. Labour must be treated as a partner, not pushed around. It must be called on to bear its share of the burden, but not other people's shares as well. Western democracy is a lot better than Communism, but it is still a long way from being as free or democratic as it ought to be. It is still too much what Disraeli called "two nations." It must become *one*. Unless it does, it cannot evoke from Labour the intense loyalty, the wholehearted co-operation, without which it can scarcely survive. Effective defence against Communist aggression demands more than just strong armed forces. It demands also a positive alternative to Communism.

## II

**W**HAT does all this mean in concrete terms?

First, Labour participation in the planning and administration of the defence effort itself. "If you want our aid, call us to your councils." There was nothing like enough of this during the last war. Price control and wage control were both imposed without any consultation with Labour. Labour had no share in the administration of price or commodity controls. Most of the control machinery was manned by dollar-a-year men from top management; precious few Labour men ever got near the inner sanctum, except cap in hand.

This was bad enough then. It would be far worse now for two reasons: the nature of the aggressor, and the enormous growth of the Labour movement, in the intervening years, in numbers, unity, maturity and power.

Communist aggression is unique in history because it is avowedly "working-class." It professes to aim at the emancipation of the workers. That is why it can always count on a certain number of working-class supporters. People who would never have dreamt of supporting Hitler will support Stalin. In Canada they are very few. But they exist, and they have an immense capacity for mischief. Unless

Labour has its share in planning and administering the defence effort, it will be fatally easy for these people to say that the whole thing is just a bosses' effort to hang on to their privileges and power, and that Labour's part is only to "hear, believe and obey." This must not happen.

But it is not only the nature of the aggressor which makes it essential that Labour's share should be far bigger than in 1939-1945. In 1939, organized Labour had less than 360,000 members. Now it has over a million. In 1939, the great basic industries were, by and large, unorganized. Now, though there are still big gaps, they are predominantly organized. Industries which a dozen years ago counted their trade unionists by the hundred now count them by the scores of thousands.

In 1939, there was no Canadian Congress of Labour: the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour was regarded by the "orthodox" unions as little better than a fake; the Railway Transportation Brotherhoods stood, for the most part, in majestic isolation. Now there is a C.C.L., which has organized vast masses of semi-skilled and unskilled workers; the Canadian and Catholic Confederation has won its spurs and is accepted as an authentic part of the trade union movement; and the whole lot, T.C.L., C.C.L., C.C.C.L. and the Railway Running Trades, are co-operating heartily. They stood together behind the railway strike. They jointly protested against compulsory arbitration. They campaigned jointly for price control. Now they have set up a permanent co-operating committee.

This is in itself evidence of a growth in maturity. The expulsion of the Communists, the steady support of the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, and resistance to aggression in Korea, the leading part which Canadian unionists have played in the organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the increasing concern of unions with broad projects of social legislation designed to benefit the people as a whole: all these bear witness to the same thing.

That Canadian unionism has grown in power since 1939 hardly calls for proof.

It is universally admitted; the only question its opponents raise is whether it has grown too much!

To treat the Labour movement of today as the Government and employers treated the Labour movement of 1939 is just impossible. The sensible thing is to bring it right into the seats of power and give it the responsibility it deserves, and as much of it as it can handle. Labour does not want to keep management out of the planning and administration of the defence effort. It does not want to assume the responsibilities of Government. It only wants its fair share, and it believes it is in the public interest that it should get it.

**A** POSITIVE alternative to Communism means also freedom to organize the unorganized. This is supposed to be guaranteed by law now, in the Dominion and in every province. But every union organizer knows that the guarantee is very imperfect, to say the least. There are still employers who fight every inch of the way. There are still administrators who seem eager to grasp at every excuse for preventing organization. And nearly all the Acts prohibit strikes until after a prescribed conciliation procedure has been gone through. On paper, this "cooling-off" period is relatively short; in practice it often lasts for many months, sometimes for over a year. In effect, the unions have often been deprived of their economic weapon, without getting the compensating protection which the Acts are supposed to give.

This is not good enough. Despite the growth of unions in recent years, only about a third of Canadian wage and salary earners belong to unions. The rest work under the dictatorship of the employer; no doubt often a mild and benevolent dictatorship, but dictatorship none the less, qualified only by the threat of organization if things get too intolerable. The extension of constitutional government in industry, through trade unionism and collective bargaining, must go on. It is an essential part of our answer to Communism. Employers, if they are really in earnest about resisting Communist aggression, must stop resisting unionization.

Governments must do something to speed up the administration of the collective bargaining Acts, though as long as they insist on keeping the Conciliation Board procedure this will not be easy. It is almost impossible to get the Boards through their work within the number of days prescribed in the Acts; only the provision for extending the time by agreement of the parties or permission of the Minister prevents the whole business from being illegal. For this reason, and also because the possibility of recourse to a Board often means that the parties don't really negotiate at all—just slap down demands and say no to each other—it might be worth considering abolishing such Boards and leaving the settlement of disputes to free collective bargaining, with the help of trained permanent conciliators. Most Labour leaders would probably dissent from this. But most of the dissenters would, I think, emphatically agree that the present procedure is much too slow.

### III

**A** THIRD element in a positive alternative to Communism is more social security. The demand for security is one of the distinguishing characteristics of our age, and the Communists have made the most of it. They have done their best to make men believe that only under Communism can they hope for security. Britain and New Zealand have shown this is not true. Canada has not. Some of the Government's promises of social security are now almost a generation old, and their realization seems as far off as ever. The long delay has played directly into the hands of the Communists. A great advance now towards comprehensive social security would be perhaps the most effective single piece of counter-propaganda we could make. It would raise the morale of our working people; it would free their minds of strain and anxiety, and so increase their productivity; it would give them an outward and visible sign that our fight *against* Communism is also a fight *for* something better. It would prove that we do not have to sacrifice freedom

to get security. It would show that our democracy cares for the common man, and is determined to protect him not only against the enemy without, but also against those formidable allies of Communism, squalor, disease and want.

The extension of social security is particularly important at a time when other social advances are bound to be slowed down or stopped. Our economy is already operating at, or near, capacity. The manpower and materials we must use for defence are not available for ordinary, peacetime purposes. We must either produce more, or take away manpower and materials from ordinary production. If we can't produce *enough* more to take care of defence without taking away from ordinary production, then we shall have to cut down the supply of ordinary goods and services. We shall be very lucky indeed if we can avoid this.

This means, among other things, that we are going to have to slow down our housing programme. Housing and defence compete for many essential materials, and defence must have priority. This is an appalling thought, for we entered the last war with a serious housing backlog, we came out of it with a worse one, and we are entering the present emergency with a worse one still—well over 700,000 dwellings. We must make every effort to see that all the materials which can be spared from defence, and from building schools and hospitals, are used for housing, and for the housing that is most needed: low-cost housing. But even so, the rate of progress must be far below what it could have been if this emergency had not arisen.

Further advances towards social security, on the other hand, if we realize their importance, and want them badly enough, are possible, even in our present difficulties.

Many people will challenge this. This year we are spending some \$1.6 billions or \$1.7 billions on defence, and we are planning to spend as much in each of the two following years. Moreover, there is reason to think that we shall have to spend a good deal more. The combined effort of the free nations is certainly not exces-

sive; the defencelessness, or near-defencelessness, of Western Europe and our own northern frontier suggests rather that it is still inadequate. The United States is devoting about 18 per cent of its Gross National Product to defence (including economic and military aid to other free nations). Britain about 11 per cent, Canada 8 or 9 per cent. Comparisons of this sort are open to a good many possibilities of error, and should not, therefore, be taken too literally or pushed too far. Nor can it reasonably be maintained that every member of the Grand Alliance ought to devote exactly the same proportion of its production to defence. That would violate the principle of ability to pay. The United States is much richer than any of its allies. Its Gross National Product per capita is close to \$2,000. Ours is about \$1,400. Britain's is probably not much more than half of this. In the circumstances, American, British, and for that matter Canadian, public opinion is likely to say that we ought to be spending more, not less, on defence.

## IV

**B**UT if we are going to spend \$1.6 billions or \$1.7 billions or \$2.0 billions, or even more, on defence, how can we possibly afford any large increases in social security? The latest official estimate of the cost of health insurance is \$300 millions, though the Old Age Security Committee admitted that "a large proportion" of this "would represent not a new burden on the people of Canada, but merely a rechanneling of existing expenditures on various forms of health care." In view of the Heagerty Committee's estimates, the results of Dr. Richter's surveys of Yarmouth and Glace Bay, and British experience, this figure is probably an understatement, certainly no exaggeration. Old age pensions of \$50 a month at age 65 (which is more than the Government's proposal, but about the least that Labour could accept) would cost \$660 millions this year (about \$550 millions more than the present pensions), and the cost would

go up steadily because of the increasing proportion of old people. (This could, however, be reduced by postponing the pensions of those old people who re-entered the labour market in the emergency). Invalidity pensions (on an un-stated scale) the Old Age Security Committee said would cost \$40 millions or \$50 millions. Add sickness cash benefits and improvements in unemployment insurance, and the total could easily reach \$1 billion.

To talk of adding this on top of \$1.6 billions or \$2.0 billions or more, for defence, may seem madness. But perhaps it isn't as mad as it looks.

In the first place, health insurance should, in a few years' time (and this emergency may last many years), more than pay for itself in increased productivity. It might make a most important contribution to defence: the healthier the people, the stronger the defence. Sickness cash benefits, by reducing the patients' anxiety, might hasten recovery, and so contribute to the same end.

Second, wider coverage and higher benefits under unemployment insurance, if accompanied (as they almost certainly would be) by higher contributions, would help the fight against inflation. The fund would take in far more than it would pay out. It would be a form of compulsory saving.

Third, the new schemes (old age pensions without means test, health insurance, sickness cash benefits, invalidity pensions) are pretty certain to be financed mainly by contributions, and on a pay-as-you-go basis. This would not involve a large addition to the budget, nor any net addition to consumer purchasing power (except in so far as the contributions or taxes were money that would otherwise have been saved, not spent for consumption).

The question, "Can we afford social security on a defence budget?" really boils down to this: Do we want it enough? If we do, we can have it, even if we double our defence expenditure, and even if the extra social security costs *more* than a billion dollars.

We must, however, recognize that we can only have it if we are prepared to forego some other forms of consumption. The supply of goods and services for ordinary consumption, including social security, is going to be inadequate for some time to come. If social security payments are substantially increased, then other demands on the supply of consumption goods and services will have to be reduced. We can't have all this and social security too. Somebody's ordinary, private consumption will have to be cut. It would be agreeable for most of us, no doubt, if all the cut could be imposed on the rich. But it can't. If we make the right kind of arrangements, the contributions will be based roughly on ability to pay, and the benefits roughly on need; but that is the best we can hope to do.

## V

**A** FOURTH element in the positive alternative to Communism is control of inflation. In the words of the joint union brief on price control: "Inflation can be as dangerous as Communism itself, and Communism's most powerful ally." If we let prices, rents and profits go skyrocketing up, we shall be making the Communists a present of the finest propaganda material imaginable. We shall be building up a Fifth Column behind our own lines.

Yet inflation is already in full swing. As the union brief pointed out, "Even before the Korean war, there had been big increases in prices. From April 1, 1946, when the post-war rise in the cost of living began, to July 3, 1950, the urban cost of living index rose 38.7 per cent, the food index 58.6, clothing 46.7, home furnishings and services 38.3. By contrast, the rent index had risen only 20.1 per cent, and fuel and light 28.5; rents were still partly controlled, and electricity is always controlled, either by public ownership or public regulation of rates. The index of farm family living costs at August 1 (the nearest date available) had risen 43.3 per cent: food 65.3, clothing 48.9, fuel 36.2. The rise in wholesale prices had been even steeper.

At July 1, the general wholesale price index was 54.0 per cent above April 1, 1946; consumers' goods 47.7, building materials 65.8, industrial materials 66.5. When controls were taken off, the public was assured that the 'natural,' 'normal' forces of competition and 'free enterprise' would keep prices down. But they didn't. Even before the fresh burst of price increases which followed the invasion of Korea, it was clear that those forces had failed, and something further was needed."

What has happened since has only intensified the need. By March 1, 1951, the urban cost of living index was 48.8 per cent above April 1, 1946: food 73.1, clothing 59.3, home furnishings and services 56.3, rent 22.5, fuel and light 36.7. Farm family living costs in January 1951 were 45.6 per cent above April 1946: food 71.5, clothing 48.9, fuel 39.5. At February 1, 1951, the general wholesale price index was 71.8 per cent above April 1, 1946: building materials 86.8, industrial materials 106.9. These higher wholesale prices are bound to be reflected in still further increases in retail prices and the increasing diversion of manpower and other resources to the armed forces and defence production will have the same effect. There is also likely to be a fresh increase in rents when Dominion rent control ends.

"At April 1, 1946," the union brief pointed out, "average weekly earnings of salary and wage earners in the nine leading groups of industries covered by the D.B.S. *Employment Situation* were \$32.56. By December 1, 1950 they had risen to \$46.59. But in terms of April 1946 dollars, they were only \$32.89, a real increase of only 33 cents in April 1946 dollars.

"What inflation means was concisely and cogently set forth by the late Prime Minister, Mr. King, in his broadcast of October 18, 1941, announcing the imposition of price control:

Rising prices, unless controlled will make it more costly and therefore more difficult to finance the war. Rising prices, unchecked, will spread confusion and uncertainty in industry and trade. They will hinder production and the proper distribution of supplies. They will make the cost of living

rise more rapidly than wages and salaries. The value of savings will be materially lessened. The result would be hardship to nearly everyone, and hardship in very unequal measure . . .

Rising prices—a rising cost of living—do not have the same effect on all households. The smaller the family income and the larger the family, the more serious the hardship imposed. For those with small incomes, rising prices of clothing, food and other necessities may mean serious hardship, while from those with larger incomes only luxuries and small comforts may have to be given up.

Rising prices thus serve to aggravate the inequalities in society, and to throw the heaviest burdens on those least able to bear them. Wartime experience has shown that prices rise faster than wages or salaries and bear more heavily still on those who live on small pensions or life savings.

Nor is the position of the farmer any happier than that of the wage earner . . . Because of the heavy demands of war on industry, the scarcity of manufactured goods is likely to be greater than the scarcity of farm products. The rise in prices will consequently be unequal if prices are left to themselves. The things farmers have to buy tend to go up in price, more than the things they have to sell . . .

The truth is that all but an insignificant minority of the population would be worse off as a result of rising prices, if prices were permitted to rise unchecked, and, in general, the relatively poor would suffer more than the relatively well-to-do.

"Mr. King . . . made it very clear that . . . a price ceiling, by itself, was not enough to stop inflation. But he made it equally clear that other measures by themselves were not enough either. That is precisely Labour's position now. Higher interest rates, higher taxes, control of consumer credit, manipulation of the external value of the Canadian dollar, control and allocation of scarce materials: all these are necessary; indeed, Labour believes that the Government will have to go much farther with some of them than it has yet done, notably by imposing an excess profits tax. But even with such additions, these measures are not enough. They were not enough in the last struggle against aggression. They are not enough now. As the struggle is intensified, they will become steadily more and more inadequate.

"Mr. Kenneth Taylor, Chairman of the

Wartime Prices and Trade Board, told the Royal Commission on Prices two years ago that the success of price control during the last war 'was made possible by a vigorous combination of supply controls, production directives, export controls, bulk purchasing, subsidies and rationing.' He mentioned specifically 'orders for diverting scarce materials and keeping down costs through simplification and standardization . . . Typical of such orders were those prohibiting the production of motor cars and other consumers' durables; controlling the uses of metals; eliminating designs wasteful of textile fabrics; restricting the uses of oils and fats; and controlling the commencement or expansion of civilian business enterprises.' Labour recognizes that measures of this kind also are essential. But again, by themselves they are not enough. Indeed, some of them, such as subsidies, obviously could not be applied without price controls.

**L**ABOUR," states the brief, "recognizes that, even with the most complete and energetic control policy, prices cannot be kept stationary. There are external forces which no one in Canada can control . . . . But the existence of such forces only makes it the more necessary that all factors which can be controlled should be controlled; and with the increasing utilization of controls in the United States, from which so many of our essential imports come, the uncontrollable forces are daily being reduced.

"The arguments against the imposition of price control now in Canada appear to be:

(a) . . . In 1941, our war effort was absorbing about 40 per cent of our production. Our present defence effort is taking less than ten per cent. What was necessary, and possible, with a 40 per cent effort is neither necessary nor possible with a ten per cent effort.

(b) Mr. King, in his 1941 broadcast, explicitly stated that price control was being imposed because of actual, physical shortages: . . . 'For two years, . . . the Government has been competing with the individual consumer for almost every com-

modity Canada produces or imports.' This is not true now; hence, so runs the argument, price control is not required.

(c) The administration of price control is an enormous task. The magnificent administrative machine the Wartime Prices and Trade Board built up is largely dismantled. . . .

(d) Wartime price control, in the words of Mr. Taylor, 'was predicated on the whole-hearted acceptance of the policy and the procedures by practically all industries, groups, sections and classes. And this almost unanimous support was in turn based upon, and made possible by that simple singleness of purpose—the winning of the war—which imbued and pervaded the whole community throughout these years.' The argument . . . implies that this 'whole-hearted acceptance,' this 'simple singleness of purpose,' would not now be forthcoming.

(e) Price control is impossible without wage control. Mr. King made this point . . . . But Labour will not now accept wage control; therefore price control now is out of the question.

"These arguments look formidable. But Labour is not impressed . . . .

"It is true that our present defence effort is taking [less than] ten per cent of our national production. But it is pure assumption that price control must wait till it is taking 40 per cent. Just because we waited last time is no reason why we should wait this time. It might even be a reason for not waiting. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. . . .

"The second objection . . . invites a similar reply. It is pure assumption that price control must wait till there are actual physical shortages caused by diversion of energies and resources to defence. . . . Price control was never a remedy for the shortages; it did not produce more goods. It was a remedy for the price increases; it kept them to a minimum. It can do it again. Besides, there is not the slightest doubt that actual physical shortages caused by diversion of resources to defence are coming, and coming soon . . . . Why wait till a lot of the damage has been done? Why not prevent what we can?

"The administration of price control is certainly a big job. But it was an even bigger job in 1941. Then there was no experience to go on. . . . Now there is the whole highly successful experience of four years." . . .

**W**HAT warrant is there," the brief asks, "for assuming that 'whole-hearted acceptance,' 'almost unanimous support,' could not be secured for price control now? Do our people really think Communism is less dangerous than Nazism? . . . Is Communism less repugnant to us? . . . Which of the 'industries, groups, sections and classes' Mr. Taylor referred to is not prepared to give 'whole-hearted acceptance' to price control, if it is needed to preserve our free society? With the argument that price control is not needed, we have already dealt; what we are dealing with now is the argument that, even if it is needed, it would not work, because our people are not willing to accept it, not 'psychologically prepared' for it.

"They certainly were not 'psychologically prepared' for it in 1941. It was sprung upon them literally overnight. Yet they accepted it, and it worked. Why? Because of the 'simple singleness of purpose—the winning of the war.' Have we no such 'singleness of purpose' about 'winning the war' against Communism?

"Labour is prepared to give price control 'whole-hearted acceptance.' Labour is 'psychologically prepared' for it. Labour has the necessary 'singleness of purpose.' Judging by the Gallup poll, most of the Canadian people feel the same way. We are at war, a war which promises to be the grimmest of our history. If there are any of our people who do not understand this, it is the business of the Government to make it clear to them. If that is done, there can surely be no question that the 'almost unanimous support' of the years of the war against Hitler will be forthcoming again. . . .

"The argument that price control is impossible without wage control is grotesquely oversimplified. . . .

"(a) Certainly price control is possible without wage *freezing*.

"(b) Labour cost is a very large proportion of total cost. But labour cost

and wages are not the same thing. Labour cost depends not only on wages but on productivity; not only on what you pay to the worker, but on what you get from him. High wages may mean low labour costs, and a wage increase may bring a reduction in labour costs, by stimulating increased productivity.

"(c) Productivity is increasing. Wages can increase with it without breaking a price ceiling.

"(d) Profits are at, or near, an all-time high." In 1950, total corporation profits after taxes were \$1,402,000,000. This is more than 76 per cent above 1946.

"Of course," the brief proceeds, "shareholders' investment has risen also. But, for 643 companies covered by the *Bank of Canada Statistical Summary* for October 1950 (p. 163), the 1949 return on shareholders' investment was 12.6 per cent, against a 1946 return of 9.7 per cent. . . . It seems safe to assume that in 1950, shareholders' return on investment may be at least a third higher than in 1946; and 1946 cannot be called a depressed year for profits. . . . There is certainly room for a transfer of income from profits to wages, which would allow for a further increase in wages without breaking the ceiling.

"(e) Wages are already subject to a large measure of control. They are usually fixed, by contract, for a year, sometimes . . . for longer, rarely for less than six months. Even if the contract is reopened before its termination, claims for increases usually have to go through a prolonged process of negotiation, and conciliation or arbitration. . . . This is not true of prices. They can, and often do, rise overnight. They are rarely subject to formal negotiation, almost never to anything like conciliation or arbitration (except in public utilities). That is why price control is urgent, while wage control, even if ultimately necessary, is not. . . .

"The Labour movement recognizes that wages *could* go up fast enough and far enough to break a price ceiling, though it sees no immediate danger of anything of the sort. It believes that the proper way to deal with this question is a Government-Labour-Management Conference to



work out methods of wage stabilization. This offers a prospect of a wage policy which will do two things, both essential: (a) preserve the spirit, the principle, of collective bargaining; and (b) bring the experience of Labour and Management into the defence effort. If our Government institutes a general policy of price and production controls, Labour is ready to take part in a Government-Labour-Management Conference to consider wage stabilization."

The brief dealt with the effects of wage increases on cost. It did not explicitly deal with their effect on demand. Undoubtedly, wage increases which would not, or need not, raise costs, could raise consumer purchasing power beyond the capacity of civilian industry to meet; could accelerate the process of "too much money chasing too few goods." But the best way to deal with this is by voluntary and compulsory saving (including, perhaps, increased unemployment insurance contributions), and by taxation, based on ability to pay.

A fifth element in the positive alternative to Communism is the steady elimination of sub-standard wages and other sub-standard terms of employment.

## VI

**A**LL these are conditions which, I think, must be met if Labour is to make its maximum contribution. They involve

both benefits and sacrifices. But are there no positive responsibilities Labour ought to assume? *Yes—*

*First*, responsibility for helping to get all possible manpower into production, and into the places and kinds of production where it will be most use.

*Second*, responsibility for protecting the new entrants to the labour market—older people, youngsters, married women, immigrants—from exploitation.

*Third*, responsibility for accepting as much overtime work as is necessary, and economically sound. Longer hours don't always mean higher production, by any means, especially over the long pull; and this emergency will almost certainly be a very long pull.

*Fourth*, responsibility, through union-management committees, for promoting productivity and making the best use of manpower and other resources.

*Fifth*, responsibility for helping the Government police any controls it adopts.

Labour does not want special privileges, just "fair shares." Nothing less will adequately serve the people of Canada, or the peoples of the democracies as a whole. Nothing less will lay the foundations for the better world which must be built "when this dark cloud has passed."

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## *A Time for Everything*

There is a fine touch of human nature in Walter Winchell's story of the Paris conference where a reporter asked a hurrying diplomat what he thought about a certain international problem. To which the diplomat replied, with some asperity, "Don't bother me now, I must make a speech. This is no time to think."