

One World-Or Two?

By HANS L. LEONHARDT

THE development toward a bi-polar system of international relations represents a manifest although regrettable fact. After the defeat of the tyrannical regimes in the center of Europe and in the Far east, power vacua emerged which made a realignment of political forces desirable and inevitable. As a result of geographic, economic and, particularly, of ideological circumstances, the new half-European and extra-European centers of Moscow and Washington have tended to exercise—and to exercise increasingly—a centrifugal influence around their respective aggregates of power. Partly this development was autogenous. Partly it was due to an accumulation of suspicion among the victorious allies for which, in its intensity, it is difficult to find a historic parallel. All the effusions about the United Nations and all the hopes that accompanied the ratification of the San Francisco Charter do not alter the supreme fact that the world has been split into two opposing camps whose dealings with each other betray their determination to prepare themselves for any future contingency. We are deadlocked with the Russians in Germany, Austria, and in Korea. We watch each other with apprehension in China, Japan, India, and Palestine. If the bi-polar trend is not stopped or modified in the near future, we run the danger of transforming major parts of the world into fertile fields for ideological combats:

Weakness of UNO

The United Nations Organization continues the traditional weakness of the League of Nations system. It has indulged in a change of names rather than

of essentials and it cannot save us from disaster unless more emphasis is placed on the principle of international co-operation and less upon a fortuitous voting-mechanism which can accomplish nothing but increase tension. In substance UNO provides only for a permanent meeting place of the great powers. It represents historically a continuation of the conference-method which was employed with more or less success in the era between the Napoleonic and our own period of upheavals. The United Nations Organization is enfeebled to the very core if the great powers perpetuate their fundamental disagreements. Because of its weak super-national structure it cannot withstand the strain of an unchecked bipartite evolution. The new world organization will continue to be tossed upon the storm-driven sea of political opposition until the great antagonists can establish a degree of harmony, a *modus vivendi*.

There are those who maintain that the manifestations of a regime in the conduct of external matters necessarily reflect its methods and aspirations at home, and nobody, indeed, can deny that states, like individuals must, of necessity draw upon their proselytizing impulses. It also has to be admitted that the two leading world powers are permeated with governmental philosophies and administrative practices which, unfortunately, are as far apart from each other as human imagination and human frailty allows them to be. And yet, we cannot afford the surrender to a conception of human defeat which resigns itself to the long-run menace of war before any attempt has ever been made to walk the slippery and dangerous path on the road toward peace, toward genuine peace. One of the most amazing phenomena of the contemporary scene is the indisputable fact that so far no attempt has been made to discuss the bi-polar problem as a whole.

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The Conferences of Teheran and Yalta served the pressing purposes of the war and the Potsdam meeting continued the former tradition of groping for temporary solutions. Actually the two worlds have slipped into an atmosphere of mounting tension without having come to grasp with the issues at large.

Necessity for Global Thinking

A modus vivendi between east and west presupposes a global arrangement, a global compromise. Only negotiations that deal with the bi-polar problem as a whole can possibly succeed. Such negotiations must take place on the highest level of state representation and should include such topics as the territorial distribution of the world, the recognition of certain indisputable spheres of influence as well as the establishment of a status for the vast inter-zone areas. At the same time commitments would be required that deal with the economic exchange between the various zones and with their ideological delimitations. Last and not least the contracting parties would have to tackle the problem of an international control of nuclear energy and the inescapable project of strengthening the basic structure of Uno. Compared with such a program of global peace endeavor, the contemporary diplomatic moves seem utterly insignificant. The powers seem to vacillate between a desire to prepare themselves for war and the recognition of the obvious fact that war is unthinkable. Thus we drift from detail to tension without any attempt at an over-all orientation. Whether Trieste will be Italian or Yugo-Slavian or a Free City à la Danzig is neither of decisive importance nor likely to save mankind. What will count more than single territorial or economic regulation will be the question whether the two worlds can establish a system of relations in which each side can find a measure of national security and of political saturation. The exceedingly difficult problem of finding solutions which assure both sides a reasonable degree of natural

protection must be handled by the great powers themselves. Vagarious majority decisions of the small nations cannot discharge the great powers of a responsibility which is theirs. They have to establish confidence among each other and so create an order upon which UNO can be based.

Russians Have Profound Feeling of Insecurity—Reasons

So far the western world has failed to realize that the Russians suffer from a profound feeling of insecurity. In part, it is true, this sentiment is caused by the peculiarities of the Soviet regime itself. Their leaders are frequently imbued with what may be termed an ideological provincialism. A thorough knowledge of the writings of Marx and Lenin is not necessarily a substitute for familiarity with western psychology. On the other hand it must be admitted that the leaders of the Kremlin draw upon appreciable experience in being subjected to foreign intervention and that the memories of Munich linger on. Moreover the acquisition and fortification of strategic positions across the Atlantic and the Pacific on the part of the United States are interpreted by the Russians as offensive in character. The western world may entertain peaceful designs. But to the Russians it does not always appear in this light. Experiments with and the production of atomic bombs coupled with proposals of air missions that encircle the globe are not likely to enhance their feeling of trust.

Both Sides Must Make Concessions, We More Than the Russians

If we want to have peace both sides will have to make concessions, and substantial ones. And the concessions on the part of the western world may have to be larger than those to be expected from the East. First of all we and our friends can afford them. Six sevenths of the world's surface, its waters, canals and straits, its very skies, are dominated by powers with regimes that are akin to

or friendly to ours. Besides, in view of the state of western industrialization, the west has more to lose than the east. It should also be assumed that the democratic institutions of the United States and of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be conducive to an approach which distinguishes itself by a greater degree of intellectual mobility and elasticity. The leaders of the western world have the historic task of penetrating the Russian mind and accounting for its susceptibilities. We have to do that although at the moment we may not enjoy complete reciprocity. So far we have failed to raise ourselves to the magnitude of the task which is at hand. We act as if our security were at stake in regions that lie clearly at the periphery of the Soviet orbit. At the same time we refuse to realize that the numerous overseas possessions of the west may at least be made an object of mutual discussions.

Moderation of Soviet Foreign Policy

If the Soviet penetrations into the eastern security belt are compared with the colonial holdings, strategic acquisitions, and internal interventions on the part of the west, it would appear that the Russians remain closer to their metropolitan area than either the United States or Great Britain or even such countries as France, Belgium or Holland. We regret of course the events in Poland, Finland, and in other nations of eastern Europe. But we should not overlook the fact that these very regions have been used in the preceding decades to serve as a cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union and that the Russians are merely reversing the tables. Moreover some of these territories belonged to Tsarist Russia prior to 1914 and the Soviets lost them as a result of the notorious treaty of Brėst Litovsk. Most of the territories in question were not particularly successful in handling democratic processes and almost all of them were in need of a land reform.

If we could accustom ourselves to global thinking and if we properly evalu-

ated the comparative strength of the western world, we might not be bent upon excluding the Russians from the Mediterranean area. It is stale and sterile to insist upon the maintenance of a status quo before any status quo has been agreed upon. The west is inclined to preach territorial expansion has gone out of fashion. Since the former and accumulated acquisitions of the west eminently favor our side this represents a rather comfortable assumption. The Dardanelles may be as close to the Russians as the Suez and Panama Canal have been to others. If we want to have peace we will have to look at these questions with a greater degree of magnanimity and understanding than we have exhibited in recent months. To be sure the west cannot afford concessions that will seem out of all reasonable proportions and a quid pro quo should be expected in turn. Perhaps Russia could be made to retire from certain regions of Central Europe against our undertaking to withdraw from the western Pacific. Both sides may thus acquire an added feeling of national security.

Is This Appeasement? No.

Are we, it may be interjected, to appease Russia? Appeasement, of course, has been discredited ever since it was used in the case of the Nazis. But it would be very superficial to assume that Hitler and Stalin pursued identical goals although their ideologies are very much apart. Does the past record of the foreign dealings of the Soviet Union justify us to jump to such conclusions? We need wisdom no less than we possess strength. Only a world order which gives the east a measure of national security and of satisfaction and in which the Russians participate whole-heartedly and unrepressed is likely to lead to stability and tranquillity. The appeasement policy of the fateful thirties developed against the background of an established and recognized order. Such an order, so far, has not been created. We run the danger of making ourselves

the unqualified protagonists of imperialistic holdings and of undesirable regimes all over the world because of fear to assist the Russians.

A final pacification of the two worlds presupposes a mutual recognition of their essential differences and of their respective long-run endeavors. Either side may have to step down from its pedestal of unadulterated self-righteousness. The west may be found sometimes over-emphasizing personal freedom at the expense of social and, particularly of racial justice, and the Soviets may frequently overlook personal freedom in their eagerness to create a new social order. Both sides should be made to realize that the two worlds could each grant structural concessions that would not be contrary to their basic goals but would facilitate a modus vivendi.

Weakness of "Getting Tough" Policy From Long-Run View

At the moment the west has settled on a policy of "friendly firmness," of "getting tough" with Russia. This attitude is not only likely to increase diplomatic tension all over the globe but it is also prone to accentuate the structural differences between the two worlds. For the time being the Russians will not force any issue but will indulge in dilatory procedures. Yet they will direct their national energies and those of their satellites toward military and technical preparation. Instead of producing consumer commodities and of improving their pitiful standard of living—not to speak of their vast task of reconstruction—they will be pushed into the business

of rearmament, which means in the direction of autarchic totalitarianism. It is a dismal vision to see mankind preparing for an unprecedented process of industrial and atomic rivalry which in the end may destroy whatever remnants of western civilization are still in existence at this time. One of these days the Soviets will know the secret of nuclear production. If by that time our mutual relations have not very greatly improved we will enter the stage of continuous alarms. We will begin to distrust everybody and everything and the push-button psychology may push either side into trying to do what the Japanese failed to achieve at Pearl Harbor. Whether under such circumstances the west will be able to continue with its democratic processes as we know them, may at least be open to question.

The People Want Peace

Mankind is face to face with frightful alternatives. At a time when the world is in need of a genuine and universal federation the states emerge as torch bearers of antagonistic ideologies and thus perpetuate and magnify the age old struggle for positions and for power. But the people of the world want peace. They have to see to it that the states, anachronistic as they are, cannot take a new lease on life by masquerading as Don Quixotes and fighting ideological windmills. Patience and understanding are needed. If the rising bi-polar trend is not curtailed in the near future the statesmen may be unable to reverse the drift and to create a stable, lasting, and universal order.

Canada's Capacity for a Large Housing Program

New Homes—Dream or Reality?

By O. J. FIRESTONE

ARE new homes and the improvement of living conditions for a large section of the Canadian population a dream,

or can such a target be made a reality? That we need new houses, many thousands of them, there is general agreement. The veteran who has returned from overseas is trying to find new living quarters for himself and his family. So is the war