

agencies acting under central direction. The field of employment and labour market research and statistics is practically unlimited. In this country the top soil has barely been turned. In this article the purely quantitative aspects were emphasized, but it would be unfortunate if the impression were left that labour market analysis can be conducted purely in terms of statistics. A great deal of qualitative investigation will be required.

In the United States, for instance, millions of dollars have been spent on their occupational research program alone; in Canada we only commenced research in this field under the pressure of war needs and then on a somewhat limited scale. We have a long way to go even to begin to match our American neighbours in labour market study. Now would seem to be a most opportune time greatly to intensify our efforts.

War and The Japanese in Canada

By F. E. LAVIOLETTE

AT the time that war broke over the Pacific Basin, there were as of June, 1941, 23,224 people of Japanese ancestry in the Dominion, according to the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Of this number 17,278 were Canadian citizens, 22 were American citizens, and 5,924 were citizens of Japan. Although this is not a large number within a population of 11,500,000 persons, the concentration of the Japanese, about 21,000 of them, along the coastal strip of British Columbia and the fact that they are Orientals and representatives of an aggressive world power brought to a head the long standing fears, suspicions, and efforts to exclude them from that area of Canada.¹

In the early settling of the Pacific Coast, there was the possibility that Chinese and Japanese immigrants might eventually out-number the people of European ancestry. But legislation was passed from time to time so that the Chinese were stopped and controls placed over Japanese in order to limit their admissions to a maximum of 150 per year. This quota has not been filled since 1928 when Ottawa had completed negotia-

tions with the Imperial Government of Japan. Although these arrangements had been made, politicians of British Columbia have continued in one way or another to keep the issue before the public. As tension increased because of Japan's attitude in international cooperation and her policy of aggression on the Asiatic continent, demands for more stringent action, such as embargoes, boycotts, and exclusion, became more clamorous. Demands for evacuation became widespread after the declaration of war, indicating that people of the region were fearful that the Japanese in British Columbia, although most of them had lived there 30 to 50 years, would play the role of a fifth column, should Japan attempt an invasion of the North American continent.

To understand the development of attitudes in British Columbia after the outbreak of war, it should be recalled that immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese launched the Malayan Campaign, the Philippine Islands attack, and the siege of Hong Kong. At first the people on the Coast were stunned by the outbreak of war and there was no apparent concern about the Japanese residents in their midst, but gradually the military implications of Japanese successes were becoming evident and anti-Japanese opinions organized. With the fall of Hong Kong on December 25, where Canadians lost 2,000

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1. For more detailed statements of evacuation see articles in the *Far Eastern Survey* for July 27, 1942, and May 31, 1944. It is also suggested that reference be made to Watson Thomson, "Beyond the Melting Pot," PUBLIC AFFAIRS, June, 1944.

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men, more credence appears to have been given to the rumors about Japanese behavior at Pearl Harbor even though American officials denied them. On the basis of historically developed suspicion and distrust and new fears due to war, the public began to direct more attention to the Japanese living in strategic areas along the Coast and in the Fraser River Valley.

First Measures

In pre-war years, Ottawa had been attempting to quiet public demands for action against the Japanese, and after war had started the authorities instituted a program of moderate action, at first impounding fishing boats, closing language schools, and stopping the publication of three vernacular papers. Because these steps were insufficient to meet popular demands, the Federal government announced on January 14, 1942 that Japanese male nationals, 18 to 45 years of age, would be removed from a defence area, defined 18 days later as a zone along the whole of the coast, extending 100 miles inland. It was stated that fishing boats would be put into operation but manned by non-Japanese and that a labor corps would be organized for other Japanese men in order to help relieve the acute unemployment problem which had developed.

But these measures of moderate action were inadequate. Public opinion had become well organized around demands for complete evacuation. This was expressed by a deluge of letters and telegrams coming from individuals, numerous service organizations, and *ad hoc* organizations. People could still see the Japanese living in their homes not far from newly established airfields and other military installations. The public became impatient with the slowness of the Federal government, which had taken just 18 days to decide what the defence zone should be. Almost no contrary opinion developed, for the rights of citizenship did not prove to be especially strong in the face of an invasion. From the point of view of the public, certainly

more radical action would have to be taken.

The moderate action program was a failure also because the Japanese resisted rather than responded to it. From its first pronouncement the program was not made clear and comprehensive. No plans were made by the government to assist the men who were to be excluded in carrying out their family responsibilities; no plan was offered for the protection of their property interests, and the government had not been successful in quieting demands for far more stringent action. Hence the number of Japanese who offered to go to road or work camps was exceedingly small, and only after much work on the part of the R.C.M.P. and after several weeks of delay did the first group get off. Obviously the plan would not work even though the government had set April 1st as the deadline for removals. By February 25 everyone knew that complete evacuation would have to be undertaken. It was announced officially the following day.

Evacuation

In order to carry out its instructions, the government established the British Columbia Security Commission. The necessary Orders-in-Council were passed so as to give the Commission absolute authority over all Japanese, regardless of citizenship, and to enable it to do whatever was necessary in order to provide food, shelter, clothing, education and medical services as well as employment for the 21,000 Japanese under its jurisdiction.

The actual evacuation was complicated by the fact that almost no community in Canada wanted to have any Japanese moved into its vicinity. But sugar beet growers in Alberta and Manitoba saw opportunities of securing labor to replace the groups which had moved into more lucrative employment. Arrangements were made for 3,600 Japanese to go from their homes in the Fraser Valley directly to southern Alberta and Winnipeg sugar beet areas. This movement has given rise to a whole new series of problems

which are not yet solved. A group of about 2,150 men were sent directly to road camps in British Columbia and Ontario while it was finally arranged that the Commission would take over mining ghost towns in the Slokan and Kootenay areas of eastern British Columbia for temporary settlement of evacuated Japanese. Into these areas of rehabilitated hotels, houses, and new, two-family dwellings, about 11,500 were moved. Of this number 8,000 had to be routed through the assembly centre at Hastings Park in Vancouver where people from outlying areas were brought together and taken care of while the interior settlements were being prepared by Japanese construction crews. In addition 3,000 Japanese left for eastern employment and self-supporting projects. In view of the resistance, which developed out of confusion and misunderstanding, 750 men were sent to an internment camp. A number of them have been released meanwhile as they were not dangerous to the security of the state. After evacuation was completed, it should be noted that approximately 16,000 Japanese remained in British Columbia, but outside of the defence area. On the whole the evacuation was completed in a relatively quiet and effective manner, although numerous British Columbians were impatient with the slowness of its pace.

Dispersal Programme

The Japanese have now been living in these relocation areas for over two years. Political pressure on the Japanese issue has been applied almost continuously to the Ottawa cabinet. The extremists have demanded complete exclusion of immigrants after the war and the return of Japanese in Canada to Japan or some captured island. In response to this pressure and to the need for a long range program, Mr. Mackenzie King, on August 4, 1944, announced that the Japanese would be segregated with respect to loyalty, that they would be dispersed over the Dominion, and that there would be no immigration after the war. The problem is by no means settled

as yet since it remains for the Federal government to implement its announced program.

It is not clear as yet how this program will work. With respect to segregation as to loyalty, it has not been stated yet what the criteria are and how they are to be applied to Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry. In its program, the government has not given these citizens opportunities to express loyalty in the usual manner. The young men have not been accepted in the military forces; the young women are not accepted in government work, such as civil service or nursing corps. They have had to be satisfied with lesser opportunities. Segregation of Japanese nationals will not be difficult as many of them have applied for repatriation to Japan. According to international practice it is customary to comply with these requests, and so it may be expected that these people will gradually be moved to an area where they will remain until they can return to Japan. Their younger children will naturally accompany them. But it is also likely that a number of older children, although Canadian citizens, will wish to return to Japan with their parents.

Implementing the dispersal part of the government's program is even more difficult than segregation. Shortly after the Japanese had been brought to the Interior Settlements, the government initiated its program of full employment for Japanese. In the settlements the Japanese were required to help administer the projects, provide fuelwood, or engage in whatever private employment was available. But as it was desirable to use employable persons in the eastern areas of labor shortage, the Commission has encouraged Japanese to move east into Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. An important part of the program of dispersal would be realized if those people could be induced to go or forced to remain where they have located when the war is over. The eastward movement is, however, not as successful as officials feel that it should be. This is due to the

development of certain rejection reactions among Canadians and Japanese, and these reactions are some of the difficulties which this part of the program will face.

The rejection of the Japanese from numerous communities may be said to be almost Dominion-wide. They are unwanted. For example, the Board of Control of Toronto passed a rule which prohibits any more Japanese from moving into that city, even though there are only 700 residents. Lethbridge, Saskatoon and Edmonton have acted likewise. In several smaller cities the Commission has been urged through demonstrations to remove the Japanese. They know that it is not only British Columbia which does not want them.

In Hamilton, Montreal, and Winnipeg and in smaller places, the Japanese have adjusted themselves well. These are usually younger people, the more able ones, and usually in the proportion of two men to each woman. It looks as if those remaining in the west are the less able and older group. Those Japanese who have gone east, have not always received the kind of work to which they think they are entitled, and they fear that as soon as war prosperity diminishes, they will lose their jobs. As they feel that they are unwanted, are not given good jobs, and will be fired first, it is difficult to secure their cooperation in the program of eastward movement. There are also important economic considerations which tend to keep many in the west. For example, quite a few sawmills would not be able to operate without Japanese labor. Thus a dilemma is presented to British Columbia. They want to move out the Japanese but at the same time they need their labor.

Obstacles to Resettlement

Other factors are complicating permanent resettlement in the east. The Japanese are fearful about eastern Canada. It is an unknown area to them. Moving seems risky to them after having experienced the psychological shock of evacuation. How can they trust even the government? At the time of evacua-

tion the Japanese thought their property interests would be protected. Instead they have been subjected to enforced liquidation, and so they are unwilling to start all over again until they have some assurance of security. The program of evacuation has classified them all as enemy aliens, although 16,000 are actually citizens. This and enforced liquidation have been two major factors in the development of hostility, intense hostility, towards the government and has resulted in passive resistance to any cooperation with the government.

These numerous anxieties and hostilities have not been resolved by living in the Interior Settlements. Although the government has seen that none have gone hungry or suffered from lack of any necessities once the Settlements were organized, the fact remains that the Japanese were moved against their will. Also, the type of life within these areas has operated to maintain animosities rather than to resolve them and make possible more adequate adjustments. As a consequence many of the people have become apathetic, have not been able to maintain their ability to make decisions, and, of course, have come to lean more and more on government decisions rather than on their own. This feeling of wardship which has developed, is something which the Japanese detest and refuse to face. In the pre-war communities they had great pride in being able to take care of their own relief cases, in their participation in Red Cross and Victory Bond drives, and in maintaining a morally respectable mode of life. All of this is now gone, and only within the program of the government, set up and maintained as a result of political pressure, are they able to work out a new mode of life.

Outlook

There will be some changes, improvements it may be hoped, in the program. For some time officials have expected to make it possible for Japanese to secure business licenses, farm property, or homes. It is hoped that travel restrictions across

provincial boundaries will be removed. Officials would like to secure the cooperation of the provinces in completing the dispersal so as to find a final solution to the "British Columbia problem." But all this progress will come very slowly, and in the meantime Japanese who resettled in the east have no more legal rights, even if they are citizens, than those who are living in the Interior Settlements. As a matter of fact, because of international agreements Japanese nationals are somewhat more privileged than Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry. Furthermore the citizens who remain are still in a very humiliating position. They cannot serve in the armed forces; they have no security in the east and last summer the Dominion Government permitted Clause 5, of House Bill 135 to pass so as to make effective in all provinces the disenfranchising legislation of British Columbia where all Orientals are deprived of the vote.

With respect to dispersal, the question arises, what kind of legislation will be necessary to control the residences of Japanese. Is Canada developing a class of citizenship which is denied freedom of movement? Does this mean compliance with the long agitation of British Columbia politicians? Will they still manage to get votes on an anti-Japanese platform, or will they shift to an anti-Chinese or anti-Indian platform? These are some of the aspects of the domestic issue which we face.

Evacuation has been costly in several ways. It has cost the Canadian taxpayer a great deal of money. The budget of the Department of Labor carries an

item of \$2,750,000 for this fiscal year. Costs will perhaps be reduced next year, but segregation will be expensive and so will resettlement. Evacuation has also been costly from another economic point of view. The contribution that the Japanese could have made to the war effort has been considerably lessened through dislocation. But evacuation has also been very costly in the sense that it has seriously upset the development of loyalty to Canada of a segment of its population. Evacuation could have been achieved with less psychological difficulties if a way had been found to take the young men into the armed forces, to place some value upon Canadian citizenship by giving different treatment to citizen and to Japanese national. It would have been equally beneficial if enforced liquidation could have been avoided and the final phases of the whole program implemented at an earlier date.

It is true that the number of the Japanese in Canada and the percentage of the total budget required for evacuation and resettlement are relatively small when compared with other war items. But the peculiar importance of the whole Japanese problem lies in the fact that it is one of those microcosms in which our basic social attitudes towards race and assimilation are focussed rather clearly. It is an object lesson for studying ourselves, the institutional developments of local, provincial, and federal governments with their inadequacies, and our uncertainties in international cooperation and tolerance which all react back upon our feelings of personal insecurity.