

(now known as National Selective Service) under the Unemployment Insurance Commission, has developed an employment service national in scope, and steps are being taken to give the discharged man the best advice and direction possible.

2. The Department of Pensions and National Health has established a Veterans' Welfare Division under the Rehabilitation Branch. District Welfare Officers, themselves ex-service men, are in the Dominion Employment Offices to give special help to discharged men. A Training Division is being rapidly organized, and vocational guidance will be offered. Local committees have been organized by the Department of Pensions and National Health to assist ex-service men.

3. Preferences in employment in the Dominion public service⁴ and in work originating in Dominion government contract, have been arranged, and the operation of national service regulations tends to accord a position of special privilege to the discharged man.

4. Reconstruction plans have been well advanced and a demobilization pattern looking towards protection of the interests of the service men is well under way.

5. Subsidiary protection is afforded to the service man giving him parity under

the Unemployment Insurance Act if he enters insured employment, as if he had been a contributor.

6. Out-of-work benefits are paid when unemployed during the re-establishment period under The Post-Discharge Re-establishment Order. The rates are similar to those paid trainees and students, and the conditions are similar to those applying to unemployment insurance benefit. The Order is assimilated to the operation of the Unemployment Insurance procedures in this regard. But out-of-work benefit is payable whether ex-service man has been employed in insured or exempted employment.

7. Grants similar to out-of-work benefits may be made while discharged man is temporarily incapacitated, and free medical treatment under certain conditions is readily available if rehabilitation can be advanced thereby.

In addition to the above there are many minor measures of assistance, and benevolent and other funds exist to cover aid to certain groups. Furthermore there is a wide range of special aid to the pensioner.

This brief summary is far from complete and relates to Dominion legislation only. There is rapidly growing a series of special Provincial measures dealing with the same subject which should be kept in mind.

4. P.C. 8541/, 1st October, 1941.

5. P.C. 2250, 21st March, 1942.

Changing Techniques of Canadian Government

By J. R. MALLORY

OUR parliamentary system grew up in the framework of the nineteenth century laissez-faire state. Coming as it did in an age when government was unimportant and unpopular, it is not surprising that the British North America Act has little to say of the forms of adminis-

tration which were expected to execute the details of national policy. What administrative structure we have was partly created on borrowed models at confederation but in the main was carried over from colonial models existing before that time. While in other states the administration grew in size and responsibility with the growth of collectivist principles of government, corresponding growth was slight in Canada. Almost until the collapse of France we had nothing to com-

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pare with the administrative growth which took place in England as the result of the social reforms of the Liberal Administration after 1910 and the new demands created by the last war.

There are two principle reasons for our relative backwardness in this respect. For one thing, a new expanding country with the beckoning opportunities of the expanding frontier had little need for the elaborate social services and governmental controls which grew up in older and more densely populated countries. For another, since we are a federal country where the social services and education are matters for the local legislatures, most of these new functions were in the provincial field and it was the provinces, not the dominion, which attempted to provide some of the new services. At the same time a judicial blight smote the legislation of the dominion government when the courts found attempts to assert the federal power in some of these new fields unconstitutional.

The halting, meagre machinery which had survived in Ottawa was shaken by the arrival of the present war. Departments whose main function had been the compilation of information for the benefit of an unenthusiastic public suddenly struggled with novel and complex tasks of administration. Whole new areas of activity appeared for which no machinery existed and whole departments had to be created and improvised. That there were mistakes and inefficiency should cause no surprise, the miracle is that enough knowledge of the almost lost art of government survived to keep the machine moving under its new load.

Our Cabinet System

We were no more prepared for the strain of continuous government at the top than at the bottom. Our cabinet system has not accepted the degree of delegation of authority and division of function which has been commonplace in England for thirty years. The cause of our relative failure to keep pace with British trends is twofold. As long as the functions of the federal government were curtailed there

was not a great deal of business to transact. The relatively short session of Parliament in which a disproportionate amount of time is devoted to the debate on the address in reply to the Speech from the Throne and relatively little to a rather meagre crop of legislation is evidence of this. Thus it was possible for the cabinet to give continuous attention to the detail of government business long after over-worked British cabinets have had to give up the attempt.

There is another and pressing reason why close collective responsibility and unwillingness to delegate have survived in our cabinets for so long. We are a federal country. Almost every item of government business affects regional interests and regional values to a degree which is impossible in the United Kingdom. And the prime safeguard of regional interests lies in the federal nature of the cabinet. In the allocation of cabinet seats custom has achieved a delicate and complex balance of the provincial, regional and religious interests that make up the Dominion of Canada. We have found by experience that it is better for the national interest if inter-regional harmony can be achieved in advance of political action through the compromise and give-and-take of a cabinet highly sensitive to federal values, than that violent dissension should follow in the wake of administrative action. There was already therefore in the cabinet a deeply ingrained habit of caring for the pence of day-to-day administration and allowing the pounds of over-all policy to emerge from themselves.

However advantageous this may have been in the vague days before the war it is not a very business-like machine for wartime government. The need for broad planning which the war brought on found a pragmatically minded cabinet a very unwilling instrument so that it is almost inevitable that the actual planning, if carried on at all, is not to be found in the cabinet, where the pressing business is the political implications of particular aspects of policy. It is highly probable that the inordinately long interval between the submission of the report of the National

War Labour Board and the decision of the government to implement some of its recommendations was due not to anxious debate over its principles but rather to a meticulous consideration of its political effects.

Successive Royal Commissions have called attention to the almost intolerable burden which a cabinet minister is expected to bear. He is the head of a great department, the major policies of which he must derive from the collective decisions of his colleagues in the cabinet, and the routine of which brings an unnecessary amount of its lesser decisions to his personal attention. He is one of the members of the cabinet itself which must pass upon if not frame, the policies of all departments of the government, and he must bring to its deliberations not only a departmental point of view, but a regional point of view as well. He is one of the leaders of a political party which must govern the country not only according to its concept of the national interest, but also with a careful eye upon the precepts of political strategy, lest it lose the fruits of office over some tricky issue of local politics. He is a minister of the Crown who must dance attendance upon the House when it is in session, facing, armed with an elaborate knowledge of his department and some debating skill, the daily ordeal of question time. It is seldom that all of these abilities can be combined in one man, particularly when the consideration of regional balance and political expertise may well outweigh the also desirable characteristics of a good minister of the Crown.

Frequently recommended and occasionally tried is the device of creating junior ministers without cabinet rank to assume some of the burdens of question time and the importunities of delegations. But in the nature of things there is little that can be entrusted to a junior minister without a radical change in the cabinet system itself. As long as the cabinet is a sort of federal parliament in miniature its members cannot allow very many of their functions to escape their personal attention. Once during the last war

parliamentary secretaries were appointed to aid the ministers but the practice soon lapsed, presumably because there was so little that could be found for the junior ministers to do. Mr. King's recent appointment of Parliamentary Assistants seems to be an attempt to put off his critics while emphasising the difference between our cabinet and that of Great Britain.

The Administrative Branch

The permanent branch of the administration, like the political branch, has scarcely moved with the times in the past two decades. The merit system of appointment was introduced in 1908 and extended in 1918 but reform in other directions has not been rapid. The service was small before the war. There was little for it to do and what it did was hardly of the order to attract the ablest and most restless minds in the country away from the higher and more plentiful rewards of business. So the service between the wars became a bit moribund. Perhaps its most serious defect has been the infrequency with which promotions take place between different grades in the service, not only in the lower grades but from the administrative grades to the posts of top responsibility in the departments since the outbreak of war. Much of the top administrative talent had to be drawn from outside, from the universities, from business, and from the provincial departments. The Labour Department, for example, has since the war appointed a Deputy Minister, an Associate Deputy Minister, and an Assistant Deputy Minister from outside the service altogether.

However it is a cause of satisfaction to note that these new outsiders have on the whole done well. The government has displayed a sound and successful eclecticism in looking for its temporary civil servants. Successful administrators have been found, not only in the ranks of the provincial civil services and the political field but also from business executives and a surprisingly large number from the universities. Perhaps the only group to contribute an unexpectedly small share of

executive talent has been the trade union leadership. But the government has not had to contend with a public prejudice which blacklisted any single group of potential executive talent. We have had nothing like the phenomenon in the United States which someone has characterised thus: "In Nazi Germany they burned the books, in the United States we have been burning the professors."

Perhaps the most serious burden under which the civil service has had to labour has been the failure to adapt procedure, suitable for a small department, to the expanding needs of a large service. In the old days the degree of centralisation which placed on the Deputy Minister responsibility for a vast number of routine decisions was understandable. But to-day the great load of responsibility at the top demands a killing pace from executives at the policy making level, while below the mass of their subordinates toil on, without responsibility, without scope for initiative, and without hope of advancement. There is some evidence that this strain is dangerously severe. The periodic appointment of fresh ranks of special assistants to take some of the burden of detail from the shoulders of the top executives is continuous evidence of the pressure of work at the top, while the pace of wartime activity seems to make more rational expansion too complex to contemplate at the moment.

New Government Agencies

As new wartime problems arose the Canadian government at first employed the ad hoc approach of creating new agencies, even new ministries, for each problem as it arose. In the beginning many of these agencies were government boards like the Defence Purchasing Board which later became the Department of Munitions and Supply. To use the board for administrative purposes in a parliamentary country is evidence of a fatal misunderstanding of the working of a parliamentary system. Boards are, as Jeremy Bentham observed, by their nature, screens. They possess wide powers just as do ministries, but they lack effec-

tive liaison with the House. They have no responsible head in Parliament who can explain what they are doing or who can be made answerable for their failure. If it be admitted that continuous parliamentary prodding is a good thing for the administration then administrative boards are bad because they make that prodding less effective.

There are of course fields in which the board is an appropriate instrument for government. This is true of the agency whose function is partly judicial in character, such as the Board of Railway Commissioners, or where it is desired to set up a form of administration for marketing or some other economic activity in which the industry is capable of knowing better what is good for itself than the legislature but where the public interest needs representation. But for the initiation and carrying out of government policy the board is not a happy instrument.

The prime example of this genus, the Prices Board, presumably owes its present shape to two factors. One is that the government apparently regards the price programme as the keystone of its policy and has thus enshrined it above the normal area of compromise with which democratic governments surround their policies. The other reason is that the Chairman of the Board is a distinguished civil servant on loan from another government agency who may well prefer not to prejudice his future as a public servant by entering the legislature.

Though at first there was a tendency to give new functions of government lives of their own this tendency appears to have reversed itself. Even unemployment insurance which was for some inexplicable reason placed under a separate commission is now to all intents and purposes part of the Department of Labour where it belonged. Similarly the employment programme of Selective Service has been gathered into the same agency, though its functions were originally part of several government departments.

One of the major legacies of the mushroom growth from the small peacetime administration to the large wartime ma-

chine has been an apparently widespread unawareness among many of the new high-ranking civil servants of the proprieties which cabinet government should impose on them. It is our peculiar misfortune that we are so close to the United States that we are prone to assume too readily that there is an identity between American problems and ours, and an identity between their methods and ours. American civil servants entrusted with wartime jobs have often been forced to supplement their rather nebulous powers with threats and exhortations to the public to pay heed to their mandatory but unenforceable policies. Impressed by the thunder of the czars from across the border a good many of our new civil servants, fresh from the realms of business where the American lead is all too gladly followed, have attempted to import these strange lightnings into the staid structure of our government departments. The result has been that the traditional anonymity of the civil servant has been lost and very often the advantages that flow from it have been lost too. Far from being repressed by the cabinet, these new vestares of the civil service have been encouraged as a means of removing some of the intolerable load of government business from the shoulders of the cabinet.

It is clear, however, that the remedy is in this case worse than the disease for it seriously impairs the efficiency and political life of valuable experts. The job of the expert and the administration is to advise on policy, to carry out policy, and to make the necessary day today decisions to make the policy work. The actual decision to embark on a policy is the business of the minister or the cabinet and for that decision, they, and not their subordinates, are responsible. The expert is protected from the political consequences of his acts and if the policy is too unpopular it is the head of the minister that will roll and not the head of the expert. Then the expert is in readiness to devise new expedients and his abilities are as much at the service of the country as before. This economical system differs from that prevailing in the United States

where the administration was forced to lose the services of that invaluable administrator Mr. Leon Henderson in order to save its policy of price control from the fury of a nation which was insufficiently aware that wars are hard on everyone. Had Mr. Henderson been a British civil servant he need never have left the obscurity of his office while public clamour would have been appeased by some unimportant cabinet shuffle.

The Canadian counterpart to the Henderson affair was the now famous dispute between Mr. Humphrey Mitchell and Mr. Elliot Little. Mr. Little has been wrongly accused of seeking dictatorial powers in the administration of National Selective Service. What he asked for were on the whole powers normally exercised by civil servants of Mr. Little's rank. But, and here is the important difference, while high civil servants may actually make policy and move the whole sovereign power of the state on their behalf, they do so in the name of the Minister. They are not responsible politically for their actions, but the Minister is, and it is that responsibility which drives him to continuous efforts to harmonise administrative necessity with what the public will take. Mr. Little seemed to be aiming at the kind of administrative agency which would be so single-minded in its determination to do its job that if it failed it would be sunk without a trace. Many such agencies have appeared in the American administration since the war and the rate of sinking has been high. Our agencies on the other hand have been held by a tighter rein of public tolerance and have survived thereby to fight another day.

On long-run grounds it is to be hoped that the ad hoc agency diminishes. When the war ends many of the administrative problems it created will end too. But many of the new activities must remain. We have come to expect them and to need them and a government acts at its peril when it divests itself voluntarily of powers on which its people have come to rely. Therefore the more of wartime activity that is begun in a framework of long-run

techniques the better. Too many of our administrative anomalies of the past grew up to answer what the government of the day fondly hoped was a temporary situation. However the very existence of these agencies created a need which could be answered only by their continuation. We cannot without great difficulty alter the system of cabinet government, parliamentary government nor would there appear to be any general desire to do so. We must therefore fit new administrative agencies into it. The war has brought to us the great increase in government activity which most countries experienced thirty years ago. It is hard to believe that the change will not be permanent.

It is probable that the government is not unaware of this possibility. Many new agencies have, sometimes after false starts, been fitted into the traditional pattern of cabinet government. Other seems to have been given a deliberately temporary form in the belief, possibly erroneous, that they represent the kind of activity which will be redundant after the war. Such are the Wartime Information Board and the Prices Board. The change that has taken place has been one of size and not of kind in our system of government, and that change has so far only served to emphasise the durability and adaptability of cabinet government.

Maritime Women at Work in War and Peace

By AIDA McANN

WHAT were the 549,969 women of the Maritime Provinces doing before the present war?

What are they doing to-day in the midst of war?

What will become of women workers when the war is won?

According as we conceive the answer to this third question our post-war plans must be made. Are we planning now to go forward into an expanding economy including modern homes, nurseries, schools and civic centers—facilities which raise homemaking to the level of a modern career? Or are we drifting back, planless and apathetic, into an era where man's fear of unemployment strives to restrict woman's activities as much as possible to the drudgery of an ill-equipped kitchen?

Without the aid of statistics most of us know vaguely what the women of the Maritime Provinces were doing before the present war. The majority were housewives. A few statistics will serve

to focus attention on some of their problems. More than two-thirds of our homemakers lived in dingy out-of-date quarters without even the amenity of bathing facilities. According to the last Dominion housing census (1941), 79 per cent of the dwellings in Prince Edward Island, 69 per cent of those in New Brunswick, and 65 per cent of those in Nova Scotia had no bath or shower.

In 1939 the majority of Maritime homemakers were struggling to raise a family on insufficient means. The following figures compiled by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics from salaries and wages paid in forty leading industries, give the average man's annual income for that year: in Prince Edward Island, it was \$581; in New Brunswick, \$894; and in Nova Scotia, \$939. On such earnings a family cannot enjoy a very high standard of living to say nothing of adequate medical and dental care.

In order to supplement their husband's meagre earnings, many married women who could be spared at home, and who were able to find work, undertook it. Like their single sisters they worked