The Innovation of Ideation and Ideology : An Analytical

Framework and Application to the Cases of

Sabbateanism and Zionism

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
the Department of Sociology at Dalhousie University

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Date September 1, 1973

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Abstract

This thesis represents an attempt to develop further the notions of "proaction" and "reaction" as alluded to by the author and Professor G. Zollschan elsewhere (85). Proaction (i.e., the creation of society by man) and reaction (i.e., the creation of man by society) are viewed as two moments in a dialectical process through which the innovation of ideation and ideology may be explained. The proactive moment is elaborated through the use of the "Theory of Institutionalization" (88), while the notions of culture, political culture and social structure (reactive elements) are employed to articulate the applicability of the framework to the innovation of Messianic ideation and political ideology. Illustrative material for the analytical framework is presented in the form of two case studies - the emergence of Sabbateanism in 17th century eastern Europe and the emergence of Zionism in 19th century eastern Europe. The thesis concludes by spelling out some of the more salient weaknesses of the present formulation and suggesting directions for further development.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

The conceptual and theoretical confusion in contemporary sociology concerning the subject matter of this thesis is sufficient justification for attempting to delineate our intentions in a fairly rigorous manner at the outset. Failing a statement of purpose inclusive of terminological distinctions, further confusion, leading to irrelevant criticisms, is bound to develop.

Two guiding principles inform our explanation of the subject matter. The first of these is the view espoused by Geertz (22) which portrays both ideation and ideology as "cultural systems" - that is, as symbolic maps of reality. According to this view, "thought consists of the construction and manipulation of symbol systems, physical, organic, social, psychological, and so forth, in such a way that the structure of these other systems - and, in the favorable case, how they may therefore be expected to behave - is, as we say, "understood" " (22, p. 61). Such symbol systems are, then, comprised of mental representations of aspects of reality - or what we prefer to call "ideation". Within the generic class of ideation we further distinguish a sub-class of "ideological" elements. Such elements are, as we shall see at a later point, conceived of as being primarily evaluative (as opposed to cognitive, or affective) in nature. When such evaluative ideation, or ideology, supports or contests the legitimacy of a distribution of power, we shall refer to it as "political ideology". (Analagous examples of ideologies are "religious ideology", which supports or contests the legitimacy of a particular "church", and "economic ideology", which supports or contests the legitimacy of a particular system of production, distribution and exchange.)

Fortunately, theoretical "victory" by definitional fiat is often denied by reference to the empirical world: in the present case it would take only a

moment of hurried reflection to realize that ideation does not exist in two, and only two, varities (i.e., ideological and "all other types"). Rather, it should be made quite clear that we are consciously restricting ourselves to this demarcation not out of ignorance of other types of ideation, but simply because of our interest in its ideological variety.

Not only do other types of ideation exist (e.g., religious, scientific, etc.) but it is not at all clear that even the sub-class that we have demarcated as an ideal type exists in the empirical world. Religious ideas, for example, can have politico-ideological implications, just as political ideologies can have religious overtones. The ideation of Melanesian cargo cults as analyzed by Worsley (81) and "totalitarian-democratic" ideology as analyzed by Talmon (68) are respective examples of these confounding cases. The **utility** of delineating ideological from other types of ideation is, however, assured if we recall that ideology is here viewed as primarily - but not solely - evaluative. A theological system may, then, be supportive of State power, but its manifest reference is primarily to the supernatural: similarly, the primary and manifest referent of a political ideology is a particular distribution of power although it may contest the legitimacy of a particular church.

The second guiding principle employed herein is the notion of a dialectical interplay between society and the symbolic maps in the minds of persons. The notion that society can be conceived of as a dialectical process in which men are both products and agents has received wide currency in both sociology and social philosophy. Marx, for instance, offers a concise statement of this interaction process when he adds to "the materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing" the idea that "it is men that change circumstances" (46, p. 108). More recently, Berger and Pullberg (8) and Berger and Luckmann (7) have used a similar notion in analyses of structures of mean-

ing, stressing that "it is important to emphasize that the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man...and his social world interact with each other. The product acts back upon the producer" (7, p. 61). Similarly, Sartre has advocated the use of a "progressive-regressive" method of analysis by which a social phenomenon must be explained by finding its beginnings in human free will and tracing its movement through its possibilities (62).

With the notion of a dialectical interplay between society and symbolic maps of reality in mind, it would seem advisable to differentiate two moments in the process by which men produce society and society produces man. The moment which views man as agent may thus be termed the "proactive moment", while the moment which views man as product may be termed the "reactive moment". Whereas the former suggests a volitional and motivational basis for the analysis of ideational and ideological innovation, the latter suggests the analysis of constraints on or determinants of such innovation as its focus.

The construction of motivational and constraining parameters for the analysis of ideational and ideological innovation will thus be the focus of our theoretical efforts. Given the fact that the theoretical portion will be of a highly abstract nature, the second section of the thesis represents an attempt to illustrate the framework through the presentation of two case studies - namely, the case of Sabbateanism (a 17th century Russian-Jewish Messianic movement), and that of Zionism (which emerged in late 19th centruy Russia). Aside from our own intrinsic interest in these cases, a second principle of selection can be adduced as the rationale underlying the choice of these two cases. The two movements and their associated ideations were markedly different, the first being a-political, and the second political. Thus, the selection of these two cases offers to illustrate the scope of the proposed framework.[1]   Moreover,

Sabbateanism can be viewed as a precursor of Zionism so that examining these cases will allow us to highlight the conditions which made possible this ideational innovation.

In Chapter One we endeavour first to develop the notion of a proactive (i.e., volitional and motivational) moment through the presentation and partial modification of a set of theoretical categories proposed by Zollschan and associates under the rubric of the "Theory of Institutionalization" (88). We next attempt to fuse these categories with reactive (i.e., constraining and determining) elements, primarily on the political cultural and social structural levels. These levels are selected for consideration due to their relevance for the analysis of political ideology which is, of course, our central concern. Much of the theoretical background for this second section of Chapter One derives from the work of Willer (78), Willer and Zollschan (79), Verba (74), Almond and Verba (3) and Marx (45; 47).

The general framework developed in Chapter One is used in Chapter Two as the basis for discussing a number of conditions necessary for the innovation of Messianic ideation (e.g., Sabbateanism) and political ideology (e.g., Zionism). In Chapter Three and Chapter Four the framework is applied to the analysis of Sabbateanism and Zionism. The concluding section suggests a number of possible lines of development, both on the theoretical and empirical levels.

Chapter One : The Proactive/Reactive Framework

A. The Proactive Moment

The proactive schema which we propose to adopt in large measure, is der-
ived from the body of motivational explanations of human behaviour which Mas-
low calls the school of "deficiency motivation" (49, esp. pp. 21-27). This
school, which includes Freudian motivational theory, relative deprivation the-
ory, frustration-aggression theory, etc., is predicated on the notion that
human action is to some degree the result of felt deficiencies of one sort or
another on the part of persons. The rationale underlying the acceptance of
Zollschan's "Theory of Institutionalization" (88) above the various other of-
ferings is twofold. First, Zollschan's work attempts to incorporate and gen-
eralize Freudian motivational theory. Second, it can be conceived of as a more
general formulation than, say, the recent and important synthesis of relative
deprivation and frustration-aggression theories provided by Gurr in Why Men
Rebel (28). Since Zollschan makes the first argument himself (83), it is the
second argument that requires some further elaboration.

Gurr defines relative deprivation (RD) as "a perceived discrepancy be-
tween men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expecta-
tions are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are
rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they
think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means
available to them" (28, p. 13). In other words, RD results from the perception
of a discrepancy between two sets of expectations - those that are subject-
ively legitimized in the mind of a person, and those that the person believes
himself to be capable of in actuality. (e.g., "I expected, and believed I was
entitled to, a salary increase: but I do not now expect to receive one.")

This definition of RD contrasts markedly with the key motivational concept in Zollschan's schema, the term "exigency" (84). Three types of exigencies are distinguished by Zollschan - affective, cognitive and evaluative. An affective exigency involves the perception of a discrepancy between a desired object and that which one perceives to have achieved in actuality. (e.g., "I want a salary increase, but I see that I have not received one.") A cognitive exigency involves the perception of a discrepancy between an expectation and that which one perceives in actuality. (e.g., "I expected a salary increase, but I see that I have not received one.") Finally, an evaluative exigency involves the perception of a discrepancy between a legitimate pattern or arrangement and that which one perceives in actuality. (e.g., "I am entitled to a salary increase, but I see that I have not received one.")[2] Despite the fact that Zollschan does not discuss the issue it is possible to conceive of a number of different constellations of desires, expectations and legitimations. For example, an exigency may result from the perception of a discrepancy between a desire and an expectation. (e.g., "I want a salary increase, but I do not expect to receive one.") Similarly, Gurr's definition of RD can be conceived of as a particular combination of exigency types - i.e., as a perceived discrepancy between two types of expectations. Even without discussing all possible combinations of desires, expectations and legitimations it should be clear that the term exigency has more general applicability than RD. It is, for example, equally useful in the explanation of innovation of scientific theory (an ideal-typically cognitive realm) and in the explanation of ideological innovation (an ideal-typically evaluative realm). This is well illustrated in a recent articcle by Zollschan and Brym (85).

The first phase of the Theory of Institutionalization is thus termed "exigency". It can be inferred that the experience of an exigency is predicated

on a number of comparisons being made on the part of persons. In the first place, the perception of a discrepancy between expectations, desires or legitimations and one's perception of an actual state of affairs involves a comparison over time. But the perception of such discrepancies need not depend just on the comparison of one's own situation at two points in time: in addition, comparisons between one's own situation and that of another reference group or reference individual can be made.

The second phase of the theory is termed "articulation", which is defined as "the recognition (whether correctly or falsely from the point of view of some "all-knowing" observer) of the existence and nature of the exigency, and postulation of goals for its removal, prevention or amelioration" (84, p. 90). Articulation is not a necessary consequence flowing from the experience of an exigency, however. Rather, three co-ordinates (or requisites) must be fulfilled in order for articulation to take place. The first requisite is "salience", which "can be viewed as a measure of discomfort of the individual stricken by an exigency" (84, p. 91). Unless the exigency is experienced as discomforting, unless it is noticed and viewed as important, progress to the next requisite is precluded. The second requisite of articulation is termed "specification", which involves the identification of the perceived cause(s) of the exigency. One must be able to give a name to the cause of a salient exigency in order to reach the third requisite, which is termed "justification". Justification is essentially the process of overcoming inhibitions so that "permissible" needs can be established.

Artciulation involves, then, the recognition and identification of an exigency, the justification of permissible needs and the postulation of goals for the removal of the exigency.[3]

It is possible to speak of ideational and ideological innovation as virt-

ually synonymous with articulation since articulation involves a change in persons' symbolic maps of reality. Cantril notes that "a critical situation may be said to arise when an individual is confronted by a chaotic external environment which he cannot interpret and wants to interpret" (11, p. 63). The utility of symbolic maps is, so to speak, disrupted by the experience of an exigency: and it is only with articulation that symbolic maps may once again become "workable". The magnitude of the innovation is a function of the magnitude of the discrepancy which gave rise to it and can, of course, vary widely from situation to situation. In its extreme form it is not dissimilar from the "mazeway transformation" discussed by Wallace(76), which involves a complete overhaul of symbolic maps.

It is entirely possible that each of the three requisites (salience, specification and justification) may be "blocked" - i.e., that for one reason or another they cannot be fulfilled. Such blockage is said to cause the development of a "second-order exigency". These are termed "ambivalence", "cognitive discrepancy" and "evaluative discrepancy", respectively for each of the three requisites. The first type of second-order exigency is caused by salience so weak that the discrepancy is not recognized as being important. The second type is the result of a lack of knowledge as to what the nature of the discrepancy might be. The third type of second-order exigency is caused by the inhibitive effects of "prohibitions" previously internalized by persons. The three requisites of articulation may thus be conveniently viewed as leadership functions (86). That is, although the potentiality for articulation may exist, articulation does not take place unless a leader (or a number of leaders) is present to perform these functions. This will become clearer when we discuss the collectivization process in section two of this chapter, but it is interesting to note at this point that Cantril observes much the same phenomenon:

"critical situations...furnish fertile soil for the emergence of the mob lead-
er, the potential dictator, the revolutionary or religious prophet, or others
with new and untried formulae. Such leaders arise because they provide people
with an interpretation that brings order into their confused psychological
worlds" (11, p. 66).

The third phase of the theory is termed "action", or locomotion towards a
goal. In order for articulation to progress to this third phase three requis-
ites must again be fulfilled. Firstly, the articulated need must have a high
"valence". It is of some convenience to view an exigency as striking at a cert-
ain point in a person's previously internalized hierarchy of needs. Thus, if
an exigency strikes at a need of great importance to a person it is experienced
as more severe than an exigency which strikes at a need of a lesser importance.
In light of what has been said above this amounts to concluding that the sever-
ity of an exigency is a function of both the magnitude of the discrepancy and
the relative importance of the stricken need. The latter point can be clarif-
ied somewhat by taking a brief look at the need-hierarchy proposed by Maslow
(48). Maslow postulates that human needs are universally arranged in a hier-
archical manner such that the most important or basic needs involve such phys-
iological necessities as food, clothing, shelter, etc., provide. Next in im-
portance are needs relating to safety and order, followed by such affective
needs as love and belongingness. Self-esteem or status needs are the next most
important variety. Finally, the least important needs for most people involve
self-actualization or self-realization. In both of our case studies we ident-
ify such concrete causes of the experience of exigencies as massacres, legal
restrictions on rights of residence, etc. In addition to determining the mag-
nitude of perceived discrepancies the location of these causes of exigencies
in terms of where they strike on the need-hierarchy forms an important part in

the logic of inferring the severity of an exigency and the consequent magnitude of ideational and ideological innovation.

The second action requisite is "application", which involves the presence or procurement of the requisite knowledge for locomotion towards the articulated goal. Finally, "legitimation" is the process by which "valent needs and the applications necessary for attaining their associated goals are rendered acceptable" to others (84, p. 94). Again, these three requisites may conveniently be viewed as leadership functions.

As was the case with the requisites of articulation, the failure to fulfill any of the three action requisites results in the formation of a second-order exigency. However, the second-order exigency which results from the blockage of an action requisite is different from that which results from the blockage of an articulation requisite in one important respect. Whereas the latter occurs intrapersonally, the former occurs interpersonally. The blockage of an articulation requisite is hence a psychiatric problem of "internal conflict", while the blockage of an action requisite is a source of interpersonal or intergroup conflict. Thus the blockage of the valence requisite results in "valence dissonance" and is caused by contradictions "between sets of need-goals that have been seperately articulated" (84, p. 94). The blockage of the application requisite results in "cognitive dissonance" and is caused by "contradictions in what are considered appropriate applications" (84, p. 94). Finally, the blockage of the legitimation requisite results in "evaluative dissonance" and is caused by "contradictions in forms of legitimation" (84, p. 94).

Since the fourth phase of the schema (termed "institutionalization") is of less direct concern to us than the first three phases our remarks regarding this final phase will necessarily be brief. (The interested reader is referred to (87).)

Institutionalization is defined as "the process whereby interpersonal patterns or forms of action become established in a more or less permanent manner" (87, p. 100).[4] Aside from establishing relatively permanent patterns of action (and despite the fact that Zollschan and associates are not clear on this point,) we would contend that institutionalization establishes the relative permanence of articulations as well. Thus, what distinguishes an articulation from an institutionalized articulation is the relative stability and obdurateness of the latter. It is this relative stability and obdurateness of institutionalized articulations that allows us to speak of "culture","political culture", "ideology", etc. The important point is that such terms as these do not refer to "reified" and permanent institutions, but rather to humanly created and sustained ones. It is precisely their continuation and modification that is problematic from the point of view of social scientific explanation. And it is precisely this explanation which the motivationally based "Theory of Institutionalization" attempts to provide.

Up to this point we have viewed ideational and ideological innovation as processes occuring in a societal vacuum. (It is, in fact, this view that represents the major weakness of Zollschan's schema.) But the exigency-articulation-action-institutionalization schema occurs in society - that is, it occurs through the motivation of people in particular positions in the social structure and with particular exposures to both sources of exigencies and institutionalized articulations. It is the social structural and cultural basis of this schema that we attempt to develop in the following section.

B. The Reactive Moment

The preceding section outlines what we have termed the proactive moment
in the innovation of ideation and ideology. We have discussed and made a
number of modifications to a schema originally proposed by Zollschan and as-
sociates which provides us with theoretical categories for the analysis of
the process by which persons, through their own volition, develop ideation and
ideology. The reactive moment, with which we shall deal in this section, views
the problem from a somewhat different perspective. Instead of suggesting the-
oretical categories for the analysis of a volitional process we must now at-
tempt to explain the constraints which operate on the development of both idea-
tion and ideology in general, and political ideology in particular. The process
by which articulations and actions become shared (i.e., "collectivization")
will form an important part of this discussion.

I. Collectivization and Structural Position

Essentially, the experience of an exigency, the articulation of needs and
goals for its removal and action towards such removal are processes that are
accomplished by individual persons. However, under certain specifiable con-
ditions, the experience of an exigency may be common to a number of persons,
the emergent articulation may be shared and action taken to remove the source
of the exigency may be collective. Marx's discussion of the process by which a
class-in-itself is transformed into a class-for-itself is instructive here. In
the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (45) Marx poses the problem of ex-
plaining peasant support for Louis Bonaparte's coup d'etat in 1851. He notes
that, despite the fact that the peasants endured similar conditions, and de-

spite the fact that they viewed themselves as a unique category of persons, they did not emerge as a manifest interest group capable of independent action. The inability of the peasants to emerge as a manifest interest group is, according to Marx, the result of peasant social structure, which precluded the communication necessary to the formation of an awareness of common interests. Thus Marx: "The small peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another, instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse...Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life through exchange with nature more than through intercourse with society...In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name" (45, pp. 515-516).

The juxtaposition of these observations with Marx and Engels' analysis of the labour movement in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (47) provides us with a set of valuable clues for analyzing the process of collectivization. Here, the concentration of the proletariat in industrial centers, the discipline of factory of labour, the low wages, and the improved means of communication and transportation enables what is at first only a local organization to develop to the national and, finally, global level. In a word, certain "objective conditions" facilitate articulation and action.

The insights provided by Marx and Engels can, we believe, be generalized by viewing the collectivization process in terms of our own framework. An exigency may be spoken of as common to a category of persons when (a) the exig-

ency is experienced as salient by members of the category under consideration ("commonality of experience") and when (b) the members perceive that they are all in "the same situation" - i.e., when they recognize themselves to be a category of persons in some sense unique from others ("group consciousness"). Articulation may become shared when conditions (a) and (b) obtain, and when (c) the specifications and justifications of leaders are accepted by members of the category ("communication"). Finally, collective action is made possible by a situation in which conditions (a), (b) and (c) obtain, and when (d) countervailing tendencies (e.g., opposition-group resources, institutionalized articulations, etc.) cannot overcome the tendency of the category of persons to act ("balance of capabilities").[5]

An exceedingly important question which we must endeavour to answer at this point is the following: Do group interests emerge in a random or systematic manner? Or, to quote from Wolpe's analysis of the emergence of revolutionary consciousness: "The particularly important point here is whether the theory relates the relevant objective factors /in our terms, commonality of experience, group-consciousness, communication and balance of capabilities/ to the social structure and accounts for the generation of these factors on the basis of some systematic, recurrent social processes, or whether it assumes these factors to occur at random" (80, p. 120). The importance of this point should be clear for, depending on how it is treated, its implications will inevitably specify those collectivities which are most likely to articulate and act. Thus, Marx points to individuals' relationships to the means of production as the factor which makes for the emergence of unique class interests (47). Weber, on the other hand, adds both the relationship of individuals to the means of social honour and the relationship of individuals to the means of power to indicate the possible emergence of class, status-group and party interests (77). Dahrendorf suggests that the "distribution of authority /in imperatively co-ordinated associa-

tions7 is the ultimate 'cause' of the formation of conflict groups" (12, p. 172). And Willer and Zollschan indicate that any basis of social rewards (e.g., education, income, authority, status, etc.) or any combination of such bases can make for the emergence of a "manifest interest group". (79)

In asking whether or not interest groups emerge in a random or systematic manner two issues are at stake which, though often confused, should be seperated. The first has to do with the problem of what types of interest groups can emerge, the second with the possibility of the existence of a tendency for certain groups to emerge. The very number and variety of interest groups which have in fact emerged in, say, contemporary Canadian society, would lead us to the conclusion that the answer provided by Willer and Zollschan is the most adequate in terms of the first problem (i.e., the types that can emerge). Any basis (or combination of bases) of social rewards can make for the development of group interests. The presence in one society of the F.L.Q., the Gay Liberation Movement, the English-speaking Quebec residents' group demanding increased English instruction in certain Quebec schools, etc., indicates that the bases of interests suggested by Marx, Weber and Dahrendorf are too restrictive if they hope to handle the explanation of this empirical diversity with any degree of sensitivity. Marx, for instance, was interested in explaining such "major historical changes" as were caused by class conflicts in a particular historical epoch. But "class" is too gross a term to handle what Marx might term "changes of a lesser historical importance". Moreover, as Lichtheim points out, "class as a socio-economic concept belongs to the bourgeois age, and it is questionable whether it can be made to work under circumstances where property in the means of production is no longer the characteristic line of division between the major groups in society" (39, p. 382).

However, we would argue that there exists a societal "tension" which increases the likelihood that particular interest groups will emerge at any

given time. The fact that certain categories of persons are objectively more deprived of valued social rewards than other persons is the cause of this tension. The interesting social scientific question from this perspective is, then, not so much, "Why do certain interest groups emerge?" as, "Why do objectively deprived collectivities not emerge as interest groups?" This is, of course, simply another way of stating the Marxian problem of false consciousness - not the false consciousness of the proletariat alone, but the false consciousness of categories of persons absolutely deprived of valued social rewards. We have endeavoured to supply an answer to the second question posed above based on two sets of considerations: (a) the relative nature of exigencies, and (b) the necessity of meeting certain objective conditions for the emergence of interest groups.

The generation of interest groups is, then, systematically related to the social structure in the sense that persons absolutely deprived of valued social rewards have a higher probability of emerging as a manifest interest group than other, less deprived, persons. However, the emergence of any interest group is contingent on the fulfillment of the four conditions specified above. With this argument regarding the collectivization process in mind it is now possible to consider the sense in which structural position is viewed as a constraint on, or determinant of, ideational and ideological innovation.

We would, following Willer (78), define structural position as "a position of social relationships entailing the probability of gaining certain information, acquiring a certain amount of wealth, status and skill, and experiencing a certain level of exigency" (78, p. 59). Thus, one's structural position determines one's degree of deprivation as well as the resources available for the fulfillment of the four conditions of collectivization. It is only within this constraint that the motivational schema outlined in section

one can be said to apply.

A number of other terms suggested by Willer (78) and Willer and Zollschan (79) fall neatly into our discussion of the conditions necessary for the emergence of an interest group. As such, these terms provide us with convenient "handles" by which we may refer to a category of persons at various stages in the process by which it emerges as a manifest interest group. Thus:

"Latent interest position /is defined as/ a position entailing a sufficient level of exigency and certain information predisposing the individual in that position to create or accept certain types of articulation of exigency" (78, p. 59).

"Latent interest group /is defined as/ any collectivity sharing similar interest positions" (78, p. 59).

"Manifest interest group /is defined as/ any collectivity of individuals which forms a potential basis for concerted action" (78, p. 59).

"Complex interest group /is defined as a collectivity/ of persons who may not occupy similar (or identical) manifest interest positions, but whose interests are none the less common in relation to a given situation. Complex interest groups may be considered as combinations of simple interest groups" (79, p. 131).

The structural position of an individual represents his point of exposure not only to sources of exigencies, but also to material resources, ideation and ideology (i.e., institutionalized articulations). Such ideation and ideology include both general cultural and political cultural elements. It is these elements which we consider in the following section.

II. Culture and Political Culture

Articulations, once institutionalized, form part of the system of ideas - of beliefs, symbols and values - that we commonly call "culture". Culture confronts persons as a reservoir of beliefs, symbols and values which defines their experience and channels choice towards approved actions. Persons draw and develop their own, internalized beliefs, symbols and values from this reservoir. As such, culture represents a constraint on ideational and ideological innovation. T. S. Eliot notes a rare and antiquated (1483) definition of culture contained in the Oxford English Dictionary: "the setting of bounds; limitation" (19, p. 5). This definition is, then, not dissimilar from our own view.

Such a view of culture does not, by any means, deny the possibility of cultural development and innovation: it simply points out that, in combination with the developmental view elaborated in section A of this chapter, it is important to consider culture as a system of elements which presents itself to the awareness of persons as an objective, already-existing reality. Thus, in addition to Berger and Luckmann's important question, "How is it possible that subjective meanings become objective facticities?" (7, p. 18), we must ask, "How is it possible that objective facticities are internalized as subjective meanings?" We do not, of course, attempt to supply a full answer to this question, but only to suggest where one might begin to look for one.

Within the general, and rather vague, notion of culture, we distinguish the more specific category of "political culture", a category of particular relevance in the analysis of political ideology. Sidney Verba, a political scientist responsible for some of the seminal work in the area, defines political culture as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and

values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics" (74, p. 513). Again, in order to achieve some degree of congruence between the notion of political culture and the proactive schema, it is helpful to view political culture as a system of successfully institutionalized articulations. We thus assume that time and time again, before a particular person began to be socialized, exigencies were experienced by people, goals articulated for the removal of these exigencies, actions took place in order to effect these removals and, finally, these actions and their associated articulations were successfully institutionalized. The person is, in the socialization process, confronted with a system of institutionalized political beliefs, symbols and values, out of which emergent political ideologies are forged. As Verba observes: "Political ideologies are affected by the cultural environment...$\underline{/}$They$\underline{7}$...have been adapted to fit the preexisting culture of the nation into which they were introduced" (74, p. 517).

Two elements of political culture are of particular interest to us herein. The first is termed "orientation", the second, "identification".

According to Almond and Verba, orientation "refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes (1) "cognitive orientation", that is, knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs; (2) "affective orientation", or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel and performance, and (3) "evaluative orientation", the judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings" (3, p. 15). It will be remembered that Zollschan's schema defined the three types of exigencies as cognitive, affective and evaluative - i.e., as respectively concerned with knowledge, desires and legitimacies. The definition of political orientation suggested by Almond and

Verba allows us to drop any assumptions about the ex nihilo development of exigencies with respect to the political-cultural sphere. In other words, rather than simply taking the generation of exigencies in the development of political ideology for granted, we can now say that cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations to the political system precede the experience of cognitive, affective and evaluative exigencies. Orientations thus indicate the locus of exigency generation.

Persons are oriented towards political objects. Such objects include (a) the political system as a general object, (b) "input objects" involved in policy making, (c) "output objects" involved in policy enforcement, and (d) the self as object. The characterization of a particular political culture thus involves the specification of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations with respect to each of these four political objects.

Almond and Verba further specify a number of ideal-type political cultures, termed "parochial", "subject" and "participant". In the parochial political culture the frequency of orientation to all four political objects is low. In the subject political culture the frequency of orientation to the system as a general object and to output objects (i.e., policy enforcement) is high, but the frequency of orientation to input objects (i.e., policy making) and to the self as an active participant in the political process is low. In the participant political culture, the frequency of orientation to all four political objects is high. This formulation thus enables us to distinguish the direction of orientation (i.e., in terms of different political objects) and the degree of orientation (i.e., in terms of the frequency of orientation among a given population).

The second important element of political culture from our point of view - the element termed "identification" - is, in a sense, a more fundamental

analytical category than orientation. Verba points out that "the most crucial political belief involves that of political identity. Of what political unit does the individual consider himself a member? and how deep and unambiguous is this sense of identification?" (74, p. 529). The fundamental nature of these questions indicates that, before we can hope to determine the direction and frequency of orientations it is necessary to determine where the political objects in question are located and the extent to which their location is unequivocal in the minds of political actors.

Identification with a particular political unit is viewed by Verba as "vertical" identification - i.e., identification with a supra-individual political unit (e.g., clan, lineage, nation, etc.). In addition, we must consider the individual's "horizontal" identification - i.e., his identification with fellow political actors - as a crucial variable in the assessment of political culture.

Persons located in different structural positions are differentially exposed to the already-existing political culture: hence, the particular configuration of political beliefs, symbols and values internalized by persons varies strongly with their structural position in society. The process by which a category of persons emerges as a manifest interest group is thus a function of both the structural position of the category and the aspects of political culture to which it is exposed. Direction and frequency of orientation to political objects, horizontal and vertical identification - all of these factors define the situation in which political ideological innovation can occur. It is in this sense, then, that political culture is a determinant of political ideological innovation.

Chapter Two : Messianic Ideation and Political Ideology

Thus far we have attempted to define and explain the innovation of idea-
tion and ideology through the formulation of an analytical framework, a sys-
tem of theoretical constructs. These constructs have been presented to take
into account both motivational and constraining elements in the developmental
process. In this chapter we endeavour to specify the applicability of these
considerations to two, more narrowly defined forms of ideation. We now turn
to the analysis of two types of "problem situations" - those which give rise
to the development or innovation of Messianic ideation and those which give
rise to the development or innovation of political ideology.

The sense in which we differentiate Messianic from political movements
is similar to the characterization proposed by Hobsbawm (31). He singles out
three elements of social movements for particular attention: (a) orientation
to the present world; (b) ideology; and (c) program of action and organization.
First, both millenarian and political movements are characterized by "a pro-
found rejection of the present, evil world, and a passionate longing for an-
other and better one" (31, p. 57). Second, ideology is chiliastic in millenar-
ian movements and seculr in political movements. Third, the program of action
and organization is vague in millenarian movements: but a political movement
"adds a superstructure of modern revolutionary politics to its basic revolu-
tionary spirit: a programme, a doctrine concerning the transfer of power, and
above all a system of organization (31, p. 59).

We noted earlier that all manner of exigencies have the potentiality of
presenting themselves to the awareness of an individual: in a sense, the ind-
ividual is continually "bombarded" by exigencies of one sort or another, only

a fraction of which manage to reach the threshold of awareness. In order for the positing of goals to be effected for the removal or amelioration of the perceived cause of the exigency, several barriers must be overcome. Only if the exigency is experienced as salient; only if the perceived cause of theexigency is specified; and only if the individual can overcome inhibitions against positing such needs and goals, does articulation take place. Moreover, a second set of barriers (signified by the terms valence, application and legitimation) must be surmounted before any action towards such removal or amelioration can take place. The term "barrier" here is apt, for it implies that of the fraction of exigencies that reach an individual's threshold of awareness, only a small number actually result in action being taken by the individual. This elaboration enables us to define a "problem situation", in general terms, as the product of a particularly severe exigency and the fulfillment of the six "leadership functions". In other words, we define a problem situation as a social process in which the experience of an exigency results in articulation and action being taken to remove or ameliorate the imputed cause of the exigency.

Political ideology has already been defined as a form of evaluative ideation which supports or contests a particular distribution of power - i.e., as a symbolic map of reality (or a segment thereof) which refers primarily to the legitimacy of such a distribution. At this point it would serve us well to consider both the nature of Messianic ideation and problem situations which give rise to its innovation. (The former set of considerations are, in large measure, restricted to the case of Judaism since we will, in the enxt chapter, attempt to analyze a Jewish Messianic movement.)

The seventeen centuries of Jewish history from 70 c.e. to 1789 c.e. has, for the most part, been a history of quietism on the part of the Jewish people.

Deprivations were part of the fabric of life of the people and yet no action of significance was taken by the Jews to effect changes in their social environment which might remove the perceived causes of these exigencies. According to our definition, no problem situation arose. This was, at least, the case aside from one, recurrent pattern of interruption: for dozens of times the normal state of quietism was interrupted in a flurry of Messianic activity. Attendant upon such eruptions were the two factors specified as those defining a problem situation - namely, particularly severe exigencies and the emergence of leaders to encourage articulation and action. These leaders were proclaimed Messiahs and the ideation which accompanied their appearance was, of course, of a Messianic nature. Jesus was proclaimed Messiah in the wake of severe Roman persecution; Shabbatai Z'vi announced his candidacy in the same year that a series of pogroms (anti-Jewish riots) swept Eastern Europe; David Frank revealed his right to the title of Messiah at a time of increasingly numerous "blood libel" charges against the Jews. Thus, whereas the typical Jewish reaction to exigencies was no reaction which would change their environment, the typical response to problem situations was the emergence of Messianic ideation and action.

As far as the Messiah idea itself is concerned it is of some interest to note that it begins, in Jewish history, as a realistic and localized yearning. Following the division of the Kingdom of Israel after the reigns of David and Solomon, "the Messianic conceptions were local and material in their nature, referring only to Israel and to the physical blessings of which it stood in need" (27, pp. 28-29). The narrow, national expression of Messianism was later to develop into a wider, universalistic mode. However, the former theme was, as we shall see, not entirely forgotten.

In the early stages of the development of the Messiah idea its dominant

theme was the hope for future deliverance from present misfortunes. This fut-
ure-orientation is of some significance both historically and sociologically.
This fact is historically important since the Western nations of antiquity
expressed in their yearnings a marked orientation to the past: Hesiod and Ovid,
for example, describe five ages of men, beginning with a golden age, each suc-
cessive age more degenerate than its predecessor. Sociologically this fact
is important insofar as it intimates an important segment of Judaism's "frame
of reference", specifying an orientation towards the future which came to be
established as distinctively Jewish. (See, for instance, (75), pp. 10-13.)

In later prophecy (notably that of Ezekiel and Zachariah) the imminence
of the Messianic Age replaced the previously unspecified date of the Messiah's
arrival. This development exemplifies a fluctuation characteristic of the
difference between the predominantly accomodating Jewish response to depriva-
tion and the outbreaks of action attendant upon the development of problem
situations. In both cases the future orientation obtains. However, the char-
acteristic response to the former situation was the expectation that the
coming of the Messiah was far off, whereas the characteristic response to
problem situations exhibited the expectation of an impending, or near-at-
hand coming. A similar and parallel fluctuation can be seen with respect to
beliefs about the ability of the people to encourage the coming of the Mes-
siah. Whereas Messianic outbreaks witnessed active preparation, ritualized
encouragement, etc., passive periods failed to exhibit these characteristics.
To quote Talmon:"It would seem that truly great expectations and a sense of
immediacy enhance the orientation to either radical withdrawal or to active
revolt, while postponement of the critical date and lesser expectation breed
quietism and accomodation" (69, p. 180).

After the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 c.e., a new dimension

was added to the Messiah idea - namely, the notion of a personal Messiah. The personal Messiah, it was held, will be a descendant of the House of King David. This line of descent does not, however, imply that the Messiah himself will be of immediately apparent regal stature for, as Talmon notes, "during this period we encounter also the emergence of the "suffering servant" motif. According to this conception the redeemer will not be a king but a poor, despised and persecuted outcast" (69, p. 161). The general theme of suffering is of some importance in the Messiah idea; in fact, suffering by the Jewish people came to be viewed as a necessary prerequisite for the coming of the Messiah. Thus, the actual suffering of the Jews was "mystified" by the embodiment of the necessity for suffering as a tenet of Jewish Messianism, and through the creation of the suffering servant motif as the symbolic explication of this role.

Of equal importance to the elements already specified we would point to a number of additional themes which became part of the Messiah idea. First, the coming of the Messiah was seen as the beginning of a return to Zion. Second, a final apocalypse was expected to immediately precede the coming. Third, redemption was to be universal, and not localized to the Jewish people alone. Fourth, the Jews themselves were viewed as having a mission, as having been chosen by God to spread the teachings of the Torah as they awaited the Messiah. Finally, the Messianic Age would see the acceptance of the Unity of God by all people. Although it would be possible to isolate additional elements (e.g., the resurrection of the dead, the notion that Elijah the Prophet would appear as the forerunner of the Messiah, etc.) the themes specified above appear to form the core of the Messiah idea. Through myth and folklore, custom and ritual, liturgical and literary allusion, religious education, etc., the idea remained very much a part of the texture of Jewish life until the emanc-

ipation of the Jews began after the French Revolution.

From the point of view of sociological theory, one of the most apposite questions one could ask in light of this brief overview of the Messiah idea is the following: Why was the response to problem situations of a Messianic, rather than a political nature? Part of the answer was indicated above when we alluded to the obdurateness of the Messiah idea in Jewish culture. But even if we admit that ideation formed for purposes of action is drawn from some cultural reservoir of beliefs, symbols and values, we have not yet indicated how the continuity of the idea was made possible. In attempting to offer an explanation, a second portion of our answer devolves around the appropriateness of the Messiah idea as a program of action; the third portion of our answer is concerned with the dearth of social-structural elements which would allow the development of alternative ideation to take place; finally, the fourth portion of our answer takes up the problem of the frames of reference operative in the innovation of Messianic ideation and political ideology.

By appropriateness we do not refer to the extent to which an ideational formation is objectively capable of aiding in the removal of the source of an exigency - i.e., we do not refer to its potential for giving rise to "successful" action. Admittedly this problem is of some considerable sociological importance: it was therefore dealt with - albeit in a cursory manner - in our discussion of the collectivization process. At this point, however, we restrict ourselves to the question of whether or not an ideational formation is capable of offering an acceptable or satisfying explanation of the exigency from the point of view of the person who experiences the exigency. This question way be answered independently of the problem of the objective success potential of an articulation.

If we were to find ourselves in the situation of being forced to describe Messianic ideation in a single word, then that word would have to be "unreal-

istic". Exigencies have their origin in the real world, so that the positing
of transcendental goals for the alleviation of an exigency (e.g., the coming
of the Messiah) have little chance of objective success - at least in terms
of altering the environment so as to achieve the articulated goal.[6] And yet,
such unrealistic, Messianic goals have, of course, been articulated by cat-
egories of people. The key to understanding the process of positing such un-
realistic goals lies embedded in the notion of second-order exigencies. Aberle
acutely observes that "a sense of blockage - of the insufficiency of ordinary
action - seems to me, as it has seemed to many others, the source of the more
supernaturally based...movements" (1, p. 212). Presumably, some more or less
urgent, more or less rational, attempt is made by the person who experiences
an exigency to specify goals for the removal or amelioration of that exigency.
However, if realistic, "this-wordly" goals are "perceived" by the person as
incapable of effecting the desired removal or amelioration, a form of second-
order exigency develops.[7] Thus, assuming that the "best" or most efficient
goal would be a realistic goal (i.e., a goal with a high likelihood of object-
ive success) the person who experiences a second-order exigency faces a dil-
emna: either the salience of the exigency can be repressed (a particularly
difficult alternative if the second-order exigency is severe) or an unreal-
istic goal can be posited. More succinctly, but less analytically, we must
ask whether or not realistic action can be expected to remove the exigency.
"If it could not, we expect a correspondingly large increment of religious
and magical action" (1, p. 212). In passing, it is interesting to note that
Marx may have meant something similar to this when he contended that "mankind
always takes up only such problems as it can solve" (44, pp. 12-13).

In our case, we would not expect realistic action to prove successful
in an objective sense because of such factors as the limited resources avail-

able to the Jewish people, the surfeit of such resources in the hands of their oppressors, etc. We would thus expect a corresponding increment in Messianic action. If, on the other hand, we could expect realistic action to be effective, we would predict a greater likelihood of the emergence of political ideology.

Up to this point our formulation suffers from two major weaknesses. In the first place, we have defined a problem situation only in terms of the different types of articulation and action that can emerge from the experience of a particularly severe exigency. In the second place, we have offered what is essentially a socio-psychological explanation for the development of Messianic ideation and political ideology (i.e., socio-psychological in its entirety save for the inclusion of the element of cultural transmission). In the attempt to offer a complementary cultural and social-structural explanation for the type of ideation which emerges from a problem situation we will be concerned with elaborating an answer that pays particular attention to the political culture and structural position of categories of persons in problem situations.

Our initial differentiation between problem situations which make for the emergence of Messianic ideation and problem situations which make for the emergence of political ideology allows us to elaborate a social-structural definition in terms of those conditions present in the latter, but lacking in the former type, and present in the former, but lacking in the latter type. Our starting point in specifying the first necessary condition for the development of political ideology is Worsley's (81) and Talmon's (69) observation that "the most important contribution of recent studies of millenarianism...lies in the insistence that millenarism is essentially a pre-political, non-political and post-political phenomenon" (69, pp. 184-185).[8] This fact,

we would argue, is intimately connected with the type of political institutions available for the articulation of political demands which are present in problem situations.

Eisenstadt (18) notes that there is an overall tendency for more organized eruptions of discontent in areas which exhibit social differentiation and political participation. "This tendency to more organizaed eruptions has been rooted in the fact that by their very nature such regimes encourage certain levels of articulation and organization of political demands and of mobilization and organization of political support" (18, p. 64). We would contend that the level of institutional support for the articulation and organization of political demands is the sociological complement to the socio-psychological expectation that realistic articulation and action will succeed, which we discussed above. In other words, high levels of institutional support encourage realistic articulation and action, while low levels of institutional support encourage unrealistic articulation and action. This argument compares favourably with Lipset's contention that "political systems that deny ...strata access to power except by drastic pressure or revolution...threaten legitimacy by introducing millenial (utopian or unattainable) hopes into the political arena" (42, p. 444).

High levels of institutional support are characterized by the presence of centralized and specialized political institutions sympathetic to the political demands of the population. Low levels of institutional support are characterized by the absence of these elements.

This view explains why Messianic outbursts are of a "pre-political" and "post-political" nature. In both "traditional" and "advanced", industrialized societies we would contend that discontent portions of the population very often have a characteristically low expectation that realistic articulation

and action will succeed. In traditional societies limited social differentiation and political participation accompany such expectations. In industrial societies political participation is again low and political institutions are viewed as so monolithic that such expectations are likewise encouraged.

We would stress the tentativeness of our argument vis-a-vis "advanced", industrial society since it attempts to explain a phenomenon that is only beginning to become visible at the present, and hence whose dimensions are as yet unknown. However, the resurgence of millenarian movements in the interstices of such socities, and the sudden growth of religious sects (especially in North America) would seem to offer some initial support for the explanation forwarded herein.

Thus far we have specified three factors which differentiate between Messianic and political problem situations. These are: cultural continuity of the Messiah idea, socio-psychological appropriateness of unrealistic needs and goals and institutional support of realistic articulation and action. A fourth condition which differentiates between pre-political Messianism and political ideology is related to the pattern of exigencies experienced by the category of persons under consideration. Following Merton (51, pp. 281-290) and Gurr (28, pp. 46-56) we would argue that, in the experience of an exigency, a person may refer some aspect of his or her Self to some aspect of a reference group or individual. Since both the Self and the reference group or reference individual are temporally situated it is possible to conceive of a total of eight such reference relationships for a person located in the present. A present-self may refer to (a) past-self, (b) future-self, (c) past-other, (d) present-other, (e) future-other, (f) past-others, (g) present-others or (h) future-others.

Such reference relationships or "frames of reference" do not "float", as

it were. Rather, they are anchored in concrete areas of concern. Our previous characterization of a number of different bases of social rewards (e.g., power, wealth, education, etc.) amounts to one possible typology of such concrete areas of concern. Thus, any frame of reference operates with respect to one or a number of bases of social rewards. To offer but one example: an exigency may be experienced by virtue of comparing one's present wealth with one's past wealth and noticing a discrepancy between the two.

Several of the eight reference points are particularly important for our present purposes. Gurr (28, pp. 46-56), following Morrison (52), differentiates between decremental deprivation ("in which a group's value expectations remain relatively constant but value capabilities are perceived to decline") and aspirational deprivation ("in which capabilities remain relatively static while expectations increase or intensify") as two fundamental patterns which distinguish between "traditional" and "modern" problem situations (28, p. 46).[9] In the first case a person refers some aspect of his present Self to his own past condition in terms of the receipt of one or more valued social rewards. In the second case a person refers some aspect of his present Self to the (legitimately expected and/or desired) future condition of either another person, other persons or himself - again in terms of the receipt of one or more valued social rewards.

Insofar as decremental deprivation is a pattern empirically related to the experience of exigencies in what Gurr calls "static societies", while aspirational deprivation is a pattern related to the experience of exigencies in societies that have experienced "positive social change" (again Gurr's term), we are presented with a further condition which differentiates between problem situations in which Messianic ideation develops and problem situations in which political ideology develops. If, as Aberle contends, "the ideology of

of the movement will be related to the type of deprivation - or at least
/the/ emphasis in the ideology will be so related (1, p. 212), then dif-
ferent patterns of exigencies may give rise to different types of ideation.
In propositional form: the more closely a pattern of exigencies represents
the type termed "decremental deprivation", the greater the probability of
innovation of Messianic ideation. Conversely, the more closely a pattern of
exigencies represents the type termed "aspirational deprivation", the great-
er the probability of innovation of political ideology.

One further matter remains to be considered in the chapter. The polit-
ical ideology which we propose to examine (i.e., Zionism) is characterized
by one element which places it in a distinct sub-class within the entire class
of idea systems we have defined as political ideologies. This element is its
nationalistic emphasis. That is, Zionism "pretends to supply a /primordial/
criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a
government exclusively its own" (32, p. 9). The two most important notions in
this quotation are the primordial nature of the criterion,[10] and the empas-
is on self-determination. To say that we have simply added the word primord-
ial to Kedourie's now-classical definition of nationalism as qualifying the
criterion used for the determination of the relevant unit of population would
be an exaggeration in light of his discussion of such criteria. Kedourie dis-
cusses only primordial criteria, although he seldom uses the word.[11] The
combination of these two elements is, needless to say, not present in non-
nationalistic political ideologies. Pre-World War One Marxism, for example,[12]
distinguishes certain units of population (namely, the proletariat and the
disenchanted bourgeoisie) as the units of population which will determine the
legitimate exercise of power. However, the criterion used for demarcating

these units of population is not of a primordial nature: hence, Marxism, at
least before 1914, does not qualify as a nationalistic political ideology.
The Marxism of contemporary African liberation movements, on the other hand,
adds a primordial criterion to the demarcation of the relevant units of pop-
ulation (e.g., language, land, etc.,) and hence qualifies as a nationalistic
political ideology according to our definition. Zionism, as we will see later,
falls into the same category.

We include this brief discussion of nationalism insofar as we believe
that it will be helpful to specify those conditions which allow for the dev-
elopment of nationalism in much the same way we discussed those conditions
which enable the development of political ideology, per se, to develop. Essen-
tially, we intend to offer a discussion of several additional conditions
which allow for the development of a nationalistic componenet in political
ideology.

The first such condition has to do with the necessary ideational prepar-
ation. Kedourie's discussion of nationalism spends considerable time in eluc-
idating the effects of Post-Enlightenment European philosophy on the develop-
ment of nationalism. Kant, for example, seperated the realm of morality from
the realm of knowledge, the former being "the outcome of obedience to a uni-
versal law which is to be found within ourselves" (32, p. 22). Kant's "new
formula" thus stresses that "the good will, which is the free will, is also
the autonomous will" (32, p. 24). This stress on the free and autonomous will
enabled nationalism, largely a doctrine of national self-determination, to
find in Kant the "great source of its vitality", according to Kedourie.

Despite our agreement with Gellner's reservation that "Kedourie's stress
on Kant over-stresses...the role of ideas in social change" (24, p. 151), we
would contend that the presence of ideas encouraging self-determination is at

least necessary in the political culture of a population for a nationalistic component of political ideology to develop. Of course, such ideas must obtain in order for any "activist" ideation to develop, such as Messianism or political ideology, per se. What distinguishes situations in which the nationalistic component is able to develop is that the stress on self-determination is combined with the primordial demarcation of the relevant unit of population.

The second major necessary condition for the development of a nationalistic component in political ideology has to do with changes in social structure which affect the transmission of political beliefs, symbols and values from generation to generation. Gellner (24) offers a broad framework within which it is possible to view this problem. As Gellner would have it, small, "primitive" societies usually have a highly developed structure and a highly developed culture, both of which display a high degree of compatability with each other. In such societies role ascription leaves little chance for personal choice; moreover, social positions and relationships are richly symbolized. The fact that most social relationships are well known by all adult members of the population means that shared culture is not a necessary prerequisite for effective communication: the propinquity of members of the population to one another and the dearth of social differentiation of roles supposedly insure that everyone knows their own and others' roles as well as others' role-expectations so well that such knowledge is second nature. Structure, rather than culture, is the medium of effective communication in "primitive" societies. This situation contrasts markedly with that of "modern" society, for with increased social differentiation and increased uncertainty regarding one's own and others' roles as well as others' role-expectations, culture becomes the effective medium of communication. To quote Gellner: "The burd-

en of comprehension thus shifts from the context /i.e., the structure_/ to the communication itself /i.e., the culture/ " (24, p. 155). Whereas in primitive societies culture reinforces and underlies structure, in modern societies culture replaces structure.

Now, in primitive societies the right of membership to the society adheres to men by virtue of occupying a certain niche in the social structure, whereas in modern societies certain rights (primarily that of citizenship) adhere to all men by virtue of the fact that they are born into the society. "In modern society, man does not possess citizenship by virtue of prior membership to some organic sub-part of it. He possesses citizenship - if at all - directly" (24, pp. 156-157). It thus follows that loyalties will, in a modern nation-state, be expressed in cultural terms.

Since the erosion of structure is seen by Gellner as a result of the very increase in size of a society, increased horizontal and vertical mobility, and so forth, we can construct the following causal chain as illustrative of the crux of Gellner's argument: increased size, increased vertical mobility, increased horizontal mobility, etc. ----> erosion of social structure ----> decrease in importance of structure for effective communication, increase in importance of culture for effective communication ----> expression of membership loyalties to society in cultural terms (i.e., increased importance of primordial ties as expressive links to society).

Gellner restricts his analysis of "cultural terms" to the problem of language. However, a more complete list would obviously include such factors as religion, custom, etc. [13] Thus, what are essentially economic and demographic changes effect social structure and culture in such a way as to promote an expression of civil loyalties in terms of what we have referred to as "primordial ties". In order to indicate the importance of this new mode of expression

for the development of nationalism it is necessary to refer to an important article by Shils (67).

The fundamental determinants of human behaviour are, Shils contends, immediate "personal ties, primordial attachments, and responsibilities in corporate bodies" (67, p. 130). It is only alongside such ties, attachments and responsibilities that beliefs and values regarding the "Right" and the "Good" come into play. For our present purposes the most important contribution of Shils is his contention that primordial ties act as important links (primarily through some mediating individual or individuals) between persons and corporate bodies such as the nation-state. Particularly in modernizing societies there exists a conflict between primordial and civil ties - what Geertz calls an "integrative revolution" (23). "The growing capacity of the state to mobilize social resources for public ends, its expanding power, rails primordial sentiments because, given the doctrine that legitimate authority is but an extension of the inherent moral coerciveness such sentiments possess, to permit oneself to be ruled by men of other tribes, other races, or other religions is to submit not merely to oppression but to degradation - to exclusion from the moral community as a lower order of being whose opinions, attitudes, wishes and so on, simply do not fully count" (23, pp. 127-128).

In nationalistic movements, identification with the movements is primarily in terms of primordial ties. The quickening of the importance of primordial bases for civil identification brought on by the demographic and economic changes referred to above in our discussion of Gellner ultimately result in the clash between primordial and civil ties referred to by Geertz. Since our restatement of Kedourie's definition of nationalism includes a stress on the primordial criteria by which units of population are demarcated for self-determination, we can conclude that certain economic and demographic changes

are responsible for the emergence of nationalism, at least when these changes occur in previously "static" societies. These economic and demographic changes which make for the erosion of the traditional social structure amount to a second necessary condition for the emergence of a nationalistic component in political ideology.

In addition to the Messianic response to problem situations it is now possible to state with some precision a second Jewish response which emerged in Eastern Europe in the latter part of the 19th century. This response was characterized by the emergence of a number of political ideologies, some of which contained a strong nationalistic componenet.

We close this chapter with the presentation of the following table, which attempts to enumerate in a schematic manner those conditions necessary, unnecessary and necessarily absent for the development of Messianic ideation, political ideology and a nationalistic component in political ideology, as they have emerged from our discussion.

Figure One. Conditions for the Emergence of Messianic Ideation, Political Ideology and Nationalistic Political Ideology

condition	Messianic	political	nationalistic political
cultural transmission of Messiah idea	1	0	0
subjective appropriateness of Messiah idea	1	-1	-1
political institutions which encourage realistic articulation and action	-1	0	0

Figure One. --continued--

condition	Messianic	political	nationalistic political
decremental deprivation	1	-1	-1
aspirational deprivation	-1	1	1
primordial criteria used to demarcate units of population and belief in right to self-determination	0	0	1
erosion of social structure attendant upon the "development" of a "static" society	0	0	1

N.B. 1= necessary condition
      0= unnecessary condition
     -1= necessarily absent condition

Chapter Three : The Sabbatean Movement

In this chapter an attempt is made to sketch the development of the Messianic movement known as Sabbateanism, which swept Eastern Europe from the mid-17th to the mid-18th century.[14] The movement - and its attendant ideation - is analyzed through the application of the framework proposed in the first two chapters. We first consider the cultural and social structural context from and within which the movement developed (the reactive moment) and then proceed to considerations involving the developmental process itself (the proactive moment). Particular attention will be paid to those conditions which made for the development of a Messianic, rather than political, movement.

By the middle of the 17th century the Jewish community of Poland was organized in an autonomous community structure. The extension of Jewish privileges had begun in 1264 (under Boleslav the Pious) and was continued in 1447 (under Casimir IV). However, it was the liberal policy of Sigismund I (1506-1548) and Sigismund Augustus (1548-1572) which was primarily responsible for the crystallization of Jewish self-government.

Sigismund I not only recognized the authority of the leadership of the many Jewish "Kehillot" (Hebrew: "communities"; singular: "Kahal"), but insisted that Jews under their authority recognize and respect them. In 1551, Sigismund Augustus issued a charter declaring his views concerning the Kehillot and legalizing the institutions of Jewish self-government. The laws and practices of the Kehillot were to be determined "in accordance with the rites and customs of the law of Moses". Thus, by the end of the 16th century, all cities and towns with a Jewish population had their seperate Kahal boards, each

responsible for its own religious, educational, administrative, judicial and charitable institutions.

Admittedly, the Kahal boards were hardly representative of the population. During Passover each year the wealthier Jews were inevitably "elected" as board members. Nevertheless, the system of government provided not only autonomy of the Jewish community from the Poles, but also a high degree of intra-community solidarity. In the words of a renowned historian of the period: "This firmly-knit organization of communal self-government could not but foster among the Jews of Poland a spirit of discipline and obediance to the law. It had an educational effect of the Jewish populace...It provided the stateless nation with a substitute for national and political self-expression, keeping public spirit and civic virtue alive in it, and upholding and unfolding its genuine culture" (15, p. 113). However, as we shall see at a later point, the encouragement of realistic political articulation and action was restricted to intra-communal matters. For most of the Jewish population political participation in the larger, Polish political system was patently discouraged.

One of the most important features of the Kehillot from our point of view was the autonomous educational system which they supported. Primary and secondary education was carried on in the "cheder" (Hebrew: literally, "room"; colloquially, "school",) while advanced learning was forwarded in the "yeshivah" (Hebrew: literally, "sitting"; colloquially, "religious academy"). Attendance in the cheder was compulsory for all children (although primarily enforced for males only) from the age of six to the age of thirteen. Studies were conducted from eight to twelve hours per day, six days per week, in Bible and in the easier Talmudic treatises (i.e., learned commentaries on the Bible). Kahal supervision extended to all schools, arranging curriculum, teachers' sal-

alaries, hours of instruction, etc.

This education was augmented with prayer services at the synagogue three times daily, which were followed by spirited debates over various interpretations of the holy texts. Thus, education was a continual process and intellectual achievement a universal goal. To quote an anthropologist writing of the same community at a later point in history: "The learned tradition...serves not only to transmit Jewish culture, it is also a prime factor of cohesion, maintaining unity and continuity in time and space" (82, p. 101).

It can thus be said without fear of overstatement that the normal Polish Jew identified not so much with the neighbouring, non-Jewish Poles as he did with his fellow Jews. This mode of identification was made possible by the sense of intra-community solidarity which pervaded the Jewish populace, as well as the sense of seperateness from the Poles bred by legal, social and economic barriers. The legal and social barriers were, of course, part and parcel of Polish Jewry's autonomous communal status: but the economic barriers were, in a sense, independent causes of seperateness. In order to understand why this was the case it will be necessary to consider for a moment the economic position of the Jew in 17th century Poland.

The century preceding the eventful year of 1648 was a period of relative economic stability and, for some Jews, even prosperity. It can be inferred that this stability enabled expectations regarding future security and well-being to remain approximately constant over this period of time. The reasons for this relative stability of both welfare and expectations regarding the future are clear: both royalty and the powerful "Shlachta" (Polish: "lords" - i.e., landed gentry) had much to gain from the Jews. In the first place, Jewish commercial activity was of great value, not only because it represented a reliable source of taxation for the exchequer, but also because it acted as

a catalyst for economic growth. "The Jews had been admitted into Poland for economic reasons. Their capital and their commercial acumen, a succession of Polish monarchs reasoned, could transform and modernize Poland's primitive agricultural economy. This assumption proved to be perfectly correct. Within a relatively short span of years, Poland had developed a sound commercial and economic life, in which...the Polish middle class was made up almost entirely of Jews" (66, p. 82). Secondly, the Jews acted as valuable middlemen between the aristocracy and the peasants, collecting taxes from the latter and tending to the management of the large estates. This is not to claim that the Jewish population did not face any problems, however. On the contrary, three forces assured the Jews that their position was little better than precarious. The first of these forces was the class of emergent Polish burghers, who viewed the Jews as undesirable competitors. The second force was the Catholic Church which, with ecclesiastical intolerance typical of the Middle Ages, was continually at odds with royalty over the Jewish question. Finally, the peasants viewed the Jewish tax collectors and estate-managers as their oppressors, often unable to extend their vision to the higher classes.

It is thus safe to conclude that Jewish solidarity and autonomy served to accentuate their economic uniqueness in a society otherwise comprised only of an aristocracy, a clergy and a peasantry. And all three factors acted in concert to insure the mode of identification referred to earlier.

In addition to the structural location of the Jews and their mode of identification, the cultural milieu in which they lived played a major role in determining the nature of Sabbateanism. Jewish culture was centered on the Torah and its teachings, two aspects of which concern us here. These two aspects, when internalized, bred a paradoxical combination of quietism and subdued Messianic expectation.

The quietist proclivity grew out of that strand of Jewish culture which teaches a form of resignation to the powers of the "host nation" and eschews the independent exercise of force by the Jews. This element represents a logical accomodation to the centuries-long Exile from Israel, an accomodation assured by the combination of actual powerlessness and culturally-defined proscriptions regarding the exercise of power. In fact, this element is of such prominence in Jewish culture that it has prompted a contemporary historian to assert that it represents the core value of Judaism (66).

Quietism and Messianic expectation were successfully transmitted from generation to generation by the highly efficient education system alluded to earlier. Both elements were so pervasive that neither our knowledge nor the limitations of space permit us to discuss their significance in the content of the educational process. However, for purposes of illustration, it would perhaps be useful to consider the place of the Messiah idea in only a small fraction of the Jewish liturgy.

The "Siddur" (Hebrew: literally, "order"; colloquially, "prayer book") is, in a way, a paradoxical development in Jewish history for, according to the Talmud, writing down a prayer is tantamount to "burning a page of the Torah". However, despite this injunction, prayers were written down and standardized. The first Siddur was printed in Italy in 1486 and became widely accepted. In essence, the same liturgical structure has been maintained until our day.

The most important prayer in the Jewish liturgy is the "Shemoneh Esreh" (Hebrew: "eighteen"), named after the number of benedictions it contains and composed in the first century, c.e., in the wake of the destruction of the Second Temple. According to Jewish tradition it is recited twenty-two times per week (four times on Saturday and three times every other day of the week).

In the first benediction God is described as "He who bringeth a redeemer to the children" of Israel. The second benediction expresses the hope for the resurrection of the dead. The seventh is a prayer for the redemption of Israel, while the tenth is a prayer for the ingathering of the Exiles. The eleventh benediction expresses the hope for the establishment of an independent government of Israel - the fourteenth, for the re-building of Jerusalem and the re-establishment of the throne of David. The fifteenth benediction again speaks of the restoration of the Davidic dynasty. Finally, the seventeenth benediction is a prayer for the restoration of Temple worship, concluding with the hope, "our eyes shall see when thou returnest in mercy to Zion". Thus, the most important prayer in the Jewish liturgy contains a host of Messianic references in addition to a number of Messianic allusions.

Similarly, the mourner's prayer refers to the building of the Temple and Jerusalem; the benediction recited after every meal contains an invocation of God's mercy on behalf of "Israel thy people, Jerusalem thy city, Zion the abiding place of thy Glory, the kingdom of the house of David thy Messiah, and the great and holy house that was called by thy name". Needless to say, the references to the Messiah are, in the totality of the liturgy, so numerous as to deny quantification. Much of the Siddur was comprised during the miseries of the Middle Ages, so it is scarcely any wonder that such references are plentiful. One scholar says of the Siddur: "It is but natural that the Jewish prayer book, developed under such influences, should be one, long, cry for redemption from the terrors of the exile" (27, p. 285).

The cry for redemption was, however, a cry of inured suffering, a cry accompanied by waiting rather than active attempts to hasten the redemption. It can thus be inferred that, with respect to their orientation to the larger, Polish political system, the Jews were members of a "subject" political cult-

ure. That is, although they were concerned with and aware of the political system and its policies as the system affected them, they were certainly not aware of, nor involved in, policy-making decisions. The larger political system in no way encouraged the Jewish masses either to articulated political demands or act on such demands. The Jews simply waited in silence, resignation and passivity.

But in the 16th and 17th centuries a number of important ideational changes prepared Polish Jewry for an alternate response to their condition. In order to understand this change it will be necessary to enter into a brief discussion concerning the Jewish Mystical tradition.

The Jewish Mystical tradition, the doctrine of which is summarily referred to as "Kabbalah" (Hebrew: literally, "tradition"; colloquially, "receipt"), was confined to a small group of the elect until the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, at which time its transformation into a popular doctrine began. Before the exodus from Spain (which displaced one of the largest and most prosperous Jewish communities of the time,) the Kabbalah was clearly not a Messianic doctrine: "The Kabbalists concentrated all their mental and emotional powers not upon the Messianic end of the world, upon the closing stage of the unfolding universe, but rather upon its beginning...Redemption was to be achieved not by storming onward in an attempt to hasten historic crises and catastrophes, but rather by retracing the path that leads to the primordial beginnings of...the world-process" (65, p. 245).

The exiles from Spain wended their way to the Turkish East and a "Community of the Devout" was established in Safed, Palestine. Safed soon became the world center of Jewish mystical speculation: moreover, it was here that ideas necessary for the outbreak of Sabbateanism were developed. The most notable Kabbalist of Safed was Isaac Luria and, despite our own lack of qualification

to enter into an exegetical discussion concerning his doctrine, it would do us to well to consider several of the more important facets of his thought.

First, the catastrophe of the expulsion from Spain incurred a radical transformation in Kabbalistic doctrine in which the attempt to return to Creation became only a means towards the precipitation of the apocalypse. "Tikkun" (Hebrew: "correction" or "perfection"), the act of striving for the perfection of the world, was thus developed as a weapon for the destruction of evil and the encouragement of redemption. "To summon up and to release all the forces capable of hastening the "End" became...the chief aim of the mystics. The messianic doctrine, previously the concern of those interested in apologetics, was made for a time the subject of an aggressive propoganda" (65, p. 247). Second, suffering in the unredeemed state of Exile was not subdued, but rather excited: "There was a passionate desire to break down the exile by enhancing its torments, savouring its bitterness to the utmost...and summoning up the compelling force of the repentance of a whole community" (65, p. 250). Third, the doctrine of metempsychosis (transmigration of the soul) stresses that the outcast soul is the most tragic fate of man possible, thus mirroring the state of physical Exile.

The sense of tragic suffering, combined with the excited desire to escape this predicament and the belief in man's ability and responsibility to hasten this escape are the three most important facets of the development of the Kabbalah in Safed from our point of view. There can be little doubt that these elements developed as a result of the exigencies attendant upon the Inquisition and expulsion from Spain: but even more to the point, the communication of these articulations had an important bearing on the later developments which are our direct concern.

Initially, the disciples of Luria did little to spread his doctrine. A large number of books belonging to one Hayyim Vital - one of Luria's discip-

les - were, however, secretly copied in Safed in 1587, and subsequently circ-
ulated within Palestine. The doctrine was internationalized between 1592 and
1598 by Israel Sarug, who actively propagandized among Italian Kabbalists.
Later, Abraham Cohen Herrera, writing in Spanish, injected a Platonic element
into Sarug's interpretation of Luria. Herrera's work was subsequently trans-
lated into Hebrew and Latin (1677). The writings of Luria and his school were
circulated in manuscript form in Poland in the 17th century, where they found
soil particularly fertile for their growth.

We would contend that the changes effected in Kabbalistic doctrine and
their subsequent communication during this period amounted to a necessary con-
dition for the outbreak of Sabbateanism in the mid-17th century. As we shall
see, the Sabbatean doctrine represented a new configuration of elements which
derived in large measure from the Lurianic Kabbalah.

When Sigismund Augustus died in 1572 a new system for selecting the king
was established by which the Shlachta were enfranchised to elect their ruler.
Initially this arrangement continued the previous policy of relative liberal-
ism towards the Jews. However, by the time the second king was elected by the
Shlachta the Polish masses were so affected by the ideas of Catholic reaction
that the king, Stephen Batory, was forced to extend his patronage to the Jes-
uits. The activities of the Jesuits effected a spread in clericalistic attit-
udes throughout the regime. Their policy was "to eradicate Protestantism, to
oppress the Greek Orthodox "peasant church", and to reduce the Jews to the
level of an ostracized caste of outlaws" (15, p. 91).

By the third decade of the 17th century the king (Vladislav IV) was forced
to side now with one estate, now with another. The events of 1642-1646 are ex-
emplary of this vacillation. In 1642 he permitted the Jews of Cracow to en-

gage freely in the export trade. Two months later he rescinded his permission at the urging of the Christian merchants of Cracow. Particularly important was a law instituted in 1646 which forbade the Jews entry into petty trade in many cities. This policy effected a substantial rise in the price of necessarry commodities, and the Shlachta successfully petitioned the king to repeal the prohibition for the city of Vilna. However, the kings's compliance was only partial for he imposed a number of additional restrictions on the Jews at the urging of the Vilna municipality.

In 1643 the Polish government instituted a particularly devestating piece of legislation which fixed the rate of profit permissible for various sectors of the population. Indigenous Christians were permitted a profit rate of 7%; foreigners were permitted a rate of 5%; and Jews were allowed 3%. The Jewish merchant was thus forced to lower the quality of his merchandise in order to undersell his competitors. This undermining of Christian trade could only incur the wrath of the Christian merchants.

However, it was not only in the political and economic spheres that the Jews began to experience exigencies. In the early 30's anti-Jewish riots broke out in Vilna, Brest and other cities. Later in the same decade a number of "ritual murder trials" were held: upon the disappearance or unexplained death of a Christian child, the Christian populace would often claim that Jews had killed the child for ritual purposes, resulting in the trial of the accused Jew. Such trials were held in 1636 and 1639, and succeeded in implanting anti-Jewish prejudices all the more deeply in the minds of the Christians. Finally, in 1635 in Cracow, a Jew was accused of stealing some church vessels. After severe torture the Jew admitted to having committed the theft, despite incontrevertible evidence to the contrary. His conviction led to rioting in which forty Jews were seized by a Christian mob. Seven of these were drowned

by the mob while the remainder saved their lives by converting to Christianity.

In the Ukraine the Jews were in an especially insecure position. The large estates in that area were the propoerty of Polish absentee landlords and were worked by the local Ukrainian peasants. The Jews managed these estates for the Polish landlords, collecting taxes and running the profitable liquor trade on their behalf. But the cleavages between the Jews, Ukrainians and Poles were not only of a national and class character for, whereas the Ukrainians were of the Greek Orthodox faith, the Poles were Catholic. Thus, the Jews were caught between Ukrainian and Pole, Greek Orthodox and Catholic, peasant and landowner. By virtue of this precarious position they were soon to experience the final set of exigencies which led to the emergence of the Sabbatean movement.

The Ukrainian peasants were organized into companies of Cossacks: in this they were encouraged by both the Tatar invasions and the Polish government's desire to protect the borders of the Empire. In the spring of 1648, during the reign of Vladislav IV, a rebellion broke out in the Ukraine led by one Bogdan Chmielnicki. Chmielnicki, inciting the Ukrainian peasants to rebel against their Polish and Jewish oppressors, organized military companies, entered a compact with the Khan of the Crimea and enlisted the aid of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The latter two groups moved to the Ukrainian border in April, 1648, and between May 6th and May 15th inflicted a severe defeat on the Polish army. This defeat encouraged the entire populace of the eastern bank of the Dnieper to rise in rebellion. "The...peasants and town dwellers left their homes, and, organizing themselves into bands, devestated the estates... slaying their owners as well as the...Jewish arendars. In the towns of Pereyslav, Piryatin, Lokhvitz, Lubny, and the surrounding country, thousands of

Jews were barbarously killed, and their property was either destroyed or pillaged. The rebels allowed only those to survive who embraced the Greek Orthodox faith" (15, p. 145).

Later in May, KingVladislav died and six months of unrest followed in which rebellion spread over the whole Ukraine as well as Volhynia and Podolia. One Russian historian describes the scene thusly: "Killing was accompanied by barbarous tortures; the victims were flayed alive, split asunder, clubbed to death, roasted on coals, or scalded with boiling water. Even infants at the breast were not spared. The most terrible cruelty, however, was shown towards Jews. They were destined to utter annihilation, and the slightest pity shown to them was looked upon as treason. Scrolls of the Law were taken out of the synagogues by the Cossacks, who danced on them while drinking whiskey. After this Jews were laid down upon them, and butchered without mercy. Thousands of Jewish infants were thrown into wells, or buried alive" (quoted in (15), pp. 145-146). The rebellious peasants soon spread into White Russia and Lithuania, creating the same havoc in their wake.

Chmielnicki, desirous of Ukrainian incorporation into the Muscovite Empire, entered negotiations with Tzar Alexis Michaelovich. In 1654, Moghilev was captured, Vilna a year later. The expulsion or extermination of the Jews occured concomitantly.

Between 1655 and 1658 Sweden attacked Poland as well. The Jews, supporting the Swedish invaders since they were spared their lives by the Swedes, were charged with disloyalty by the Poles who, in 1656, vented their fury on the Jews. "Nearly all the Jewish communities in the province of Posen, and those in the provinces of Kalish, Cracow, and Piotrkov, were destroyed by the saviours of the Polish fatherland" (15, p. 156). In 1658, after huge concessions to Russian and Sweden, Poland was able to restore it political order -

at least until 1697. Between the first outbreaks in 1648 and the beginning of the "restoration" a decade later, seven hundred Jewish communities had been destroyed and approximately half of the Jewish population of Poland had been slaughtered.

The events of 1648-1658 can, then, be inferred to have caused the experience of particularly severe exigencies on the part of the Jewish population of Poland. In comparing their present (1648-1658) position with their past (pre-1648) position in terms of economic well-being, social status, political power, etc., they obviously perceived a set of major discrepancies. It can further be inferred that, despite the salience of these exigencies, the articulation of realistic needs and goals was precluded as a result of their lack of experience with, and inability to conceive of, such a mode of expression. The larger political system had never encouraged articulation and action on their part and their cultural milieu taught them accomodation rather than activism. In our terminology, then, the articulation of realistic needs and goals was "blocked" - i.e., it was inappropriate for the situation. Nevertheless, the salience of the exigencies demanded that a solution to the perceived discrepancies be proposed. A problem situation had arisen.

The type of literature that had become popular among the Jewish masses at this time was derived from the Kabbalah - especially the so-called "Kabbalah ma'asith" (Hebrew: "practical Kabbalah",) which dealt with gruesome stories involving the exploits of demons, the performance of miracles, the transmigration of souls, etc. A writer of the times makes the observation that "there is no country where the Jews are so much given to mystical fantasies, devil hunting, talismans, and exorcism of evil spirits, as they are in Poland" (quoted in (15), pp. 203-204). In this situation it may seem as if it was only necessary for the right leaders to emerge in order for Jewish

frustrations to be channeled into a Messianic movement. However, as is commonly claimed bt students of rebellion (see, for instance (13),) such outbreaks do not normally occur when potential partisans are experiencing such severe exigencies that they can think of little else other than survival: what is necessary is a slight improvement in welfare which enables potential partisans to think not just of surviving, but also of overcoming their predicament. The restoration of 1658, referred to above, offered just such a development.

During and after the massacres of 1648-1658 thousands of Jewish captives were led to Turkey by the Tatars, there to be ransomed. In Smyrna (Turkey) there lived a young Jew by the name of Shabbatai Z'vi, to whom the captives conveyed a horrifying impression of the events in Poland. As early as 1648 Z'vi had regarded himself as the Messiah. But no one took him seriously until, after his return from a visit to Jerusalem, he publicly proclaimed himself as such. This was in 1665. By 1666 "the whole Jewish world resounded with the fame of Shabbatai Z'vi as the Messianic liberator of the Jewish people ...The Jews of Poland /reacted/ with particularly morbid sensitiveness" (15, p. 205).

While in Jerusalem Z'vi had made the acquaintance of Nathan of Gaza, who was then about eighteen years old. Scholem calls Nathan "at once the John the Baptist and the Paul of the new Messiah" (65, p. 295). Their meeting had indeed been propitious for, "had it not been for Nathan of Gaza /Z'vi/ would undoubtedly have remained one of the many anonymous emthusiasts of his generation who, in the years after the great catastrophe of the Chmielnicki persecution in 1648, entertained vague dreams of Messianic vocation, without anybody paying attention to them" (65, p. 294).

Z'vi's leadership functions were primarily the establishment of salient

needs and valent goals - he was the sensitizer and the goal-setter. Nathan, on the other hand, displayed a complementary set of leadership functions - those of specification, justification, application and legitimation. He was the propogandist, the strategist, the "ideologueń, per se. Scholem has this to say about Nathan's functions: "He had all the qualities one misses in Shabbatai Z'vi: tireless activity, originality of theological thought, and abundant productive power and literary ability. He proclaims the Messiah and blazes the trail for him, and at the same time he is by far the most influential theologian of the movement" (65, pp. 295-296). Thus, it was the explosive combination of leaders able to fulfill the articulation and action requisites and a "ready" audience that spelled success for the movement.

As mentioned above, the effects of Z'vi's proclamation were world-wide. The London Stock Exchange offered odds of ten to one that the Jews would establish a kingdom of their own (5, p. 240). The merchant princes of Amsterdam sent letters to Z'vi informing him of their implicit faith in his project (57, p. 311). In Spain, where the fires of the Inquisition were still burning strong, the approaching deliverance was hailed with jubilation. And in Eastern Europe, according to the Ukrainian historian Galatovski, Jews "abandoned their houses and property, refusing to do any work and claiming that the Messiah would soon arrive and carry them on a cloud to Jerusalem, denying food even to their little ones, and during that severe winter bathing in ice-holes, at the same time reciting a recently composed prayer" (quoted in (15), p. 205). Yet another source indicates that young children were united in wedlock "so that they might beget bodies into which the few remaining unborn souls might enter, the last impediment to the Redemption being thereby removed" (57, p. 311).

With the spread of the Sabbatean agitation from the Ukraine to White

Russia a delegation was sent from Poland to Z'vi's residence near Constantinople in order to investigate the accuracy of his claims to the title of Messiah. Z'vi learned from the members of the delegation that a certain Nehemiah Cohen had predicted the coming of the Messiah in Poland, and requested that Cohen come to see him. When Cohen arrived they engaged in a Kabbalistic debate which is said to have lasted a full three days. When the debate was over, Cohen refused to acknowledge Z'vi as the Messiah. In Adrianople Cohen spoke to the Turkish authorities, the result of which was Z'vi's imprisonment. The Sultan offered Z'vi a clear choice - either Z'vi would convert to Islam or the Sultan would have him decapitated. Z'vi chose conversion.

The effects of this conversion were similar to those reported by Festinger, et. al. in Why Prophecy Fails (89). The faithful rationalized that Shabbatai Z'vi had "put on the Turban temporarily in order to gain the confidence of the Sultan and afterwards to dethrone him" (15, p. 207). Thus, rather than lose their faith they became all the more resolute in their convictions, even of the movement subsided for the moment. This rationalization was not without its doctrinal ramifications, however. The actions of the faithful were accompanied by the necessary changes in articulations.

Before turning to considerations regarding the emergent articulations of the Sabbatean movement, it must be recalled that the Lurianic Kabbalah had stressed the suffering of the Exile, the intense expectation of Messianic deliverance and the ability and responsibility of man to hasten this coming. These elements were certainly heightened by the Sabbatean movement, thereby enabling people to carry out their frenzied preparation for the coming Messianic age. However, the emergent articulations did not simply reflect a greater intensity than the old doctrine. Rather, Z'vi's apostasy effectively tore apart the link between the inner (i.e., spiritual) and outer (i.e.,

historical) realms of redemption. In the Lurianic doctrine, **redemption** had
remained primarily a spiritual affair, although not without its historical
aspects. "The Kabbalist laid far greater emphasis on the spiritual nature of
Redemption than on its historical and political aspects. These are by no
means denied or discounted, but they tend more and more to become mere sym-
bols of that mystical and spiritual process" (65, p. 305). The ability of man
to hasten the coming of the Messiah was, in the Lurianic tradition, an **inner**
power - i.e., a power resulting from probing the inner depths of the soul,
a moral "improvement". The regeneration of the nation would come about as a
result of this moral improvement.

With the onset of Sabbateanism it was necessary to somehow rationalize
the intense expectation that the Messianic era was at hand with the contradic-
tory empirical evidence of Z'vi's conversion. Thus, the doctrine which emerged
"tried to bridge the gap between inner experience and the **external reality**
which had ceased to function as its symbol" (65, p. 306). The truss for the
doctrinal bridge was the "tragic paradox" of the apostate Messiah. Thus, Nath-
an of Gaza preached that before the redemption the Messiah must "descend into
the realm of evil": only through the act of apostasy could his mission be ful-
filled.

This last element permitted the development of a theory of antinomianism
at the hands of Abraham Perez, a student of Nathan of Gaza. In 1668, only two
years after Z'vi's apostasy, Perez wrote that whoever remained faithful to the
traditional Jewish law was in fact a sinner. More precisely, the traditional
law is seen as only temporary so that "the facade of orthodoxy is preserved,
although there can be no doubt that the emotional relation to its tenets has
undergone a complete change" (65, p. 313). The injection of this antinomian
element prepared the Sabbatean movement for its total degeneration some ninety

years later.

Despite Z'vi's apostasy in 1666, the Sabbatean movement carried on, al-
though temporarily becalmed. In Poland in 1695, and once again half a dozen
years after that date, Messianic claimants appeared, but with little popular
success. Twice, in 1722 and 1725, an assemply of influential Polish rabbis
pronounced the "herem" (Hebrew: "excommunication") against the members of the
Sabbatean sect. However, such measures proved effective only until 1755 when
a new set of exigencies caused the recrudescence of the movement. One set of
exigencies devolved around a plethora of charges of ritual murder and dese-
cration of Christian sacraments against the Jews. A list of the most outstand-
ing of these trials would include those held in Sandomir (1698-1710); Posen
(1736); Zaslav (1747); Dunaigrod (1748); Pavalochi and Zhytomir (1753);
Yampol (1756); Stupnitza (1759); and Voislavitza (1760). The utterly absurd
nature of these accusations, the torturing of the accused and their frequent
forced conversion to Christianity, forced the Jewish community of Poland to
send a delegation to Pope Clement XIII in Rome. The Pope finally ruled in fav-
our of the Jewish representation but the Papal decree was hardly successful
in preventing further similar occurences.

A second set of exigencies involved further Ukrainian uprisings directed
once again against the Poles and the Jews. Greek Orthodox peasants and Ukrain-
ian and Zaporozhian Cossacks began a number of incursions which soon took the
shape of insurrection. In 1734 and 1750 a number of towns and villages were
destroyed by the rebels in the provinces of Kiev, Volhynia and Podolia. Jew-
ish losses were again heavy. In the words of Dubnow, "the year 1768 was a min-
iature copy of the year 1648" (15, p. 186).

Amidst the frenzy of ritual murder accusations and the re-emergence of

unrest in the Ukraine arose the Frankist sect, an off-shoot of the Sabbatean
movement. David Frank had been born in Podolia "in an atmosphere filled with
Mystic and Messianic fancies and marked by superstition and moral laxity"
(15, p. 212). From 1752 until 1755 he lived in Smyrna and Salonika, where he
came into contact with the members of the local Sabbatean movement. He re-
turned to Podolia in 1755 with a single aim in mind - to become the prophet
and leader of the local Sabbateans. Podolia itself had become rife with un-
rest after the ritual murder trials and the Ukrainian uprisings. Moreover,
it had developed into the center of Sabbateanism in Poland. Thus, when Frank
first appeared in Podolia he was regarded as the reincarnation of Shabbatai
Z'vi and the newly appointed leader of the movement.

During a fair in Podolia Frank and his followers were seen assembled in
an inn holding mystical services and dancing around a nude woman. Upon receiv-
ing this information the Polish authorities banished Frank to Turkey, while
his followers were delivered into the hands of the Kahal authorities. The Ka-
hal authorities were severe in delivering their verdict: they proclaimed a
strict herem against the heretics, forbade all contact with them, prohibitted
the study of Kabbalah before the age of thirty, and the study of Luria's writ-
ings before the age of forty.

The sectarians, however, appeared before the Catholic Bishop Dembovski,
declaring their rejection of the Talmud and the acceptance of the Trinity (com-
prised of God, the Messiah and the Shechinah, the female hypostasis of God.)
Dembovski, anxious to encourage Jewish conversion to Catholicism, published
their confession and ordered the Podolian rabbis to participate in a public
disputation. Following the disputation (which took place in 1757), the Bishop
decided that the rabbis should pay a fine to the Frankists for the outrage
committed them, and simultaneously ordered all copies of the Talmud in Podol-

ia burned. The sectarians, encouraged by the Bishop's action, sent for Frank to return from his exile in Turkey. Upon his return, Frank informed his followers that, just as Shabbatai Z'vi had converted to Islam, so had they to convert to Christianity "as a mere stepping-stone to the faith of the true Messiah" (15, p. 216). Moreover, his return so encouraged the faithful that they lent the weight of their testimony to the ritual murder trials which were agitating the whole of Poland.

After a second public disputation in 1759 the sectarians were called upon to indicate their acceptance of Christianity through immediate mass conversion. With Frank's words concerning the necessity for such a move as instrumental in hastening the Messianic era still echoing in their ears, they readily acceded to the demands of the Church. However, the clergy soon found out that the conversion was an act of hypocrisy, conducted not out of true love for the Cross, but in order to achieve the Messianic goals of the sect. Consequently, Frank was arrested in 1760 and imprisoned by Church authorities. From the time of Frank's imprisonment until 1772, the esteem in which Frank's followers held him soared, for now Frank represented the "suffering Messiah", as he should do according to doctrine. However, when Frank left Poland for Moravia after his release in 1772, and especially after his death in 1791, the sect began to disintegrate rapidly.

In doctrinal matters the Sabbatean sect had split over the issue of the tragic paradox of the apostate Messiah. The "moderates" claimed that only the Messiah himself need descend into the unspeakable evil of conversion in order to hasten the onset of the Messianic era. The "radicals", on the other hand, "could not bear the thought of remaining content with passive belief in the paradox of the Messiah's mission" (65, p. 315). Rather, they viewed the conversion of the Messianic claimant as a signal for their own apostasy. The

Frankists thus espoused the holiness of sin, a fact which explains not only their apostasy, but also their nihilistic license. Scholem, in comparing the Frankists with the Carpocration Gnostics("regarded as the most outstanding representatives of this libertine and nihilistic form of gnosis,") asserts that "nothing that is known of /the Carpocration Gnostics/ touched the resolute spirit of the gospel of antinomianism preached by Jacob Frank to his disciples...The ideas he adduced in support of his teachings constitute not so much a theory as a veritable religious myth of nihilism" (65, p. 316). Needless to say, this ran counter to everything that had ever been taught in Jewish moral thought, indicating the radical alteration of ideas made possibble by the experience of severe exigencies and the failure of emergent manifest interest groups to succeed in the implementation of their goals.

In this brief overview of the Sabbatean movement we have endeavoured to analyze its genesis and subsequent development through the use of the framework proposed in the preceding chapters. In defining the "context" of the movement we have attempted to underline the importance of four factors: (a) the structural location of the manifest interest group, (b) the orientation to politics displayed by its membership, (c) the mode of identification expressed by its membership, and (d) the cultural reservoir of beliefs, symbols and values from which new configurations of ideas were developed. This contextual description led us to the conclusion that the experience of exigencies could not in this case have resulted in the development of political articulation and action. This "postdiction" was, moreover, borne out by the historical events, the articulations and action, which followed the experience of exigencies, as were our postdictions regarding the conditions necessary for the emergence of Messianic ideation.

The Sabbatean movement failed to remove the sources of exigencies through environmental (e.g., political or economic) change. It also failed to bring the onset of the Messianic era for its adherents. And yet, the articulations and actions which made up the movement were, to a degree, successfully institutionalized. By translating Messianic expectations from simple yearnings into a form of active encouragement, Sabbateanism was responsible for adding the notion of activism to the modern political-cultural heritage of the Jews. Moreover, the reaction against the Sabbatean heresy formed a new "carrier" of the Messiah idea. This reaction was the Chasidic revival, which we will have more to say about in the following chapter.

In Chapter Four we attempt a somewhat more detailed analysis of an ideological innovation which occured some two centuries after the Sabbatean movement began - an innovation achieved by the same ethnic group in the same geographic location, but in vastly altered circumstances, and hence with very different results.

Chapter Four : The Emergence of Zionism

A. The Reactive Moment

With the third partition of Poland in 1795, Polish Jewry first entered
the realm of Russian control. They were confined to the westernmost area of
the Russian Empire - an area that came to be known as the Pale of Settlement
(See map, p. 63). Later legislative enactments defined the boundaries of the
Pale precisely, and stringently enforced the residence restrictions so that
by the fourth quarter of the 19th century over 4,000,000 Jews lived within
its 362,000 square mile area.

From the point of view of the Jewish populace of the Pale in about 1875,
the ideational and ideological milieu can conveniently be viewed as a mosaic
comprised of four major themes, or orientations. The first of these (and un-
doubtedly the most extensive in terms of the sheer number of people it affect-
ed as well as the intensity of its influence) was the system of beliefs, sym-
bols and values contained within the orthodox religious tradition. In the
none-too-harsh words of Dubnow: "Life was dominated by rigidly conservative
principles" (16, p. 112). The quietist orientation was again dominant: severe
negative sanctions were employed to deal with deviations from custom; the
mental energy of most men was, despite their impoverishment, invested in ard-
uous Talmudic study; and even the Chasidic "revolt" of the early part of the
century had become stagnant. This last point deserves some further elabora-
tion since the influence of Chasidism on the lives of the Jews was twofold.
Chasidism was, as we saw earlier, a form of religious revivalism which emerged
as a reaction to the Sabbatean heresy of the late 18th century. Predicated
on the notion that "God is in everything" this new form of Jewish mysticism
was anti-intellectual (and therefore anti-Rabbinic) and, compared to its pre-

THE PALE 1835-1917

0	200
	Miles

Baltic Sea

⊙St.Petersburg

1891. 2,000 Jews deported, many of them in chains

1865. Open to Jews

⊙Moscow

1891. 20,000 Jews expelled

VITEBSK

KOVNO

GERMANY

SUWALKI

VILNA

PLOCK

LOMZA

MOGILEV

WARSAW

KALISZ

SYEDLITZ

GRODNO

MINSK

PIOTRKOW

RADOM

LUBLIN

CHERNIGOV

KIELCE

VOLHYNIA

Brody ○

Kiev ○

POLTAVA

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

KIEV

PODOLIA

EKATERINOSLAV

BESSARABIA

KHERSON

RUMANIA

Nikolaev ⊙

TAURIDA

Sebastopol ⊙ ○ Yalta

Black Sea

Principal town from which in 1880 began the exodus of over two million Jews from the Pale to the United States, Britain, Europe, South America, and Palestine

In 1882 500,000 Jews living in rural areas of the Pale were forced to leave their homes and live in towns or townlets (shtetls) in the Pale. 250,000 Jews living along the western frontier of Russia were also moved into the Pale. 700,000 Jews living east of the Pale were driven into the Pale by 1891

☐ The Pale of Settlement. Russian Jews confined to this area by laws of 1795 and 1835. By 1885 there were over 4 million Jews living in the Pale

⊙ Towns within the Pale barred to Jews without special residence permits

decessor, less damaging to the Jewish tradition. Its uniqueness was established
on the basis of two elements. In the first place, it managed to act as a car-
rier of the Messiah idea, not through activism (as in the Sabbatean heresy),
but rather through a return to Lurianic precepts. That is, Chasidism was less
concerned with the historical and political complement of redemption than it
was with the inner, spiritual component. Moreover, it was an emminently pop-
ular movement, spreading its "doctrine" in simple, yet colourful aphorisms
(65, pp. 325-350). Despite its popularity and vivacity, however, it had lost
its elan within three-quarters of a century, primarily as a result of the
"Tzaddikim" (Hebrew: "righteous ones") who capitalized in an opportunistic
manner on their role as putative miracle workers. To the extent that Chasid-
ism entailed a revolt against orthodox Rabbinism it demonstrated the possib-
ility of rebellion; paradoxically, to the extent that it had stagnated, it
was **one of the causes of a** reaction against the religious tradition in toto.

Whereas orthodox Rabbinism and stagnant Chasidism informed the lives of
the Jewish masses, ideational and ideological rumblings came to be heard more
and more distinctly among the members of the elite who managed to receive a
secular education. These rumblings were of some significance for, despite
their small numbers, it was the members of the Jewish intelligentsia who were
to exercise the most decisive influence on the emergent ideologies of the
1880's and 18890's. It was amongst the intelligentsia that the second import-
ant ideational orientation emerged - that of the "Haskalah" (Hebrew: "en-
lightenment). The Haskalah, as a liberal intellectual movement, had begun
not in Eastern Europe, but rather in the post-French Revolution West, where
the emancipation of the Jews led to the development of a novel response to
the problem of ethnic identity. The "Maskilim" (Hebrew: "enlightened ones")
of Western Europe came to believe that they owed their allegiance primarily
to the State in which they resided, and not the Jewish people. Their relig-

ion was viewed as a private affair: as the foremost German spokesman of the movement (Moses Mendelsohn) put it: "I am a Jew in my home, but a German in the street". This attitude represents a radical departure from the traditional Jewish view of allegiances and identifications. Moreover, it was accompanied with a desire for secularization and a strong sense of disdain for the "backward" Jewish tradition. But here again we confront a paradox of considerable importance for, although the Haskalah was an assimilationist movement from one perspective, preaching the civic and cultural integration of the Jews with the surrounding community, it also prompted what Sachar calls a "conscious cultivation of Jewish nationalism" (60, p. 262). This was especially true of the Eastern European Haskalah in which, under the influence of Russian Populism and the memory of the Chasidic revolt, a spirit of popular national activity was generated (70, p. 434). The intellectual influence of the Haskalah was effected primarily by the emergent "Science of Judaism", a rather ambitious rubric which entailed the "non-spiritual" (or, more accurately, "less spiritual") study of Jewish philosophy, history, etc. Thus, a Galician Maskil known as Nachman Krochmal, greatly influenced by German idealism, pointed to the role of the Jewish nation standing outside of the evolution and decline of civilizations as an indication of Divine Providence. Krochmal's studies displayed to the Jews their national heritage, inculcating pride in what had previously been accepted as mundane by subsuming religion within the larger category of nation.

Adjacent to Krochmal's Galicia was the Russian province of Podolia. This geographical propinquity allowed Isaac Baer Levinsohn, a Podolian, to associate with Krochmal and his colleagues. Enamoured with the notion of Haskalah, Levinsohn soon became the "Russian Mendelsohn" (16, p. 127). But this was in the first quarter of the 19th century. As the decades passed, Enlightenment came

to play an increasingly prominent part in the thought of the Jewish intellig-
entsia, despite Rabbinic and Chasidic opposition. The liberal beginnings's of
Alexander II's reign (1855), with which we shall be concerned at a later
point - provided a crucial catalyst for the rush to Enlightenment. Dubnow is
worth quoting at length with reference to this last point: "In the inner,
cultural life of Russian Jewry a radical break took place during this period
...The rapidity and intensity of /the Jewish intelligentsia's/ spiritual
transformation may well be compared with the stormy eve of Jewish emancipa-
tion in Germany. This wild rush for spiritual regeneration was out of all
proportion to the snail-like tardiness and piecemeal character of civil e-
mancipation in Russia. However, the modern history of Western Europe shows
more than once that such pre-emancipation periods, including those that ev-
idently prove abortive, offer the most favourable conditions for all kinds
of mental and cultural revolutions. Liberty as a hope invariably arouses
greater enthusiasm for self-rejuvenation than liberty as a fact, when the
romanticism of the unknown has vanished" (16, p. 206).

The yearning for Russification; the study of Darwin, Spencer, Pisarev
and Chernyshevsky; governmental inducements for the rejection of the orthod-
ox tradition; the fructification of a Jewish periodical press - all of these
factors led to a dogged fight against obscurantism - a fight which even in-
cluded complicity with the Russian police. The Haskalah was particularly pro-
nounced in the literature of the time. Thus, Abraham Mapu published a novel
in 1853 entitled "Ahavat Tzion" (Hebrew: "Love of Zion") which depicted the
dawn of the Jewish nation in ancient Judaea. Such a return to ancient nation-
al sources was lauded by the Enlightened.

It is important to point out that the Haskalah was an intellectual move-
ment whose membership was comprised primarily of the upper middle class intel-

ligentsia. Its middle class roots can be seen both in its general outlook and in some of the more subdued interests it displayed. Sachar remarks: "Virtually all of the pioneering humanists came from wealthy merchant families... /Thus the Maskilim/ urged the Jews to productivize themselves, move into useful, dignified livelihoods. Actually, the "productivization" of the Jewish masses was directly in the interest of the rising Jewish capitalist class; for the impoverished non-productive peddlers and hawkers, who dominated the population of the Pale, were a handicap to the expansion of the internal market" (60, p. 201).

The middle and lower middle class intelligentsia, on the other hand, became involved in the third important cultural orientation - that of the Russian Populist ideology. The defeat of Napoleon at the hands of the Russian army early in the century had led to the rise of a patriotic movement comprised primarily of Russian officers. Despite the reformist character of this movement it was instrumental in the development of Populism due to the nationalist fervour it evoked. After 1825 (and the failure of the Decembrist revolt), when the Russian intelligentsia was very much under the sway of the German idealists Schelling, Fichte, Kant and Hegel, one can detect the emergence of a Slavophilic view of society as based on the Orthodox Christian Church and the Russian peasant commune, or "mir". As Aksakov saw it: "The mir is in its essence the sovereign, supreme manifestation of the people, which fully satisfies all the demands of legality, of social justice, of a communal court, and, in sum, the will of the commune" (2, p. 81).

The ferment created by the Crimean War (1853-1856) was followed by Alexander II's liberal regime: interestingly, "the revolutionary movement among the intelligentsia began precisely at the height of the liberal reforms" (56, p. 167), which included the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. But this intel-

ligentsia was not the same as the officers' reformist group of the 20's and
30's in terms of its composition. Rather, it was comprised of members of
mixed social origin ("raznochintsy"): and it was from this new intelligent-
sia that Populism arose. In 1862 Herzen issued his famous call, "narodnich-
estvo" (Russian: "to the people"); 1866 saw the attempted assasination of the
Czar by a member of the revolutionary movement; in the 1870's the revolution-
ary group "Zemlia i Volia" (Russian: "Land and Liberty") was formed. The ex-
tremists were guided by Pisarev's nihilistic ideology and then by the true
founders of the Russian Populist movement - Herzen, Dobrolyubov and Cherny-
shevsky - who urged a peasant uprising against the Czarist regime in order to
procure the immediate achievement of a communist state. Nor can one fail to
mention the anarchist Bakunin whose ideal was "an organization of society
through a free federation of workers' associations...at first on the level of
the commune, then as a regional federation of communes, followed by the fed-
eration of regions into nations and of nations into one brotherly Interna-
tional" (9, pp. 87-89).

But the peasantry proved to be unreceptive to Populism, at least in terms
of the revolutionary "applications" it espoused. By the 1880's the movement
"to the people" had virtually ended, but not before the People's Will party
had assasinated the Czar in 1881, and not without its ideological repercus-
sions.

Although we will deal with Jewish participation in the Populist movement
at a later point and at greater length, it serves to mention at this point
the appeal which Populism had for those Jewish youths who had a secular educa-
tion. They were motivated in their participation in large, but not dispropor-
tionately large, numbers by the general political reaction in the Russia of
the 1870's. They identified themselves with the Russian, as opposed to the

Jewish nation. "It seems impossible to extract any specifically Jewish motives which actuated these revolutionaries, except in the most general and indirect sense: if liberty were achieved for the whole of Russia, the Jews among others would benefit. Indeed, the most striking feature of the Jew in the revolutionary movement at this period is the extent to which his whole mode of action and thought became assimilated to a specifically Russian form and tradition, even in some cases a Christian tradition" (64, p. 153). Thus, one of the founders of Land and Liberty, Mark Natanson, was a Jew. Another, Aaron Zundelvich, was a member of the executive committee. Hesya Helfmann, a Jewess, was among the several Jews who received the death sentence for the assasination of the Czar. The Jews, then, played an important rôle in propoganda, organizing and terrorism.

The fourth important cultural orientation did not begin to exert its influence on the Jewish intelligentsia until the 1870's. This orientation was Marxist ideology. The decade after the publication of the first Russian edition of Marx's Das Kapital in 1872 saw what Chernov called a "Marxist craze" amoung the young. This was scarcely any wonder for, during the last half of the 70's, Czarist repression effectively ended the Populist movement. At the same time, the peasants proved to be unreceptive to certain important aspects of the Populist ideology. In the words of Pushkarev: "The peasantry, of course, did not object to the idea of redistribution of land, but they awaited the order for redistribution to come from the Czar, and to the horror of their mentors, they showed an inclination toward private ownership of land" (56, p. 181).

One of the most significant differences between Populism and Marxism devolved around the problem of the economic development of Russia. Whereas the Populists "rejected the idea that Russia could achieve socialism only by pas-

sing through the stage of capitalist development...⟨The Marxists⟩ argued that Russia had entered the path of capitalist development to the full extent, and that it consequently must fulfill all the stages of development that constitute the Marxian scheme" (56, pp. 192-193). A second difference between the two ideologies was their respective views concerning the revolutionary agent: whereas Populism looked solely to the Peasantry, the Marxist looked to the urban proletariat.

Marxism served in part as an ideological surrogate for the Jews previously involved in the largely unsuccessful Populist movement. Thus, both the motivation for entry and the class origin of the entrants was more or less constant over the two movements. However, there were a number of additional attraction which Marxism contained. In the first place, it was difficult for the Jews to identify with a Slavophilic movement and much easier to identify with the global proletariat. Marxism was, after all, a cosmopolitan Western ideology so that the Jews were likely to find it quite palatable along that dimension. Secondly, Marxism contained a "Messianic" flavour with which the Jews were well acquainted. To quote Talmon: "The totalitarian democratic school...is based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics. It may be called political Messianism in the sense that it postulates a preordained, harmonious, and perfect scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven and at which they are bound to arrive" (68, p. 52).

Thus far we have endeavoured to sketch the rough outlines of the cultural and political cultural environment from which Zionism emerged. We have focused primarily on the political orientations and patterns of identification attendant upon, as well as the class basis of recruitment into, participation in the various ideational and ideological orientations. Figure Two on page 71, although based solely on descriptive historical data (and there-

fore perhaps overly-impressionistic) summarizes our argument thus far.

Figure Two. Characteristics of the Four, Major Ideational and Ideological
Orientations of pre-1881 Russian Jewry

orientation	socio-economic class origin of membership	political orientations	identification with...
Rabbinism and Chasidism	lower class, middle class	conservative, passive, seclusionist	Jewish people
Haskalah	high class, upper middle class intelligentsia	liberal, active, assimilationist	the "host" nation and the Jewish people
Populism	middle class intelligentsia, lower middle class intelligentsia	revolutionary	Russian peasantry
Marxism	middle class intelligentsia, lower middle class intelligentsia	revolutionary	international proletariat

Given the cultural/political-cultural milieu described above, what struc-
tural position did the Jews occupy? In particular, out of what sort of demo-
graphic and economic conditions did Zionism emerge?

By 1897 the Jewish population of Russia was close to 5,000,000, having
quintupled since the beginning of the century. Figure Three on page 72 illus-
trates this rapid growth by region. Although we do not possess complete data,
Figure Three clearly indicates rapid population growth both in absolute num-
bers and in relation to the general population. However, it can also be seen
that there was a marked decrease in the growth rate over the span of the cent-
ury. In fact, one source (60, p. 188) indicates that the Jewish population in-
creased 325% in the first half of the 19th century, but only 60% in the second

Figure Three. Growth of Jewish Population of Russia by Region (1816-1897)

year	nine western provinces	Poland	New Russia	Poltava and Chernigov
1816	-	212,000 (7.8%)	-	-
1844	-	-	95,305 (3.0%)	-
1847	947,753 (9.3%)	-	-	-
1860	-	598,100 (12.4%)	-	-
1880	-	1,004,282 (14.1%)	368,567 (7.4%)	-
1881	2,291,272 (16.9%)	-	-	-
1890	-	1,134,268 (13.7%)	-	-
1897	2,622,553 (13.4%)	1,321,100 (14.1%)	730,278 (8.9%)	225,396 (4.5%)

N.B. (a) The figures in brackets represent the percentage of Jews relative
        to the total population.
     (b) The "nine western provinces" include Vilna, Vitebsk, Volhynia,
        Grodno, Kiev, Kovno, Minsk, Mohilever, and Podolia.
     (c) "Poland" includes the provinces of Kalisz, Piotrkow, Kielce, Radom,
        Lublin, Syedlitz, Warsaw, Plock, Lomza, and Suwalki.
     (d) "New Russia" includes the provinces of Bessarabia, Taurida, Ekater-
        inoslav, and Kherson.
     (e) Data from (38, pp. 31-35). Author's translation.

half. The two immediate reasons for this drop can be inferred from descrip-
tive historical accounts. The first (and definitely the less important of the
two) was the number of Jewish deaths caused by the pogroms of 1881-1884 (to
be discussed in the second section of the present chapter). The second was
the relatively large Jewish migration from Russia which began during the pog-
rom period.[15] In the 81 years from 1800 to 1880 Jews emigrated from Russia
at the average rate of 3,000 per annum. This figure rose sharply in the fol-
lowing 19 years, the per annum rate rising to nearly 23,000 according to one
source (60, p. 306) or 50,000 according to a second source (59, p. 45).

Before 1881 migration among Russian Jewry was predominantly internal:

the legal restrictions and the mass expulsions during this period forced both rural Jews and Jews living in the interior of Russia towards the cities of the Pale. The following table illustrates the urbanization pattern over the 19th century.

Figure Four. Urban Jewish Population in the Pale in the 19th Century for Cities with a Population over 10,000

year	Russian Pale	Polish Pale	total	% of total Jewish population of Pale
1800	75,055	-	-	-
1850	229,257	89,022	418,409	12%
1897	1,136,613	447,911	1,584,524	35%

N.B. (a) All figures are approximate.

(b) "Russian Pale" includes the provinces of Vilna, Vitebsk, Volhynia, Grodno, Kiev, Kovno, Minsk, Mohilever, Podolia, Poltava, Chernigov, Bessarabia, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav, and Kherson.

(c) "Polish Pale" includes the provinces of Kalisz, Piotrkow, Kielce, Radom, Lublin, Syedlitz, Warsaw, Plock, Lomza, and Suwalki.

(d) Data from (38, pp. 71-77) and (58, p. 490). Author's translation.

Whereas in 1897 approximately 35% of the total Jewish population of the Pale lived in cities with a population of more than 10,000, 13% lived in cities of less than 10,000; 33% in towns; and only 18% in villages (38, p. 43). Using what is perhaps a more revealing (although poorly defined) set of categories, 77.8% of the total Jewish population of the Pale were "urban" in 1897, while 22.2% were "rural" (58, p. 493).

In order to understand the role of the three, interconnected demographic trends described above (urbanization, migration and population growth) in terms of their consequences for the collective experience of exigencies, it is important that we consider them within their economic context.

Although by the beginning of the 19th century we can detect the begin-
nings of increased social differentiation and economic differentiation among
the Jews of the Pale, they still represented a fairly homogeneous sector of
the general population. Thus, the Russian census of 1818 shows that in the
Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania together, the Jewish labour force was com-
prised of 86.5% "businessmen" (i.e., merchants, peddlers, hawkers, etc., for
the most part), 11.6% artisans and 1.9% farmers (37, p. 195). But in the
course of the 19th century we witness the erosion of the feudal structure and
the onset of the process of capitalization - a process entailing several im-
portant repercussions for the Jews. First, the Russian populace began to com-
pete more vigorously with the Jewish businessmen. Second, new industrial cen-
ters began to replace the old, feudal trade centers. Thus, even before the
restrictive legislation and pogroms of the 80's and 90's the Jews were being
crowded out of their old economic and geographic positions. Urbanization and
productivization were (in addition to emigration and pogrom-inflicted death)
also responsible for the decreased growth rate of the Jewish population in the
second half of the 19th century (36, pp. 215-216). These factors were, in ad-
dition, responsible for Jewish proletarianization - i.e., the entry of Jews
into the field of productive labour. It is interesting to note that the prol-
etarianization process was, generally speaking, remarkably different for Jews
and non-Jews, for "whereas the non-Jewish blacksmith or peasant found his way
into the factory or the mine, the Jewish proletarianized masses flowed into
small industries producing consumer goods" (37, p. 201). The proletarian Jew-
ish elements were for the most part restricted to the artisan class even at
the end of the century: in 1898 two-thirds to three-quarters of all artisans
in the Pale were Jews (63, pp. 190-192) although the Jewish population of the
Pale represented only 11.6% of the total population of that area (38, p. 42).

A more precise occupational breakdown is presented in Figure Five, below.

Figure Five. Number and per cent of Jews and non-Jews in the Russian Empire and the Pale of Settlement Engaged in Each Group of Gainful Occupations in 1897 (Figures for Pale only in brackets)

occupational category	non-Jews	per cent	Jews	per cent
agriculture	18,204,676 (6,032,875)	60.5 (63.2)	40,611 (38,538)	2.9 (2.9)
professional service	916,863 (250,472)	3.0 (2.6)	71,950 (67,238)	5.0 (5.1)
personal service	4,872,546 (1,889,903)	16.2 (19.8)	277,466 (250,078)	19.4 (18.8)
manufacturing and mechanic- al pursuits	4,627,336 (1,068,675)	15.4 (11.2)	542,563 (508,844)	37.9 (37.9)
transportation	668,801 (167,806)	2.2 (1.8)	45,944 (44,177)	3.2 (3.3)
commerce	804,137 (129,454)	2.7 (1.4)	452,193 (426,628)	31.6 (32.0)

N.B. Data from (58, pp. 500-501).

The demographic and economic developments outlined above inevitably involved what can only be described as the pauperization of the Jews. Both the overabundance of Jewish artisans and increased competition between Jewish merchants and the invigorated Russian mercantile class gave rise to sixteen hour workdays, meagre wages, seasonal employment and abject poverty for the Jews. Of course, a small number of Jews (especially in the Russian interior) had managed to become economically powerful: in railroad construction, banking and the liquor trade Jews were particularly prominent (14). But for the Jewish masses, Maurice Samuel's comment remains accurate: "the richest Jew could be bought out on the lower margin of four figures" (61, p. 26).

B. The Proactive Moment: The Nature and Salience of Exigencies (1855-1897)

The demographic **changes** described above were no doubt instrumental in
the dissolution of the traditional Jewish social structure for, as Sorokin
has pointed out, mobility, both vertical and horizontal, "is a factor which
shortens the longevity of a culture complex, weakens its continuity and fac-
ilitates its disintegration and through this, the long existence of a soc-
iety or social institution" (90, p. 597). Moreover, the economic changes re-
ferred to can be inferred to have had "exigential" repercussions for the urb-
anized and pauperized Jewish masses by about the 1860's. To understand this
second point better it is necessary to consider the fact that the period from
1855 to 1863 was, in many respects, a period of improving welfare and rising
expectations for many Jews.

The accession of Alexander II in 1855 entailed a transition in govern-
mental policy which had wide-ranging implications for the Jews of the Pale.
However, it would be mistaken to construe the liberal attitudes of the regime
towards the Jews as a simple gesture of humanitarianism: rather, two distinct
interests informed the policy shift. The first of these was the desire for a
unified Russia. The second was the need for economic development. The first
interest lead to the easing of certain legal restrictions which had prevented
Jewish integration with the surrounding Russian populace. The second led to a
policy of "assimilation by seduction" in which the regime offered inducements
to "useful" Jews. Thus, in 1856 the law (enacted in 1827) which forced Jewish
children to serve from 25 to 31 years in the Czar's army was rescinded. Later
that same year some civil rights were extended to the Jews. In 1859 Jewish
capitalists were permitted to reside in the Russian interior. This was extend-
ed to professionals in 1861, artisans, merchants and distillers in 1865 and
veteran soldiers in 1867. Within the Pale itself the cities of Nicholayev and

Sevastopol were opened for Jewish residence, and Jews were permitted to acquire land in rural districts.

Certainly one of the most consequential aspects of the early liberal policies of Alexander was the opening up of high and preparatory schools to Jewish children. Even the "official" (i.e., governmentally-run) schools established during Nicholas' reign were touched by the new spirit: "In 1867 their Christian inspectors were replaced by Jews, and in 1873 the entire system of official schools was reorganized" (73, p. 411). The previously mentioned intense desire on the part of most of the Jewish intelligentsia for Russification was further invigorated by the extension of loans and scholarships to Jewish students by the Russian government.

Meanwhile, in Russian-held Poland, the Polish inhabitants were not reconciled to their loss of national independence. In 1863 a rebellion broke out in Poland and soon spread to Lithuania and the Western Russian provinces. The immediate consequence of this rebellion was a reversal of the eight year long policy of liberalism. Clearly, the period preceding 1863 was one of rising desires and expectations on the part of the Jews, as opposed to the situation of nearly constant desires and expectations preceding the 1648 Chmielnicki massacres. "Aspirational deprivations" were soon to give rise to a problem situation.

The cry of the Christian mercantile class (which accused the emergent Jewish plutocracy of economic exploitation) received a sympathetic hearing in Russian governmental circles, so that by the end of the 1870's the government's attitude toward the Jews had returned to its pre-1855 mode. There can be little doubt that this reaction was stimulated by the publication and distribution of two anti-Semitic books entitled The Book of the Kahal (1869) and Concerning the Use of Christian Blood by the Jews (1876). But

the occurence of a pogrom (from the Russian verb "to destroy) in Odessa in 1871 and a ritual murder trial in Kutais in 1878 indicates that anti-Semitic sentiments had never been remote from the minds of either the general populace or the government itself.

The 1881 assasination of Alexander II led to a sudden and brutal confirmation of this last point. In the government, among the people, and particularly in the public press, the assasination sparked not only a further political reaction, but also a mounting wave of "Judaphobia". The southern Russian press spread the news that organized attacks were being prepared against the Jews. Governmental emissaries were sent to the south, warning the local police against interference with "demonstrations against the public will". Finally, Russian businessmen encouraged the peasants in their Judaphobia, assuring them that a ukase had been issued calling on the Christians to attack the Jews during the coming Easter holidays.

Beginning in Yelisavetgrad on Easter eve, 1881, a series of pogroms spread throughout the southern part of the Pale of Settlement, displaying a degree of brutality reminiscent of the Chmielnicki massacres. The American ambassador to St. Petersburg stated in a report to the State Department that "the acts which have been committed are more worthy of the Dark Ages than of the present century" (quoted in 30, p. 180). These pogroms (as well as subsequent massacres directed solely against the Jewish populace lasting until 1884) constituted one of the several major sources of exigencies experienced by the Jews of the Pale during this period. But given the fact that a major pogrom had occured in Odessa in 1871, what were the reasons that this latter series of outbreaks constituted "an emotional crisis for many...and a break in modern Jewish history? There are two major reasons: their extent, and t h e composition of the mobs" (30, p. 180). Within a few months of Alexan-

der's assasination over 160 cities witnessed at least one pogrom. Moreover, the incitement provided by the newspapers and some Russian businessmen coupled with the silence of the Russian intelligentsia amounted to a severe shock for all Jews, and especially the Jewish intelligentsia. By 1881, then, the Jews' rising desires and expectations had been dashed.

Although the official causal explanation of the pogroms at first pointed the accusative finger at "terrorists", the appointment of N. P. Ignatyev to the post of Minister of the Interior was accompanied by the adoption of "the theory of Jewish exploitation /which was used7 as a means of justifying not only the pogroms which had already been perpetrated upon the Jews but also the repressive measures which were being contemplated against them" (16, p. 261). With the new explanation in mind Ignatyev created the "Central Committee for the Revision of the Jewish Question" in October, 1881 - the committee which was to be in large measure responsible for what Dubnow calls the "legislative pogroms" which ensued. The repressive legislation which followed formed the second major exigency of the period. In Sachar's words: "With the appointment...of Ignatyev's Committee a paralyzing grillwork of legal disabilities was dropped on the Jews which was not lifted until March, 1917" (60, p. 243).

The "Ignatyev Report" of 1882 both noted the failure of the policy of toleration vis-a-vis the Jews and suggested a set of new measures which received legal sanction in the form of the notorious "May Laws" of that year. The laws not only forbade new Jewish settlement in rural Russia (including the Pale itself), but attempted to evict Jews already settled in rural areas and force them into the already overcrowded cities of the Pale. Furthermore, a numerus clausus on Jewish students in the Russian school system was proclaimed in 1887, forcing many young Jews to attend universities in central and western Europe. This latter piece of legislation was self-defeating in the extreme, for many of these people returned to Russia after ending their

Western education with revolutionary ideas for the reconstruction of the Jewish people.

The residence restrictions and the <u>numerus clausus</u>, while amounting to the two most infamous pieces of legislation of the period, were accompanied by additional oppressive enactments. In addition, it must be remembered that governmental policy continued unabated for decades after the institution of the May Laws. Thus, when in 1891 Alexander III's brother was appointed to the office of Governor-General of Moscow, 20,000 Jews were evicted from that city in "preparation" for the arrival of the new official. Similar mass expulsions took place in St. Petersburg and Kharkov.

C. The Proactive Moment : Articulation

The events which occured in the watershed years following 1881 proved for many Russian Jews that their old maps of social reality could no longer function as useful guides for behaviour. More precisely, the old political orientations and identifications contained within the four ideational and ideological themes delineated at the outset of this chapter could, for many, no longer provide such useful guides. To offer but one illustration: the political passivism of traditional orthodoxy could no longer be maintained since the salience of exigencies exceeded by far the (primarily religious) satisfactions offered by such passivism. Disillusionment with old ways gave way to a plethora of hurried responses: "Some...intellectuals...were carried off by the current of assimilation, culminating in baptism. Others stood at the crossroads, wavering between assimilation and Jewish nationalism. Still others were so stunned by the blow they received that they reeled violently backward, and proclaimed as their slogan the return "home", in the sense of a complete

renunciation of free criticism and of all strivings for inner reforms" (16, p. 327). Assimilation, indecision, reaction - "negative responses" in Dubnow's terminology - were matched by "positive" attempts at national rejuvenation (Territorialism, Bundism and Zionism) as well as increased interest in Marxism and the remnants of the Populist movement.

It is important to stress that the new, emergent ideologies, while receiving their impetus from the salience of exigencies, obtained their content from the surrounding cultural and political cultural milieu. Hence, the possibility of specifying and justifying new political needs arose out of both the subjective inappropriateness of old cognitive maps and the presence of beliefs, values and symbols which could be combined in new and more appropriate configurations.

The specification and justification of new needs is often connected to the problem of identity. Stated otherwise, the disruption of old cognitive maps and the consequent emergence of new needs often involves a re-definition of one's Self in terms of one's identifications. This was clearly the case for a portion of Russian Jewry in the 1880's. Basically, three modes of identification presented themselves - civil, primordial and class (i.e., identification with the Russian "host" nation, identification with the primordial Jewish nation, and identification with a particular socio-economic class, respectively). It would perhaps not be too much of an oversimplification to view the emergent ideologies as permutations of hierarchical orderings of these three modes of identification.

The central theme which permits the name "Zionism" to be attached to a body of communicated articulations is the goal of national (Jewish) rejuvenation in the land of Palestine. Even this may be allowing too much for, where-

as the orientation to Palestine is without doubt a central and binding theme, this is not entirely the case with respect to the national element. Given the fact that a nation can be defined by any one or a number of primordial criteria (91, pp. 79-80), we can detect a number of such differentially valent criteria appearing in the 1880's. Whereas Smolenskin and Ha-Am stress the (general) cultural criterion and Ben-Yehudah that of language, Mohilever points to the Jewish religion as the critical criterion by which inclusion into the nation is to be judged. These ideologists contrast with Lilienblum and Pinsker, who can be said to have defined the Jewish nation as an entity unified through common historical experience and common origins in the land of Palestine. And even Lilienblum and Pinsker differed in terms of the nature of their orientation to Palestine, for Pinsker viewed settlement in Palestine as more of a possibility open for consideration than a necessary element of Zionism - i.e., he valued the notion of a Jewish homeland more highly than Jewish settlement in Palestine, per se. (See (55) .)

Within the range of sub-ideologies that comprised the nascent Zionism of the 1880's it is possible to differentiate between two, fundamental goal states - the "spiritual" and the "political". Corresponding to these two goal states were two modes of legitimation: ideologues who espoused the former variety of Zionism viewed the Jewish problem as essentially a problem of identity (i.e., as the "problem of Judaism"), whereas those who espoused the latter variety viewed the Jewish problem as a result of anti-Semitism (i.e., as the "problem of the Jews"). Similarly, the applications suggested for the accomplishment of valent goals can be broadly categorized as spiritual (e.g., rejuvenation of the Hebrew language, revitalization of religious roots, etc.) and political (e.g., diplomacy, acquiring territory, etc.). With these general comments in mind, let us now ask the question: What were the specific and

immediate ideational and ideological influences on Zionism?

As mentioned earlier, the Haskalah had in part the effect of renewing interest and pride in the Jewish nation. Moreover, the proposal of a ra-tional solution to the Jewish problem found favour in the eyes of the Zion-ists. "In the Zionist view, the valid historic contribution of the Western modernists had been the insistence that there was a Jewish problem that had to be rationally solved" (29, p. 66). But despite these positive influences on Zionism, the major thrust of the Haskalah can most efficaciously be viewed as one of the causes of a Zionist reaction. Thus Halpern: "In ideol-ogical terms /Zionism/ was a reaction against Emancipation, a denial of it as a rational solution of the Jewish problem" (29, p. 58). The Haskalah solution was, of course, the view that Jewishness was primarily a religious (as opposed to national) category: this explains the common Haskalah nomen-clature for Jews as "Germans (or Frenchmen, or even Poles) of the Mosaic per-suasion."

Similarly, the orthodox religious tradition had both positive and negat-ive influences on Zionism. Incorporating a large measure of Biblical symbol-ism and anti-assimilationist tendencies, Zionism can, from one perspective, be seen as an outgrowth of orthodoxy, maintaining as it did links with the religious, historical and cultural past. And yet it reacted vigorously to the cultural degeneracy, passivism and lack of independence so characteristic of the religious tradition.

Halpern's view that Zionism was a "rapprochement" between orthodoxy and enlightenment thus strikes us as essentially sound (although subject to a num-ber of qualifications): "Zionism...regarded traditionalism and modernism as the "thesis" and "antithesis" of a Hegelian dialectic, with Zionism itself ap-pearing as the "synthesis" of its historic predecessors. That is to say, Zion-

ism recapitulated what it conceived to be the valid criticisms of tradition by modernism and of modernism by traditionalism. The element by which it hoped to transcend both was chiefly the new stress it laid on "auto-Emancipation"... as an indispensable requirement for the solution of the Jewish problem" (29, p. 66).

In an analogous manner Zionism both drew upon and rejected elements of the Marxist and Populist ideologies. In addition to the nationalist persuasion of the latter, Populism provided Zionism with a "return to the soil" element in the Tolstoyan tradition. Marxism stressed an awareness of the "inverted pyramid" of the Jewish class structure and the necessity of creating a proletarian base for the Jewish nation. Both added a sense of rebellion against the traditional.

But a number of tendencies mitigated against the full acceptance of either of these two ideologies by many of the Jews of this period. The intense Slavophilism of Populism required the (psychologically difficult) denial of one's Jewishness in the face of open-faced Populist anti-Semitism: not only had "the Narodnaya Volya distinguished itself in 1881 with an appeal for a pogrom against 'the Czar, the nobles, and the Jews' " (40, p. 315), but Bakunin had described the Jews as "an exploiting sect, a bloodsucking people, a unique devouring parasite, tightly and intimately organized" (4, pp. 124-126) and had argued that Marx and the Rothschilds held each other in mutual self-esteem! Whereas Marxism could offer the Jews universal justice (and was hence more palatable), Populist justice excluded the Jews. And, as the history of the Jews shows time and time again, anti-Semitism almost always results in a seclusionist attitude on the part of the Jews, rather than a willingness to break all Jewish ties.

The reaction against Marxism is a somewhat more subtle case, for Marx-

ism offered so much that was appealing to the Russian Jew - liberation from oppression, universal justice, "Messianic" redemption, cosmopolitan Westernism, etc. It would seem as if the inbred fear of "false promises" weighed heavier in the balance than the rewards offered by Marxism, however. This came to light in a most poignant manner in the wake of the 1881 pogroms, which acted as the immediate cause of the rejection, on the part of many Russian Jews, of their former proclivity towards Marxism.[16] This rejection is illustrated in the following passage from the autobiography of Abraham Cahan: "As a result of the anti-Semitic riots there occured such scenes as the following, for example: In Kiev a group of Jewish students came into a synagogue packed with mourning, weeping Jews. One of the group, a slender University student named Aleinikoff, got up on the reader's stand and addressed the people in Russian: "We are your brothers, we are Jews like you, we regret and repent that we considered ourselves Russians until now. The events of the past weeks - the pogrom in Elisavetgrad, in Balta, here in Kiev, and in other cities - have shown us how tragically we were mistaken. Yes, we are Jews." It is needless to describe the impression that such words made on the community" (10, p. 500).

It thus becomes clear that the appeals of Zionism resulted from a novel configuration of ideational and ideological elements extracted from the cultural and political cultural milieu - a configuration which admittedly appealed to a minority of the Russian Jewish populace, but which was also to prove obdurate. One appealing element of Zionism deserves special mention, however, before we end this section - namely, the symbol of "Zion" itself.

For Jewish religious orthodoxy "Zion" was a markedly utopian symbol in Mannheim's sense of the word (43, pp. 192 ff.). As we saw in the preceding chapter, the Messianic era entailed, in the Jewish orthodox tradition, a re-

turn from the state of Exile to the Holy Land: thus, "Zion" represented not only a geographic location, but also a constant yearning which, in "exigential" situations, erupted into Messianic fervour. The essential paradox of such outbreaks was that this fervour entailed an abrogation of the Exile without achieving the goal of restoration to Zion. Hence the contorted ideational changes attendant upon such outbreaks - contortions necessitated by the need to maintain belief in the restoration despite empirical evidence contradicting the belief. The Messianic outbreaks, the educational and community structure of the Jews, the innumerable references to the return to Zion in liturgical and Biblical sources and the constant migratory trickle of religious emissaries to the Holy Land ensured the transmission of the idea of Messianic redemption from generation to generation.

The symbolic opposite of Zion was the notion of Exile, which was viewed "as a penance to be lovingly borne" (29, p. 100). When Zionism emerged in the 1880's, it was to deny the traditional acceptance of Exile, yet retain the idea of of Zion, the idea of redemption in the Holy Land. Its appeal to those acquainted with both religious and modern, secular thought was thus assured through its rejection of the "unworkable" and its revitalization of the traditional.

What were the characteristics of Zionist partisans? As far as the original leaders and ideologues of the 1880's and 1890's are concerned a rather clear picture emerges, especially if these ideologues and leaders are compared to, say, the founding members of the Jewish Social Democratic group (the direct antecedent of the anti-Zionist, Jewish, Socialist party known as the "Bund") who formally organized for the first time in 1890. The table on page 87 illustrates the differences between the two groups in terms of three characteristics - year of birth of members, educational background of members and socio-

Figure Six. Some Characteristics of Zionist and "Bundist" Founders

	year of birth	educational background	socio-economic class origin
Zionists (Smolenskin, Lilienblum, Ben-Ye-hudah, Pinsker, Ha-Am, Syrkin, Berdichevski, Pines, Mohilever)	1821-1867	traditional (rel-igious) and sec-ular (modern)	middle class, upper middle class
Bundists (Kremer, Srednitsky, Izenshtat, Levinson, Kopelson, Mill, Gozhansky)	1865-1873	entirely secular (modern)	lower middle class, middle class

N.B. (a) The only exception to the pattern outlined above is Pinsker, a Zion-ist, who received a primarily secular education.

  (b) Data from (30) and (72).

economic class origin of members.

The table itself needs little explanation. The Zionists were older than the Bundists, had received a traditional, religious education in their youth-ful years and were, generally speaking, of a higher class origin. Divorced from non-traditional proclivities in their youth and not so disposed to find Marxism as appealing as the generally lower-class Bundists, the Zionists were nevertheless exposed to secularism after adolescence. They had had enough ex-posure to modern secularism to enable them to reject traditionalism in large measure, but not enough to embrace Marxism. Moreover, they displayed a higher degree of "embourgeoisification" than the Bundists.

Descriptive historical accounts of membership (as opposed to founding leadership) characteristics, although much sketchier, offer an analogous pic-ture, at least in terms of class background. Generally speaking, Bundists were drawn from the artisan class, while Zionists were more likely to be from the mercantile class. However, this division is only impressionistic since little relevant data exists of membership characteristics.

D. The Proactive Moment: Action and Institutionalization

The Zionist ideology "struggled to life amidst the birth pangs of the pogroms" (16, p. 328): and in their wake came the formation of the first Zionist manifest interest group, the "Chibat Tzion" (Hebrew: "Lovers of Zion"). The first ideologue of the group was M. L. Lilienblum, whose message was as forceful as it was simple: "Let all special questions, whether religious or economic in nature, take second place to the general question, to the sole and simple aim that Israel "be saved by the Lord with an evrlasting salvation". Unite and join forces; let us gather our dispersed from eastern Europe and go up to our land with rejoicing; whoever is on the side of God and his people, let him say: I am for Zion" (41, p. 172). Only by ceasingto be a stranger in every land (and therefore removing the cause of suffering) would the Jewish people be able to continue its life. In September, 1882, L. Pinsker expressed similar sentiments in his pamphlet Autoemancipation (55), with but one notable exception. National liberation, he claimed, would be possible in any "available" part of the world. P. Smolenskin and L. Levanda joined Pinsker and Lilinblum as the foremost of the early Zionists.

In 1882 an organization known as "Bilu" - an acronym composed from the Biblical phrase, "O house of Jacob, come ye, and let us go" (Isaiah 2.5) - was formed in Kharkov. Its aims were twofold - first, to establish an agricultural colony in Palestine, and second, to propagandize the idea of colonization. The "Biluites", committed to Marxist ideals and about 500 in number, sent 40 young men to Palestine in June and July, 1882. Sixteen arrived at their destination. However, attempts to negotiate a large parcel of land from the Turkish government failed, so that the Zionists were forced to work on the agricultural settlements recently founded in Palestine by the "Alliance", a French philanthropic organization.

Several members of Chibat Tzion were, however, successful in founding a number of agricultural settlements at Rosh Pinah, Zichron Ya'akov and Petah Tikvah. In this they were aided by the philanthropy of Baron Edmond de Rothschild in Paris. However, "the more they brooded about /their lack of legal status with the Turkish authorities/ the more they were convinced that mere settlement could not create the homeland; by itself settlement was far too tortuous and precarious" (60, p. 269).

Not desirous of depending upon Rothschild's philanthropy, the leaders of the scattered Chibat Tzion societies held an organizational conference in Kattowitz in 1884. The 34 delegates elected to federate under the title of the "Montefiore Association for the Promotion of Agriculture Aomng Jews and especially for the Support of the Jewish Colonies in Palestine". But, as Laqueur correctly points out, "this and subsequent conferences of the Lovers of Zion clearly showed that it was basically a philanthropic, not a political association, and not a very effective one at that...Some of its members emigrated to Palestine, but the great majority consisted merely of well-wishers and sympathizers" (35, p. 77). This ineffectiveness was compounded by internal conflict between spiritual and political Zionist factions.

A second organizational conference was held at Druskenik in 1887 in order to improve and expand the organization. And in 1890 the Russian government, always ready to rid itself of its Jewish population, gave official sanction to the society under the new name of "Society for the Support of Jewish Agriculturalists and Artisans in Palestine and Syria".

Not only did political Zionists succeed in creating short-lived organizations, for in 1889, under the leadership of Ahad Ha'Am, the "B'nei Moshe" (Hebrew: "Sons of Moses") emerged as the first organization of spiritual Zionism. Ha'Am "laid down the principle that the preparation of the land for the

people must be preceded by the transformation of the people into a firmly-knit national organization: "We must propogate the national idea and convert it into a lofty moral idea" " (17, p. 49). In 1891 the Bialystok branch of the B'nei Moshe founded the Palestinian settlement of Rechovoth.

The sporadic organizational attempts gave way to the publication of a number of newspapers, the spread of a few small student Zionist groups (which were particularly prominent among Russian Jews studying in western European Universities) and the few meagre attempts at emigration mentioned above. The severity of conditions in Palestine; the attraction of other, competing ideologies; the poor reception accorded the newcomers to Palestine by orthodox Palestinian Jewry; the unwillingness of the Turkish authorities to sanction the influx; the dream of emigrating to "Golden America" - all of these factors proved to be sufficient cause for the extremely limited success of the movement. Thus, from 1882 to 1897 only 20,000 people emigrated from all of eastern Europe to Palestine. Of these, only 3,000 went to form agricultural settlements. In 1896 Zionism was not a mass movement: "In 1896 no one but half a dozen rabbis, a few young people in Berlin and Cologne, and some older intellectuals and businessmen hailing from Russia, even knew about the idea of Zionism" (35, p. 83).

It was only under the aegis of a Viennese Jew known as Theodore Herzl that the Zionist ideology really gave birth to the beginning of the institutionalization phase of the developmental process we have endeavoured to describe. Herzl was instrumental in organizing the first World Zionist Congress, held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897, at which he became its first president. It is from that date that Zionism is usually judged to have entered the stage of being a mass political movement.

Legislative oppression and violence, demographic and economic exigencies

- all of these forces combined after the liberal beginnings of Alexander II's reign so as to result in the experience, for the Jews of the Pale, of a severe discrepancy between expectations, desires and legitimations on the one hand, and the actual state of affairs on the other. Their traditional cognitive maps of reality no longer worked. Moreover, the articulations which emerged as a consequence of these exigencies were "realistic" in the sense previously defined. This was the case for a number of reasons. First, we can detect the presence of factors which led to the dissolution of the traditional Jewish social structure. Second, we see the presence of ideological orientations which espoused the ability and legitimacy of self-determination. Third, we note the influence of the demonstrated success of nationalist movements in Italy, Germany, Canada, Serbia, Montenegro, etc. in the 1860's and 1870's - successes which were bound to reinforce nationalist proclivities already bred by the Haskalah movement amongst the Russian Jewish intelligentsia. Sachar notes a number of particular cases of such influence. "The passion and virility of Germany's Jung Deutschland...made a powerful impact on Micah Joseph Lebensohn when he lived in Berlin; Hungarian and Slovakian nationalism had a similar effect on Smolenskin during his stay in Vienna...Ben Yehuda was notably impressed by the intensified Pan-Slavism which swept through Russia and the Balkan States during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78" (60, p. 263).

However, the ideological innovation which we have described - Zionism - was in no sense "total". There was a substantial carry-over from the old maps of reality to the new. The overall result was the transformation of Messianism, per se into political Messianism; of a Sabbatean-type movement, doomed to failure, into a movement with at least the potentiality of success. However, Zionism - despite the fact that it was more realistic, more political and potentially more successful than Sabbateanism - had one element in common with the

latter that deserves special mention.

When applied, when acted upon, both articulation were, in sum, __not__ representative of the "universalistic" mode of Jewish thought. "Often," notes Hans Kohn, "messianism was the expression of a narrow group mind. In such cases it meant that to the suffering group alone justice would be done and that for them alone sufferings would end and /a/ new happy life begin" (33, p. 357). If we may be permitted to drop the guise of social scientific objectivity for a moment, we would contend that it is this element which spells out the biggest danger for Zionism in its institutionalized phase. For only if Zionism can be re-united with its universalistic origins and, at the same time, remain a political movement, can it hope to do justice to the tradition from which it emerged.

Conclusion

This thesis can properly be viewed as little more than a suggestion - a suggestion, moreover, that raises many more questions than it provides answers. If the theoretical considerations contained herein have been of any value, then it is only because they offer a delineation of those aspects of the phenomenal world that we feel are particularly important for the subject under investigation. This is not, however, a particularly strong recommendation for the use of the proposed framework. In the Introduction we noted that the Sociology of Knowledge is muddied with conceptual confusion and theory that cannot offer even "causally adequate" explanation, let alone prediction. And we have not as yet endeavoured to indicate how the present contribution is in any way "better" than others. For these reasons we define our concluding task as involving both the specification of the framework's weaknesses and its possible value over other formulations.

Foremost among the framework's weaknesses is the hazy line of demarcation we have drawn between the two variants of ideation which have been our major concern - namely Messianic ideation and political ideology. We set out by differentiating ideology from other forms of ideation on the basis of the evaluative primacy of the former. That is, ideology was seen as a form of ideation fundamentally concerned with supporting or contesting the legitimacy of concrete forms of social organization. Political ideology was further differentiated from other ideological forms by virtue of its manifest reference to the legitimacy of political systems (or sub-systems thereof). Following Hobsbawm (31, pp. 57-59), we next distinguished Messianic ideation from political ideology on the basis of two sets of considerations. First, Messianic ideation is chiliastic (or "unrealistic") while political ideology is secular (or "real-

istic").[17] Second, Messianic ideation proposes only a vague program of organization and action while political ideology contains a very much more specific doctrine of organization and action.

These distinctions suffer from a number of problems. How, for instance, does one actually go about distinguishing the evaluative primacy of an ideology from, say, the cognitive primacy of a scientific theory? How can one determine whether a particular ideational form is chiliastic or secular? At what point on the "vague-specific" continuum is a particular ideational form vague? specific? These conceptual and methodological problems must, we feel, be tackled if the utility of our approach is to be demonstrated.

The second major weakness of the framework has to do with the exigency-articulation-action-institutionalization pattern. It is not at all clear that articulation always precedes action in the innovation of ideation and ideology. It may be the case that the "overly-cognitive" bias of intellectuals (and therefore, one hopes, sociologists) deems the notion of "articulation before action" pleasing by virtue of the conformity of this pattern to the manner in which (at least institutionally-approved) sociologists work. However, this pattern should make no claim to being an accurate paradigm for all ideational and ideological innovation. In what circumstances and for what sorts of ideation does the progression from articulation to action hold? When does it not? Does the progression vary at different levels of analysis - i.e., for individual persons, institutions and whole societies? If so, how and why does it vary? All of these questions must be answered before we can hope to accurately "locate" the realm of applicability of the proposed framework.

Despite these rather serious weaknesses, and despite the fact that we cannot, at this point, enter into a full discussion and critique of alternate formulations, there are certain obvious points which would seem recommend

our approach above those of, say, Parsons or Marx. As opposed to Parson's form-
ulation (54, esp. pp. 326-427; also (53)), ours does not attempt to be a first
step towards a theory of ideational and ideological stasis. In opting for a
dynamic approach, the problem of ideational and ideological persistence is
viewed as a special case in which "pattern maintenance" is possible only be-
cause exigencies of sufficient severity do not present themselves to the a-
awareness of persons. In other words, we do not assume that "equilibrium" is
"normal" but problematic from the point of view of both social actors and soc-
ial analysts.

The "dynamic mechanism" in our formulation involves, of course, a restate-
ment of a Marxist dialectic - a restatement which delineates both motivational
and constraining elements in the production of society by man and the produc-
tion of man by society. This dialectic is, however, only one of three that seem
to be particularly important in the Marxist formulation. The second involves
the dialectical relationship between "infrastructure" and "superstructure",
while the third involves the mutual antagonism of conflicting classes.

The infrastructure/superstructure problem has, of course, been a partic-
ularly contentious concern for those Marxists who would have us believe that
"economic factors" (the infrastructure) act as independent variables in the
determination of ideation and ideology (the superstructure), as well as for
those Weberians who would have us believe that ideational and ideological fac-
tors act as independent variables in the determination of economic factors.
Both of these extreme positions have, of course, been tempered somewhat in
later discussions (see, for instance, (20) and (21)). However, we have not
dealt with this problem, except implicitly, insofar as it is our impression
that it is, at best, ill-conceived. (Peter Berger, being less kind, terms the
problem "stupid" (6)). We have attempted to formulate a systemic approach

which takes cognizance of both superstructural and infrastructural elements
as determinants of (future) superstructural and infrastructural change. The
important point that emerges from our discussion is not dissimilar from the
position assumed by many neo-Weberians and neo-Marxists alike: both super-
structure (ideation and ideology) and infrastructure (here interpreted as
concrete social organization) are in a dynamic interaction process.[18] Ad-
mittedly this point has not been particularly well worked out - but at least
we have stated the problem in such a way as to enable us to "go beyond" the
futile "chicken-and-egg" discussions of causal primacy.

The third dialectic (that between mutually antagonistic classes) has
been dealt with less obliquely. By broadening the conception of ideational
and ideological innovators to include all "manifest interest groups", the
present formulation promises to offer greater sensitivity in the treatment
of the subject matter. That is, we include ideational and ideological changes
of a "lesser historical importance" as sociological problems of considerable
significance. Moreover, the mutual antagonism between manifest interest groups
and those to whom they are opposed is viewed herein as a potentiality that can
only become manifest under certain specifiable conditions. With respect to
this last point, we have not departed from the Marxian position.

Notwithstanding these rather general recommendations for the use of our
framework, it is our impression that a good deal of work has to be done be-
fore it deserves the rubric of "theory", let alone "theory which has gener-
ated hypotheses that have withstood empirical testing". In particular, three
areas seem to be in greatest need of further work.

We have already pointed out the problems involved in our rather hazy de-
marcation of the concepts Messianic ideation and political ideology. In ad-
dition, but still remaining within the realm of concept formation, it should

be made clear that for the most part we have been content to simply name and define such key terms as "exigency", "political culture", etc. However, if we want to develop our framework into sociological theory it will be necessary to specify those dimensions along which each of the major concepts vary. Exigencies, for example, vary with respect to time, the reference points employed, severity, etc. Stated this way, the concept not only suggests possibilities for operationalization, but also lets us know precisely what the content of the concept is. Such a strategy would seem to be inherently superior to simply operationalizing without coming to grips with the problem of conceptual content. Second, it would seem advantageous to re-cast the framework into propositional form. A propositional framework would allow us to generate hypotheses which could then be tested.

Whereas the first two suggestions for additional work are essentially methodological concerns, a number of theoretical issues, aside from those mentioned previously, require further work as well. One such issue involves the specification of conditions which give rise to different forms of ideational and ideological innovation. Whereas we have attempted to delineate two sets of conditions which enable Messianic ideation and political ideology to develop, it would seem fruitful to follow the same rationale in asking such questions as, "What conditions enable religious dogma to develop and change? scientific theories? specific types of myth and folklore?" Presumably, this specification would entail the consideration not only of conditions which are either present or absent, but also conditions which are present in various degrees. Obviously, such conditions would be less likely to take account of political culture as a determinant: instead, other areas of culture would seem to be operative in determining, say, the development of scientific theory.[19]

It is because this framework requires so much additional work that we have cast it in the form of a suggestion, of an "analytical framework", rather than a theory. Hopefully, it will be sufficiently provocative to motivate improved articulations in the same vein.

Footnotes

(1) For an elaboration of this rationale see (26, esp. pp. 45-77).

(2) Zollschan considers perceived discrepancies between expectations, desires or legitimations and actualities as constituting exigencies. Due to certain measurement considerations, however, we prefer to define as exigency as a perceived discrepancy between expectations, desires or legitimations and perceptions of actualisties. See (71).

(3) It is important to stress the difference between a need and a goal. Whereas the former simply expresses the necessity for the removal of an exigency, the latter postulates the action necessary for its removal.

(4) For more than one person, institutionalization occurs under one of four conditions. If the articulated need of ego requires a response from alter, then institutionalization can occur where alter articulates similar needs to those of ego (mutual complementarity) and/or where "the activation of a suitable response to ego will aid the locomotion of alter to his own, seperately articulated goals (manipulative complementarity)" (87, p. 105). If, on the other hand, locomotion toward the articulated goal requires the activity of more than one alter, institutionalization will occur where the articulated need of ego and others is similar (simple cooperation) and/or where locomotion toward the goal will aid others' locomotion towards seperately articulated goals (transactional cooperation).

(5) It is of some interest to note that the final condition involves the problem of ideational/ideological and group conflict. As such, it amounts to a condition which necessitates the modification and partial reformulation of emergent articulations.

(6) We here disregard the interesting possibility of transcendental goal-achievement through intrapersonal (as opposed to environmental) transformation. See also footnote (17).

(7) It is important to note that the term "perceived" is used here most cautiously insofar as this process occurs at the pre-articulation level.

(8) The sense in which both Talmon and Worsley employ the term "non-political" is quite broadly conceived and, from our point of view, quite correct. Even millenarian movements have political implications, for, "whether the behaviour of the believer is subjectively oriented to spiritual ends or not... his behaviour, insofar as he acts with, or in relation to, other men, will have effects upon and consequences for them. Insofar as the believer acts at all, and not only where he tries to deliberately influence others, he is acting politically, not just religiously" (81, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii). Millenarian action is, then, oriented to spiritual goals, yet exhibits political implications: political action is both oriented to political goals and exhibits political implications.

(9) A third pattern, "progressive deprivation". "in which there is substantial and simultaneous increase in expectations and decrease in capabilities"

(28, p. 46) is cited as a special case of aspirational deprivation.

(10) The primordial ties categorized and discussed by Geertz (23) include race, language, custom, assumed blood ties, region and religion.

(11) Kedourie does not appear to be unaware of the word, however. For instance, at one point he speaks of the nation as a primordial entity" (32, p. 73).

(12) During World War One Kautsky and Bernstein explicitly implored a fight for the German fatherland under the banner of Social Democracy, much to the chagrin of Lenin.

(13) See footnote (10).

(14) It should be made clear that the movement did not affect eastern European Jewry alone. Rather, it is our intention to ignore its ramifications in such areas as Spain and Asia Minor so that we may concentrate on the movement as a precursor of Zionism.

(15) Economic factors leading to decreased population growth are discussed later in this section.

(16) It should be pointed out that the pogroms had an opposite effect as well, causing a marked increase in Jewish participation in Marxist circles. The effe cts of the pogroms are thus more accurately viewed as having forced a decision one way or the other, rather than having simply invogorated a rejection of Marxism.

(17) We would again stress the point that Messianic ideation may only be "unrealistic" from the point of view of effecting extrapersonal or environmental change. In terms of effecting intrapersonal changes, Messianic ideation may be a highly effective device.

(18) We are indebted to Professor Martin Kolinsky, who made this point in seminar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1972.

(19) With respect to the example of scientific theory, Kuhn's notion of institutionalized scientific "paradigms" would seem to be particularly suggestive. (34).

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