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Delegate Support Patterns at Nova Scotian Leadership Conventions

The importance of leadership conventions in provincial politics is beyond dispute.¹ Victory in a leadership convention is a necessary, and occasionally sufficient, condition for becoming premier: conventions determine the pool from which provincial electorates draw their premiers.² Conventions also provide an opportunity to observe provincial parties while they are engaged in their most important function: leadership selection. The composition of the conventions provides an overview of the party activist body³ while voting divisions serve to indicate the nature of intra-party competition.

This paper will examine leadership conventions in Nova Scotia in an effort to highlight the nature of voting divisions within the parties. The data is drawn from surveys of delegates to the three most recent Conservative and Liberal conventions. Delegates to the 1971 Conservative and 1980 and 1986 Liberal conventions were sent questionnaires shortly after each convention was completed. The response rate was quite high: 55% in 1971, 48% in 1980, and 52% in 1986. More importantly, the reported vote of the respondents closely mirrors the actual convention results. (See Table 1: all tables after footnotes.)

Past Nova Scotian conventions suggest possible voting divisions. These suggestions revolve around religion and community size. Camp has provided a vivid portrait of the religious split between Protestants and Catholics at the 1954 Liberal convention.⁴ Similarly, Aucoin has described the 1962 Liberal gathering as marked by "an urban, rural division."⁵ More recently, analyses of the 1971 P.C. convention by Adamson and Kavanaugh have suggested that this convention was affected by divisions of region, religion and ideology.⁶ These perspectives have not been without detractors. Fraser, in commenting on the rumored religious division of 1971, called it "one of the most imaginative political interpretations of the year."⁷ Beck maintains that the

1962 decision owed more to “oratorical abilities” than to an urban rural split. He likewise introduces some ambiguity over the 1954 convention, saying only that “it appeared as if the delegates had ganged up to defeat the only Catholic among the contestants.”⁸ Controversy thus attends the understanding of past Nova Scotian conventions.

In an attempt to provide some empirical evidence as to the nature of voting divisions at the three conventions covered, this paper will probe for such divisions in the areas of social group membership, place of residence and attitudes. As Johnston said of national conventions, “Ideological affinity, social group membership, and geographic identification come readily to mind as criteria that might govern individual’s choices. But the empirical status of these criteria is a matter of controversy.”⁹ This paper aims to clear up some of this controversy as it relates to Nova Scotia.

Before proceeding with the analysis of voting it is important to introduce the candidates and provide an overview of the context in which the conventions were held. All three conventions took place when the party was the out in the circulation of ins and outs that is the stuff of provincial electoral history. In each case too, an election defeat had precipitated the resignation of the party leader which necessitated the calling of a leadership convention. The concern of the party in convention then, was the selection of a leader who could return the party to power.

The 1971 Progressive Conservative convention followed the defeat of the party in the 1970 election after fourteen years in office. The premier, G.I. Smith, had been acclaimed leader in 1967 after Robert Stanfield’s successful campaign for the leadership of the federal party. Although the Liberals in 1970 had won only a minority government, Smith was in poor health and did not wish to continue as leader.¹⁰

The leadership contest attracted a good deal of attention. Three relatively well known and young candidates sought the leadership making it the most competitive in Tory provincial history. Gerald Doucet, 33, a lawyer, MLA from Richmond, Cape Breton, and seven-year veteran of the Cabinet was perceived to be the front runner and attracted numerous caucus endorsements. Doucet was an Acadian and a Roman Catholic. Another former cabinet minister, John Buchanan, 39, was regarded as his main competitor. A Cape Breton born lawyer, Buchanan was a Protestant who lived in Halifax and represented one of its ridings. He was first elected to the legislature in 1967 and only appointed to the Cabinet in 1969. The final candidate,

Roland Thornhill, 38, was something of an outsider and was viewed as a dark horse. Born in Newfoundland, Thornhill's family had moved to Dartmouth when he was quite young. Thornhill had never sought provincial office, but was the mayor of Dartmouth. He was a businessman and a Protestant.

There was little in the way of policy disagreement among the three candidates. All agreed that the party had to be reorganized, youth had to be involved and the Regan government quickly defeated. The only discordant note was Thornhill's claim that his lack of political experience was an asset in that he was unsullied by the 1970 defeat. In light of the widespread policy agreement, the *Halifax Chronicle Herald* was moved to lament: "It appears that the impression of the candidates rather than his policies, will be a determining factor in how delegates mark their ballots."¹¹

The convention lasted two ballots. On the first, Doucet justified his front runner status by finishing first with 282 votes, forty more than Buchanan and seventy ahead of a surprisingly strong Thornhill. Thornhill declared his support for Buchanan who went on to defeat Doucet 391-346 on the second ballot. Doucet's supporters were somewhat embittered by the defeat and attributed it to an urban/rural or Cape Breton/Mainland split. The candidates denied such a split and the *Chronicle Herald* assigned the issue to "the level of academic irrelevance."¹²

The Liberal convention of 1980 was called when Gerald Regan announced that he was going to run federally in the election of that year. Regan, a two-term premier, had been defeated by Buchanan's Conservatives in the 1978 election. He made clear then that he would not again seek provincial office and the federal election was an opportunity of which he took advantage, rather than the cause of his resignation.

Four candidates sought the leadership. The perceived front runner was A.M. (Sandy) Cameron. Cameron, 42, a businessman and the only Protestant in the race, was from Sherbrooke and had served as MLA for Guysborough since a by-election victory in 1973. He had been immediately appointed to the Cabinet and had held a number of portfolios. Cameron was thought to be the choice of the party establishment. Fraser Mooney, 53, of Yarmouth was the most politically experienced of the candidates. A pharmacist, he had first been elected in the Liberal victory of 1970 and served in the Cabinet throughout the Regan era. The last caucus candidate was Vince MacLean, a 36-year-old teacher. MacLean was from Sydney and had been elected to the

legislature in 1974. He served as Speaker of the House and also spent two years in Cabinet. The final candidate, Ken MacInnis, 37, of Halifax had never run for provincial office. He was a lawyer whose political experience consisted of two years as special adviser to Deputy Prime Minister Allan MacEachen.

With one exception, the candidates were not divided on policy and the campaign was not marked by policy concerns. The exception concerned ownership of offshore mineral rights. The three former Cabinet ministers supported the deal negotiated with the federal government ceding ownership claims for royalty payments. MacInnis disagreed with this and maintained that Nova Scotia should own its offshore resources. The question of political experience was debated with MacInnis portraying himself as the newcomer who could revitalize the party while Mooney stressed his Cabinet experience and years of party service. Cameron and MacLean attempted to project quite different images. Both emphasized their ability to lead the party back to power, but while Cameron was low-key in the Stanfield tradition, MacLean presented himself as a dynamic leader.¹³

The first ballot left Cameron well out in front. With 340 votes he was well ahead of MacLean at 244; Mooney, 192 and MacInnis, 138. MacInnis declared his support for MacLean but the second ballot brought no diminution of Cameron's lead. He climbed to 412 while MacLean rose to 317 and Mooney held relatively steady at 187. Mooney refused to endorse either candidate, but the bulk of his support went to Cameron who won a comfortable 558-356 victory on the third ballot.

The *Chronicle Herald* felt Cameron was a compromise middle of the road candidate, but noted his establishment support and pointed out the impact of religion. The paper referred to the past Liberal tradition of alternating Catholic and Protestant leaders and suggested that "one of the factors preventing Fraser Mooney, a Catholic from publicly siding with Vince MacLean also a Catholic . . . was the religious factor."¹⁴ Subsequent research by Adamson also indicated the influence of religion. Adamson found that one of the reasons interim Liberal leader William Gillis had not sought to make his position permanent was his belief that it was a Protestant's turn.¹⁵

Cameron's tenure as Liberal leader was markedly unsuccessful. He became only the second Liberal leader in provincial history not to serve as premier and led the party to all-time popular vote lows in the elections of 1981 and 1984. In the 1984 election the Liberals were

reduced to six seats, none of which belonged to Cameron. As a result of this failure Cameron resigned and a convention was called for 1986.

Vince MacLean, his resumé updated as Opposition leader in the House, made his second try for the leadership. He was challenged by only one other candidate. Jim Cowan, 43, was a Halifax lawyer who had never held public office. A Protestant, he was President of the provincial party until he resigned to contest the leadership.

One cannot claim that the two candidates differed in terms of policy.¹⁶ Both condemned the economic shortcomings of the Buchanan government and made education and care for the aged their priorities. The one area of difference emphasized was political experience. MacLean stressed his resumé and urged delegates to pick a leader with experience, comparing the alternative to buying a car without looking under the hood. Cowan argued that it was clear Nova Scotians wanted a change and that the Liberals could best provide this with a leader who was *truly* new.

The campaigns betrayed a slight regional bias. MacLean boasted of his Cape Breton base and claimed that Cowan's island support was virtually nonexistent. Cowan referred to past Liberal failures in metro Halifax, suggesting that the new leader should be from that region and claimed the support of two-thirds of the delegates there.¹⁷

The convention ended up being one-sided. MacLean's second try for the leadership was successful as he outpolled Cowan 1082 to 721. Post convention analysis by the media claimed that while MacLean's support was strongest on Cape Breton, his was a province wide victory.¹⁸

This examination of the context of the three Nova Scotian conventions makes it apparent that none of the conventions were understood at the time as ideological battlegrounds. The few delegate cleavages which might have existed were seen to be based more in geography or group differences.

Geographic Divisions

Journalistic coverage of the three Nova Scotian conventions raised the spectre of geographic splits at two of them. In 1971, rumors circulated that Buchanan's victory was due to an urban/rural or an anti Cape Breton voting split. Both candidates at the 1986 convention claimed extensive home region support in Cape Breton and metro Halifax respectively. One therefore might expect to find significant associations between area of residence and voting.

An examination of the regional variable makes clear its impact in the three conventions. The regional variable displayed a more consistent association with voting than any other variable. Significant relations between voting and region were found on every convention ballot. (For the purposes of the survey Nova Scotia was divided into six regions. The most obvious division is that between Cape Breton and the mainland. However, the mainland is also subdivided into five regions. These are metro Halifax, Annapolis Valley, South Shore, Eastern Mainland and North Shore.)¹⁹

The regional voting patterns were quite revealing. In 1971 it was Doucet's support from Cape Breton that created his first ballot lead. He took 72% of the Cape Breton votes, but was unable to achieve even a 40% share of the vote in any mainland region. Buchanan's Cape Breton origins did him little good as he received his least support there, a minuscule 9%. Thornhill's best showing came in metro Halifax where he won his only plurality, albeit in a tight three-way race. The only other region which Doucet carried was the North Shore and Buchanan won the other three regions with at least 40% of the vote. (See Table 2.)

The second ballot results were virtually identical. Doucet increased his majority share of the Cape Breton vote to 81% and essentially split the North Shore vote with Buchanan. Buchanan won the remaining regions with majorities of not less than 54%.

The tendency of Cape Breton delegates to provide overwhelming support to the local candidate was again evident in 1980. MacLean took 73% of the Cape Breton votes for fully 52% of his total vote count. Local candidate support could also be seen in the regional voting for Mooney. Mooney won 53% of the South Shore vote and this accounted for 41% of his total. Mooney actually outpolled MacLean among mainland delegates. MacInnis was unable to carry any region, but his best showing was in metro Halifax where he finished second with 24% of the vote. This support from the capital region comprised 44% of his total. Support for Cameron was the most balanced. He won pluralities in four regions and was second to Mooney on the South Shore and MacLean on Cape Breton. His strongest showings were in the Eastern Mainland and North Shore where he carried over 70% of the votes for almost half (46%) of his total. Of course his home town of Sherbrooke is located in the Eastern Mainland.

The regional trend was no weaker on the second ballot. Mooney continued to carry the South Shore, but his mainland support as a whole dropped behind that of MacLean. MacLean marginally in-

creased his support from Cape Breton, but even the endorsement of MacInnis did little to help him in metro Halifax where Cameron won over half the vote. Cameron increased his vote share in each region and came very close to a second ballot victory. Only Cape Breton's support for MacLean prevented that victory as Cameron won 57% of the mainland votes.

Cape Breton remained loyal to MacLean on the third ballot. His 75% share of the vote there exceeded by 40 points his best mainland showing. Cameron won each mainland region by a minimum of 30 points with an overall share of 72%.

The 1986 convention differs from the other two in that at this convention the candidate from Cape Breton won. This does not mean that his Cape Breton support did not stand out. MacLean's victory was due in no small part to the overwhelming support he received from Cape Breton delegates. His pre-convention claim that Cowan lacked island support was not idle boasting. Cowan was able to get only 4% of the Cape Breton vote. Unfortunately for Cowan, his claim of two-thirds of the metro Halifax vote was less accurate: his support in that region only reached 43%. Still, Cowan's mainland support was a respectable 48%, it was the bloc vote of Cape Breton that made the convention a rout.

Expanding the analysis to community size enhances understanding of the geographic effect. Indeed, the community size variable was itself significantly associated with voting in many cases. The media contention that Buchanan's victory was that of urban over rural can be discounted. While the second ballot showed virtually no relationship between voting and the size of a delegate's home community, the first indicated that in the city of Halifax (community over 100,000) Doucet actually attracted more support than either Buchanan or Thornhill. Indeed, in the next largest category, communities between 10,000 and 100,000, Doucet again outpolled Buchanan; although Thornhill won a plurality of the votes. This category included Thornhill's home town of Dartmouth and the Cape Breton city of Sydney. Buchanan's best showing was among the rural delegates. His victory cannot be understood as one of urban over rural.

Examining the community size variable for 1986 restores some credibility to Cowan's claim that his candidacy was popular in the Halifax area. Cowan won over half the votes of delegates living in Halifax itself (community over 100,000) but nowhere else could he gain a majority. His support could not penetrate Dartmouth or the suburbs. (See Table 3.)

Examination of the results from the two geographic variables provides substantial evidence of a "friends and neighbors effect."²⁰ Cameron, Mooney, Doucet, Thornhill, MacLean (twice) and MacInnis all had their highest levels of support from their friends and neighbors in their home regions. Moreover, although Cowan proved unable to win his home region, he nonetheless carried a majority of the Halifax city vote. Support for him in the city simply did not spread to the rest of the region.

This distinction between greater Halifax and the city itself was also noteworthy in 1971. As we have seen, Doucet won a plurality of the vote in the city of Halifax, but Thornhill carried the region. Examining the vote of the metro Halifax region broken down by community size helps clear up this puzzle. Thornhill's margin of victory was created by disproportionate support from delegates living in communities of between 1000 and 100,000. He won 84% of the votes from delegates in this category, most of whom presumably lived in Dartmouth. In essence, of all the candidates at the three conventions, only Buchanan failed to benefit from support from his friends and neighbors.

Group Divisions

Media coverage of the three conventions suggested little in the way of group-based voting cleavages. The one exception was the 1980 convention where rumors of a religious division and an establishment versus grassroots split excited the commentators. Inferential evidence of an establishment cleavage at the other conventions can also be gleaned from suggestions that one candidate had the majority of caucus support. References to the salience of other group cleavages were absent.

For the purposes of analysis, it is useful to subdivide the groups into three categories: traditional, economic and institutional. Traditional groups are those based on ethnic origin or religion. Economic groups are based on education, income or class. Institutional groups are considered to be those which have a certain degree of participation mandated by party rules. In Nova Scotia this refers to groups based on gender, age and delegate type. The analysis of group voting will proceed by looking first at the institutional groups, then at traditional groups and finally at the economic groups.

Delegates come to a convention in either of two ways. They can be chosen by constituencies or they can be delegates by virtue of the positions they hold (ex officio). In 1980 it was suggested that Cameron

had the support of the party establishment, essentially the ex officio delegates. As well, in both 1971 and 1986, one candidate was said to be the caucus favorite. Ample reasons exist to expect a voting division on this dimension.

Despite this, significant results were found only for the two final ballots in 1980. A marked preference was evident for Cameron among the ex officio delegates. (See Table 4.) His support from ex officio delegates ran well ahead of his support from other delegates. The other conventions did not have such an institutional split despite the rumored caucus preference for a particular candidate. Only at the 1980 Liberal convention was such a division evident. Perhaps not coincidentally, this convention was also marked by discussions on the religious alternation of leadership.

Another group whose participation was mandated by the parties was youth. Constituencies were required to provide representation to young party members thus allowing for a potential generation gap in the voting. Indeed, a significant relationship between age and voting can be seen at each convention. The first ballot in 1971 saw Doucet achieve his highest level of support from delegates under thirty and his lowest level from delegates over sixty. For both Buchanan and Thornhill the reverse was the case. This tendency intensified on the final ballot. Doucet won 60% of the youth vote, but could win just 49% of the votes cast by delegates between thirty and sixty and a meagre 35% of the vote from the over sixty group. (See Table 4.)

Significant results in 1980 were found for the two final ballots. Essentially, the level of support for Cameron increased with the age of the delegates. On the second ballot, Cameron and MacLean virtually split the youth vote while Cameron won hardy majorities from the older delegates. Cameron won majorities from every age group on the last ballot, but his share remained highest with the oldest delegates and lowest with the delegates under thirty.

MacLean's relatively strong showing among the younger delegates did not persist at the 1986 convention. Indeed, delegates under thirty were least likely to support him. Cowan's support reached its zenith of 47% with the youth and did not exceed 35% for the other age groups.

Evidence from all three conventions suggests that age is related to voting. Young delegates vote somewhat differently than do older delegates. This cannot be attributed solely to the relative ages of the candidates. For example, in 1986 the older Cowan had his best showing with the younger delegates.

The last institutional group is based on gender. At each convention representation of women was demanded from each constituency. However, this analysis reveals no evidence of a gender based voting gap. Gender was not significantly associated with voting at any of the conventions. (See Table 7 which provides Cramer's V measures of association for variables significantly associated with voting.)

It is with the traditional variables that one might expect to find the strongest voting divisions. Ethnic divisions have been of major importance in Canadian politics, but the relevance of such divisions to Nova Scotian leadership conventions is doubtful. Acadians make up less than ten percent of the provincial population. Not surprisingly, no significant associations were found between ethnicity and voting. Of the eight candidates, only Doucet was of non-British stock and since only six percent of the 1971 delegates were Acadian, his ability to exploit this advantage was limited. Nonetheless, Doucet did win 48% of the vote from delegates of French origin on the first ballot and 67% on the last. The number of French delegates was just too small for this to be of real importance.

In contrast, religious differences have historically been politically important in Nova Scotia. The 1954 Nova Scotia Liberal leadership convention experienced a major religious division.²¹ Indeed, media speculation suggested that religion was also of some import at the 1980 convention and Adamson has noted the impact of religion in 1971.

This analysis indicates that religion was not only significantly associated with voting in 1971, but on every ballot at the other two conventions as well. The evidence presented here suggests a strong relationship between religion and voting preference. (See Table 5.)

On the first ballot in 1971, Doucet took 57% of the votes cast by Catholics, but trailed Buchanan in Protestant support. The second ballot accentuated the split. Doucet won two-thirds of the Catholic vote, while Buchanan was supported by 58% of the Protestants. The initial impression is that the under representation of Catholics (37% of the population to 25% of the convention) may have cost Doucet the leadership. However, if more Catholics had been present it would have been a very different party, more like the Liberals. Catholics made up at least 45% of the delegate total at the two Liberal conventions and historically have played a more prominent role in that party.

The rumors suggesting a religious division in 1980 appear to have been very well founded. On the first ballot, Cameron won over half the Protestant vote, but was outpolled by MacLean by a margin of 41% to

26% among Catholics. Seventy percent of Cameron's supporters were Protestant, while 63% of MacLean's were Catholic.

This split persisted on the second ballot. Cameron's share of the Protestant vote climbed to 60% while MacLean's Catholic support rose to 47%. Given the large number of Catholic delegates, a third ballot was necessary. Cameron's 62% of the third ballot vote came from winning 71% of the Protestant vote and just over half of the Catholic vote. The importance of the religious division is clear. If only Protestants voted, Cameron would have won a first ballot victory. If only Catholics voted, MacLean might have won.

A religious split was again evident in 1986, although it was not as stark as at the other conventions. MacLean was able to win majority support from both religious groups, but his share of the Catholic vote was 20 points higher than his share of the Protestant vote. Cowan was far more successful in attracting support from Protestants.

There is little doubt that all three conventions were affected by a religiously based voting cleavage. Catholics and Protestants vote differently, even at leadership conventions. Rumors regarding the political demise of religion in Nova Scotia appear exaggerated.

Finally, the analysis moves to consider the economic variables. Given the history of Nova Scotian politics, divisions among these groups would be rather surprising. Rather surprisingly, such divisions appear. (See Table 6.) Nonetheless, they offer little evidence of a consistent status gap in delegate voting.

Income level was associated with voting on two of the six ballots. On the first ballot in 1980, Cameron was outpolled by MacLean among delegates at the highest income level. Subsequent ballots saw Cameron correct this trend. In 1986, Cowan won 49% of the votes cast by the wealthiest delegates, but was not nearly as successful in attracting support from their less affluent colleagues.

Level of education provided even less evidence of delegate voting divisions. Only on the final ballot in 1971 could an education gap be discerned. University educated delegates gave Doucet 58% of their votes, while Buchanan was given majority support from the less educated delegates. Class, or occupational status, was also significantly associated with voting only on the second ballot of the 1971 convention. Again, Doucet won 56% of the upper middle class vote, a share that declined with class level.

The economic variables, then, appeared to exert an influence mainly at the 1971 convention. Delegates who could be considered higher status, that is upper middle class or university educated, preferred

Doucet over Buchanan. The other delegates did not. It is something of a surprise to discover that economic variables may have been important at even one of the conventions. High status delegates preferred the loser in 1971. It may be that such a preference is related to the more expected regional or religious differences. This possibility will be examined later.

This presentation of the bivariate association between delegate voting and selected group variables indicates (see Tables 7 and 8) that religion is associated more strongly and consistently with voting than any other social group variable. Aside from the reference to Mooney not supporting a fellow Catholic in 1980, the journalistic coverage was silent as to the existence of religion as a source of voting divisions. Indeed, questions over the place of religion in Nova Scotian politics are controversial. It seems that no religious issues exist which divide the province,²² that partisan support cuts across party lines,²³ and that the religious traditions seem "to have decreased in importance."²⁴ Yet this is not supported by the evidence presented here. One potential explanation for the continuing importance of religion at conventions suggests that religion's decline is most pronounced among the young, the highly educated or members of the higher classes. The religious influence might not appear among members of these groups and it existed at conventions only because members of these groups were not present in large enough numbers.²⁵

Broadly speaking, however, further investigation reveals that educational and class controls could not remove religion as an important source of cleavage at the three conventions. (See Table 8.) While significant results could not be obtained for each category, the tendency of Protestants to disproportionately support Protestants and Catholics, Catholics was omnipresent. The religious cleavage was significant at all conventions for both *university educated and upper middle class* delegates. Religion as a source of cleavage, then, was not appreciably weaker among these relatively elite delegates. Moreover, a multiple regression analysis that includes all geographic and social groups (Table 11) indicates that religion was significantly associated with voting at every convention.

The impact of age on religion is somewhat harder to describe. In 1971, Doucet won a majority of votes cast by delegates under thirty regardless of their religious affiliation. Yet his share of the Catholic youth vote was much higher than his share of the Protestant youth vote. Cameron, in 1980, invariably won more support from Protestants than Catholics. However, on the two final ballots MacLean won a

majority of the votes cast by young Catholic delegates, but not from older Catholic delegates. Thus, contrary to expectations, it was the older delegates who did not adhere to the religious division. At the 1986 convention, Cowan's support from youth delegates was primarily Protestant. He won a majority of the Protestant youth vote but, in contrast, took only a third of the Catholic youth vote. His share of the votes from Catholic youth was actually smaller than his share of the votes from older Protestants.

The importance of the religious cleavage, then, is scarcely diminished by the introduction of age, educational or class controls. In essence, Protestants and Catholics vote differently regardless of age, class or educational similarities. This is not to say that such categories are unimportant. Rather, their influence is, at least, mitigated by the religious variable.

The importance of age per se, can be seen in Table 7. Age was significantly associated with voting at each convention and the value of Cramer's V was higher with age than it was with any other group variable save religion. The interaction with religion discussed above helps make clearer the nature of a possible generation gap. In 1971, the impact of religion was more subdued among the younger delegates. Specifically, Doucet was preferred over the other candidates regardless of religion. However, this age effect was limited to Protestants: young Catholic delegates were no more supportive of Doucet than were their elders!

In examining the age cleavage in 1980, the introduction of a religious control virtually removed the significance of age on the second ballot. The proportion in which Protestants and Catholics voted for candidates was virtually unaffected by age. However, on the final ballot, while all Protestants gave Cameron majority support, his share rose from 61% of the under-thirty vote to 70% from delegates between thirty and sixty to 85% from delegates over sixty. Even among Catholics, his highest level of support comes from the older delegates. Religion notwithstanding, Cameron's candidacy was strongest among the older delegates.

At the 1986 convention religious controls did not remove the significance of the age cleavage, but highlighted the precise nature of that cleavage. Among Protestants, only youth provided Cowan with majority support. Similarly, the proportion of support for MacLean increased with the age of Catholic delegates. Cowan's candidacy was strongest with youth of both religious groups, albeit *much* stronger among Protestants.

Religion and age were the only group variables significantly associated with voting at each convention. Other variables were significantly associated with vote at, at best, two conventions.

Somewhat surprisingly, economic groups displayed an association with voting in both 1971 and 1986. In 1971, the tendency was for university educated and upper middle class delegates to support Doucet. However, it appears that the educational split was due largely to the voting of Catholics. (See Table 8.) Buchanan's majority support from Protestants contained majority support from university educated Protestants. His poor showing among the university educated was caused by the 80% support given Doucet by university educated Catholics. The educational division was largely created by the mass support for Doucet from university educated Catholic delegates—as strong an objection to the notion that religion becomes less influential as status increases as one is likely to find. Similarly, the impact of the class variable was modified by the introduction of a religious control. Buchanan's Protestant support was consistent across class lines. Doucet's majority in the upper middle class delegate categories derived from the 79% support given him by upper middle class Catholics. In essence, the economic divisions discovered in 1971 are due largely to the overwhelming support for Doucet provided by high status Catholics.

Income level was the economic variable most strongly associated with voting at the 1986 convention. The direction of the association was disproportionate support for Cowan among the wealthy. This association remained noteworthy despite the introduction of religious and age controls. Cowan not only won a slim majority of the votes cast by affluent Protestants (51%), he also won 46% of the votes from affluent Catholics. Less wealthy Catholics gave him no more than 30% support. The more affluent delegates, regardless of religion, were more likely to support Cowan.

Finally, the relationship between delegate type and religion was examined to determine the joint impact on voting. An argument could be made, that *ex officio* delegates with a more immediate interest in leadership questions might be immune from the religious division. The delegate type variable was itself significant only at the 1980 convention. Briefly recapitulated, the tendency was for Cameron to receive proportionately more support from *ex officio* delegates than he did from the constituency delegates. The question is whether *ex officio* Catholics were more supportive of Cameron than constituency delegates.

The answer is yes! It becomes clear that the significance of Cameron's ex officio support was due largely to his support from ex officio Catholics. On the first ballot Cameron won a plurality of 43% from Catholic ex officio delegates, but was beaten by MacLean by 19 points among Catholic constituency delegates. Again on the final ballots, Cameron was outpolled among Catholic constituency delegates, while he won comfortable majorities of the ex officio vote. While results for the final two ballots were not significant, it seems clear that the general weakness Cameron had in attracting Catholic support did not apply to ex officio delegates. Perhaps these delegates were more cognizant of the tradition that said it was a Protestant's turn and acted from more brokerage minded motivations.

At the other conventions the division of delegate type had almost no impact on the religious cleavage. In both 1971 and 1986, Protestant ex officio delegates voted more similarly to Protestant constituency delegates than they did to Catholic ex officio delegates. Voting by ex officio delegates evidenced just as strong a religious cleavage as did the voting of constituency delegates. Of course, at neither of these conventions were brokerage concerns as explicit as they were in 1980.

The interaction of the group variables helps elucidate the patterns of delegate support. In order to understand more fully the nature of the voting divisions it is necessary to analyze the relationship between group variables and geographic variables. As Table 7 showed, the strongest associations with vote were invariably found to be regional. The notion of region at the provincial level is somewhat problematic. Few observers claim that Nova Scotian politics is riven with sectionalism. Instead of region per se being important, it may be that regions simply contain different concentrations of social groups and the regional dimension replicates a religious or age division. Conceived in this way, friends and neighbors support might simply be a product of differing concentrations of the religious and age groups earlier found to be important.

The effect of religion at the 1971 convention does not justify the container argument. The regional cleavage was significant for both religious groups on the final ballot and for Catholics on the first. This does not mean that religion was unimportant. In every region but one (Annapolis Valley) Doucet received more support from Catholics than he did from Protestants. The reverse was true for Buchanan. It should also be noted that excluding Cape Breton, the only region in which a majority of delegates were Catholic, does not remove the significance of religion. Even when consideration is limited to the mainland, Pro-

testants gave majority support to Buchanan and Catholics preferred Doucet.

The same pattern was largely evident at the 1980 convention. The significance of the regional cleavage was maintained for both religious groups on each ballot. The regional cleavage was not, then, a product of religion. Nonetheless, in each region support was higher for Cameron among Protestants and for MacLean among Catholics. The only exceptions to this trend were the Annapolis Valley and the South Shore, both on the third ballot. The Valley and South Shore were Mooney's strongest regions and it may be that Catholic supporters of Mooney shared his reluctance to support MacLean.²⁶

The results from the 1986 convention do not justify the region as container argument either. The regional cleavage was significant for both religious groups. However, the religious cleavage remains significant even if Cape Breton is excluded. Mainland delegates who were also Catholic were extremely supportive of MacLean while Protestants were more likely to support Cowan. On Cape Breton, Cowan's candidacy was only marginally stronger among Protestants.

The interaction of the religious and regional variables at the three conventions serves to underline the independent impact of region. It is clear that the friends and neighbors effect diminishes the pattern of religious voting. However, one cannot dismiss religion as an artifact of region. Generally, the tendency of Protestants to give disproportionate support to Protestants and Catholics to Catholics was present. If only Catholics voted, Doucet would have been chosen leader in 1971 and MacLean might have won in 1980. If only Protestants voted, Cowan would have had a respectable 45% of the vote in 1986. Indeed, he took almost half of the votes cast by mainland Protestants. Religion, then, was by no means incidental.

The interaction of age and region in 1971 reveals much of the convention dynamic. Only for delegates between thirty and sixty, the bulk of convention goers, was region significantly associated with vote. Even on the mainland most delegates under 30 preferred Doucet. Most older delegates, *except in Cape Breton*, voted for Buchanan.

Age divisions were less significant in 1980. Region was significantly associated with voting for all age groups on all three ballots. Regional preferences were unmitigated by age. In 1986, as in 1980, the regional cleavage was significant for all age groups. Unlike 1980, however, this appears to mask a strong age effect. Examination of each region showed that delegates under thirty gave Cowan a majority everywhere

save Cape Breton. In Cape Breton, MacLean's impressive showing was unmarred by the relative disdain of youth.

The use of regional controls highlighted the nature of the age cleavage at the three conventions. In 1986, it was apparent that, although Cowan was preferred by Mainland youth, his youth support could not penetrate Cape Breton. MacLean's proportionate weakness among young delegates in 1986 stands in contrast to his relatively strong youth support in 1980. Perhaps his 1980 youth support is better understood as weakness among the over sixty delegates. On the final ballot, his share of the over sixty vote reached a mainland high of 27% in metro Halifax and only exceeded 10% in one other region. Cameron's support from the aged largely failed to spread to Cape Breton. Age seemed most important in 1971 where the final ballot saw Doucet carry a majority of the youth vote everywhere but the Annapolis Valley. However, only in Cape Breton, was his youth support exceeded by support from older delegates.

Cape Breton stands alone in the consistency of its voting pattern. On every ballot at each convention, the Cape Breton candidate won a majority of votes cast by island delegates regardless of age or even religion. Other regions were also loyal. For instance, Mooney and Cameron won pluralities from all ages and religious groups in their home regions. However, in 1971, Thornhill's plurality in metro Halifax masked majority support for Doucet from the youth and plurality support from Catholics. The friends and neighbors effect, then, can be limited.

The other significant group variables—education and class in 1971; income in 1986; and delegate type in 1980—modify the regional trends slightly. Doucet carried Cape Breton regardless of education or class level. On the mainland he was outpolled by Buchanan among the upper middle class, but carried the university educated vote in almost every region. Cowan won a majority of votes cast by the wealthiest mainlanders, but had almost no support from wealthy Cape Breton delegates.

Delegate type did not eliminate the regional pattern of South Shore support for Mooney on the first two ballots nor the loyalty of Cape Bretoners for MacLean. Ex officio delegates were also susceptible to the friends and neighbors effect. However, Cameron did do much better with Cape Breton ex officio delegates than he did with constituency delegates. (He still attracted only minority support.) At the other conventions delegate type was even less relevant to the regional cleavage. The regional cleavage remained significant and the patterns

were virtually identical for both types of delegates. It is difficult to maintain, then, that ex officio delegates were less affected by the friends and neighbors pull than their constituency brethren. The friends and neighbors pattern appears ubiquitous.

Attitudes

The very existence of an attitudinal cleavage depends on the presence of actual disagreement. If the delegates are in general agreement then an attitudinally based voting cleavage is impossible. As Table 10 shows such agreement did not exist at any of the Nova Scotian conventions. A consensus index²⁷ indicates the degree of disagreement among the delegates. On a range of 0 to 50 (perfect consensus) the three conventions record average scores of only 21.6, 25.7 and 16.0. There was then ample possibility of an attitudinal cleavage. Whether these differences were utilized by the candidates is another matter.

The convention campaigns suggest not. Generally, the candidates waged similar campaigns that were more notable for the widespread policy agreement than for disagreements. Delegates, then could not pick up on clearly different issue positions on the part of the candidates.

However, Adamson has shown that in 1971 an attitudinal division in voting could be seen.²⁸ Indeed, on the first ballot eight attitudinal variables were significantly associated with voting while this was the case for nine variables on the second. (See Table 10.) The disagreement appeared particularly salient on issues that could be considered French/English. On the first ballot, delegates who did not agree that Quebec should have special recognition in Confederation, who felt no special attention should be paid to Quebec and who believed that French Canadians should have no special privileges gave the plurality of their support to Buchanan. Those who held opposing views and who agreed that it was all right to speak to Anglo provincial governments in French delivered sizable pluralities to Doucet. This trend continued on the second ballot with the exception that the pluralities hardened into majorities. In each case, most delegates held the position from which Buchanan drew more support.

Certain other areas of disagreement were also associated with voting. On the first ballot, Buchanan won pluralities from delegates agreeing that employers have the right to seek strike injunctions, that government spends too much on social welfare, and that government should interfere less with business. Doucet took a majority of votes

cast by delegates with opposing views. The final ballot saw Buchanan's pluralities become majorities.

The only other variables associated with vote in a significant way dealt with the idea of Maritime union. On the first ballot, Buchanan won a 46% plurality from delegates who did not want Nova Scotia to enter into formal economic cooperation with the other Maritime provinces. Doucet took a plurality of 40% from delegates desirous of such cooperation. The final ballot saw Buchanan win a majority from delegates who believed that Nova Scotia should enter no kind of Maritime union, while Doucet won a majority from those holding divergent opinions.

Perhaps then, Buchanan's victory over Doucet was, at least partially, a victory for the conservative wing of the party. It certainly indicates that the majority of Nova Scotian Progressive Conservatives held rather conservative views.

The 1980 Liberal convention was not marked by as much attitudinal division. Interestingly, as in 1971, there was disagreement over the place of Quebec in Confederation. The final two ballots showed a clear preference for Cameron from delegates who did not feel that Quebec should have special recognition. In a slightly contrary vein, Cameron's support was stronger among delegates who did not agree that government spends too much on social welfare. MacLean did much better with delegates who felt that too much was spent. This variable was only associated with voting on the first ballot and no other relevant attitudinal variables were associated with voting.²⁹

It is difficult to support the contention that attitudinal differences had much impact on voting at the 1980 convention. No clear pattern seemed to separate supporters of one candidate from those of another. At the very least, the variables used in the 1980 survey do not provide evidence of an attitudinal voting cleavage.

The impact of attitudes on voting in 1986 was also minimal. Three variables were significantly associated with voting, but it is difficult to read much in these differences. One of the issues likely measured a regional division. The majority of delegates believed that the SYSCO coke ovens should be closed. MacLean received 72% support from those who disagreed, but only 59% from those holding the majority disposition. Since the ovens are in Cape Breton and were most valuable to that region's economy, it might have been MacLean's island support that was measured. MacLean attracted slightly more support from delegates who wanted the provincial government to have more power than he did from those in disagreement (66% versus 57%). He

also did proportionately better among delegates who supported the firing of Conservative appointees following a Liberal victory. It is important to stress that all of these differences were simply of degree. MacLean won majority support from delegates regardless of the position they held on any of the variables measured.

The Conservative convention stands out as the only convention where attitudinal disagreements appear related to voting in any coherent fashion. Liberal disagreements do not lend themselves to generalization. (One should however note that the attitudinal variables differed by convention and were not selected to provide an indication of ideological conflict within the party. They are presented merely to show the degree to which delegates who supported different candidates held different opinions on the issues measured.) The general conclusion is that the importance of attitudes at Liberal conventions is very low, but that voting at the Conservative convention might have had an attitudinal base. However, these attitudinal divisions might also have replicated the earlier divisions based on friends and neighbors, religion and age.

It is also possible that Doucet's Acadian ancestry may have spurred some delegates to take an anti-Quebec or an anti-French position. In essence, opposition to Doucet may itself have led delegates to take such positions. Further investigation revealed significant attitudinal divisions between Catholics and Protestants on these issues. Catholics were more likely to believe that Quebec should have special recognition and that it is fine to address English provincial governments in French. They were less likely to agree that no special attention should be paid to Quebec or that Francophones should have no special privileges. What this indicates is that the attitudinal voting division on these issues may indeed simply replicate the religious division. The significant association of such opinions with voting may be due to the presence of a Catholic candidate. Without such a candidate the differences in opinion between the religious groups might not have resulted in different voting patterns. It is also true that young delegates were significantly more likely to take pro-Quebec/French positions than were older delegates. Again, there is a coincidence between membership in a group more likely to support Doucet and issue positions.

Moreover, significant attitudinal differences were found between Cape Bretoners and mainlanders on whether governments spend too much on social welfare and whether governments should interfere less with business. Not surprisingly, delegates from government-dependent Cape Breton were less willing to criticize government spending or regula-

tion. Again, the association of these attitudes with voting replicates the friends and neighbors support for Doucet. Support for him from these delegates then, may represent friends and neighbors voting more than an expression of attitudinal affinity. One might conclude, given the lack of policy disagreement in the campaign and the traditional absence of ideology in Nova Scotian politics, that the attitudinal disagreement at the 1971 Conservative convention should be understood in the context of the religious, generational and friends and neighbors voting that marked that convention.³⁰

Some Conclusions

This study leaves little doubt that friends and neighbors support and religious divisions were more strongly related to voting than were any other variables. Multiple regression analysis indicates that the strongest factors in the support of almost all candidates were regional and that significant religious divisions existed at each convention. (See Table 11.) It is quite clear that region was pre-eminent and much support exists for considering Nova Scotian conventions in a friends and neighbors context.

The nature of the regional cleavage obviously indicates that it was favorite son support. Candidates drew best from their home regions. This was particularly true of Cape Breton. On the second ballot in 1971, Doucet won 81% of the Cape Breton vote. On the third ballot in 1980, MacLean won 75% and in 1986 he won 96% of the island votes. Indeed, multiple regression indicates that Cape Breton residency was the major factor in support for each of the Cape Breton candidates. Cape Bretoners were extremely supportive of their local candidates but this tendency was by no means restricted to Cape Breton.

Mainland candidates generally attracted their highest level of support from their home regions as well. In 1971, Thornhill's only regional plurality came from metro Halifax. In 1980, MacInnis did best in the capital region, while Mooney won a majority only in his home region of the South Shore. Multiple regression analysis reveals that home area was the major factor in support for each of these candidates. Even Cameron, on the final two ballots, had his highest support from the Eastern Mainland delegates.

Buchanan and Cowan were the only candidates for whom pronounced friends and neighbors support was not readily apparent. For Cowan, lack of support in the metro Halifax region masked his support in the city of Halifax itself. Cowan actually won 52% of the

votes cast by delegates living in the city of Halifax (over 100,000). His friends and neighbors support simply did not spread to Dartmouth or the suburbs. Friends and neighbors support for Thornhill was also strengthened when the city of Halifax was separated from the metro Halifax region. He won 84% of the vote from the part of the region that included Dartmouth, but was not as popular among delegates from Halifax itself.

Buchanan stands alone in not experiencing friends and neighbors support. He had the least support both in his region of birth, Cape Breton, and his region of residence, metro Halifax. He compensated for this by winning virtually everywhere else. His lack of friends and neighbors support may be attributed to the presence of other regional candidates whose claims on regional loyalties were stronger than his. On the positive side, Buchanan's lack of explicit friends and neighbors support enabled him to claim ties to various other regions, claims that the other candidates could not validly make.³¹

The friends and neighbors effect spilled into adjacent regions. Thornhill, Mooney and MacInnis all had their strongest support in their home region, but their second best showing came from the adjacent Annapolis Valley. Cameron's base extended along the Northumberland Strait from the Eastern Mainland to the North Shore, while MacLean, on the first ballot, did his mainland best in the Eastern Mainland.

It is apparent that delegates, when the opportunity to do so exists, are likely to support a candidate from their home region. They are also quite likely to support a candidate from an adjacent region. Candidates do best with delegates who, in geographic terms, can be considered their friends and neighbors.

The second variable strongly associated with voting was religion. Protestant delegates offered disproportionate support to the candidates of Buchanan, Thornhill, Cameron, and Cowan. Each Protestant candidate received more support from Protestants than Catholics. Catholic delegates gave disproportionate support to the Catholic candidates Doucet, MacInnis, MacLean and Mooney. Religion remains important in Nova Scotian politics.

The religious voting differences were hidden in the convention totals. Buchanan's narrow victory in 1971 concealed the fact that he could win only a third of the Catholic vote. Similarly, the convincing victories of Cameron and MacLean suppressed the strong showings made by MacLean (1980) and Cowan among their coreligionists.

This pattern of support for a coreligionist, however, was modified by friends and neighbors support. Candidates, in carrying their home regions, usually carried the vote from both religious groups. For instance, Cape Breton candidates Doucet and MacLean, won majorities from both Catholic and Protestant islanders. As well, Mooney and Cameron were able to win support from both religious groups in their home regions. In contrast, Thornhill's friends and neighbors support came mainly from the votes of his fellow Protestants although when Dartmouth is considered separately, Thornhill had more Catholic support than Doucet. Indeed, even in the cases in which candidates received home region support from both religious groups, their level of support was always higher among delegates of their own religion. In essence, while delegates, regardless of religion, tended to support local candidates, they supported most strongly a neighbor who was in another sense a religious friend.

The importance of religion can be further seen by examining age, the only other variable consistently associated with voting. It will be recalled that losing candidates Doucet, MacLean and Cowan achieved their highest levels of support from delegates under thirty—with Doucet actually winning a majority from that group. However, only Doucet was able to win majority youth support from both religious groups and even he attracted much greater support from young Catholics. MacLean was able to win majority support from young Catholics on the two final ballots in 1980 and Cowan received the bulk of votes cast by young Protestants in 1986. Neither were successful in gaining youth votes from delegates in the other religious group.

It is beyond contention that the traditional cleavages of region and religion were evident at all of the Nova Scotian conventions. There are no partisan differences, each party convention expressed the same divisions.

With few exceptions, delegates divided on the basis of region and religion regardless of similarities in age, education, class, or income. The traditional variables exerted a strong influence even among relatively high status Nova Scotians. Surprisingly, *ex officio* delegates, except in 1980, were as affected by the regional and religious cleavages as the constituency delegates. The uniqueness of 1980 may be due to a realization on the part of Catholic *ex officio* delegates that if Cameron did not win, arguments that it was a Catholic's turn could never again be made. At the other conventions considerations of this ilk were unnecessary.

It appears that the delegates least susceptible to the religious and regional voting trends were the young delegates. They were more likely to vote in violation of these trends than other delegates. However, even their immunity was only relative and regional and religious differences could still be observed. One should also note that the support for Catholic candidates by Catholic youth *never wavered*.

Certain variables had almost no association with voting. Gender and ethnicity had little effect on the voting of delegates. Nor were either of the Liberal conventions marked by attitudinal voting divisions. The Conservative convention of 1971, however, did display an interesting attitudinally based voting division.

The Progressive Conservative party of Nova Scotia appeared more conservative than progressive. The bulk of delegates held rather conservative views on the role of government and the place of Quebec, and Francophones in general, in the country. Buchanan's candidacy was very popular with delegates holding these views, but he was unable to win majority support from the delegates holding contrary positions. This is not to say that the 1971 convention was ideologically divided. It is not clear whether the issues on which significant voting divisions could be found were even salient, although one must concede that such potential did exist. At any rate, delegates could not pick up on explicit ideological signals from the candidates and, the attitudinal divisions that did exist were strongly associated with divisions on the basis of religion, age and region.

This analysis of convention voting in Nova Scotia finds that region and religion were the most important sources of voting divisions. The demise of religion in the province has been greatly exaggerated. At Nova Scotian conventions, where a candidate is from and the nature of his religious background, are very important considerations. Nova Scotian conventions fit very well into a friends and neighbors framework.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Marshall Conley and Agar Adamson of Acadia University for making available the data on which this paper is based. They bear no responsibility for the use made of the data.
2. All present premiers were selected at conventions as were all opposition leaders except Jacques Parizeau of the P.Q.
3. See John McMenemy and Conrad Winn, *Political Parties in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1976), 152.

4. Dalton Camp, *Gentlemen, Players and Politicians* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1979), 151.
5. Peter Aucoin, "The 1970 Nova Scotia Provincial Election," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 7 (1972), 27.
6. Agar Adamson, "The 1971 Nova Scotia P.C. Leadership Convention: How Representative," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 1972. Peter Kavanaugh, *John Buchanan: The Art of Political Survival* (Halifax: Formac, 1988), 50.
7. Duncan Fraser, "Nova Scotia," in John Saywell (ed.), *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1972), 146.
8. J. Murray Beck, *Politics of Nova Scotia* (Tantallon: Four East Publications, 1988), 273, 240.
9. Richard Johnston, "The Final Choice," in George Perlin (ed.), *Party Democracy in Canada* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1988), 204.
10. For a good discussion of the events surrounding the convention and the convention itself see Adamson, "The 1971 Nova Scotia P.C. Leadership Convention."
11. *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, March 3, 1971, 1. But see Adamson, 15.
12. *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, March 8, 1971, 1.
13. *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, May 27, 1980, 1, 2, 6.
14. *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, June 12, 1980, 7.
15. Agar Adamson, "The 1981 Nova Scotia Provincial Election," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 1982, 5.
16. *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, February 22, 1986, 8.
17. *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, February 3, 1986, 21; February 6, 1986, 3.
18. *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, February 24, 1986, 16.
19. The regions are based on combinations of counties—the unit on which all Nova Scotian constituencies are based. Annapolis Valley: Digby, Annapolis, Kings and Hants; South Shore: Yarmouth, Shelburne, Queens and Lunenburg; Halifax Metro: Metro Halifax; North Shore: Cumberland and Colchester; Eastern Mainland: Pictou, Antigonish, Guysborough and non-Metro Halifax; Cape Breton: Cape Breton Island. For a largely similar description of Nova Scotia's regions see Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1986), 183.
20. The term friends and neighbors is one used by V.O. Key in his classic *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949). Briefly, it was a pattern of localistic support for gubernatorial candidates. In a primary election, free of the impact of party identification and with no enduring factions, candidates tended to rack up huge margins in their home area. Subsequently the term has been used in a variety of situations all of them basically outside of inter party competition, in politics that are largely traditional and rural. Nova Scotia would seem to fit on all dimensions.
21. See Camp, 1979, 151; see also Dyck, 1986, 115.
22. J. Murray Beck, *The Government of Nova Scotia* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1957), 166.
23. J. Murray Beck, "Nova Scotia," in Martin Robin (ed.), *Canadian Provincial Politics* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1978), 201.
24. Adamson, "The 1981 Nova Scotia Provincial Election," 5.
25. Still Nova Scotian delegates are the same relatively elite group that seem to populate all leadership conventions. For a somewhat similar argument regarding regionalism see Jon Pammett, "Public Orientations to Regions and Politics," in David Bellamy et al (eds.), *The Provincial Political Systems* (Toronto: Methuen, 1976), 92, 93.
26. See above page 3 for speculation on Mooney's failure to endorse MacLean.
27. The consensus index is taken from Donald E. Blake, R.K. Carty and Lynda Erickson, "Social Credit Leadership Selection in B.C.," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 21 (1988), 519, 520. Basically, a score is arrived at by subtracting from the percentage who agree with a particular statement the absolute value of 50. If 100% or 0% agree with the statement, the score is 50—perfect consensus. If 50% agree, the score is 0 indicating an evenly divided opinion split or no consensus. The higher the score the closer opinions are to perfect consensus.
28. Adamson, "The 1971 Nova Scotia P.C. Leadership Convention," 16, 31.
29. Some attitudinal divisions based on internal party matters are not discussed here. For instance, in both 1980 and 1986, delegates who supported losing candidates were more willing to tinker with the convention system.

30. Indeed, when examination of the significant issues is limited to delegates who were either from Cape Breton or were Catholics, one invariably finds majority support for Doucet. Regardless of attitude, delegates who were Catholics and/or Cape Bretoners delivered a majority of votes to Doucet. Similarly, when only Protestant mainlanders over 30 are considered the pattern of majority support for Buchanan is widespread. Only on one issue did he fail to receive half the votes from both sides and that failure was by the slimmest of possible margins.
31. One aspect of Key's treatment of friends and neighbors emphasized the importance of past or family ties. If this is applied in 1971 then perhaps some form of friends and neighbors support did exist for Buchanan. His strongest regions were the Annapolis Valley and the South Shore, regions that essentially meet at Digby. As a student, Buchanan had worked summers in Digby, his wife was from the Digby area and his eldest son was born in the area. One might interpret his support there as a kind of friends and neighbors effect. Such an interpretation also serves to make more comprehensible his support from Catholic delegates in that area.

APPENDIX

Table 1
Comparison of convention votes with sample vote

		Actual	Sample
1971	Buchanan	33%	33%
	Doucet	38	39
	Thornhill	29	27
1980	Cameron	37%	40%
	MacInnis	14	14
	MacLean	27	29
	Mooney	21	17
1986	Cowan	40%	38%
	MacLean	60	62

In all tables percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Table 2
Delegate Voting by Region (Percentage Down)

	Annapolis Valley	South Shore	Halifax Metro	North Shore	Eastern Mainland	Cape Breton
1971						
Buchanan	41 (62)	40 (64)	33 (56)	35 (49)	42 (54)	9 (19)
Doucet	29 (38)	33 (36)	33 (44)	37 (51)	37 (46)	72 (81)
Thornhill	30	27	35	28	20	19
1980						
Cameron	35 (70)	26 (75)	39 (65)	76 (79)	73 (80)	14 (25)
MacInnis	20	9	24	9	2	9
MacLean	18 (30)	12 (25)	21 (35)	9	23	73 (75)
Mooney	26	53	17	5	—	2
1986						
Cowan	44	48	43	59	46	4
MacLean	56	52	57	41	54	96

Figures in brackets are final ballot results. All figures significant, chi square < .000.

Table 3
Metro Halifax: Voting by Community Size

	Over 100,000	1,000-100,000	Under 1000
Thornhill	21%	81%	20%
Cowan	52%	34%	44%

Figures significant, chi square < .01.

Table 4
Voting by Institutional Variables: Age, Delegate Type
(Percentage Down)

	Age			Delegate Type	
	Under 30	30-60	Over 60	Regular	Ex officio
1971					
Buchanan	26 (40)	34 (51)	37 (65)		
Doucet	40 (60)	37 (49)	29 (35)		
Thornhill	19	28	34		
1980 (3rd)					
Cameron	54	62	79	[48] 60	[63] 73
MacLean	47	38	22	[36] 40	[28] 27
1986					
Cowan	47	35	32		
MacLean	53	65	68		

1971: figures in brackets are final results. 1980: figures in square brackets are second ballot results. All figures significant, chi square < .05.

Table 5
Voting by Religion

		Protestant	Catholic
1971	Buchanan	37% (58%)	20% (33%)
	Doucet	33 (42)	57 (67)
	Thornhill	30	22
1980	Cameron	50% (71%)	26% (50%)
	MacInnis	13	14
	MacLean	20 (29)	41 (50)
1986	Mooney	17	18
	Cowan	45%	26%
	MacLean	55	74

Figures in brackets are final ballot results. All figures significant, chi square < .000.

Table 6
Vote by Economic Variables: Class, Education, Income

1971 (2nd)	Class			Education		
	Upper Middle	Middle	Working	University	High School	Less than High School
Buchanan	44%	56%	62%	47%	49%	53%
Doucet	56	44	38	53	41	47

	Income		
	High	Medium	Low
1980			
Cameron	29%	43%	46%
MacInnis	12	14	12
MacLean	31	29	33
Mooney	28	15	10
1986			
Cowan	49%	34%	42%
Maclean	51	66	58

All figures significant, chi square < .05.

Table 7
Association between voting and selected variables using
Cramer's V as a measure of association

Variable	Cramer's V					
	1971 P.C.		1980 Liberal			1986 Liberal
	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	3rd	
Region	.23	.30	.40	.43	.41	.37
Urban/rural	.17	—*	—	—	—	.14
Ethnicity	—	—	—	—	—	—
Religion	.22	.22	.27	.25	.22	.19
Age	.13	.16	—	.11	.16	.12
Sex	—	—	—	—	—	—
Delegate type	—	—	—	.12	.10	—
Education	—	.15	—	—	—	—
Income	—	—	.13	—	—	—
Class	—	.13	—	—	—	—

* Cramer's V reported only chi square was significant at .05.

Table 8
**Vote by Religion (Controlling for Upper Middle Class,
 University Degree, Youth, Ex Officio)**

UPPR MIDDLE CLASS								
1971	Prot.	R.C.	1980	Prot.	R.C.	1986	Prot.	R.C.
Buchanan	56%	21%	Cameron	66%	55%	Cowan	47%	25%
Doucet	42	79	MacLean	34	45	MacLean	53	76%
	*(119)	(43)		*(108)	(111)		*(261)	(284)
UNIVERSITY EDUCATED								
1971	Prot.	R.C.	1980	Prot.	R.C.	1986	Prot.	R.C.
Buchanan	53%	20%	Cameron	68%	51%	Cowan	46%	32%
Doucet	47	80	MacLean	32	49	MacLean	53	68
	*(111)	(46)		*(98)	(113)		*(237)	(212)
YOUTH (under 30)								
1971	Prot.	R.C.	1980	Prot.	R.C.	1986	Prot.	R.C.
Buchanan	42%	33%	Cameron	61%	47%	Cowan	57%	34%
Doucet	58	67	MacLean	39	53	MacLean	43	66
	(60)	(24)		*(44)	(51)		*(113)	(120)
EX OFFICIO								
1971	Prot.	R.C.	1980	Prot.	R.C.	1986	Prot.	R.C.
Buchanan	64%	35%	Cameron	77%	62%	Cowan	44%	21%
Doucet	36	66	MacLean	24	38	MacLean	56	79
	*(84)	*(29)		(51)	(26)		*(118)	(98)

*Figure significant, chi square < .05.

Table 9
**Friends and Neighbours support from Delegates
 under 30 or other religious group**

	Under 30		Other Religious Group	
	Home Region	Average	Home Region	Average
Buchanan	25%	26%	38%	20%
Doucet	73%	55%	48%	33%
Thornhill	25%	18%	25%	22%
Cameron	64%	36%	47%	26%
MacInnis	23%	15%	26%	13%
MacLean	64%	33%	63%	20%
Mooney	50%	17%	52%	17%
Cowan	60%	47%	38%	26%
MacLean	97%	53%	90%	55%

Table 10
Policy Consensus: Percent in Agreement and Consensus Index

	1971		1980		1986	
	% agree	C.I.	% agree	C.I.	% agree	C.I.
1. More power for the provinces +	64	14	29	21	43*	7
2. Special recognition for Quebec	23*	27	43*	7	26	24
3. Favor unrestricted right to strike	26	24	36	14	—	—
4. Employers have right to seek strike injunctions	65*	15	—	—	—	—
5. Too much spent on social welfare	60*	10	59*	9	46	4
6. Right to foreign capital	73	23	82	32	—	—
7. Government must help helpless	93	43	93	43	—	—
8. Pay welfare only to needy	95	45	95	45	—	—
9. Government should interfere less with business	59*	9	—	—	—	—
10. Offshore a joint responsibility	—	—	86	36	—	—
11. More federal money for poor provinces	94	44	83	33	—	—
12. N.S. should control Offshore	90	40	14	36	—	—
13. Favor Maritime union	10	40	29	21	26	24
14. SYSCO ovens should remain open	—	—	—	—	30*	20
15. Negotiate freer trade with U.S.	—	—	—	—	35	15
16. Reduce U.S. cultural influence	58	8	—	—	—	—
17. No firing of tory appointees	—	—	—	—	50*	0
18. Pay no attention to Quebec demands	48*	2	—	—	—	—
19. No special privileges for Francophones	76*	26	—	—	—	—
20. Use French to deal with provincial governments	35*	15	—	—	—	—
21. N.S. control environmental legislation	60	10	—	—	—	—

+ Not all attitudinal variables are contained in this table.

* Significantly associated with voting.

Table 11
Social and Geographic effects on vote (Multiple Regression)

Variable+	Buchanan	Doucet	Thornhill	Buchanan (2)	Cowan
Dartmouth	-.24*	-.34**	.57**	.33**	—
Cape Breton	-.30**	.34**	-.04	-.34**	-.37**
Urban++	.03	.03	-.06	-.02	.06
Ex officio	.04	-.01	-.03	.06	.01
Under 30	-.05	.20**	-.15*	-.11	.10**
Male	-.02	.07	-.05	-.05	.05
British	-.06	.11	-.05	-.03	—
Protestant	.07	-.14*	.06	.13*	.09*
College	-.08	.04	.05	-.12	-.01
Wealthy	.03	.02	.02	.01	.11*
	r sq.	r sq.	r sq.	r sq.	r sq.
	.10	.18	.12	.17	.17

Variable+	Cameron	MacInnis	MacLean	Mooney	Cameron (3)
Eastern Mainland	.02	-.08	.12	-.06	.06
South Shore	-.41**	-.02	-.04	.47**	-.17
Cape Breton	-.48**	.03	.53**	-.09	-.46**
Halifax metro	-.23**	.18**	.03	.02	-.04
Ex officio	.05	.05	-.01	-.08	.02
Under 30	-.06	.01	.02	.03	-.03
Male	.00	.03	-.06	.03	-.10
British	.03	-.02	.05	-.07	.06
Protestant	.16**	.00	-.11*	-.06	.13*
College	.00	-.04	.03	.01	.00
Wealthy	-.12	-.07	.08	.11*	-.05
	r sq.	r sq.	r sq.	r sq.	r sq.
	.21	.07	.24	.22	.21

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

+ Independent variables are dummy variables scored "1" if they have the characteristic named "0" otherwise. The dependent variable, vote, is also a dummy variable scored "1" if the vote was for the candidate named, "0" otherwise.

++ Urban means community over 100,000.