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Huxley's Cosmic Dandy

Rebellion against conventional answers to modern man's metaphysical questions has been so well-documented in the literature of this century that the social, political or metaphysical rebel is a familiar character. He is so central to modern letters that understanding the nature of his rebellion is requisite to understanding much that has been written since Nietzsche. In fact, there is probably no single statement more frequently associated with man's rebellion than Nietzsche's announcement of God's death, an avowal less personal than generic. In his definitive work on the nature of man's rebellion, *The Rebel*, Albert Camus emphasizes Nietzsche's role as spokesman for his contemporaries: "Nietzsche did not form a plot to kill God. He found him dead in the soul of his contemporaries."¹ Camus identifies man's metaphysical rebellion, his rejection of the old God of Injustice, as the source of social and political revolution. The rebel sees life as chaos and seeks a new God of Justice, One who will restore order and harmony. An excellent example of the modern rebel is Maurice Spandrell, the quester dandy of Aldous Huxley's *Point Counter Point*. The novel is itself a quest for harmony, and many of its characters seek God.² Spandrell, Huxley's most controversial seeker of God, exemplifies the author's view of the human dichotomy. Like many of Huxley's contemporaries, Spandrell wants to believe in spiritual tradition, yet he intellectually rejects its platitudes. In the context of *The Rebel*, Spandrell wants to find not so much a "new" God as a new relationship with the old one, a relationship founded upon a more equitable recognition of man's personal, individual right to respect and fair treatment. It is in the guise of the cosmic dandy, a role which Camus says can exist only in relation to God, that Spandrell throws down the gauntlet to the divinity.

Robert S. Baker has described Spandrell's "quest for God" as the one most central to *Point Counter Point*.³ Baker develops a thesis suggested earlier by Donald Watt, who says that Spandrell's quest for

the absolute is possibly a search for a "mother-substitute."⁴ Baker analyzes Spandrell's Freudian masochism and accurately assesses the extent of his preoccupation with the "prostitute complex."⁵ In the eyes of the adolescent Spandrell, his mother prostitutes herself to marry Major Knoyle. Spandrell's faith in his mother's purity was the ideal of his youth.⁶ Losing his ideal and thus, his faith, he deliberately repeats the moment of his mother's violation by violating the innocence of others. Consequently, he violates his own innocence which is hateful to him because it left him vulnerable to an unjust God. In retaliation, he is bent on "spiting [his mother], spiting himself, spiting God."⁷

Baker is clearly on-target in assessing the extent to which Spandrell's Freudian compulsions give rise to his quest for God. But these compulsions are largely subconscious, universal and timeless. They are not peculiar to Spandrell or to *Point Counter Point* in any significant way. There is, however, another aspect of Spandrell's quest, one more conscious, and one more particularly associated with Huxley and those of his peers who are generally acknowledged to be the most immediate models for the characters in the novel. This aspect is suggested but not developed in Baker's article. Quoting from the novel, Baker says that "Spandrell's role as a 'modern aesthete' is to confuse art with life or in Philip Quarles's terms, [to put] art before life"⁸ Spandrell is indeed a modern aesthete, who consciously plays the role of the dandy. It is a role popular with the rebellious young men of the twenties, dandies whose predilection for "cocktails and kisses"⁹ was rakishly flaunted in the face of conventional devotion to God, country and family. Joseph Wood Krutch reviewed *Point Counter Point* in 1928 and recognized Huxley's role as depicter and denouncer of his own generation. Spandrell is "the latest model of the eternal wastrel," whose "insolent modernity" is suggested by both his rebellion and his dandyism.¹⁰

In her recent work on the *honnête homme* and the dandy, Donna Stanton describes the prototypical characteristics of the dandy, including his pose as the bored, unhappy, foppish, egotistical villain and rebel.¹¹ Stanton is concerned primarily with dandyism in the nineteenth century, but it was also cultivated in the aristocratic bohemianism of Huxley's post-war Cafe Society as a means of asserting the individual's superiority to the masses. The intellectual was the new aristocrat beset by democratic domesticity, and he was determined to assert his "will to power" over the plebian majority.¹² Standing out from the crowd in dress, manner and actions was his means of asserting his superiority. Spandrell belongs to the group of dandies who frequent Sbis's Cafe. Most are non-violent, philosophical rebels—Philip Quarles, Mark Rampion, and Willie Weaver. Spandrell, how-

ever, views his rebellion as an active assault against the deity. His Oedipal anxieties appear to feed his intellectual restlessness to the point that he becomes Huxley's most aggressive rebel against God's injustice.

Spandrell rebels against God and the good He represents because he feels betrayed. He is, says Rampion, a "permanent adolescent," who feels abused by Fate and made evil against his will (136). Because "God was really bent on damning him," he has had to define his existence, not in traditional terms of good, but in terms of evil (286). Huxley describes Spandrell's conscious creation of an antithetical identity as role-playing: "He liked, rather childishly, to play the part of the anchorite of diabolism" (181). Camus associates such conscious acting with the dandy's creation of an alternative mode of existence in an "aesthetic of singularity and of negation" (C, 51). This aesthetic is the means by which the dandy redefines his shattered self-image and gives unity to his life:

The dandy is, by occupation, always in opposition. He can exist only by defiance. Up to now man derived his coherence from his Creator. But from the moment that he consecrates his rupture with Him, he finds himself delivered over to the fleeting moment, to the passing days, and to wasted sensibility. Therefore he must take himself in hand. The dandy rallies his forces and creates a unity for himself in the very violence of his refusal. Profligate, like all people without a rule of life, he is coherent as an actor. But an actor implies a public; the dandy can only play a part by setting himself up in opposition. He can only be sure of his existence by finding it in other people's faces. Other people are his mirror. A mirror that quickly becomes clouded, it is true, since human capacity for attention is limited. It must be ceaselessly stimulated, stirred on by provocation. The dandy, therefore, is always compelled to astonish. Singularity is his vocation, excess his way to perfection. Perpetually incomplete, . . . he compels others to create him, while denying their values. He plays at life because he is unable to live it. He plays at it until he dies . . . (C, 51-52).

Thus, Rampion is right when he says that Spandrell must over-act to convince himself that he exists at all (99). His actions are conscious efforts to shock his audience, to play the *diable*.¹³ His viciousness is a studied reaction to the pain of his rejection by the Creator. Hugging his pain to him, he forges a new identity for himself, an identity consonant with his purpose in life: to seek out the deity and challenge His authority.

To say that Spandrell does not want to challenge God, that he wants only to adore Him is to miss much of the philosophical implication of his rebellion. He may want to adore God, but only after God has met his requirements. Camus says that "dandyism admits a nostalgia for ethics" (C, 53). The dandy yearns for God, and at the same time, defies

Him, a dichotomy typical of Spandrell's spiritual attitude. Thus, Camus points out, the blasphemy of the dandy is reverent (C, 55). Wanting but unable to adore, the dandy substitutes, in place of conventional ethics, his own "aesthetic of solitary creators who are the obstinate rivals of a God they condemn" (C, 53). The dandy, especially the intellectual aesthete of modern times, challenges God by seeking knowledge.¹⁴ Spandrell wants divine understanding; he wants *to know* so intensely that he commits murder in an effort to taste the Edenic fruit of knowledge. Yet he finds, he says, only "an enormous stupidity. At the core of the fruit from the knowledge of good and evil he had found" not the awesome fires of holy ground, but more dust and ashes (410). Nonetheless, he refuses to give up the quest. Fighting against his own doubts, he clings to his right to proof of God's existence. Such presumption is clearly blasphemous. To question God is to put oneself on a level with God. That is the position which the dandy dares to assume, but it is not the human position. The human way, says Rampion, is to walk a tightrope with no positive knowledge of absolutes (410-11). Spandrell cannot accept that position and continues to challenge God as the satanic dandy.

Spandrell's defiance of God typifies him as a romantic rebel, an identity supported by Rampion's description of him as a "Peter Pan à la Dostoevsky-cum-de-Musset-cum-the Nineties-cum-Bunyan-cum-Byron and the Marquis de Sade" (136). Camus says that "romanticism, at the source of its inspiration, is chiefly concerned with defying moral and divine law" (C, 50). Rampion's epithet suggests both that defiance and the romantic's "nostalgia for an unrealizable good" (C, 48). Spandrell is both the rebel and the naif. He is "Peter Pan" who retains an adolescent ideal of innocence founded upon an impossible "good," the "unrealizable" purity of his angel-mother. Faced with an earthly woman whose perceived innocence is lost forever, Spandrell challenges God through evil. As the creator of his own dandy image, he is the rival of God (C, 53). Camus has said, "Dandyism, of whatever kind, is always dandyism in relation to God. The individual, in so far as he is a created being, can oppose himself only to the Creator. He has need of God, with whom he carries on a kind of gloomy flirtation" (C, 55). Spandrell teases God in a dandy role comprised of characteristics evident in earlier dandies and rebels. Part of Spandrell's self-conscious pose derives, Rampion suggests, from Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov, the innocent challenger of the God of Injustice. Like Karamazov's rejection of God, Spandrell's is not a denial of His existence so much as it is a refutation of His moral right to rule (C, 55). Spandrell is also a Byronic figure, a Prometheus tormented by an unjust God of Force, a Manfred in metaphysical revolt against the spirits of the heavens.

Spandrell is an amalgam of the dandy characteristics of Ivan Karamazov, the Byronic hero and certain nineteenth-century bohemians like Alfred de Musset, who was frequently called "Byron's brother."¹⁵ In a letter to his brother Julian, Huxley referred to Musset's "spiritual sadisme," a religious philosophy predicated on the enjoyment of pain, on revelling in the Promethean anguish of the scorned of God.¹⁶ *Delectatio morosa* is an especially significant characteristic of the Nineties' dandies, affected strongly by the *Weltschmerz* which Musset, voicing the attitude of his generation, called *le mal du siècle*.¹⁷ Spandrell is the social and cosmic dandy who plays the paradoxical role of the Bunyanesque seeker of God, one more sadistic in his search, however, than penitent.

Consequently, Rampion associates Spandrell with the Marquis de Sade. Camus discusses Sade as a paradigmatic rebel, "the first theoretician of absolute rebellion" (C, 36). Camus points out the inevitable violence of Sade's reasoning: "If God kills and repudiates mankind, there is nothing to stop one from killing and repudiating one's fellow men" (C, 37). Conceiving of God as a murderer, Sade rejected man and morality. Thus, Sade became a passionately violent rebel whose justification for his excesses was wounded human pride. He, like all rebels, wanted to talk to God as His equal (C, 55). Because God thumbed His nose at him, Sade rebelled in kind: "Evil was the answer to evil, pride the answer to cruelty" (C, 55). Pride compels the rebel, in challenge to the cruelty of the Creator, to create his own world, but it must, on principle, be an inversion of the real world. Spandrell creates a world similar to Sade's "republic of crime," (C, 41), a world, in Huxley's words, based on perverse and topsy-turvy moral principle" (221). Like Sade, Spandrell went to God "with outstretched hands, offering . . . friendship and devotion" (294). Because God's only response was "to put his hands in his pockets and turn away," Spandrell feels that it has become "a point of honour" to knock Him down: "And the more you'd admired, the more violent the knock and the longer the subsequent dance on his carcass" (294). Spandrell is committed to his perversity, he tells Philip Quarles, because it is his "destiny" and "because once one's damned, one ought to damn oneself doubly" (225).

Spandrell has a perverse value system which requires that he do well what he does. He exhibits the ethics of dandyism which Camus defines as "honor degraded as a point of honor" (C, 53). Like Sade, Spandrell feels that his honor has been degraded. Since God claims the good in man, (C, 47), Spandrell chooses the evil and finds "the maximum of enjoyment" from "the maximum of destruction" (C, 43). But the enjoyment must be experienced in an indifferent, god-like manner. The "objects of enjoyment must never be allowed to appear as persons.

If man is 'an absolutely material species of plant,' he can only be treated as an object, and an object for experiment" (C, 43). Spandrell feels as though his damnation were manipulated by a God who rejected him as one of the Elect. Consequently, he follows Sade's practices and systematically corrupts the innocent. Harriet Watkins is one of Spandrell's "objects." He manipulates her malleable soul until, as he was, she is brought "in perfect ingenuousness to the most astonishing pitch of depravity" (119). For all his erotic atrocities, however, Spandrell is unfulfilled. His destruction, like Sade's, fails to give him satisfaction. Thus, he must go from injustices to crime. The rebel proclaims, "Since violence is the root of all creation, deliberate violence shall be its answer" (C, 48).

Spandrell is no longer satisfied with his licentious wickedness because it has become routine: "Robbed gradually by habit both of his active enjoyment and of his active sense of wrongdoing (which had always been a part of his pleasure), Spandrell had turned with a kind of desperation to the refinements of vice" (222-23). The result of Spandrell's growing despair is the evolution of authorized murder in the mind of the satanic dandy.¹⁸ Camus describes the youthful, charming, sad adolescence of the modern Satan who feels that he has suffered so many injustices and such great sorrow that all excess is justified (C, 49). To combat his growing boredom, Spandrell turns to its reverse, which according to Camus, is the "frenzy" which justifies murder: "The Byronic hero, incapable of love or capable only of an impossible love, suffers endlessly. He is solitary, languid, his condition exhausts him. If he wants to feel alive, it must be in the terrible exaltation of a brief and destructive action" (C, 49). Forever unable to realize his "impossible love" for his mother, Spandrell must turn to the exaltation of murder.

The prelude to Spandrell's murdering Webley is his slashing the flowers in a forest. He does not know that Webley and Elinor are there at the same moment. Ironically, the post-Edenic forest is peopled with two fallen and lustful Adams, both of whom want to be God. Yet neither is aware of the other's presence or of the extent to which their fates are tied. Spandrell escorts the prostitute, Connie, presumably short for "Constance." With her beside him to remind him of his violated mother and her "inconstancy," Spandrell turns to the violation of Nature's innocence, which he knows is as false as his mother's. She, Connie and Spandrell are witnesses that there is no primordial innocence as there are no more untainted Eves and Adams. Having the knowledge of evil, Spandrell knows that sex is everywhere, in his mother, in Connie, in the "bulging" trees of summer, in the "pleasingly phallic" foxgloves which rise from the floor of "God's country" (351).

Thus confronted, Spandrell slaps the face of his elusive God once again. Slashing down the foxgloves, he gloats over the ground "strewn with murdered flowers" (352). As it was to Sade, nature is abhorrent to Spandrell. The foxgloves are a manifestation of the Face behind the flowers. But, as Camus points out, crimes against nature are not "the definitive crime. It is necessary to go farther. The executioners eye each other with suspicion" (C, 44-45).

Spandrell eyes Everard Webley because both are masters governed by the Nietzschean code. According to that code, with which the dandy allied himself, arrogance, egotism and vanity are desirable traits which go hand-in-hand with the will to power. Only in the conventional Christian code of the bourgeoisie are such traits labeled undesirable.¹⁹ Both Spandrell and Webley despise the mediocrity of the common man; both perceive themselves as the new aristocrats, Spandrell in intellectual terms, Webley in political terms. Spandrell is more obviously a dandy than Webley, but on close inspection, Webley is no less arrogant, egotistical or vain than the most arrant fop. He is merely more militaristic, more apt to wield the sword than rhetoric alone. Such militarism suggests a significant change in Spandrell, who progresses from rebel to revolutionary. The two men are proper adversaries. They both recognize that the "law of this world is nothing but the law of force; its driving force, the will to power" (C, 41). As god-men, Webley and Spandrell have taken power unto themselves and, as Camus says, "They cannot reject it if it turns against them. Murder must be repeated: in their turn the masters will tear one another to pieces" (C, 45).

True to his theory that Providence invariably conspires to damn him, Spandrell is given the key to the Quarles home where Webley is to meet Elinor. With the key comes the easy opportunity for the execution and the chance to smite still nearer to the face of God which stands behind His human creation. Webley is an excellent specimen, "the rare man," not "the little individual" (343). He is a natural giant among men, a giant on a mission of love. Hence, he is as "pleasingly phallic" as the "tall proud" foxgloves which Spandrell smote down in the forest (351). Yet, ironically, Spandrell finds murdering Webley no more rewarding, no more terrifying than murdering the flowers.²⁰ Having assumed god-like power in his world, Spandrell perceives the extent of divine indifference to violence. With his foot on Webley's dead eye, he tramples out "the essential horror from his murder" (390). It becomes nothing more than a farce. Webley, after all, is no different from other men. Spandrell sees that in God's eyes, even a giant among men is little more than a concoction of chemicals whose heroism and dreams are reduced to the mechanical motions of a "puppet." God is the "joker" in

the circus that is life; He pulls the strings that make heroes and villains alike dance at His will (397). Spandrell realizes that he too is the puppet of the cosmic joker, who has merely laughed at his most extreme *danse macabre*.

All of Spandrell's outrageous acts have been experiments designed to draw out his divine rival. The murder has proven so farcical to him, however, that he momentarily doubts the very existence of God, and even of Satan. He fears that he has been "dung-beetling in search of a non-existent God" (432). Desperate to cling to any vestige of his belief in absolutes, he quickly reaffirms his rationale that God *must* be there, "but hiding" (432). God's trick was turning Spandrell's incantation on its head. Spandrell reasons that the murder failed "to incarnate God as a felt experienced quality of personal actions," but that it nonetheless proved His existence, "outside" (432). The rebel's challenge still exists: "To raise [himself] to the level of God" (C, 55). To do so, Spandrell must force the Creator out of His "lair": "It was a matter of violently dragging him from outsideness and aboveness to insideness" (432). Camus expresses the dandy's determination in similar terms: he "finally drags [the deity] from its refuge outside time and involves it in history" so that It will be made subject to human terms and therefore, equalled (C, 24-25). To equal God, Spandrell must do something violent enough to escape his personal relegation by God to a dust-bin existence. The murder was obviously not violent enough. Never personal nor political, it was designed solely to bring God out of hiding, to be the absolute evil which would prove absolute good, the "absolute wrong" which would, in turn, imply an absolute right (411). It had not worked, and Spandrell fears that he will fail to force God to incarnate Himself, and therefore, that he will fail to achieve the rebel's consummation.

Spandrell finds his hope to escape his dung-beetle existence renewed in the realization that the murder was not his last chance to find God. Since self-murder is the ultimate violence, it must surely be the "absolute wrong." His own death will be Spandrell's "last card" (433) to call God from "outsideness" to "insideness" (432). Like a true master, he accepts his fate. What Camus calls "a curious kind of stoicism, derived from vice" enables Spandrell, like Sade, to reject the world so thoroughly that he can "accept personal annihilation" (c, 45). Spandrell's one remaining wish, pursuant to committing suicide, is that he have an external symbol of the absolute.

That Spandrell should find his symbol in music is true to the dandy's concept of life as art. The dandy considers himself a work of art comprised of dress, manners, and conversation.²¹ Moreover, he is ever the champion of art,²² both as *l'art pour l'art* and as the attempt of the

artist to order the world, to give it unity. All art—dance, sculpture, literature, painting, music—constitutes the language by which the artist creates a unified view of life. As the dandy-artist, to whom language is of paramount importance, Spandrell seeks his own perception of order, his own approach to life's absolutes. He finds his language in the music of the *heilige Dankgesang* of Beethoven's A Minor Quartet. The music is Beethoven's "signs with ink on ruled paper," — concrete, visible signs of an abstract, invisible truth (436). Spandrell's finding his symbol of the absolute in music is as appropriate as Lord Gattenden's finding his proof of God's existence in mathematics, another language by which the abstract is ordered and made perceivable. Spandrell's proof is equally as subjective as Lord Gattenden's, and as transient.

In the consummate spirituality of the *heilige Dankgesang*, Spandrell finds the reward of the dandy's long quest for God. He feels that he finally escapes the "dust-heap" of his life, that God acknowledges him by granting water to the "parched land" of his soul (435). In the "Lydian heaven" of Beethoven's Quartet, Spandrell finds peace because he sees the music as a divinely-granted symbol—"To me it's the beatific vision. . ." (438). It was God finally showing himself to Spandrell, and in that sense, it was to him a personal reassurance not only of God's existence, but of His recognition of Spandrell himself: "After so many years of drought, a spring, a fountain . . . The wetted dust was fragrant. That music was a proof. . ." (435).

The extreme subjectivity of Spandrell's proof is emphasized clearly by Mark Rampion, the imperfect but most viable and most humanistic consciousness of the novel.²³ He condemns Spandrell's "heaven" as too spiritual, too death-oriented and bloodless. Spandrell himself suspects the bitter truth about his proof, especially its transience. Before he posts the letter to the British Freemen, he admits that the music is a proof "only so long as the violins were playing. When the bows were lifted from the strings," the old doubts would return (435). It would be dust-bins yet again: "Garbage and stupidity, the pitiless drought" (435). But Spandrell does not realize the absurdity of his proof in human terms. He becomes too much the "dead angel," as he has been too long the living demon to know the human position of "the miraculous paradox of external life and eternal repose" (439). Man cannot absolutely experience such a paradox and continue to live. Rampion knows that all such proofs are "spiritual cancer," consuming the living flesh and condemning the human condition, the struggle to be neither angel nor devil, but man (438).

Camus explains the absurdity of a proof such as Spandrell's assurance of God's existence in different, but similar terms. He says that

the cosmic dandy's rebellion always contains "the metaphysical demand for unity, the impossibility of capturing it, and the construction of a substitute universe. Rebellion is a fabricator of universes. This also defines art" (C, 255). Sade fabricates, in the art of his letters, a "republic of crime"; the dandy fabricates a universe of the self; Beethoven fabricates a world of music. Camus specifically defines the way in which music can achieve an alternate world of aesthetic unity and harmony:

The symphonies of nature know no rests. The world is never quiet; even its silence eternally resounds with the same notes, in vibrations that escape our ears. As for those we perceive, they carry sounds to us, occasionally a chord, never a melody. Music exists, however, in which symphonies are completed, where melody gives its form to sounds that by themselves have none, and where, finally, a particular arrangement of notes extracts from natural disorder a unity that is satisfying to the mind and heart. (C, 255-56).

Spandrell finds his satisfying vision in the harmony of music. In doing so, he exhibits the greatest fault of the dandy, one Rampion pointed out very early in the novel—Spandrell must play at life to live it (99). Camus defines the dandy identically. Huxley too seems to believe that such a unified, harmonious perception of life is possible only in the realm of art.²⁴ Philip Quarles, Huxley's alter-ego in the novel, comments on the fallacy of the artistic dilettante's substitution of "false abstractions for the living complexities of reality" (326). Putting art before life insures the dandy's failure in the art of living. If he goes so far as Spandrell persists in doing, he will kill himself. Mark Rampion, the most alive character in the novel, warns Spandrell that his proof is "not human": "If the music lasted, you'd cease to be a man. You'd die" (439).²⁵ Spandrell is one of Camus' "estranged citizens of the world" who long to be God, to attain absolute knowledge (C, 260). Such a unified vision of life, however, is contradictory to the human condition. Such a vision, Camus says, "can only appear, if it ever does appear, at the fugitive moment that is death, in which everything is consummated. In order to exist just once in the world, it is necessary never again to exist" (C, 260-61). In Spandrell's case, the dandy's very human demand for unity is carried to inhuman extremes.

In his acceptance of his own "personal annihilation to achieve his ideal rests Spandrell's most admirable strength. It is, finally, however, a strength insufficient for mastering the ideal espoused though not attained by Philip Quarles, the "art of integral living" (326). Only Rampion seems to have attained this ideal state. Huxley's condemnation of Spandrell's proof and the sacrifice it demands is best illustrated in Rampion's observation that Spandrell cannot be human. He is the

"gargoyle" to the end, devil and angel, but not man (98). The absurdity of Spandrell's solution to man's quest for harmony is emphasized by the mechanical scratching of the phonograph needle and the puerile splashing-about in a bathtub of two erstwhile "angels" (441).²⁶ Spandrell's quest itself is noble, born of the courage to defy the insurmountable odds which have arbitrarily assigned him the mark of Cain. But the real challenge of the dandy's rebellion, a challenge suggested by Rampion's criticism of Spandrell, is not to be willing to die for his cause but to learn to live for it amid the chaos of life.²⁷ Spandrell's greatest fault is that he cannot live life, that he finally relinquishes what must, for the living, be a perpetual struggle to learn to be human in spite of the contradictions inherent in such a condition.

NOTES

1. Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage, 1956), p. 68. Subsequent references to this work will be noted parenthetically within the text. All references will include the author's surname abbreviated to C, followed by page number(s), and all references will pertain to this edition.
2. See Milton Birnbaum, *Aldous Huxley's Quest for Values* (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1971), p. 124.
3. Robert S. Baker, "Spandrell's 'Lydian Heaven': Moral Masochism and the Centrality of Spandrell in Huxley's *Point Counter Point*," *Criticism*, 16 (1974), 131. George Woodcock, in *Dawn and the Darkest Hour: A Study of Aldous Huxley* (New York: Viking, 1972), p. 160, also calls Spandrell the best representative of "the true spirit of *Point Counter Point*, its pessimism that cannot abandon hope, its brutality that yearns for tenderness, its sense of despairing finality."
4. Donald J. Watt, "The Criminal-Victim Pattern in Huxley's *Point Counter Point*," *Studies in the Novel*, 2 (Spring 1970), 49. The article will be abbreviated hereafter to "Criminal-Victim."
5. Baker, p. 121.
6. Birnbaum, p. 124.
7. Aldous Huxley, *Point Counter Point*, (n.p.: Grosset and Dunlap, 1928), p. 216. All further references to this work will be made parenthetically within the text, and all page numbers refer to this edition.
8. Baker, p. 133.
9. Joseph Wood Krutch, review appears in *Nation* (New York), 31 October 1928, v. 127, p. 456. Also excerpted in *Aldous Huxley: The Critical Heritage*, ed. Donald J. Watt (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 157-159.
10. *Ibid.* See Cyril Connolly's review in *New Statesman*, 20 October 1928, v. 32, p. 56. Also reprinted in *The Critical Heritage*, pp. 153-155. Connolly points out Huxley's role as denouncer of his generation. John Alfred Atkins also notes Huxley's rejection of "the good times" and "the goals of modernity and sophistication" which were espoused by his generation. See *Aldous Huxley: A Literary Study* (New York: Orion Press, 1967), pp. 26-27.
11. Domna C. Stanton, *The Aristocrat As Art: A Study of the Honnête Homme and the Dandy in Seventeenth- and Nineteenth-Century French Literature* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 33-35.
12. Stanton, see pp. 63-105.
13. See Peter Bowering, *Aldous Huxley: A Study of the Major Novels* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 91. Bowering calls Spandrell an "inverted Christian." Peter Firchow contrasts Spandrell's "Christian diabolism" with Rampion's "Hellenic humanism" in *Aldous Huxley: Satirist and Novelist* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 108.

- Jerome Meckier calls Spandrell a "diabolist" in *Aldous Huxley: Satire and Structure* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 125. Donald J. Watt labels him a "self-victimizing satanist" in "Criminal-Victim," p. 49. Woodcock also calls Spandrell a satanic character, *Dawn and the Darkest Hour*, pp. 153-155. In the Baker article the author dismisses Spandrell's satanic role as "broadly conceived and equivocal designations" which "skirt the central issue" of Spandrell as a major and unifying character (p. 120). I think that Professor Baker dismisses the implications of Spandrell's satanic role too lightly because it is a role which serves to suggest an important organizing principle more particular to *Point Counter Point* than the Freudian one.
14. Watt, "Criminal-Victim," p. 43.
 15. Stanton, p. 63.
 16. *Letters of Aldous Huxley*, ed. Grover Smith (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 155. See also Huxley's essay on Baudelaire, "Do What You Will," for further substantiation of Huxley's interest in the dandy. Bearing upon Spandrell and the Baudelaire influence, Donald Watt suggests that Spandrell is "Huxley's modern replica of Baudelaire" in "Criminal-Victim," p. 49. Charles Holmes offers a similar notion in *Aldous Huxley and the Way to Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1970), p. 65.
 17. Stanton, p. 102.
 18. Watt discusses Spandrell's "potential criminality" in "Criminal-Victim," p. 47.
 19. Stanton, pp. 67-68.
 20. Watt, "Criminal-Victim," pp. 48-49.
 21. See Stanton, pp. 154-74.
 22. See Martin Green, *Children of the Sun: A Narrative of 'Decadence' in England After 1918* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 139-48.
 23. Firchow, pp. 108-11.
 24. Baker, p. 133.
 25. Watt, "Criminal-Victim," p. 49.
 26. Firchow, p. 110.
 27. Krutch, p. 456. Krutch specifically points out Huxley's ability to "exist—to live and to write—in a world where all of the others die some kind of death," this in spite of his lack of solutions to the problems of the world. Henry Seidel Canby also reviewed *Point Counter Point*, *Saturday Review of Literature*, 2 February 1929, v. 5, pp. 637-38, reproduced in *Critical Heritage*, pp. 166-171. Seidel notes Spandrell's incapacity to live. The contrast with Huxley is evident.