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### THREE VICTORIAS: A STUDY IN REALITY

The traditional views of Queen Victoria's personality, character and political role exhibit a surprising range of interpretation. She was a tyrant and a dutiful, constitution-conscious monarch. She was eager to please and gracious, but she shot off killing glances and gave vent to unending spleen. She was always weak and liable to mental collapse, while her strength never failed her. In the face of all these generalizations, the historian's task becomes one of assembling a believable, reasonably comprehensive portrait of Queen Victoria from the bits and pieces, the toms and weighty collections available today.

In the first place, Victoria can speak for herself in the many volumes of her letters and in the published extracts from her daily journal. Supplementing these are the letters of her three prime ministers, Palmerston,<sup>1</sup> Gladstone<sup>2</sup> and Disraeli,<sup>3</sup> and the several books written by those who knew the Queen. Among the latter, some of the most reliable material is contained in Arthur Ponsonby's *Queen Victoria*, written in 1933 by the son of her secretary; Theodore Martin's *Queen Victoria as I Knew Her*, published in 1908; and Sidney Lee's "official" *Queen Victoria* of 1903. Finally, *Victoria R.I.* by Elizabeth Longford provided in 1964 an objective, scholarly study of the Queen's life and reign.<sup>4</sup> There are numerous other biographies of Queen Victoria, each with its relative merits and distinctive emphases; and many studies of particular aspects are valuable—Frank Hardie's *The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861-1901* (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1963), to indicate one of the most informative. Taken altogether, the primary and secondary materials now available on Queen Victoria make it possible to construct a comprehensive portrait of the monarch without resorting to either exaggeration or distortion.

But to describe Queen Victoria's development with a mind to understanding her political effect, it is necessary to begin by trisecting her reign. There was not one Queen Victoria, but three. The eighteen-year-old girl who ascended the throne in June, 1837, conducted herself differently and held different views from the wife of Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and from the Queen-Empress. It is generally agreed that the girl-Queen performed her social duties excellently and with relish, that the earnest and hard-working Victoria enjoyed rather more authority than initiative while the Prince Consort carried the Crown's weight from 1841 to 1861, and that the dowager-Queen asserted herself with impressive vigour during the final third of the reign. These periods (1837-41, 1841-61 and 1861-1901) require rather different explanations of the Queen's role and reasons. This examination of the "real" Queen Victoria will draw upon selected aspects of each of the three periods. It will become evident that the Queen's story contains not contradictions but evolutions, not mysteries but maturation, not anomalies deserving either adulation or caricaturization, but characteristics requiring recognition.

In order to watch the evolution and development of Queen Victoria's personal character and her political views, it is useful to begin with a picture of her youthful circumstances. Born in 1819, Victoria was raised by her mother, the Duchess of Kent, who was widowed by the death in 1820 of the fourth son of George III. Installed by George IV as his perpetual guests at Kensington Palace was a small group centered on the Princess. The Duchess of Kent had the help of Victoria's German governess, Fraulein (Baroness from 1827) Lehzen, as well as a group of servants and a series of tutors; all of these bent their efforts toward shielding the child from all Court influence.<sup>5</sup> The German ladies were joined by Sir James Conroy, Controller of the Household of the Duchess<sup>6</sup>. Conroy was a man of intense ambition and little scruple; not long before Victoria's accession, he and the Duchess had put the Princess through a harrowing period by attempting to force her to name the Duchess regent and Conroy her secretary if William IV should die before Victoria's eighteenth birthday. Baroness Lehzen stood by Victoria, without whom she would have been entirely alone, for no outsider had been allowed to become intimate with the Princess, whose every move had been supervised from infancy.

Somehow, despite this tight rein (or perhaps because of it), Victoria developed an intense self control. The tale told of her response when, at age nine, she learned of the likelihood of her succession, epitomizes this capacity. With little display of elation, Victoria is supposed to have announced to her governess, "I will be good."<sup>7</sup> Both the concern with virtue and the tendency to *will* became hallmarks of Queen Victoria; neither was inappropriate in a Queen of England. Victoria's rank had been uppermost in her mother's mind, leading her to arrange a careful education which included the usual ladylike accomplishments (Victoria was fluent in German, French, and Italian, sang especially well, and sketched with talent), and smatterings of history and geography. But she was not equipped with an intimate knowledge of the workings of the British constitution. Her uncle Leopold, widower of Princess Charlotte, supplied information on this subject during Victoria's rather frequent visits to Claremont; he eventually became an important personal advisor to the Queen from his throne in Belgium. But in the main, information about her constitutional duties and position had to come from her first Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne.

No one could have been better suited to the young Victoria. Her desire to be an exemplary Queen and her characteristic need for a sincere personal companion were met by attitudes on Melbourne's part that made the relationship a joy to both, if a strain on him. Victoria asked Melbourne's advice on a multitude of matters—personal, political, and philosophical. In addition to handling endless technical inquiries of his sovereign, Melbourne took many opportunities to inform her on more general matters. In two particular areas, his instruction was received willingly by the new queen, only to be rejected in her later life. The best way to approach the problem of keeping a "pure" court, which Victoria wanted very much to do, was with a dash of sophistication, Melbourne advised. His pupil was much more broad-minded than the Queen-Empress would later be: when her prospective bridegroom protested about the selection of men of questionable character as his attendants, the Queen at first advised him to exercise tolerance toward failings:

As to your wish about your gentlemen, my dear Albert, I must tell you quite honestly that it will not do. You may entirely rely upon me that people who will be about you will be absolutely pleasant people, of high standing and good character.<sup>8</sup>

As to those who would not be in immediate daily contact with the Prince, Victoria suggested that protocol must be observed despite personal predilections, a tone which clearly reflects Melbourne's relaxed attitude. Eventually, Queen-Empress Victoria was so convinced of the importance of maintaining an impeccable court that she refused to invite the respectable seventy-year-old wife of her Lord Chancellor into her presence because Lady Sugden had erred fifty years before, with her subsequent husband!<sup>9</sup>

The second of Melbourne's teaching eventually to "get the axe" was his idea that the Crown should be identified with the government of the day.<sup>10</sup> Prince Albert was decidedly of a different opinion, following his mentor, Baron Stockmar, in maintaining that the sovereign must be strictly impartial in relations with all political parties. By 1851 the Queen adopted his attitude thoroughly and searched impartially among all parties and factions for a leader in the crisis of February. This concern with being impartial remained with Victoria. She would sometimes conclude that particular persons were politically infallible (or impossible!), but she always tried to make herself objective in her evaluations of the parties she dealt with. Even in her anti-Liberal years after 1880, her damning statements about any faction would be qualified with a phrase such as, "Of course, there are exceptions."

The light-hearted, sociable girl-Queen wrote in her first year as sovereign, "I received so many communications from my ministers, but I like it very much....I *delight* in this work."<sup>11</sup> She was reluctant to marry, for two reasons: she wanted to retain her personal ascendancy, which would be unseemly in a wife; and she feared her own temper as an insuperable barrier to compatibility. Melbourne encouraged her reluctance at first. But the promptings of her Uncle Leopold, who had long expected her to marry Albert, and Albert's irresistible comeliness eventually won her over. She began her marriage with the intention of maintaining her exclusive control over all things, and including Albert only as a personal companion. To his request for an extended honeymoon, she replied:<sup>12</sup> "You forget, my dearest Love, that I am the Sovereign, and that business can stop and wait for nothing. I am never easy a moment, if I am not on the spot, and see and hear what is going on." Four months later, Melbourne advised Victoria to take the Prince more into her confidence. She began to do this.

Gradually Victoria withdrew from the active daily chores of government business. This process accelerated from natural causes (four children in four years), and by 1852 the Queen felt quite differently about sharing her responsibilities:<sup>13</sup>

Albert grows daily fonder and fonder of politics and business, and is so wonderfully *fit* for both....and I grow daily to dislike them both more and more. We women are not *made* for governing—and if we are good women, we must *dislike* these masculine occupations.

The Prince, with the coaching of Stockmar and Uncle Leopold, had anticipated all difficulties in the transition from Whig to Tory administration in 1841, and by his successful handling of that episode he established himself as the Queen's closest advisor. Sir Robert Peel and Albert were perfectly suited by disposition to collaborate. For her part, Victoria came to respect the capacity of the Prime Minister whose installation she had so dreaded during the Bedchamber Crisis of 1839. With Prince Albert representing Victoria often at ministerial interviews, researching and judging innumerable questions which came before her, corresponding with ministers and with foreign friends and relatives, and eventually drafting much of her correspondence, Queen Victoria could be content with fulfilling her public duties and supervising her growing family.

It is extremely difficult, therefore, to separate the Queen's influence and ideas in political matters from that of Albert. But this is not to say that the Queen became a political cipher. She shared with Albert an antipathy to her Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston, which was grounded on a basic divergence in their attitude toward England's proper role in foreign affairs. Whereas Palmerston, eager to promote liberal movements for constitutional government everywhere, used means sometimes questionable, the royal couple insisted upon respect for legitimate sovereigns and scrupulous adherence to the letter of treaties, and would use only well-mannered persuasion to promote liberalization on the continent. As one would expect, Victoria put more emphasis on the inalienable rights of sovereigns than did her ebullient minister.<sup>14</sup>

It is, in some cases, possible to distinguish the Queen's own letters from her husband's even though they held identical opinions concerning Palmerston's conduct. For example, in a note to Lord John Russell complaining of Palmerston's reluctance to caution the British

representative against intriguing at the Portuguese court, it is asserted that "Lord Palmerston has behaved about this note really like a naughty child."<sup>15</sup> That was the Queen speaking. The tone of a letter to Palmerston concerning his encouragement of Sardinian encroachment on Austrian domains written just two weeks later is remarkably different. The Queen asserts that she ought not and cannot "conceal from him that she is ashamed of the policy which we are pursuing in this Italian controversy in abetting wrong."<sup>16</sup> We know that this letter was actually composed by the Prince and copied out by the Queen to send to her minister.<sup>17</sup>

The Queen's consternation at Palmerston's general conduct was expressed in her own words in a memo for the royal files. Recording a conversation with her Prime Minister, she noted that she had told Russell she "felt really I could hardly go on with him [Palmerston] and that I had no confidence in him, and that it made me seriously anxious and uneasy for the welfare of the country and for the peace of Europe in general." In enumerating her reasons for this, the Queen explained that Palmerston was "distrusted everywhere abroad," that he "often endangered the honour of England by taking a very prejudiced and one-sided view of a question," and that "his writings were always as bitter as gall."<sup>18</sup> Although Albert was doing most of the work, Victoria was vitally concerned with state affairs and intensely involved.

Eventually, the royal pair had their way and Palmerston was removed from office. Victoria was responsible for insisting on action when Palmerston ignored the Cabinet and countermanded the Queen's injunction to her Ambassador in Paris to remain entirely passive concerning President Napoleon's *coup d' état* of December, 1851. As soon as the Queen learned of Ambassador Normanby's discomfiture from his relative in her household, she demanded that Lord John put a stop to Palmerston's independent conduct. She did not expect the degree of success her insistence achieved:

Windsor Castle, December 20: By 2 we were at Windsor, where we found a box from Lord John containing great and most unexpected news. He felt the time had come when it was best he [Palmerston] should no longer hold the Seals of the Foreign Office.<sup>19</sup>

Prince Albert continued to carry the major share of the responsibility involved in the sovereign's position. He contributed ideas and impetus to carrying on the Crimean War, while Victoria's public appearances

and activities on behalf of her Army made the Queen extremely popular during the war period. Although the Prince's popularity, derived from the Great Exhibition which opened in May, 1851, had disappeared briefly at the outbreak of hostilities in the Crimea, he retained the respect of the well informed. The coalition government of Lord Aberdeen met with their approval, for they had always feared that party interests would overshadow national welfare. When Palmerston took over in 1855, they found him surprisingly easy to work with in a war atmosphere.

Responding to government crises on behalf of the Queen; attending to administrative routine; at the Queen's side through royal visits to France and Germany; receiving with her kings, emperors and statesmen; building Balmoral in Scotland and improving Cowes on the Isle of Wight—Prince Albert provided for Victoria's needs and guided her actions. On rare occasions they had personal quarrels,<sup>20</sup> and sometimes they differed on matters of state,<sup>21</sup> but for the most part, Victoria was not exaggerating when she wrote:

I feel that I could not exist without him, and that I should sink under the troubles and annoyances...of my very difficult position, were it not for his assistance, protection, guidance and comfort.<sup>22</sup>

Queen Victoria's personality and character matured during her twenty years with Prince Albert. Naturally serious and well-intentioned, she was able in time to control her imperious temper. He and she worked to keep her excitable nature under careful direction. Her tendency to take politics too personally was countered by his insistence on analysis and objectivity; her preference for withdrawal from the public eye always met with his reminders of Duty. Although she had borne nine children, her health was quite robust, in contrast to his, and she had regularly been spared some of the strain of decisions and some of the responsibility. Completely accepting the role of wife and relinquishing to Albert parts of the role of sovereign, Victoria at forty-two was well on the way toward self mastery and reasonably content to accept sound political advice, even if it meant unwelcome change.

But she was not ready for what occurred. Four days after the Prince's sudden death from typhoid, Victoria wrote to her eldest daughter, Vicky (married in January, 1858, to the Crown Prince of Prussia):<sup>23</sup>

I felt so very secure—I always repeated: “And God will protect us!” though trembling always for his safety....I never dreamt of the physical possibility of such a calamity—such an awful catastrophe, for me, for all...

The loss of Albert meant as much to Victoria's personal life as it did to the established patterns of governmental business. Her naturally effusive personality took over in her first grief, and her era's preoccupation with death encouraged this propensity. The aura of mourning lasted, marked by increasingly superficial observances, until the end of her reign. Its beginnings were immediate, for the Queen had Albert's belongings “enshrined” in his rooms, and vowed to her uncle:<sup>24</sup>

My firm resolve, my irrevocable decision [is] that his wishes, his plans, about everything, his views about everything are to be my law! And no human power will make me swerve from what he decided and wished.

In the natural course of things, Victoria was unable to enact this firm resolve. She succeeded in creating almost a cult of widowhood, surrounding herself with ladies in a similar plight. She maintained her personal awareness of her grief in a ritualistic manner and never ceased to wear mourning.<sup>25</sup>

Although she felt her loneliness intensely and insisted that others remember this, she never succeeded in making his wishes her law—for it was impossible. Time brought changes which made Albert's ideas inapplicable in some spheres of international affairs: the illiberal nature of the new Prussia after 1870, which had “swallowed up everything” and ceased to deserve the honour of an English consort;<sup>26</sup> the incorrigible Boers against whom violence was the only answer.<sup>27</sup> Concerning internal governmental matters, Victoria accepted ideas and persons that Albert would have rejected out of hand. And she forgot to remember his lessons concerning the impartiality of the sovereign and the necessity of remaining aloof from party quarrels even if one's inclinations were toward partisanship. Because Victoria did not remain pledged to her husband's opinions, but continued to reflect both her experiences and the influences impinging on her, there emerged the Queen-Empress, a figure in striking contrast to the girl-Queen and the Prince's wife.

Among the most important of the developments after 1861, having wide implications, were the Queen's relationships with her two ministers, Disraeli and Gladstone. The Queen had shared with Albert an



antipathy toward Disraeli which was founded on the latter's treatment of Sir Robert Peel. As late as March, 1859, "the complete lack of character and the untruthfulness of Disraeli" made the royal couple uneasy.<sup>28</sup> But Disraeli came forward with fulsome praise of Albert during the early period of the Queen's bereavement. This sincere appreciation of Prince Albert drew the Queen's attention to Disraeli, who struck a responsive chord by treating the lonely sovereign with exaggerated warmth. The Queen was convinced by 1868 that:<sup>29</sup>

Mr. Disraeli has achieved his present high position entirely by his ability, his wonderful, happy disposition and the astounding way in which he carried through the Reform Bill, and I have nothing but praise for him. One thing which has for some time predisposed me in his favour is his great admiration for my beloved Albert.

While Victoria particularly liked Disraeli, it should not be assumed that she disliked Gladstone at this time. She and Albert had long appreciated Peel's earnest protege, and Victoria did not long hold against him his 1845 resignation over the Maynooth bill to finance the education of Irish Catholics.<sup>30</sup> When he first became her Prime Minister in 1868, she wrote in her journal: "He is very agreeable, so quiet and intellectual, with such a knowledge of all subjects, and is such a *good man*."<sup>31</sup> Her opinion was not to remain thus. Guedalla shaped *The Queen and Mr. Gladstone* to indicate the deterioration in relations between the two earnest figures; 1868 to 1871 is entitled "Harmony;" 1871 to 1874 is "Divergence;" by 1885, "Antipathy" prevails. Many factors explain the rift.

Gladstone, concerned over the Queen's growing unpopularity (and the republicanism "in the air"), sought to convince her of the wisdom of making more public appearances. She believed a concession would lead to unending pressure, and so she took refuge behind her "nerves" and the assertion that she was already overworked: "From the hour she gets out of bed till she gets into it again there is work, work, work—letter-boxes, questions, etc., which are dreadfully exhausting."<sup>32</sup> Gladstone's tenacious effort to persuade the Queen to delay her departure for Balmoral until the House rose in August, 1871, was offensive to the Queen. She did not believe that the delay was requested on account of her popularity, and felt Gladstone was trying to use her to placate a politically troublesome House and strengthen his

own party. The Queen was actually quite ill when she did get to Balmoral, and when Gladstone next saw her, a new tone was discernible:<sup>33</sup>

The repellent power which she so well knows how to use has been put in action towards me on this occasion for the first time...I have felt myself on a new and different footing with her.

Relations were only made worse by Gladstone's attempts to convince the Queen that some of her social and public functions should be taken over by the Prince of Wales. Nor did she accept Gladstone's plan for ensconcing the Prince in Ireland. Her eldest son was not up to the mark that Victoria had set for him, and she refused to trust him with significant responsibilities.

The upshot of Gladstone's pressuring the Queen on her prolonged retirement was that relations between them cooled. By the end of 1873, Gladstone realized they both avoided candid conversation, although good manners prevented any open breach. It was undoubtedly with relief that Victoria received Disraeli as her Prime Minister in February, 1874.

Disraeli discovered two effective approaches to Victoria. The girl-Queen who had responded warmly to Melbourne's personal approach to matters political was the same Victoria who welcomed Disraeli's "We authors, Ma'am..." He flattered her as a woman and exalted her as a sovereign; she became convinced that Disraeli was her personal supporter and a true statesman, above party. His concern for the lower classes and his government's legislation on their behalf were welcome to the Queen, who prided herself on her rapport with the people. And when he guided the Royal Titles Act through a reluctant Parliament in 1876, Victoria felt he had enhanced the dignity of her throne. But Disraeli had forsaken honesty for flattery, and the Queen was surprised by the rough reception of this bill. Her secretary, Colonel Henry Ponsonby, believed that Disraeli had insulted the Queen's intelligence.<sup>34</sup>

I really think that if matters are fairly and properly put before her she sees them. It is that terrible plan of telling her she is right, not explaining the real issue and letting it burst upon her afterwards [that is unwise].

The Queen never doubted the sincerity of her exotic friend, and upon his death in April, 1881, wrote:<sup>35</sup>

His devotion and kindness to me, his wise counsels, his great gentleness combined with firmness, his one thought of the honour and glory of the country, and his unswerving loyalty to the throne make the death of my dear Lord Beaconsfield a national calamity. My grief is great and lasting.

While Victoria was admiring Disraeli's concern for the glory of the country, Gladstone had been causing her endless concern on this very point. In 1876 when Gladstone carried out his campaign against Turkey for its repression of Christian rebels, the Queen held him responsible for the subsequent Russian invasion of Turkey. "I know that this war...would have been prevented, had Russia not been encouraged...by one of my late government," she wrote in April, 1877.<sup>36</sup>

During Gladstone's ministry from 1880 to 1885, Victoria's hostility to him reached its height. She had lost all confidence in his reliability and deplored his policies. When he took office in 1880, she warned that there must be "no democratic leaning, no attempt to change the foreign policy....in short, no lowering of the high position this country holds."<sup>37</sup> She was "utterly disgusted with his stump oratory"<sup>38</sup> and his conviction that he was God's instrument. "The People's William" the Queen found intolerable. In fact, it can be argued that Victoria was jealous of her crusading minister's popularity;<sup>39</sup> but she objected to his policies as well as to his popularity. His efforts to cut military expenditure and imperial expansion seemed little short of treason to her:<sup>40</sup>

What she fears is, a growing tendency to swallow insults and affronts and of not taking them up in that high tone which they used formerly to be.

Victoria recognized the dangers in the government's attempt to find a way out of the Sudan crisis. After all her warnings, which began as early as February of 1884, when General Gordon's death at Khartoum was reported in January, 1885, the Queen was convinced the government's delays and shiftings were to blame. "Mr. Gladstone and the government have—the Queen feels it dreadfully—Gordon's innocent, noble, heroic blood on their consciences. No one who reflects on how he was sent out, how he was refused, can deny it."<sup>41</sup> In this attitude the Queen reflected her subjects' response to the calamity, but it speaks poorly for her that she could not be more objective. By this time, Gladstone and all he touched were anathema to her.

In the Queen's view, Gladstone endangered the institutions of her

realm by insisting on a franchise bill in 1884 that was not acceptable to the House of Lords. In a series of memoranda, Victoria expressed her fear of Gladstone "sweeping away, in his wild vindictive passion, all that keeps the State together." He should give way and stop dictating to the House of Lords, or resign, she argued.<sup>42</sup> Eventually, her efforts to bring about direct discussions between the party leaders succeeded,<sup>43</sup> and a compromise solution was reached; but she always held Gladstone culpable for the whole affair.<sup>44</sup>

The Lords are *not* in disharmony with the people, but unfortunately Mr. Gladstone's government leans so much to the extreme Radical side...that measures are presented to the House of Lords which the Conservatives and moderate Liberals do not feel they can with safety agree to.

The Queen felt Gladstone's determination to promote Home Rule for Ireland was a direct attack on the unity of her Empire, and would cause her to break her coronation oath and let down her sacred charge. She resisted the project whenever the opportunity arose. In 1885 she urged the formation of a party to defeat Gladstone;<sup>45</sup> she was delighted by his defeat the following year; she forced the government to drop the term "better" from its 1893 description of the Home Rule Bill in the Throne Speech;<sup>46</sup> and she rejoiced when the Lords threw out the bill in 1894. When Gladstone finally retired in 1894, Victoria's determination to be well-mannered must have struggled with her devotion to honesty. She found Salisbury's coalition of Conservatives and Unionists much to her liking after the struggle with the "old, wild and incomprehensible"<sup>47</sup> man who headed the government for so long.

The Queen-Empress, in her interactions with all of her ministers and in her performance of all her royal duties, manifested impressive energy and capability. Her ministers received occasional "wiggings"; she refused to be stampeded into consenting or approving when her convictions were not satisfied; she kept a finger on the pulse of every critical issue, foreign and domestic, that confronted her country. Simultaneously, she carried out an impressive calendar of formal engagements after 1867 and managed the affairs of her ever-growing family with devotion and tact—all this, while suffering from a deep sense of loneliness and isolation and contending against physically painful, if neurotically induced, ailments. In the final ten years of her reign, it became obvious that she once again enjoyed her duties, as she

had as a girl-queen. But now, her pleasure was enriched by a consciousness of wisdom and an experience unequalled by any other figure of state.

Victoria's prestige was immense by the end of her reign, and the consequent near canonization of the Queen made it difficult for observers to separate dignity from divinity, mastery from mystery. The exaggerated respectfulness of her subjects at the turn of the century eventually gave way to the critical approach of Strachey; this has now gone out of style, and we attempt a reasoned, analytical approach. By that avenue, Queen Victoria appears as a woman of intelligence and common sense, determined to do what was right and, as maturity fortified her, confident that she knew how to do it. She may at times have acted in ways that strained the constitution and exasperated those who would be her guides, but she never failed to embody the Victorian *raison d'être*—a sense of Duty.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Brian Connell, *Regina Vs. Palmerston* (London: Evans Bros., 1962).
2. Philip Guedalla, *The Queen and Mr. Gladstone* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1933, 1934).
3. W.F. Monypenny and G.E. Buckle, *Life of Disraeli* (London: John Murray, 1929).
4. Needless to say, the famous Lytton Strachey *Queen Victoria* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1921) is a literary masterpiece and a historical misfortune. Its style insures that it is memorable, but its easy tone and breezy approach are neither adequate nor accurate in many cases.
5. Dormer Creston [Dorothy Baynes], *The Youthful Queen Victoria* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1952), pp. 103-09.
6. Although it has been suggested that Conroy was the Duchess' lover, the relationship was probably platonic; but it was nonetheless unpalatable to Victoria (Cf. Longford, p. 119).
7. It should be noted that the tale was well meant when recorded years later by Lehzen, but is probably apocryphal (Lee, pp. 124-25.)
8. *Queen Victoria's Early Letters*, (ed.) John Raymond, (London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1963), p. 38, letter of 8 Dec., 1839.
9. Frank Eyck, *The Prince Consort* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1959), pp. 192-93.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 21, quoting Melbourne.
11. Longford, p. 74.
12. *Early Letters*, p. 41, Jan. 31, 1840.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 188, Feb. 3. In spite of the obvious satisfaction she derived from her role as Queen-Empress, Victoria never did admit to enjoying her position; she sought sympathy by emphasizing its inconveniences.
14. Connell, pp. 2-3.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 80, June 18, 1848.
16. *Early Letters*, p. 145, July 1, 1848.
17. Connell, p. 83.
18. *Early Letters*, p. 149, Memo of Sept. 19, 1848.

19. Connell, pp. 133-34.
20. Longford, p. 161.
21. Eyck, pp. 184-88. The Prince felt the Queen must call on Lord Derby to form a government in Feb., 1852, while Victoria resisted his direction. She believed Derby would press for Protection once again, and the country would be torn apart and liable to foreign invasion in its weakness. Eventually, the Queen accepted Derby; but her resistance shows that her individuality remained intact.
22. *Early Letters*, p. 148, August 29, 1848.
23. Longford, p. 307, Dec. 18, 1861.
24. *Early Letters*, p. 292, Dec. 24, 1861.
25. Typical is a reference in her Christmas greeting to the Gladstones in 1884: "Alas! to the Queen since Dec. 14, 1861,....this Season is sadly overshadowed...Mr. Gladstone is fortunate enough not to know what it is to have one's dearest and nearest taken from you and to have to live on...." (Guedalla, pp. 634-35.)
26. Longford, p. 368.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 543.
28. Eyck, p. 240. Prince Albert to King Leopold.
29. *Further Letters of Queen Victoria*, (ed.) H. Bolitho, (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., c. 1938; Kraus Reprint Co., 1971), pp. 165-66.
30. *Early Letters*, p. 106.
31. Longford, p. 358.
32. Martin, p. 29.
33. Guedalla, p. 66.
34. Longford, p. 405.
35. Lee, pp. 454-55.
36. Hardie, p. 65. Queen Victoria to the Duke of Argyll.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 68. Queen's memo to Ponsonby.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 74. Queen to Ponsonby, Sept. 16, 1884.
39. Longford, p. 529.
40. Guedalla, p. 583. Queen to Gladstone, Oct. 30, 1883.
41. E.F. Benson, *Queen Victoria* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), p. 298.
42. Frederick Ponsonby, *Side Lights on Queen Victoria* (New York: Sears Publishing Co., Inc., 1930), pp. 247-48.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-373.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
45. Hardie, pp. 92-93.
46. Hardie, p. 98. Victoria similarly objected to part of the Throne Speech in 1881 (announcement of the withdrawal of the English from Kandahar), but she had to approve it anyway. Cf. Ponsonby's *Sidelights*, pp. 183-213.
47. Hardie, p. 97, quoting Newton's Lansdowne, p. 100.