Clyde E. Dankert

WEALTH AND ILLTH–RUSKIN RECONSIDERED

Ruskin's best known statement is undoubtedly his assertion that "THERE IS NO WEALTH BUT LIFE."[1] This remark, with its underlying philosophy, goes far in accounting for the author's vigorous criticism of Classical Economics and of the Classical ecomonists, though it does not justify the harshness that sometimes accompanies the criticism. The remark also suggest the basic reason for the neglect Ruskin has suffered at the hands of professional economists. Moreover, the remark throws a great deal of light on Ruskin's own unorthodox brand of Economics and on his social philosophy in general.

In the first part of the present essay we shall examine the relationship between Ruskin and what we might now call the "Establishment" economists, including both the Classical economists and their successors. In the second part of the essay we shall deal with the contemporary relevance of some of Ruskin's economic and social ideas. With the great interest we are currently taking in our physical environment, with our increasing concern over pollution in its various forms, with the increasing thought we are giving to such matters as "social priorities", "diseconomies", and "human values"–with these developments there is ample justification for our reconsidering some of the views Ruskin expressed a century and more ago.

The Preface to *Munera Pulveris* begins as follows: "The following pages contain, I believe, the first accurate analysis of the laws of Political Economy which has been published in England."[2] Previous writings on the subject, which Ruskin found unsatisfactory, included such notable books as Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations,* Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,* Malthus's *Principles of*

Political Economy, and John Stuart Mill's *Principles of Political Economy.* To this list might be added the works of James Mill, Nassau Senior, John Ramsay McCulloch, and Henry Fawcett. These men were, to varying degrees, all associated with the so-called Classical School of economists, a group with which Ruskin had little sympathy—and for which he had few kind words.

In *Unto This Last* he refers to the current Political Economy as "the bastard science" (at another point he hedges a bit, saying it is "probably a bastard science"); he calls it "the science of darkness" and also refers to it as a "*soi-disant* science" (XVII, 85, 92, 25). In *Munera Pulveris* he labels Political Economy "a pseudo science", and speaks of its purpose as "the weighing of clouds and the portioning out of shadows" (XVII, 138, 166). In *Fors Clavigera* he maintains that modern Political Economy is "the great *savoir mourir*", and that the Political Economy of John Stuart Mill school is "essentially of the type of a flat-fish" (Letters 5, 10, XXVII, 91, 180). Ruskin's most severe criticism of the then current Economics is found in a letter he wrote to Dr. John Brown in 1862. There he asserts that "The Science of Political Economy *is* a Lie." It is "the most cretinous, speechless, paralysing plague that has touched the brain of mankind" (XVII, lxxxii).

Ruskin was not only harsh with Classical Economics but with the Classical economists. In *Unto This Last* he speaks of "Ricardo, with his usual inaccuracy", and says that the value of John Stuart Mill's *Principles* arises from its inconsistencies (XVII, 108, 79). In the Preface to *Munera Pulveris* he uses the expressions "vulgar economists", and "vulgar political economy" (XVII, 136, 137). In *Fors* he refers to Adam Smith as "the half-bred and half-witted Scotchman", and as the man who taught "the deliberate blasphemy" that "Thou shalt hate the Lord thy God, damn His laws, and covet thy neighbours' goods" (Letters 62, 72, XXVIII, 516, 764).[3] On the margin of one of the books in his library Ruskin wrote that "I have always said that neither Mill, Fawcett, nor Bastiat knew the contemptible science they professed to teach" (XVII, lxxxiii).

In spite of his extreme epithets and pronouncements, indeed perhaps in part *because* of them, Ruskin's contribution to Economics (or Political Economy as the subject was then called) has sometimes been looked upon with great favor. George Bernard Shaw, who admitted that

Ruskin was not "a completely equipped economist", nevertheless placed him with the brilliant Stanley Jevons, "because he knocked the first great hole in classic economics by showing that its value basis was an inhuman and unreal basis, and could not without ruin to civilization be accepted as a basis for society at all."[4] G.K. Chesterton thought that Ruskin "talked the most glorious nonsense about landscape and natural history, which it was his business to understand"; on the other hand—and "within his own limits"—"he talked the most cold common sense about political economy, which was no business of his at all."[5] And Walter Lippman, in one of his early books, spoke of Carlyle and Ruskin as having "battered the economists into silence with invective and irony", in this way "voicing the dumb protest of the humane people of England".[6]

If the economists have been "battered" into silence, it has been chiefly silence about Ruskin himself—and about Carlyle too. Despite the claim he made in *Munera Pulveris,* and the opinions expressed by some of his admirers, Ruskin's economic views have received little attention from professional economists. There have been some exceptions to be sure, but even here the amount of consideration given to Ruskin has generally been very small.

To some degree Ruskin's neglect at the hands of economists has been due to a lack of knowledge on their part of the great social critic's writings. But the matter goes much deeper than that. The neglect can be accounted for largely on the basis of the particular type of Economics Ruskin preached. And this type can be better understood if we first consider some of the weaknesses our author found in the accepted doctrines of the time.

Speaking of the current Political Economy, Ruskin declared, in *Unto This Last,* that "I neither impugn nor doubt the conclusion of the science if its terms are accepted" (XVII, 26). Again, and this time referring specifically to John Stuart Mill's *Principles,* he states that "the only conclusions of his which I have to dispute are those which follow from his premises" (XVII, 79). One premise in particular that Ruskin objected to was the concept of an "economic man".

In order to place their subject on a more scientific basis, the economists have long found it helpful, indeed necessary, to abstract from the totality of man's attributes. By narrowing their approach to economic motivation, and by assuming that man ordinarily acts in his own interests, and with a high degree of rationality—in other words, by adopting the notion of an economic man—they have been able to formulate reasonably accurate laws or principles concerning wealth: its production, exchange, distribution, and consumption.[7] (Economists have not always agreed, however, on the detailed characteristics of the economic man.) In careful hands this analytical concept is of great value, but there is the danger that the person using it will give the impression that the economic man is the whole man.

Despite any impressions they may have given to the contrary, the Classical economists were well aware that human nature extends beyond economic nature, that the whole man was more than the economic man. Ruskin, however, was greatly dissatisfied with the methodological device the Classical writers had created. "Modern political economy", he asserts in *Unto This Last,* assumes that man "is all skeleton", thereby founding "an ossifant theory of progress on this negation of a soul" (XVII, 26). He declares that he does not deny the truth of the theory but does deny "its applicability to the present phase of the world". What Ruskin apparently wanted to do was to create a very comprehensive science of Economics in which man as a complete unit would be assumed—not just part of man. The word "life", which he equates with "wealth", includes, in his definition, "the happiness and power of the entire human nature, body and soul" *(Munera Pulveris,* XVII, 149).

Of the non-skeletal parts of man's make-up, Ruskin gives special attention to the moral aspects of behavior. In other words, Ethics plays a key role in Ruskin's analysis. He seeks to tie Economics and Ethics together, not in any remote, indefinite relationship but as inseparable parts of a common whole. To Ruskin a study of "what is" must be united with a study of "what ought to be".

Such a vast widening of the scope of Economics as Ruskin favored met with little support from the professional economists of the day. The latter were interested in establishing their subject as a science, and in furtherance of this aim they felt they had to limit its boundaries: limit them to just one aspect of "what is", and to exclude, from the scientific part of their analysis, "what ought to be". The economists' central aim was to establish "laws" or "principles", either on the basis of demonstrable and, if possible, quantifiable evidence, or by deductive reasoning. The qualitative considerations that Ruskin wished to interject would prevent any such purpose from being realized.

As time went on, however, some approach was made to the Ruskinian ideal. Economists increasingly began to distinguish between Economics as a "positive" science and Economics as a "normative" science,[8] between the "science" and the "art" of Economics. The first terms in these two categories have to do with "what is"; the latter terms relate, at least to some degree, to "what ought to be". Though this distinction bore partial resemblance to what Ruskin had in mind, the economists making the distinction did not mix the science and art of Economics in the manner that Ruskin favored. And it should be added, as a matter of no small importance, that "standing" in the profession has been based on one's contribution to the progress of Economics as a positive science, not as a normative one. There have been partial exceptions to this rule, one must admit. J.M. Keynes is an outstanding example.

A further point should be noted. From Ruskin's criticism of Classical Economics and of Classical economists, and even from what has just been said about the emphasis placed by the economists on the scientific aspects of their discipline, one might get the impression that the earlier economists were largely uninterested in social reform. Such a conclusion would be untrue. As Professor Lionel Robbins has well demonstrated, the Classical economists were not anti-reform; they were reformers.[9] They too wanted to improve society, but the methods they favored often differed from those supported by Ruskin. While by no means favoring complete *laissez-faire,* they were not as enthusiastic about governmental intervention as Ruskin was. Possibly some of the economists did not fully realize the seriousness of the adverse conditions arising from the ongoing Industrial Revolution, and hence underestimated the scope of the legislation needed to improve the conditions. Possibly, too, some of the popularizers of the Political Economy gave a wrong impression of the relationship of the discipline to governmental action. Under any circumstances there was a widespread feeling in England that the economists were an inconsiderate lot. Writing at the end of the 1870's, the decade in which Ruskin wrote most of his *Fors* Letters, Arnold Toynbee gave expression to the common view when he spoke of "the bitter argument between economists and human beings."[10]

Since Ruskin's time there has been a vast growth in the subject matter of Economics, but this growth has been primarily internal, not external. There has been no substantial effort to transform the discipline into something much larger, to make it an integral part of a general Science of Society; to change Economics from a study of the "skeleton" of man, as Ruskin worded it, to a study of the whole man. True, there are some economists whose intellectual interests and capabilities extend far beyond their specialized field, and who make intrusions into other areas of knowledge. Some even make an effective use of poetry—sometimes their own—in their writings. In addition there are a great many economists whose policy recommendations have more than economic implications; in fact such implications are generally inevitable. Moreover, there has been a considerable amount of cooperative effort among social scientists, and between social scientists and other scholars. But nothing in the way of a general synthesis has been achieved, not in the social sciences considered by themselves, and certainly not among the social sciences, the physical sciences, and the humanistic disciplines. Such a general synthesis is indeed impossible. And yet additional efforts are greatly needed to bring the widely diverse fields of knowledge relating to man into a higher degree of unity. This is necessary if we are to come closer to the joint Ruskinian ideals of achieving a fuller, more comprehensive picture of man as he is—"body and soul"—and of promoting the development of man to what he ought to be.

In limiting the scope of their subject in order to make a more scientific approach to it possible, economists have given the term "wealth," the phenomenon that constitutes the core of their discipline, a restricted interpretation. Even within its narrow limits, the exact meaning of the word has over the years been a matter of considerable discussion. Ordinarily, however, the term has been applied to material objects that have exchange value.

Ruskin vigorously objected to this kind of definition, and he set about to describe the true nature of wealth. "The real gist of these papers", he says of the journal articles that constitute *Unto This Last,* "their central meaning and aim, is to give, as I believe for the first time in plain English, ...a logical definition of WEALTH." At one point in his discussion he states that "our definition of Wealth, expanded, becomes: 'The possession of useful articles, *which we can use.*' " A few paragraphs later he says that wealth is "THE POSSESSION OF THE VALUABLE BY THE VALIANT". And nearer the end of his analysis he makes the classic statement in which he equates wealth with life. He goes on to remark that life includes "all its powers of love, of joy, of admiration". And, by way of further elaboration, he declares that "That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings" (XVII, 18, 87, 88, 105).

One can readily see why the economists of the time, bent on increasing the stature of their subject as a science, would be most unimpressed by Ruskin's attempt to introduce such nebulous, qualitiative terms and notions into their discipline. There could be no *science* of wealth, if wealth were defined in the sense our author favored.

Ruskin's brave attempt to redefine the main concept of Economics, and thus alter the whole nature of the subject, met with failure. No economist today defines wealth in the Ruskinian sense. But in the parlance of Economics there is a widely used term that approaches in meaning the word wealth as Ruskin defined it. This is the simple word "welfare". In fact, a specialized branch of the discipline, known as Welfare Economics, has developed.

Contemporary Welfare economists, however, differ markedly from Ruskin, and should not be looked upon as his spiritual heirs. These economists operate on a much narrower intellectual plane than Ruskin did, and their work is much more sophisticated than his. Though their efforts have met with only modest success, the Welfare economists have clearly demonstrated—if any demonstration were needed—that wealth, as economists use the term, and welfare are by no means the same. This is the lesson that Ruskin tried to teach. Possibly he exaggerated the difference between the two—the size of the gap between wealth and welfare—but in general the point he made was well taken.

The tendency in modern society has been to link wealth and welfare too closely together. But a change is occurring. Under the impact of modern industrial developments and of modern warfare, we are becoming increasingly skeptical about the effects of great wealth and of rapid economic expansion on human wellbeing.[11] In a sense, we are returning to the gospel preached by Ruskin. We are becoming increasingly interested in "life", and less interested in "wealth".

Evidence relating to this shift in emphasis is found in the change that has been taking place in our attitude towards that great index of the wealth-producing capacity of the nation, the GNP. No one disputes the fact that the GNP contributes very significantly to the general wellbeing of a people; but doubts have been growing concerning the exact size of the contribution.

The GNP is defined as "the total national output of goods and services valued at market prices". The goods and services covered are for the most part those that are purchased "for final use (excluding illegal transactions) in the market economy". Though illegal transactions are excluded from the GNP totals, there are transactions included that add little if anything to human welfare. Indeed, they may subtract from it.

A very large entry in the GNP is the one covering defense expenditures, including such items as munitions, tanks, warships, and warplanes. Ruskin would not have been happy about these immense expenditures. He inveighed against the vast amount of energy devoted to the production of war goods. "For a great part (the reader would not believe how great until he saw the statistics in detail) of the most earnest and ingenious industry of the world", he declares in *Munera Pulveris,* "is spent on producing munitions of war; gathering, that is to say, the materials, not of festive, but of consuming fire; filling its stores with all power of the instruments of pain, and all affluence of the ministries of death" (XVII, 175).

The GNP of today is based on market values, and these do not always reflect the true merit of the goods. The goods may be poorly made, and may be even harmful and dangerous. Ruskin would have vehemently criticized the making of such goods and objected to their inclusion in the GNP. In *Time and Tide* he speaks of the prevention of all kinds of theft— "chiefly of the occult and polite methods of it; and, of all occult methods, chiefly, the making and selling of bad goods" (XVII, 383). At another point he speaks of adulteration as "a type of foul play" *(The Crown of Wild Olive,* XVIII, 425 and XVII, 383). And at still another place he refers to "your cunningly devised shoddies" *(Studies in Peasant Life,* "Notes Upon Gypsy Character," XXXII, 163).

The GNP of today includes a wide range of "gadgetry," much of it of little or no use. Here again Ruskin, with his moral yardstick for estimating wealth, would have objected. Some of our gadgets can be placed among the luxury goods, a type of goods about which Ruskin had a great deal to say; more particularly, "unnecessary luxury goods". It should be pointed out, however, that both with respect to such luxury spending and war spending our author recognized the possibility of a favorable "employment effect", as we would say today (SVII, 176). Such spending might put otherwise idle labor to use. But he obviously would have favored other methods, methods with a better moral fundation, for stimulating employment.

The types of goods just mentioned, instead of being referred to as wealth could, at least to some degree, be referred to as "illth." Such goods, and we can also include similar kinds of services, instead of contributing to human welfare lead to human "illfare". It was Ruskin who coined the very suggestive term "illth", though in his writings he appears to use the word only twice, and then in the limited sense of excess wealth. In *Unto This Last* he has the word cover the portion of their wealth that owners are "inherently and eternally" incapable of using properly (XVII, 89). In *Munera Pulveris* he uses the term in a similar fashion applying it to excessive amounts of "property" and "any other things". "Plunged to the lips in Orinoco, he shall drink to his thirst measure; more at his peril" (XII, 168). In *Fors* (Letter 7, XXVII, 122) Ruskin expands the term to "Common-Illth".

It is strange that Ruskin did not directly apply "illth" to war goods, to useless gadgets, to "shoddies". These goods are not wealth in his sense of the term; they do not add to the enrichment of life, with "all its powers of love, of joy, of admiration". Since he himself remarks that illth is the "correspondent term" to wealth, it seems clear that not only is excess wealth (as commonly defined) in the illth category but so are all the items we have just mentioned. At least there are illth elements in these items. Had Ruskin been asked for his opinion on the matter, there is every reason for believing that he would have agreed with the point just made.

If it is unfortunate that Ruskin did not make a more extensive use of his excellent term, it is even more unfortunate that the word has been largely disregarded by others, including economists.[12] The latter, in particular, could put it to very effective use, though it must be granted that they would have great difficulty in quantifying the goods and services covered by the term. But few persons, it seems, even know of the word's existence. The larger dictionaries ordinarily have an "illth" entry, but they do not always mention Ruskin as the one who coined the word, and in a number of cases they describe the term as "rare". Smaller dictionaries usually do not mention "illth" at all.

Such expressions as social costs, disenconomies, and spill-overs, terms that today are commonly employed by economists, were as unfamiliar to Ruskin as GNP; but he clearly knew what these terms imply. This is obvious from his definition of wealth. It is even more obvious from his numerous remarks about pollution. This is a word with which he was very familiar.

Ruskin was greatly interested in man's natural environment and was gravely concerned about the way it was being desecrated. In his voluminous writings he often turns to the theme, frequently in picturesque language. Without question Ruskin was one of the greatest environmentalists of all time, an ecologist of very high standing and of vigorous utterance.

Our author was acquainted with all the general types of pollution that exist today. He often gave attention to the menace of smoke, including that emitted by railroad engines. In one of his *Fors* letters he speaks of smoke blotting out the sunlight; in another he refers to the United Grand Steam Percussion and Corrosion Company and its order, "Let there be darkness", the darkness involving "a poisonous black wind, ..., of an entirely corrosive, deadly, and horrible quality," (No 46, XXVIII, 175; No. 60, XXVIII, 463-464). In *St. Mark's Rest,* he declares that "the primal effort" of the "entire human existence" of the Venetian, Italian, Frenchman, or Englishman was "to vomit out" the largest black cloud "he can pollute the heavens with" (XXIV, 267). At another point, in *Ariadne Florentina,* he goes so far as to ask guilty manufacturers (unintentionally guilty) why they do not "leave the England they pollute" (XXII, 453). A drastic suggestion, indeed.

Another form of pollution Ruskin inveighed against was the pollution of rivers, a development that in his opinion had gone very far. The manufacturers, he observes in his *Academy Notes, 1875,* had still left, in some parts of Britain, streams of "real water", and he remarks that he himself knew "several so free from pollution that one can sit near them with perfect safety, even when they are not in flood" (XIV, 305). In *Fors* he speaks of every river in England as having been turned into "a common sewer, so that you cannot as much as baptize an English baby but with filth, unless you hold its face out in the rain; and even *that* falls dirty" (Letter 5, XXVII, 92). Here we have a combination of both water and air pollution. A similar combination is found in the reference Ruskin makes in another *Fors* letter to the "total carelessness of the beauty of the sky, or the cleanness of streams, or the life of animals and flowers" (No. 66, XXVIII, 615). As one might expect, in his idealistic community of St. George one of the rules was to keep the streams lovely and pure—at another point Ruskin refers to the rule of seeing that the streams are not "wantonly polluted", and also that the existing timber is preserved (*Fors,* Letter 58, XXVIII, 423). One of Ruskin's most eloquent and bitter criticisms is his statement in *The Crown of Wild Olive* (XVIII, 385-387) about the dumping of refuse into streams by house-holders.

A century ago the pollution of streams by paper companies was a serious problem, as it has been in recent years. Ruskin in a note to a *Fors* letter refers to an observation made in the *Fourth Report of the Rivers Pollution Committee* that of all polluting refuse liquids from manufactories, "the discharges from paper works are the most difficult to deal with" (No. 33, XXVII, 607).

During the earlier part of Ruskin's life there had been a rapid expansion of the railroads, a development that did not please him. In his *Modern Painters* he speaks of the current time "when the iron roads are tearing up the surface of Europe as grapeshot to the sea" (IV, 31). In *Arrows of the Chace* he tells of railroads and manufacturers destroying "half the national memorials of England", and declares that to him the railroads are "the loathsomest form of devilry now extant, animated and deliberate earthquakes, destructive of all wise social habit or possible natural beauty, carriages of damned souls on the ridges of their own graves" (XXXIV, 506, 604). In *Fors* (Letter 1, XXVII, 14-15) he affirms that he would like to destroy most of the English railroads and all those in Wales. (The rest he would nationalize.) In his work of destruction Ruskin would include other examples of man's handiwork. Some of these examples, like the House of Parliament, he would rebuild. But others he would not rebuild. Included in the latter group was New York City. This, be it observed, was the New York of a century ago. With his harsh criticism of railroads—which he used only when he could not get to his destination by horse—it requires little effort to imagine how Ruskin, if he were living today, would feel about many of our modern highways. What language he would use in discussing them!

Ruskin does not say a great deal about noise as a polluting agency. This is understandable as there was not nearly as much noise in his day as there is now. He lived in the pre-automobile, pre-jet, pre-outboard-motor era. But Ruskin does not completely omit mention of this particular menace to the good life. In the previously quoted remark about the "devilry" of railroads, he refers to this form of public conveyance as "animated and deliberate earthquakes".

In a rather obscure passage in *Unto This Last* relating to unfair exchange transactions—which one might expand to include the purchase of articles involving pollution effects—Ruskin has a number of excellent statements concerning the positive and negative effects of economic transactions. He speaks of "the plus quantities" of Political Economy—"the pluses"—and of "the minuses". The latter, he says, have "a tendency to retire into back streets, and other places of shade,—or even to get themselves wholly and finally put out of sight in graves." This, he continues, "renders the algebra of this science peculiar, and difficulty legible, a large number of its negative signs being written by the account-keeper in a kind of red ink, which starvation thins, and makes strangely pale, or even quite invisible ink, for the present" (XVII, 91-92).

Possibly we are going a bit far in linking, in Ruskin's analysis, these statements with pollution problems. At any rate the terminology he uses is most suggestive as one discusses current environmental conditions. The costs of pollution are "the minuses" in our economic and private accounting calculations, minuses that have a tendency to slip into the back streets or even into the silence of the grave; they are the red-ink entries in the account-keeper's records, which tend to grow pale and even become invisible—that is, for the present. Ultimately these red-ink entries will make their existence known: harm to the environment will ultimately manifest itself.

In the interests of future generations, as well as of the present one, it is generally recognized today that the pollution of the environment must be brought under control. Ruskin has an interesting allusion to the matter of control in a section in *Munera Pulveris* entitled "Meristic Law". He speaks of the conditions which the merited possession of wealth imposes on the owner. Though the wealth to which he gives most attention relates to works of art and books, he includes other forms of wealth as well. The object of Meristic Law, he declares, is "not only to secure to every man his rightful share" of wealth, but to "enforce the due conditions of possession, as far as law may conveniently reach." He then gives a number of examples: "land shall not be wantonly allowed to run to waste"; "streams shall not be poisoned by the persons whose properties they pass, nor air be rendered unwholesome beyond given limits" (XVII, 239-241). In his striking remarks Ruskin does not directly allude to possession represented by industrial and commercial ownership. But, without any doubt, he would have agreed that his observations apply to them as well as to land ownership.

Ruskin wrote on a number of other matters that are closely related to his concept of wealth, and which are also of relevance and importance today. First there is the question of work, about which our author had much to say. It was his belief that work should be a direct source of happiness and human improvement. He contends that employers should be concerned not only with making goods in "the purest and cheapest forms" but with making the employments involved "most beneficial to the men employed" *(Unto This Last,* XVII, 41). In other words, Ruskin felt that employers should be interested not only in the Veblenian ideal of making goods but in the making of men. In *The Stones of Venice* (X, 196) he complains that in the manufacturing cities "we manufacture everything ...except men." In the same place, and probably with Adam Smith's celebrated pin illustration in mind, he launches a heavy attack on the division of labor. Current discussions about the "alienation" of the worker would have greatly interested Ruskin.

So, too, would our increased concern with consumer problems. Ruskin's interest in the production of wealth was accompanied by a deep interest in its consumption. "Wise consumption", he declares in *Unto This Last* (XVII, 98), "is a far more difficult art than wise production." This remark is similar to one made later by Alfred Marshall, the famous English economist, about the use or consumption of leisure. "In every age, in every nation and in every rank of society", said Marshall, "those who have known how to work well, have been far more numerous than those who have known how to use leisure well."[13] In *Munera Pulveris* (XVII, 154) Ruskin discusses what he calls "effectual value", and points out that this type of value has two requisities: *"first, the production of a thing essentially useful; then the production of the capacity to use it."* With this suggestive idea we shall abruptly take leave of John Ruskin, recognizing that in his provocative —and "unscientific"—economic writings of a century and more ago there is still much food for thought.

FOOTNOTES

1. *The Works of John Ruskin,* Library Edition, 39 vols., ed. E.T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn (London, 1903-1912), XVII, 105. All subsequent quotations from Ruskin will be identified, in the text, by volume number and page number from this edition of our author's writings. In each instance the title of the specific work will be indicated or will be obvious from the context.

2. In the Preface to *Munera Pulveris,* which was written in 1871, nine years after the essays comprising the volume were published in *Fraser's Magazine,* Ruskin declares that he had intended writing "an exhaustive treatise on Political Economy". He looked upon the essays in *Fraser's* as the preface to such a work. This intention Ruskin did not carry out, though he hoped that his *Fors Clavigera* Letters would accomplish his chief purpose, though less formally (XVII, 143-144).

3. One should probably be charitable here and ascribe these grotesque outbursts about Smith to the mental difficulties Ruskin was experiencing during the time he wrote the *Fors* Letters. Frederic Harrison, a friend of Ruskin's, said that Ruskin "has never (in full health and of cool purpose) said an unkind word of living man, nor an unjust word of a dead man," despite the fact that "for these fifty years" he has been "assailed, ridiculed, thwarted." *Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill* (New York, 1900), pp. 83-84. "Cool purpose" was not a condition in which Ruskin always found himself.

4. *Ruskin's Politics,* The Ruskin Centenary Council, 1921 (Oxford, 1921), pp. 17-18.

5. *The Victorian Age in Literature* (New York, 1913), p. 68.

6. *A Preface to Politics* (New York, 1913), p. 88.

7. Somewhat after the fashion of Ruskin, Kenneth E. Boulding has referred to this hypothetical personage as a "clod", and has declared that "No one in his senses would want his daughter to marry an economic man." Professor Boulding believes, however, that though the economic man is a clod, the "heroic man" is a fool, and that somewhere between the two "human man, if the expression may be pardoned, steers his tottering way". *Economics as a Science* (New York, 1970), pp. 134, 135.

8. For an extensive discussion of "Positive and Normative Economics", see Fritz Machlup's contribution to *Economic Means and Social Ends*, ed. Robert L. Heilbroner (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969). Machlup points out that the man most responsible for the extensive use of the two terms, John Neville Keynes, really proposed a third type of Economics, namely "practical".

9. *The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy* (London, 1952).

10. *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England* (London, 1908), p. 137. The young scholar and social reformer states that the argument has ended in "the conversion of the economists". Toynbee, as an Oxford undergraduate, had been one of the so-called "Hinksey Diggers"; indeed he had been a foreman in this road-making venture of Ruskin's. See Frederick W. Roe, *The Social Philosophy of Carlyle and Ruskin* (New York, 1921), pp. 262-265. Walter Bagehot also commented on the prevailing attitude towards economists. "No real Englishman in his secret soul was ever sorry for the death of an economist", Bagehot declared; "he was much more likely to be sorry for his life." Quoted in James W. Nisbet, *A Case For Laissez-Faire* (London, 1929), p. 18.

11. A fine example of the literature on the subject is E.J. Mishan's *The Costs of Economic Growth* (London, 1967).

12. Among the exceptions are George Bernard Shaw, who has a brief section entitled "Illth" in his *Economic Basis of Socialism*, one of the early pamphlets published by the Fabian Society; and Newton Arvin who, in his biography of Walt Whitman, has a long chapter labelled "Wealth and Illth". In the spring of 1973, the coming publication of a book by Ralph Barsodi was announced bearing the title, *Wealth and Illth: Its Nature, Its Growth, Its Future*.

13. *Principles of Economics*, 8th ed. (London, 1925), p. 720.