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## THE ANTI-AMERICAN INGREDIENT

### IN CANADIAN HISTORY

Canada has not one but three national games. First and foremost is ice hockey.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, there is the sport of determining whether a particular area or piece of legislation ought to be under federal or provincial jurisdiction. In both of these games a winner emerges periodically before the next series begins. Canada's third national game—assessing the Canadian identity—never ends and has never declared a winner. “Has Canada got an identity—this everlasting, frustrating, humiliating question!” wrote an exasperated Hugh MacLennan. “It is like asking a person to state his reasons for being alive, the assumption being that if he cannot explain *why* he is alive, he must be presumed dead”.<sup>2</sup> This paper will assume—as cavalier as the thought might seem to some observers—that *rigor mortis* has not yet stiffened the Canadian body and that a Canadian identity does indeed exist. Even if this assumption be attacked as performing an act of miraculous resurrection, it would not negate the fact that historically one very important ingredient in the Canadian identity has been an attitude which can best be labelled as “anti-Americanism”. It is this anti-American ingredient in Canadian history which this essay proposes to analyze. The paper will mainly devote its attention to historical origins and development rather than to contemporary manifestations of anti-Americanism.

What is the definition of anti-Americanism within the context of Canadian history? Is it the sort of detestation Colonel George Taylor Denison demonstrated upon hearing that a statue of George Washington was to be

placed in Westminster Abbey in commemoration of the centenary of Anglo-American amity? Denison's response was to say that he would have to make the trip over there in order to spit on the figure.<sup>3</sup> Undoubtedly, Canadian hatred of Americans is one facet of anti-Americanism, but it is only the 'lunatic fringe' of anti-American sentiment in Canada. Certainly most Canadians, in the last century at least, have wished Americans well, have applauded their successes and sympathized with their trials. At the same time, Canadians have long resisted the influence of the United States. This is the meaning of anti-Americanism in Canada—opposition to the Americanization of Canada whether in economic, social, cultural or political terms.<sup>4</sup> Canadian anti-Americanism is therefore integrally connected with the Canadian's concept of his own country. That a country should partially define itself in terms of what it was not and ought not to be, is neither unique nor particularly surprising. According to Robert Kelley, "a shared vision of the enemy does more to bind men together than anything else".<sup>5</sup> Anti-British sentiment was long a factor in the American mentality, and perhaps it is not too far-fetched to suggest that anti-communism holds a similar position today. Canadian conditions are peculiarly well-suited for the existence of this sort of negative identification:

When we come to appreciate these conditions—the requirements of a separate national identity seeking to establish itself against internal divisions and against strong external affinities, and fearing the encroachments that come from the radiating influences, social and economic, of a neighboring and vastly larger state—then we see that the image formed by Canadians of Americans is as natural a phenomenon as the rising sun.<sup>6</sup>

Anti-Americanism has a venerable tradition in Canada as the late Frank Underhill pointed out in 1954:

The oldest and most tenacious tradition in our communal memory centres around our determination not to become Americans. This is also the one tradition in which English Canadians and French Canadians have been whole-heartedly united. . . . In fact it would be hard to overestimate the amount of energy we have devoted to this cause. One can never tell what will be the next occasion on which we'll gird up our loins and save ourselves once again from the United States. One can only predict with confidence that the occasion will come.<sup>7</sup>

The origins of anti-Americanism certainly predate the emergence of either the United States or Canada as nations and may even precede the settlement of the white man in North America, for the conflict between the Iroquois Confederacy and the northern tribes was gradually transferred to the original

white settlers—the French in the St. Lawrence River valley and the Dutch and later the English on the Hudson River, and thus “the ancient war between the Algonkin and Iroquois . . . became a war between two European powers and two economic regions for dominance in North America”.<sup>8</sup>

During the entire century and a half of its existence, New France was under military threat.<sup>9</sup> At first the Iroquois were the enemy; but it slowly became clear that the Anglo-American colonists of New England, New York and Virginia posed the most serious danger to New France.<sup>10</sup> Economic competition was central to this struggle and from the very beginning the St. Lawrence and Albany fur traders strove for hegemony. In the long run, however, it was the moving agrarian frontier of the English colonies which provided the great economic threat to the commercial empire of New France.<sup>11</sup> Compounding this economic antagonism were the vastly different socio-political characteristics exhibited by the French and English colonies. One might, for example, contrast the influence of the Catholic Church, the seigneurial system and the hierarchical and absolute governmental system of New France with the influence of differing institutions in the English colonies. Conflicting in economic structures, differing in socio-political institutions, contrasting in cultural characteristics, the French and English colonies confronted each other in North America. What was involved was a contest between two societies which, while certainly not independent of their mother countries, were unique societies nonetheless and definitely in conflict with one another. “The adversaries knew this”, writes Guy Frégault, “and said so. They recognized each other for what they were, irreconcilable enemies”.<sup>13</sup> At the final defence of Quebec in 1759, “old men of eighty and children of twelve presented themselves for service. . . . The Bishop exhorted the population to fight for the freedom of their country, and curés contributed their tithes to the Royal Treasury”.<sup>14</sup> To prevent the conquest of Canada was a mission which apparently galvanized the entire population. The fact that Canadians had constantly fought for their very survival against forces from the south obviously resulted in anti-Americanism.

There were, however, certain countervailing forces in operation. In the first place Canadians naturally did not always differentiate between the English colonists and the English across the sea. Thus antagonism tended to be directed almost as much at all Englishmen as at colonial Englishmen. Secondly, while the North American component in the colonial conflict should not be forgotten, the imperial nature of the contest ought to be considered. Canadians were, after all, fighting the battle for the French Empire as well as

for themselves, and the interests of Empire did not always coincide with the interest of Canada.<sup>15</sup> In one sense, New France was a military outpost, a part of the French imperial policy to tie down a large English force with a small garrison.<sup>16</sup> Now the soldiers of a military garrison are not always noted for their pure hatred of the enemy; many fight for their livelihood, not for their souls. In terms of New France it may be that some inhabitants fought more out of duty than conviction. Indeed, there is evidence to show that French colonists were not totally antagonistic towards their English counterparts. There was, for example, a good deal of smuggling between Montreal and Albany in the eighteenth century.<sup>17</sup> Finally, other characteristics of Canadian society were not especially conducive to the development of anti-Americanism. As has been seen, anti-Americanism is closely connected with the concept of the Canadian national identity. The era of New France, however, had come to a close before the French Revolution, and its aftermath had created the dynamic concept of modern nationalism. The socio-political structure of the colony tended to be hierarchical, authoritarian and non-democratic. New France had no newspapers. These things meant that there was little incentive and few means to whip up anti-American sentiment amongst the masses.

While these qualifications must be made, the fact remains that New France's entire existence had been on an anti-American basis. Therefore, with the defeat of New France in 1760, most people undoubtedly thought that the anti-American history of Canada was at an end. But there was one observer who hoped otherwise. General Murray, the commander of the British troops at Quebec in 1760, stated that he thought it would be wise to return Canada to the French as it would act as a check upon New England.<sup>18</sup> His hopes were not fulfilled, but he was given the chance to use Canada as a curb on the English colonies to the south; he was appointed governor of the new English colony of Quebec.

The patterns established by New France were not all discontinued at the time of the Conquest. Some authorities of the new imperial government apparently seemed interested in using Canada as an anti-American establishment. The economic competition between the northern and southern commercial systems continued.<sup>19</sup> The society and political structure of Quebec remained quite distinct and largely antagonistic to that of the older English colonies. These factors remaining relatively constant, it is not surprising that Quebec did not join the American Revolution. French Canadian *habitants* may well have desired neutrality in this English civil war and trade with the side that paid cash, but strong and active support for the rebels was not forth-

coming.<sup>20</sup> As Henri Bourassa later put it: "It was all very simple; we had to choose between the English of Boston and the English of London. The English of London were farther away and we hated them less".<sup>21</sup> The American invasion of 1775-76 itself contributed to anti-American feeling amongst French-Canadians, especially after the check to the American advance and the depletion of their cash reserves had impelled American troops to forceful exaction of supplies and services from the Canadians.<sup>22</sup>

The American Revolution did more than confirm the anti-Americanism of French Canadians; it also created an anti-American English-speaking community in British North America. At the beginning of the Revolution the merchants of Montreal and settlers in Nova Scotia comprised the English-speaking population in the area which became Canada. The attitude of both groups toward the Revolution was one of considerable sympathy—at first. However, the demands of the St. Lawrence economic system quickly forced the merchants to desire that Canada be independent from the emerging American nation.<sup>23</sup> In Nova Scotia, the Halifax merchants and the military establishment strenuously opposed the Revolution. It would appear, however, that the 'neutral Yankees' of Nova Scotia were little affected by the views of the Halifax elite and never did develop a strong sense of anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, numerous raids by American privateers on Nova Scotian coastal settlements during the Revolution, did result in increasing hostility towards the Americans.<sup>24</sup> On the whole, however, Nova Scotia did not develop a sense of bitter anti-Americanism during the Revolution.<sup>25</sup>

In marked contrast were the views of the United Empire Loyalists—known as the Tories in American history. The political position of those who became Loyalists was not really as antagonistic to that of the American revolutionaries as is often assumed. While believing that revolution was unnecessary and undesirable, many Loyalists were convinced that reform ought to be sought.<sup>26</sup> Joseph Galloway, for example, had been one of the strong and popular colonial leaders in the Continental Congress before he decided that things had gone too far and became a Loyalist.<sup>27</sup> No, the basis of Loyalism was a fear of the American majority.

Taking all the groups and factions, sects, classes, and inhabitants of regions that seems to have been Tory, they have but one thing in common; they represented conscious minorities, people who felt weak and threatened. . . . Almost all the Loyalists were, in one way or another, more afraid of America than they were of Britain. . . . Being fairly certain that they would be in a permanent

minority (as Quakers or oligarchs or frontiersmen or Dutchmen) they could not find much comfort in a theory of government that assured them of sovereign equality with other Americans *as individuals*.<sup>28</sup>

For the 40,000 or 50,000 Loyalists who emigrated to British North America after the Revolution, the anti-Americanism they brought with them became a psychological necessity in the new land. "How could this *émigré* people deny their history, or the choice they had made . . . it was essential for Canadians not to believe in the United States. . . ." <sup>29</sup> Despite all of this, Loyalist attitudes were complicated by the fact that the United States had been the homeland. Many Loyalists left behind close friends and relatives. The result was a complex love-hate relationship which has been characteristic of Anglo-Canadian views of the United States since that time.<sup>30</sup> Jonathan Sewell put it this way: "as to Massachusetts Bay . . . God mend them, and bless them—but let me never, never be cursed with a residence among them again. I hate the Climate where Rebellion and Fanaticism are ingendered [*sic*]" <sup>31</sup>

Despite these nuances, it is clear that anti-Americanism had been firmly established in British North America by the end of the American Revolution. In the Atlantic Provinces and in Quebec the War of 1812 mildly reinforced this attitude.<sup>32</sup> In Upper Canada the War of 1812 was much more significant, for that was the area most susceptible to Americanization. In the years before 1812 the small Loyalist population was almost submerged beneath a flood of American settlement as the agrarian frontier of the United States pushed westward.<sup>33</sup> By 1812 approximately eighty per cent of the Upper Canadian population was of American origin; only one-quarter of these were Loyalists or their descendants.<sup>34</sup> Active warfare, however, forced the inhabitants to make a decision on the matter of allegiance.

The loyally-minded took up active resistance. Would-be neutrals found that they had to choose sides, if only for self-protection—and it was manifestly the American invaders who had brought in a war that threatened their crops and farms and families. As for those who nevertheless chose openly to espouse the American cause, they had to leave the province as enemy aliens, depart with the retreating invaders they had supported, or in some cases face arrest and sentence for treason.<sup>35</sup>

Thus the War of 1812 caused a fresh outburst of anti-Americanism which melded with the Loyalist tradition to create an Upper Canada devoted to the task of resisting absorption into the United States.<sup>36</sup>

By 1815 the bases for the anti-American tradition in Canada had been laid. Amongst French Canadians anti-Americanism went back to the earliest days of settlement. English-speaking Canadians found the source of their anti-Americanism in the American Revolution and the War of 1812. The sentiment was not totally devoid of friendliness towards Americans as individuals. But on the other hand, anti-Americanism had been created and confirmed in blood.

Between 1815 and the present day there have been fluctuations in the degree and nature of anti-Americanism which Canadians have displayed. For the sake of convenience I would suggest that there have been four distinct periods. From 1815 to the Treaty of Washington in 1871 was an era in which Canadians feared armed aggression from their neighbours to the south. For the next half-century, that is until World War One, the suspicion that the United States posed a military threat waned; instead Canadians felt that Americans were resorting to more subtle means to bring about their old goal of annexation. The period from World War One to the mid-1960s was one of general harmony in which anti-Americanism was much less prominent than it had been earlier. Finally, Canada may well be in a fourth state, the characteristics of which are not entirely clear but do indicate a strong revival of anti-Americanism.

From 1815 to 1871 the United States provided plenty of fuel to feed the fires of Canadian anti-Americanism. A perpetual fear of American "manifest destiny" gripped British North Americans, as was evidenced in D'Arcy McGee's 1865 speech in favour of Confederation:

... the policy of our neighbors to the south of us has always been aggressive. There has always been a desire amongst them for the acquisition of new territory. ... They coveted Florida, and seized it; they coveted Louisiana, and purchased it; they coveted Texas and stole it; and then they picked a quarrel with Mexico, which ended with their getting California. ... They sometimes pretend to despise these colonies as prizes beneath their ambition; but had we not had the strong arm of England over us, we should not now have had a separate existence. ... The acquisition of Canada was the first ambition of the American Confederacy, and never ceased to be so, when her troops were a handful and her navy scarce a squadron. Is it likely to be stopped now, when she counts her guns afloat by thousands and her troops by hundreds of thousands?<sup>37</sup>

This was the frame of reference for Canadians when they looked at the raids from American soil which followed the 1837 Rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada; the disputes concerning the Maine-New Brunswick border and the

Oregon territory in the 1840s; and the difficulties caused by the Civil War including the Fenian aftermath. While this fear was not totally unwarranted there were other causive factors involved in the creation of Canadian anti-Americanism.

Firstly, there was the imperial component. It seems clear that imperial authorities, both before and after 1815, used and promoted anti-Americanism as a means of maintaining the loyalty of the colonists to the imperial connection.<sup>38</sup> Francis Bond Head, the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada from 1836-38, attempted to justify his conduct which had helped to precipitate the Rebellion in Upper Canada, on the grounds that every act of his administration had been "*To save the people of Upper Canada from following in the footsteps of the United States. . .*"<sup>39</sup> Not surprisingly, many British North Americans supported the retention of the British tie because they feared American encroachments. In Upper Canada, for example, "The apprehended threat from the large American-born element in the population, and the quite genuine danger, military, political and cultural, from the United States, made 'loyalty' the crux of conservative attitudes".<sup>40</sup>

This was imperialism from the bottom up, so to speak, and was intimately connected with an emerging colonial identity. By and large, imperial and national patriotism have worked in harmony in Canadian history. By the 1860s, however, it was apparent that British North Americans were so adamant in their anti-Americanism that they were willing in fact to weaken the imperial tie in a confused attempt to strengthen their defences against the United States.<sup>41</sup> The point is that Canadians needed little aid from across the sea in promoting anti-Americanism. This sentiment had become so much a part of the definition of being a British North American that an immigrant who wished to accommodate himself to his new environment adopted some of the anti-American biases of his fellow citizens. Perhaps the best confirmation of this assertion is to be found in the views of Timothy Anglin, an Irish Catholic who came to Saint John, New Brunswick, in 1849. To most Irish Catholic emigrants, the United States was an earthly utopia and the hope of the world. Unquestionably, Anglin was never as antagonistic towards the United States as were some colonists. Still, before a decade of residence in New Brunswick had passed, Anglin was mouthing the typical Canadian view that American society was "rotten beyond all conception". The United States, he wrote, was a country in which "individual will and individual passions and prejudices are more and more usurping the place of law. . .".<sup>42</sup>



If there was a tendency for an Irish Catholic leader in British North America to develop anti-American attitudes, one may be sure that there was a social basis for anti-Americanism. The elite of British North American society were the most vocal spokesmen for anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism had certain advantages for the elite. The Tory oligarchy in Upper Canada found it a most useful stick with which they could beat down the forces espousing the nasty 'American' doctrines of reform and democracy. This meant that they were able to retain their positions of power and privilege for several decades. Their retention of power cannot, however, be explained solely in terms of 'blackmail' politics. After all, their anti-American arrows had to have a target to hit. For many Upper Canadians the arrows went straight to their hearts. The explanation of the longevity of Canadian conservatism is to be found, in part, in Canadian anti-Americanism.<sup>43</sup> Conversely, the conservatism of Canada has often been suggested as a reason for Canadians to be wary of 'radical' Americans. In any case, while it is true that anti-Americanism did serve the interests of a social elite, it is clear that this group represented the views of the Canadian populace, though undoubtedly more vociferously than the ordinary Canadian.

The results of anti-Americanism between 1815 and 1871 were widespread and profound:

The enduring recognition by Canadians that the United States was potentially strong enough to annex Canada "peacefully or otherwise" . . . kept constantly alive in the Canadian consciousness a conviction that things Canadian must be defended *in toto* and things American rejected *in toto*. There was no room for eclecticism here.<sup>44</sup>

In this atmosphere, everything from Yankee schoolmasters and circuit preachers to temperance societies came under attack for Americanism.<sup>45</sup> Perhaps the most important effects were seen in the realm of politics. One major reason for the failure of the 1837 Rebellions in the Canadas was the fact that the rebels were accused of supporting American political ideas, said to be antagonistic to British institutions.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Confederation would have come in the 1860s, perhaps ever, were it not for the fears aroused by numerous incidents during that decade. Many British North Americans believed that the United States with its huge army was ready to embark on a war of conquest and from this perspective they viewed the Fenians as American shock troops. Because British North Americans did not wish to fall into the land-hungry grasp of the United States, they agreed to become united in a

Confederation.<sup>47</sup> French Canadians, as much as English Canadians, accepted the logic of the anti-American argument, as was seen in Sir Etienne-Pascal Taché's speech in favour of Confederation:

If the opportunity which now presented itself were allowed to pass by unimproved . . . we would be forced into the American Union by violence, and if not by violence, would be placed upon an inclined plane which would carry us there insensibly. In either case the result would be the same.<sup>48</sup>

Even the constitutional arrangements of Confederation reflected the anti-American atmosphere in which they had been drafted. The Fathers of Confederation were convinced that the theory of states' rights symbolized the great error in the American constitution—the weakness of the principle of authority. Therefore, the British North America Act enshrined their *belief* in a strong central government (but at the same time upheld their rather contradictory *desire* to retain very important powers for the provincial governments).<sup>49</sup> Moreover, the Fathers of Confederation had no sympathy with the democratic principles they saw to the south of them. Democracy, they were convinced, had led to mobocracy and a lack of morality in the United States. Thus the nation of Canada was founded on principles and practices which were non-democratic and anti-republican.<sup>50</sup> In short, the political ramifications of anti-Americanism were legion.

Between 1815 and 1871, then, anti-Americanism thrived and became one of the most important elements in defining the meaning of the new Dominion of Canada. During this period anti-Americanism had been perpetuated and encouraged by the interaction of at least five things: the actions of the United States, the promotion of the imperial connection, the urgings of incipient colonial identities, the interests of social elites and the exigencies of partisan politics. With such a grounding it is hardly surprising that anti-Americanism remained an important aspect of the Canadian mentality in the years that followed.

May 16, 1972, was the one hundredth anniversary of the acceptance of the Treaty of Washington by the Canadian House of Commons.<sup>51</sup> It was one centenary which was not marked by great celebrations. Yet it was an event which is of very great significance in the history of Canadian-American relations. The Treaty of Washington enabled Britain to withdraw her troops from North America with some show of decency. The tail of the British lion was not tucked between the legs; it merely dragged the ground. This action seemed to leave Canada defenceless against the United States. Strange as it

may seem, however, for Canada the best defence was no offence. Now Americans were sure that Canada posed no threat to them. The desire to annex Canada became less urgent, and Americans began to think in terms of a 'ripe fruit' theory of annexation—that is, eventually Canada would mature and fall into the waiting basket of the United States. In the meantime, Canada could be allowed to exist.<sup>52</sup> This is what the Treaty of Washington demonstrated, although in a very tentative fashion. In time, in fact, Canadian fear of American military aggression faded, although Canadians continued to believe that the United States had sufficient strength to absorb Canada.<sup>53</sup> The grounds for defence against the United States shifted between the acceptance of the Treaty of Washington and World War One; it became more a battle of economics than of bullets.

The changing nature of the component parts of anti-Americanism partially accounted for this shift. By and large, the actions of the United States provided fewer incidents for the promotion of Canadian anti-Americanism than in earlier periods, although American procedures in the Alaska Boundary Dispute roused the ire of Canadians.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, imperial sentiments strongly revived in Canada during the period. But while British authorities still played a role in promoting imperialism, the major force behind the desire to retain and strengthen the British connection was an incipient nationalism which desired a counterbalance to the influence from south of the border.<sup>55</sup> Canadian imperialists were among the most critical observers of the United States.<sup>56</sup>

One might say that before Confederation, British North America had a number of colonial identities; after Confederation one finds emerging something which might be called Canadian nationalism. Integral to the definition of the nationalism of the new country was anti-Americanism.<sup>57</sup> It had been a cause of Confederation; it was a major bond of unity after Confederation; and it demanded the energies and actions of Canadians:

Thus Canadian national life can almost be said to take its rise in the negative will to resist absorption in the American Republic. It is largely about the United States as an object that the consciousness of Canadian national unity has grown up.<sup>58</sup>

Anti-Americanism operated within Canadian nationalism when times were bad, as during the late 1870s when Canada adopted a protective tariff to spite American protectionism and to develop a Canadian economy which would be

less dependent upon the United States.<sup>59</sup> But anti-Americanism was also to be seen when times were good, as in 1911 when Canadians rejected reciprocity, in part because they did not wish to jeopardize the glorious future they foresaw for the country.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, the building of economic defences against the United States was in keeping with the changing social structure in Canada. Before the mid-nineteenth century the commercial class had been significant, but wealth had by no means been the only or even the most significant determinant of social position. Birth, military background, education and 'right ideas' were just as important. By Confederation, however, merchants, manufacturers, financiers and their agents had largely replaced the earlier elite, at least as far as control of the ship of state was concerned. What they found when they grasped the helm was that they could maintain control and promote their own interests by using anti-American appeals to the populace. Again, one must emphasize that there was nothing particularly insidious about this. Emotional appeals by those in power to the electorate against an 'external threat' is usual procedure. Moreover, the anti-American appeals of the elite found a ready response amongst a large segment of Canadians. Thus the partisan political use and promotion of anti-Americanism did not diminish during the period. The 1891 and 1911 elections were two of the most anti-American campaigns in Canadian history.

The general trend between 1872 and 1914 was for Canadians to moderate their anti-American sentiments. The shift from military fortifications to economic ramparts was significant. Moreover, Canadians became somewhat more knowledgeable about conditions in the United States, and strange as it may seem expressions of an anti-American nature were frequently coupled with protestations of friendliness.<sup>61</sup> A Tory backbencher demonstrated that Canadians even felt that Americans would not resent Canadian antagonism when, in 1876, while arguing in favour of a protective tariff, he stated:

They have kicked and cuffed and knocked us about in every way, from pillar to post, and have laughed at us in their sleeves; they think that we are fools. . . . When we adopt a defensive policy, they will begin to think a little of us, and say we are businessmen and not before.<sup>62</sup>

Even in the midst of the 1911 election campaign, it was clear that Canadian anti-Americanism had moderated considerably since the 1860s.<sup>63</sup>

This trend continued after 1914. In fact, the period from 1914 to the mid 1960s is the least anti-American of any epoch in Canadian history. There

were various reasons for this. In the first place, during the 1920s Canada achieved autonomy within the British Commonwealth. The British connection was not severed but was considerably loosened. Some Canadians bemoaned this development but most approved or acquiesced. What this meant was that the imperial component in the anti-American equation declined almost to the point of disappearance. By the 1950s some Canadians were searching for another counterbalance to the United States such as Great Britain had once provided and could no longer.<sup>64</sup> While imperialism was declining, the actions of the United States during these years seldom caused great antagonism in Canada. There were, to be sure, a hundred and one petty annoyances which Canadians felt vis-à-vis their neighbour to the south. But the old idea of military defence against the United States became either so ludicrous or hopeless in the minds of Canadians that in 1933 Canada cancelled Defence Scheme Number 1, the plan which anticipated attack from the United States.<sup>65</sup> Seven years later Canada and the United States together formed the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, an agency to plan for the co-operative defence of North America.<sup>66</sup> It was the epitome of the modification which had taken place in the Canadian mentality, for it marked a change from armed hostility to military alliance. Along with the decline of imperialism and of belief in the military threat of the United States went a rather confident, some would say complacent, nationalism. When the U.S.A. no longer appeared to be a military menace, Canadians felt that they had won their struggle for a separate existence in North America. With these factors undercutting the appeal of anti-Americanism in Canada, the Canadian elite did not find it particularly beneficial to lead anti-American crusades. Moreover, as the Canadian economy became more completely interlocked with the American, it became disadvantageous for the economically powerful to promote anti-Americanism.<sup>67</sup> Finally, it is clear that while anti-Americanism was a factor in the campaigns of 1930 and 1957, the issue had lost much of its conjuring power in elections. The election result of 1963 might be explained in several ways, but for George Grant its significance was that for "the first time in our history . . . a strongly nationalist campaign did not succeed, and . . . a government was brought down for standing up to the Americans".<sup>68</sup>

Canadians were less anti-American between 1914 and 1965 than in earlier periods of Canadian history; that is clear.

There is no country in the world with whom Canadians are more sincerely desirous of preserving friendly relations than the United States [stated one newspaper in 1921.] There is no country on earth with whom it is more essential

for our own peace and comfort that Canadians should continue to enjoy the most harmonious intercourse.<sup>69</sup>

But it cannot be denied that anti-Americanism still remained a significant component of the Canadian mentality. Many Canadians remained or became concerned about the American economic threat, although few in the twenties and thirties feared that political implications would follow American dominance.<sup>70</sup> By 1957, however, even the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects expressed concern about increasing American dominance of the Canadian economy and proclaimed that Canada needed to ensure that foreign-owned concerns would, "whenever reasonably possible, make decisions that are in the best interests of Canada. . . ."<sup>71</sup>

For Canadians, the American menace between 1914 and 1965 was perhaps more social and cultural than political or economic. One observer was convinced as early as 1926 that Canadian social life had been annexed to the United States.<sup>72</sup> Canadians did not believe that this had happened. They did not want it to happen. A mid-thirties analysis put it this way:

Their charge would be that the standards of American civilization are materialistic and banal; that the dollar is used as the measure of all things, even of things which men of culture or humanity think beyond price; that the social outlook of the United States is becoming biological rather than spiritual; and that the world outlook is narrow and selfish. . . . If, as they will readily admit, Canadians are affected in some degree with the same faults, they will say that it is the United States which has influenced them.<sup>73</sup>

The evil influence of American periodicals, movies and radio on Canadian life and morals was a prevalent theme between the World Wars.<sup>74</sup> Once again, it was a Royal Commission, the Massey Commission of 1951, which drew attention to the possibility of the Americanization of Canada through non-military means; in this case, through cultural domination.<sup>75</sup> Especially by the 1950s there was growing concern about American economic and cultural dominance of Canada. Frank Underhill claimed that there was more anti-Americanism in 1957 than he had ever known since his birth in 1889.<sup>76</sup> While this was an overstatement undoubtedly caused by Underhill's intense dislike of anti-Americanism and those who promoted it,<sup>77</sup> there certainly was an anti-American impulse in Canadian life which the decades had not destroyed.

The outburst of anti-Americanism since the mid-sixties is, therefore, neither an aberration of the Canadian historical tradition nor antagonistic to

the Canadian mentality.<sup>78</sup> During the last seven or eight years there has been a rise of a bitter and pessimistic antagonism towards the United States. In 1964, for example, the eminent historian W. L. Morton wrote that "the country is so irradiated by the American presence that it sickens and threatens to dissolve in cancerous slime".<sup>79</sup> In 1965, George Grant's *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*, was published. The title told everything; the Americans, with aid from Canadian Liberals, had emerged triumphant in their long quest to absorb Canada. Donald Creighton swelled the anti-American chorus with his writings, culminating with *Canada's First Century*, a book which ends on a most pessimistic note.<sup>80</sup> Numerous other books with provocative titles on Canadian attitudes to and relations with the United States have been published.<sup>81</sup> Magazines, journals and periodicals have been crammed with articles pointing out the variety of ways in which the United States threatens Canada. Frequently, positive reasons for wishing to resist American encroachments either were not considered or were assumed. The simple desire not to become American was deemed to be sufficient justification for Canadians to put up staunch resistance:

It needn't be uniquely Canadian so long as it isn't a copy of the United States [wrote Gad Horowitz about Canadian nationalism]. It could be anything. It could be a replica of Sweden, or if you like of North Korea, Albania or Ireland, or Spain or Yugoslavia, or Cambodia, or all of them. . . . We are nationalists not in the sense that we want to keep Canada forever out of future mergers of nations, but in the sense that we want to keep Canada out of the *United States* in the foreseeable future. We are nationalists because we believe that something new can be created here—something different from what the Americans have created—and that something new might be a social democracy.<sup>82</sup>

By relating contemporary anti-Americanism to the historical pattern, certain parallels can be discerned. In the first place, actions of the United States in recent years have irritated Canadians. The recent imposition of the import surcharge was seen by Canadians as simply one more example of Uncle Sam's irrationality and selfishness in international relations. The war in Vietnam, race riots and urban violence have convinced Canadians that they are much better off remaining outside the United States. But anti-Americanism is also a reflex of Canadian nationalism. By the 1960s Canadians had lost their complacency about the future of the country. Rather, it often appeared that the country was breaking apart, an aggressive and restrictive French-Canadian nationalism being the most evident symbol of this disintegration. The obvious, but probably subconscious, response of those desiring to preserve Canadian

unity was to focus on a common enemy—the United States. As had been the case for many a year, anti-Americanism could be promoted to induce Canadians, both French-speaking and English-speaking, to work together.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, anti-Americanism was once again being advanced by an elite, a struggling new elite, the intelligentsia. Undoubtedly this new elite finds anti-Americanism as useful for its own interests as did the elite of the nineteenth century. With this stick the intelligentsia can beat the money barons and ‘alien’ competitors for power and influence as the Tories used to beat the Reformers. If this analysis is true—and the membership of the steering committee of the Committee for an Independent Canada provides some verification—the battle against American ‘infiltration’ of Canadian universities is not particularly surprising. There may even be ‘imperial’ ingredient to the new anti-Americanism. Certainly it was for the benefit of Europe that Claude Julien in *Canada: Europe's Last Chance* urged Canadians to retain their independence from the United States.<sup>84</sup> Finally, there have been indications that anti-Americanism may well emerge as a significant issue in future elections.

Three and a half centuries have elapsed since Champlain had his first skirmish with the Iroquois. Ever since that time Canadians have feared the threat posed by their neighbour to the south. As we have seen, Canadian concepts of the nature of that threat have changed over the years. The basic constant is that Canadians have always desired to remain apart from the United States. For the last hundred years or so Canadians have wished Americans health and success in their own land. For some time Canadians have placed a good deal of trust in their American brethren. But as recently as 1971 G. Frankfurter gave Canadians a strenuous warning about being complacent:

Canadians should constantly remember that in negotiating with the only nation that has repeatedly attacked us on our own soil and daily exerts the crudest kind of pressure on our government, the pistol is always on the table alongside the brief. We had better have a little powder of our own handy and make sure it is dry.<sup>85</sup>

Colonel Denison himself could hardly have stated it more forcefully.

#### NOTES

1. In fact, lacrosse is Canada's official national sport.
2. H. MacLennan, "Canadian National Identity", *Canadian Identity*, ed. G. F. C. Stanley (Sackville, New Brunswick: Mount Allison University Publication, 1969), p. 23.



3. C. Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 19.
4. It is significant to note that in the vocabulary of Canadians the term "American" usually refers to the country of the United States rather than to the continent of North America.
5. R. Kelley, *The Transatlantic Persuasion: The Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. xix.
6. H. F. Angus (ed.), *Canada and Her Great Neighbor: Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1938), p. xxv.
7. F. H. Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1960), p. 222. See also J. K. Morchain, "Anti-Americanism in Canada 1871-1891" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1967), p. 55. On the anti-American thread running throughout the Canadian intellectual tradition see R. D. Mathews, "U.S. expansionism, Canadian literature, and Canadian intellectual history", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, VI (November, 1971), pp. 30-41.
8. W. J. Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier 1534-1760* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 25. On the anti-American nature of New France see Morchain, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-29.
9. A. Lachance, "The Soldier in New France, 1663-1759", *Documentary Problems in Canadian History*, Vol. I: *Pre-Confederation*, ed. J. M. Eumsted (Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey Ltd., 1969), p. 25; and W. J. Eccles, "The Social, Economic and Political Significance of the Military Establishment in New France", *Canadian Historical Review*, LII (1971), 1-22.
10. G. F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (2d ed. rev.; Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1960), p. 31. There was a transitional stage during which the inhabitants of New France convinced themselves that the English colonists were the real force behind Iroquois aggression (see Eccles, *Canadian Frontier*, p. 120; Y. F. Zoltvany (ed.), *The French Tradition in America* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 114-115 and 118; W. J. Eccles, *Frontenac: The Courtier Governor* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968), pp. 223-224; and W. J. Eccles, *Canada Under Louis XIV, 1663-1701* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964), pp. 171-172).
11. Eccles, *Canadian Frontier*, p. 11.
13. G. Frégault, *Canada: The War of the Conquest*, trans. M. M. Cameron (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. x.
14. G. Lanctot, *A History of Canada*, Vol. III: *From the Treaty of Utrecht to the Treaty of Paris, 1713-1763*, trans. M. M. Cameron (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 166.
15. W. J. Eccles asserts, for example, that the thrust into the Ohio country was dictated by imperial concerns rather than Canadian demands (see Eccles, *Canadian Frontier*, p. 166).
16. Eccles, *art. cit.*, p. 1.
17. J. Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-60", *Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1939, pp. 61-76. Further evidence which can be cited include the facts that efforts to ally Canada and the New England colonies against the Iroquois menace were not too far from success in the mid-seventeenth century (see G. Lanctot, *A History of Canada*, Vol. I: *From*

- Its Origins to the Royal Regime, 1663*, trans. J. Hambleton (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co. Ltd., 1963), pp. 199-200; and "Letter to the Council of Quebec to the Commissioners of New England, Quebec, June 20, 1651", *The French Regime*, ed. C. Nish (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1965), p. 40 and that there were strong connections between New England and the French settlers at the military fortress of Louisbourg (see Lanctot, *op. cit.*, III, 77).
18. Frégault, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-294.
  19. D. G. Creighton, *The Empire of the St. Lawrence* (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1956), pp. 20-21.
  20. G. A. Rawlyk, *Revolution Rejected 1775-1776* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1968), pp. 58-59.
  21. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 10. See also *ibid.*, p. 90.
  22. *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 67, 79 and 90.
  23. Creighton, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
  24. On Nova Scotia's response to the Revolution see Rawlyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-54; J. B. Brebner, *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony During the Revolutionary Years* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1969); W. S. MacNutt, *The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society 1712-1857* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965), pp. 76-86; and G. A. Rawlyk, "The American Revolution and Nova Scotia Reconsidered", *Dalhousie Review*, XLIII (1963), 379-394.
  25. The New Light movement, a religious revival led by Henry Alline, swept through Nova Scotia during the Revolution. For the inhabitants of Nova Scotia this provided an escape from a political problem they did not wish to face.
  26. L. Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution with An Historical Essay* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1864), I, 64; W. G. Shelton, "The United Empire Loyalists: a Reconsideration". *Dalhousie Review*, XLV (1965), 5-16; and K. D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History", *The Founding of New Societies*, ed. L. Hartz (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964), p. 235.
  27. Sabine, *op. cit.*, I, 453-457. Galloway settled in England rather than British North America after the Revolution.
  28. W. H. Nelson, *The American Tory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 91. The anti-American nature of the Loyalists receives further witness in Sabine *op. cit.*, I, 73-74; E. Ryerson, *The Loyalists of America and Their Times: From 1620 to 1816* (New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd., 1970), II, 186; A. L. Burt, *The United States, Great Britain, and British North America From the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace After the War of 1812* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 95-96; and L. F. S. Upton (ed.), *The United Empire Loyalists: Men and Myths* (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 170-172.
  29. S. F. Wise and R. C. Brown, *Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), pp. 21-22.
  30. R. Cook, *The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971), p. 51.
  31. Quoted in W. H. Nelson, "The Last Hopes of the American Loyalists", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXII, (1951), 34.

32. Little actual fighting involved these regions. Glimpses into Maritime and French Canadian attitudes towards the United States at this time are given in Wise and Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26; M. L. Hansen and J. B. Brebner, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples*, Vol. I: *Historical* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1970), p. 92; and J. M. Bliss (ed.), *Canadian History in Documents, 1763-1966* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1966), pp. 22-23.
33. By 1806 strong concern was being expressed about allowing Americans open access to public lands (see Hansen and Brebner, *op. cit.*, p. 87).
34. F. Landon, *Western Ontario and the American Frontier* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1967), pp. 19-20.
35. J. M. S. Careless, "Introduction", *The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812*, ed. M. Zaslow (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1964), p. 3.
36. See *ibid.*, pp. 2-6; C. P. Stacey, "The War of 1812 in Canadian History", *The Defended Border*, ed. Zaslow, pp. 335-337; and Burt, *op. cit.*, p. 184. One result of this feeling was the curtailment of American settlers (see Hansen and Brebner, *op. cit.*, pp. 95 and 105).
37. P. B. Waite (ed.), *The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada 1865* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963), pp. 81-82. According to Professor Winks, no fewer than sixty speeches of members of the Legislative Council and Assembly considered the 'American danger' (see R. W. Winks, *Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1960), p. 348).
38. J. W. Dafoe, "Canada and the United States", *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, IX (1930), 724-725.
39. Bliss, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
40. S. F. Wise, "Upper Canada and the Conservative Tradition", *Profiles of a Province: Studies in the History of Ontario* (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1967), p. 31.
41. The author is aware that neither the pro-Confederates nor Canadian historians have interpreted Confederation in this manner, but he believes it to be true nonetheless. A brief discussion of certain aspects of the question may be found in W. M. Baker, "No Shillelagh: The Life, Journalism and Politics of Timothy Warren Anglin" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1971), pp. 140-141, 158-159, 181 and 208.
42. *Morning Freeman* (Sa'nt John), Apr. 30, 1859. On Anglin's attitude to the United States see Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-121 and *passim*.
43. Wise and Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 96; and S. D. Clark, *The Developing Canadian Community* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 188-191.
44. Wise and Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
45. Hansen and Brebner, *op. cit.*, p. 103; and E. C. Guillet, *Pioneer Days in Upper Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 145. See also Angus, *op. cit.*, pp. 87 and 94.
46. G. M. Craig, "The American Impact on the Upper Canadian Reform Movement Before 1837", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXIX (1948), 333-352. The Rebellions and their aftermath intensified anti-American feelings, particularly in Upper Canada (see R. J. Eady, "Anti-American Sentiment in (1969), 1-8.)
47. The material available on this topic is far too extensive to document fully. Two brief analyses are: C. P. Stacey, "Confederation: The Atmosphere of

- "Crisis", *Profiles of a Province*, pp. 73-79; and D. G. Creighton, "The United States and Canadian Confederation", *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXIX (1958), 209-222.
48. Waite, *Confederation Debates*, p. 19.
49. E. McInnis, "Two North American Federations: A Comparison", *Essays in Canadian History*, ed. R. Flenley (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1939), p. 103; D. G. Creighton, "The Myth of Biculturalism or The Great French-Canadian Sales Campaign", *Saturday Night*, LXXIX (September, 1966), p. 37; and Bliss, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
50. B. W. Hodgins, "Democracy and the Ontario Fathers of Confederation", *Profiles of a Province*, p. 88.
51. G. P. de T. Glazebrook, *A History of Canadian External Relations* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 135. The vote on this day was on the second reading of the bill.
52. William H. Seward had voiced this attitude even in 1860. On viewing the advances made by British North America he had said: "It is very well; you are building excellent States to be hereafter admitted into the American Union" (see *New York Herald*, Jan. 25, 1861, quoted in L. B. Shippee, *Canadian-American Relations, 1849-1874* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1939), p. 184).
53. Wise and Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
54. Canadian antagonism over the Alaska Boundary Dispute was also directed against Great Britain. On the topic, see J. A. Munro, "English-Canadianism and the Demand for Canadian Autonomy: Ontario's Response to the Alaska Boundary Decision, 1903", *Ontario History*, LVII (1965), 189-203.
55. Berger, *op. cit.*; and N. Penlington, *Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 198-225.
56. Berger, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-176.
57. See Morchain, *op. cit.*
58. Angus, *op. cit.*, p. 243. That anti-Americanism was a counterbalancing force to regionalism is demonstrated in G. Rawlyk, "An Emerging Maritime 'Popular' Stereotype of the United States", *Journal of Popular Culture*, IV (1971), 1052-1059.
59. Dr. Morchain contends that even the opponents of protection used anti-American arguments (see Morchain, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-201 and *passim*).
60. W. M. Baker, "A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in English-Speaking Canada: The Election of 1911", *Canadian Historical Review*, LI (1970), 430-431 and *passim*.
61. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
62. Quoted in Morchain, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
63. Baker, *art. cit.*
64. H. W. McCready, "Canada, the Commonwealth, and the United States", *International Journal*, X (1955), 179-182; K. McNaught, "American-Canadian Relations", *India Quarterly*, XII (1956), 285 and 290; Underhill, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-260; and F. H. Underhill, "The Revival of Conservatism in North America", *Royal Society of Canada Papers and Transactions*, Series III, Vol. LII (1958), Section II, p. 18.
65. J. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, [1964?]), p. 77. See also Angus, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-348.
66. D. Beatty, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defence: Agency for Canadian-

American Military Association", Paper read before the meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Winnipeg, June 4-5, 1970.

67. G. Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970), p. 47.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
69. *Evening Telegram* (Toronto), June 4, 1921, quoted in Angus, *op. cit.*, p. 274.
70. Angus, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-260, 287-289, 324-326 and 334-336; Dafoe, *art. cit.*, pp. 731-732; McCready, *art. cit.*, pp. 180-181; McNaught, *art. cit.*, pp. 285-289; and *A Long View of Canadian History* (The text of two half-hour programs by Donald Creighton and Paul Fox as originally presented on the C.B.C. Television Network, June 16th and 30th, 1959), p. 11.
71. Bliss, *op. cit.*, p. 373.
72. D. MacKay, "The Americanization of Canada", *Century*, June, 1926, p. 190, quoted in Angus, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-357.
73. Angus, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-172, 278-283, 310-314 and 319-324. See also George Grant, quoted in Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
75. *Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1949-1951* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), pp. 11-18.
76. Underhill, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
77. C. Berger, "F. H. Underhill and the Tenacity of Liberalism", *Canadian Forum*, LI (November, 1971), 13.
78. It may be that I am too close to events to be able to analyze them accurately. Perhaps the mid-sixties do not mark the beginning of a new era in the history of Canadian anti-Americanism but are simply a continuation of the post World War One pattern with its normal fluctuations. While time alone will answer this question, there certainly has been a marked change in tone since 1963.
79. Quoted in Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
80. The vision of the United States as the real enemy to Canadian integrity is, of course, central to virtually all of Creighton's work (see *ibid.*, pp. 155-158).
81. A. Purdy (ed.), *The New Romans: Candid Canadian Opinions of the U. S.* (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig Ltd., 1968); K. Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The Multi-national Corporation in Canada* (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1970); I. Lumsden (ed.), *Close the 49th parallel etc.: The Americanization of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); G. Frankfurter, *Baneiful Domination: The Idea of Canada in the Atlantic World 1581-1971* (Don Mills, Ontario: Longman Canada Ltd., 1971); and J. H. Redekop (ed.), *The Star-Spangled Beaver* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1971) are examples.
82. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
83. Interestingly enough, one complaint sometimes voiced by French Canadian nationalists is that English Canadians have already become Americanized and are now threatening to Americanize the French Canadians. Anti-Americanism is very prevalent in the recent and popular book by Léandre Bergeron, *The History of Quebec: A Patriote's Handbook*, trans. B. Markus (Toronto: New Canada Press, 1971).
84. C. Julien, *Canada: Europe's Last Chance* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada Ltd., 1968). Julien's appeal for the strengthening of European and Canadian ties found a favourable response in W. E. Harris, *Canada's Last Chance* (Toronto: Savvy Ltd., 1970).
85. Frankfurter, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.