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THE BEGINNING AND THE END:

D. H. LAWRENCE'S *PSYCHOANALYSIS* AND *FANTASIA*

Fantasia of the Unconscious (1922) is generally viewed as Lawrence's second polemical attempt to denigrate Freudian psychoanalysis and at the same time to systematize the philosophy of the unconscious he had been advancing in his fiction. The reason for the repeated effort, it has been suggested, was the reviewers' ridicule of his first attempt, *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* (1921); thus Philip Rieff explains in his introduction to the two works, "When he saw how completely his message had been misunderstood, he immediately tried again—belligerently, even somewhat peevishly. 'I stick to the solar plexus', he announces, and *Fantasia*, published in 1922, is a restatement and elaboration of his doctrine of the Unconscious as it had been stated in *Psychoanalysis*".¹ To Rieff, the two essays are fundamentally similar and consequently can be treated as a single statement in discussions of Lawrence and psychoanalysis. And in this respect he appears to be representative. In his pioneering exploration of "Lawrence's Quarrel with Freud", Frederick J. Hoffman used both essays in the same way to arrive at his summary of Lawrence's objections to Freudian theory and moved from the early to the later work with the simple observation, "In *Fantasia of the Unconscious* Lawrence carried his disagreement with Freud further".² Similarly, in his recent attempt to explore the mythic dimensions of Lawrence's "theory of human psychology", James C. Cowan shifts from the one essay to the other without specifying from which of the two he is quoting.³ Whatever their particular approaches or conclusions as to the value of these essays, Lawrence critics share in common

the premise that there is no essential difference between *Psychoanalysis* and *Fantasia*.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that there is a significant difference between Lawrence's two attempts to answer the challenge science in general and Freudian psychoanalysis in particular seemed to present—the difference between an empirical and a poetic methodology, between an analytic and an archetypal approach to the unconscious. My concern is with the style and structure of the two essays, and my contention, therefore, is not that Lawrence said different things in these two works but that he said things differently in *Fantasia* than he did in *Psychoanalysis*, so differently that not only must *Fantasia* be viewed as a new statement rather than as a re-statement but also that it must be viewed as a different *kind* of work from *Psychoanalysis*. Specifically, my argument is that while *Psychoanalysis* may appear extremely poetic and consequently unscientific according to absolute standards, in contrast to *Fantasia* and therefore from Lawrence's point of view, it was designed as a scientific answer; and while *Fantasia* cannot be classified as fiction, it demands to be approached as a work of art with its "Foreword" as Lawrence's serious explanation of why he changed his approach. Thus the present study should bring into focus a central document not only in Lawrence's aesthetic development but in the history of the relations between science and art as well.

Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious was originally projected as "Six Little Essays on Freudian Unconscious", and a glance at the external structure of the published version indicates that the expository format was carried through. *Psychoanalysis* consists of six chapters: the first two are concerned with a demonstration of the limitations of Freudian theory, the last four with a presentation of Lawrence's own ideas. But if this ratio supports Hoffman's thesis that Lawrence's purpose was to "replace" Freud's explanation of the operations of the unconscious with his own, the language and style of this essay make clear that Lawrence did not view Freud's system as "sober, scientific", as Hoffman suggests (164), but quite the opposite. "The aim of this little book", Lawrence repeatedly emphasizes, "is merely to establish the smallest foothold in the swamp of vagueness which now goes by the name of the unconscious" (42). Lawrence's basic argument, in short, is not that Freud and his followers are too dispassionate and empirical but that they are not scientific enough. His method in the first two chapters of his little book is to discredit the scientific pretensions of psychoanalysis, and this he does in three ways.

Psychoanalysis begins with the insinuation that psychoanalysts are the descendants of the old-fashioned medical charlatan: "No sooner had we got used to the psychiatric quack . . . than lo and behold the psychoanalytic gentleman reappeared on the stage with a theory of pure psychology" (3). And throughout the opening pages he continues to ridicule them because they are pretenders. For example, one might notice Lawrence's use of "as" and words suggestive of magic: "They have crept in among us as healers and physicians; growing bolder they have asserted their authority as scientists; two more minutes and they will appear as apostles" (3). It is not because they are medical men but because they are "medicine-men" (4) that they are suspect: "Have we not seen and heard the *ex cathedra* Jung? And does it need a prophet to discern that Freud is on the brink of a Weltanschauung—or at least a Menschenschauung, which is a much more risky affair?" (3). To Lawrence, therefore, psychoanalysis is the enemy of morality not because it operates according to scientific principles but because it does not; science is not concerned with moral issues, psychoanalysis according to Lawrence is.

But simply to label them frauds, to indulge in name-calling and invective, is to prove nothing; and if anything Lawrence's purpose in this essay is to prove that psychoanalysts are wrong. The obvious way to discredit their authority as scientists is to demonstrate that their logic is faulty, and the easiest means to such an end is the classic *reductio ad absurdum*. In Lawrence's discussion of the Oedipal aspects of Freud's theory this technique is everywhere in operation. According to Lawrence, psychoanalysis believes "that at the root of almost every neurosis lies some incest-craving, and that this incest-craving is *not the result of inhibition of normal sex-craving*" (7). But if this is the case, argues Lawrence, then one must view incest as a natural desire: "What remains but to accept it as part of the normal sex-manifestation?" Some psychoanalysts, he then goes on, will go this far, but that is not enough. If their theory is to hold up they must go all the way: if neurosis is caused by repression and if incest is natural, then the cure for neurosis is "to remove all repression of incest itself. In fact, you must admit incest as you now admit sexual marriage, as a duty even" (7). Of course, if psychoanalysis had minded its own business, had remained a descriptive "physical" science instead of "assuming the role of psychology" (6), its theories could not be brought to this ludicrous end. But it has not, and therein lies "the moral dilemma of psychoanalysis" (7), and the justification of Lawrence's appeal to morality to discredit it.

A third way in which Lawrence faults psychoanalysts is by pointing out that they do not adhere to the fundamental principles of empirical inquiry: instead of inductively exploring the unconscious, they proceed deductively. Suppose, says Lawrence, the unconscious does contain repressed incest impulses; "But must we inevitably draw the conclusion psychoanalysis draws?" (8)—that this is all the unconscious is? The reason the Freudians come to this conclusion is that they begin with the consciousness, with ideas and ideals, and proceed to interpret the unconscious according to this principle. The unconscious to them is the repressed consciousness, and in thus proceeding they may be making an autonomous and prior thing the effect of a later stage in man's psychic development. For there is one thing "psychoanalysis all along the line fails to determine, and that is the nature of the pristine unconscious in man. The incest-craving is or is not inherent in the pristine psyche" (8). Instead of first making certain that they had found the "rock" (4), the Freudians have built their "doctrine" upon idealistic principles and consequently all of their arguments have an *ex cathedra* rather than an empirical ring.

Lawrence's first purpose in *Psychoanalysis*, therefore, is to denigrate Freudian psychoanalysis by exposing its unscientific methodology; his second purpose is to introduce his own system and a more logical and accurate—in a word, more scientific—procedure.

"There is a whole science of the creative unconscious, the unconscious in it law-abiding activities. And of this science we do not even know the first term" (16). Undoubtedly, the reason critics have tended to appreciate the significance of Lawrence's emphasis upon the scientific aspect of *Psychoanalysis* is (aside from what he might say elsewhere) such statements in the essay as the following: "But it needs a super-scientific grace before we can admit this first new item of knowledge" (16-17). But to repeat, my argument is not that such a statement is scientific but that the context in which it appears indicates that Lawrence did not consider it as antithetical to the scientific method and that in contrast to the way in which such an issue is presented in *Fantasia*, as we shall see, the practice here can be described as "scientific".

With respect to the passage in question, for example, one should notice that the request for "super-scientific grace" is presented not as an alternate or opposite but as the logical solution to the problem that the unconscious presents. The Freudians, he begins, have restricted the unconscious "within certain ideal limits" (16); that is, they have tried to confine the unconscious

in terms of consciousness. Clearly such a method is to defeat one's purpose at the outset; but where then can one begin? Lawrence's answer is that one must begin at the beginning—with the unconscious and therefore with the pre-conscious and pre-cognitive sense rather than with the intellectual apprehension. But in a series of four conditional clauses he carefully explains that such a procedure is not to abandon rationality. "Once we can admit the *known*, but incomprehensible, presence of the integral unconscious" is his first statement, and as his italicization indicates, his point is not that we must irrationally accept the concept of the unconscious as an *ex cathedra donnée* but rather that the fact that we *know* and yet cannot mentally comprehend the unconscious illustrates its pre-cognitive nature. Therefore to understand the unconscious we must begin by utilizing this type of knowledge: "once we can trace it home in ourselves and follow its first revealed movements". But if we must thus by virtue of the nature of the problem begin intuitively, we must proceed methodically: "once we know how it habitually unfolds itself". And this leads directly to the final statement: "once we can scientifically determine its laws and processes in ourselves". In short, while the phrase "super-scientific grace" may seem to us indicative of a departure from a scientific approach, Lawrence clearly did not consider his method as such. Indeed, he goes on to anticipate objections on these grounds: his method, he says, "means that science abandon its intellectualist position and embraces the religious faculty. But it does not thereby become less scientific, it only becomes at last complete in its knowledge" (17).

It is therefore not for a replacement of "the sober, scientific" approach of the Freudians by a "poetic, mystic affirmation" (Hoffman, 163) that Lawrence argues in *Psychoanalysis* but rather for the recognition of a pre-cognitive mode of perception. In this essay it is not the "affirmation of the irrational" (Cowan, 16) that is Lawrence's concern but the rationality of recognizing an uncerebral form of knowledge.

These observations are further supported when one considers the way Lawrence handles the problem of authority in *Psychoanalysis*. "And where in the developed foetus shall we look for this creative-productive quick? Shall we expect it in the brain or in the heart?" he asks in an attempt to locate the physical centre of the integral consciousness. His answer is typically derived from two sources: "Surely our own subjective wisdom tells us, what science can verify, that it lies beneath the navel of the folded foetus" (19). In short, whenever he resorts to subjectivity in this early essay, he immediately either

confirms it with an appeal to science, as in the previous example, or he explicitly denies that he is being unscientific, as in the following anticipation of those who would write off his explanations as poetical: "The nuclei are centres of spontaneous consciousness. It seems as if their bright grain were germ-consciousness, consciousness germinating forever. If that is a mystery, it is not my fault. Certainly it is not mysticism. It is obvious, demonstrable scientific fact, to be verified under the microscope and within the human psyche, subjectively and objectively, both" (43). Whether Lawrence is accurate in his assertion that science can verify his theories is for the present purposes beside the point. The significant issue is Lawrence's determination to be accepted as scientifically respectable and consequently his insistence that his intuitions coincide with and complement scientific fact.

In addition to "subjective wisdom" Lawrence frequently relies upon the wisdom of the past or explores traditional metaphors to explain his theories. For example, in attempting to describe the division of consciousness into subjective (located in the abdominal area) and objective (located in the breast) he observes that his explanation is consistent with an old and traditional attitude. However, instead of simply relying upon its poetic truth, he feels called upon to justify his use of this source by emphasizing that the men of the past were not simply being poetic: "When the ancients located the first seat of the consciousness in the heart, they were neither misguided nor playing with metaphor. For by consciousness they meant, as usual, objective consciousness only" (31). And if one argued that the reason Lawrence insisted upon such a literal interpretation was that he wanted his system to be taken literally, one confirms rather than refutes the argument that *Psychoanalysis* was designed as a scientific exposition.

Similarly, he twice emphasizes that "in calling the heart the sun, the source of light, we are biologically correct even. For the roots of vision are in the cardiac plexus" (36); "It is not merely a metaphor to call the cardiac plexus the sun, the Light" (37). Instead of giving the essay the quality of "mythic restatement" (Cowan, 16), the metaphors and symbols to be found in *Psychoanalysis* have an opposite effect. In this essay Lawrence's approach to the poetic is comparable to the approach of the Cambridge anthropologists to myth and ritual—they attempted to provide a rational explanation of primitive mysteries; Lawrence is trying to provide a rational basis for his intuitions. "This is the vertical line of division. And the horizontal line and the vertical line form the cross of all existence and being", he observes, and here, as Cowan

suggests, he employs "the cosmic image of the cross" (16). But Lawrence does not encourage us to view his system in such mythic terms, for he immediately adds, "And even this is not mysticism—no more than the ancient symbols used in botany or biology" (44). Every poetic usage in *Psychoanalysis* must be defended or justified empirically.

A final way of suggesting the expository design of *Psychoanalysis* is to point out that with one necessary exception (4-5) the entire six chapters utilize the first person plural. On the one hand, this usage enables Lawrence to give his essay an impersonal tone, the tone of critical objectivity: "Now before we can have any sort or scientific, comprehensive psychology we shall have to establish the *nature* of the consciousness" (35). On the other hand, the journalistic "we" characterizes the writer as the spokesman for the majority and thereby enables him to avoid sounding impressionistic: "If however, the unconscious is inconceivable, how do we know it at all?" is the fundamental question in *Psychoanalysis*, and strictly speaking, Lawrence's answer should be "I know it through intuition". But that is a purely subjective answer. "We know it by direct experience" (15) is probably equally subjective but it sounds more scientific. And it is also this use of "we" that makes the speaker's apologies for not employing the specialist's idiom contribute to rather than detract from the tone of critical authority. "We do not pretend to use technical language", Lawrence emphasizes, "But surely our meaning is plain even to correct scientists" (20). The implication here is not that the writer could not, but that because of his role as humanistic spokesman he will not use technical terms. Similarly, when he writes, "We profess no scientific *exactitude*, particularly in terminology. We merely wish intelligibly to open a way" (36) the italicization makes clear that he is not attacking the scientific mode but rather anticipating the charge that because he does not employ the jargon he does not understand the issues involved. The impression would be greatly altered, however, if the statement had read, "I profess no scientific exactitude".

However poetic, mystical, or absurd *Psychoanalysis* may have sounded to his contemporaries and may sound to the modern reader, then, the style of the essay clearly indicates that Lawrence did not view it as such but rather as a scientific piece designed to expose psychoanalysis as a pseudo-science and to introduce a pioneer interpretation of the unconscious. If there are inconsistencies and contradictions in the work it is not because his purpose was to affirm the irrational but because he was too concerned with demonstrating

the rationality of his insights. Intuition cannot be bounded by reason and to attempt to do so is to do injustice to either. My concern now is to demonstrate that it was Lawrence's recognition of this situation that prompted him to try again. He wrote *Fantasia*, I suggest, not simply because *Psychoanalysis* was unsuccessful but because he realized that he had invited failure because of the method he had chosen. The "Foreword" to *Fantasia* is simultaneously an explanation of why *Psychoanalysis* was a failure—its expository and empirical method—and an introduction to the new methodology and format of the second work—an archetypal perspective and an artistic structure.

"The present book is a continuation from *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious*", Lawrence announces at the outset of *Fantasia*. "The generality of readers had better just leave it alone. The generality of critics likewise" (53). According to Rieff, this opening may be described as "an unhappy effort to appeal to the snobbishness of his readers" (vii), and generally it is interpreted as evidence of the "companion" nature of the two essays. The style and structure of this introduction and *Fantasia*, however, suggest an alternate interpretation. In the first place, Lawrence does not say that *Fantasia* is a continuation of but a "continuation from" *Psychoanalysis*: the former phrase connotes "restatement and elaboration", but the latter can imply a movement away, a departure from the early essay. While not enough to make a case, it is sufficient to stimulate a reconsideration. Similarly, if one examines the context carefully, the negative appeal to a few fit readers can be viewed as something more than a peevish reaction to the critical fate of *Psychoanalysis*. The dismissal of the "generality", in the first place, is explained in terms of a diagnosis of the ills of Western civilization: "I count it a mistake of our mistaken democracy, that every man who can read print is allowed to believe that he can read everything that is printed. I count it a misfortune that serious books are exposed in the public market, like slaves exposed for sale" (53).

Therefore, if one approaches the "Foreword" simply as Lawrence's peevish reaction to the fate of *Psychoanalysis*, then one must conclude that he is blaming the entire cultural and political system for the failure of his first work. But his argument is not that the majority cannot read, i.e., are insensitive, but that the average man *should* not read: the first is the typical defensive complaint of the misunderstood writer, but the second is a statement of principle—furthermore, a principle that constitutes one of the central themes of *Fantasia*. "*The great mass of humanity should never learn to read and write never*" (122), Lawrence writes in the chapter entitled "First Steps

in Education"—not because the masses did not appreciate *Psychoanalysis* but because literary education leads to the "disease of idealism" and the death of spontaneity (120). There are, therefore, better explanations than the reviewer's ridicule of *Psychoanalysis* for Lawrence's *caveat* against the general.

Lawrence's second alleged reason for not seeking a public response, or rather for not seeking a response at all, is that he has no interest in converting anyone to his way of thinking: "I really don't want to convince anybody. It is quite in opposition to my whole nature" (53). Before demonstrating that this seeming petulance is also expressive of a key issue in *Fantasia*, one should recall that *Psychoanalysis* was nothing if it was not an attempt to convince. And therein lay one of the central problems of the work: for the message there, as in *Fantasia*, was that "The mind is the dead end of life" (47), but the method of persuasion there was reason and logic, a direct appeal to the *mind*. Lawrence's excessive protestations in that essay that he was not being "mystical" may indicate that already he was aware of the conflict between medium and message; however, in *Fantasia* it is evident that he has not only recognized the problem but also knows the solution. "In that little book, *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious*, I tried rather wistfully to convince you, dear reader, that you had a solar plexus and a lumbar ganglion and a few other things. I don't know why I took the trouble. If a fellow doesn't believe he's got a nose, the best way to convince him is gently to waft a little pepper into his nostrils. And there was I painting my own nose purple, and wistfully inviting you to look and believe. No more, though" (68). His insights into the unconscious, Lawrence suggests, cannot be demonstrated to be accurate; the reader must be made to respond sensually rather than mentally. Therefore, the solution to his problem is that of many anti-intellectualist intellectuals—art, with its dramatic rather than discursive techniques, its poetic rather than rational logic, its connotative rather than denotative language. And again, this reason for turning away from the expository method is not simply thrown up in the "Foreword" as a defensive retort, but is fully explored as another of the central principles of *Fantasia*: "For the mass of people, knowledge *must* be symbolical, mystical, dynamic" (113). But if this is true, then the method of *Psychoanalysis* was wrong, for there Lawrence tried to appeal to the masses in quite an opposite manner. While the failure of *Psychoanalysis*, then, is undoubtedly involved in the writing of *Fantasia*, it is better to describe the latter work as an alternate rather than as a second attempt.

The next directive of the "Foreword" further emphasizes that *Fantasia* is a deliberate departure from the methods of *Psychoanalysis*: "Finally, to the

remnants of a remainder, in order to apologize for the sudden lurch into cosmology, or cosmogony, in this book, I wish to say that the whole thing hangs inevitably together" (53). *Psychoanalysis*, one remembers, tried to hang together logically, its structural format was that of the expository essay; *Fantasia*, Lawrence here announces, will not be governed by the analytic method but will proceed according to the pattern of myth; its coherence will arise from the nature of the subject itself rather than from without. And in the simple statement, "I am not a scientist", Lawrence explains why he has adopted this new procedure. A scientist must prove his assertions, and Lawrence seems to realize that he cannot. Thus when he goes on to say, "you either believe or you don't", he is as much emphasizing the intuitive nature of his material as he is warning his readers not to expect him to prove what he has to say. His apology, therefore, is in the traditional manner—an explanation as much as an admission of a failing.

But technically as well as structurally, *Fantasia* will differ from *Psychoanalysis*. In the latter essay, as we have seen, Lawrence's method was to argue for the empirical validity of intuition and ancient wisdom, to emphasize the correspondence between truths perceived poetically and analytically. In the "Foreword", he now announces that it will be the distinctness of the two modes that will be the premise in *Fantasia*: "Only let me say that to my mind there is a great field of science which is as yet quite closed to us. I refer to the science which proceeds in terms of life and is established on data of living experience and sure intuition. Call it subjective science if you like. Our objective science of modern knowledge concerns itself only with phenomena, and with phenomena as regarded in their cause-and-effect relationship. I have nothing to say against our science. It is perfect as far as it goes" (54). And the point is not that it does not go far enough but that it cannot. Consequently, instead of asserting that science can verify his insights, as he did in *Psychoanalysis*, Lawrence now argues for the independent authority of intuition; subjective and mythological truths are justified not because they can be scientifically verified but because they verify each other.

It is this very recognition of the correspondence between the past and the present, the universal and the individual, that broadly defines *Fantasia* as an archetypal work.⁴ Let science proclaim progress and new discoveries, he argues, "Myself, I am not so sure that I am one of the one-and-onlies" (56); to the archetypalist, there is nothing new under the sun. From our "own little dunghill" we see only the present, but from a cosmic perspective one realizes that history continually repeats itself: *eadem sed aliter*: "I do not believe in

evolution, but in the strangeness and rainbow-change of ever-renewed creative civilizations" (56). Therefore, instead of trying to enunciate a new theory of the unconscious, as he had in *Psychoanalysis*, Lawrence now describes his method as an attempt "to stammer out the first terms of a forgotten knowledge" (56). And not by attempting to "revive dead kings", or "to arrange fossils and decipher hieroglyphic phrases", like the Cambridge anthropologists (one remembers Ludwig Horace Holly's reference in Haggard's *She* to his "fossil friends at Cambridge"), but by exploring the symbolic significance of "the relics our scientists have so marvellously gathered out of the forgotten past, and from the hint develop a new living utterance" (56). For according to Lawrence, the symbol is the link between the past and the present and "the intense potency of symbols is part memory" (56). Instead of the collective unconscious of Jung, however, Lawrence introduces the myth of Atlantis as the foundation of his archetypalism. The Atlanteans were our historical ancestors and they developed the science of life (reflected in symbols) and through their wanderings made it universal. Then came the cataclysm, however, and the refugees became the founders of our modern civilizations: "And some degenerated naturally into cave men . . . and some retained their marvellous innate beauty and life-perfection . . . and some wandered savage . . . and some, like Druids or Etruscans or Chaldeans or Amerindians or Chinese, refused to forget, but taught the old wisdom, only in its half-forgotten, symbolic forms. More or less forgotten as knowledge: remembered as ritual, gesture, and myth-story" (55). In myth and ritual, therefore, will be found the old wisdom, and through myth and ritual the artist is able to make this knowledge available and in doing so to reveal the "inevitable" repetition of the past in the present.

"One last weary little word" (57), adds Lawrence, by way of introducing a comment on the relationship between his fiction and his theories; and this introduction of his creative work indicates a final way in which the "Foreword" points to a difference between *Psychoanalysis* and *Fantasia*. In the former study there was no mention of the fact that the writer was also an artist; indeed, every precaution seemed to be taken to conceal this fact. As was suggested at the outset, most readers do not appreciate this difference but assume that both essays are designed as Lawrence's attempt to systemize the ideas he had formulated in his art. But even to view only *Fantasia* in this manner is inaccurate. According to the "Foreword", *Fantasia* was not written with a view to the fiction but as an answer to "the absolute need which one has for some sort of satisfactory mental attitude toward oneself and things in

general" (57), that is the need to formulate a world view on the basis of one's experience. The novels and poems, as Lawrence explicitly states, are part of that experience—part of the material upon which the formulation is based but not necessarily the reason for it. The purpose of *Fantasia* is to answer the need of not only the writer but also of the *man*. Furthermore, while he emphasizes that fiction came before the theory, he goes on to emphasize the Arnoldian idea that criticism is not only the conclusion but also the preparation for art: "Our vision, our belief, our metaphysic is wearing woefully thin, and the art is wearing absolutely threadbare" (57). And since "art is utterly dependent on philosophy", before we can enter a new creative phase we must get new bearings: "We've got to rip the old veil of a vision across, and find out what the heart really believes in, after all. . . . And then go forward again, to the fulfillment in life and art". According to the "Foreword", then, philosophy and criticism are as much the beginning as the end of art, for their function is to "evolve something magnificent out of a renewed chaos" (56). To indicate the ways in which *Fantasia* answers to the polar needs of destruction and revitalization is finally to demonstrate its departure from the purpose and method of *Psychoanalysis*.

Although the many digressions and the encyclopedic nature of the work justify the title's suggestion of a formality and spontaneity, *Fantasia* has a very well-defined structure; indeed, two distinct patterns are employed. The first establishes the archetypal dimensions of the work and thus answers to the "Foreword"'s demand that criticism be positive and that it announce "what the heart really wants" (57). *Fantasia* begins, in the "Introduction", literally with The Beginning: "In the beginning—there never was any beginning, but let it pass. We've got to make a start somehow" (63). And *Fantasia* ends, in the "Epilogue", with the announcement that never is there any end: "'As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, World without end. Amen'" (222). The basic structure of *Fantasia* is cyclic, and thus affirmative of the pagan and cosmic perspective.

The second formal pattern of *Fantasia* fulfills the iconoclastic need posited in the "Foreword". Its direction is not cyclic but linear, for it is the Judaic-Christian version of genesis. Following this pattern, we begin not at the top of the turning wheel but on top of a "historical" mountain: "The Moses of Science and the Aaron of Idealism have got the whole bunch of us here on top of Pisgah" (62). And we end, not as in the previous pattern where we began, but at the bottom—"at the foot of the Liberty statue" (222). America becomes the Promised Land, but by evoking the pattern of the fall,

Lawrence makes its science and idealism negative rather than positive.

Moreover, in addition to this structural and graphic evocation of the contrast between the archetypal and Hebraic version of genesis, Lawrence also explicitly and strategically invokes the myths that are central to his purposes. In *Psychoanalysis* he suggested that the Edenic fall could be interpreted as a fall from innocent to conscious and therefore guilty sexuality. In *Fantasia*, he centres this idea and in thereby making it dramatic makes it doubly effective. Leading up to it are chapters dealing with the birth and development of the child's or the dynamic consciousness; following it are the sections dealing with cerebral consciousness and social problems. Instead of attempting to prove that cognition and its consequent idealism are steps in the wrong direction, therefore, he simply forces the reader to assent to his conclusion: "Why were we driven out of Paradise? Why did we fall into this gnawing disease of unappeasable dissatisfaction? Not because we sinned. Ah, no. . . . Not because we sinned. But because we got sex into our head" (121). By making the birth of consciousness the "fall", Lawrence simultaneously modernizes the old myth making it available to modern readers and demonstrates the wisdom of the ancients and the eternal validity of myth.

But balancing the Hebraic myth is also a pagan one—a Greek version of the "fall" and the consequent insatiable desire, the legend of Aphrodite. The "sea-born Aphrodite" (212) was the love-goddess born when the Olympians (the mind-gods) castrated Kronus and threw his phallus into the sea. Then history, in the linear sense we envision it, began; and herein according to Lawrence, with this pedestalizing of the woman in the name of an idea, is the prototype for the Statue of Liberty. With her "carrot-sceptre" (223) she is the perfect goddess for a "Moony" nation of "half-born slaves" (225, 71).

Fantasia abounds in imagery, but two patterns are particularly distinct and serve to reinforce the opposing mythic structures. Suggesting the futility and sterility of idealism is a series of machine metaphors, which significantly appear in aggregated force only after the "fall". Our education, for example, turns children into robots triggered to respond automatically to ideals, particularly such sexual ideals as chivalry: "The Windmills spin and spin in a wind of words, Dulcinea del Tobosco beckons round every corner, and our nation of inferior Quixotes jumps on and off tramcars, trains, bicycles, motor cars, in one mad chase of the divine Dulcinea" (118). Suggesting the naturalness and fecundity of the pagan attitude toward life are tree-images, some simply vegetative, some biblical, some Druidical. For example, after attacking our educational process as the hanging of ourselves on a dead tree, he goes on to

suggest the corrective: "The idea, the actual idea, must rise ever fresh, ever displaced, like the leaves of a tree, from out of the quickness of the sap, and according to the forever incalculable effluence of the dynamic centres of life. The tree of life is a gay kind of tree that is forever dropping its leaves and budding out afresh quite different ones" (119). But the tree also has an additional thematic importance in *Fantasia*. The book was written, he tells us, in the "Black Forest", symbolic both of the dark unconscious and our ancient past. "That's how I write about these planes and plexuses, between the toes of a tree, forgetting myself against the great ankle of the trunk" (82). As he forgets himself—becomes unconscious—he begins to remember, and also to "understand tree-worship. All the old Aryans worshipped the tree. My ancestors" (82). By rediscovering his past he recovers his psychic origins. The two thus are one. Perhaps the best way to define the genre of *Fantasia*, therefore, is to follow Lawrence when he describes the work as his "tree-book, really" (82). For his real subject is the tree, "The tree of life and death, of good and evil, tree of abstraction and of immense, mindless life; tree of everything except the spirit, spirituality" (84). Not mystic but mythic is the best way to describe Lawrence's approach.

A final way of demonstrating the artistic nature of *Fantasia* and consequently the way it differs from *Psychoanalysis* is to consider the nature of the speaker. In contrast to the former essay, where as a rule the editorial and critical "we" was employed, here there are three symbolic voices. The first is the first person singular, which has probably contributed to the solipsistic view of the book, but which is demanded by its archetypal premise; the individual experience is a microcosm of the universal one; to look out one must look in. Therefore the second speaker is the cosmic "I" (67). And these come together to constitute the third mode: the plural "we", different from the usage in *Psychoanalysis* in its Whitmanesque implications of camaraderie and in its sense of geographical and temporal unanimity: "Climb down [sic] Pisgah, and go to Jericho. Allons, there is no road yet, but we are all Aarons with rods of our own" (65). The *speaker* in *Fantasia* (the tone of vocal rather than written communication should also be noticed), then, is a *persona*, an artistic creation, and not necessarily Lawrence "coming out from behind the fictional mask to speak directly, in his own person" (Rieff, xx).

The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that there are significant differences between *Psychoanalysis* and *Fantasia* and that the "Foreword" to the latter work indicates that the change in methodology was a deliberate one occasioned by Lawrence's recognition that his method in the

former work was incompatible with the nature of his insights. The "Foreword", therefore, should not be viewed as a peevish appeal to snobbishness; nor should the two essays be considered as a single statement. But neither should either of these essays be considered in isolation; for only in contrasting them does one appreciate their significance, first, with respect to Lawrence's development, and second, with respect to the way they provide a chapter in the history of the artist in an age of science.⁵ In *Psychoanalysis* Lawrence attempted to answer what he felt was the challenge of science by meeting it on its own grounds; in *Fantasia* he demonstrates that the artist need not feel challenged but should feel stimulated by the discoveries of science. For science provides the "hints"—the beginning—and art provides the humanistic explanation—the end.⁶

NOTES

1. Philip Rieff, *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* and *Fantasia of the Unconscious* (New York, 1960), p. vii. Henceforth all quotations from Lawrence will be from this Compass edition and will be identified by page number in parentheses.
2. Frederick J. Hoffman, *Freudianism and the Literary Mind* (Louisiana, 1967), p. 165.
3. James C. Cowan, *D. H. Lawrence's American Journey: A Study in Literature and Myth* (Cleveland, 1970), pp. 15-24.
4. I am indebted to John J. Teunissen and the group to which I belong, the "Massachusetts Archetypalists", for my definition of the archetypal perspective. Tentatively, by *archetypal* we imply *the conscious use of mythical patterns and symbols as a ritualistic means of abrogating historical time and its attendant evils and of thereby returning to a cosmic perspective and valuation*. Because our approach is inductive, however, our premise is always that the work itself must provide the definition; I will, consequently, not introduce our conclusions into the body of this study.
5. A similar chapter in this history is provided by the work of Otto Rank and N. O. Brown, both of whom began as Freudians and later, finding it impossible to work within the system, repudiated it in favor of the poetic and archetypal.
6. I wish to express my indebtedness to the Canada Council for the financial assistance which enabled me to explore this subject without pressure.