

THE SECURITIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN AID: A CASE STUDY OF THE
DADAAB REFUGEE CAMP

by

Terence A. Rudolph

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2013

© Copyright by Terence A. Rudolph, 2013

For Manfred and Lorraine

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
ABSTRACT.....	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Research Statement.....	1
1.2 Purpose of the Study.....	2
1.3 Research Questions and Structure of Thesis.....	3
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	6
2.1 Introduction.....	6
2.2 Security and Development in the post-Cold War era.....	6
2.3 Biopolitics and Development.....	9
2.4 Sovereignty and the Growth of International Non- Governmental Organizations.....	13
2.5 Refugees, Perpetual Emergency and Development.....	44
2.6 The Securitization of “Surplus Populations”.....	15
2.7 UNHCR and Human Security.....	18
2.8 From emergency relief to development.....	21
2.9 The Securitization of Humanitarian Aid.....	26
2.10 Conclusion.....	28
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	31
3.1 Overview.....	31
3.2 Case study on the securitization of aid.....	32
3.3 Dadaab: The Camps That Aid Built.....	33
3.4 Humanitarian Aid Organizations at Dadaab.....	36
3.5 Study Population Sample.....	38
3.5 Interview Model.....	42
3.6 Developing the questionnaire.....	42
CHAPTER 4: SECURITY RISKS AND CONCERNS.....	44
4.1 Overview.....	44
4.2 General Security Concerns at Dadaab.....	47

Size of the camps	47
Proximity to the Somali border.....	48
Political instability in Somalia and Dadaab.....	50
4.3 Specific Security Concerns at Dadaab	52
Kidnappings aid workers and insecurity.....	52
Improvised Explosive Devices.....	54
Attacks on the UN and or DRA compound.....	56
Community relationships and aid insecurity.....	57
Changing security standards and perceptions.....	58
Gender and security concerns.....	60
Complacency and camp security.....	62
4.4 Summary analysis	64
CHAPTER 5: SECURITY RESPONSES	70
5.1 Overview	70
5.2 The Role of the UN and the Security Framework for Dadaab.....	70
5.3 Security Responses and Strategies	73
5.4 Security training.....	75
5.5 Security Partnerships Between Humanitarian Organizations at Dadaab	76
5.7 Private Security and Humanitarian Organizations at Dadaab	80
5.8 Changing Security Needs and the Effectiveness of Security Procedures	82
5.9 Summary Analysis	85
CHAPTER 6: SECURITY IMPACTS	89
6.1 Overview	89
6.2 The Relative Importance of Security to Humanitarian Services at Dadaab.....	90
6.3 Security Strategies, Humanitarian Principles and Access to Beneficiaries	91
6.4 Community Acceptance and Security Partnerships	96
6.5 Risks to Specific Aid Services	97
6.6 Security Risk and Types of Humanitarian Aid Workers.....	99
6.7 Impacts of Security Costs on Humanitarian Services	102
6.8 Remote Management	103
6.9 Remote Management and the Operation Continuity Plan.....	106
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION	114

7.1 Overview.....	114
7.2 Security and Aid Delivery in Practice.....	114
7.3 Implications for Securitization Theory and Debates.....	116
REFERENCES.....	125
APPENDIX A Interview Questions.....	134

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	This table catalogues each interview and reports the gender, race, nationality, position and type of organization for each participant. Aside from the one government agency; organizations in my study fall under three identifiable types; International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs).....	39
---------	---	----

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines, empirically, the securitization of aid delivery at the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya. Through a series of semi-structured interviews with aid workers, it documents their security concerns, organizational responses to security risks, and discusses the impacts of these concerns and responses on the delivery of aid to the camps. Armed with a biopolitical conceptualization of sovereignty, articulated in the human security paradigm, the humanitarian aid industry has increasingly reached beyond national borders to touch ‘bare life.’ By now, it is widely recognized that humanitarian principles such as neutrality have often failed to protect aid workers from violent attack as they increasingly venture into the world inhabited by “surplus populations.” Drawing on existing research, this study demonstrates how humanitarian aid delivery in high-risk environments, like refugee camps, is essential to the broader task of using aid to securitize and contain high-risk populations and political instability. Paradoxically, without the securitization of aid at the operational level, humanitarian workers are left exposed to the same enduring elements of insecurity that persistently threaten the lives of those they endeavor to help.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

ASMT	Area Security Management Team
AWSD	Aid Worker Security Database
DRA	Department of Refugee Affairs
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
GSU	General Service Unit
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IGO	International Governmental Organization
Int.S.	Interview Subject
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MSF	Medicines Sans Frontieres
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCP	Operation Continuity Plan
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCK	Refugee Consortium of Kenya
SMT	Security Management Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission Refugees
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation to Somalia
ISWG	Interagency Security Working Group
SOP's	Standard Operating Procedures
SPP	Security Partnership Project
WFP	World Food Program

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Alastair Summerlee inspired me to pursue this work. Christopher Murphy, Theresa Ulicki, David Black and Margaret Denike have guided me through a research process that has allowed me to produce something I can be proud of. Each of these mentors has helped me in ways that I will never forget. The interviews in Kenya would have never happened had it not been for Georgina and the aid workers who volunteered their valuable time to speak with me. My friends, Abdi and Naka, have provided me with much needed insight and support. I am further indebted to my brother Carl, sister Anneliese, and especially my grandfather, Donald. I am thankful for having each of these people in my life.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Statement

The delivery of humanitarian assistance has always been a risky business. Current estimates suggest that there are about 210,000 aid workers operating internationally delivering approximately 18 billion dollars worth of humanitarian assistance (Barnett, 2011, p. 3). While academics and policy makers alike lament the lack of reliable data on the risks associated with delivering humanitarian services, there is a growing consensus that 1) there are more humanitarian organizations in the field delivering services than ever before; 2) humanitarian aid workers frequently find themselves in dangerous environments; 3) since the end of the Cold War the number of humanitarian aid workers assaulted and killed is increasing; and 4) security is a significant concern to most aid agencies and workers (Sheik, Gutierrez, Bolton, Spiegel, Thieren, & Burnham, 2000; VanBrabant, 2001; King, 2002a; King, 2002b; King, 2002c; King, 2003; Stoddard, Harmer, & Haver, 2006; Barnett & Weiss, 2008; Bollettino, 2008; Stoddard, Harmer & DiDomenico, 2009; Fast, 2010; Egeland, Harmer, & Stoddard, 2011; Stoddard, Harmer, & Hughes, 2012).

Security is now embedded in the conceptualization, planning and delivery of humanitarian aid. Drawing on the literature of development and security my thesis provides an empirical analysis of the significant impact of security on the delivery of humanitarian services at the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya.

Despite the apparent elusiveness of the concept of security, it remains a highly relevant topic for the international community today, as is evidenced in the policy and scholarship on security and development. A growing body of literature and policy on the relationship between development and security emerged in the post-Cold War period. This literature provides an entry point for my discussion and analysis. A common assumption that appears throughout this research and writing is that security cannot be separated from development, as is evident through the ubiquitous policy mantra “Without security there is no development and without development there is no security” (International Peace

Academy (IPA), 2006, 6; vanHouten, 2007, p.639).¹ This post-Cold War approach to security has given rise to an extensive body of work on what is referred to as the “security-development nexus,” which lays the foundation for the framework of my thesis.

My analysis of aid delivery is explained through the concept of “securitization.” Following a social constructivist approach, “securitization” is generally explained as a discursive and public process that involves the social and political construction of threats to national and or state security (Murphy, 2007, p.450; Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998). Nonetheless, scholars have pointed out that security has proven to be a malleable concept that is constantly being redefined, as Murphy points out, by influential securitizing actors such as national governments (Murphy, 2007, p. 450; Taureck, 2006). Other scholars (Vaughn, 2009; Watson, 2011) have argued that humanitarianism itself is capable of promoting a securitization discourse. The logic of risk and security reconfigure and influence the phenomenon that is securitized. In this case concerns about security and risk are reconfiguring and influencing the delivery of humanitarian aid delivery in ways that are unclear and with outcomes that are uncertain. Through a case study analysis on humanitarian service delivery in the largest refugee camp in the world—the Dadaab camps in Kenya, I document the logic and risk of the securitization of aid operations.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of security concerns on aid delivery at the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya. This study identifies and examines operational and organizational security concerns of NGOs and it assesses their impact on the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance. The aim of this analysis, in part, is to increase awareness of the security risks and their impact on aid delivery in emergency environments.

The study population is made up of humanitarian aid organizations associated with Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya – home to nearly half a million refugees. Given the limited academic literature on this topic, this exploratory investigation of security and aid delivery

¹ See also the (2011) World development report: conflict security and development; and for a detailed critique of this approach, which includes a summary of the Tillian position see Jones & Rodgers, (2011).

will contribute important new research-based knowledge on an issue of growing concern to policymakers and academics alike: the securitization of humanitarian aid. Based on the collection of data from a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with aid workers involved with humanitarian service delivery to the Dadaab camps in October, 2012, the findings and analysis from this research will also engage contemporary scholarship on the issues of security and aid delivery, and it will provide an additional empirical basis for contributing to the largely theoretically driven debates about securitization and aid delivery. While the generalizations derived from these interviews are limited to this case study, they may provide additional evidence of the growing importance and influence of security or insecurity in the delivery of humanitarian aid in other high-risk environments.

This study is informed by a variety of academic works, which fall under the broad category of “security and development” research and writing. This literature reflects the dynamic relationship that exists between humanitarian aid and security, and throws into relief connections between human security, the responsibility to protect (R2P), and the securitization of humanitarian aid. Contemporary analyses on security and development also provide insight into the impact of humanitarian security strategies on service delivery in emergency environments.

1.3 Research Questions and Structure of Thesis

This thesis is guided by the central research question: How does security affect the delivery of aid services in general, and specifically in the Dadaab refugee camps? I refine this inquiry by attending to the following interrelated questions:

- 1) What are the security “concerns” of the humanitarian organizations at the Dadaab camp?
- 2) What organizational policies and strategies do humanitarian organizations develop to respond to the risk and insecurity of service delivery in emergency environments in general and refugee camps specifically?
- 3) How are security issues and concerns “affecting” the delivery of international aid and assistance in general?
- 4) What are the implications of this case study for the securitization of aid thesis?

To address these questions, and to take up the broader exploration of security and development, this thesis is set up as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the human security paradigm and theoretical discussions of biopolitics as they are presented in the development and security literature. These discussions lay the foundation for an understanding of the shifting forms of power and governance that are at play in international humanitarianism and they demonstrate how doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) work to justify contemporary increases in the number and humanitarian organizations and account for their movement across national borders. Through the lens of biopolitics we see that in the context of contemporary atrocities, and within the debates surrounding the responsibility to protect ‘vulnerable’ populations, refugees are considered as both threat and victim. Chapter 3 clarifies my methodology, and it outlines the nature and scope of data collection process. Furthermore it describes the study population and establishes the appropriateness of Dadaab as the ideal site for a case study on the securitization of aid. Following a summary of the interview data, Chapter 4 explores individual and organizational security concerns at the Dadaab camps, and relates them to central themes in the available literature. Chapter 5 summarizes the responses of participants to a range of questions concerning individual and organizational security, and compares these findings with data from other studies and web-based material, on humanitarian security strategies. Chapter 6 explores the impacts of security on the delivery of assistance at Dadaab. The thesis concludes with considerations for future research, and the implications of this study for the securitization of aid theory.

My case study on one of the largest and most protracted refugee situations in the world validates much of the biopolitical analysis on the securitization of humanitarian aid. More importantly, however, this thesis demonstrates that the securitization of aid delivery at the Dadaab refugee camps is precipitated by very real security concerns including, but not limited to, kidnapping, improvised explosive devices (IED’s) and ongoing conflict in neighboring Somalia. While a biopolitical framework works to render inequities in the distribution of risk among aid workers more visible, it does not provide workable solutions to these enduring security dilemmas.

Every participant in this study has undergone security training and expresses that they are motivated to do so by security incidents that have taken place at the Dadaab camps.

Interestingly, participants reveal that security training does not necessarily make them feel any safer. In addition, their collective move towards securitization at Dadaab can be separated from politically motivated security strategies that seek to contain the risks posed by the free flow of large populations of people, as outlined in biopolitical theory. Regardless of the motivating force that security incidents provide, and in spite of repeated claims of political neutrality, some aid workers in this study are also explicit in their recognition that aid work does not occur in a political vacuum and that the humanitarian operation at the Dadaab camps is made possible through a variety of political channels. A biopolitical analysis helps to capture this aggregate observation, and it urges a more in-depth analysis of the aid operation as a whole. For this reason a biopolitical framework can foster a necessary dialogue between academics and aid workers on the ground in an effort to highlight and address the different contexts in which humanitarian aid is instrumentalized to promote political agendas.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The issue of security has been examined by a number of scholars in a variety of disciplines. This chapter provides an overview of that literature, with attention to the leading debates on biopolitics, human security, emergency, development, and sovereignty. Working with development literature, in particular, I discuss the dynamic process of the securitization of humanitarian aid and position my findings within the larger theoretical debates.

The first section of my study introduces the “development-security nexus,” which refers to the development literature that analyzes the interconnectedness of security and development issues. The objective of this section is to contextualize an analysis that relies heavily on the concepts of security and development. The “development-security nexus”, as a macro-level theoretical framework, permits an explanation of increased humanitarian assistance in the post-Cold War era. My analysis then moves from the more macro-level to mid-range theory that helps account for the relationship between sovereignty, emergency and refugees. A nuanced understanding of these relations within and beyond refugee camps enables me to theoretically contextualize the securitization of humanitarian services. Through this multi-layered analysis, I aim to add some clarity to what remains a complicated subject matter: the relationship between development and security in the context of emergency.

2.2 Security and Development in the post-Cold War era

The general consensus among post- Cold War development scholars about the inseparability of development and security splintered into different approaches to understanding the relationship between them, and policies that could address them. Regardless of whether or not it was security or development that needed to come first, it is clear that in the post Cold War period there was, as Caroline Thomas put it, “a widening of the global security agenda to encompass matters such as health, environment and poverty issues” (Thomas, 2001, p. 159).

Mary Kaldor's (2003) work on what she describes as the "new wars" has identified a new kind of conflict that has influenced the way security and development is conceptualized. Kaldor argues that, starting from the end of the Cold War; "new wars" have come to replace inter-state conflict, or "old wars", as the main source instability in the contemporary political economy. She suggests that "new wars" are fundamentally different from "old wars" in that they involve both state and non-state actors, and civilians are often the targets of violent attacks (Kaldor, 2003). Regardless of the given interpretation of what constitutes a "new war," it is clear that those who are often financing or benefiting from a war can be outside of the path of destruction, as these recent conflicts take place mainly in the poorest or "underdeveloped" countries of the world (Fukuda-Parr, 2010, p. 17).

For example, to reinforce the notion of poverty as a serious threat to security, Thomas (2001) contrasts the 30 million people killed in both world wars to the 15 million people who "die of hunger related causes each year" (p. 163). She reports "every two years the number of people who die from hunger is roughly the number killed in 11 years of world war" (Thomas, 2001, p. 164). These respective tales of carnage suggest divergent security threats. The human security paradigm, which articulates these divergent threats as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want", has come to represent this widened security agenda. "Freedom from fear" relates to the threat of human violence. "Freedom from want" describes the threats posed by structural violence. A critical examination of the trajectory of the human security paradigm in the post-Cold War era provides valuable insight into the relationship between humanitarian assistance and development.

The concept of "human security" hit the global stage in 1994. The *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security* is illustrative of the convergence of development and security discourse. The report introduced the first definition of human security: "It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression. And, second it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life" (United Nations Development Program, 1994, p. 9). Policy makers and scholars were quick to champion and criticize the nascent paradigm and the continued work that relies on definitions of human security.

While many scholars and commentators associate the "freedom from fear"

approach to human security with Canada's foreign policy, they associate "the freedom from want" approach with Japanese foreign policy.² While Japanese governments were promoting a more structural, economic and poverty-related definition of human security, MacFarlane and Khong (2006) point out that this "effort to define human security along economic and development lines faltered in the mid-1990s, and its position was increasingly challenged by the discussion of physical protection during the latter part of the 1990s" (p. 157). The emphasis on physical protection, described by Bosold and Werthes, in relation to an understanding of human security, is exemplified in the debates surrounding the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These debates illuminate the political economy that surrounds contemporary humanitarian services. Moreover the on going armed conflicts, famines and natural disasters that ignite and fuel debates about protection and humanitarian aid are constantly providing new sources of tension.

These tensions involve a struggle to define the responsibilities and roles of nation-states and the international community in contemporary disasters and emergencies. A social constructivist approach provides a lens through which to view the discursive struggle between contemporary conceptualizations of sovereignty (in which the human security paradigm is omnipresent). Exploring the social meaning and repercussions of these debates about sovereignty highlights the connection between conceptualizations of sovereignty and the security ethic espoused by humanitarian aid organizations. For the purposes of this

² Canada, represented by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, was particularly active in promoting the new development oriented security that came to be defined as "human security." Axworthy suggested that it could act as a "tool to assess the value of aid projects" and that "it provides a conceptual framework which will improve the coherence between Canadian foreign policy and assistance priorities" (Axworthy, 1997, p. 188-189). One of the most familiar examples of human security policy is the Ottawa Convention, which was championed by Axworthy. The Ottawa Convention, officially the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, has worked to associate Canada with a successful application of the human security agenda (Makaremi, 2010, p. 111). As Makaremi (2010) points out, the Ottawa Convention is particularly noteworthy because it "avoids engagement with issues of war and conflict themselves, but still focuses on warfare" (p. 111). She identifies the Convention as a "paradigmatic case of the human-security approach," since the security concerns it addresses rest with individual citizens and "the unforeseen, accidental nature of landmine injuries and their relationship to everyday activities and places" (Makaremi, 2010, p.111). Bosold and Werthes (2005) report that consecutive Japanese governments, motivated by Asia's economic crisis emphasized the importance of economic development and particularly the provision of basic needs, such as food and shelter that fostered a "freedom from want" (p. 95). For a detailed analysis of Japanese and Canadian government approaches to human security see Acharya (2001). See also Maclean, D., Black, D., & Shaw, D., (2006); Paris, (2001).

thesis, the debates surrounding sovereignty outline the political rationale for the increasing levels of militarized humanitarian intervention in order to produce security. In other words the post-Cold War conceptualization of sovereignty, as a state of exception and international lawlessness, facilitates the securitization of humanitarian aid.

2.3 Biopolitics and Development

The 1990s witnessed a growing body of literature that formulates power and systems of governance in biopolitical terms.³ Following the work of Michel Foucault, several theorists have defined political power in terms of biopolitics or biopower, that is, politics that concerns itself with protection and the regulation of life and its processes.⁴ Biopolitics marks a shift in political thought, and in particular a theory of power. Instead of a strict focus on “legal subjects” and “sovereign will,” which characterized thinking about sovereignty in the 19th century, it deals with the “administration and regulation of life at the level of populations” (Lemke, 2011, p. 4). Biopolitics involves itself with the production of “specific political knowledge” through evolving disciplines such as “statistics, demography, epidemiology, and biology” and manages “individuals and collectives by practices of correction, exclusion, normalization, disciplining, therapeutics and optimization” (Lemke, 2011, p. 11). For the purposes of this thesis, with its attention on protecting and managing life, it helps throw into relief the political investment in security, humanitarian aid and refugee camps. The rise of biopolitics as a domain of study to understand national and international political formations and processes is also evident in research and writing on the human security paradigm. Thomas Lemke (2011) suggests that one of the primary lines of interrogation in biopolitical analysis is to ask, “how does biopolitics function, and what counterforces does it mobilize?” (p. 77). My thesis highlights the work of key development and security scholars who pursue this line of questioning, and outlines humanitarian aid as one such “counterforce.”

Development and security scholar Mark Duffield (2007) builds on the work of

³ See, Hardt & Negri (2000); Dean & Henman (2004); Zanotti (2005); Dalby (2005); Campbell (2005); Reid (2004); Fraser (2003); Merlingen (2003); Duffield & Waddell (2004, 2006); Duffield (2004); Dillon (1995); De Larrinaga & Doucet, 2008. See also Lemke, (2011) for a useful summary for debates on biopolitics.

⁴ See Foucault (1978/1976) *History of Sexuality* and Foucault, M. (2003/1997), *Society must be defended: Lectures at the college de France 1975-1976*.

Michel Foucault, and in particular Foucault's approach to understanding contemporary forms of state power and institutional power as a matter of fostering and protecting life. Duffield argues that liberal forms of government have always been concerned with 'securing' social and biological processes at the aggregate level of population, economy, and society "in the name of people, rights and freedom" (p. 4). He states, "As a liberal technology of security, human security distinguishes between effective and ineffective states in order to assert an interventionist responsibility to protect" (p. 123). In short, Duffield sees the work of humanitarian organizations through a biopolitical lens. His application of Foucault's work provides a unique understanding of the relationship between development and security.

Foucault's theory of biopolitics rests on a distinction he draws between sovereign power and "biopower." According to Foucault (1978/1976), "for a long time, one of the main characteristic privileges of a sovereign power was the right to decide life and death" (p. 135). He contrasts this "right to kill" or "refrain from killing" with the right to "let live" which characterizes the spirit of biopower. Foucault's (1976/1978), concept of biopower suggests, "the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death" (p. 138). By this he means that the power of states is no longer derived from their ability to kill, but from their ability to "invest in life through and through" (p. 139). Foucault describes biopolitics as the "calculated management of life" and the mechanism through which the state invests in life. This investment in life, according to Foucault (1978/1976), is carried out, at the aggregate level of populations, through "a series of interventions and regulatory controls" (p. 139). As evidence of the shifting dynamics of power, and to outline the administrative reach of biopolitics, Foucault (1978/1976) points to the

rapid development of various disciplines —universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops, there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of "biopower." (p. 140)

This way of thinking about how governments manage populations is central Duffield's work on development and security.

For Duffield, a biopolitical approach effectively explains the role of humanitarian organizations in containing/managing the spread of underdevelopment or surplus populations.⁵ Moreover, the security dimension inherent in the liberal paradox, which concerns how security risks can be effectively managed without compromising the rights and freedoms of the individual, is captured by Duffield's application of biopolitics. Duffield offers a macro-level understanding of the role of humanitarian organizations in liberalisms' contemporary practice of securitizing underdevelopment on a global scale. By way of his biopolitical approach to security, he outlines the connection of the human security paradigm to doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Duffield suggests that, although a liberal problematic of security is exemplified in the human security paradigm, the underlying process of securitization is nothing new. What is new is Foucault's ability to articulate these processes (prior to the development of the human security paradigm) as a function of the politics of life and death, which for him helps to explain the state interventions into biological, social and economic processes at the aggregate level of population in an effort to protect and nurture life at the level of a population.

Duffield's unique contribution to the application of biopolitics is to relate it to development and security. Using the language of biopolitics, Duffield points to "surplus populations" and the extent to which they are perceived as a security threat. He suggests

⁵ He argues,

Initially I had thought that development involved the universalising of the technologies that Foucault had outlined in relation to Europe, a sort of internationally scaled-up biopolitics that acts on a 'global' population. The answer, however, now seems as obvious as it is simple; rather than a universalising biopolitics, development is the opposite. It is a means of dividing humankind against itself in the generic form of developed and underdeveloped species-life. Development is thus central to the new culturally coded racism that emerged with decolonisation. Developed life is supported and compensated through a range of social and private insurance-based benefits and bureaucracies covering birth, sickness, education, employment and pensions. In contrast, the underdeveloped or 'non-insured life existing beyond these welfare technologies is expected to be self-reliant. Surplus non-insured life is the subject of development, while the stasis of basic needs and self-reliance is its biopolitical object. Rather than development being concerned with reducing the economic gap between rich and poor countries, or extending to the latter the levels of social protection existing in the former, as a technology of security it functions to contain and manage the underdevelopment's destabilizing effects, especially its circulatory epiphenomena such as undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, trans border shadow economies or criminal networks. (Duffield 2007,preface)

that the NGO movement has expanded as a security response to this perceived threat, posed by underdevelopment and surplus populations. Duffield (2007) argues that, rather than being motivated by any truly humanitarian concerns, the securitization of these populations is driven by a will to neutralize the spread of underdevelopment in an increasingly interconnected world. While this, decidedly pessimistic, argument concerning humanitarian motivations is impossible to verify empirically, it does provide a frame through which to view the increasing linkages between theories of security and development in the era of globalization and liberal governance. Moreover, the implications of such an argument need not be interpreted as a death blow to humanitarian workers and their convictions; instead it can be taken as a decision to look beyond the terrain of humanitarian emergency and into the more complex world of international political structures.

While Foucault never applied his “biopolitical” analysis to the study of development, Duffield provides compelling arguments for doing so. According to Duffield, the idea of ‘development’ works to address the international liberal paradox. He argues that biopolitics is also a “necessary condition of development,” and suggests that biopolitics, liberalism and development “are intimately connected” (p. 7). Specifically, he states, “If biopolitics uncovers the dynamics of life at the level of population, and liberalism seeks to govern life through its freedom, then development provides a solution to the problem of governing too much or too little” (p. 7). Duffield makes the argument that humanitarian services function to contain the security risks posed by uninsured populations. This particular argument helps to clarify the context of humanitarian emergencies and protracted emergencies in particular, as a solution to the problem of the liberal paradox. In this way it sheds light on the politics of humanitarian organizations, and the motivations that inspire differing strategies of intervention. More specifically, the biopolitical framework helps to clarify the global political securitization strategies, which identify “surplus populations” as a threat that must be secured. Furthermore, it outlines the role of development and humanitarian aid in this broader political security strategy of managing conflict.

2.4 Sovereignty and the Growth of International Non- Governmental Organizations

A number of scholars have drawn connections between Foucauldian biopolitics and security. According to political theorists, Miguel DeLarrinaga and Marc Doucet (2008), “the human security discourse enables a dual exercise of sovereign power and biopower” (p. 517). By this they mean that the human security paradigm is orchestrated around the security needs of the individual without compromising the primacy of traditional notions of state sovereignty. According to DeLarrinaga and Doucet (2008), while human security is about the protection of global citizens it is also about “defining the conditions of exceptionality that assist in sovereign power’s ability to authorize international interventions meant to secure human life” (p. 517). The securitization of humanitarian aid unfolds in the terrain carved out by this contemporary conceptualization of sovereignty.

Their approach to human security provides insight into the increase of International-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). The growth of the humanitarian industry is predicated on this new conceptualization of sovereignty, or state power, being about the responsibility to provide security to populations including through humanitarian intervention. As Michael Ignatieff (2003) puts it, “in contemporary Europe and North America a states strength depends not on maintaining the attributes of Westphalian sovereignty – non interference, omniscience, and full international legal personality- but on pooling and sharing some of these features” (p. 312). The spread of INGOs is a prime example of this pooling of resources, as these organizations rely on funding from various national governments.

Thomas Weiss (2003) outlines a multitude of developments in the 1990s that shaped the international community’s response to various humanitarian causes, he states,

These include the complete disregard for international humanitarian law by war criminals and even by child soldiers, the direct targeting of civilians and relief personnel, the use of foreign aid to fuel conflicts and war economies, and the protracted nature of so many so-called emergencies that in fact last for decades. (p. 84)

This multitude of security risks reflects the (in)security faced by humanitarian organizations at the turn of the century. Many scholars point to the tragic events in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, as providing the impetus for asking, “when if ever, is it appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular – military action, against

another state for the purposes of protecting people at risk in that other state” (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006, p. 177). In an effort to develop a response to this question, in 2000 the Canadian government and a number of US foundations created the International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS). Chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun, the ICISS was designed to develop “a way of reconciling sovereignty and human rights” (Bellamy, 2010, p. 369). The creation of the ICISS was informed by the work of Frances Deng and Kofi Annan.⁶ According to Bellamy (2010), “together, Deng and Annan pointed to a new way of thinking about sovereignty as responsibility” (p. 369). Together their conceptualization of sovereignty reflects Foucault’s biopolitical analysis of liberalism’s urge to legitimize states of exception and to nurture or secure the existing international balance of power.

The commission’s report, entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* was released in 2001, and is the subject of much controversy as it worked to contradict section 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (1945).⁷ According to DeLarrinaga and Doucet (2008) the human security paradigm is closely connected with the issue of exceptionality. They argue that the human security discourse provides the foundation “for the justification of suspending founding elements of international law while simultaneously seeking the force that law must entail in order to authorize a new form of international intervention” (p. 534). According to MacFarlane and Khong (2006), “The central point in the report was that states had the responsibility to protect their own citizens. This obligation was deemed inherent in the concept of sovereignty” (p. 177). Both Deng and the ICSS maintained that when states failed to protect their citizens in the face of avoidable catastrophe, the responsibility to protect shifted to the broader society of states. For Larrinaga and Doucett (2008), this “logic of exceptionality” enabled by the human security discourse has flourished in the post-9/11 world. In a thoroughly, and globally applied, social constructivist approach, they argue that human security discourse “can be understood as providing the grounds for an

⁶ Deng (1996) offered a new way of conceptualizing sovereignty as state responsibility. Annan, as cited by Bellamy (2010), joined the discussion in his annual address to General Assembly in 1999, and in light of NATO’s controversial intervention in Kosovo, observed, “the state is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice versa” (p. 369).

⁷ Section 2(4) explicitly states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (UN, 1945, p. 3).

exercise of sovereign power on a planetary scale” (p. 534). Humanitarian organizations operate in this space and deliver their services under very same “logic of exceptionality”, albeit with much different methods.

The ‘legitimation’ of the use of force in the name of protection marks a pivotal turning point for the relationship between humanitarian aid and military intervention, and one that certainly solidifies the marriage between contemporary development and security issues. This observation does not deny the existence of previous development security relationships. Instead, documenting and analyzing the contemporary security-development nexus provides insight into the current political economy in which the securitization of aid transpires. The 9/11 attacks have worked to focus the security-development nexus on the issue of mobility, and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ seems to suggest that R2P is best understood as an attempt to confine the devastation of war to failed states.⁸

The next section outlines development as the mechanism of containment through a social constructivist analysis of the perceived security threats posed by the free mobility of surplus populations.

2.6 The Securitization of “Surplus Populations”

This section provides a more focused analysis of the victims of emergencies, who are simultaneously the “beneficiaries” of humanitarian aid, and how they provide the impetus for the securitization of humanitarian organizations.

The figure of the refugee as a “stateless” person (Arendt) or *homo sacer* (Agamben) continues to appear in the biopolitical thought of development scholars. For example, Mark Duffield develops a similar analysis of “emergency,” “stateless” people and humanitarian aid. Duffield (2007), like Agamben, observes that, “it is common to regard humanitarian emergencies, such as those resulting from wars, famines and natural disasters,

⁸ See Duffield & Waddell (2006) for an explanation of how the ‘war on terrorism’ is fueled by security concerns, especially national security, and focuses on the global circulation of people, weapons, illicit commodities, money, etc...through the world’s conflict zones and how a biopolitical understanding of development works to explain this global attempt securitization. See also the (2003) *Human Security Now* report for a detailed outline of the perceived relationship between international security, terrorism and migration.

as a temporary breakdown of an otherwise normal condition of relative stability” (2007, p. 32). To demonstrate how this conception of emergency impacts humanitarian aid agencies, he cites the work of Buchanna-Smith and Maxwell (1994). They suggest that, “most aid agencies regard humanitarian assistance and immediate life-saving relief as essentially different from development (Duffield, 2007, p.32). Duffield contends that while the perception of a separation between life-saving or relief services and development services exists, the two humanitarian aims are closely connected. This connection lies in the mutual biopolitical purpose, of development and emergency relief agencies and programs, to contain the threat posed by “stateless” people.

Duffield (2007) outlines the biopolitical function of humanitarian aid. He builds on Agamben’s theory of exception, that the ability to decide what (or whom) can be excluded is the definition of sovereign power, by adding that, “as a liberal alternative to the extermination of surplus life, relief and development effect the reinclusion of excluded populations” (p.33). Duffield contends that humanitarian emergency is the “site of this maneuver” (ibid). His book, *Development Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*, is a critique of development and emergency relief. His critique is based on the idea that “the NGO movement embodies a liberal problematic of security” and that “it has internationalized and deepened its institutional reach through the expediency of permanent emergency” (p. 33). Duffield’s characterization of the NGO movement as an institution is in line with a social constructionist approach, which reveals that institutions “by the very fact of their existence” seek to “control human conduct” (Berger and Luckman, 1966, p.55).

Duffield (2007) suggests that between the 1950s and 1970s, for the first time in history, the world was populated with territorial nation-states and, by extension, with “millions of new citizens living for the first time within their own national borders” (p. 197). The focus of his analysis, however, is not the citizens who live inside the national borders but on the politically surplus populations who are beyond the state. Duffield emphasizes the significance of Hannah Arendt’s work to illustrate the connection between security and development. According to Arendt (1994/1948) “the danger is that a global universally interrelated civilization may produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions, which, despite all appearance, are the conditions of

savages” (p. 302). Drawing on Arendt’s foreboding account of the negative externalities of the nation-state system, Duffield advances a critical understanding of the ‘humanitarian institution.’

In short, Duffield sees development as the international community’s response to the “danger” outlined in Arendt’s work. He suggests that development should be considered a state led technology of international security that emerged as response to the global issue of surplus populations (Duffield, 2007). Moreover, his argument suggests that racism, migration and development are intimately bound to contemporary conceptualizations of global security. Duffield (2007) suggests that the manifestation of this “new racism” can be observed through an examination of the inequities of the world’s social safety nets.⁹ That is, liberal nation-states are primarily concerned with protecting “the welfare systems of mass society” against the “the spontaneous circulation of non-insured global surplus life” (Duffield, 2007, p.191). Development, through humanitarian organizations, has also been instrumental in responding to the perceived threat posed by surplus populations, and the “racism,” identified by Duffield, is found in the fact that responses differ according to politico-cultural contexts as opposed to strictly biological ones. Duffield argues “the biopolitical translation of development and underdevelopment into the differential technologies deemed socially appropriate for supporting developed and underdeveloped life—that is, social insurance and its derivatives as opposed to self-reliance respectively—is itself suggestive of the racism within development” (p. 209). Duffield’s critical theory of the “new racism” within development contextualizes my empirical analysis of the securitization of humanitarian services at the Dadaab refugee camps. It does so by providing an alternative, deep cause explanation for the post-Cold

⁹ Duffield (2007) examines “development as a technology of containment associated with the division of the global population into insured and non-insured life...and the permanent crisis of containment arising from the moral political and practical impossibility of maintaining this division” (p.184). His argument rests on what he terms the “new culturally coded racism” which he suggests works to define post-Cold War development strategies. To bring his argument into focus he contrasts biological racism and the new “culturally coded racism.” Duffield’s concept of culturally coded racism is influenced by Foucault’s (1976) work which describes racism as “a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is that is under powers control: the break between what must live and what must die...It is a way of separating out groups that exist within a population” (p. 251-252) One of the features of the “new culturally coded racism,” according to Duffield, was to “to place the immigrant within a zone of exception excluded from normal society” (p.191).

War increases in the prevalence humanitarian organizations and the insecurity that precipitates the securitization of aid.

The next section will document the connections between forced migration (of surplus populations) and increased humanitarian aid in order to demonstrate the inter-state effort to “police spontaneous migrations” and “contain global surplus population in situ” (p.209). An examination of the UNHCRs post-Cold War expansion, highlights the connections between mobility, security and humanitarian services.

2.7 UNHCR and Human Security

This section focuses on the role of ‘humanitarian institutions’ in containing the flow of surplus populations. According to Anne Hammerstad (2011), since the Cold War ended, and particularly after 9/11, refugee movements have increasingly been depicted as a threat to security (p. 237). She argues, “this development is intrinsically linked to the widening of the concept of security in the post-Cold War period” (p. 137). Guided by the research and writing of Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse (1987), I illustrate how the work of the UNHCR in this period demonstrates their organizational ability “to create institutional arrangements” that renders the problems associated with stateless people, “perceptible, namable and actionable” (p. 85). This process is exhibited through the work of UN High Commissioner Sadako Ogata and exemplifies the connection between a human security approach to dealing with refugees and humanitarian emergency.

Sadako Ogata helped to orient the security-development nexus around the issue of mobility during her tenure as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 1991 to 2000. When Ogata was asked in 1999 about the impact of the end of Cold War on the work of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, she pointed to two consequences: 1) the number of refugees has gone up, and 2) the causes for refugees to flee have changed from interstate conflict to internal conflicts (UCtelevision, 2008). According to Ogata, the shift from interstate conflict to internal conflict required changes in the UNHCR and specifically that it could, as she put it, “no longer just be waiting for refugees to cross international borders to receive them” (UCtelevision, 2008). Ogata’s statements reflect two very important developments in the linking of development with security: 1) the UNHCR would prioritize the development and security needs of individuals over particular

national sovereignties; and 2) the UNHCR would push towards identifying internally displaced people as a new category of humanitarian aid recipients. Both of these developments have implications for the “securitization of aid,” as they form the justification for increases in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in increasingly risky environments.

Ogata, is recognized for reinforcing the connections between refugees and international security, and for strengthening the UNHCR's relationship with the UN Security Council (UNHCR, 2012). While she was in office, the UNHCR became increasingly involved with IDPs and other victims caught in violent conflicts. During her tenure, the budget and staff of the UNHCR more than doubled (UNHCR, 2012). The significance of changes that were initiated during Ogata's tenure are thrown into relief by comparing the *2011 Global Trend* report to the UNHCR's *The Global Report 1999*. According to the 1999 report there were “no reliable estimates” of internally displaced people (IDPs) and that meeting the needs of IDPs is more difficult than meeting those of refugees who cross borders (UNHCR, 1999). By 2011, not only are IDPs counted, but they are fully identified as a new category of forcibly displaced people.

The UNHCR's 2011 report provides evidence of the impact of identifying IDPs as representing a new category of asylum seeker and the expansion of the ‘humanitarian mandate’. Specifically the 2011 UNHCR report documents that “For the fifth consecutive year the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide exceeded 42 million, a result of persistent and new conflicts in different parts of the world” (UNHCR, 2011). Of the 42.5 million forcibly displaced people the UNHCR reports having assisted, 10.4 million were refugees and 15.5 million were IDPs in 2011. While reliable statistics on the forcibly displaced are perennially hard to come by, the creation of a new category of people requiring assistance does not rely solely on statistical significance to provide it with analytical legitimacy. Instead, as Specter and Kitsuse (1987) suggest, analyzing “the type of evidence they used to support their views, the political strategies and tactics they used to gain acceptance of their definitions, and the support given them by government agencies for institutionalizing those definitions” provide for a more insightful exploration of socially constructed problems (p.43).

According to Ogata, “international borders meant much more” during the Cold

War; and now in the post-Cold War period, borders are “really fuzzy” (UCtelevision, 2008). Ogata’s response reflected a “human security” approach to state sovereignty. Describing borders as “fuzzy” opens up “political space” that enables the recognition of a new category of people that require protection from the international community in the form of IDPs. In other words, the “knowledge” that borders are “fuzzy,” and the existence of IDPs and refugees triggers values that justify a humanitarian response or as David Reiff (2002) describes it, “a moral imperative to act” (p. 36). This moral imperative to act is tempered by a variety of conditions that impact the way in which it is framed and carried out. The *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) is illustrative of this.

With the production of “refugees,” comes the construction of threats that they pose to internal to the global population. After the *Responsibility to Protect* document was released in 2001, and after 9/11, many scholars began to suggest that there is a relationship between refugee camps and “terrorism”, and the potential for the militarization of refugee camps. Scholars like Suzanne Schmeidl (2002), Ahmed Rashid (2000) and Arthur Helton (2002a & 2002b), as summarized by Makaremi (2010), “put forward the idea that the Taliban is the product of the camps established by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for Afghans in Pakistan” (p. 114). These scholars put the “terrorist” squarely within the rubric of the security-development nexus when they assert, as noted by Makaremi (2010), that the Taliban “are mainly produced by an incomplete humanitarian management of the forced displacements of the last decades” (p. 114). This line of argument constructs “terrorism” as the result of a failure on behalf of the international community to address the “human security” needs of the forcibly displaced. According to Schmeidl, “their individual and physical insecurity, their poverty, the destruction of social frameworks, and the lack of psychological care made them a threat to regional and global security” (as cited by Makaremi, 2010, p. 114).

Many authors have characterized the humanitarian response to this global security threat as a “win-win situation: The securitization of the victims’ basic needs is also the guarantee of the security of Western States” (Makaremi, 2010, p. 114). The outcome of this security-oriented relationship between refugee camps, refugees, terrorism, and national security is one that constructs the potential recipients of aid as both a “victim” and a “threat”. Makaremi (2010) observes that, “Humanitarian intervention, as a political

process, thus becomes a pact of security anchored in the bodies of aid beneficiaries” (p.114). Collectively, the forcibly displaced (refugees and IDPs) are, as Craig Calhoun, suggests “the prototypical face of the emergency” (p. 33).

The next section of this chapter will work to describe the implications of a human security approach to humanitarian emergency in the 21st century.

2.8 From emergency relief to development

The meaning and scope of “emergency” is one of the most frequently debated subjects in security and development research and writing. This, in part, includes an understanding of the meaning of emergency and its significance to contemporary development literature. In short, the human security paradigm invokes the notion of emergency in order to justify humanitarian intervention, and the securitization of humanitarian aid relies on the same logic. James Fearon (2008) provides a detailed analysis of increasing emergency relief assistance in the post-Cold War era. Relating forced migration to emergency, Fearon (2008) notes that, “emergency relief is by definition aid focused on saving the lives of people threatened by manmade and natural disasters” (p. 55). He points out that the majority of the people affected by such disasters are either refugees or, since the early 1990s, IDPs (p. 55). As a starting point, he observes that despite the substantial decline in the world’s refugee population since 1991, “emergency aid has continued to increase dramatically, in real terms, over the last fifteen years” (p. 49). Even though Fearon (2008) discounts “increased natural disasters as an explanation for increased emergency aid over time”, he nonetheless finds, “evidence of a strong association between emergency aid and the total number of enumerated IDPs around the world” (p. 51). This association suggests that the containing tendency expressed in the human security paradigm continues to exert itself despite apparent decreases in naturally occurring emergencies, and invites a more detailed analysis of what constitutes an emergency.

The OECD defines emergency as an:

urgent situation created by an abnormal event which a government cannot meet out of its own resources and which result in human suffering and/or loss of crops or livestock. Such an emergency can result from i) sudden natural or man-made disasters, including wars or severe civil unrest; or ii) food scarcity conditions arising from crop failure owing to drought, pests and diseases. (Fearon, p. 52)

This definition of emergency provides a starting point for my analysis in this section, which seeks to outline the connections between emergency and development services.

The connection between relief and development policies and strategies has its roots in the international reaction to the African Famines of the 1970s and 1980s (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). In the 1990s there was a shift in terms of how disasters and emergencies were perceived and addressed. According to a number of scholars and policy documents (Bradbury, 1998; Macrae and Bradbury, 1998; Commission of the European Communities (CEC), 1996), this shift was characterized by a change in donor government policy,¹⁰ which now favored development instead of relief assistance. This change in policy impacted the way aid agencies organized their operational strategies on the ground. These new strategies came to represent what has been referred to as the “new humanitarianism,” which supports the “idea of a ‘relief to development continuum’, or the ‘linking of relief and development’ strategies in conflict situations” (Duffield, 2001, p. 98-99). The ‘relief to development continuum’ is based on the idea that “Better ‘development’ can reduce the need for emergency relief; better ‘relief’ can contribute to development; and better ‘rehabilitation’ can ease the transition between the two” (Commission of the European Communities, 1996, p. iii). According to Duffield (2001) the ‘relief to development continuum’ provides an “example of the merger between development and security” because it defines development in terms of “conflict resolution and societal reconstruction” and it casts “security in terms of underdevelopment becoming dangerous” (p. 99). Organizationally, the relief to development continuum has worked to “link donor governments, IGOs, and implementing agencies” under “more stringent contractual mechanisms, more comprehensive and inclusive project design” and increased “monitoring and reporting techniques” (Duffield, 2001, p. 99). Whereas relief and development organizations were previously distinguishable, the distinction is no longer maintained.

The work of Michael Ignatieff elaborates on the dynamic relationship between foreign policy and development assistance, as he highlights the implications for the

¹⁰ The UNs Department of Humanitarian Affairs, established in 1991, was responsible for the management of the relief to development continuum. See also *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development* (CEC, 1996)

securitization of aid thesis. Ignatieff (2002) suggests that R2P is “An intervention strategy that takes sides, that uses force, and that sticks around to rebuild”, and that it “is very different from one premised on neutrality, casualty-avoidance, and exit strategies” (para. 2). Ignatieff’s definition of R2P provides insight into the character of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, and it exemplifies the conflation between emergency and development aid through a rubric of security. His concept of an R2P style intervention has received criticism from scholars who note that the imbrication of military force and humanitarian aid has itself been a root cause of recent trends in violence against aid workers (Barnett, 2011, p. 193, Fast, 2010, p. 377).

Documenting the spread of R2P style interventions, Fearon (2008) observes, “the end of the Cold War has been followed by a series of high profile interventions and post-conflict reconstruction projects by the United States and other major powers (sometimes through the UN) that have been magnets for emergency relief aid” (p.71). He argues, “the rise of emergency aid looks like a consequence of the changed foreign policy priorities of the major powers, the result of new security concerns and a new willingness (or sense of freedom) to act on humanitarian concerns” (p.71). This new willingness to act is grounded in a human security approach to emergency. Michael Barnett (2011), suggests that during the 1990s and into the 21st century major donors were ready to invest more money at the same time that aid agencies “wanted to do more than provide a ‘bed for the night’ or keep alive the ‘well fed dead’” (Barnett, 2011, p. 197). According to Barnett (2011), there was increasing overlap between relief and development organizations as “relief agencies were increasingly contemplating how to tie relief to post conflict reconstruction, and development agencies were increasingly trying to use emergency relief as a springboard for development” (p. 197). The entanglement of emergency relief, development, and military operations has come to be the norm in 21st century humanitarian interventions. As noted above these relations are illustrative of the biopolitical formations of our time, particularly as they concern themselves with these recently constituted ‘vulnerable’ yet ‘threatening’ refugee populations.

Fearon (2008) describes these “internationally mandated interventions in conflict-as involving “a consortia of intergovernmental organizations, major powers, nongovernmental organizations, and private contractors” In addition to humanitarian

concerns, these interventions he suggests are driven by fears of refugee flows, regional wars, terrorism, or other “spillover effects “ (p.50). Further pursuing this critique, Duffield (2007) argues that the securitization of aid in the post-Cold War era is not explained solely as a recreation of Cold War security strategies. He describes “Western involvement in the reconstruction of ineffective states in order to satisfy the basic needs of population” as a “post-Cold War phenomenon” (p. 129). According to Duffield the (2007) “containing tendency within human security” is reflected in post-interventionary societies where the international community is now highly involved in the delivery of the “core economic and welfare functions of the state, that is, its core biopolitical functions” (p.129). Understanding how this tendency has worked to simultaneously erode the practicality of humanitarianisms’ guiding principles and justify the securitization of aid in the post-Cold War era is discussed next.

Duffield (2007) maintains that the “NGO movement is deeply implicated and involved” in the biopolitical appropriation of state sovereignty (p. 129). He argues that expanding definitions of “humanitarian emergency” allowed “UN agencies and NGOs to work legitimately on all sides of unresolved internal wars” (Duffield, 2007, p. 222), without restriction. According to Barnett (2011), relief and development organizations were cooperating more and more with human rights activists, and integrating their activity (p. 197). Duffield argues that this new predilection for cooperation coincides with the upsurge in Western emergency funding in the 1990s, and that it facilitated “the emergence of system-wide relief operations drawing together donor governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies and defense establishments into new forms of interaction, cooperation and competition” (Duffield 2007, p. 222). The assimilation of emergency aid, development and security agendas, as Larissa Fast (2010) similarly notes, is connected to the securitization of aid. She contends that by “embracing a humanitarianism that departs from a singular focus on saving lives and relieving suffering, humanitarians have adopted a social transformation agenda that transcends its core principles” (p. 377). The following discussion outlines these core principles and connects their demise to the securitization of aid.

Michael Barnett (2011) provides the most detailed history of humanitarianism in his book *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*. He reminds us that “the

debates regarding the relationship between humanitarianism and the use of force are as old as humanitarianism itself, but in the last decade of the last century they became a point of controversy among humanitarian organizations” (p. 171). These debates center on the politicization of humanitarian service delivery and the practicality and effectiveness of humanitarianism’s core principles. Developed by the Red Cross as an extension of a universal ethic, which holds that “all people have equal dignity by virtue of their membership in humanity,” these core principles—the humanitarian imperative, impartiality, neutrality and independence—are based on the Geneva conventions.¹¹ The goal of these guiding principles is to create “humanitarian space” in war by separating humanitarian aims from the political incentives of the conflict.

Conversely, many scholars have documented the potential for humanitarian service to prolong, or even escalate, conflict and the resulting violence, or through the culture of dependence, to sustain humanitarian emergency (Lischer 2005, Terry, 2008). For this reason Sarah Lischer (2005) asserts, “to avoid contributing to the spread of conflict, humanitarian organizations, such as UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGOs, cannot approach their work in isolation from the political and military context surrounding it” (p. 143). Specifically Lischer argues that “despite their desire for neutrality, it is virtually impossible to have a neutral effect in a conflict situation” (p. 143). This realization has predominated in the literature, and it lays the foundation for the justification of the securitizing strategies being adopted by humanitarian organizations. Scholars, policy makers, and humanitarian organizations alike have outlined these securitizing strategies—acceptance, protection and deterrence.¹² While the security

¹¹ “The humanitarian imperative declares that there is an obligation to provide assistance wherever it is needed, and is predicated on the right to receive, and to offer, humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Impartiality implies that assistance is based solely on need, without any discrimination among recipients because of nationality, race, religion, or other factors. The principle of neutrality denotes a duty to refrain from taking part in hostilities or from undertaking that furthers the interests of one party to the conflict or compromises those of the other. Independence is an indispensable condition to ensure that humanitarian action is exclusively concerned with the welfare of humanity and free of all political, religious, or other extraneous influences.” (Terry, 2002, p. 19)

¹² “Acceptance refers to when the community in which humanitarian agencies are working supports and accept their presence, and out of that acceptance grows security Protection is the equipment needed to provide security, such as walky- talkies, barbed wire and helmets; operational policies and procedures, such as curfews, training and clear policies on vehicle operations and finances; and coordinated operations, such as coordination and coop- eration with the. Deterrence signifies posing a counter threat, and involves such measures as utilizing guards and coordination of activities with external international military forces in peacekeeping missions” (Eckroth, 2010).

afforded by acceptance is rooted in humanitarian notions of neutrality and impartiality, and favored by the majority of humanitarian organizations, the other two approaches have expanded under the “logic of exceptionality” and are better suited to a traditional securitization framework. Coincidentally, this steady growth is inextricably linked to perceptions that the protective capacities of acceptance, neutrality and impartiality have proven to be inadequate.

2.9 The Securitization of Humanitarian Aid

The securitization of aid at the operational level is a response to the multiple risks faced by humanitarian organizations in emergency environments. As Jocelyn Vaughn (2009) notes, “organizational survival” is directly connected to the “survival of civilian beneficiaries” (p. 271). The logic of securitization suggests that if humanitarian organizations are not adequately protected, then they will be unable to provide for the human security needs of victims of humanitarian emergencies. It follows that security incidents have a direct negative impact on humanitarian service delivery. According to Vaughn (2009) these security incidents have a direct negative impact on an organization’s ability to assist the victims of humanitarian emergencies, as they typically result in programme closures, suspension, or even withdrawal” (p. 271). As a result, security incidents should be considered a threat to the potential beneficiaries of aid. Jan Egeland (2004) effectively describes these relations in noting the impact of security incidents involving humanitarian aid workers on the populations intended to receive aid:

Attacking an aid worker undermines this most basic principle: that people caught on the front lines of violence or disasters have a right to assistance. The ripple effects of an attack begin, of course, with the family and colleagues of the slain, but extend more widely to countless others whose survival may well hinge on the provision of aid. There is a direct and deadly correlation here: When humanitarians are attacked, aid agencies feel they have no choice but to suspend or downscale their operations. . . . Thus, the loss of one life leads to the potential loss of thousands more whom humanitarian food and medical programs can no longer reach. (Egeland, para.7-9, 2004)

For aid workers making the connections, and managing these relations between the risks they face and the threat of substantial loss of aid recipient life is fundamental to the process

of securitizing humanitarian aid delivery.¹³ Moreover, the relation between aid provision and recipient populations has performative constitutive effects: as Vaughn (2009) notes, connecting organizational security to the security of populations in need strengthens three interrelated objectives of the securitization process: 1) they “convince their audiences that the survival of their beneficiaries and humanitarian identity and practices are inseparable from the security of individual organizations in specific settings”; 2) they “strengthen the claim that humanitarian organizations indeed face an existential threat because security incidents simultaneously imperil” humanitarian workers and those who rely on their services; and 3) “they reinforce the claim that extraordinary measures are necessary, because so much is jeopardized” (p. 271). It is not surprising, then, that many aid providers have been advocates of enhanced security, including through police and military partnerships.

The process of securitization among humanitarian organizations is also often motivated by concern with theft, the control of which has often been used to justify the need for heightened security measures. According to Lischer (2005), warehouses and international compounds are targeted by armed groups to steal food, medicine, and equipment (p. 8). She reports that thousands, if not millions, of dollars of relief resources, including vehicles and communication equipment, are stolen every year” (Lischer, 2005, p. 8). In a series of incidents in the 1990s, for example, after the theft of \$20 million in equipment during the civil war, aid organizations curtailed their operations in Liberia (Lischer, 2005, p. 8). Similarly, Fiona Terry (2002), in her work on Somalia in the 1990s, reports the banditry raised the diversion of food aid to “an unprecedented level,” as somewhere between 20 to 80 percent of food aid was stolen. She also notes that most Somali Red Crescent staff interviewed by Alex de Waal estimated that “half of the food distributed by the Red Crescent Staff was looted, diverted, or extorted” (p. 40). While the exact amount of ‘lost aid’ will never be known, the justification it provides for the securitization of aid is crystal clear, particularly for those whose relief work and whose

¹³ Scott Watson (2011) argues humanitarianism rivals security in its ability to legitimize emergency measures, and has also proven to be as ambiguous and open to abuse”(p. 3). To support this claim he notes that humanitarianism has been used to justify military interventions in a wide range of interventions. He lists: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Zaire, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq and Afghanistan (p.4).

material resources are impaired by security issues.

Clearly, it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the subject, as Terry (2002) notes: “considering the amount of aid money and supplies that directly contributed to the warring factions in Liberia and Somalia, aid organizations are understandably reluctant to publicize such information” (p. 40). The devil is in the details, and the dissemination of such detail could not only jeopardize the “good” image of aid among individual donors, but it also fuels arguments for restricting aid or for supporting military intervention (p. 41). This possibility is born out by the fact that it was on account of the loss of up to 80 percent of food aid, as noted by senior officials of the UN and CARE, that the US decided to intervene militarily” in Somalia (Terry, 2002, p. 41).

2.10 Conclusion

While both theft of aid and violence against aid workers have prompted the securitization of aid at the operational level, this process unfolds in the context of a larger discourse that transpires at the level of foreign policy. In this political process, the securitization of aid is best understood as a response to the potential spread of conflict and the resulting violence posed by unchecked migration. The militarization of refugee camps has already been cited as an example of the perils associated with an incomplete humanitarian response. Furthermore, the literature that deals with the notion that the militarization of refugee camps are a primary threat to international peace is in effect the realization of Arendt’s nearly 50-year old warning, that a world of nation-states states has produced “barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions, which despite appearances, are the conditions of savages” (p. 302). The securitization of forced migration and humanitarian aid represents the biopolitical cure to this enduring civilizational pathology.

The debates surrounding human security and the responsibility to protect reflect a post-Cold War shift in the way political power has been conceptualized. A biopolitical framework explains this shift in political thought, and it helps clarify the role of humanitarian organizations in securitizing “surplus populations.” The work of Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben outlines the biopolitical figure of the refugee and highlights the sovereign’s (including as the ‘international community’) ability to declare a state of

emergency and to dictate that entire populations be exempt from their rights as the central characteristic of sovereign power. Furthermore, they both identify humanitarian aid as the international community's consistent and inadequate response to the "exceptional" state of perpetual emergency. Mark Duffield picks up on the work of Foucault, Arendt and Agamben in order to explain the expanding and overlapping roles of relief and development organizations in the post-Cold War era, and their collective focus on securitizing the threat posed by surplus populations. The role of the UNHCR in the post-Cold War exemplifies the biopolitical conceptualization of "sovereignty" and its work in producing "stateless people." The relationship between emergency and development aid highlights the shift from humanitarian principles of neutrality to more overt securitization strategies, such as protection and deterrence at the operational level.

This theoretical analysis reveals that the securitization of aid in conflict environments at the operational level is part of a larger political process of securitizing the spread of potentially destabilizing "surplus populations." Moreover, humanitarian aid delivery in high-risk environments, like refugee camps, is essential to the broader political task of stabilizing and containing high-risk populations and political instability. Jocelyn Vaughn (2009) supports this understanding of securitization as an interrelated process. She contends that "securitizers" may offer various justifications for their securitizing strategies (p. 264), including protecting aid workers from violence; preventing theft of material aid; and containing the threat posed by unchecked migration. According to Vaughn (2009), a securitization strategy is most effective when the audience no longer considers the various justifications for securitizing moves "independently" of the "larger implications of the threat" (p. 264). This analysis suggests that the securitization of aid is best understood as a process that unfolds under the biopolitical logic of the human security paradigm. It begins with the humanitarian ideal of protecting/securing life itself and ends with the doctrine of the interventionist logic of just war, and the doctrine of R2P. It could be said that the interests of such a militarized approach is not to protect "human lives," as much as it is to secure the international order of sovereign nation-states. As such, it becomes difficult to separate the political and operational securitization strategies as both work to justify increased security for humanitarian organizations, especially in dangerous environments.

While my study is concerned with documenting the operational securitization

process at the Dadaab camps, it also aims to place these findings within the broader political process of securitization. In pursuit of this dual purpose, this theoretical analysis has outlined the “a broad consensus among scholars” and commentators that, “since the end of the Cold War, and in particular after the terror attacks of 9/11, ... refugee movements have increasingly been portrayed as a threat to security by state policy makers, the media, and even the UNHCR” (Hammerstad, 2008, p. 238). However unacquainted the growing number of humanitarians in the field are to the biopolitical function of humanitarian aid, their day-to-day operations unfold against the backdrop of this seismic global urge to securitize both life and the socially constructed international order of sovereign nation-states.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Overview

The security-development nexus and the securitization of humanitarian aid suggest a variety of implications for the delivery of humanitarian services. While these broader issues have been raised in the literature by a variety of development and security scholars (Duffield, 2001, 2007; Stoddard, Harmer A., Haver, 2006; Robinson, 2005), critics have identified a gap between empirical evidence and theoretical arguments (Barnett, 2011, Fast, 2007). My research study is designed to address this gap by examining what motivates the process of securitization from the perspective of humanitarian organizations; how securitization is undertaken; and the impacts of this process on the delivery of aid services. Uncovering the nature and impacts of the securitization process in the humanitarian aid system might help highlight some of the concerns outlined in the literature that connects security and development.

My research project was initially designed to take place at the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya. Web based research revealed 22 organizations delivering humanitarian services in the camps. When this research project was first conceived in October 2011, I had an opportunity to volunteer as an English teacher for the Windle Trust. This position would have given me access to the camps and refugee workers themselves, as well as the UNHCR and DRA compounds which house national and international humanitarian staff. After my arrival at Dadaab I had planned to schedule interviews with a variety of humanitarian workers, with the only parameter for inclusion in the study being involvement in the delivery of humanitarian services at the camps. My initial plan was frustrated by a number of issues and concerns that simultaneously highlighted the relevance of my research topic and the difficulty it posed for the development of a relevant research strategy.

First, ethical considerations forced me to limit my study population to senior level aid workers who were capable of providing informed consent. This particular parameter was established to protect refugee aid workers from any threat to their employment or unintended risks resulting from their participation in my study.

Secondly, unanticipated serious security concerns forced the Windle Trust to rescind their offer of a volunteer opportunity. My access to the aid compounds and Dadaab camps vanished along with the volunteership. Given the considerable time and effort already spent on the development of this research project, rather than abandoning the study completely, I elected to pursue a slightly different research strategy. In collaboration with my supervisor and graduate coordinator and after having conducted a web based investigation of organizations operating at Dadaab I elected to travel to Nairobi to secure interviews with senior level humanitarian aid workers who had experience working and delivering humanitarian services at the Dadaab camps. This seemed like a viable alternative given the restricted access to the camps and the fact that the majority of organizations delivering services at Dadaab had head offices in Nairobi.

My theoretical and conceptual framework provides the foundation for my semi-structured interviews with aid professionals who have experience delivering services at the Dadaab camps. Web-based research identified 22 organizations that had offices in Nairobi. I used Google maps to locate the different organizations and employed a local taxi driver who was familiar with the city to find the organizations. Until the 12th interview meetings were never granted on the first trip to an organization. Fortunately, interest in the study was strong and every organization I located physically, save two, expressed interest in my study and made themselves available for interviews. All of the interviews were conducted in person except for two telephone interviews with participants who were calling from inside either the UNHCR or the DRA compounds. During all the interviews, I used snowball sampling to gather additional information concerning locations and potential candidates for participation. In the end I ran out of time and had to leave before interviewing some aid workers who had expressed interest in participating in the study.

3.2 Case study on the securitization of aid

To explore the securitization of aid, I decided on the case study approach as my primary research strategy. This research approach allows me to examine a variety of aid organizations, in some depth, and to provide detailed information on securitization in a specific context. My goal was to deliver a detailed analysis of the context, processes and impact of the securitization of aid and link them to the theoretical issues presented in my

literature review. I combined a variety of research methods, including existing web based research and field research in the form of limited participant observation and 21 semi-structured interviews.

This case study is primarily exploratory, descriptive and in part explanatory. My analysis explores the basic facts, settings and concerns that motivate the securitization of aid in general and specifically it documents the security concerns that confront aid workers at Dadaab specifically. The case study is explanatory in the sense that it elaborates and expands the empirical basis of the theoretical explanations offered in the academic literature. Specifically, I am studying the experiences and attitudes of aid workers who work at the Dadaab refugee camps to illuminate the securitization process among humanitarian organizations in a particular context, and then placing these findings within the broader literature and debates on security and humanitarian aid.

While generalizations from my research findings will be limited to this case study they may provide additional evidence of the growing importance and influence of security or insecurity as an important new problematic factor in the delivery foreign aid in high-risk environments. This case study, as well as the application of related literature, is limited to the Dadaab refugee camps, and specifically to the delivery of humanitarian aid at the camps. It is further limited by the inability of researchers, much less aid workers themselves, direct access to these camps.

3.3 Dadaab: The Camps That Aid Built

The Dadaab refugee camps are located in the notoriously dangerous northeastern part of Kenya. Colonial and post-colonial Kenyan governments have consistently sought to limit Somali encroachment in this region. In the 1960s ethnic Somalis fought to include this area in the greater Somali state (Crisp, 2000, p. 616). The enduring insecurity in this region is related to the ongoing political unrest in Somalia. After an initial ten years of post independence multi party democracy, the military took power in 1969. Soon after the regime of President Mohamed Siad Barre deteriorated into a police state and lost the Ogaden War with Ethiopia. During the Cold War the country was able to exploit its strategic location as a port city to garner considerable foreign aid, despite being reported to have one of the worst human rights records in the world. In the late

1980s, with the end of the Cold War, and after and being refused foreign aid based on its human rights record the Somali state ultimately descended into open civil war from 1988-1990. The state ultimately collapsed in 1991-1992 (Menkhaus, 2010, p. 137).

In 1991-92 Somali refugees fled famine, civil war and state collapse and crossed the border into Kenya in record numbers. By May 1992 there were 427, 278 Somali refugees in Kenya. The majority of these Somalis were settled in several refugee camps in northeast Kenya. The camps were located just a few miles from the Kenya-Somali border where “bandits, collectively referred to as shiftas, attacked seemingly at will, targeting the camps in search of food and money” (Loescher & Milner, 2005, p. 41). The massive number of refugees and their extended presence have challenged Kenya with a variety of security concerns. In April 1992, in order to protect humanitarian aid workers in Somalia the UN Security Council passed UN Resolution 794, which created the United Nations Operation to Somalia (UNOSOM) on the basis that the “magnitude of human suffering in Somalia, constituted a threat to international peace and security” (Loescher and Milner, 2005, p. 38). The deployment of 3,500 UN troops had limited impact and aid agencies were increasingly attacked. The insecurity impacted the delivery of life-saving assistance and by the end of 1992 the famine is reported to have killed 300,000 Somalis (Loescher and Milner, 2005, p. 38). The failed US military mission started in December 1992 and by 1994 both the UN and US troops had left.

More than two decades later Somalia is still considered a failed state and consequently there is still a massive Somali refugee population in Kenya. Although the number of Somali refugees in Kenya had dropped below the 200,000 mark from 1993 to 2006 the population has been steadily increasing since 2008 and Kenya is now host to over half a million Somali refugees (Loescher and Milner, 2005, p. 38-40; UNHCR, 2013). These staggering numbers can also be explained by the unwillingness of Western countries along with the Kenyan government to accept refugees from Somalia. The reduction in the numbers of refugees in the 1990s did nothing to decrease the insecurity faced by refugees in Kenya. Since 1996, in response to security concerns the Kenyan government closed camps that were close to urban areas and moved the overwhelming majority of refugees to the Dadaab camps in the notoriously dangerous northeastern part of Kenya. In this remote

area just a few miles from the Kenya-Somali border refugees have been consistent targets for criminals who enter the camps and steal money and food. In this area refugee women and girls have been particularly impacted, with a disturbing number of them being raped by Kenyan and Somali bandits while outside the camps foraging for firewood (Loescher and Milner, 2005, p. 40).

The Kenyan government has maintained the position that Somali refugees represent a security threat to the Kenya state. After a series of attacks, including the August 1998 attack on the US Embassy in central Nairobi and the coordinated attacks and the 2002 attacks in Mombassa, Kenyan and US government investigations implicated the Dadaab refugee camps. The allegations suggest “Kenya’s porous border with Somalia and the presence of refugee camps provided ideal cover for the operations of a terrorist organization, while the disaffected camp population provided fertile base for recruitment” (Loescher & Milner, 2005 p. 41). To date these allegations remain unsubstantiated, yet their implications are very real.

The Dadaab camps represent the world’s largest protracted refugee situation and the third largest city in Kenya. Initially built to host 90,000 refugees, 20 years later the camp is now home to 425, 795 Somali refugees (UNHCR, 2013). Dadaab means two things: 1) the five refugee camps 2) Dadaab town. The 5 refugee camps (Ifo, Hagadera, Dagahaley, Ifo2 and Kambioos) that have come to be referred to as Dadaab and home to nearly half million refugees are separated by dirt roads, some fencing and UNHCR and private security personnel. While many humanitarian organizations operate within the different camps they are based either in Nairobi and/or in Dadaab town. Dadaab town is roughly 20 kilometers from the refugee camps; and is home to the UNHCR compound and the DRA compound, both of which compounds house the different humanitarian organizations which deliver services to the camps.

Dadaab is situated in a semi-arid region of Kenya where struggle over resources between local clans existed before the arrival of the refugees in the 1990s. The arrival of refugees, with their own clan rivalries from Somalia, only served to intensify insecurity (Loescher & Milner, 2005, p. 42). Adding to the volatile situation are protests from the host community concerning services provided to the refugee population that they have no access to as Kenyan nationals—services like free health care and education (Ibid).

The camps themselves are comprised both of semi-permanent structures (bricks, steel, concrete) and tents. There are no paved roads in any of the camps or Dadaab town; however taxi service is available between camps. Many refugees have lived their entire lives in the camp while others have only recently made the long journey to the camp. The vast majority of refugees in the camps are Somali. Some are living in more established housing and following a more patterned lifestyle while others are living in tents and less permanent structures. The camp is divided into sections and different sections share water access and sanitation points.

Recently the root causes of the Somali displacement have been exploited further by the widespread drought that plagued Eastern Africa in 2011, during which the UNHCR (2012) reports that, “around 30,000 arrived in June, 40,000 in July and 38,000 in August” (para, 4). Writing from inside the camp during the famine, Sally Williams (2011) reports: “and they are still coming: on average 1,000 a day” (para 32). While the massive influx of Somalis has stabilized, there have been a series of security incidents that have transpired in and around the Dadaab camps that have influenced the manner in which aid is delivered in the camps—specifically, the September 21, 2011 kidnapping of a Kenyan driver working for CARE; the October 13th 2011 kidnapping of two MSF doctors and murder of their driver; and the June 29, 2012 murder of 1 NRC driver and kidnapping of 4 NRC foreign aid workers. These events have received considerable media coverage. Unfortunately, however, they represent the tip of the iceberg in relation to the security issues faced by humanitarian organizations that operate in the town that aid built and the refugees who depend on their services.

3.4 Humanitarian Aid Organizations at Dadaab

Examining the security concerns of individual NGO organizations and the general security frameworks that govern the service delivery of humanitarian organizations at the Dadaab refugee camps provides an opportunity to analyze one of the most long-term and large scale humanitarian responses ever. In her (2011) article Sally Williams reported that, “there are now 1,022 aid workers from 22 agencies living on the UNHCR compound” (para, 32). The UNHCR (2013) currently lists 22 organizations operating in 17 different areas of service delivery in the Dadaab camps.

Surprisingly there is little published research on the impact of individual and organizational security responses to service delivery within refugee camps despite the fact that camps themselves represent a site of security. Exploring the impacts of security strategies on the delivery of services is becoming increasingly relevant as humanitarian organizations are progressively adopting various security strategies that focus on “how to stay” as opposed to a “when to leave” approach to security risks in the field. Those involved in delivering humanitarian aid at the Dadaab camps are in a unique position to provide information on the impacts of security concerns on service delivery.

The UNHCR website currently lists 17 categories of humanitarian service being delivered by the different humanitarian organizations at Dadaab (UNHCR, 2013). These areas are: Child Protection 1, Community Services 3, Core relief items (CRI's) 3, Education 10, Environment 2, Food 4, Gender Based Violence 2, Health 9, HIV/AIDS 9, Livelihood 1, Logistics 3, Nutrition 3, Protection 9, Registration 2, Shelter 3, Transportation 1, Water and Sanitation, 6.¹⁴

The 21 participants who participated in my study represent 17 different humanitarian organizations. These 17 organizations are: Oxfam, Windle Trust, Lutheran World Federation (LWF), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), CARE International, International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Vision, RED R, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, World Food Program, MSF Switzerland, Islamic Relief, Department of Refugee Affairs, Organization for the Cooperation of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

¹⁴ There are 23 organizations listed in total, 9 of the organizations are not represented in my study; however, my study engages participants who work or have worked for 6 organizations that do not appear under any category on the UNHCR list. These six organizations could have been left off the list for a variety of reasons including but not limited to, simple error or the fact that they are not funded by the UNHCR. This apparent discrepancy will be discussed in more detail later in my analysis. For this descriptive chapter, observing and recording the wide range of humanitarian services and the organizations and individuals who provide them reveals the complexity of the humanitarian effort at the Dadaab camps. Given that organizations are constantly adapting and changing roles in an effort to address the variety of issues that confront relief efforts, the notion that tracking which organizations are doing what where and when is challenging is not surprising.

3.5 Study Population Sample

The study population that informs this analysis consists of 21 humanitarian aid and security workers who operate at the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya. All of the participants, and the organizations they work for, will be referred to anonymously. Some organizations are involved with a variety of services.

Table 1: This table catalogues each interview and reports the gender, race, nationality, position and type of organization for each participant. Aside from the one government agency; organizations in my study fall under three identifiable types; International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs).

Subject	Race/ Gender	Nationality	Position	Type of Organization
Int.S.1	White/ Male	Swedish	Senior Field Safety Advisor	IGO
Int.S.2	White/ Female	American	Emergency Coordinator	IGO
Int.S.3	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Program Manager	NGO
Int.S.4	White/ Male	British	Humanitarian coordinator	INGO
Int.S.5	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Senior Program Officer	INGO
Int.S.6	Black/ Female	Kenyan	Health Program Quality Coordinator	INGO
Int.S.7	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Regional Security Advisor	INGO
Int.S.8	Black/ Female	Kenyan	Program Assistant	INGO
Int.S.9	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Program Officer	INGO
Int.S.10	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Security Trainer	INGO
Int.S.11	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Program Officer Refugee Operations	IGO
Int.S.12	White/ Female	Swiss	Head of Mission	INGO
Int.S.13	White/ Male	Belgian	Rehabilitation technical coordinator	INGO
Int.S.14	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Country Director	INGO
Int.S.15	White/ Male	Kenyan	Kenya Director	INGO
Int.S.16	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Director	INGO
Int.S.17	Black/ Female	Kenyan	Program Officer	INGO
Int.S.18	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Refugee Camp Officer	Government Agency
Int.S.19	Black/ Male	Kenyan	Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator	IGO
Int.S.20	White/ Female	German	External Relations Officer	IGO
Int.S.21	White	Canadian	Emergency Response Manager	INGO

As reflected in the chart, my case study is based on 21 semi-structured exploratory interviews with senior level employees from 15 NGOs (14 of them INGOs), 2 IGOs, and 1 government agency. There are 15 male participants and 6 female participants. Of the 21 participants 7 are foreign aid workers and 14 are Kenyan. 13 are Black and 8 are White. The participants come from a variety of different educational and work related backgrounds. The majority of participants had a university level education. Of the 21, 6 participants can be considered security professionals. These 6 participants, whose positions are primarily security-oriented, came from a police or military background. My definition of what constitutes an “aid worker” is taken from the aid worker security database (AWSDB).¹⁵

In total, I interviewed participants from 17 organizations. Two of the organizations in the study provided two different employees for interviews. One of the organizations is represented in the study by 5 separate interviews with participants who work for the same organization in different capacities. In my analysis the majority of the participants had been working for a humanitarian aid organization for over 5 years. In most cases they were informally identified by their organization as someone who has experience at the Dadaab camps and is involved with the organizations’ service delivery at the camps. All the participants in my study communicated in English.

All of the participants had experience delivering services in risky environments and had spent time working in the Dadaab camps, or were on their way to Dadaab shortly in one case. In light of recent security issues my interviews were conducted in Nairobi. Many of the participants reported being based in Nairobi but focused on Dadaab. The majority of Nairobi based participants reported that taking regular working visits to Dadaab was part of their job. Most participants had previous experience working and living in Dadaab at some point during the lifetime of the camps. While limited, the sample of participants in

¹⁵ "Aid workers" are defined as the employees and associated personnel of not for profit aid agencies (both national and international staff) that provide material and technical assistance in humanitarian relief contexts. These include various locally contracted staff (e.g., transportation, security, etc.). This includes both relief and multi-mandated (relief and development) organizations: NGOs, the International Movement of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, donor agencies and the UN agencies belonging to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO) plus IOM and UNRWA. The aid worker definition does not include UN peacekeeping personnel, human rights workers, election monitors or purely political, religious, or advocacy organizations.

this study represent the largest group of humanitarian professionals with experience delivering humanitarian services at the Dadaab camps ever interviewed about humanitarian security in the camps. While none of the participants have worked in Dadaab for the duration of its existence, many left only to return years later, and their collective experience spans from the very beginnings of the camps to the present.

The career trajectories of the participants in my study are in line with research that describes the diversity of humanitarian workers.¹⁶ Although many of the participants had previously lived and worked in Dadaab, currently most of them were based in Nairobi. This made it easier for me to meet with them in person, given that the security concerns at the camp had led to limitations on travel to and from Nairobi and the UNHCR and DRA compounds in Dadaab town and especially the camps themselves.

Within their respective organizations the positions of the different participants ranged from program officers, program coordinators, safety and security officers and advisors, to program and country directors. At Dadaab, the different responsibilities and duties of the aid workers reflect their variety of educational and work related backgrounds. In short, the diversity of the participants in my study is mirrored by the diversity of services offered by the organizations they work for. In addition, the career trajectories and backgrounds of the participants in my study support the findings of Fechter and Hindman (2011) that “people who work in aid” make up an extremely varied group, in almost all possible respects” (p.8). My experience with the participants in my study demonstrates that many of them refer to themselves by their specific job title as opposed to the more general “aid worker” or “professional aid worker.” This tendency is supported in the work

¹⁶ According to Fechter and Hindman, “this diversity of members of the aid community is further increased by a professional fluidity across both time and space” (p. 10). Fechter and Hindman (2011) are referring to the tendency for aid workers to “move through a range of different job roles and capacities through out their careers in Aidland or indeed the course of their lives” (p.10). The career paths of the participants interviewed in my study were similar. Moreover, this tendency to move through a variety of employment positions is not uncommon throughout the majority of the contemporary work force. Participants in my study and those referenced in Fechter and Hindman (2011) describe a career trajectory that, in some cases, can start with a position as a volunteer or intern; and then transition into a fixed term contract as junior advisor for an aid agency “which may (or may not) become a permanent contract with the initial employer or a different employer” (p. 10). For many of the participants in my study this meant that their opinions and experiences at the Dadaab camps have occurred while employed with different organizations and under a different job title with different responsibilities. In addition to having a diverse set of skills and having experience in the aid industry, all the participants in my study were currently paid employees of aid organizations that were delivering services in the Dadaab camps, save one organization which had recently withdrawn their services.

of Fecther and Hindman (2011), who report, “many of those we spoke with about their aid work identify as engineers, missionaries, or educators rather than as aid workers” (p. 5).

3.5 Interview Model

The central research question that guided my interviews was: How has security impacted the delivery of aid at the Dadaab camps? To address this question my research strategy was divided into three sub-questions 1) what are the security concerns and issues affecting the delivery of aid and assistance in emergency situations in general and specifically at the Dadaab camps? 2) What are the security responses of aid organizations in general and at Dadaab specifically? 3) How do security concerns and responses impact service delivery at the Dadaab camps? Each of these three research questions was investigated through a set of sub-questions derived from available literature and web based research. Each set of answers are described in the next three chapters.

3.6 Developing the questionnaire

Exploring, identifying and describing security concerns are the first steps in my research process. To prepare for my interviews, the literature on security and development and related work, which outlines the securitization of aid, provided an opportunity to familiarize myself with some of the issues that I would expect to encounter while pursuing this line of questioning with participants. From the more general questions I move to more specific questioning in which participants are asked to outline specific security risks and concerns at the Dadaab camps.

In addition to the academic literature and in preparation for my interviews I reviewed available organizational material on security. My interview questions that are categorized under the theme of ‘security responses’ begin with an inquiry into the extent to which the particular organization has adopted different security strategies. To gauge this process of securitization my initial questions request information on specific security policies, philosophies, procedures, practices and training. In this section I ask about different security relationships with the UN, governments, other humanitarian organizations, local populations and private security firms.

The final category of interview questions, presented in detail in Chapter 6, explore the impacts of securitization on service delivery to the Dadaab camps. Participants are

asked whether or not they feel that any particular type of service they provide makes them more or less vulnerable to security threats. They are asked how security concerns and responses impact organizational effectiveness and efficiency. This section explores issues related to the added costs of security measures. The aim of this section is to examine the attitudes of aid workers in relation to security and to allow them the opportunity to describe the different consequences of the securitization process.

CHAPTER 4: SECURITY RISKS AND CONCERNS

2.5 Refugees, Perpetual Emergency and Development

A lot has been said about the exceptional legal status of refugees. Much of this commentary is indebted to Hannah Arendt, and particularly her characterization of refugees as “stateless” or “rightless” people. The following section works with those critics who have taken up Arendt’s analysis to sketch, in theoretical terms, the way that humanitarian organizations operate. This, in part, includes an understanding of the meaning of “emergency” and its significance to contemporary development literature. Through a presentation of the conceptual roots of contemporary development and security theory my aim is to contextualize the protracted emergency, and the humanitarian response, at the Dadaab refugee camps.

In an article written while she herself was a refugee, Arendt (1943) points out that “contemporary history has created a new kind of human beings—the kind that are put in concentration camps by their enemies and internment camps by their friends” (p. 111). Her influential work has cast the marginalized figure of the refugee as the ultimate symbol of the state of exception in the leading role in the cinema of contemporary political analysis. Arendt’s (1948) analysis of statelessness provides a damaging critique of the nation-state system. She addresses the paradox of human rights: the fact that since human rights are the province of states, and therefore that the stateless people who need them the most have no access to them. According to Arendt (1994/1948): “The survivors of the extermination camps, the inmates of concentration and internment camps, and even ... stateless people could see... being nothing but human was their greatest danger” (p. 300). Her analysis stresses the legal invisibility which confronts the legions of refugees, stateless people, displaced people—and still applies to the more recently identified, internally displaced people—who cohabit the state of exception.

Arendt (1994/1948) suggests that while law is typically thought of in terms of punishment, which is characterized by deprivation of certain rights, “the deprivation of legality, i.e. all rights, no longer has a connection with specific crimes” (p. 293). While Arendt recognized that “political refugees...still enjoy the right to asylum...in some countries” (p. 295), her analysis ultimately finds that all discussions about refugee

problems revolved around this one question: How can the refugee be made deportable again?” (p. 284). The international community’s response to the problem of the internment camp, according to Arendt (1994/1948), “has become the routine solution for the problem of domicile of the “displaced person”(p. 279).

Giorgio Agamben takes up Arendt’s juridical breakdown of the refugee, and the camp, and applies a biopolitical framework to her robust historical analysis. Agamben expands on her observation that camps have been the “routine solution” for the forcibly displaced and he relates it to his understanding of sovereignty as a function of biopolitics. In doing so he provides a compelling argument for placing the refugee at the center of contemporary political analysis. According to Agamben the states sovereign juridical power, which enables it to define what counts as an emergency, has always been its primary biopolitical function. His central point is that what we think of or speak of as an exception is really the standard. To effectuate his point, Agamben (2000) relies on Walter Benjamin: ““The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule”” (p. 6). He argues that that the ability to define emergency is a key characteristic of sovereign power.

In his (1998) book *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Agamben introduces the contradictory figure, taken from Roman law, of *homo sacer* whom he defines as that which “anyone could kill with impunity”, but which was “not to be put to death by ritual practices” (p. 72). For Agamben the refugee is exemplary of the figure of *homo sacer*.

Agamben (1998) develops an analysis of sovereignty and its relation to biopolitics through his construction of the refugee as the central biopolitical figure. He contends that, “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” and that “biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). Agamben describes the refugee as the classic biopolitical subject and suggests that the power of the sovereign to decide what constitutes an emergency is bound to the perpetual humanitarian task of addressing the plight of the “stateless”(Agamben, 1998; Agamben, 2000).

Bringing together Arendt’s account of the camp and its function with Foucault’s account of biopolitics, Agamben (2000) suggests, “the camp is the paradigm itself of political space at the point in which politics becomes biopolitics, and the *homo sacer*

become indistinguishable from the citizen” (p. 40). According to Agamben (2000), “if sovereign power is founded on the ability to decide on the state of exception, the camp is the structure in which the state of exception is permanently realized” (p. 41). Both Agamben and Arendt consider the response of the international community to the issue of forcibly displaced people to be altogether inadequate. According to Arendt (1994/1948), “Every attempt by international conference to establish some legal status for stateless people failed because no agreement could possibly replace the territory to which an alien, within the framework of existing law, must be deportable” (p. 284). Agamben (2000) comes to a similar conclusion and identifies the role of humanitarianism and police, the quintessential characters of the securitization of aid relationship, as the international community’s derisory response to the issue of stateless people (p. 18).

Agamben suggests that humanitarian organizations are ill-equipped to respond to the plight of the refugee. He argues that the League of Nations, and later the UN, are unable to address the “the refugee problem” because they do “not have a political character but rather only a ‘social and humanitarian’ one” (Agamben, 2000, p.18). He goes on to say that despite “all the solemn evocations of the inalienable rights of human” these organizations have proven to be “absolutely incapable of not only solving the problem but also of facing it in an adequate manner” (Agamben, 2000, p.18). In other words the fate of the refugee, lies with organizations that are, at best, only capable of securitizing the rest of the international community from the perceived deleterious impacts of the “stateless.” Agamben’s work outlines the roots of the relationship between security and development, and brings a biopolitical lens through which to view the enduring “victim” of emergency and “beneficiary” of humanitarian aid as one of the same: namely the refugee.

4.1 Overview

This chapter explores and describes the security concerns and risks associated with the delivery of humanitarian services at the Dadaab refugee camps. The semi-structured interviews were designed to add to existing research and to gaps in the literature. I have organized the research findings into 2 sections; general, and specific security concerns.

The general security concerns at Dadaab highlighted in this chapter are, the size of the refugee population; the proximity of the camps to the porous Somali border; tensions

between the host community and the refugee population; the protracted nature of the crisis; political instability in Somalia; and an absence of educational and work and employment opportunities. Specific security concerns that are identified by participants are kidnapping; improvised explosive devices (IED's); limited community relationships; changing standards and perceptions; and complacency towards safety procedures.

4.2 General Security Concerns at Dadaab

Size of the camps.

It's the largest camp in the world. A normal standard camp is supposed to have 30,000 people but in Dadaab there are 4 camps, the fifth is being established, that means 120,000 maximum. Currently, there are around 470,000 people there, that's almost 4 times the recommended size, and the camps are intermingled with the local community. (Int.S.11)

Every interview participant identified the sheer size of the refugee population at the Dadaab camps as the major security issue. Dadaab was initially built to service 90,000 refugees and now the population is growing close to 500,000.

While participants were unanimous in the identification of the size of the refugee population as a security concern, many participants had different explanations concerning the implications of this sizeable population. Some participants focused on the limited numbers of police officers and the growing population of refugees.

In the summer of 2011 I was a member of ASMT for 6 months and I think the number was that there was 80 police officers for 500,000 people and I mean back when the camp was much smaller it was much easier to police that group and now were talking about half a million people and no police officers and so I would say December 2011 is when the situation started to deteriorate rapidly even before then you could tell there was no way to react and there were not enough police to take us places. (Int.S.2)

In addition to an overstretched law enforcement structure, participants described the different types of refugees that came with the influx and the strain this placed on an already overwrought security system.

There were you could say "bad people" coming in, extremists, criminals, not the majority not even a small minority but some. In an environment which is not structured, I mean this could even be in the US after Katrina,

or it can take place anywhere in the world where you have new people coming into a new environment where there is no law enforcement structure. Bad things start to develop and that is what basically correlated with the influx. (Int.S.1)

Many participants also suggested that the stress caused by the size of the camps worked to impact the host community. The term “host community,” in the context of Dadaab, refers to the Kenyan population that has lived in the area where the camps are now established since before their inception in the early 1990s. The point being made here is that the massive aid operation in Dadaab has an impact on the “host community” and that this impact is considered a security concern.¹⁷

In terms of the host community dynamics as well it’s different. It’s quite a challenge working with host community in Dadaab. They have an expectation that it’s their right, because the refugee operation is there, it’s their right to get jobs and employment from the agencies that have the operations and that it’s their right to get aid through whatever infrastructure projects are in place for the refugees. (Int.S.4)

A country director for an INGO suggested that the host community’s “environment has been degraded because of the camps so it has affected their traditional livelihoods” and that has created “a lot of tension between the host community, the agencies supporting the refugee operation and the refugees themselves” (Int.S.4). The pressure for humanitarian organizations to meet the needs of the refugees and the host community is intensified by limited aid resources and works to create a general security concern.

Proximity to the Somali border.

Another general security concern mentioned by most participants was the proximity of the Dadaab camps to the Somali border and the security concerns of this location. Nearly every participant mentioned the “Kakuma” refugee camp, another UNHCR camp located

¹⁷ Although this distinction is not always clear, it needs to be clarified that the name Dadaab means two things: 1) the five refugee camps and; 2) Dadaab town. The 5 refugee camps that (Ifo, Hagadera, Dagahaley, Ifo2 and Kambioos) have come to be referred to as Dadaab and home to nearly half a million refugees are separated by dirt roads, fencing/shrubbery and UNHCR and private security personnel. While many humanitarian organizations operate within the different camps they are based either in Nairobi and/or in the UNHCR or DRA compounds in Dadaab town. Dadaab town is roughly 20 kilometers from the refugee camps. Both the camps and the compound are all guests to the “host community” who inhabited Dadaab town before the massive influx aid workers to Dadaab town and refugees to the surrounding areas began in the early 1990s.

in the North Western part of Kenya bordering Sudan and South Sudan. It is home to over 100,000 refugees, the majority of whom are Somalis. One senior level program officer who had previously lived and worked in Dadaab describes the security concern in the following way: “in Dadaab it’s walking distance, from Somalia, as in they walk across. I mean the border is porous. Even if we have the police here, there is another area where they can cross and so they cross” (Int.S.17). The proximity and porousness of the border and the ability to walk or drive across unchecked was articulated as the main general security concern. One reason for this security concern was that that “militants” from Somalia were able to cross the border into the camps.

I think it’s well recognized that Somali militants are moving regularly across the border, so coming into the camps and then going back to Somalia and using the camps as a base. Maybe they’ve got family and relatives there, so they kind of come and go as they please. There’s certainly not that militarization in Kakuma. (Int.S.4)

In addition to militants, one security professional noted that criminals were also among those who flowed across the porous border into the camps.

Proximity to a border always complicates things it’s not only that warriors and soldiers have easy access for rest and recuperation it’s also that economic networks and criminal networks have easier access. Somalia is the hotbed and it’s a question of about 1 or 2 hours from the border. This is a major difference. On top of that it’s that even if we had new refugees coming into Kakuma they’re still not overwhelmed in the same way. (Int.S.1)

Another participant suggests that, an inability to differentiate between refugees and the local population had an impact on security.

The main issue is that the local community in Dadaab is the same as the one that is outside of the border. You can’t tell the difference same clans, same language, same people. In Kakuma it is easier to tell a refugee from a non-refugee. (Int.S.11)

The free flow of militants and criminals along with a vulnerable population of refugees across a porous border presents a security concern for aid delivery at the Dadaab camps. The inability to differentiate between these different people complicates and adds to the general security concerns at Dadaab.

Political instability in Somalia and Dadaab.

Another common security concern mentioned was the political situation in Somalia, and the belief that the general security concerns in the Dadaab camps cannot be separated from the origins of instability and insecurity in Somalia. One program director stressed the importance of acknowledging this relationship: “the fact that part of the Somali conflict is taking place inside of Dadaab and so what’s happening inside the camps is constantly mirroring what’s happening in Somalia” (Int.S.12). Another senior level program coordinator reinforced this connection as a root cause of insecurity in the camps: “I think it’s just the dynamics of what’s happening in Somalia and the direct affects it’s having on the camps in the surrounding region” (Int.S.6). One participant described the importance of clan-based conflict to the protracted situation at the Dadaab camps as a stressor that placed constantly building pressure on the security environment.

The different thing about Dadaab is the clan dynamics. Within the Somali people in the Dadaab camp there are different clans that have been competing for years, for political, for economic even before they came. Now they are forced to live in this congested place with minimal support, so there are already frustrations within the clans. (Int.S.14)

The seemingly oxymoronic term ‘permanent emergency’ is certainly fitting to the protracted refugee situation at the Dadaab camps. The duration of the instability and insecurity in Somalia ensures that the refugees at Dadaab are always in a state of insecurity, as the humanitarian effort at Dadaab is stretched to its limits.

Living in tents for so long, waiting for 20 years and nothing good seems to be happening. We provide food to beneficiaries; but there are just so many people. People want more than just food, they want top education for their kids. (Int.S.14)

The most recent drought in the horn of Africa, and consequent famine in Somalia, was also cited by many of the participants as contributing to insecurity at the camps. The strain the drought put on the already fragile infrastructure of the failed Somali state is believed to be a trigger point for increased insecurity at the Dadaab camps.

We knew in 2010 it would be a bad harvest. The economics are universal when people can’t feed themselves and they become thinner and thinner and either they stay and die or they pack up their belongings and they move. In the case of Somalia, by spring 2011, a lot of people reached that point and

they pack up their things and they go, some were IDP and some crossed the border in Dadadab. (Int.S.1)

Some participants described the “interconnectedness” of the famine and other security issues, and believed that there was no singular cause and effect explanation for the insecurity at the Dadaab camps.

You cannot explain all these things with the famine, but if the famine had not occurred the likelihood of having that many refugees is not likely. I mean other things could have happened, but keep in mind that Somalia has been at war for a long time. In fact the absolute majority came when al-shabab did not exist. Certainly the famine is a key factor it changed the demographics in the camp. When there is that many people there will always be some criminals who take advantage. In this case criminals were responded to by the Kenyan invasion of Somalia. (Int.S.1)

Another security concern relates to the invasion of Somalia by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) on October 17th 2012. One participant describes the series of events, which precipitated the invasion, in the context of the famine and subsequent influx of Somalis to the Dadaab camps. His response describes how Dadaab became a target first for criminals in the form of kidnapping and then for militants in retaliation for the KDF invasion of Somalia.

When people were about to find their shelters, food and support, economic actors, criminals, and terrorists started to take action. What we saw was that, at the beginning of autumn, was criminal networks position themselves, in terms of kidnapping for ransom. These occurred at the same time, now I’m simplifying this, at the same time as the piracy activities along the coast were on the decline. Now the pirates who previously earned money kidnapping and extorting along the coast, first looked in Kenya along the coast just across the border in Lamu and that’s where there were kidnappings. Now if you look at the map, you can see Lamu is just a stones throw away from the next spot where you would find foreigners, Dadaab... The Kenyan government thought this a pretext to attack Somalia and al-shabaab and then of course al-shabaab decided to resist and retaliate, and going back in history you try to retaliate not in your own territory but on the other territory. (Int.S.1)

The idea that opportunistic criminals and not militants were responsible for the kidnappings that precipitated the KDF invasion is supported by some of the participants in my study. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of participants believe that current insecurity in the camps is a direct result of retaliatory attacks, in and around Dadaab, from Somali militants

for the subsequent KDF invasion of Somalia. Another study participant stated, “when the government of Kenya, when the KDF went to Somalia, things became worse so now anything is possible at any time” (Int.S.17). Another suggested “these are retaliatory attacks...the moment we as a Kenyan government decided to pursue al-shabaab it’s perceived these are retaliatory attacks” (Int.S.3).

Typically, when asylum seekers cross a border they are interviewed by UNHCR staff members who determine whether or not they will be officially registered as refugees. They are only eligible for support after they are officially registered as refugees. After the Kenyan invasion of Somalia the UNHCR was forced (by the Kenyan government) to stop registering refugees. One participant mentioned that this made monitoring who was entering the camps even more difficult and added to the overall insecurity in the camps.

Registration was banned and that created a situation where you didn’t really know who was entering the camps, anybody could come. I have not been to many other camps, but I think it’s the dimensions, proximity to border and that you can’t monitor who is coming in and out. (Int.S.20)

Participants were very clear that the ongoing political instability in Somalia and the KDF invasion has worked to create increased insecurity in the Dadaab camps. The protracted nature of the camp is evidence of this.

4.3 Specific Security Concerns at Dadaab

This section will move from general security to specific security concerns. Data focuses on security incidents that have transpired in and around the Dadaab camps and undermine the humanitarian aid efforts at the camps. Kidnapping and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) emerged as prominent security concerns followed by security issues related to, community relationships, criminality, gender, safety procedures and corruption.

Kidnappings aid workers and insecurity.

At the time that this study was being developed and carried out, the kidnapping of foreigners in Kenya was becoming global news. Before the kidnappings around Dadaab, a

number of foreigners were kidnapped in the coastal regions of Kenya.¹⁸ The first reported case of an aid worker being kidnapped at Dadaab was the September 21, 2011 abduction of a Kenyan driver working for CARE. On October 13th 2011, two female MSF doctors from Spain were kidnapped. This high profile incident, coupled with the recent kidnappings of foreigners along the coast, provoked the Kenyan invasion of Somalia on October 16th 2011. After the Kenyan invasion the kidnappings temporarily stopped and then on June 29, 2012, 4 foreign aid workers, from Canada, Pakistan, Norway and the Philippines, were taken from Dadaab and their driver murdered. All of them were rescued on July 1, 2012. As a result of these kidnappings I was no longer allowed to travel directly to Dadaab to conduct interviews.

There is a perception among the participants that the kidnappings were the catalyst for the insecurity at Dadaab.

The insecurity started September 2011, that was when the CARE driver was kidnapped. It was October when the two MSF women were taken and then Kenya invaded Somalia then the grenade attacks and IEDs started to be planted. (Int.S.4)

One participant, who left her position at the camps after the MSF kidnappings, discussed the potential motivations for the kidnappings and her decision to withdraw in light of her nationality.

I realized that I was an American and I was worth a lot of money and if I were an unemployed person with nothing to do then I would probably go for the money as well ...I think most of the kidnappings are about money. I really don't think that any of the abductions, so far, are about trying to make a point and kill people. You do see that there were Kenyan officials kidnapped and taken across from the border, not from Dadaab but from neighboring towns, and that's more political but the kidnappings of international staff is basically done for ransom. It's a large amount of money and we're neighboring the freaking libertarians paradise. I mean there is nothing happening in Somalia and when pirates can't get them on the sea they come and get them by land. (Int.S.2)

¹⁸ In September 2011, a British man was murdered when he resisted being taken from a resort close to the Somali border. His wife was kidnapped and released in March 2012 after the payment of a ransom. On October 1st 2011, a disabled woman from France was kidnapped from Lamu (off the coast of Kenya). She died in captivity and the kidnappers still attempted to ransom her remains.

Other participants mentioned that kidnappings were a direct threat to westerners. One added that grenade attacks were also an issue:

Currently and since last year June, it has been an issue of grenade attacks. These have actually been an issue of concern. There have been so many issues of grenade attacks and kidnappings. Lately the imminent attack of westerners has been the primary concern, which we don't take for granted. (Int.S.10)

This point was recognized by a number of participants who suggested that kidnappings of foreign humanitarian workers were disconnected from political motivations and were instead motivated solely by financial gain. This financial motivation contrasts the motivations described by participants in relation to IEDs. Of course criminal and political ends are not always mutually exclusive and that while some kidnapping victims have been ransomed and returned others have not. In addition, the recent murder of the Kenyan driver makes it very clear that while the target of the kidnappings were foreigners it was a Kenyan who paid the ultimate price.

Improvised Explosive Devices.

During the last year there have been over 30 reported attacks using grenades or explosive devices in Kenya, killing a reported 76 people and injuring 220.¹⁹ In November 2012, and during my stay in Nairobi, an improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated on a bus killing 10 Kenyans. The threat that results from IEDs to humanitarian aid workers at Dadaab has been described as indirect. An indirect threat results from a situation whereby humanitarian aid workers are “to move in escorted convoys and marked police cars are targeted so there's an indirect threat that a humanitarian vehicle may be hit” (Int.S.7). Unlike the kidnappings IEDs are not directly targeting humanitarian workers. Nevertheless, they present an extreme danger and security threat to the lives of humanitarian workers at the Dadaab camps.

¹⁹ Ten of these attacks happened in the North Eastern province, and the majority of those in Dadaab, Wajir and Garissa. The most deadly attack occurred in July 2012 killing 17 people, at two separate churches in Garissa. Shortly after my arrival in Nairobi, a Kenyan Administrative Police church in Garissa suffered a grenade attack, killing the pastor who was also a policeman, and wounding many others. The only road from Nairobi to Dadaab is Garissa road, and it runs right through the township of Garissa.

The IEDS have always, to date, targeted police and security forces, so they're not directly targeting the NGOs, but we move with the police and the security forces so there's a risk that we could be collateral damage if we're moving behind a police escort and that police escort is targeted. So it's balancing the risks of moving without an escort or with an escort. Now the 4 high profile NRC staff that got kidnapped at the end of June chose to move without a police escort, so we would rather move with—and I think to date—we still only move with a police escort and if there's staff on the ground laying pipes or doing any major works we will need to have an escort within the vicinity of us and we don't move right into the interior of the camps so once you get in the blocks, right into the interior you're kind of exposing yourself to risk. (Int.S.4)

Participants in the study agreed that the IED attacks were directed at police and security personnel and that humanitarian workers were at risk of being collateral damage. A Kenyan security professional, that had spent six years in the camps, suggested that IED attacks were retaliation for the invasion of Somalia and that the invasion of Somalia was retaliation for the kidnappings.

It started with the 2010 kidnapping and murder of tourists in Mombasa and then the focus shifted to the camp. So it was an issue that started with pirates on the coast and then moved to Dadaab. At Dadaab it started with the kidnapping of the CARE driver, then became successive on a very fast pace to the point where the KDF was sent to Somalia. They were sent for the reason that Kenya depends on tourism, so we needed to contain the issue of kidnappings. The invasion made it worse. For 20 years there had never been an issue of IEDs. They just started after the KDF invasion. It's better to have someone you can fight as opposed to someone who just plants something somewhere. (Int.S.10)

While militants are reported to have denied being responsible for the kidnapping of foreigners for ransom, they have reportedly made threats and claimed responsibility for IED attacks in retaliation for the Kenyan invasion of Somalia.

Even before I got there, there was an attempted car jack in one of the markets. Well actually I think they did take the car. Then in September we started realizing the kidnapping threats were there. The driver from CARE got kidnapped (Sept 19), then (Oct 13) two ladies from MSF, then the Kenyan military went into Somalia (Oct 17) and Al-Shabab said it's not us and said we're going to retaliate if you keep this up. Then it continued and then the reprisal attacks started in the camps with IEDS. At first there was a couple attacks in Nairobi one at a bar one, at a bus station then we had an IEDS on the road in Garrissa on the way to the camp and then early November 2011 they started coming into the camps. (Int.S.21)

Another security professional stressed the connection between IEDs and the KDF invasion of Somalia: “Al-shabab made it very clear that they will bring the war onto Kenyan soil and they started to respond by using IEDs targeting police and government assets” (Int.S.1). Kidnappings and IEDs are closely related; kidnappings trigger a need for armed escorts, and then IEDs target the armed escorts.

Attacks on the UN and or DRA compound.

While a direct attack on the UNHCR or DRA compounds have not yet occurred some participants expressed the view that it was a primary security concern of theirs. One participant explained, “one of the big concerns is that if the main staff compound gets hit, it would be detrimental to the delivery of services and it would have a very high death toll” (Int.S.2). Another participant recalled that there had been a direct threat issued which suggested the compound would be the target of an attack. She stated:

There was a time there was threat that they were going to attack the UN compound. Of course that means that we are being targeted. All along it seems like they were targeting the government or the police forces and now here the aid workers are being targeted. That was quite a threat. (Int.S.17)

Another participant explained how she felt extremely vulnerable to attack in the compound.

I think the biggest issue that I had was being on the compound because the security measures especially at the beginning when everything deteriorated were not good at all. The security wall was very low. The exit gates were not guarded that well. If they wanted to get you they didn't have to wait they could have just come to the compound and get you. They could throw a grenade or climb a tree if they really wanted to. So I had these thoughts in the compound more than in the camps. (Int.S.20)

The impact of a direct attack on either one of the two aid compounds would cause a major disruption in life saving aid services. Consequently, it presents a major risk to both the aid and security workers who live in the compounds and by extension the refugees who depend on the services they deliver.

Community relationships and aid insecurity.

Security for humanitarian aid workers is dependent on maintaining good relationships with the camp population. Participant responses indicated that weak or negative community relationships presented a risk to humanitarian aid workers. One participant described the importance of sharing information about criminal activity in the camps between the refugee community and humanitarian workers.

For example if 20 people show up and they're staying with people with guns this is the kind of information, we as agencies, need. When they do tell us it leaks and they get killed, and we see this again and again over the last year. I think this is one of the only ways that we're going to be able to manage Dadaab if we get that kind of information and we don't get it. (Int.S.2)

Aid agencies working in refugee camps have to build community relationships in order to strengthen security. Participants reported that they had made limited progress developing these connections: "things that other camps have Dadaab just does not have, there's no mass sms system, so there's no way to get information out there and there's just so much gossip, no radio station" (Int.S.2).

A serious obstacle to building strong community relationships was the inability to protect those community members that come forward with valuable security information.

Obviously it was the IEDS and the kidnappings but another thing that made us nervous was the killing of refugee leaders. I think like 3 or 4 times and it was also those who were mediators and they would be there to liaise with us. They were not necessarily spies, but they were working with us for security so when they go killed the question was to what extent could they affiliate themselves with us. All these refugees who were working for organizations were exposed to risk so they were also target and so it was not just the police and the international humanitarian workers it was the refugees themselves this was a whole new dimension. (Int.S.20)

The killing of community members who offer aid workers information concerning security issues is a major threat to the security of Dadaab. Not surprisingly, people are often unwilling to come forward with information concerning security issues. One participant described a "brotherhood" whereby community members of similar ethnic and or national backgrounds "treat each other as brothers and as long as it's not affecting me or one of us then it does not bother them. So you find as long as it is the others who are targeted or who are suffering they will not go out and identify the people who did this or that even if they

know them” (Int.S.17). By “brotherhood” she means that people who have information may not feel compelled to come forward if those who have been victimized are not part of their ethnic community. International aid workers and Kenyan nationals do not belong to any of the clans that make up the community in Dadaab, as a result she suggests that there is a reluctance to share information about attacks on internationals and Kenyans because they are not perceived as a direct threat to people from their immediate community. As evidence of the impacts of this “brotherhood” she suggests that the only reason the most recent kidnapping victims were rescued was because the drivers, one of whom was killed, were community members,

After the latest kidnapping of the NRC the information we have is that they were not rescued because of the intelligence that was used it was their own selling off. It was because a driver from their own community was killed and another was injured. So they sold out the others, but if none of this had happened, those people would still not be found to date because they have a kind of secrecy. (Int.S.17)

It is difficult to gauge to what extent this kind of attitude persists in the camps. Not cooperating with the police is common in many areas with high crime rates. It is clear, however, that the perception among many of the humanitarian workers is that having good ties within the community is arguably one of the most effective ways of managing security in the camps

Changing security standards and perceptions.

Many of the participants in my study have been working at Dadaab for a number of years. According to various accounts there has always been crime and banditry at Dadaab, but at a level which was tolerable.

Yeah, well I think Dadaab has always been a volatile place, I mean anything can happen. There have always been guns at Dadaab. I remember going to the markets in Hagadera, when I was a lot younger, and going to buy fruits so the guy had took the blanket off and there were AK47s there. Even back then you had armed guards walking with you in the camps, but even with that, given the guns, I never really felt that unsafe. I had been around Somalis a lot I had worked in a lot of camps so I really wasn't that freaked out about it. (Int.S.2)

Although, this participant acknowledges the enduring volatility of the environment at

Dadaab, she ultimately explains that she felt safer then than now. Another participant explains that the environment at Dadaab was similar to other urban areas and that the banditry that existed did not prevent her from moving freely within the camps.

For many years Dadaab was fine it was totally safe. I would go to the markets with photographers and take pictures. I would go into corners that nobody goes and into the restrooms and the bars and have coffee there. Of course I was totally exposed. Everyone could see I was with an aid organization, but nobody cared. People lived together for many years and had been exposed to so many organizations. There was never really an issue apart from the banditry. There was nothing really major and even the police at that time they were well-respected officers that spoke Somali. Some of the youth who had grown up in the camps and been taught the Kenyan curriculum spoke some Swahili. It was a normal life, there have been developments for over 20 years it's like a city you have market, hospital you have schools, well sort of normal life. (Int.S.1)

This particular response gives the impression that previous levels of crime and banditry in the camps were not necessarily surprising or alarming given the size of the population in the camps. Certainly, densely populated and impoverished urban areas in most developed countries are not without the occasional security incident. Both of these participants framed their responses in terms of before and after, in relation to the kidnappings and the Kenyan invasion of Somalia. The kidnappings and the Kenyan invasion occurred after the massive influx of refugees, as a result of the famine. However, previous to these cumulative events the levels of insecurity in the camps were described as stable and tolerable in the years immediately prior to the famine.

Another participant, with 6 years of previous experience at the camps, described the changing security environment as follows,

We are at the tip of the iceberg now... In the first few years there was issues of banditry... but the government did all they were able to do and they were able to address banditry. It was opportunistic, people used to carjack vehicles along the bushy areas and other things. Now, during my six years being in Dadaab, things were relatively calm until last year. All of a sudden things changed. It started in a different way whereby there was a drought. (Int.S.10)

Another participant also identified banditry as a manageable security concern and contrasted its impacts on service delivery to that of kidnappings and IEDs.

Around October November last year you could still go to the camps, there was a bit of banditry but then at the end of last year people started getting kidnapped and putting IEDs on the road so now they've put restrictions on the traveling aid workers. (Int.S.11)

One participant made a connection between criminal and militant activity in the camps. His response suggests a different level of insecurity for refugees and humanitarian aid workers and suggests that this insecurity has provided a breeding ground for kidnappings and IEDs.

In terms of the engagement of the Kenyan government Dadaab has really been hands off so you have a situation in the camps where criminal elements and al-shabab elements are able to operate freely. I think that this is the nucleus of the problem. If you ask me, there is an environment within the camps that enables criminal and al-shabab activity. The criminal activity affects mostly locals and refugees because they're the ones who spend their time in the blocks. The humanitarian workers will go in for a period of time for specific activities. So its during the day when the criminal activities are low, so they're not as exposed and that leads into the concerns about Dadaab where you have the kidnappings because of the environments in the camps these people are able to observe, conduct surveillance and decide which targets to pick and when. IEDS same thing they are able to plant the IEDS in the camps and have safe haven in the camps where they cannot be picked off. (Int.S.7)

This makes it clear that the insecurity that threatens aid workers and service delivery is omnipresent in the camps. Without addressing the general insecurity in the camps there will continue to be an environment that allows criminals and militants to operate with impunity.

Gender and security concerns.

During the interview process participants were asked if there were any gender related concerns such as deploying women in certain circumstances. Officially organizations consistently rejected the idea that women humanitarian workers were treated any differently than their male counterparts in terms of security.

Our organization is an equal opportunity employer so you would even find that you would have quite a number of females; the head of the program is female, head of the engineering is female. So it's usually left to the individual to decide; security issues affect everyone, male or female. (Int.S.8)

Other participants suggested that there had been no recorded cases of gender based violence and therefore they did not feel there were any gender based security concerns at Dadaab. One female participant responded bluntly, “No, because there is nobody who is targeted because you are this sex or that one” (Int.S.17). Another female participant responded as follows,

I don’t think its escalated to that level. But I think all precautions are being taken across the board for all staff; I don’t think there has been any incident that has happened that dictated that one particular gender is targeted or is at risk. (Int.S.6)

Most of the participants submitted that their respective organizations did not profess any gender bias in terms of hiring practices and assigning duties. Other participants went further in their responses and did more to relate their responses to security.

Informally other participants voiced gender related security concerns that organizations refrain from stating officially. One participant put it the following way: “I think rape is always an issue, in Dadaab I don’t think its come into play to say we’re only going to send men here, because our organization would have a very hard time putting that into writing” (Int.S.2). While this participant identifies rape as a specific threat to females, she shares the view that at Dadaab females are not being specifically targeted.

Another participant acknowledged the risk of gender based violence but couched his response in the rhetoric of individuality:

We don’t try to have gender biases, we try to be as fair as it can be done unless the person is unwilling, but at the same time there is the risk of gender based violence so people have to have the background in terms of what can happen but in terms of assigning duty there is no gender bias in terms of hiring. Nobody says a lady can’t do this, unless the person says they don’t want to go. (Int.S.11)

The idea that individuals and not organizations should be the ones making the decisions on whether or not to take the risks associated with aid delivery at Dadaab, was voiced by many participants.

Another participant, when asked if there were any specific gender related security concerns, quickly thought of the massive numbers of rapes suffered by Somali women on their way to, and/or while living in the camps. After I asked that

she focus on gender based risks to humanitarian aid workers she responded in the following way,

For staff or for refugees...I don't know, no. Now you can see there are less female staff in Dadaab not sure why, only 2 female international female staff now in Dadaab and before we were many I don't know if that's a coincidence. So it really decreased maybe less women apply but also the agencies might feel more comfortable giving those jobs to men. (Int.S.20)

While she supported the idea that women humanitarian aid workers were not being targeted based on their gender she did raise the possibility that men may be preferred over women for jobs in the camps. A male participant responded to the question about special security concerns for women at Dadaab by suggesting that, "for Dadaab not necessarily in terms of appointment to positions. We do have a sizeable number of female staff but because of education it's actually a struggle to get a good balance. The challenge is actually getting a good female candidate" (Int.S.17). To be clear, it appears that both of these participants are speaking about an absence of women applicants for positions at Dadaab. While my study population is in no way representative, it is worth noting that during my search for participants, who were informally identified by their organizations, only 6 of 21 were female.

Complacency and camp security.

While the majority of participants seemed to find comfort in the safety and security measures employed by their different organizations, some participants identified gaps in these protocols as specific security concerns. One participant described the complacency towards safety procedures as one of the biggest security issues at Dadaab:

For me personally seeing that process then you get confidence or non confidence in the organization...so if it says speed regulation and seatbelt use are required and everybody is driving fast and nobody is wearing a seatbelt then obviously you need to do a personal check. I would say to myself so great it's written down but it doesn't mean fuck-all. (Int.S.21)

He went on to describe complacency in terms of security protocols in the context of the protracted refugee situation at Dadaab. To illustrate the importance of complacency towards security standards he suggests that in terms of security management, it is much

easier to impart technical knowledge than it is to influence worker behavior and adherence to safety procedures:

A lot of security management is technical knowledge, like an IED is like this so here are the ten things you do to lessen the chances of getting blown up or killed, or if you get blown up...but the technical part is the easiest part to put in place. It's the buy in by management for security decisions and staff as well. A lot of people who had been working there for years were fine with the security. They thought its fine, its Dadaab nothing will ever happen to us ... that complacency through long term calm was the biggest problem... The situation changed and matching the situation with proper security management was the biggest thing. There were a few agencies that were better or worse at this and in terms of having the experience and implementing those changes and some not having those experiences and saying no it should be fine so that complacency is the biggest security risk anywhere. (Int.S.21)

While the general security concerns stemming from a protracted refugee situation has already been discussed in terms of clan dynamics and prolonged suffering, the notion of complacency in terms of humanitarian aid worker adherence or adaptability to a changing security environment provides yet another dimension to the security dynamic at the Dadaab camps.

One participant suggested that the guards and the police in charge of security contributed to the insecurity in the camps.²⁰

Guards were supposed to weed out cars that were not on the list, but you would find a vehicle inside the compound that was not supposed to be there...I think everybody, especially the international staff, was very aware of this...we talked about it extensively, that we don't even trust that the compound were living in is safe, much less the camps where you have even less control of your surroundings...Knowing the capacity of the police and guards we had, there wasn't a whole lot of trust and knowing that you could easily put a guard uniform on anyone, I mean most of the time they would be asleep. I mean there were hundreds of guards there, yet nobody felt safe.

²⁰ Even though only one participant raised the issue of police corruption it seems worthy of mention. During the course of my research, police attempted to extort money from me. As a result of this, and other supporting research, I am inclined to consider the possibility that police corruption can certainly be categorized as a specific security concern at the camps. Corruption in the Kenyan police force is well documented, and human rights groups have reported incidence of corruption and violence against refugees, by police, in and around the refugee camps in Kenya (Crisp, 2000, p.621). It was somewhat surprising that very few participants mentioned corruption and more specifically police corruption as a security concern in the camps. Nonetheless, one participant suggested that this silence in regards to police corruption was something people are not interested in discussing,

It's an incredibly unprofessional place and unfortunately if it was run more like UN operations in military zones I think I would go back to Dadaab right now, but knowing what the capacity and the reaction time was I would not go back there now. (Int.S.2)

While many participants expressed that they felt safe in the camps and in the compound — some even expressed that they felt safer in Dadaab than in Nariobi — none of them provided the detail and comparisons provided by this particular participant. Furthermore, many provided examples of situations where they felt threatened. There is no way of determining the degree to which complacency and staff safety procedures impact security at the camps as the different participants voiced different perceptions in relation to them. This section has demonstrated, however, that both complacency and staff safety procedures represent serious security concerns for some participants.

4.4 Summary analysis

For more than decade now, and particularly, in the past three years, there has been a growing consensus that incidences of violence against aid workers have been on the rise (Fast, 2010; Humanitarian Outcomes, 2012).²¹ The anecdotal accounts of the security risks faced by humanitarian aid workers in the field continues to demonstrate the relevance of addressing issues concerning the securitization of humanitarian aid. This chapter has documented the security concerns identified by aid workers who have provided services at Dadaab and who have participated in one of the largest and most prolonged humanitarian efforts of our time, to clarify the gravity of these security risks.

²¹ While some scholars (Barnett, 2004; Bollettino, 2008) have been critical of the data, which supports this claim, the empirical research that documents this increase is steadily working to address these concerns (see detailed reference list on p. 10 of this thesis). As a result, although skeptical these same critics have come to accept this trend as an irrefutable fact (Barnett, 2008; Bollettino, 2008). Nevertheless, their criticisms which argue that “There is no hard evidence at this point to suggest that there has been a significant increase in the number of security incidents either in numbers of incidents, or in numbers of people affected” (Barnett, 2004, p. 22); or that “accurate estimates of the number of humanitarian aid workers serving in the field are not available for the period for which there are statistics on the number of humanitarian aid worker fatalities” and this means that little can be assumed about the rate at which humanitarian aid workers are dying, since the “denominator—the number of aid workers—is not available” and that “scholars employ different methods for selecting cases and for defining security incidents, raising cross-study reliability concerns. Furthermore, a lack of consistency in the data collection methods employed by humanitarian aid organizations themselves makes security incident data validity notoriously problematic” (Bollettino, 2008, p. 264), have worked to facilitate a more detailed and rigorous empirical account of this issue.

Findings in this chapter demonstrate that both the size of the population at Dadaab and the camp's proximity to the border represent general security concerns. The majority of participants in my study reported that the extraordinary size of the population at the Dadaab camps made security a monumental challenge. This finding supports Sarah Lischer's (2005) observations of the consensus among policy analysts that point to the urgency of security issues at large refugee camps (p. 34). Also of concern is the proximity of a camp to a border.²² Aid workers also identified as a security concern issues related to clan dynamics and the host community. Participants noted that these tensions were aggravated by the protracted nature of the refugee crises at Dadaab, and they had a direct impact on the refugee operation in the host community. These findings were also supported in existing research. For example, according to Gil Loescher and James Milner (2005), protracted refugee crises have "indirect security implications" (p. 8), such as the aggravation of tensions by competition over scarce resources between refugees and the host population (Loescher & Milner, 2005, p. 5). They note that friction between refugees and the local populations often result from the belief that refugees "receive preferential treatment" in accessing social services, such as health care and education. Although participants mentioned that organizations were attempting to address the needs of the host community to minimize these tensions, they still identified the protracted nature of the refugee crisis and its continued impact on the relationship between the host community and the refugee population, as an ongoing security concern.

In addition to the impacts of clan dynamics on border control, many participants also identified as a security concern the porousness of the border and the ability of militants to have access to the camps at virtually any point. Crisp (2000) notes that the area around the border in northeastern Kenya has always been plagued by "banditry, cattle rustling and insurgency" (p. 618). His research also lends support to concerns expressed by interviewees that Somali militiamen use the Dadaab camps as a base. He reports that it is widely acknowledged that militant groups from Somalia reside in northeastern Kenya, and that in the early 1990s when the multi-national forces of Operation Restore Hope intervened a number of militiamen and bandits were driven across the border into Kenya

²² In Lischer's (2005) work she cites a UNHCR report which suggests "refugee camps should be located at a reasonable distance from the border... and should not ideally exceed 20,000 refugees" (p. 34).

and specifically into the Dadaab camps (Crisp, 2000, p. 619).

The majority of participants identified political instability in Somalia as a general security concern. Crisp's (2000) work also supports this finding. He reports that the refugees at Dadaab, with few exceptions, "are victims of protracted and brutal conflicts in their countries of origin—conflicts in which civilian populations have been systematically targeted by the belligerents" (p. 624). According to one policeman quoted by Crisp (2000), the refugees at Dadaab "have been brought up without justice and under the rule of the gun" (p. 624). In addition, he suggests that, the insecurity in both Somalia and the camps is "self-perpetuating" as people are continually exposed to insecurity and, as a result, they are more prone to violence. Interviewees for this study also concur with Crisp that the lack of opportunity for refugees to resettle in other countries, return to Somalia, or pursue other life opportunities places extreme stress on the population. The absence of educational, recreational and work-related opportunities in Dadaab, according to one NGO worker cited by Crisp (2000), is "a very good way of making more bandits" (p. 628). A decade later, this remains true.

In terms of specific security concerns, participants identified kidnapping as the most pressing threat at Dadaab. The *Aid Worker Security Report 2012* notes that starting in 2009, kidnappings have come to represent the most common source of violence against aid workers, and that incidents of kidnapping represent the most sharply increased form of violence during the last decade (p.2).²³ The report presents data from 2011 which indicates that the majority of victims were nationals: approximately 13% of victims (28) were international staff and 87 % (280) were national staff working for either international or national organizations in their own countries (p.2). Nonetheless, the report goes on to note that international staff are at greater risk of being kidnapped, even though they account for approximately 4% of the global aid worker population. In other words, "nationals remain the vast majority of victims" (p.2).

The majority of participants in this study reported that Improvised Explosive Devices were not directly targeting aid workers. However, they still considered IEDs to

²³ According to the report the data suggests that at least 85% of the kidnappings of aid workers did not end in the victim's death (p. 2).

be a specific security concern. Participants recognized that although the police were the intended targets of the IEDs, aid workers could very easily become collateral damage. Although the *Aid Worker Security Report 2012*, points to a decline in the “use of explosives in attacks on aid workers” in the past year (p. 2), the report also highlights the situation described by participants in my study: in Kenya’s Dadaab camp, it notes, while police escorts potentially reduce the risk of kidnapping, they at once bring agencies into direct threat of an IED attacks since police are the primary target of extremists using IEDs (p.10). Moreover, the report suggests the vulnerability of those being escorted by the police is compounded by the practice of providing pre-arranged convoys over fixed routes, which are known to attackers (p.10).

The section in this chapter entitled “Limited Community Relationships” suggests that it has been extremely difficult for aid workers to build relationships with the Dadaab community. Perhaps the most troubling finding is that some members of the host community have been killed for sharing information with them. According to Silke Roth (2011), for aid workers, strong community relationships mean “on the one hand being protected by the local community and, on the other hand, not being attacked from within their midst” (p. 162). While these relationships have been identified as an area of concern, there is very little optimism when it comes to the ability to strengthen these relationships at Dadaab.

The section on “Changing Standards and Perceptions” suggests that there has been a dramatic change in the security environment that began with the major influx of refugees escaping the drought of 2010, which was followed by the high profile kidnappings of aid workers, and with the targeting of police with IEDs and grenade attacks. It is notable that the prevalence of guns and the dangers of banditry were essentially “normalized” prior to the influx, kidnappings and IEDs. This “normalization of danger” is well documented among humanitarian aid workers. According to Roth (2011), the process involves putting risk into context by “juxtaposing” those that are encountered in the field to risks encountered at home, and getting acquainted with security threats (p. 157). Crisp (2000) suggests that this process is evident in a UNHCR report on Dadaab, which notes that no major security incidents were reported and that the security situation was “fairly good,” despite the fact that there were five armed robberies,

two rapes, and one attempted rape during the previous month (p. 612-613). In any case it is still worth stressing the proposed connection (offered by one participant in this section) between previous levels of crime and the current levels of insecurity.

The participants interviewed for this study denied that gender bias is a factor in security threats or hiring practices among organizations at Dadaab. This, however, does not mean they are not instrumental in security issues, or fundamental to the structure of the camps and to systems of aid relief. According to Larrissa Fast (2007), gender-based violence is systemic, and underreported and “acts of gender- based violence are conspicuously...absent from the survey results” (p. 145). This study has similar concerns and similar findings. While the general consensus among participants was that there were no gender based security concerns in terms of aid delivery, it appears as though many programs that are delivered primarily by women (to women) are most impacted by increased security procedures, as they are not considered “life saving services,” and are thus less eligible for security procedures. Given the sensitive nature of gender-based questions, and the inability to travel to the camps directly, it would be important to further explore gender based security concerns.

The recent major security incidents have had a significant impact on the complacency of aid workers at Dadaab. While there is no specific research on complacency, there is evidence to suggest that aid workers actively work to downplay the risks they take. For example, Dan Bortolotti (2004) reports,

If there's one thing that annoys MSFers more than being asked why they do humanitarian aid work, it's being asked whether they're afraid of getting killed. Many downplay the risks, arguing that traffic accidents or avoidable acts of stupidity kill more aid workers than landmines or gun-totting rebels. "I'm more worried when I drive through the south side of Chicago than any other place I've been on earth," says surgeon Bruce Frank. "People get really paranoid about the safety thing. They have wild imaginations about going to different countries and how dangerous it is, when in fact there's no real palpable danger...friends and family back home often paint entire countries- or in the case of Africa, an entire continent – with the same blood-stained brush. Are you sure you want to be in Kinshasa, they ask when there's violence in Burma? It's like worrying about walking the streets of Tulsa because Detroit has a high murder rate. (p. 219)

The participants in this chapter suggest this type of attitude, which works to downplay risk, can lead to complacency in areas of protracted emergency like Dadaab, and should therefore be considered a security risk.

CHAPTER 5: SECURITY RESPONSES

5.1 Overview

This chapter examines personal and organizational security strategies and responses at the Dadaab refugee camps. The aim of this chapter is to examine the degree to which humanitarian aid organizations have undertaken the process of securitization in response to the perceived security concerns that were described in Chapter 4, and to highlight emerging trends. To explore the securitization process, I investigate different categories of security responses at Dadaab. The chapter moves from broad based organizational security strategies towards more specific and personal security responses at the Dadaab camps.

The first section introduces the UN security framework that governs the delivery of the humanitarian effort at the Dadaab camps. The following sections present security responses and strategies, such as security training for humanitarian aid workers at Dadaab, and organizational security partnerships. All of the participants involved in this study have undergone security training and the majority of the organizations have separate security departments within their respective organizations. This chapter reveals the complexity of developing security based relationships with the refugee and host communities, and explores aid participant perceptions concerning the effectiveness of security training. One of the major findings in this chapter is that community members at Dadaab who have cooperated with humanitarian organizations and security professionals for heightened security have been killed. Another is that although all of the aid workers in this study have undergone security training, this training does not make them feel any safer.

5.2 The Role of the UN and the Security Framework for Dadaab

Before discussing the various security responses and strategies revealed by my participants, it is important to understand the role and function of the UN in the overall security framework of the Dadaab camp. The United Nations Security Management system proclaims that the protection of humanitarian staff is the responsibility of the host government (UN, 2006; UNHCR, 2007; UN, 2007). The mission statement of the UN system asserts: “the goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable

the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority” (UN, 2007, p.1). This security framework is based on institutionalized Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS), which set security standards for UN duty stations in terms of planning, training, communications and security equipment (Duffield, 2011, p. 459).

The entire refugee operation at Dadaab is based on an agreement between the UN and the Kenyan government. In addition to agreeing on the location of the camps the UN and the Kenyan government cooperate specifically on camp security. This security relationship has a variety of security dimensions.²⁴ Formally, the security partnership between the UNHCR and the Kenyan government is outlined in the security partnership project (SPP).

The Security Partnership Project (SPP) is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that was signed by the UNHCR and the government of Kenya, to enhance and fund the security at Dadaab. It funds the police and supports the infrastructure for the government to be able to provide security. It was funded through the UNHCR to fund the Kenyan government to provide security. (Int.S.20)

In fact, all UN missions rely on host government for security purposes. Another participant elaborated on the significance of the SPP:

SPP defines the kind of support the UN will provide to the government in order for them to provide safety and security for humanitarian staff and the protection of the refugees. We don't have armed protection and some of the challenges we have necessitates armed protection and it also necessitates that you have a legal foundation upon which to act... It's very important and frequently overlooked that to use violence... you must have the legal backing. (Int.S.1)

These particular quotes highlight the origins of the security partnership between the Kenyan police and the humanitarian organizations. The result of this partnership is that

²⁴ The two aid compounds are symbolic of this relationship. The Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) compound and the UNHCR compound are both located in Dadaab town and the five Dadaab refugee camps are located in the surrounding areas. The DRA compound is home to government officials, Kenyan military, Kenyan police, administration police, INGOs and NGOs. Administration police are a separate government branch of police that many participants refer to as being more professional than the Kenyan police. The General Service Unit (GSU) is a part of the Kenyan military and they stay within the DRA compound. The majority of participants were unaware of the role of the GSU in the camps, as they were only recently deployed to Dadaab since the Kenyan invasion of Somalia.

the police provide armed protection for the humanitarian organizations at Dadaab. The majority of participants highlighted the arrangement between their respective organizations, the UNHCR and the Kenyan police in terms of protection in the compounds and in particular for the use of armed escorts from the compounds to the camps. The timing of particular convoys are primarily organized through the UNHCR, and occur only during daylight hours.

The main, UN led, administrative body that deals with security at Dadaab is called the Area Security Management Team (ASMT).²⁵ This administrative team communicates with United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) concerning issues of security in Kenya and in Dadaab specifically. The UNDSS, according to one participant, “does extensive risk analysis, I mean they have their own little CIA, we are a part of that and we participate heavily in that” (Int.S.2). The cooperative, security based, relationship between UNDSS and the ASMT was described in the following way:

In the context of Dadaab the responsibility really rests with the UNDSS. It’s a long process but it starts at the level of Dadaab with all the security persons involved at that camp. They make a draft at the ASMT then that is shifted up to Nairobi level that’s where a number of security professionals add input and draft an SRA (security risk assessment)which is sent to the SMT(security management team), that is the advisory body at country level that advises the coordinator of that program. The coordinator will then endorse the SRA and ship it off to New York and eventually and under particular circumstance the Under Secretary may raise objections. During this process, when the SRA is being established, there are a number of people and entities feeding in to it. (Int.S.1)

In addition to the ASMT the UN is also highly involved in other aspects of security management in the camps.

The United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) provides two security-training programs, which are mandatory for all UN staff that work at Dadaab, they are, Basic Security Training, and Advanced Security Training in the Field I and Advanced Security Training in the Field II. The UNHCR (2011) has recently released the *UNHCR*

²⁵ “The ASMT (area security management team) ... only consists of the head of UN agencies which means the head of UNHCR the head of IOM the head of WFP and the head of UNICEF plus two ngos that serve as observers one was LWF and CARE and they were together with the security staff would come up those recommendations but the area security coordinator would make the decisions that was the structure” (Int.S.20).

Manual on Security of Persons of Concerns.²⁶ The manual is described as “a practical guide whose contents and relevance should be continuously reviewed and updated” (UNHCR, 2011). The first part describes potential threats and presents twenty-three of “the most common security threats” (UNHCR, 2011).²⁷ In “Part two of the Manual”, staff and partners are presented with twenty-two responses that they can apply “separately or in combination to prevent or mitigate particular security threats to persons of concern” (UNHCR, 2011).²⁸ The scope and magnitude of this policy document represents a clear, and coordinated, security response to a catalogue of security threats, many of which are covered in my study of Dadaab.²⁹

5.3 Security Responses and Strategies

The majority of participants involved in this study were employed by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). These organizations were all involved in a variety of relief and development services across a variety of contexts. The same is true

²⁶ The introduction of this policy document outlines the operational goals of the UNHCR: “In the last decade, attacks on humanitarian workers have increased, while humanitarian access has been constricted. Both trends have a direct impact on the capacity of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving services. Assistance to persons of concern is often delayed and they are sometimes totally deprived of support for lengthy periods. The response of humanitarian organizations has been to shift from risk aversion to risk management. The enabling security approach focuses on “how to stay” as opposed to “when to leave” and has been adopted in the UN system and by many other organizations”(UNHCR, 2011, p. 9).

²⁷ Each threat is described by scenario that, “help staff and partners relate the issue to their everyday work” (UNHCR, 2011). Then each threat is organized into subsections that “define and describe the threat, using typical situations and examples”(UNHCR, 2011). The following sections describe “possible causes and triggering factors” and “provides staff with some tools for analysing risk” (UNHCR, 2011). Next a section entitled immediate action “describes what to do when the threat has just occurred”, the “preventive action” section “looks at measures that can be taken to mitigate the occurrence of the threat” (UNHCR, 2011).

²⁸ Similar to part one, part two includes examples “based on a real case from UNHCR’s experience” (UNHCR, 2011). These examples are followed by sections that work to define, describe and explain the usefulness of given security responses, and outlines “some key questions and steps that need to be taken when applying the Response in question” (UNHCR, 2011).

²⁹ Under the heading “Intended audience” the manual states, The Manual is primarily for use by UNHCR staff in the field (at all levels and with all functional backgrounds), and their international and national partners (including government counterparts and stakeholders). The Manual aims to further strengthen the ability of UNHCR and its partners to coordinate and cooperate in all operational environments (UNHCR, 2011).

for the inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) involved in this study. Most of the INGOs have security departments or security professionals within their organizations. Having a designated department or security professional on staff was mentioned by a number of participants as the main source of their organizations' general security strategy.

All of the aid organizations involved in this study had security plans. Every aid worker interviewed had been assigned a security manual for his or her current position. One participant, who worked for an INGO, commented on the contents of her organizations security strategy:

We have SOP's (standard operating procedures) not only for Dadaab but we have them for each and every country, and here we have them for Dadaab and for Nairobi and they keep on getting updated, I don't know if you can access them I think usually they're internal. (Int.S.17)

One participant explained the three key security strategies for aid workers: protection, deterrence and acceptance.

When you talk about security management there's usually one of three approaches, or at least three tools you can use to manage your security, protection like having physical things ... between you and a risk like having a thick wall could stop crossfire from getting to your compound and hitting someone. There's deterrence: that's having some high level community members with you so people know that if you attack the agency these people will do bad things to you, or maybe it's a reputational thing a lot of clans do this. If you kill someone from one clan, there's a retribution killing of somebody, not necessarily the killer, but somebody on the other clan but that deterrence often stops people from posing a risk to you. It could just be that you kill somebody who is a health actor and they might leave and then you have no health provider... Then acceptance, and what that is, is that people like what you do and they realize that there's no interest for them to hurt you or do anything with you. So if you're clearly neutral to a conflict then they accept that you're there, and then there's a residual bit that you cannot manage. (Int.S.21)

The three key security strategies of protection, deterrence and acceptance used by humanitarian aid organizations in emergency and conflict environments feature prominently in the literature (Terry, 2002; Humanitarian Practice Network, 2010; Eckroth, 2010; Barnett, 2011). The effectiveness of these strategies and their impact on service delivery at Dadaab are discussed in the following chapter.

5.4 Security training

Every single participant interviewed in this study had undergone security training and or briefing. Many participants noted that within their organization security training was mandatory.

In regards to training there is basic mandatory training for all staff, and then also now for areas like Dadaab we are beginning to put in specific training modules. One is provided by other training organizations like Red R. (Int.S.7)

Another participant described a similar training process in her organization “even if you were hired here to be in the office in Nairobi you have to go through security training and then if I go to Dadaab the security officer does context specific training” (Int.S. 8). The fact that organizations have context specific security training seems logical given that the security plans of most INGOs are also context specific. The other point that was increasingly mentioned is the fact that many organizations coordinated with humanitarian organizations that specialize in security training. One participant summarized staff security training at his organization in the following way:

Staff safety is a training that we give to anyone including our interns that is part of our induction package. Anyone involved with our organization, even the office cleaning staff are trained in safety. There is also special training for those who are based in the camps. We have special training for whatever context. Where there is high likelihood of kidnapping the training is adjusted. We are not unique in our approach to security training services. We coordinate with organizations like RedR or Echo. (Int.S.14)

The majority of organizations reported having mandatory basic security training for all staff, and context specific security training was often provided, at no cost to the employee, by other humanitarian organizations that specialized in security.

Participants were also asked to describe the type of security training that was provided to them. A program officer for an INGO described a layered system of training offered by different humanitarian security organizations:

We contract training from REDR and KK security. They deliver different security trainings at different levels. We have trainings that are for one day, like introduction of safety and security and individual safety and security. Then we had first aid. Then we had security management that was a 5 day training, that was attended by selected people, not for everybody but those who are in charge of overseeing or making decisions when there was insecurity situations. Then we had defensive driving targeting our drivers.

Depending on your job you could undergo different training, but 100% of staff are trained on personal safety and security so they are the look out for whatever will happen, they receive tips on how to survive a kidnapping for example, you know the do's and the don'ts. (Int.S.17)

The focus on personal safety and security was also verified by a number of other participants.

It's all about orientation, because you're being orientated in so many other things. The key is personal security and by virtue that our work is about security you're made aware of different environments. We have layered training; we have context specific training for places like Dadaab. We have to make sure before you move you get to know what is happening. (Int.S.10)

Having humanitarian workers take personal responsibility for their own safety seemed to be a major theme in the security training provided by most organizations. According to one regional security advisor for an INGO "Non-compliance with security measures is a breach of our code of conduct and would attract disciplinary measures and it's made very clear to all staff" (Int.S.7). This security training fits within the broader security strategies of the organizations involved in this study.

5.5 Security Partnerships Between Humanitarian Organizations at Dadaab

This section probes the extent and character of security relationships among different humanitarian organizations. The UNHCR is the lead organization and most study participants recognized that much of their organizational security strategies and training was provided by or aligned with UN security policies. As result the majority of the inter-agency cooperation was facilitated by the UNHCR.

There is a lot of coordination. We work under the mandate of the UNHCR so you will find that most of our security protocols are more or less aligned to what the UNHCR would dictate in different scenarios. (Int.S.6)

The majority of participants reported that their organizations would have representatives attending what was commonly referred to as the "Tuesday meeting." The "Tuesday meetings" are run by the UN agency OCHA (Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). These meetings can be considered a form of risk analysis. They provide the opportunity for organizations to share information concerning security incidents and security risks.

The Tuesday meeting is a security cell meeting. Security cells are the security branches of all the different ngos working in Dadaab; around 15-25 organizations and most have a security officer. Before some of them may not have one, but now they definitely all have one. They draw up recommendations; they do analysis on specific problems and send recommendations to the area security coordinator, who has the double role of heading the entire refugee complex in addition to being the area security coordinator. He then approves these security recommendations and executes them (Int.S.20).

One participant described the “Tuesday meetings” as a way of ensuring security compliance among the various agencies involved in aid delivery.

The Tuesday meetings are run by what they call the Interagency Security Working Group (ISWG). The agencies will meet together to discuss security concerns. At that meeting, if an agency was seen by the others not following the rules they would be named and shamed, or they would be put on the spot to explain. That is actually done to ensure compliance with the MOPS that the UN has set up. (Int.S. 8)

The “Tuesday meetings,” also provide an opportunity for organizations to coordinate armed escorts to and from the camps and to and from the compounds to Nairobi. “They agree at those meetings, for example, the convoy to Nairobi will go on Thursday not Wednesday, so the changing of those things to avoid predictability” (Int.S.17). All of the participants in this study made it very clear that coordination among their organizations is a central component of their security strategies.

In addition to the Tuesday meetings, participants reported that the primary means of disseminating information resulting from organizational risk assessment strategies were weekly security reports, which were provided by their respective organizations. These reports have a rating system, which would designate a threat level for the week in a particular area, like Dadaab. “We have a rating system, every week we have a security report, every Friday, from the field, from Dadaab and from Nairobi. There are four levels that are color coded and numbered” (Int.S.17). While these ratings are based primarily on data collected through extensive UN security assessments, the internal security departments of many INGOs would provide additional information based on their own risk assessment.

We have periodic assessments, and also participatory assessment, which we conduct with the staff. We also have an incident report system. From the

reports we pick up if there are any trends or emerging threats, and then respond accordingly in terms of amending our measures. We do that here, that's what I do, and I support the safety and security officer who is based in Dadaab. (Int.S.7)

The coordinated security response of humanitarian organizations at the Dadaab camps is clearly a dynamic and ongoing process.

5.6 Securitizing the Refugee and the Host Communities

Cooperation with the host community and the refugees themselves for security purposes was a very contentious issue. My inability to travel to the camps directly impacted my access to both refugees and people from the host community. The majority of participants indicated that their organizations employed both local community members and refugees, and that these employment relationships strengthened the security of the humanitarian organizations operating in the camps. One example provided by an education based INGO, demonstrates the importance of these partnerships.

There's always been an issue of security in the camps. Insecurity cannot make humanitarian work run away. We work with the local people, with the community, with the refugees directly to help provide humanitarian work. For example, during these times of insecurity our schools have never closed because the refugee parents have provided security. They walk children to school. They walk teachers to school. The schools cannot close, therefore if the security is very serious they send groups of parents to the school to keep guard. Also, during national examinations, the parents come and make sure the exams are not targeted. They're very alert. They know that insecurity does not come to the camp through magic. Someone who brings insecurity is already known to the community. If you work with the community and they're happy with what you're doing, then you know who can bring insecurity. The greatest security we have is the community ownership of the program. (Int.S.16)

In order to address security concerns that result from tensions between the host community and the refugees, some participants reported that their organizations would deliver similar programs and services to the host community.

We made it clear when we opened up in Dadaab, we won't have a refugee operation without a parallel activities with the host community. When we're drilling water in the camps, we have also been drilling boreholes for the benefit for some of the host community. When we've been trucking water during the scale up last July/August during the drought in the camps, we were also trucking water to some of the host community's villages, and

similar sanitation we've done school latrines in host community villages—but there is a lot of tension between host community and the agencies supporting the refugee operation and with the host community and the refugees themselves. (Int.S.4)

One program officer reported that his organization, in an effort to build positive relationships, provides training programs and exchanges food for services with the host community. “We give training groups and lunches and we provide food to the host community. We also have a program called food for assets where they do projects and we give them food” (Int.S.11).

While many participants expressed the importance of local community acceptance, other participants suggested that there were also limitations to security partnerships with refugees. One security professional discussed the challenges, benefits and limitations of community based security at Dadaab,

Working in the camp is not easy...especially my work, it entails getting a lot of information and remember Dadaab close to 500,000 refugees and all these people walking from war torn Somalia. You expect a lot of issues. You can imagine working in safety and security, the magnitude of the work. It's a matter of making sure that the systems are in place. I managed to put up the systems where the emphasis was on community policing. I managed to put a group community police and safety teams together. We trained these teams on how to manage safety and security in the camps, and that has made Dadaab what it is now and we have someone in the camps now. These teams will inform people that the law will catch up with you, but the issues of kidnapping is far beyond the capabilities of community policing, issues of terrorism are too complex. (Int.S.10)

Another security professional suggested that formal security partnerships with refugees could also work to increase security risks to refugees and that they had no security partnerships with the refugee community.

We don't try to set up security arrangements because within the camps some of these elements would tend to target people who they think are sharing information with the authorities so anything with a security bend to it is a bit sensitive... (Int.S.7).

One security professional was even more certain of the potential dangers associated with security partnerships. He was so skeptical about the ability of the police and humanitarian community to offer protection to refugees cooperating formally for enhanced security in

the camps that he dismissed the idea. “I actually think we can’t. There’s nothing we can do, the only thing we can do is to strengthen the community structures” (Int.S.9).

While most participants expressed serious concern over the difficulties associated with building trusting and mutually beneficial security relationships in the camps, the majority indicated that their organizations would hire and provide services to members of the refugee and host community to maintain a good relationship but that enhanced security was simply a by-product of these efforts.

5.7 Private Security and Humanitarian Organizations at Dadaab

The expanding role of private security has recently been a subject of much of the security and development literature. As evidence of the post-Cold War expansion of private security forces, a number of scholars (Vaux, Seiple, Nakano & Van Brabant, 2001; Singer 2003, 2006 & Spearin 2008) cite the international legal debates that have worked to differentiate private military and security companies (PMSCs) from the negative connotations of the mercenary label. According to Christopher Spearin (2008), private security companies have expanded under the same post-Cold War conditions as the NGO movement and the “humanitarian” label, now includes private security companies (PSCs) that deliver humanitarian assistance (p. 363). He suggests that private forces are not encumbered by organizational ethics like neutrality and impartiality and that this will likely (continue to) translate into their increased involvement in previously humanitarian areas of service delivery in conflict areas (Spearin, 2008, p. 375).³⁰

According to Spearin (2008) “while PSCs do not provide security to those in actual

³⁰ Singer (2003) adds that “demining operations have been contracted out in nearly every U.N operation, with the overall world market reaching \$400 million annually” and that in major refugee crisis PMSCs have also provided “military-style surge capacity in the area of supply and engineering” (p. 82). According to Singer (2006), roughly 25% of “high end” PSCs have provided services to humanitarian organizations and “over 50% of firms that provide military support or logistics functions, such as military air transport, have worked for humanitarian clients (p. 70). As evidence of this increasing trend Singer (2003) reports that “faced with increased attacks, the United Nations, for example, hopes to raise its annual budget for its relief and refugee agencies by 300 percent”(p. 82). Despite the acknowledgement of the increasing relationship between private security forces and humanitarian aid organizations Spearin (2008); Vaux et al., (2001); Singer (2003, 2006); and VanBrabant, (2010) all report that there are no established guidelines, which govern the relationship between humanitarian organizations and PMSCs.

need of humanitarian assistance, they do protect the providers of that assistance, thus making them ‘aid enablers’” (p. 368). Peter Singer (2003) reveals that delivering services to NGOs and the United Nations represents a “pot of gold” for PMSCs. (p.82). Generally speaking, PMSCs offer humanitarian aid organizations “a cost-effective means of reducing their security risk” (Singer, 2003, p.82). According to Vaux et al. (2001), PMSCs commonly provide “risk analysis, security training for staff, crisis management advice (e.g. regarding kidnapping)” as well as “security audits, and the “provision of guards (mostly unarmed) for site protection, notably of offices, warehouses and residences” (p. 8). At Dadaab, participants reported that unarmed private security was used to guard the aid compound.

We have private security at all of our facilities but in terms of movements I mean private security are just guards that are paid almost nothing to stand there with a uniform all day and in Nairobi they’re like gate openers and in Dadaab it’s even worse. Basically you’re almost forced to hire from the host community and because of the need and demand there are hundreds of them. It ends up that everyone’s drunk cousin is a guard up there. I don’t think that they do anything and I think that if anything they just supply information to the outside about what happens on the inside. They do not make me feel safer in Dadaab in other locations, yes, I have had amazing security guards that have gone above and beyond. (Int.S.2)

All the participants reported that private security guards were hired to guard the compound; only a few participants expressed dissatisfaction with their ability to do their job.

Guards went on strike in 2012, over pay and it lasted a couple of days so it was one of those situations where I was really nervous so the gates were not guarded very well and they recruited these random people to be guards, and then the security officers started to control the compound (Int.S.20).

Group 4 Securicor (G4S) is the private security company contracted by the UNHCR to provide security services in the camps and to guard the compounds. Reports confirm the strike and suggest that it was due to complaints of poor working conditions and salary grievances. The strike lasted 4 days after which time services were renewed. While the majority of participants reported that G4S was the primary private security company in the camps they some also reported using different private companies for guarding their offices inside the compounds and inside the camps.

Some participants mentioned that private security guards were occasionally used to escort convoys.

At the height of the insecurity, , in order to avoid travel with the convoy because they were being targeted, you would hire a private escort to move separately from the major escort so you would move separately with private security like G4S, or during times outside the normal convoy times you could also do this (Int.S.13)

Considering that travelling without armed escort was contrary to UN protocol, my suspicion is that participants in my study would have been reluctant to acknowledge the prevalence of organizations circumventing this security procedure. It is clear that private security plays a significant role in terms of security in the camps and despite being unarmed they represent an important aspect of the humanitarian security strategy.

5.8 Changing Security Needs and the Effectiveness of Security Procedures

Assessing the effectiveness of security procedures is difficult; however, one of the goals of this study was to afford an opportunity for humanitarian aidworkers to provide input as to the effectiveness of the security procedures that dictate the parameters of their employment and subsequent service delivery. An opportunity to explore and report on the perceptions of humanitarian aid workers to changes in security responses at the Dadaab camps came as result of extremely serious security incidents. This section explores recent changes in security responses in light of these incidents and presents participants' "perceptions" concerning the effectiveness of camp and aid security procedures.

In general, participants feel that security procedures and training provide valuable, and useful knowledge. One participant suggested that the effectiveness of security training stemmed from the fact that the trainings were done by organizations and individuals that were part of the humanitarian system. "They're very effective because they're not by outsiders they're with people, with the officers themselves they're part of the organizations they're part of the system, they're very effective" (Int.S.9).

While participants were hesitant to suggest that security procedures and training made them any safer, they had no reservations about the importance of security training: "I wouldn't say they make me feel safer but they make me more knowledgeable and when

I get information I know how to react in different situations” (Int.S.8). Another participant validated the importance of security training as preparation for possible security risks.

I do have a lot of friends who are working for organizations who have been raped or abducted... and many of them have said that these trainings were beneficial... I think that the more drills you do the more prepared you are if there is an emergency. It's nice to have the shared knowledge. If you know, that your colleagues know, that if we get separated we're all going to meet at the highest water tower. If we get separated there is the comfort in that knowledge that you would all be there at the same time. I don't think they're ever going to prepare you for everything. Of course we're not in the military and this is not some sort of GI Joe thing; but I do think it's important to practice it, to get exposure and especially things like radio protocol are incredibly important. (Int.S.2)

This quote highlights the importance of being prepared. One security professional highlighted the dual role of security training, he suggests that security training works to both increase awareness in terms of security protocols but that it also endeavors to change behaviors and attitudes.

I don't think there can ever be enough training. Are they effective? I tend to look at security measures or standard operating procedures (SOPS) like the guidelines are there we have the security measures to serve as the stick, the carrot of course is involving the staff. It's a participatory process, training which creates buy in. Of course things like training gives people the skills the capacity the confidence but at the same time it increases their awareness to appreciate the security and be more involved on a day to day basis and take responsibility for their own security, but I tend to look at security as its more about behaviours, attitudes habits and that takes time, its human beings, it takes time to get that culture going. (Int.S.7)

However, security training does not necessarily make everyone feel safe. When asked whether or not all the security training made him feel safer in the camps, one security professional responded;

I don't feel safe. I wrote to someone today, she wrote to me “not to worry,” I said “not to worry” is a luxury for security advisors. Our job is to worry. I don't think anyone can feel safe in the sense that you can be ignorant or reduce your posture or your awareness or even fall into the trap of we call it the boiled frog, all the coping mechanisms kick in and you start to reduce the perception of threat and risk intentionally or unintentionally or subconsciously in order to continue to work and survive mentally in a threatening environment... But Dadaab is not safe and I don't feel “more safe,” but my job is to make sure that the risk level is acceptable to the organization. The organization has an acceptance to risk, we know that we have to deliver a program protection and

assistance in sometimes where a context is not safe but it must be sufficiently safe so that the organization can look at its staff and say we tried our best. (Int.S.1)

This particular response reinforces the idea that the goal of the security procedures and training at Dadaab is to increase aid workers' "awareness" of potential threats and security responses. Ensuring staff compliance or adherence to security strategies is particularly difficult in a protracted situation like Dadaab:

Getting documentation and compliance right is always a challenge and something we're working on and getting that right in places like Dadaab is very difficult. This is tied to long history of Dadaab so to make the transition is difficult... sometimes it takes an incident to get things going. (Int.S.7)

Security incidents often prove to be the motivating factor for aid workers taking security training and procedures seriously. The security professionals in this study indicated that the presence of regular "security incidents" motivated more staff "buy in" to security training and procedures.

I want to say that for example people who are working in Dadaab it's not an issue to do with panic mode just for the sake of that. It's a true real life experience, it is things that they have seen, and that they have witnessed themselves by being close to the border; you can see, you can hear, you can feel it. For them when it comes to training, it is not something that you are being pushed to do. Everybody is asking, how best can I be trained? Because it's a ways and means of reducing vulnerability. The more get trained in Dadaab, the better for the people working in Dadaab, because it will help you get to know what is supposed to be done and how to do things. When you talk about convoy rules, nobody will go against convoy rules just because he or she is in a hurry to go and do things. They know the consequences of not adhering to the rules. It's both about trainings and seeing the consequences of those who have not been doing that. (Int.S. 10)

The interview data in this section reveals that changing staff attitudes and behaviors towards the significance of security training and strategy is much easier after a security incident. The findings also that suggest although participants have respect for security training and protocols, they are also aware of their limited protective capacity.

Some participants emphasized that security awareness and training are separate from increased feelings of safety. This is evident by the fact that some participants, despite having gone through security training, or maybe because of it, decided to leave the camps.

“I left the camp. I stopped going in January 2012. I would not go back to the camps today, and I would not even go to the compound now either. I would not go back” (Int.S.2). It is unclear how often this happens but it appears it’s not uncommon for foreign aid workers to leave for security reasons.

The significance of perception of security or risk was a central theme for the security professionals in this study. According to one participant, the cornerstone of a good risk analysis is attention to the individual or organizations perception of risk,

Risk analysis is all about your organization, myself as a professional and as a security trainer if I have to do a risk analysis for your organization it is up to you to give me the information. I will have to ask to you what are the threats to you as an individual working for this organization what are the threats that you feel in priority? What are the highest on the ladder? Then we talk about the impacts... if this happens what will be the impact? If you have this then you can come back with a nice risk analysis because of course your drawing from what they give you because different people perceive things differently. (Int.S.10)

This particular quote illustrates the importance of connecting both organizational and individual perceptions of risk and threat to their potential impacts.

5.9 Summary Analysis

This chapter explored the security strategies of humanitarian organizations at the Dadaab refugee camps. Participants reported that the responsibility for humanitarian staff security is established by the security partnership program (SPP) through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the UNHCR and the Kenyan government. Moreover, it forms the security partnership between the humanitarian organizations and the Kenyan police. UN policy documents support the information provided by participants that outlines how the security framework functions in the Dadaab context.³¹

³¹ At Dadaab and within the UN in general, the principal instrument for managing potential threats is called Security Risk Management (SRM) it functions by identifying safety and security threats to staff, assets and operations (UN, 2011). The security risk assessment (SRA) is a component of the SRM, that identifies the likelihood of specific incidents occurring and outlines potential responses that could mitigate the levels of risk and ensure the continuation of programs (UN, 2011). The mitigation procedures documented in the SRA are then employed to establish Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) for all UN field operations (UN, 2009). This framework is administered by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), which is located in New York, and acts on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to maintain a consistent response to security situations (UNHCR, 2007). UNDSS is headed by an Under-Secretary General who reports to the Secretary-General.

The majority of participants in the study reported that their organizations had their own security departments and that every participant had undergone some form of security training. Much of this training was aligned with UN security protocols and frameworks and the UN works to set the agenda in terms of coordinating security responses at Dadaab. The process, described by participants, of collecting and assessing relevant security information from the various organizations, and using that information to develop effective security responses, is also supported in UN policy documents.³²

The section on “Securitizing the Refugee and Host Community” revealed that developing positive relationships with the refugee and host communities was important for the overall security in the camps. Some participants suggested that partnerships with the refugee community were instrumental in providing security for their organization. Most participants revealed that enhanced security, however, was mainly a by-product of involving refugees and host community members in their programs, either as recipients or as employees. Other participants pointed out that formal security relationships with the refugee community worked to create increased risk for both organizations and refugees who were visibly cooperating with the humanitarian organizations at Dadaab for heightened security. Larrissa Fast’s (2007) findings are consistent with participants in this study who reported that building formal security partnerships with the refugee community

³² In Kenya the Security Management Team (SMT) consists of heads of the various UN agencies. This team reports to the Director General of the United Nations Office at Nairobi, when dealing with issues of security this person is referred to as the Designated Official (DO). The DO reports to the Under Secretary General and takes responsibility for all UN operations in Kenya, including Dadaab. At Dadaab, there is an Area Security Coordinator (ASC) who reports to the DO. Similar to the SMT, the area security coordinator has an Area Security Management Team. As described by participants in this study, the most senior level employees of UN agencies operating at Dadaab head the ASMT. In advance of these meetings were the “Tuesday” meetings, which would include members from the majority of organizations at Dadaab, but were also organized and facilitated by the UNs Organization for the Cooperation of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Information from these “Tuesday” meetings was passed on to the ASMT meetings. In addition, security professionals from various organizations would be invited to the ASMT meetings. However, only UN agency representatives would be eligible to vote on what would ultimately be included in the SRA. The recommendations from the ASMT meetings would be deliberated at the country level by the SMT then, assuming they were approved, passed to the DO in Nairobi and from there to the UNDSS in Geneva and finally New York, again assuming their approval along the chain of command. Finally, the recommendations would be approved and implemented in an operational context, which flows backward through the same channels just described. An examination of this process makes it clear that while there is cooperation among the humanitarian organizations at Dadaab, the UN is the overall leader in terms of establishing protocol.

put aid workers and refugees at increased risk (p. 144). Fast's (2007) work contradicts claims made by other study participants that embody the framework of acceptance, and assumes that more integrated humanitarian organizations have stronger community relationships, more legitimacy, and hence more security (p. 144). Overall, the findings in this chapter reveal that community relationships are complex, and it is extremely difficult to measure their effectiveness.

The section on "Private Security" revealed that G4S is the primary private security company at Dadaab and that they are hired by the UNHCR to guard the compound. Unfortunately, though it is apparent that private security has an important role in aid delivery at Dadaab the interviews did not probe the issue enough to provide a reasonable analysis of their input. The limited data in this study could be indicative of an identified trend on behalf of humanitarian organizations to have "a far lower awareness of the issue" than their private security industry partners (Singer, 2006, p. 70). Moreover, this lack of awareness could be deliberate if we accept that the subject is "still a source of embarrassment" for humanitarian organizations who, according to Robert Pelton, "say they don't want or need armed assistance, but as soon as they are kidnapped or blown up, they have two choices: Quit the area or hire muscle" (as cited by Singer, 2006, p. 70). Regardless of the lack of data procured in this study, and based on Peter Singer's (2006) observation that identified "40 different contracts between humanitarian actors and private military firms" (p. 69), the suspicion is that increasing linkages between private security and humanitarian organizations are forthcoming.

The section on "Changing Security Needs" revealed that participants felt that security training provided valuable and useful knowledge. This finding is supported by Mark Duffield's (2010) observation that aid workers both "enjoyed and appreciated the field security training they received" in 2008 (p. 461). In my study, many security professionals suggested that serious security incidents motivated humanitarian aid workers to take security training seriously. Collectively, participants seemed to suggest that the security training did not make them feel any safer. Instead, it appeared as if the increased "awareness," promoted in the security training, worked to teach aid workers to take more individual responsibility for their own security. This finding lends support to Duffield's

(2010) work, which argues, “the purpose of professional security training is to encourage behavioral change and so strengthen personal and organizational resilience” (p. 461).³³

³³ Duffield (2010) also provides a detailed account of the UNs Basic and Advanced Field Security training modules, which were described by participants this chapter to be mandatory for UN staff, “These training modules come on two interactive CD-ROMs that combine voice-overs, video clips and role-play exercises with multiple-choice end of level tests. The Basic and Advanced modules both culminate in a final multiple-choice examination. The identity of the trainee is password protected and an animation at the bottom of the computer screen records their progress through the levels. Reflecting the content of the training, it features a white UN SUV travelling along a twisting road bordered in places by trees that could conceal an ambush. Correct answers incrementally advance your journey to the safety of your destination. Wrong ones knock you back, keeping you longer in this threatening environment. Each CD takes about an hour to work through. Upon successful completion, the software prints a named pass certificate” (p. 461).

CHAPTER 6: SECURITY IMPACTS

Impact of Security on the Delivery of Humanitarian Services at Dadaab

6.1 Overview

This chapter describes the impacts of security concerns and responses on the delivery of humanitarian services at the Dadaab camps. The research explores the impacts of security on the delivery of humanitarian services and establishes connections between security and humanitarian service delivery.

In this chapter participants describe security procedures and protocols as enabling and facilitating the delivery of all other services. While the majority of participants define their organizations as politically neutral, other participants point to the inherently political aspects of humanitarian aid and the politically brokered agreement that underpins the Dadaab operation specifically. This debate provides valuable insights into the practical and theoretical limits of neutrality as both a concept and security strategy. This examination of neutrality connects with an exploration of participant reflections on the limits of community acceptance as a security strategy. Specifically, participants report that acceptance is similarly limited as a security strategy.

In addition, it becomes apparent that organizations are not targeted based on the specific types of services they deliver, but that the majority of attacks occur while aid workers are in transit; therefore, organizations that spend more time on the roads are more likely to be targeted. Furthermore, individual risk factors include nationality and race and participants support existing research that suggests white foreign aid workers are more likely to be kidnapped for ransom. In the aftermath of these kidnapping incidents, however, black national aid workers and security professionals are left in the field to face increased risk on a more consistent basis. Not surprisingly, this chapter also reveals the added costs associated with increased security procedures. Finally, participants describe the contested concept of remote management as both a transfer of risk and a necessary procedure triggered by insecurity. The general consensus in this chapter is that security procedures allow humanitarian organizations to continue the delivery of life saving services to the Dadaab camps in times of heightened insecurity.

6.2 The Relative Importance of Security to Humanitarian Services at Dadaab

An agency offering or not offering their services depends on security; they really monitor the security of their staff. If it's not safe we can't deliver. Once security is addressed then other very essential services like water, like sanitation, like food can be delivered. Insecurity shrinks humanitarian space. We can't go in so we won't do anything. When security is addressed other needs that are equally important can be addressed. (Int.S.8)

During the interview process participants were asked to consider the importance of security in the camps in relation to other aspects of humanitarian service. The majority of participants reported that the ability of their organizations to deliver aid services depends significantly on the security of the camps and its workers. Another similar response describes the impacts of insecurity on the delivery of aid services.

It's very high, you can have the funding but you can't implement. You can have the best program developed in the boardroom in Nairobi but with insecurity you cannot monitor. Security issues are fundamental for us. Before we accept to work somewhere we have to do a security risk assessment to see what level of access we will be having as an organization. (Int.S.14)

Participants consistently ranked security as "the most" important issue at the camp, and the majority of participants justified their responses by suggesting that without security there can be no service delivery.

Many participants responded by suggesting that security impacts service delivery in different ways.

The high commissioner, that's the big boss, he says there are no operations without security; and that is to some extent true and today and particularly in an environment like Dadaab operations as we perceive them are not likely to survive without security. To shut down an operation, as we perceive them and I'm saying that because one of the issues where you can also have an impact is the way you posture your operations, but all in all security is unfortunately a prerequisite for conducting operations. (Int.S.1)

This participant introduces the idea that humanitarian organizations can choose to "posture" their operations. By this he means that programs can be delivered in "such a way that they're more or less risk free" (Int.S.1). He provides the following example of such a program,

In South Sudan, during the war, before South Sudan was an independent state there was a need to feed people. What we did was operation lifeline

Sudan. We flew in and bombed or dropped by aircraft food. This means that a number of bags and a number of kilo- calories hit the ground. Now the system on the ground was not there to make sure that the ones that really need the food were actually given the food, but it delivered the food. (Int.S.1)

This extreme example demonstrates the impact that security can have on the method of service delivery and the limited ability of organizations to both shape and monitor their programs in light of different security contexts.

Another participant, places the security of aid staff as a priority over the security of aid delivery.

It depends how you look at it. So number one, staff protection is paramount. It's the first thing because you don't want to talk anything else unless the staff is safe. We do everything we can to protect our staff. Then we have to look at our operations and our mandate of humanitarian assistance and those we are there to assist; and those are the refugees. So first our security concerns are the number one priority and then we try to figure out how to serve the refugees critical services, like water, food, and housing. To do that, we do what's called criticality assessment. To do that we ask, "what is really critical for the operation?" For example, if we do not deliver food what does that mean? It means it would increase insecurity, it might mean refugees might have to go out, and steal and that would have implications for the host community, insecurity would increase. (Int.S.11)

This response points out that security also depends on the ability of organizations to deliver adequate levels of service to the camps. Furthermore it works to shift the understanding of security from a state, which is imposed, by security measures and procedures to one that flows from the ability of organizations to meet the needs of the refugee community.

6.3 Security Strategies, Humanitarian Principles and Access to Beneficiaries

I'm absolutely certain that acceptance is the way to proceed, because as an NGO that's the only real security mitigation that really works for us. We don't have guns. We don't even want to be anywhere near guns. We don't want to be anywhere near the politics of it. Therefore understanding that community and making sure more importantly that that community understands what the individual NGO is doing is a far more effective measure. (Int.S.15)

Community acceptance, as a security strategy, is inextricably linked to the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality; humanitarian aid organizations

believe that these principles allow them access to aid recipients and that they simultaneously foster community acceptance. One of the core principles of humanitarian service delivery is that INGOs and IGOs are neutral in relation to indigenous political conflict. However camp insecurity can require aid organizations to adopt security strategies that may compromise this neutrality principle.

The majority of participants reported that their respective aid organizations “do profess neutrality” (Int.S.3). In addition, many participants reported that the security partnership with the Kenyan police did not impact their organizations ability to appear neutral nor did it impact their ability to access the refugees and deliver their services.

I do think the people we serve do know we are neutral and this has not affected access to the beneficiaries of our services or impaired or put our staff at risk, but it’s a tough one, I don’t know what to really say about it...it has not impacted our ability to gain access nor the perception of the people we serve because I think there is just a few people from the larger community who really want to cause problems and by extension it has not brought direct risk to our organization or other NGOs working in Dadaab. (Int.S.6)

While the majority of participants reported that their organizations were neutral, some participants rejected a simple notion of neutrality outright in favor of a much more politicized understanding of the concept. One participant explained that neutrality was of no force or effect in the context of Dadaab, his response reflected what we already know about UN operations. Specifically, that all UN operations, including refugee camps run by the UNHCR, rely on host governments for protection

Well neutrality normally comes into play when you have two forces fighting...so you need to be neutral because basically you don’t want to support this movement or the other side. When you’re talking about attacks you cannot be neutral to attacks because you’re under the government. You could be a target because basically you’re here under the invitation of the Kenyan government, but you cannot say I don’t support the government, then the government would tell you to leave. It must be very clear you’re under a specific government. (Int.S.11)

Another participant revealed the difficulties associated with providing assistance and the implications of being seen as an extension of the United Nations—a political organization.

Now this is my view and I'm not a politician but you know its like this, the UN is not a neutral and impartial body. We may hope or wish or believe it is or was or is but its not. We know that, what I think the few of us that have been part of and working with the UN we see this more clearly. If you look at the population at large what effects them directly they hear about is the security council and the security resolutions that are made there about interventions around various countries in the world its about embargos its about a lot things and depending on who you are and where you sit and even where your born you may not always or I would even say you would rarely perceive that as being neutral or impartial and that descends with political wings so to speak also down to agencies programs and funds with their mandates which are not necessarily that political. (Int.S.1)

This understanding of neutrality reflects the fact that the aid operation at Dadaab has political roots and that aid organizations are responsible to, and are acting on behalf of, donor governments. The different descriptions of neutrality are not surprising given the organizational set up at Dadaab: the majority of INGOs and NGOs delivering services are independent humanitarian organizations; however, they operate as implementing partners for the UNHCR, which means that they too are funded by donor governments. As a result, while aid organizations may claim neutrality, in the context of Dadaab their operations are in fact highly politicized. Furthermore, while the majority of participants described their organizations as politically neutral they had a more difficult time explaining their security-based relationship with the Kenyan government.

This section presents a range of responses, which works to summarize the perceived impacts of security relationships on perceptions of organizational neutrality. A program officer for an INGO reported that her organization went to great efforts to remain politically neutral, however, she also recognized that the nature of the humanitarian operation at Dadaab worked to foster strong relationships with those responsible for humanitarian staff safety, namely the Kenya police.

We are very neutral. We are not aligned to any political party. We are not even supposed to be discussing politics on the job even though there is an election in March... but it can never be fully eradicated ...but what happens in Dadaab, its because of the way we are situated, the way operate, the way we live, the way the environment is, everybody is interacting with everybody. You may realize that this person is from CARE, this person from UNHCR, this person from World Food Program, this person is from the police, but we are all one... When you have maybe a party or something, we all get together, there is no separate party for NGO staff with no police,

so with that you cant avoid being friends with them because they are your brothers and sisters. They're here to protect you. At the moment we fear because they are the ones who are the target of these IEDS that are being planted and the grenade attacks that are being thrown they're being thrown to them. From the time the camp begun people have been together so the fact that the staff are talking to police is not something that is unusual...it hasn't started now since the invasion. (Int.S.17)

The majority of participants in this study described their organizations as neutral but at the same time they acknowledged that they relied heavily on the Kenyan police for their protection—a political arm of the Kenyan government.

Many participants noted how security requirements undermined political neutrality. One participant drew a comparison between the humanitarian operation at Dadaab and Guantanamo Bay.

I wonder what the host community must make of that Dadaab main office complex. I've never been to Guantonomo bay, but I imagine that it resembles something like the humanitarian operation at Dadaab. They've got these military hesco style sand walls, which are 1 meter thick that would take the impact of a sizeable explosive and then on top of that one the side of it and the top of it is razor wire. We're hiding away from the host community in our own little prison. It's highly undesirable, whether it's necessary or not I guess you could argue it either way. If you could go back 20 years and start up that refugee operation again things would be done slightly differently it wouldn't be necessary to lock ourselves up its very unfortunate. (Int.S.4)

Another participant acknowledged that the security partnerships with police and the General Service Unit (GSU) of the Kenyan military could be perceived as support for the Kenyan government's invasion in Somalia or for police brutality in the camp. She describes the efforts to remain neutral, in spite of these necessary security relationships with the police and military, as a constant struggle for her organization.

We never have police or guns in our vehicle, we would hire a private vehicle that would be escorted by armed police, but we don't put them in our vehicles. I realize that the police themselves are perpetrators of crime, so you mean sort of how MSF does, like traveling without security, even though they do, anyway yeah I think that we try to remain neutral. Often after an incident the police go through the camp and beat everybody up and rape them, I mean not all police but many of the officers. So obviously sometimes you don't want to associate yourself with them because they do have such a negative element, and it does show us aligning ourselves with them which is another reason why the GSU was such a contentious decision.

The GSU is Kenyan military and that's like saying if we're working with the Kenyan military that's like saying were supporting the Kenyan military being in Somalia, but I think we try hard to remain neutral. (Int.S.2)

Another participant indicated that the UN is not perceived as politically neutral despite their efforts to offer humanitarian service without prejudice.

It's clear that al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda and a few others they don't perceive the UN as being neutral they tell us they write about it they blog, they use pictures and that's the reality and I don't believe that most of the refugees perceive us to be neutral and impartial to conflict around the world and even if we try to do our best in terms of programming making sure that there's no discrimination in terms of access to aid whether there's no difference made due to ethnic affiliation or whatever the fact of the matter is that we aim to save lives or protect people who have fled. (Int.S.1)

Despite the political nature of the humanitarian operation at Dadaab, and the security partnership with police, some participants note that militants have not been directly targeting humanitarian workers. In their view, this is the most important gauge of whether or not their organizations are considered neutral or not. They argue that if militants did perceive humanitarian organizations at Dadaab to be legitimate targets they would have been targeted by IEDs along with police.

Clearly they have the technical ability to target us, and that was one of the arguments that came up when the IEDS begun. Are they victim operated? Is it simply the vehicle driving over, or was it remote control? Essentially it's the police vehicle being targeted. In the beginning it wasn't very clear, but with time it was very clear that it was specific targeting. There is a deliberate effort *not* to target the humanitarian community directly ...If we were seen as legitimate targets then we would have been hit. (Int.S.7)

All these observations demonstrate the difficulty associated with measuring something as abstract as the principle of neutrality. While many participants describe their organizations as politically neutral the security risks and the political context of the humanitarian operation at Dadaab severely limits this humanitarian principle. In addition, it appears as though financially motivated criminals as opposed to politically motivated militants target aid workers at Dadaab.

6.4 Community Acceptance and Security Partnerships

Many participants described security partnerships as a necessary approach to service delivery in insecure environments where the general strategy of community acceptance failed to offer adequate protection for humanitarian staff.

I think for program work we don't like, and it's totally out of the norm for us to move with an armed escort. I think our principle deterrent in terms of exposing ourselves to risk is to work on the basis that we have acceptance within the communities we work. If we're moving with an armed escort it's an indication that we don't have the acceptance of the people we're working to support. (Int.S.4)

Community acceptance does not necessarily provide the necessary protection from the risks posed by "criminal" actors.

What is called "humanitarian space," is sometimes very limited because of a lack of acceptance by armed actors. Now the major issue world wide as a security advisor is not really how you are posturing yourself or how you are perceived vis a vis armed actors. What is much more difficult to deal with are the criminal groups, the criminal gangs because if you consider that I've just saw that they've just released a few people from Somalia for 3 million US dollars each, that's a hell of a lot of money. If I have a government to deal with or even a rebel force, even a rebel commander ... at least I have someone to talk to. When it comes to organized or criminal gangs (criminality) it's very challenging to deal with these guys, even to meet them. It's even more difficult than dealing with some elements of al-Qaeda and al-shaab, at least you know where they come from. (Int.S.1)

Another participant framed the use of humanitarian security strategies of protection, deterrence, and acceptance, by comparing how they work in Dadaab versus how they work in smaller communities. He suggests that the size of the population at Dadaab makes it difficult to identify the powerful people and that the people committing the crimes are often not the beneficiaries (or representative of the larger community) of aid services.

With those three tools (protection, deterrence, acceptance) applying them to Dadaab, how they would work there, well the people doing the kidnapping generally aren't the beneficiaries. The protection offered by acceptance is limited because unlike a small village ... Dadaab is so big. There are so many actors, in terms of agencies, and also people in the camps... In a small village you could talk with the authorities and say look our people feel threatened by kidnapping. You could talk with everybody and get some

major agreements ...we would get some confidence from that that. Who are the powerful people in Dadaab? Nobody knows. (Int.21)

One participant, who believed strongly in the utility of acceptance, used the kidnapping of the four NRC staff in June 2012 to outline the limitations of the strategy.

NRC was really like an example of one of the NGOs that I thought was taking the right approach. They used acceptance. In June they didn't have a police escort. They thought they had such good ties with the community, and then the kidnapping took place. On the day of the mission they said we have so good relationship with the community, and then the kidnapping happened. So the question is to what extent does acceptance work? (Int.S.20)

While acceptance as security strategy has limitations, the securitizations procedures that buttress their weakness also impose limitations on humanitarian service delivery. More specifically, the security partnerships and strategies have a great deal of impact on humanitarian service delivery at the camps, and can be appropriately summarized in the words of one interviewee: "If your question is how much it impacts service delivery? It impacts it a lot obviously" (Int.S1).

6.5 Risks to Specific Aid Services

The majority of participants interviewed for this study worked for humanitarian organizations that are "operational" meaning they were directly involved in delivering "programs and activities" to the refugee camps at Dadaab (Fast, 200, p.310). This means that humanitarian organizations were required to travel to the camps on a regular basis to deliver their services. Given that the majority of the two major security threats, kidnappings and IEDs, occurred while aid workers were in transit it is not surprising that participants felt that "moving" was their greatest risk, "our people are constantly on the road and most of the incidents are happening on the road so this causes a huge issue" (Int.S.2). Participants were asked whether or not particular aid services were affected by security concerns more than others. Most suggest that their organizations would reduce the spectrum of services offered during times of heightened insecurity. It became clear through this line of questioning that at Dadaab the humanitarian services that were most disrupted

as a result of securitization strategies were those *not* deemed “life saving.” One participant explained it the following way,

Myself for example, I go to Dadaab regularly, to our office in Dadaab, but I have not been out to the camps for a year. Only to Dadaab town---at the moment I think---at the height of the insecurity no staff were going into the camps at all for a period of several months---you would only go to the camps if it was a life saving intervention. For example, if a pump breaks down and there is no water coming out the taps then that needs to be fixed---so the risk justifies the need to go into the camp---but if you’re training a group of people on hand washing then you can wait until next week, next month or next year even, if you cant be sure you’re going to be safe in the camps. (Int.S.1)

Another participant, employed by an organization responsible for the delivery of food in the camps, when asked about the risks associated with a life-saving service responded the following way,

Actually, it’s vulnerable because its essential because people must be provided with food but actually at the same time because people think that the disruption of the food services can impact everyone, so basically when it comes to food water and essential services the attacks have been minimal because they know if something happens the services will be stopped. (Int. S.11)

The lack of security incidents surrounding material and life saving services is a reflection of the community’s acceptance and appreciation of the services and the organizations that provide them and its importance to their survival. Moreover, the knowledge that a security incident involving a particular service will result in the cessation of that particular essential service can be seen as forced acceptance. One participant explained the importance of making this connection obvious to beneficiaries.

When I was working as a safety and security officer it is all about making them understand that, for you to get all these services the best way possible is to ensure that there is law and order in the camp. Because when we realize there is no law and order in the camp no one will wish to come and serve you. So it makes sense for them to say, for us to get these services we have to make sure that our humanitarian workers are not subjected to any kind of threats. Still, this is a huge combination of people and even though most of them will agree on this, there will still be those that have a different understanding. (Int.S.10)

This quote demonstrates that the potential withdrawal of life saving services to the camps is thought to ensure camp security and to protect foreign aid workers. However, the fact that a few criminals can disrupt the delivery of services to the majority of the refugee community who are tasked with the impossible responsibility of ensuring the safety of all humanitarian aid staff is highly problematic. Nonetheless, community acceptance, motivated by the threat of withdrawal, along with armed police escorts, helps to ensure the safety of organizations during the delivery of their respective services and in particular those services deemed “life-saving.”

6.6 Security Risk and Types of Humanitarian Aid Workers

During the course of the interviews it became clear that specific categories of aid workers were impacted differently by insecurity and risk. First, security professionals face different standards of risk exposure by virtue of their job description. Secondly, Western humanitarian workers, primarily white, faced security based travel restrictions that were not imposed on national and or local staff.

The security professionals in this study reported that they were subject to a greater degree of risk than the rest of the employees at their respective organizations. According to one regional security advisor

There is a tendency for organizations to look at the security officer as separate from the rest of the staff. In many occasions you will find, across the organizations, they will take staff out and then you will send in the security person to assess the situation, so sometimes there is a bit of disconnect so you find by default we go to more insecure environments compared to the other staff. I think it's an occupational hazard. We tend to look at situations in a removed manner. When something happens you tend sort off to think about the other staff, and you tend sort of to forget about yourself so you don't actually process the threat to you yourself, if you get what I mean. (Int.S.7)

Another program officer for a security based INGO revealed that organizations “dealing with issues of security are to be targeted.” As a response to this he articulated that his organization attempts to “work with existing structures like UN, Kenyan police, Kenyan government” (Int.S.9).

Some security professionals discussed their coping mechanisms. “I've been doing this over 7 years so you develop coping mechanisms, I do monitor myself, I don't kid

myself, if pressure builds I manage it, I take time off, I do exercises, I try to manage my stress” (Int.S.17). Another security professional described how his willingness to take risks has changed over the years.

The concept of the tolerance to risk is organizational, but it is also individual. For example my tolerance to risk has been quite high throughout the years I like that, but now I have a son and of course now my appetite for risk is lower, my tolerance is still the same, but I am also having worked very long time with lots of people. I am also very aware of that the perception of risk and the perception of threat are very different from different people often according to different gender, different nationalities and previous experiences. When you’re the security advisor and you brief people, and employ people you have to be aware of that. (Int.S.1)

While security professionals appear to face more security challenges their responses suggest that they are acutely aware of the exclusive role they play within their organizations, and in some cases are comfortable with risk and in some cases may even seek it.

Race and nationality also represent categories that impact the differential distribution of risk among humanitarian workers. Security concerns over kidnapping has resulted in myriad organizations electing to send “national and local staff” to deliver programs in the camps while restricting the movements of international aid workers to minimize “their” risk.

We have MOS and they are like our guidelines and they tell you the does and don’ts and these keep being reviewed in light of the context; so this advises staff travel, so for staff to travel then staff would be forced to get clearance so at the moment for an expat to go to Dadaab they have to get clearance and once they are in Dadaab they cant leave the compound they are grounded there...I don’t know how they do it. It’s done by the security department. So for myself or for like Kenyan staff it doesn’t need clearance, you would easily go and also go to the camps simply because there is a perception that the kidnapers would value the whites and consider them high value targets usually for purposes of ransom and things like that so then you find restrictions for expatriates or whites are higher than for us. (Int.S.8)

Further reinforcing the local/national/foreign risk dynamic one participant expressed that being white made him easily identifiable and therefore more vulnerable.

So I would probably be prepared now to go into the camps, myself, where as last year I probably wouldn’t go into the camps. That said I’m kind of

the overall head of the program but I have very good staff under me that are not exposed to the same level of risk when they go into the camps, because they're either local Somali and blend in totally or they're Kenyan so they're not as big a target or there East African so they look like they're Kenyan, but a white European or Western male or female sticks out like a sore thumb. (Int.S.4)

Alternatively, one participant revealed that the pressure to continue offering life-saving services worked to put added pressure on national and local staff to take risk that international aid workers won't take.

Health was really our last program we ever wanted to stop. I mean basically we always try to send our doctors out. We were in a good position to be able to tell our staff "you don't have to go" these are the security risks you know make people very aware. The reality of the situation is that it's a job and most people here who don't have jobs are going to do what ever you tell them to do, so you really have to be very careful about saying "you're not going to get fired, this is a choice you make if you don't want to go I understand, I myself am not going, you have to make a decision for yourself and your safety" (Int.S.2).

This pressure to maintain life saving services increases the risks posed to national and local staff, who may also feel the added pressure of a risk to their employment if they don't continue delivering service even when international staff have decided not to go to the camps.

Although the police are not humanitarian aid workers they do play a critical and dangerous role in terms of humanitarian service delivery and they incredible risk they face at Dadaab. Police are the direct targets of terrorist attacks.

You know there is one aspect that we tend forget, in this case there is a colonial past where the police were used as a repression tool, so when they were sitting here 50 years ago under a tree discussing the future of Kenya the enemy was the police because it was a colonial tool and many of these people and my staff here they grew up with police being bad, and sometimes they are bad, but sometimes I have to say they are very brave. You know having seen your friend blown to pieces, knowing that these guys don't have any where near the medical support that most western world, developed world would benefit from. The following day after your friend has been divided in to ten pieces, you see the same police officer driving in a similar car. I challenge my staff here to consider how fun is it to get into that car the following day and drive the same route, you have to have a lot of kahunas. (Int.S.1)

One participant described the challenges associated with identifying risk categories based on gender and nationality.

There are now two schools of thought in my view. This is a hot potato but personally I am of the opinion that we should refrain from making those kinds of assessments. It's very easy to fall into that trap for example women should not be exposed to certain kinds of environments because of the issue of being raped; but if we go down that line we end up in a very difficult discussion because I could use the same kind of methodology to argue that a North American should not work there, or an African should not work there, or a Tutsi or Hutu; so you end up, particularly in this part of the world, if you start to talk about sex and gender and religion and color of the skin or ethnic belonging or tribal belonging you end up in a discussion that is fairly complicated. I could pull up 200 pages about why we are unsuitable for working in some context and you could pull up 200 for a Canadian. You end up with a very complicated discussion and in the end an organization, in my view, should not make those judgments it's up to the individual to make those judgments on whether or they work in a particular context in my view. (Int.S.1)

The distribution and impact of risk among humanitarian staff is an area of growing debate. This study suggests that organizations work to distribute work related to risk across different categories of workers, and the most prominent categories appear to be race and nationality.

6.7 Impacts of Security Costs on Humanitarian Services

Security is expensive. Though some would argue that security creates the necessary space for humanitarian aid to be delivered, security measures are not service categories such as food, water and health services. The majority of participants reported that the security response at Dadaab increased the overall cost of aid service delivery in the camps significantly.

What is difficult is that we commit to donors to achieve some results with clear indicators, which we agreed to before signing the contract to deliver, but with the insecurity today it's extremely difficult. When we signed, we were quite ambitious. We had a contract for 3 years with one donor. When we signed the contract there was no security issues at all and now that we have this insecurity and we cannot deliver as expected it's difficult to keep a good relationship with the donor...basically we have to spend more to do the same. (Int.S.13)

The financial cost to UNHCR to provide security at Dadaab is considerable and increasing as revealed in this quote.

The point you have to understand is the impact of the funding. UNHCR announced 2 months ago that for 2012 they spent 18 million dollars on security that they didn't foresee in 2011 and 2010. You know security escorts, securing the compound, new cars all those costs went up and you know the donors often don't necessarily understand that to continue to operate at the same level of quality and delivery you have to pay for escorts and more cars you need to travel with two cars and all those costs and protocols impact the result and now the more people are employed in security jobs, it's a vicious circle, how bad is the security really? (Int.S.13)

Another participant described how added security costs work to negatively impact the delivery of aid services. "A lot of NGOs that might not have budgeted for police escorts and 7 hour working days because they're used to having their workers out there for 12 hours this really has limited what they're able to do" (Int.S.2). She went on to add that disparities in funding, and the costs associated with security escorts can create friction among different humanitarian organizations

The other thing is that people steal the police especially Christian groups... People would pay the police double to be taken to the border and then the next morning we get up and there's no police for any other agency so there's no police escorts to bring people water in the camps...and this really pisses people off...The police are paid huge incentives to do this work. It's not like they do it because they love it they do it because they get a ton of money and every time they get an escort to go somewhere they get an extra 10 dollars or whatever and if they get an overnight escort they get an extra 2000. It's a market so if world vision is willing to pay them double to go the border then they're going to take the money. (Int.S.2)

6.8 Remote Management

Transferring risk is what you really mean...The idea is that we don't stop delivering that's what NGOs do, no matter how deep in the shit we are we're still doing what we need to do...if we just pack up and go home people would die. There are certain circumstances, however, where various categories of individuals just can't work within an area because they are at a level of threat that is just unacceptable, so responsible organization and or individuals do need a layer of mitigations, and, yes, remote management is one of those. (Int.S.15)

The idea of remote management is an extremely controversial issue in the humanitarian aid community and in the literature. The Humanitarian Outcomes report, entitled, *Once Removed: Lessons and challenges in remote management of humanitarian operations for insecure areas*, defines “remote management” (often called ‘remote control’) as an, “operational response to insecurity, that involves withdrawing or drastically reducing international and sometimes national personnel from the field, transferring greater programme responsibility to local staff or local partner organizations, and overseeing activities from a different location” (Stoddard, Harmer, & Renouf, 2010, p. 7). The term remote management has been criticized for being ambiguous and is resisted by those who feel “it connotes a situation where the agency has reduced its control and management capacity” (Stoddard et al., 2010, p. 11). The responses of the aid workers in this study suggest that the controversy surrounding the concept is particularly acute in the Dadaab context. The Operation Continuity Plan (OCP), which essentially embodies the remote management approach to aid delivery, is a direct example of the impacts that insecurity has on service delivery in the Dadaab camp. It also provides an opportunity to analyze the perceptions of aid workers in relation to the concept of remote management in general and to the OCP specifically. At the time of the interviews, (October 2012) many organizations involved in this study were just learning of the impact that the changes outlined in the OCP would have on their organizational future in Dadaab.

The idea of remote management is contentious because it strikes to the very core of what it means to be a humanitarian aid worker. As one participant put it

At the end of the day the core of the humanitarian system is the solidarity expressed by the person who wants to leave their home country and be close to the people. We want to be service providers and we want to keep the proximity to the people. (Int.S.12)

The idea of remote management challenges this idea of “proximity” in situations of heightened insecurity and therefore threatens a central value held by many humanitarian workers and organizations. Nevertheless, the concept has gained increasing support in areas, like Dadaab, where aid workers operating within this proximate ideal (or ‘humanitarian space’) have been victims of violent attack. Those who support the idea of remote management suggest the aim is to empower aid beneficiaries to be responsible for the delivery of their own services. Critics suggest that remote management is better

understood as the transfer of risk from the international aid agencies and staff to local and national staff.

Participants were asked how their organization viewed the concept of remote management. One participant who worked for a health based NGO indicated that remote management was not an acceptable alternative for her organization

We are very much against the remote management of our projects. What we have seen, what we know, is that after you leave a project with “remote management,” the quality decreases. Inexperienced staff are unable to deliver services at the same level and quality suffers. It’s something we really don’t like to do. The whole idea for us is to have an international presence and there are some things you cannot ask of the local staff. There are some statements or messages or opinions that have to be voiced by us. There are certain things that have to be done by us, this is why we resist remote management. The problem is that there isn’t any local ability to take over the hospitals and run such a massive operation like at Dadaab there is a hospital of 200 beds for 145,000 people in Dagahaly camp plus the host community, and plus Ifo2. (Int.S.12)

Another health-based organization representative discussed the added costs of remote management and discussed its negative impact on access and program quality,

If we shift to remote management you have to spend more on training and trainers and hire more cars so your costs still go up. We won’t risk the lives of our staff, so security is on the same level of access. If we don’t have access we don’t work and of course it’s related to the funding and to what kind of quality we can guarantee because right now its very difficult for me and many other staff to go to the blocks or to the camps to see what is the situation. As a result we rely on the refugee workers or the Kenyan staff to report the situation to us. (Int.S.13)

The problem of remote management as a long-term aid strategy is revealed in this observation, which suggests humanitarian organizations lose the ability to monitor their programs effectively when they shift to remote management.

It’s not a longterm measure. The problem is that you’re doing no monitoring and evaluation so you have no idea how effective your program is, or if you’re being ripped off, or if it’s being sold on the market for a bunch of goats. You have no fucking idea what’s going on. While sometimes you have to move to that position it shouldn’t be the default position. Effectively that’s where people are at right now in Dadaab. (Int.S.15)

Whether or not the varying degrees of a security based remote management will result in a total breakdown of humanitarian service delivery at Dadaab is debatable. The creation of

the Operation Continuity Plan is, however, evidence that the UNHCR is implementing a security strategy that incorporates the idea of remote management into aid delivery at Dadaab.

6.9 Remote Management and the Operation Continuity Plan

The operation continuity plan (OCP) is an example of security based remote management. The insecurity in Dadaab has led to the restriction of movement of humanitarian staff and severely impacted access to refugees. Developed by the UNHCR, the Operation Continuity Plan (OCP) was conceived as “a contingency plan to respond to this situation, ensuring continued service delivery to refugees under restriction of movement and even evacuation of staff. However, the OCP is also considered by many as an “opportunity to revise and rethink the core principles of the Dadaab operation” (Int.S.20). This section presents interview data that describes the perceived negative and positive impacts of the OCP.

A key impact of the OCP has been the reduction of “implementing partners” (INGOs funded by the UNHCR to deliver services) at Dadaab. Contrary to popular belief, it was the UNHCR, under the OCP framework, and not the INGOs that were pressing to resume service delivery to the camps in 2012.

Usually the implementing partners are more present in the field but after the insecurity in the beginning of 2012, and with the new management of the UNHCR we were pushed to go back because it was all in the spirit of this OCP. So it was UNHCR leading the process of going back and some of the NGOs were very reluctant and the security protocol is totally subject to the individual organization. (Int.S.20)

She went on to describe the friction between the UNHCR on the one hand and, reluctant “implementing partners” on the other. She suggests that the fact that the different organizations had separate security protocols worked to frustrate the resumption of service delivery.

If you have different security SOPs, especially between UN and NGOs it makes it very difficult; and you can't say the NGOs are more flexible than the UN, which is usually the case worldwide, because it was the other way around for a certain time at Dadaab (Int.S.20). As part of the OCP, the UNHCR has re-evaluated its implementing partners in terms of their “willingness to accept risk. (Int.S.20)

As a result, the OCP has cut the number of implementing partners at Dadaab from 23 to 12.

The UNCHR did an evaluation of their partners working in Dadaab and their willingness to operate in an insecure environment is now one of the selection criteria. Some of these ngos have been working there for 20 years and they came with a very different idea of what they signed up for. Now the UNHCR has cut partners from 23 to 12. I mean there were different criteria also cross-functionality flexibility...Its happening right now, ngos that were basically cut received a letter two days ago and I don't think there's any report now, but it would be interesting to ask the Kenya office because I just observe this but basically there were many many meetings where we tried to harmonize the security protocols and get rid of operational overlap in terms of organizations offering the same services. (Int.S.20)

One participant described the UNHCRs methods as coercive because they select their implementing partners based on their willingness to accept risk as coercive.

The big dog with all the money up there is the UNHCR and you need to look at the way they have abused the NGO presence up there by essentially holding the purse strings and the position right now is that NGOs are being told, you put yourself at risk and we will give you money which is absolutely immoral and its just ridiculous and that has been going on for 20 years and they're playing favorites. (Int.S.15)

Another participant, who worked for one of the INGOs that was cut as a result of the OCP framework revealed that even before his organization was cut as an implementing partner, they were informed that they were going to be responsible for contributing to the increased security costs associated with operating at Dadaab.

The UNHCR cannot ensure, only with their budget, for all security for the NGOs. The cost is so high. For us for example we are looking for a third donor because of the changed situation. Before we were fine with two but now since were most likely not going to be implementing partners with UNHCR we have to look for another donor. So in the new budget 2013 we have to share the costs and put security expenditures in our budget line. (Int.S.13)

Other participants welcome the OCP, as a much needed response to the long-standing insecurity at Dadaab. One participant described the insecurity at Dadaab as the motivating factor for rethinking key areas of service delivery that could be done by refugees themselves, as a key component of the OCP,

How can we just go out there blindly and hand out food when staff are being murdered? There's been a lot more using incentive staff to do more and I mean honestly it's a camp that's been there 20 years it's ridiculous that so many internationals and nationals are doing jobs that refugees could be doing...I mean one of the greatest things about this was that it was a wake up call to the community. We have to do business differently, if we want to continue doing it. You asked earlier: what would have to happen now for everyone to pull out? Instead of saying what *if* it happens why are we not working towards the camp being able to run without so much outside influence anyway? (Int.S.2)

Security incidents and the added security costs associated with delivering services in an insecure environment were the motivating factor behind the creation of the OCP.

Another participant described the dynamics of the OCP in more detail, and how security defined the nature and level of service.

I think there's definite situations where you have to do something but you cannot be present...in Dadaab they had the operation continuity plan(OCP). It started relative to security but we started looking at 4 different levels of remoteness one being normal operations no remoteness; one being you can get to the camps maybe 2 times a week and you can be in the camps or you can have teams living in the camps but it's a reduced movement and presence; then a third one only present in Dadaab town in the compound; and the fourth one being not being present in Dadaab, so being in either Garrissa or Nairobi so being remote. In a way these four situations are defined by a security presence but then we were looking at 5 different essential sectors and how to run those 5 sectors of health, food, education, protection and water and sanitation (WASH). Specifically, how to run those sectors in each of the four different level of remoteness? (Int.S.21).

Some participants discussed the insecurity and the OCP as creating an opportunity for innovation and a method for shifting aid policy away from dependency.

I think it relates to what I said before you know seeing crisis as something positive. We created this huge dependency machinery at Dadaab and now by transferring more responsibilities to the refugee community I think it's a unique opportunity. The idea is that we continue with these new measures even when Dadaab becomes safer. The operations and the NGOs should not go back to how we used to work. This OCP is the new basis for funding for problematic priorities. It's a kind of a way of redesigning activities ... On an overall perspective it's a good opportunity to redesign the overall program. (Int.S.20)

One participant claimed that, the OCP facilitates increased coordination among police and the larger humanitarian organizations, and will therefore result in the prioritization of crucial services and increased cooperation among humanitarian staff.

I do think things' being more organized is a good thing; and I would say that most of the NGOs ...have agreed what the priorities are so we don't have to fight in the morning about who gets a police escort.... I think in that way the protocols and the security restrictions have made things better (Int.S.2).

However, at the other end of the spectrum she recognized that smaller NGOs may view the security protocols and the OCP as limiting as opposed to facilitating service delivery.

For smaller agencies, the protocol makes it harder for sure. Obviously the easiest thing to do would be to continue to deliver aid and pray that nobody gets hurt, I mean cross your fingers that no one gets bombed on the way to food distribution. At the same time I think this is the big dilemma: can we still deliver when we have all these rules? Some people would say that the rules are terrible. I have a lot of friends who work with gender based violence and they hate it because you know they're Irish and they want to go out and talk directly to the refugees ... I would say that the security protocols do make that harder. (Int.S.2)

Currently, the situation at Dadaab is largely impacted by the OCP "At the end everything became quite security driven. Basically all the operations were based on this OCP" (Int.S.20)

6.9 Summary Analysis

This chapter began by placing security within the context of other services delivered at the Dadaab refugee camps. The general consensus among participants is that security served to enable and facilitate the provision humanitarian services in an insecure environment. Such considerations reflect what has been described as a fundamental "conceptual" shift in the "security thinking" of humanitarian operations in recent years (OCHA, 2011, p. 7). In other words, the participants were supporting the view promoted by Under-Secretary General, Gregory Starr that humanitarian organizations need to start thinking in terms of "how to stay" instead of "how to leave" (OCHA, 2011, p. 7-8). To be clear, participants responses to the "how to stay" query essentially describes the securitization of humanitarian aid.

The section on “Security Strategies, Humanitarian Principles and Access to Beneficiaries” presented some key findings that are worth placing in the context of existing research. The majority of participants in this study reported that their organizations professed to be politically neutral. Similarly, OCHA (2011) reports that 94% of the organizations involved in their study “actively promoted the principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality” and that promoting these principles was “helping to enhance their security” (p. 46). In addition, the majority of participants in this study felt that their use of police escorts did not impact their ability to be perceived by the host community as politically neutral. To substantiate such claims, they reasoned that were they not perceived as neutral, they would have been targeted by the same IEDs that are targeting and killing Kenyan police. Nevertheless, the findings in this chapter reveal that the two major threats identified in Chapter 4 (kidnapping and IEDs) put humanitarian workers in a very difficult position: travel with armed escorts and run the risk of being collateral damage to a politically motivated IED attack, or travel without armed escort and run the risk of being kidnapped by criminals.

In addition, participants provided different definitions and connotations of what neutrality means. In other words, in the context of Dadaab, while some organizations and workers professed neutrality, others see the aid operation as inherently political, pointing, for example, to the fact that the whole humanitarian operation at Dadaab is the product of an agreement between the Kenyan government and the UNHCR. As VanBrabant (2001) notes, despite –if not in spite of-- the political playing field within which they inevitably operate, many organizations see the pursuit of neutrality as a condition of being accepted, and hence of key part of a “security strategy” (p. 31). In this study, the participants would concur: who described their organizations as neutral, linked neutrality to acceptance and security, while those who pointed to the political nature of the aid operation at Dadaab were offering a more detailed account of the Dadaab context. Regardless, this study, and the organizations involved, would do well to follow the advice offered by VanBrabant (2001) to do a better job at clarifying what, exactly, the concept of neutrality means to them, and what it looks like in practice. Or, in sum, “how does one operationalise neutrality?” (p. 32).

The section on the “Limits of Acceptance and the Impact of Security Partnerships on Camp Access” reveals that there are limits to the security provided by community acceptance strategies based on neutrality. As Peter Singer (2006) notes, the principle of neutrality is a “double edged sword” and that “while neutrality is a guiding principle, it is offering less and less protection” (p.75). This study reveals that at a camp the size of Dadaab it is difficult to identify who the powerful people are and to ensure that those committing the crimes are not the beneficiaries of aid services. At Dadaab the limitations of community acceptance strategies necessitates the securitization of aid. This resonates with Eckroth (2010), who observes that humanitarian organizations have increasingly turned to protection and deterrence strategies in the face of increased attacks on aid workers (p.11).

Chapter 5 introduced Larissa Fast’s (2007) work that suggests the more that NGOs are integrated into the refugee community, they more they are at risk of security incidences. This chapter provides support for her research with findings that point to the limitations of acceptance strategies at a large camp like Dadaab. Fast (2007) notes that this could be because the NGOs that are integrated into a community are simply subject to the same insecure environments as their beneficiaries and/or that they are not easily identified as aid workers (p.144). Her findings and analysis are supported in this study.

In the section on “Risks to Specific Aid Services,” participants reported that organizations were not targeted because of the specific services they delivered; rather, their vulnerability to attack was linked to factors such as having to move from one location to another. This finding is supported in Fast’s (2007) work, which identifies organizations that are directly involved in delivering “programs and activities” as being more at risk (p.140). In contrast to Fast’s work, the participants in this study suggested that organizations delivering material aid such as food, had not been targeted because at Dadaab it is well known that an attack on such an essential service would force the cessation of that particular service; whereas Fast (2007) reports that the more insecure organizations “are those carrying out multiple activities combined with the provision of material aid” (p.142). This section also reveals that although no specific category of aid had been targeted, those services that are not considered life-saving are the programs and services that are most impacted in times of heightened insecurity.

The section on “Security Risk and Types of Humanitarian Aid Workers” introduces the idea that security professionals face more risk than the rest of the employees at their respective organizations and that this particular category of humanitarian worker actively accepts and manages the increased risk that goes along with a security based position. In addition it was reported that some participants felt that white foreign workers were more at risk of kidnapping than their black, local and national counterparts, and they attributed this to the fact that they were more easily identifiable in the field. The increased risk of kidnapping for foreign aid workers has already been mentioned in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 also revealed that national aid workers represent the majority of aid workers and that on the whole they suffer the most attacks. Participants also recognized the increased risk faced by national and local aid workers who were not afforded the same opportunities as white foreign aid workers and that in times of heightened insecurity, they faced an increased burden of risk. This finding is supported in the *2011 Aid Worker Security Report: Spotlight on security for national aid workers: Issues and Perspectives*, which reports that, national staff are more vulnerable to attack because they are more exposed given that they are “out in the field, travelling by road” and “living without additional security precautions at home” (p. 11).

The section on “The Impacts of Security Costs on Humanitarian Services” reveals that the costs of funding additional security measures has a great impact on service delivery. Participants revealed that the increased costs associated with security had initially been absorbed mainly by the UNHCR, but that the process of dispersing the added costs was part of the new strategy at Dadaab. In addition, it was revealed that the scarcity of police escorts led to disputes among humanitarian organizations over who would get access to such services at any given time. Organizations that were able to afford the additional costs, and barter for such security services, would be seen to be taking it from others, and to be frustrating a coordinated delivery of services.

The section on “Remote Management and Operation Continuity Plan” revealed that remote management is widely viewed as highly problematic. Many participants described “remote management” as just another way of describing the transfer of risk to local and national staff. They argued that “remote management” made it difficult to monitor programs and services, added costs to service delivery, and generally reduced the quality

of services. However, many participants recognized that, in times of heightened insecurity, “remote management” was an appropriate course of action in order to continue the delivery of services. This resonates with Duffield’s (2011) observation that “the growth of uncertainty following the dismantling of system-wide attempts to negotiate humanitarian access is driving experimentation with techniques of remote management, new forms of subcontracting and the employment of private security (p. 484). The Operation Continuity Plan relies on this logic.

Participants described the OCP as being motivated by the security incidents at Dadaab. They chose to understand the OCP as an opportunity to re-organize the “dependency machine” at Dadaab by examining how services were delivered and determining which services could be easily delivered by the refugee community. Participants also reported that the OCP effectively worked to reduce the number of UNHCR implementing partners, and that this decision was largely based on the willingness of organizations to accept risk. This finding is supported by other research that outlines the coordinating role of the UNHCR. According to Mommers and van Wessel (2009), the relationship between NGOs and the UNHCR was crucial for NGOs, “not only in terms of being able to do their jobs, but also in terms of being allowed to do them.” As the coordinator and funder in a web of bilateral relationships, the UNHCHR is in the business of “legitimizing” its partners. (p.166). This finding resonates with Duffield’s (2011) observation that, current humanitarian aid delivery strategies reflect “the inevitable migration of resilience thinking from beneficiaries to aid workers” (p. 485). In general, the security strategies, policies and trainings evidenced in this study all reflect this new “how to stay” approach to aid delivery in insecure environments. The details suggest that those who stay are organizations that accept the risks and the individual who stay are more likely to be local and national workers.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 Overview

In my research with the interviewees in Nairobi, and by “taking direction” from aid workers, my study helps to fill what Michael Barnett (2008) calls an “ironic lacuna” in humanitarian scholarship, which typically limits itself to system-level analysis (p. 284). While this study has not abandoned a system-level analysis, it has focused primarily on aid workers themselves. The approach has yielded a wealth of thought-provoking data that should be considered in future research projects.

My study has arrived at a variety of relevant findings at the operational level. Attending to the security concerns of aid workers and to the response to those concerns, it documents the coordinated system of responsive security initiatives, and explores their impact on the delivery of humanitarian services to the camps. This final chapter presents the key operational findings from the semi-structured interviews and discusses some of their implications for the theoretical debates concerning the securitization of aid.

7.2 Security and Aid Delivery in Practice

Humanitarian aid workers at the Dadaab camps perceive security as a major concern at the operational, organizational and managerial level. As demonstrated by all of the interviews, security pervades all aspects of aid delivery in camps. Aid workers at Dadaab face a gamut of risks and have a variety of security concerns. Financially motivated individuals and criminal networks are not dissuaded by organizations that claim to be politically neutral. They have perpetrated the kidnappings of aid workers at Dadaab, and these kidnappings have been used as part of the justification of the Kenyan invasion of Somalia. In the minds of aid workers, the invasion caused the deterioration of security at the camps since militants continue to attack their police escorts with improvised explosive devices. These findings resonate with existing research, which suggests kidnapping represents the biggest security risk for aid workers worldwide.

At Dadaab the various security concerns have translated into a heavy investment in security training and policy and have conditioned the circumstances under which aid can be delivered. Overall the response to a variety of security concerns at Dadaab has been to

increase the securitization of aid delivery in the camps. My study has demonstrated that even after humanitarian workers have been directly targeted by violent criminal actors, they continue delivering “life-saving services.” Their vulnerability to various forms of violence justifies the securitization of aid and the suspension of principles of neutrality and impartiality, and the militarization of its delivery. One of the main findings in the study is that aid workers consistently ranked security as the most significant issue at the camp, and they justified organizational security strategies at the operational level as necessary to enable the delivery of all other services. Part of this trend was extensive and pervasive security training, as evidenced by the fact that every single participant had undergone security training. Interestingly, while the majority of participants reported that the security training was effective, many of them reported that the training did not make them feel any safer. Part of the operational securitization strategy at Dadaab was to restrict the movements of white foreign aid workers while continuing to allow national and local aid workers to assume the risks associated with travel to and from the camps. This separation, while a seemingly calculated response to the targeting of white foreign aid workers for kidnapping and ransom, provides a good practical example of the biopolitics of distinguishing and valuing some lives over others. After all, comparatively speaking, refugees, national and local aid workers are not afforded the same range of security options, nor can they expect the same kind of treatment, when they face equally deadly threats on a near daily basis.

The UNHCR coordinates the humanitarian operation at Dadaab. The securitization of aid generates both financial and policy changes that directly impact the delivery of aid to the camps. This study has documented the extensive security procedures and practices that govern the relationship between the refugee community and the humanitarian organizations at the Dadaab camps. One of the major findings in this study is that the majority of the organizations at the Dadaab camps are “implementing partners” of the UNHCR, meaning that they rely on the UN for funding to deliver their programs. As such, while many of the organizations claim to be politically neutral, in fact the entire operation at Dadaab transpires under a political agreement between the Kenyan government and the UN. An equally revealing finding in this study is that despite the seemingly negative connotations attached to the idea of “remote management,” many participants present the

Operation Continuity Plan as an opportunity to re-organize service delivery at Dadaab. Furthermore, for many participants, the OCP provides a prospect for turning the insecurity at Dadaab into a positive change. Whether this hope will be realized is unclear; what is clear is that the OCP integrates the increased costs of funding security procedures into the overall camp management budget and part of this process is selecting implementing partners based on their willingness to accept the risks (and to share the increased security costs) involved with delivering services to the Dadaab camps. The securitization aid at the operational level is now firmly embedded and a normal part of the entire aid delivery system, from choosing partners to coordinated delivery systems. In short, aid delivery at Dadaab has been securitized in daily practice.

7.3 Implications for Securitization Theory and Debates

The implications of this study for the debates on the securitization of aid are brought into focus through an examination of the continuing trend in the humanitarian aid industry for many organizations to separate “life-saving services” from development or rights-based initiatives that engage in the dirty work of politics. This principle is evidenced in the question posed by an MSF worker: “Fighting poverty or something like that, that’s way beyond our reach. We’re like rescue workers on a highway after a car crash. Should [we] stop just because tomorrow there will be another crash?” (as cited by Redfield, 2008, p. 209). The securitization of aid at the operational level unfolds along the same logistical lines. For example, at the Dadaab camps, in times of heightened insecurity, organizations securitize their services and, on occasion, restrict their work to what they deem to be “life-saving.” However, amidst the scramble towards securitizing procedures at the operational level, the challenge remains for humanitarians to identify and prioritize what Redfield (2008) calls “the most serious accidents amid a world-wide pileup” (p. 209). Moreover, organizations’ must decide what risks and threats they’re willing to accept in their effort to provide their services.

When placed in the context of existing theoretical debates and literature on the securitization of aid, the empirical findings in this study have some significant implications. While the securitization of humanitarian aid at the operational level does enable the continuation of life-saving services in insecure environments like Dadaab, it

does not address the root causes of insecurity. When asked how to improve the security of aid workers and thereby increase the delivery of services to refugees, one participant made the connection between camp security and aid worker security very clear:

Improve the security in the camps. Most of the problems are coming from within the camps, which have been neglected from a very long time. The tendency is to focus on the threats to the aid workers, but it is elements from within the camps that do not get discussed. The day-to-day challenges faced by the beneficiaries, including those who work for us as incentive staff, they face this insecurity on a day-to-day basis. They are threatened by a criminal element and even targeted if they are perceived to be close to the authorities. That is never addressed, despite all the SOPs, all the efforts, all the discussions with the government, that is never addressed...there is no magic pill approach there needs to be a systematic approach. (Int.S.7)

More than a decade ago, Jeff Crisp (2002) essentially said the same thing in his comments concerning Dadaab:

The security measures introduced by UNHCR and its partners cannot be expected to resolve the problem of violence in Dadaab. At best, those measures can only help to mitigate the security situation, preventing it from becoming more serious than it otherwise might be. While eminently sensible, it must be emphasized that most of these proposals are essentially designed to address the consequences, rather than the causes, of violence in and around Kenya's refugee camps. (p. 632)

While these similar responses may make these concerns appear simple, in fact achieving a manageable level of security in the Dadaab camps has been a perennial problem. If nothing else, my study demonstrates that the insecurity in the camps is a multi-faceted issue.

It seems clear that the neutral, yet securitized, "life saving" services are not enough for the refugees at Dadaab. This analysis supports an expansive definition of humanitarian aid that does more than "keep alive the 'well-fed dead'" (Barnett, 2012, p. 197). According to Hugo Slim (2002) the "sentimental, depoliticized and frequently paternalistic language of compassion and help" employed by humanitarian organizations constructs the recipients of humanitarian aid as "beneficiaries"— a term that he suggests undermines the very people they're trying to save (p. 5). This "depoliticized" humanitarian aid, however, has value at the operational level. The protracted nature of the situation, however, suggests that being sentenced to a lifetime as a "beneficiary," "refugee," or "victim," though not as damaging as being labeled a "threat," still contributes to an overly paternalistic

humanitarian response. While paternalism is not inherently negative it can work to sustain inequality among people, and eases their transition from “victim” to “threat” in times of heightened insecurity. In the Dadaab context it helps to legitimize separating the security of those who live in the camps from the security of international aid workers who provide service to them. Operational findings in this study demonstrate that making this separation is detrimental to the security of both aid workers, and the people who live in the Dadaab camps. In short, Dadaab is a dangerous place for everyone.

While humanitarian organizations may believe themselves to be politically neutral, the fact that they have to prioritize one human crisis over any other involves them in an inherently political, and particularly biopolitical, process. As Peter Redfield (2008) notes, “in this sense the humanitarian worldview is thoroughly biopolitical, even in its oppositional form” (p. 201). To be clear, this selection process entails that choosing to deliver services in one context requires that another be “sacrificed.” This means, among other things, that the securitization of aid at the global level is fully imbricated in the securitization of aid the operational level. A biopolitical analysis raises questions about the interconnectedness of operational and political processes of securitization. More specifically, a biopolitical framework can serve to highlight the connections between international politics and operational procedures; however, it offers no real alternatives to the current processes of securitization. My study has employed a biopolitical framework to explore the operational securitization of humanitarian aid and to place my findings within a broader political context. This approach has yielded a variety of interesting findings, however many questions remain. Most importantly, it suggests that humanitarian organizations are deeply embedded in international political processes and forces a critical analysis of their role in maintaining “underdevelopment.”

Slim (2002) points out that the global humanitarian effort is neither entirely political nor entirely philanthropic (p. 4). The “simplistic” separation of humanitarian aid organizations along these different lines draws attention away from the common ground on which a more comprehensive humanitarian aid industry could be organized. For example Fiona Terry argues, at the operational level, neutrality should be considered, as little more than a “tool” used by aid organizations “to get access to people most in need of assistance” (TEDxTalks, 2011). Likewise, aid organizations need to be cognizant of the

fact that foreign governments can and do use humanitarian organizations as the instruments of securitization on a global scale.

The “new humanitarianism” has been known to pursue a new politically activist agenda that no longer presumes the political neutrality that aid work has long touted. However unwittingly, the development-security nexus has provided the justification for this transition. In other words, it could be argued that the motivation and rationalization for humanitarian aid delivery stem from a neoliberal urge to protect the status quo from the threat of ‘underdevelopment.’ In this pursuit, the securitization of aid is the ultimate biopolitical instrument: it allows aid to be delivered to potentially destabilizing political environments such as refugee camps. Although theoretical explanations of the securitization of aid can work to validate a biopolitical analysis, they do not explain why humanitarian aid workers at Dadaab believe, and continue to promote, the humanitarian principle of neutrality while at the same time recognizing that its protective capacities are limited. Furthermore, aid workers face a variety of deadly risks and these threats necessitates appropriate security responses. While this does not discount the significance of theoretical arguments that portray the negative impacts of securitized humanitarian responses, it certainly reinforces the need for context specific analysis and measured responses.

With respect to the situation at the Dadaab refugee camps, my study illustrates the following: the UNHCR, which is funded primarily by national governments and transnational organizations, dictates where the humanitarian effort will be exerted and which populations are marked for securitization. The more than 20 years of political limbo experienced by Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps throws into relief the extent to which the humanitarian effort is basically dealing with “bare life,” offering these people little chance at anything other than charitable solutions. While many organizations are involved in delivering development oriented services such as education, the inability to effectively address the root causes of Somali displacement ensure the continued suffering of the refugee population. As Hugo Slim (2002) notes, some organizations might see themselves as political entities advancing a certain philosophy of rights, while others see themselves as just being in the business of saving lives (p. 1). As this study makes clear, the securitization of aid at the largest protracted refugee camp in the world demands

consideration of both of these objectives: it points to the value of remaining critical about the formations of biopower that are at play in aid delivery; at the same time, it highlights the necessity of enabling and supporting the efforts of those who restrict themselves to “saving lives” in a very real sense.

Underlying the circumstances that reduces refugees to bare-life is statelessness and effectively, the absence of social and economic rights that, as Hannah Arendt suggests, is the fate of those without a state from which such rights might be extended and enforced. Also central to their insecurity and disempowerment is systemic poverty, which conditions the very possibility of life chances. As Amartya Sen (2003) points out, “the lack of effective citizenship is also a poverty issue”; moreover, “human security” policy should focus on the “protection of people not borders or territories” (p. 33). Such protection is first and foremost about securing the socio-economic conditions and capacities that enable humans to flourish. Furthermore, the extraordinary and growing gap between the rich and the poor evidenced in countless studies in political economy, create, as David Black (2008) suggests, an “ethical imperative to address the poverty, inequalities and other deprivations that scar a world order of truly unprecedented aggregate wealth and privilege” (p. 54). Social safety nets in the form of rights, insurance and welfare economics work to insulate individuals from the spread of crises and disaster. Moreover, citizens of the global North are calling for even thicker social safety nets, although this safety net is non-existent in the global South. Instead, humanitarian workers are left to fight the symptoms of the world’s most debilitating afflictions, poverty and statelessness. The securitization of aid is not a cure to the violence that is now confronting humanitarian aid workers: unable to address the systemic poverty, and ‘rightlessness’ at the camps, humanitarian organizations are basically in the business of providing band-aid solutions.

Fiona Terry and David Rieff similarly address the securitization of humanitarian aid at the level of foreign policy. As David Rieff (2002) notes, since human rights began to be integrated into the plans of NGOs, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the “rhetoric” and the “policies” of humanitarian NGOs, “the UN system, and Western governments” (p. 322). He argues that this problem is exacerbated by a situation where “few agencies... are in a position to refuse contracts from donors or UN agencies” and that NGOs increasingly see themselves as “subcontractors for major donors” (p. 322).

Likewise, Fiona Terry points to the close proximity of American NGOs to the government that has been notable since the Cold War. As she puts it, “the whole ‘non’ in the non-governmental organization is really a fallacy” (Keenan Lecture, 2008).

While the level of neutrality will vary across different contexts, humanitarian organizations can work to increase their effectiveness by recognizing the inherently political nature of their actions. To do so, they must first acknowledge and sometimes resist their role in securitizing strategies founded on the biopolitical appropriation of established security and development relationships. These tactics of dividing groups and populations into the deserving and the expendable create and sustain distinctions between “victims” and “savages” (Mutua, 2001), typically in the name of protecting the former’s rights and freedoms against the latter. As such, humanitarian organizations are obligated to address the securitization of humanitarian aid at the level of foreign policy, which, through the commandeering of human rights rhetoric, invariably risks reinforcing “a binary view of the world in which the West leads the way and the rest of the globe follows” (Mutua, 2001, p. 245).

There will always be a place for philanthropic life-saving humanitarian services; however, their role should be supplementary to a humanitarian effort that addresses the “structural violence” suffered by millions of people. As Mary Robinson (2005) puts it, “we are challenged in new ways to respond to profound concerns over human security in our world today” (p. 312). In order to establish a comprehensive humanitarian response, organizations must collectively acknowledge, as Black (2006) points out, that by “‘securitizing’ a wide range of global dangers,” human security “opens the door to their being constructed as ‘threats’ and thereby gives license to a much more permissive approach to the application of force by those in a position to use it” (p. 59). While the use of force is not easily perceived in the humanitarian effort at Dadaab, the securitization strategies of humanitarian organizations that govern the delivery of services to the camps is evidence of a highly politicized and forceful humanitarian system. This is not to say that humanitarian workers are not responding to legitimate security concerns, instead the point is to highlight that the people living in the Dadaab camps have been securitized in a camp for a generation. As Margaret Denike (2008) points out the manipulation and securitization of humanitarian efforts can work to limit what “‘human rights’ and

‘humanitarian concerns’ can and do mean, particularly for those vast sectors of ‘humanity’ that are not counted as ‘human’ and that have engaged in generations of struggles to obtain them” (p. 116). A generational struggle to be recognized and counted as human is surely taking place at the Dadaab camps, and the duration of this struggle appears to support the depressive analyses of Duffield, Agamben and Arendt.

The impacts of the recent insecurity at Dadaab provide a salient example of the relevance of a biopolitical framework. While white foreign aid workers, myself included, were denied access to the camps, people in the camps, *as refugees*, remained excluded from all communities in the West. The fact that white foreign aid workers are more likely to be targeted for kidnapping is used to legitimize the differential treatment of surplus populations, and to justify the biopolitical urge to ‘protect’ vulnerable workers against the ‘foreign’ threat. More specifically, both kidnappers and aid organizations are reacting to the biopolitical economy which values, in economic terms, one life over another. Likewise, in biopolitical terms, the Dadaab camp itself functions to protect the international community from the perceived threats associated with the spontaneous migration of a sizeable Somali population. Moreover, the impact of a kidnapping on the delivery of humanitarian services can have deadly consequences for the refugee population. Nonetheless, the humanitarian effort at Dadaab is amazing in terms of its ability to deliver life-saving services, in spite of chronic insecurity. Furthermore, humanitarian aid is inevitably part of a political process, and this reality will continue to frustrate the delivery of assistance to conflict areas.

To appreciate the context of the securitization of aid, we need to reflect on the criticisms leveled against decisions to withdraw, or never start, the delivery of humanitarian aid services in emergency environments. While the reflexive powers of a biopolitical framework go to the core of the humanitarian effort, the testimonials of the humanitarian aid workers interviewed in this study demonstrate that the humanitarian ideal remains firmly intact. The fact remains that humanitarian aid workers are themselves at the mercy of overreaching political structures that govern their collective action and can also distort truly humanitarian motivations.

A biopolitical framework raises many questions about the complicity of the

humanitarian industry in the political securitization of surplus populations; however, it does not provide workable solutions to the issues it raises. As aid continues to be delivered in dangerous environments, the securitization of humanitarian aid will continue to provide an alternative to program closures. The biopolitical framework can help humanitarian organizations recognize that securitization procedures can also become synonymous with the instrumentalization of their collective actions. To combat their instrumentalization, humanitarian organizations can adopt reflexive approaches that question the extent to which aid is working to prolong conflict and suffering in any given context. As the situation in Somalia continues to produce victims, including among humanitarian workers, the decisions that allow humanitarian aid to continue to be delivered at Dadaab reflect the complexity of this reflective process. Moreover, in my view, the violence in Somalia serves to reinforce the need for the sanctuary, however, limited, that is provided by the Dadaab refugee camp and the aid workers who labour to maintain it. Cooperation between humanitarian aid workers, security professionals, and academics presents an opportunity to address on-going humanitarian crises in an area where withdrawing humanitarian services costs people their lives. Failure to address the political structures that frame international humanitarian responses on the ground ensures the continuation of necessary band-aid solutions.

7. 4 Next Steps

The securitization of humanitarian aid delivery at the Dadaab refugee camp provides significant evidence for the broader thesis concerning the instrumentalization of humanitarian aid. Ideally this case study would benefit from comparative analyses with other refugee camps (Terry 2002, Lischer, 2006). Each and every refugee camp has its own particular historical, cultural, and political context, and some refugee camps have significantly higher security and risk profiles. The choice of Dadaab as the research site was, in part, based on this security issue, and therefore, it may or may not be representative of many other refugee camps and aid delivery practices.

The importance of Dadaab as the largest refugee camp in Africa does provide strong empirical evidence of the growing significance and influence of security or insecurity as a problematic factor in the delivery of humanitarian aid in high-risk environments. Ideally, as security-oriented refugee camp studies emerge in the future, it

will be possible to situate the Dadaab experience in similar contexts. Comparative analyses of different refugee contexts will facilitate a more accurate assessment of the uniqueness of the Dadaab site.

Further research that focuses specifically on key aspects of the humanitarian effort at the Dadaab camps would also be valuable. Exploring the complex relationships between donors, organizations, aid workers, security professionals, host communities and aid recipients would provide interesting and useful knowledge to the field of aid securitization. Moreover, accessing the camps themselves and attaining interviews with refugee workers would provide balance to research data included in this study.

REFERENCES

- Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life*. CA: Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, G. (2000). *Means without end: Notes on politics*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Agamben, G. (2005). *State of Exception*. CH: Chicago Press.
- Anderson, M., & Woodrow, P. (1989). Rising from the ashes: Disaster response towards development. Boulder: Westview.
- Acharya, A. (2001). Human security: East versus west. *International Journal*, 56(3), 442-460.
- Arendt, H. (1994). *The origins of totalitarianism*. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc. (Original work published in 1948).
- Arendt, H. (1943). We refugees. *Menorah Journal*, 31(1), 69-77.
- Axworthy, L. (1997). Canada and human security: The need for leadership. *International Journal*, 52(2), 183-196.
- Barnett, M. (2011). *Empire of Humanity: A history of Humanitarianism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Barnett, M., & Weiss, T. (2008). Humanitarianism: A brief history of the present. In M. Barnett & T. Weiss (Eds.), *Humanitarianism in question: Politics, power, ethics* (pp. 1-48). Cornell University Press: Ithaca.
- Bellamy, A. (2010). Humanitarian Intervention. In A Collins (Ed.), *Contemporary security studies*. (360-377). Oxford: University of Oxford Press.
- Berger, P., & Luckman, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Garden City, N.Y: Anchor Books.
- Black, D. (2006). Mapping the interplay of human security practice and debates: The Canadian experience. *A decade of human security: Global governance and new multilateralisms*. In S., Maclean, D., Black., & T Shaw. (Eds.), (pp. 53-62) England: Ashgate Publishing.
- Bollettino, V. (2008). Understanding the security management practices of humanitarian organizations. *Disasters*, 32(2), (pp. 263-279).

- Bortolotti, D. (2004). *Hope in hell: Inside the world of doctors without borders*. Richmond Hill: Firefly Books.
- Bosold, D & Werthes, S. (2005). Human security in practice: Canadian and Japanese experience. *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft/International Politics and Society*, p. 84-101
- Bradbury, M. (1998). Normalising the crisis in Africa. *Disasters*, 22(4), (pp. 328-338).
- Bradbury, M., & Macrae, J. (1998). Aid in the twilight zone: A critical analysis of humanitarian-development aid linkages in situations of chronic instability, UNICEF. Retrieved from http://pdf2.hegoa.efaber.net/entry/content/622/1_Tackling_Transition.pdf
- Buzan, B., Waever, O., & deWilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. London: Lynn Rienner Publishers. (Original work published in 1997).
- Foucault, M. (1978). *The history of sexuality: Volume 1 an introduction*. Vintage: NY. (Original work published in 1976).
- Foucault, M. (2003). *Society must be defended: Lectures at the college de France 1975-1976*. M. Bertani & A. Fontana (Eds.). D, Macey, Trans.). NY: Picador. (Original work published in 1997).
- Campbell, D. (2005). The Biopolitics of security: Oil, empire, and the Sports utility vehicle', *American Quarterly*, 57(3), 943–972.
- Castles, S. (2003). Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation." *Sociology*, 37, 13-34.
- Commission of the European Communities. (1996). Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LLRD). Retrieved from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0153:FIN:EN:PDF>
- Crisp, J. (2000). A state of insecurity: the political economy of violence in Kenya's refugee camps, *African Affairs*, 99, p. 601-632.
- Dean, M. & Henman, P. (2004). Governing society today: Editors introduction, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 29(5), 483–494.
- Dalby, S. (2005). Political space: Autonomy, Liberalism, and empire. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 30(4), 415–441.

- DeLarrinaga & Doucet, M. (2008). Biopolitics and the sovereign power of human security. *Security Dialogue*, 39, 517-537.
- Deng, F.M. (1996). *Sovereignty as responsibility: conflict management in Africa*, Washington: Brookings institution
- Denike, M. 2008. The human rights of others: sovereignty, legitimacy, and 'just causes' for the war on terror. *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*, 23(2), 95-121.
- Duffield, M. (2001). *Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and Security*. Zed Books Ltd, London
- Duffield, M., & Waddell, N. (2004). 'Human security and global danger: Exploring a governmental assemblage', *Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster*. Retrieved from www.bond.org.uk/pubs/gsd/duffield.pdf
- Duffield, M., & Waddell, N. (2006). Securing humans in a dangerous World. *International Politics*, 43(1), 1–23.
- Duffield, M. (2007). *Development security and unending war: Governing the world of peoples*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Duffield, M. (2010). Risk management and the fortified aid compound: Every-day life in post-interventionary society. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 4, 453-474.
- Duffield, M. (2012). Challenging environments: danger, resilience and the aid industry, *Security Dialogue*, 43, 475-492.
- Eckroth, K. (2010). The protection of aid workers: principled protection and humanitarian security in Darfur, *The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*.
- Egeland, J. (2004). Humanitarianism under fire, *Christian Science Monitor*, retrieved from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0805/p09s01-coop.html>
- Egeland, J., Harmer, A., & Stoddard, A. (2011). *To stay and deliver: Good practice for humanitarians in complex security environments*. Organization for the Cooperation of Humanitarian Affairs. Retrieved from https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Stay_and_Deliver.pdf
- Fast, L. (2010). Mind the gap: Documenting and explaining violence against aid workers. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16, 365-389.
- Fast, L. (2007). Characteristics, context and risk: NGO insecurity in conflict zones. *Disasters*, 31(2), 130-154.

- Fassin, D., & Pandolfi, M. (2010). *Contemporary states of emergency*. Zone Books.
- Fearon, J. (2008). The rise of emergency relief aid. In M. Barnett & T. Weiss (Eds.), *Humanitarianism in question: Politics, power, ethics* (pp. 49-72). Cornell University Press: Ithaca
- Fraser, N. (2003). 'From discipline to flexibilization? Rereading Foucault in the shadow of globalization', *Constellations* 10(2), 160–171.
- Fukuda-Parr, S. (2010). Poverty and violent conflict: rethinking development. In Necla Tschirgi, Michael Lund & Francesco Mancini (Eds.), *Security and development: searching for critical connections* (17-45). Colorado: Lynne Rienner Inc.
- Hammerstad, A. (2010). UNHCR and the securitization of forced migration. In Betts, A., & Loescher, G. (Eds), *Refugees in international relations*: Oxford Univ Pr.
- Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Helton, A. (2002a). Rescuing the refugees. *Foreign Affairs*, 81(2), 71-82.
- Helton, A. (2002b). The price of indifference: Refugees and humanitarian action in the new century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffman, P., & Weiss, T. (2008). Humanitarianism and practitioners: social science matters. In M. Barnett & T. Weiss (Eds.), *Humanitarianism in question: Politics, power, ethics* (pp. 264-285). Ithaca: Cornell Univ Pr.
- Ignatieff, M. (2002a). Intervention and state failure. *Dissent*, 49 (1), 114-123.
- Ignatieff, M. (2003). State failure and nation-building. In J.L Holzgrafe & Robert Keohane (Eds.), *Humanitarian intervention: Ethical, legal, and political dilemmas* (pp. 321).
- International Peace Academy (IPA). (2006). The security-development nexus: research findings and policy implications, *International Peace Academy*, New York
- Kaldor, Mary. (2006). *New and old wars: organized violence in a global era*. CA: Polity press
- KeenanEthics. (2008). Fiona Terry: Doing good and doing harm, the paradox of humanitarian action. Retrieved October 7, 2012, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TUHyux1PEf8>
- Kenya Red Cross. (2012). KRCS to Improve upon Sanitation in Daadab IFO2 West. Retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/node/479137>

- King, D. (2002a) Chronology of humanitarian aid workers killed in 1997–2001. UN OCHA, Retrieved from
- King, D. (2002b) Paying the ultimate price: An analysis of aid-worker fatalities. *Humanitarian Exchange*, July, 15–16.
- King, D. (2002c) Paying the ultimate price: Analysis of the deaths of humanitarian aid workers (1997–2001). UN OCHA, 15 January.
- King, D. (2004) *The Year of Living Dangerously: Attacks on Humanitarian Workers in 2003*. Washington, DC: Humanitarian Information Unit, US Department of State.
- Kitsuse, John., & Spector, Malcom. (1987). *Constructing Social Problems*. Hawthorne, N.Y: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Lemke, T. (2011). *Bio-politics: An advanced introduction*. NY: New York University Press.
- Loescher, M., Milner, J. (2005). *Protracted refugee situations: Domestic and n international security implications*. London: Routledge.
- Lischer, S. (2005). *Dangerous sanctuaries: Refugee camps, civil war, and humanitarian aid*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
- MacFarlane, S. N., & Khong, Y. F. (2006). *Human security and the united nations* Indiana: Univ Pr.
- Makaremi, Chowra. (2010). Utopias of power: from human security to the responsibility to protect. In D. Fassin and M. Pandolfi (Eds.), *Contemporary states of emergency: the politics of military and humanitarian intervention* (107-127). Zone Books: New York
- Merlingen, M. (2003). ‘Governmentality: towards a Foucauldian framework for the study of IGOs’, cooperation and conflict, *Journal of Nordic International Studies Association* 38(4), 361–384.
- Mommers, C., & van Wessel, M. (2009). Structures, values, and interaction in field-level partnerships: the case of UNHCR and NGOs. *Development in Practice*, 19 (2) 160-172.
- Moyo, D. (2009). *Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa* Farrar Straus & Giroux.
- Murphy, C. (2007). Securitizing Canadian policing: A new policing paradigm for the post 9/11 security state? *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 32(4), 449-475.

- Mutua, M. (2001). Savages, victims, and saviors: The metaphor of human rights, *Harvard International Law Journal*, 42, 201-245.
- Ogata, S., & Sen, A. (2003). *Human security now*. Retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA50C6907C1256D19006A9353-chs-security-may03.pdf>
- Orbinski, J. (2009). An imperfect offering: Humanitarian action in the twenty first century. Anchor Canada. (Original work published 2008).
- Paris, R. (2001). Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air? *International Security*, 26(2), 87- 102.
- Rashid, A. (2000). Taliban, Islam, oil, and the new great game in central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Redfield, P. (2008). Sacrifice, triage, and global humanitarianism. In M. Barnett & T. Weiss (Eds.), *Humanitarianism in question: Politics, power, ethics* (pp. 196-234). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Reid, J. (2004). 'War, liberalism, and modernity: The biopolitical provocations of "emmpire"', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17(1), 63–79.
- Reiff, David. (2003). *A bed for the night: humanitarianism in question*. NY:Simon and Schuster, Inc. (Original work published in 2002).
- Robinson, Mary. (2005). Connecting human rights, human development and human security. *Human Rights in the 'war on terror'*. In Richard Ashby Wilson (Ed.), *Human Rights in the 'war on terror'* (308-316).
- Roth, S. (2011). Dealing with Danger: Risk and Security in the Everyday Lives of Aid Workers. In Fechter, A., & Hindman, H. (Eds.), *Inside the everyday lives of development workers: The Challenges and Futures of Aidland*. Kumarian Press.
- Schmeidl, S. (2002). Human security dilemmas: Long-term implications of the Afghan refugee crisis. *Third World Quarterly*, 23(1), 7-29.
- Senellart, Michel. (2007). *Michel Foucault: Security, Territory, Population*
- Sheik, M., Gutierrez., Bolton, P., Spiegel, P., Thieren, M., & Burnham, G. (2000). Deaths among humanitarian workers. *British Medical Journal*, 321, 166-168.
- Singer, P. (2003). *Corporate warriors: The rise of the privatized military industry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Singer, P. (2006). Humanitarian principles, private military agents: some implications of the privatized military industry for the humanitarian community. In V. Wheeler &

- A. Harmer (Eds.), *Resetting the rules of engagement: trends and issues in military humanitarian-humanitarian relations*. Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Retrieved from <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/273.pdf>
- Spearin, C. (2008). Private, armed and humanitarian? States, NGOs, international private security companies and shifting humanitarianism. *Security Dialogue*, 39, 363-382.
- Slim, H. (2002). Not philanthropy but rights: The proper politicisation of humanitarian philosophy. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 6, 1-22.
- Stoddard, A., Harmer A., & Haver, K. (2006). *Providing aid in insecure environments: trends in policy and operations*. Humanitarian Policy Group Report No.23, September 2006. UK: Overseas Development Institute.
- Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., DiDomenico, V. (2009). *Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 Update. Trends in violence against aid workers and the operational response*. Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief 34, April. 2009. UK: Overseas Development Institute.
- Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., & Renouf, J. (2010). Once removed: Lessons and challenges in remote management of humanitarian operations in insecure areas. Humanitarian Outcomes. Retrieved from <https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/RemoteManagementApr2010.pdf>
- Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., & Haver, K. (2011). Aid worker security report 2011: Spotlight on security for national aid workers: Issues and perspectives. Humanitarian Outcomes. Retrieved from: <https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/AidWorkerSecurityReport2011.pdf>
- Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., & Hughes, M. (2012). Aid worker security report: Host states and their impact on security for humanitarian operations. Humanitarian Outcomes. Retrieved from <http://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/resources/AidWorkerSecurityReport20126.pdf>
- Taureck, Rita. (2006). Securitization theory and securitization studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9(1), 53-61.
- TEDxTalks. (2011). Fiona Terry: The paradox of humanitarian aid. Retrieved October 7, 2012, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J45cWdDEbm0>
- Terry, F. (2002). *Condemned to repeat?: The paradox of humanitarian action*. Cornell: Univ Pr.

- Thomas, C. (2001). Global governance, development and human security: Exploring the links. *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2), 159-175.
- UCtelevision. (2008, June 12). *Conversations with History: Sadaka Ogata*. Retrieved October 7, 2012, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1e4RwLjD7U>
- United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations and statute of the international court of justice. Retrieved from <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf>
- UN. (2006). *United Nations Field Security Handbook. System-wide Arrangements for the Protection of United Nations Personnel and Property in the Field*. Effective January 2006.
- UN. (2007). *Inter-organizational security measures: Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System*. United Nations. Department of Safety and Security. Office of the Under-Secretary-General. Interoffice Memorandum.
- UN (2009). *Annex C. Policy for United Nations Minimum Operating Security Standards*.
- UN. (2011). Chapter 4. Security Management. *United Nations Security Management System. Security Policy Manual*. New York, NY: United Nations Department of Safety and Security, UNDSS.
- United Nations Development Program. (1994). *The Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*. Retrieved from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/>
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (1999). The year in review. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d4d6615.html>
- UNHCR. (2007). *UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies*. Third Edition. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- UNHCR. (2011). *UNHCR Manual on Security of Persons of Concerns*. Retrieved from <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f6313032.html>
- UNHCR. (2011). Global trends 2011: a year in crisis. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html>
- UNHCR. (2012). Sadaka Ogata (Japan) 1990-2000. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0a2a6.html>
- UNHCR. (2012). Dadaab – World’s biggest refugee camp 20 years old. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/4f439dbb9.html>

- Vaux, T., Seiple, C., Nakano, G., & VanBraban, K. (2001). Humanitarian action and private security companies: opening the debate. *International Alert*. Retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-action-and-private-security-companies>.
- VanBrabant, K. (2001). Mainstreaming the organizational management of safety and security: A review of aid agency practices and a guide for management. *Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute*.
- VanHouten, P. (2007). The World Bank's (post-)conflict agenda: the challenge of integrating development and security. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20(4), 639-657.
- Humanitarian Practice Network. (2010). *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments*. Humanitarian Practice Network Good Practice Review Number 8 (New edition). December 2010. UK: Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/documents%2FGPR%5F8%5FRevised2%2Epdf>
- Vaughn, J. (2009). The unlikely securitizer: humanitarian organizations and the securitization of indistinctiveness. *Security Dialogue*, 40, 263-285.
- Watson, S. (2011). The human as referent object? :Humanitarianism as securitization. *Security Dialogue*, 42(3), pp. 3-20.
- Weiss, T. (2003). Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action. In A, Lang (Ed), *Just Intervention* (p. 202-225). US: Georgetown University Press.
- Williams, S. (2011). Famine in Africa: inside Dadaab, the world's largest refugee camp. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/sally-williams/8762161/Famine-in-Africa-inside-Dadaab-the-worlds-largest-refugee-camp.html>
- World Bank. (2011). World development report: conflict security and development. Retrieved from http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Complete%202011%20WDR%20Conflict,Security%20and%20Development_0.pdf
- Zanotti, L. (2005). Governmentalizing the post-Cold War international regime: The UN debate on Democratization and good Governance', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 30(4), 416-487

APPENDIX A Interview Questions

Introduction

1. Gender:
2. Age:
3. Educational and work related experience:
4. Position title:
5. Time in the camp:
6. Nationality:
7. Race:

Individual and organizational decision making questions:

1. What is the general purpose/mission of your organization?
2. What is your position/responsibilities in the camp?
3. Why is your organization in the camp?
4. What factors were influential in making the decision to come to the camp?
5. What specific services does your organization provide to the camp?
6. Did security concerns impact your decision to come to the camp (personally/organizationally)?

Security Concerns:

1. What are the general security concerns at the Dadaab camps?
2. Does your organization have any specific security concerns?
3. What security issues is your organization most concerned about?
4. Are there any special gender related security concerns?
5. What is unique about Dadaab in terms of security concerns?

Security Responses:

1. Does your organization have,
 - Security policies or philosophies? (If yes can I access them?)
 - Special security procedures? (formal or informal)
 - Security training? (If yes, who provides it and what does it consist of?)
 - Established security protocols or technology?
 - Why are the procedures necessary
2. How does your organization identify security concerns? (risk analysis)
3. Are you aware of the UN security protocols?
4. Does your organization comply with UN security protocols?
5. Does your organization engage private security, in the camp or otherwise?
6. What security relationships does your organization have with the following,
 - Kenyan government
 - Police
 - Other humanitarian organizations
 - Host and refugee community
7. Who is ultimately responsible for maintaining the overall security in the camps?
8. How has the security environment changed at Dadaab and do you feel the security training is effective?

Impacts of Security Risks and Responses:

1. How do security partnerships or relationships impact your organizations ability to appear politically neutral?
2. In what ways do you think that security concerns and affect the delivery of services in the camp?

3. Do you think the nature/particular type of services your provide affect your security in any way?
4. How do security concerns and responses impact the effectiveness/efficiency of your programs and services?
5. Do you think that security concerns and strategies add to the cost of assistance/service delivery to the individuals in the camp in any way? (If so, how and why?)
6. Does security have any impact on your organizations ability to recruit, deploy or maintain aid workers? (If so, how an why?)
7. Under what circumstances do you think your organization would withdraw their services?
8. How does security rank in relation to other issues/services in the camp?
9. What can be done to improve security in the camps?